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Ukrainian Banking System: After the Perfect Storm Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015 Yaroslav Sovgyra, Associate Managing Director, Financial Institutions Group

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Page 1: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking System: After the Perfect Storm

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Yaroslav Sovgyra, Associate Managing Director, Financial Institutions Group

Page 2: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

‹#›Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Agenda

1. Ukraine on Moody’s rating scale

2. Operating environment

3. Banking system outlook

Page 3: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

‹#›Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Agenda

Ukraine on Moody’s rating scale1

Operating environment2Banking system outlook3

Page 4: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

‹#›Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Ukraine on Moody’s Rating Scale1

Page 5: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015 5

Ukraine’s Sovereign Rating is Ca

» Local currency bond and deposit ceilings are Caa2 » Foreign currency bond ceiling is Caa3, deposit ceiling is Ca

LT Issuer Rating (Domestic)

Ca

Page 6: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Sovereigns Rated Caa1 - C

» There are currently 8 sovereigns rated by Moody’s Caa-Ca

Rating Sovereign

B3 Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Honduras, Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan

Caa1 Belarus Argentina (LC) – unresolved 2002 default on government debt

Caa2 Cuba – unresolved 1986 default on government debt Jamaica – distressed deb exchange in 2013 Belize – distressed debt exchange in 2013 Caa3 Greece, Venezuela

Ca Ukraine – in default until debt exchange is completed

c none

Page 7: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Ukraine Will Rely on IMF’s Support as Market Access is Likely to Remain Limited

» Moody’s treats Ukraine’s agreed debt restructuring as distressed exchange

» On average, sovereign governments remained out of international capital markets for 5.6 years after default and 4.4 years after final default resolution

» Length of market exclusion was highly correlated with the loss imposed on investors during the debt restructuring

Source: Moody’s Investors Service

Page 8: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Key Rating Drivers of the Sovereign Rating

Credit Strengths

» Substantial natural resources

» Educated and low-wage labor force

Credit Challenges

» Weak external liquidity

» Low institutional quality

» Large contingent liabilities

» High domestic political risks and very high geopolitical risks

Page 9: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

‹#›Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Ukraine’s Rating Factors

Government Bond Rating Range

Government Financial Strength

Caa2 - C

Economic Resiliency

Institutional Strength Fiscal Strength Susceptibility to

Event Risk

Very High (+)

Very Low (-)

Very Low (-)

Economic Strength

Very Low (+) Very Low (-) Very Low (+)

Factor Score Assessments and Indicative Rating Range

Page 10: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

What Can Change Rating Up / Down

An upgrade would likely require » Improvements in its external liquidity position » Positive policy track record of structural reforms » Improved economic growth prospects and » Positive debt dynamics

Moody’s would downgrade Ukraine's rating if bond holders were to incur higher losses than what is captured by the Ca rating as a result of the planned debt restructuring, or any other default by the government

Page 11: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

‹#›Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Operating Environment3

Page 12: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015 12

GDP Contraction

» Ukrainian economy has not recovered from 2008-09 crisis and was double hit by the new economic, financial and political crisis

» Real GDP contracted 6.8% in 2014 and 15.8% in 1H2015 » Moody’s estimates GDP decline of 7.5% in 2015 and 2.0% in 2016

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

-30%

-21%

-12%

-3%

6%

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

GDP growth, YoY GDP growth, 2008=100%

79.1%80.8%

87.3%

93.7%93.7%93.5%

88.7%85.2%

100.0%100.0%

85.2%88.7%

93.5% 93.7% 93.7%

87.3%

80.8%79.1%

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Moody’s forecast

Page 13: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015 13

High Inflation

» Ukraine’s economic downturn partly reflects the erosion of the purchasing power of households as a consequence of rising inflation, in turn due to ▪ the depreciation of the hryvnia and ▪ hike in administered prices

Inflation

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

22%

12%9%

5%

-0% 1%

25%

36%

18%

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Moody’s forecast

Page 14: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 201514

Local Currency Depreciation

» The UAH lost more than 60% if its value and remains highly vulnerable to further volatility:

▪ falling exports -> the supply of FX on the market is scarce

▪ NBU's FX reserves remain depleted

UA

H p

er 1

US

$

0

10

20

30

40

US

$ bi

llion

- 0

6

12

18

24

YE2011 Jun-12 YE2012 Jun-13 YE2013 Mar-14 Jun-14 Sep-14 YE2014 Mar-15 Jun-15

UAH per US$1 (LHS)FX reserves (RHS)Source: National Bank of Ukraine

Page 15: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Ukrainian Banks: Current State and Moody’s Forecasts

15

Page 16: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015 16

Key Drivers for Ukraine’s Negative Banking System OutlookFactor Trend CommentsOperating environment

Deteriorating - Economic contraction will deepen in 2015 and continue in 2016

- Ongoing military conflict in industrial regions

- Sharp hryvnia depreciation and high inflation -> weak internal consumption

Asset quality and capital

Deteriorating - Further erosion of already weak asset quality

- Problem loans will rise to 60% of gross loans in 2015, while NPLs will rise to 40% from 25% - Provisioning needs would completely erode Ukrainian banks' capital

Funding and liquidity

Deteriorating - Deposit outflows until recently

- We expect further distress exchanges to extend maturities

Profitability and efficiency

Deteriorating - Pre-provision profitability will deteriorate because of declines in performing loans

Systemic support

Deteriorating - Ukrainian government has very limited ability at present to provide timely capital support to banks

Page 17: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Performance of Ukrainian Bank’s Core Industries Exposure Will Be Weak in 2015-16

17

Source: National Bank of Ukraine, State Statistical Service of Ukraine, Moody’s Investors Service

Exposure as of 1 April

2015

% total corporate loan book

Foreign currency

denominated

Asset quality trend for 2015-16 Rationale

1Wholesale trading 228,082 25% 52% ↓ Weak internal consumption

2Construction and real 135,600 15% 53% ↓ Weak internal consumption

3 Agriculture 59,027 7% 47% ↔ Stable export and production

4Metals and mining 58,988 7% 84% ↓

Low production and export, production in military conflict

5Food production 56,479 6% 65% ↓

Trading barriers from Russia, limited progress with EU

6 Retail trading

54,577 6% 26% ↓ Weak internal consumption

7Professional services 43,293 5% 30% ↓ Weak internal consumption

8Transportations and

41,287 5% 81% ↓

Weak internal consumption, low foreign trade activities

9Energy and public

33,318 4% 60% ↓ Low production

10 Chemicals 26,800 3% 77% ↓ Low production and export

TOTAL 737,452 82% ↓

Page 18: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Asset Quality Is Weak and Continues to Deteriorate

18

Source: National Bank of Ukraine, Moody’s estimates

40% 40% 37% 35%

45%

60%

15% 14%16%

13%

18%

35%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015F

Problem loans % loans, Moody's est. (LHS) LLR % Loans, Local GAAP (RHS)

» Economic contraction together with sharp LC devaluation weakened borrowers’ ability to service debt. We expect NPLs to increase to 40% at YE2015 and restructured loans to comprise another 20%

» Reported LLR do not cover in full even NPLs, let alone restructured loans

Page 19: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Exposure to FX Risk

19

FX-denominated loans, % of Net loans

0%

18%

35%

53%

70%

State-owned banks Foreign-owned banks Large private banks Rest of the system System-average

53%

32%

43%

67%

56%

37%

23%27%

55%

39%

YE2013 1H2015

» Hryvnia depreciation inflated the value of foreign-currency denominated loans » Revaluation of legacy NPLs in FX call for additional LLR

Source: National Bank of Ukraine, Moody’s estimates

Page 20: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Banks Will Remain Loss-Making in 2015-2016

20

» Ukrainian banks’ earning are eroded by large NPLs (need for LLRs) and high funding costs » Recurring revenues can only absorb additional credit costs of 3% of gross loans

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

State-owned banks Foreign-owned banks Large private banks Rest of the system System average

3.0%2.2%0.4%

4.3%5.5%

22%

11%14%

25%

35%

LLR / Gross loans PPI /Average gross loans

Note: Recurring PPI (Pre-provision income) = Net interest income + Net fee and commission income – Operating expense Source: National Bank of Ukraine, Moody’s Investors Service estimates

Page 21: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Regulatory Capital Adequacy Ratio Under Moody’s Base-Case Scenario

21

Source: National Bank of Ukraine, Moody’s Investors Service estimates

8.4%

2.0%

-13.7%-3.3%

-2.2%

-8.8%

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0 %

5%

10%

15%

Regulatory CAR asat Q1 2015

Retained earningsafter four quarters

Additional LoanLoss Charges

Securities exposureTier 2 amortisation CAR after stress &capital

replenishment

» Our scenario analysis generates a negative capital adequacy ratio sector-wide in a one-year horizon provided all necessary provisions are expensed

Page 22: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Capital Dynamics by Group

22

Note: Net of insolvent banks

Source: National Bank of Ukraine, Moody’s Investors Service estimates

» New capital injections are needed to restore solvency » Private shareholders do not inject much capital

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

Regulatory CAR as at Q1 2015

-0.109

-0.292

0.076

0.107

-0.135

-0.303

0.062

0.106

-0.026

-0.203

0.096

0.0810.005

-0.15

0.054

0.101

state-owned foreign-owned large private system-average

Page 23: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015 23

Liquidity Risks Due to Vulnerability of Deposit-Base

» Contraction of real income capital control contain expansion of customer deposit base

UA

H b

illio

n

-0

200

400

600

800

Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep

Local currency Foreign currencyDevaluation effect

Source: National Bank of Ukraine

Page 24: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 201524

High Reliance on Foreign Currency Wholesale Funding

» Ukrainian banks are locked out of the capital markets and rollover rates are low » Unlike in case of sovereign debt, Oschadbank’s and Ukreximbank’s debt restructuring terms

do not envisage any grace period and therefore no significant pain relief is expected

0%

8%

16%

24%

32%

US

$ bi

llion

- 0

8

15

23

30

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 1H2015

Foreign debtFC Wholesale funding, % Total liabilities…, net of foreign banksSource: National Bank of Ukraine, Moody’s estimates

Page 25: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Liquidity - Sufficient But Depended on NBU Funding

25

Source: National Bank of Ukraine

» Liquid assets are mainly composed cash and equivalents and Ukrainian government bonds

0 %

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

-

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Aug-15

Deposits (LHS) Liquid assets (LHS) Liquid assets % total deposit (RHS) Liquid assets % total assets (RHS)

Page 26: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Government Support: LC Liquidity Supply and Regulatory Forbearance

26

» Capital support

▪ tight budget does not allow the government to participate in recapitalization of banks

▪ IMF support package does envisage any funding for bank recapitalization either

▪ NBU allows banks to breach prudential ratios

» Liquidity support

▪ NBU provides repo facilities against state bonds collateral

▪ the repayment deadline is extended until 2020

▪ various administrative measures - cap on foreign-currency deposit withdrawals, ban on prior-to-

maturity withdrawal of time deposits

Page 27: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Conclusion

27

Banks face highly adverse operating conditions1Asset quality is weak pressured by rapid build-up of new NPLs,

driving up provisioning needs2

3Banks are in need of massive recapitalization; Ukrainian authorities

have limited capacity to support the banking sector4Funding: weak depositors confidence and lack of access to market

funding remain key concerns 5

Banking system is expected to be loss-making both in 2015 and 2016

Page 28: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

‹#›Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

Yaroslav Sovgyra

Tel. +7 495 228 6076

AMD, FIG

[email protected]

Page 29: Ukrainian Banking Sector Outlook 2015-16

Ukrainian Banking Forum, October 2015

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