Congress 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← Congress – July 18, 2011

←← Recap:

American political system has not been a linear progression over

time, but rather a serpentine ebb and flow.

Roger Smith: American political development has had a serpentine

development over time, and that multiple traditions better explain

this ebb and flow over time than would a single tradition.

o Eg. Emancipation

← Practice questions

Federalism is:

o Sep (horizontal) of powers across different institutions within

the same level of governt

o Division (vertical) of powers across multiple levels of

government in which each level enjoys at least some

power independent of others.

o Division powers across multiple levels of govt must be

independent

o None of the above

Smith (1993) argues that:

o American political culture consists of multiple interacting

traditions including liberal democratic thought but also in

egalitarian ideologies

←← Congress

← 1. Basic Facts

Leg branch of US fed govt

Bicameral leg – two chambers

o The House

Members

435 Members

2-year terms

More formalized, and under control of majority party,

than senate

Campaigns less $$ and higher incumbency rate

o The Senates

Senators

100 Members

6-year staggered terms

Confirms presidential appointments

Indirect elections pre-1913

Confirms presidential appointments and ratifies treaties

Campaigns more $ and lower incumbency rate

“Congress” can also refer to a period of time

Relationship between 2 chambers

o Both must pass all laws

o Nominally requires a majority in both chambers

BUT in the Senate often requires 60 out of 100 to head

off a filibuster (i.e. 60 votes needed to use cloture on a

filibuster, down from 67 votes pre-1975)

Check and balances: between branches

o Presidency

Veto bills passed by Congress

Congress can override by 2/3 votes in BOTH houses

Can remove precedence through an impeachment

process

Confirms presidential appointments

o Judiciary

Strike down acts of congress

Senate must confirm judicial appointments

Congress has some control over the structure

Parties

o Majority party controls the leadership positions in the house

House: the Speaker

Senate: Majority Leader

Both Houses: leadership of the committees

o Party caucuses in each chamber choose their own leaders

o Strength of party leaders has ebbed and flowed over time,

centralized now, committee used to be more powerful

o B&W: Leaders can only exercise the powers that their

party members give them”

o Canadian comparison: CDN leaders have greater leverage

over their legislators – much higher party discipline in Canada

than the USA. (eg. Party leaders can refuse to sign

nominations, but party caucuses cannot typically depose their

leaders)

Committees

o Main functions

Scrutinize legislation

Engage in congressional oversight

Arguably also provide credit claiming opportunities for

MCs (Mayhews 1974)

o Power of committees has an inverse relationship to the power

of party leaders

How a Bill becomes Law

o Bill is introduced

o Committee and sub-committee consider bill

o House and Senate consider bill and vote (presented to floor)

o Conference committee resolves any differences between

House and Senate

o Bill passes both houses

o President sign or vetoes the legislation

Agenda control in HOUSE

o Standing committee votes in favour of bill, it’s sent to House

Rules Committee for a rules that sets out how bill will be

considered on floor of House

Open rule: any germane amendments from the floor)

Closed rule: restriction on types of amendments

o These restrictions can have a big effect.

Closed: take it or leave it offer

Open: opportunity for compromise

These restrictive rules are typically not present in the

Senate

o Median voter theorem with closed and open rules, and the

take-it or leave-it approach

← Smith – “Congress, the Troubled Institution:

Main argument: their are 4 interrelated trends in congressional

politics. These trends are undesirable, and can only be reversed by

electing more moderates

1. Party Polarization

o Caused by sorting of both MCs and voters (liberals more likely

to be democrats, conservatives more likely to be republicans)

o Parties are becoming more internally homogenous and pulling

apart over time

o Cause of sorting is as of yet unclear

2. Procedural abuses

o In House: cohesive majority party able to freeze our minority

party

o In Senate: cohesive minority party able to filibuster (or

threaten to filibuster) more effectively

o Consequence: gridlock – things can shoot through the house,

but get stuck in the senate

3. Ceding of congressional power to the president

o Leads to a weakened congress

Crises (e.g. terrorism, Iraq, economy) lead Congress to

delegate powers to president

Weak oversight of George W. Bush presidency when

GOP majority party in Congress

4. The unpopularity of congress

o Approval rating of Congress in the tank. Caused in part by

highly visible scandals, partisanship, and apparent gridlock.

←← What Drives Congress?

What drives congressional decision making? Why do MCs do what

they do?

o 1. General motivation and incentives (Fenno 1973, Mayhew

1974, Hall 1996)

o 2. Constituency (Clinton 2006, Bartels 2008)

o 3. Party (Krehbiel 1993, Ansolabehere et all 2001, Cox and

McCubbins 2005)

o 4. Organized

← Fenno, Richard – Congressmen in Committees

Main arguments:

o 3 basic goals: re-election, influence in House, and make good

public policy

o mix of 3 goals varies across MCs and time

o opportunities to achieve these goals vary across committees

Evidence

o Uses surveys of and interviews with MCs on 6 standing

committees in the 50s and 60s to ID goals of these MCs

o Finds that eg. personal influence is dominant goal of members

to Appropriations Committee while constituency service is

dominant goal of Interior Committee

← Mayhew, David

Main argument: assumes that MCs are primarily interested in

reelections

o From this we should see them take part in 3 activities:

o 1. Advertising 2. Credit claiming 3. Position taking

o Congress in well-suited to allowing members of congress to

get reelected

Typology

o Advertising

Promote name and positive image, but with little

political content

Non political speech, congratulations etc.

o Credit claiming

Generate BELIEF that one is personally responsible for

government doing something good

Often accomplished through delivery of

particularized benefits (pork)

o Position Taking

Public enunciation of a judgmental statement eg. Roll

call vote, policy interview

Consequences of single-minded reelection seeking

o Delay, particularism, servicing of organized interest, symbolic

but unsubstantial legislative action

Evidence

o Largely destructive

Key point – BOTH FENNO AND MAYHEW

o Internal practices

←← Carson and Jenkins: Examining the Electoral Connection

Question: Does Mayhewian electoral incentive apply to previous

congressional eras?

Main argument: yes, four necessary condition for Mayhewian

electoral incentive are present at least as early 1980s

o Ambition

Have to want to get re-elected

Congressional careerism beginning in 1890s

Political ‘leap-frog’ careerism from even earlier

o Autonomy

Development of direct primary election in early 1900s.

Earlier still: could print own ballots – avoided need for

nominations

o Responsiveness

Eg. Rivers and harbours legislation in 1880s

Earlier still use of private bills for pensioners

o Accountability

Evidence: state-generated ballot beginning in 1880s

makes ticket splitting easier

← Hall: Participation in Congress

Puzzle: Why do MCs engage in committee work to produce public

goods for floor when have incentives to free ride on efforts of

others.?

Main argument:

o MCs still decide to act out of some sense of self-interest

(electoral or personal), not because of congressional norms or

socialization.

o 3 types of interest

1. Enhance likelihood of reelection (Mayhew)

2. Pursue their own personal policy preference (Fenno)

3. Prosecute the president’s agenda

Evidence: interviews with MCs staff

←← Constituency

Lots of research on the role of the constituency on the behavior of

MCs

o Similar trends between parties, but difference in actual

placement. Eg. Bartells constituency opinion vs. voting score

← Clinton – Representation in Congress (based on party affiliation)

o Question: To what extent are constituency and partisan

subconsti. Preferences reflected in MCs roll call voting in 106th

House

o Findings

Reps are not completely responsive to the district of the

whole (geographic)

Majority party R. are especially responsive to the prefs

of R constituents and

Minority party D. are most responsive to the

preferences of non-Democratic constituents

Bartels – Unequal Democracy (based on income)

o Question: How has rising economic inequality and increased

role of money in the political process affected who actually

governs the USA

o Finding: late 80s and early 90s, senators were WAY more

responsive to rich constituents than they were to poorer

constituents

Krehbiel – Where’s the Party

o Main Argument: Signigicant party effects are rare

o Correlation-causation problem:

Observes that just because party affiliation is correlated

with voting behaviou does not necessarily mean that

party CAUSED the voting behaviour

o Evidence:

Party behaviour in assignment of members to standing

committees and conference committees. Finds Majority

party status is a weak predictor of committee

assignments

Ansolabehere

o Main arguemnet: BOTH MCs party affiliation andpreferences

do matter

o Evidence: statistical analysis in which MCs preelection

preferences are measured using candidate surveys

o Finding

Party exerted an independent effect on members voting

behaviour in roughly 40% of roll calls taken during 103,

4, 5th congress

Jump seen on graph is called the ‘Party effect’

Cox and McCubbins

o Main Argument: Maj. Party contrls house’s agenda and uses

agenda control to

Block bills that majority of majority party opposes

Promotes bills taht they favour

o Key Assumption

MCs delegate power to their party leaders who take

action to build and maintain a desirable party brand for

re-election purposes

o Evidence

Eg. Committee roll calls

4/5628 bills that the majoirty of the majority party

opposed were reported from the committee to the

floor. (Democratic majority)

←← Summary

General motivations and incentives

o Fenno, Mayhew, Hall

Constituency

o Clinton, Bartels

Party

o Krehbiel, Ansolabehere, Cox and McCubbins

Organized interest – later class

Presidency and Bureaucracy 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← Recap:

Filibuster – West Wing “Stackhouse filibuster”

o Essentially just means that you need 60 votes, not a simple

majority to pass anything in the Senate

Clinton – 1 unit change is more highly related to change in

Republicans in 106 (majority) congress.

o Could this be because Reps are appealing to their base, while

Dems are trying to bring more people into the fold?

Cox and McCubbins

Congressional Committees

o Joint and Conference (from both houses)

←← Main questions

←← Selection

President and VP are only nationally elected offices in fed gov’t

Details of selection process are complex

Not exactly popular vote, but a weighted popular vote (Electoral

College)

← Succession

President

o Vice-president

Speaker of the House

President pro tempore of Senate

Cabinet Secretaries

← Removal

Impeachment

o Treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors

o 2 steps

House votes to impeach

Charged with a crime

Majority vote

Trial in Senate

Can convict and remove by 2/3rds vote

← Powers in three categories

Executive

o Chief administrator

o Appoints heads of civil service depts and ambassadors,

subject to Senate approval

o Commander-in-chief of armed forces

Cannot declare war themselves, but once war has been

declared, the president is in charge

o Empowered to negotiate treaties, subject to Senate approval

Legislative

o State of Union address (weak proposal power)

o VP as tie-breaker vote in Senate

o Executive orders: nominally clarifications of laws already

passed by Congress

To direct civil service to a particular type of action

o Signing statements

Attaches a statement when it signs a bill into the law. A

way where the president can pick and chose which parts

of the law they want to follow

o Presidential veto, subject to congressional override

Judicial

o Appoints federal judges, subject to Senate approval (includes

senatorial courtesy and holds)

The president is expected to consult with the Senators

that the appointment is being made in, and to appoint

someone they like

o Direction of activities of the Justice Dept.

Some leverage over what they choose to litigate,

defend

o Pardoning power

← Historical Evolution

Tradition (Founding to 1930s)

o Relatively weak executive

o Position dwarfed by legislative power of Congress

Modern (1930s to Present)

o Same constitutional powers as during traditional period

o Now greater public expectations, greater role of government

Ebb and Flow of Presidential Power

o Serpent returns

o Considerable delegation of Congressional power to FDR during

Great Depression

o Vietnam War – alleged abuses by president caused Congress

to enact new laws to decrease power of president

o Bush/Cheney seek to revive muscular presidency (theory of

unitary executive, where all executive power is concentrated

in the president)

← Strategy

Persuasion of MCs, state official, etc.

Going public

o Seeks to get what they want from other politicians by

leveraging public support

o Contingent on presidential approval ratings

← Kernell bumpersticker

Act of going public by presidents increased a lot since 50s and 60s

Tension between going public and Neustadts opinion of behind the

scenes bargaining

←← Group discussion

Persuaded:

Can going public/threat be effective

Good or bad thing?

o Bypassing?

Is the public incompetent? Does it matter

←← Presidential Success

Divided government: president is different party than one/both

houses

o Much more successful at having bills that the president

supports passed when government is united (legistlative

program)

←←

← Bureaucracy

Key point: both president and congress compete for control of the

bureaucracy MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM

In the US: certain presidential appts (eg. Heads of departments) are

subject to congressional confirmation, congress holds the purse

strings, congress engages in oversight

In Canada: PM had free hand in appointment of heads of depts.

o This same type of multiple principal problem doesn’t exist in

Canada, where the bureaucracy only has one master

← US Cabinet

15 cabinet level departments

← Executive Office of the President (EOP)

Fed bureaucracy that is under the direct control of the president

Office of Management and Budget

o National Security Council

White House Office

← From Lewis, in Kernell and Smith

Because the president cannot be assured of the loyalty of the

burreaucracy, the president politicizes the burreaucracy

o Career bureaucrats and political appointments

← Moe 1985

Key point: President is driven by expectations gap to pursue

responsive competence (in response to president’s political needs)

How is responsive competence achieved

o central policy making in White House (bring the decision

making power closer to himself)

o appoint officials all over the federal bureaucracy, based on

loyalty, ideology and programmatic support

Rudalevige (2002)

o Centralization is contingent on political environment and

policy

Lewis (2008)

o Politicization hasn’t changed over time, nor with republicans

← Moe 1989

Key point: Federal bureaucracy is not designed to be effective (267)

Underlying logic of Moe’s argument?

Contrast with Canada – should we expect Canadian bureaucracy be

better designed?

o Yes – because we don’t have the issue of multiple principals,

so the PM SHOULD be able to just fix the problem.

← Who is the most powerful chief executive? PM or President

←← Richard Neustadt (1960) – gov’t of separated institutions SHARING

powers

←←←

Judiciary 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← Outstanding questions:

What constitutes a majority in congress?

o IT depends – simple majority of both houses is a quorum

o Sometimes you need a super majority of not just those

present, but of all member

What is a treaty for the purposes of senate approval (while the

same technically, but go through different routes)

o Treaty – approval of the senate

o Executive agreement – just the approval of the president,

does not need the senate

Conference committees – mechanism by which two houses

reconcile – each house only has one vote in the process (decided

upon by the majority of each house)

Iraq war – powers to declare war (congress) vs. exercise way

(president)

o Was a congressional approval of war in 2002

← Recap

Presidency

o Contemporary presidents have high levels of public

expectation, but also have constitutionally limited powers

Incentives to pursue non-traditional strategies

o Competition between presidency and bureaucracy (responsive

competence)

Prompts president to politicize the bureaucracy

Appoint bureaucratic heads who agree with the

president’s agenda

Facilitates inefficient agency processes

← Big questions

What drives judiciary decision making? Why do judges rule as they

do?

Given what we know about what drives decision making Congress

and the courts – who should be making laws? Does it matter?

← Judiciary

Lots of kinds of laws

Laws can come from several different institutions

o Statutory laws

o Administrative laws

o Executive orders

o Judicial decisions

2 separate court systems

o federal courts

powers to fed government in constitution

o state courts

powers reserved for state governments in constitution

State Courts

o Most legal action is at the state level (Barbour and Wright)

o Some variation in structure and selection processes across

the 50 states

o Usually 3 tiers

Court of original jurisdiction

Intermediate courts of appeal

State’s supreme court (decision final, unless entails a

federal question, then can be appealed to federal court

system)

o Selection

Not appointed for life, but elected or appointed for a

certain time period

Judicial elections often means election campaigns

o Face some kind of regular election – 3 common types

Partisan elections

Run with a partisan label

Non partisan elections

Run without partisan labels

Retention elections

Incumbent judge runs for reelection without

partisan label or challenger (wins if he gets a

certain % of voters continue to support him)

o Canes-Wrone et all (2010)

Trend over time

Partisan>non-partisan>retention

Which election system do you think is most likely to

favor judicial independence (from public opinion)

Main argument: retention elections will not insulate

judges from pressure to cater to public pressure. In the

context of modern judicial campaigns (with interest

groups). An absence of party label makes judges

susceptible to being characterized by one or two

isolated decisions.

If you dont know a lot about a candidate, then a

lack of label can be difficult to overcome, in the

face of a few well marketed decisions. If you have

a party label, then it gives more information about

values.

Data:

Abortion decisions

Findings

Retention election

10 pt increase in pro-life public opionion =

pro life decision increased by 8-10%

Non partisan elections

Positive relationship

Partisan elections

Almost no relationship, almost a negative

relationship

Conclusion

Contrary to conventional wisdom, retention

elections do not insulate judges from public

opinion on hot button issues, and in fact

creates greater pressure than a partisan

election system

K’s questions – does this control for judges who

are not seeking reelection, do term limits apply to

judges, why the negative relationship for partisan

elections

Federal Courts

o 3 tiers

federal district courts (94 districts, geographically)

US courts of appeal (12 circuits, geographically)

US Supreme Court (1 court, 9 justices, all based in DC)

considers only small fraction of cases

o The appellate courts DO NOT make any new judgements

regarding facts, but are concerned with how the trial judge

made decisions

o Selection

Appointed by president, confirmed by senate

Lifetime appointments on good behaviors

Basis of president’s selection

Electoral needs

Ideological compatibility

Libs vs. cons, constructionist vs.

interpretivist, activist vs. restrained

Merit (ABA reviews)

Reward

o Confirmation

Senatorial courtesy, not for USSC

Informal process

Increasingly politicized and partisan Senate

confirmation process

MALTZMAN (2005)

Purpose: examine confirmation process of lower

federal courts (district and circuit)

Data: length of confirmation, likelyhood of

confirmation over 25 years

Result: less likely to be confirmed, and more likely

to take longer to be confirmed now than 25 years

ago

Suggested causes:

Divided party control of White House and

Senate

Increased ideological distance between

parties

Partisan balance in federal courts (new

appts would tip in favour of 1 party)

Increased policy importance of federal

courts

Suggested Consequences

Vacancies may hurt performance of federal

courts

Politicized confirmation process may harm

legitimacy of courts

Partisan tension may harm senate

Acrimonious confirmation process may

discourage promising judicial nominees

KASTELLAC et al.

Main question: does public opinion influence

Supreme Court confirmation politics

Data: Senate vote and state-level opinion on

recent USSC nominees.

Finding: Greater home-state public support

increase significantly the probability that a

nominee with be confirmed.

50% public support = 50/50 chance of yes

vote from Senator, high quality nominee

low quality nominee needs 65% support to

have the same chance

o Canadian Comparison

CDN reflects a federal arrangement. But is more

integrated, than the American system

Criminal law is a federal jurisdiction

Provinces have some control over the structure of

the courts, but feds appoint and pay all superior

court judges. No confirmation process in Canada

(appointed by Cabinet)

Decision Making

o BAUM, LAWRENCE

3 dominant models

strategic model

Persue own policy prefs, BUT instead of

taking ideal point, they strategically modify

their opinion to:

o Secura approval of rest of court

o Avoid reversal on appeal

o Win the compliance of mass public

o Avoid provoking legistalture

Most widely used

Strategic in their choices

Pure attitudinal model

Pick the decision that most pleases them,

regardless of the other factors

Pure legal model

Interpret the law accurately, without

concern for their own preferences or the

desirability of the policies that results

No longer commonly accepted by Political

Scientists, as the decision making model of

judges

Critique of 3 models

All 3 assume that judges act solely on their own

interest in the substance of legal policy, but this

doesn’t make sense, because achieving these

goals is hard work, and subject to free-riding.

SO....discard this assumption

Main argument

Craft rulings to gain and maintain regard of

audiences that they care about. Their desire to be

liked by certain groups.

o Discussion

Do Scalia and Segal and Cover fit somewhere in these

three models? Where?

Scalia:

Does not want judges to rule on own policy

prefernces.

Prefers the pure legal model

Segal and Cover

Pure attitudinal model at the USSC level

← Segal and Cover (1989)

Main argument

o USSC judges’ policy preferences have large effect on their

votes

Evidence

o DV: votes on civil liberties cases

o Explanatory Va: policy preferences, inferred from content

analysis of editorial written about them between nomination

and confirmation

←←

← Regression questions to consider:

Do the variables measure the concept of interest well? Could they

be measured better? Would this produce a different results?

Are there omissions from the analysis that might change the key

inferences?

If a causal claim is being tested, is their hypothesis causal

mechanism clear? Does the step from A-B-C-D make sense?

Are the authors’ conclusions reasonable given their results?

(generalizability)

←← Scalia, A.

Where would he be placed?

o Very conservative

o Textualism – just the text, not concerned about intent

o Pure legal model of Baum

← Preview

Public opinion and representation

Talk about the analytic essay

Summarize Stimson et al.,

Druckman and Lupia.

Chapter 10 of B&W

Public Opinion 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← Review from last class

What to do if there are an even number of justices sitting on the

USSC

o Majority of those present – so if there were 8 sitting, you need

5 to agree. Quorum of 6 to funtion

Life-terms at the USSC – what to do if a judge is debilitated

o No provision for removing a judge due to inability to preform,

much more likely now that they will do into retirement

Analysis of Kaplan - NYT

o How does the news relate to the course material?

Challenging constitutionality of a federal law – federal

court

interested parties, but not actual litigents, seek to

influence judicial decisions making by filing amicus

curiae briefs

President’s judicial powers: ability to direct the

department of Justice’s actions

Brain storming exercise re. judiciary

o Factors in judicial decisions

Attitudinal model

Pure legal model

Strategic attitudinal model

← How to write the analytic essay

2 stages

o When it comes to politics is the American puplic competent?

Why?

o If it is not competent, does it matter? Why?

o

← Public Opinion – Areas of Consensus

Beyond the fundamental setup of US govt

o No longer basic facts like we have been doing

o Will now talk about scholarly consensus and controversy.

←← Kinder - 1988

Sample survey is dominant measurement tool, but also as

weaknesses

American lack important political information (see Carpini and

Keeter)

Evidence of intolerance is ambiguous

o Tolerant in abstaract, less in specific situations

o Mixed if Americans have becomes more tolerant since 1950s

3 ingredients of opinions

o Material self-interest

Little evidence to suggest its important, but matters

more when teh cost/benefit is well publicized

o Attitudes towards groups

Opposition to social welfare programs derives from

hostility to towards the poor.

o Principles and Values

Individualism, equality, limited government

American are programatically liberal (specific

policies)

Don’t like it in the abstract, big pictures

Opinion and Action

o Campaign effects mixed

Dueling campaigns with competing messages

Durable party attachments

Large segments of public pay little attention

o Bigger effects when information flow is one-sided (only one

candidate is well-known)

Framing: a central organizing idea or story line

Priming: rendering certain consideration more prominent

Considerable evidence that framing, agenda-setting and priming all

strongly affect how cititzens form opinions

Elites attempt to prime and frame in order to shape public opinion

←← Druckman and Lupia – Preference Formation

Purpose: Review literature on how individuals form and change

preferences

o Dominant model of preference formation and change

Information-beliefs – evaluation (attitudes about an

object) – preference

Conclusion

o 1. Preferences are a result of individuals personal experience

AND interaction with his/her environment

o 2.Individuals process information using a memory-based

model

o 3.Middle attentive individuals are more susceptible to

preference change (Zaller 1992). Why?

Requires receipt and acceptance of message

Low-attentiveness don’t even receive teh message

High-attentiveness receive the message, but know

enough to generate internal counter-arguments

o 4. People are risk averse when it comes to politics: so

negative messages are more persuasive than positive

messages

o 5. Individuals evaluate source of information when updating

their beliefs and preferences

←←← Controversy #1 – Online vs. Memory Models

Memory Models - Zaller

o Main Idea: people base their evaluation on information that

they retrieve from long-term memory

o Examples

Individual receives information about a candidate

When prompted, searches memory for relevant

information and generates and evaluation, based on

what she remembers

o Variant

Limited processing capacity, evaluation is based on top

of mind information (easily recalled)

o Implication

Citizens are unlikely to have true attitudes (Drukmen

and Lupia)

People don’t have fixed, stable, coherent attitutdes, but

rather about how people search their memories

Online Models - Lodge

o Main idea

Base evaluations on a running taly

o How it works

Recieves information about a candidate

Retrieves her running taly from long term memory,

updates with new information, refiles in long term

memory, and eventually forgets where/how/that she got

the new information

Remembers the what, but not the why

o Implications

Ppl can’t remember or explain the basis of their

evaluation, so while initially informed, it might not

appear so at a later date

Preferences are more stable than accessibility-based

memory models

Which model is correct?

o Both are likely used, depending on context and political

sophistication

o ONLINE: believe judgment will be required later, MEMORY:

when not (Druckman and Lupia, Kinder)

o Some evidence that online processing occurs more often

among political sophisticates (Druckman and Lupia)

←← Controversy #2 – Competence

Many ways competence can be assessed

Essay reading highlights ONE major aspect of competence debate:

whether or not lack of political knowledge makes them incompetent

Essay reading

o Uncontroversial – lack of political information

o Very controversial – lack of information undermines

competence

Some reading aggress (Bartels, Carpini and Keeter,

Quirk and Kuklinski)

Ppl can get buy relatively well with other methods

Lupia 1994, Barbour and Wright

Political ignorance is not necessarily ignorant

Lupia 2007

o Note: Lupia et al. in a reply to early piece

Bartels: Homer gets a tax cut

Why did most American support large Bush era

tax cuts that mostly benefited the wealthy?

Argument: not because they were indifferent to

economic inequality, but because they didn’t

connect their concern for inequality with the tax

cuts

Data: 2002 ANES, asked several questions about

econ. Inequality and Bush tax cuts

Findings:

MANY american dont’ know if they support

tax cuts, but of those that do, 2:1 in favour

of Bush tax cuts

Hypothesis: Because they like equality

opportunity so much, they are willing to

accept economic inequality as a result

o Found wrong: widespread recognition

and disapproval of economic

inequality

Hypothesis: Support due to simple minded

and misguided consideration of self0interst

o Found: perception of own tax burden

was a good predictor of support for

Bush tax cuts, but perceptions of the

rich tax burden was not

Hypothesis: support due in large part so

misguided considerations of self-interest

o Found: rich families less supportive of

Bush tax cuts

o Those who wanted more government,

spending more likely to favor Bush tax

cuts

o Better informed, are less in favor of

tax cuts

Some readings have a helpful summary of the debate,

we must adjudicate which we find most helpful

←

← Controversy #3 – Partisan Bias

Definition

o No standard definition

o Ppl resist, or selectively ignore information which challenges

their partisan predispositions and loyalties

Findings

o Berelson (1954)

Perceive own candidates stand as similar to own, and

opponents stand as dissimilar, and this misperception is

stronger among partisans. A projection effect.

Gerber and Green (1998, 1999)

There is no partisan bias

Tracking aggregate level evaluation, across 3

groups, move at the same speed and direction

over time.

Bartels (2002)

Large aggregate differences between partisan

groups exist for many factual beliefs (objective

economic conditions during Reagan Admin.)

Gaines et al. (2007)

Theory: Complete updating

Reality-beliefs-interpretations-opinions

Data: Panel studies of university students. Asked

factual and opinion questions about Iraq war and

its conduct

Finding

Most respondents, regardless of PID, had

similar factual beliefs, their interpretations

of these facts differed across groups

← Controversy #4 - Representation

Interest Groups and Media 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← Review of material

Consensus

o Lack important political information

o Self interest, attitudes towards groups, values, impact P.O.

o Middle-attentive most susceptible

Controversy

o Online vs. memory models

o Competence without information

o Partisan bias

← Controversy #4 – Representation

Manza and Cook – Public Opinion on Public Policy

o Large effects

3 types of evidence

quantitative studies

intensive, policy domain-specific, qualitative

journalistic accounts of politicians consumption of

polling data

o Small effects

o Contingent Effects

Relationships between po and pp changes depending on

institution, policy area, time etc.

← Stimson et al.

Does po influence pp?

Theory

o Indirectly

Electoral turnover, kicked out of office

o Directly

Rational anticipation, change to reflect, so they don’t

get kicked out office

Data

o Large surveys of p.o. and policymaking in House, Senate,

Presidency, USSC

Findings

o Changes in public opinion and public policy correspond over

time.

o

←←← Interest Groups

Groups with the same political goal, and unite to influence policy in

their favour

Many types of interest groups: economic, civil rights, public interest,

govts etc

← Collective action problem (free rider problem)

o Why join if I can benefit without joining

o Like in Baum, or Halls

Overcoming the collective action problem

o Selective incentives (member-only benefits)

Material benefits ( newsletter, discount)

Solidarity benefits (bonding with other members)

Expressive benefits (strongly expressive values)

Strategies

o Direct lobbying

Long-term contacts with congressional members

Expertise to MCs

Fundraising for MCs (max $5000.00)

Meet with bureaucrats

Litigate/intervene in court cases

o Indirect lobbying

Mobilizing membership or wider public to pressure

polticians

Akin to ‘going public’ strategy (Kernell)

Guest Lecture, Interest Groups and Media 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← Deliberation in congress TEXTBOOK

Committee hearings

o Witnesses called and questioned

Committee Markups

o Amendments offered by both parties

Floor debates

o Final opportunity for amending by both parties

The textbook assumes that both parties have an equal opportunity

to amend and present their ideas on a bill.

← Increasing Partisanship

Change in the way that bills become laws.

o No a proposal is discussed, and introduced, but no may just

be written up behind closed doors, without the opportunity for

markups, and goes straight to the rules committee, followed

by a very limited debate

o Total majority domination of the process and content of a bill

← Speakers use Partisan Task Forces/Design Teams

Ad hoc informal groups to work in place of the committees.

Newt Gingrich – headed most task forces, and would be surrounded

by favored legislators and lobbyists.

Nancy Pelosi – first 6 bills presented were written behind closed

doors by favoured senior Democrats.

←← Legislative deliberation

Definition: gather, discuss and evaluate policy information to make

policy decisions (Quirk 2005) Runs along a continuum from one

extreme to the other.

One-party deliberation

o Speaker and likeminded colleagues

o Involves only majority party

Two-party deliberation

o Committee of jurisdiction

o Involves both parties.

←← Which conditions encourage one- and two-party deliberations?

H1: As parties become more polarized, the majority party will

control bill deliberations

H2: More 1-party bill deliberations when the majority party’s

support decreases. When it looks like its majority may be under

threat.

H3: Majority party will dominate deliberatsion more during unified

control.

o President becomes the ‘legislator in chief’, and congress

majority party wants to look like they support their president.

H4: R. control of House will lead to more 1-party deliberations than

D. control

o Republicans as daddy party, Dems as Mommy party

←← Findings:

Partisan polarization and electoral pressures encourage house

majority leaders to omit hearing and markups

o As the parties move further apart, the less likely it is for a bill

to go through a 2-party process

Contrary to Expectations

o 1. Bipartisan debate more likely in periods of unified control

Unified: Majority wants to avoid obstruction later, and to

have the president’s agenda enacted. If we allow open

debate, and involved the majority party, and then send

the bill to the house. IT is harder to justify a filibuster a

bill that the minority party has been thoughtfully

involved with.

Divided: Majority wants to put our strong bill initially to

boost its bargaining power, because they know that

most things will die. By pushing out the most extreme

bills possible, you will satisfy the debate, and you want

to start from the strongest possible position, knowing

whatever will make it into the final bill, will be diluted

down.

o 2. Republicans are more willing to engage in open debate

than Democrats.

Republicans have more party discipline, and are more

unified than democrats.

← Consequences of 1-party deliberation

1.Gridlock

o 21% less likely to be signed into law if they do not undergo

hearings.

2. Flawed Policy

o to evaluate 1-party bills, examine negative predictions before

enactment and then see whether prediction materialize

look at editorials on legislation before and after passage

o example: Iraq Reconstruction

2003, REPs pushed through 22 billion bill to rebuild

papers warned bill lacked sufficient oversight

concerns that crony capitalists would pocket money

without fulfilling contracts

9 billion disappeared and never recovered

5.6 billion diverted to security needs

contractors bribed US officials with cash and

prostitutes

← Conclusions

1. Sharp increase in partisan deliberations over the last 2 decades

2. Ideological divisions, electoral competition and divided

government all encourage one-party lawmaking

3. Partisan deliberation produces policy mistakes

←← Review of Material From Last Class

Brainstorming:

o Interest groups face the “Collective action problem” so they

offer selective incentives

o Interest groups can influence through Direct Lobbying and

Indirect Lobbying (like going public)

o Difficult to cleanly identify interest groups influence

←← Interest Groups

Disagreement about extent to which interest groups influence

policymaking, especially the extent to which interest groups “buy”

floor votes in Congress

Wright, John

o Argument

Fundraising structures of certain types of PACs

undercuts their ability to influence congressional roll

calls.

Political Action Committee – Fundraising arm of

interest groups

“If person X raises 10K at the local level for

candiate Y, who we don’t think is deserving, we’ll

support person X’s work. If we didn’t support

person X, next time, he might not raise the same

amount of money for us.

o Theory

PACs confronted by a paradox

Local, grassroots most effective way to raise

money

BUT this allows grassroots to influence allocation

of PAC contribution

Grassroots are AMATEURS, and they want money

to go to sympathetic, threatened MCs and

candidates, rather than those who are on the

fence, and might be swayed.

Structure limits the ability to deploy money effectively

o Findings

1. Larger contributions to sympathetic, needy

candidates rather than those in leaderships positions,

who are potentially influential

2. Contributions had miniscule effect on probability of

vote in selected key roll call votes

Hall and Wayman

o Argument

PAC money should be allocated in order to mobilize

legislative support and demobilize opposition,

particularly at the most important points in the

legislative process

Critique of Wright – looking in the wrong place, lots of

stuff happends before the bill gets to the floor, and the

extent that different members participate in bill

development

o Theory

Should be looking at participation at the committee

stage, not roll calls

o Findings

1. PAC contributions to supporters increased

participation in all three policy areas

2. In 2/3 policy issues, PAC contibutions to opponents

decreased participation, but change was not statistically

significant.

←← News Media

1. Does the American news media do an adequate job of informing

Americans about politics

← Motivation

80% of American reports consuming some kind of news on any

given day

BUT...in same survey, only 14% of Americans were able to correctly

answer 4 knowledge questions about news items

o 1. Majority part in the house

o post held by Eric Holder

o company run by Steve Jobs

o country with active volcano that recently disrupted air travel

Possible explanations for this apparent disjuncture – they consume

a lot of media, but don’t know a lot. Exposure vs. recall?

o 1. Problems of measures of exposure and knowledge

o 2. Online model – informed but lacking in recall

o 3. Media not doing a very good job

Threats to an informative media

o Ideological bias in reporting

o Commercial biases

Building and maintaining and audience

← Commercial Biases

← Lance Bennett

Arguments

o 1. 4 information biases that keep people from learning about

political events and see the big picture

o 2. Political actors take advantage of these traditional

informational biases

o 3. Ideological biases – more difficult to correct and less

dangerous than people think

o 4. Thematic, in-depth coverage would be better than episodic

coverage

4 information biases

o Personalization

Focus on actors involved at the expense of the big

picture, causes etc.

o Dramatization

Emphasized crisis, present rather than the future focus.

Personal scandal rather than institutional context.

Chronic issues go unreported as we lurch from crisis to

crisis

o Fragmentation

Stories isolated from each other, encapsulated, little

background provided, within and between reports

o Normalization

Officials promise return to normalcy, framing through

traditional values, demobilizes people rather than

becoming more concerned and active

Evidence: Secondary studies, anecdotes, and case studies

←←

Race, Gender and Politics

← Define AND give example of the presidential strategy of going public.

Examples should be from the readings. Try not to through out information in

word vomit. Be selective.

←← Returning to where we started with Smith in “Beyond Tocqueville”. Ebb

and flow. Many different traditions that work together.

←← Two key questions

← 1)How does race shape political preferences

Gilens, Martin. Race coding and White Opposition to Welfare.

o Like Kinder. Attitudes towards groups

o 1988 Willie Horton Attack ad.

o Research questions: Do white Americans’ racial attitudes

shape their posistions on “ostensibly race-neutral” welfare

policy?

o Define welfare: gov’t cheques in the mail.

o Argument: Literature has failed to consider racial views.

Focused instead on individualism and economic self-interest

o 2 types of evidence

phone survey

DV: support for welfare

IV: racial attitudes, poor attitudes, income etc.

Finding: Perception of blacks as lazy single largest

predictor

experiment embedded in a telephone survey

b/c measurement problems in traditional survey

Main finding: While avr. Belief about welfare

mother same in both treatments, neg. beliefs

about black welfare mothers associated with

much more negative view of welfare. Priming

race.

o Race does influence the levels of support for welfare

programs amongst whites.

Abramowitz. Triumph of Diversity

o B&W – Obama’s victory suggest that racism is on the wane.

o Preliminaries

20% White. 18% of Hispanics & Asian Americans said

the possibility of a Black president made them

uncomfortable.

Less that ½ of white americans voted democrats.

Lingering racial prejudice.

o Findings

Racial prejudice in high-school educated whites, had a

negative impact on the likelihood of voting for Obama.

Nonwhite share of US electorate increased from 13% in

1992 to 26% in 2008

o Conclusion

Growth in non-white electorate as a whole, helped

Obama out, as did the large margin he won in the non-

white population, to offset a minimal change in support

levels among White voters

← 2) How well are hisorically disadvantaged groups representd?

Griffin and Newman.

o 2 questions

Are white prefs better represetned than Latinos in

congressional voting

What affects relative representation of two groups

o Method

Make assumption sin order to place MCs and voters on

the same scale. (Roll call and phone surveys)

o Findings

1. White preferences are much closer ideologically to

MCs actions than those of Latinos to their MCs

← Macdonald and O’Brien.

Research question

o Do female of MCs better represetn women’s interest than

male MC

Problems

o Prev. work often omitted measures of constituency

preferences, potentially biasing effects of gender

Solution

o Sample pair where MCs where female preceded or succeeded

a male MC

Data

o # of sponsorships of feminist and social welfare bills

Findings

o Women, on average, sponsor more feminist bills

o Effect of gender on feminist bills contingent on number of

female MCs

Low number of women, similar number of sponsored

bills btwn men and women

More women, number of bills by women goes up, and

number by men goes down

Bumper sticker work 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← My house, my rules.

Cox and McCubbins. Setting the agenda.

← Angry voter driving to the polls

Valentino et al.

← Odds of being a judge – 50/50

Retention elections

← Where you stand doesn’t depend on where you sit.

Khreible. Where’s the party

← Attention! Breaking –

← Dems, Republicans & Independents. (rainbow)

←← Account of Tea Party movement. Nationally and in E. Mass.

Williamson. Tea party remaking republican conservativism

← Deliberative democracy was the concious creation of the founders.

Besett. Mild voice of reason

← Benefits available to members, not non-members

Material Benefits

← 1970 Congress polarization leading to party homogenity

Jacobson. Party polarization

← Ppl voted for tax cuts because they were incompetant and ignorant

Bartells. Homer gets a tax cut

← Open to amendment

Open rule

← Bureaucrats: Who’s your daddy? The president!

Moe. Polarized Presidency

← Are you scared of 6.5% of the workforce. The democrats are.

Wills. Obama and Big Labour

← Carston & Jenkins. Rub it in why don’t you.

Credit claiming.

← Don’t rush judgement

Maltman. Advice and consent

← Big happy family

Party in government

← Pick a team.

Closed primary

← Don’t blame us, we’re just responding to demands

Hamilton: Media and market

← I’m a D. What R you?

Party identification

← Washington one level, states another

Federalism

← You don’t get a say. Tough.

Closed rule

← We just arent into each other.

Fiorina. Polarization in US public

← Do what I say, or I go to the ppl.

Kernell. Going Public.

← Why did I convict you? Because I don’t like your face.

Segal and Cover. Ideological values on supreme court votes

← Opposites are opposites

Party polarization

← IIIII

Online modle

← Fox news missed a memo

Groseclose. Social science perspective on Media Biases

← Amateurs waste $

Wright. PAC

← B/C nobody like NJ

Great compromise

← Break a filibuster

Cloture

← Small states are over represented.

Leohardt. 1 ppl, 1 vote. Hardly.

← Politicians still learning to share: Fed vs. state powers

Kettle. Federalism battlelines

← Infotainment

Commercial bias

← Split power is stagnant power

Divided govt

← Passing means president

electoral college

← Spidey sense btwn elections (sorta)

Stimson et al. Dynamic representation

← I want you to want me

Baum. Judges and audiences.

Domestic and Foreign Policy 7/18/11 6:03 PM

← Argument: US foreign policy-making is influences by US domestic

politics and institutions

Tools used to understand domestic politics can be extended to

foreign policy making

←← Jacobs and Page. Who influences US Foreign Policy

Data: Survey of US foreign policymakers

Finding: Business leaders>experts>labor>public opinion, level of

influence on policy makers

← Bartels. Reagan Defense Build up

Data: MC voting behaviour and NES survey

Finding: in early 80s MCs vot on defense budget related to

constituency preferences.

← Will Georege: Obama and free trade: Appease big labor. Washington

Post.

Being in bed with big labour is driving foreign policy regarding free

trade. To the detriment of the American economy

← Rubenzer. Campaign Contributions and FP outcomes

Question

o Level that ethinic minority interst groups are able to influence

US FP.

Data/Method

o Contribution affects re 2005 cuban embargo.

Findings – contrary to Wright

o Campaign contributions from pro-embargo groups increased

likelihood of pro-embargo vote.

o Impact of campaign contributions on congressional roll calls

was more limited when vote concerned, clear, non-technical

and salient issues.

← Lieberman

Purpose

o Reexamine claim that pro-Israel foreign policy is caused by

the ‘Isreal Policy’. Collection of Jewish & Christians individuals

and organizations

Findings

o Small percent of contributions, and group so small that they

are statistically insignificant in elections. Eg. 2004 Bush win.