u. of chicago conference on foreign assistance and ...rmyerson/conference2020/mines.pdf ·...
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U. of Chicago Conference on Foreign Assistance and Political
Development in Fragile StatesSession 6: Problems of Host Resistance to Reform and
Donor Conditionality
Keith W. MinesU.S. Institute of Peace
May 16, 2020
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Colombia Grenada El Salvador Somalia Haiti Darfur Afghanistan Al Anbar, Iraq
Political Consolidation
Building Security Forces
Economic Development
Nation – political compact that unites a people of a defined territory under a single identity.State – The institutions that can manage the business of governing within that nation.
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Questions in Play
1. What do we want?2. What tools do we have to
achieve it?3. How do we deploy those tools?4. How does the host
country/tribe/movement respond?
5. Lessons Learned
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Haiti – 1996 Economic Reform - I
• Stability w/o migration + democracy + human rights• Aristide: From misery to poverty with dignity
1. What do we want?
• Economic and Political: Foreign Assistance• Security and Justice: Programs and Advisors
2. What Tools?
• Conditioned on neo-liberal framework• Short term (jobs) vs. long-term (good policy)• Transactional (nature of the transaction not clear)• Weak advisory presence
3. How Deploy Foreign Assistance?
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Haiti – 1996 Economic Reform - II
• Training of new police and special units (advisors)• Judicial and prisons• Coast Guard – per resources high and long-term
3. How Deploy Security and Justice?
• Internal power struggle Aristide vs. Preval over privatization
• Parliament Fractured, $500M stayed on the table• Weak ministries – low absorptive capacity
4. How Respond? Economic Assistance
• Human capacity and willingness had real limits• Also political tool• When training and advisors present + persistent = success• Justice was complex system – reforms only in 2015-17
4. How Respond? Security & Justice
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Haiti – 1996 Economic Reform - III
• Institutionalization before Liberalization (Roland Paris and Kimbra Fishel)
• Simple Financial Transactions to us are Complex Political Transactions to Them
• Assistance needs to Land Well (Ministry Advisors - Shadow Government)
• Security + Justice takes time – a positive low-key presence is everything
What did we Learn?
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Afghanistan –2002Counter-Terrorism - I
• Mixed: Eliminate terrorist safe havens, corner Bin Laden, demonstration vs. terrorist supporters
• Later – Drugs and non-corrupt government (state building?)
1. What did we want?
• Foreign Assistance ($52 per Afghan vs. $1,400 Balkans)
• Security assistance & U.S. force deployment• Training and Advisors for ANA (1 SF B Team)• Ministry Advisors• Diplomatic Support• Political Support – Loya Jirga
2. What Tools?
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Afghanistan –2002Counter-Terrorism - II
• Not much to deploy (U.S. shift to Iraq) see Dobbins• No real institutional assistance (Fin Min only)• UN Minimal (low profile, small footprint)
3. How Deploy?
• Openness to ministerial advisors• Desire for donor coordination• Acceptance of technical assistance (currency rollout)• Warlords and regional strongmenRent Capture – border posts, drugs, aidLoya JirgaIsmael Khan – HeratNo effort to nationalize militias (CT partners)
4. How Received?
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Afghanistan –2002Counter-Terrorism - III
• Build essential institutions early (e.g. anti-corruption)
• Advisors Matter (Canadian SAT)• Transactions multi-faceted and
have local context• Early trade offs have
consequences (e.g. militias)• Humility: We don’t always know
better
5. What did we Learn?
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Darfur – 2007Unify Rebel Groups I
• Macro: Stop genocide• Micro: Unify rebel groups into a cohesive political
force
1. What do we Want?
• Macro: Sanctions, int. isolation• Micro: PKO, foreign and humanitarian assistance
2. Tools
• Support for PK architecture (AU/EU/UN - CFC)• Support for Commanders Conference• Assistance to Rebel Groups as inducement
3. How Deploy?
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Darfur – 2007Unify Rebel Groups II
• Acceptance of architecture but . . .• . . . no real inducement to unify or make
peace• Missing local context
4. How Received?
• International regional actors often better (e.g. Aprezi and Kouyate)
• Need Flexible Funding and Enough of it • Long–term Field Officers (M. Nolte)• All Peace is Local
5. What did we Learn?
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KM2
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Slide 14
KM2 Keith Mines, 5/14/2020
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Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative --Fight Drugs I
• U.S. Drugs, border security, close ungoverned spaces, protect human rights
• Them: End violence and make peace
1. What do we Want?
• Colombia $12B, Mexico $4B• Advisors, program managers• Good Relations• Trade• Reputation, Tourism
2. Tools
• Largescale programs: equipment, technical advice, training
3. How Deploy?
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Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative –Fight Drugs II
• Pro-US• Leadership consistent• Strong Societal Support• Institutions well led, good framework• Low levels of corruption• Planning effective
4. Response - Colombia
• Federalism complicated• Leadership up and down, inconsistent at different levels• Often non-existent institutions• Hesitation about U.S. assistance
4. Response - Mexico
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Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative –Fight Drugs III
• Sometimes the stars align• Respectful of local experience• Whole of government brings
synergy• Local popular backing helps
(good brand)• Resource proportionality
5. What did we Learn?
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Ramadi Peace Park, 2004Stabilizing Gesture I
• Tear down Ba’ath Party HQ, build a peace park
1. What do we Want?
• $70K
2. Tools
• Open Bidding Process
3. How Deploy?
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Ramadi Peace Park, 2004Stabilizing Gesture II
• Seven bids, 1 Colonel, and 1 Sheikh• HQ down, no peace park• Safer Streets
4. Response
• Some things are more important than an open bidding process
5. Lessons Learned
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Somali Peace Negotiations, 1994End Famine, Build State
• End violence • Build basic state institutions
1. What did we Want?
• Foreign Assistance• Moral Authority• Relations with int. community
2. Tools
• Kismayu to Nairobi peace negotiations
3. How Deploy?
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Somali Peace Negotiations, 1994End Famine, Build State
• 70 Clan leaders to Nairobi• 2 weeks of talks in 3 ½ star hotel• Assumption we wanted it more than
them• Then . . . the threat of a sex strike
4. Response
• A switched on civil society can be a more powerful inducement to peace than foreign assistance
5. Lessons Learned
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