turkey's ambassadors vs. erdoğan meq winter 2011

8/7/2019 Turkey's Ambassadors vs. Erdoan MEQ Winter 2011

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/ 47Aras: Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkeys Ambassadors

vs. Erdoanby Damla Aras

I

n June 2010, the deepening rift between Turkeys ruling Justice and DevelopmentParty (AKP) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) unexpectedly came to the

public eye when seventy-two retired ambassadors and consul-generals issued a writ-ten statement protesting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoans lack of respect in dub-bing them mon chers and criticizing the governments foreign policy.1Why did the primeminister publicly snub his diplomats? By way of answering this question, this article reviewsthe ongoing rift betweenErdoan and his diplomats before carrying an English translationof the ambassadors statement and interviews with two retired senior diplomats.

Damla Aras is a post-doctoral research associ-ate at the department of war studies, Kings Col-lege London.

BACKGROUND

Two main reasons come to mind. To begin,there is the perceived class difference betweenthe diplomats and the right-wing political par-ties (such as nationalist and Islamic movements),which have their roots in and represent mostlythe rural areas and the urban working class, andwhich view the diplomats as an elitist group thatlooks down on the common citizen. The termmon cherimplies that they are snobbish, West-ern-influenced status seekers who are discon-

nected from the traditions and values of theTurkish nation.2 A vivid illustration of thismindset was afforded in May 2006 when Erdoanscolded Turkeys ambassador to Berlin,Mehmetali Irtemelik, for preventing a local Turk-ish woman from using a photo with a headscarfin her passport though the ambassador wasmerely enforcing the official regulations.3

While there are some intellectuals and diplo-

mats who disagree with Erdoans perception ofthe ambassadors,4 others subscribe to his argu-

ment, including diplomats who did not sign thestatement for those reasons.5 One senior ambas-sador asserts that although tarring all diplomatswith the same brush is wrong, some diplomatsdespise the grassroots and are uneasy seeingcommoners like Erdoan in power. To this end,in January 2010, Foreign Minister AhmetDavutolu took a group of diplomats to the cityof Mardin in southeastern Anatolia to allow themto mingle freely with the masses and get a first-

hand sense of their ordinary compatriots.6

1 Hrriyet (Istanbul), June 18, 2010.

2 Lale Saribrahimolu, u monerler meselesi, Taraf(Istanbul), Feb. 4, 2009; Aziz stel, Buzlu Viski Ic GeerMonerciim! Stratejik Boyut(Ankara), June 11, 2010; EmreAkz, Monerliin lzumu yok, Sabah (Istanbul), June 23,2010; Talip Kkcan, Moner deil bykeli, Star Gazetesi(Istanbul), Jan. 25, 2010.

3 Radikal (Istanbul), May 27, 2006.

4 Sedat Ergin, 2002 ncesinde izlenen diplomasi onursuzmuydu?Hrriyet, June 8, 2010; Mehmet Tezkan, Dilerinikapatalm elileri kovalm,Milliyet(Istanbul), Aug. 15, 2010.

5 Saribrahimolu, u monerler meselesi; stel, BuzluViski Ic Geer Monerciim!; Akz, Monerliin lzumuyok.

6 Kkcan, Moner deil bykeli.


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48 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY WINTER 2011

The second source of tension betweenErdoan and his diplomats is ideological. Several

retired and serving ambassadors are wary of theAKP government since its leadership comes fromthe Islamic political movement. Specifically, theold school, brought up on the modernist, secu-larist principles on which Mustafa Kemal Atatrkpredicated the modern Turkish stateestablishedon the ruins of the Ottoman Empireconsidersthe governments policies a reflection of theAKPs ideological precepts rather than ofTurkeys national interests. They argue that thegovernment has deviated from Turkeys tradi-

tional, Western-orien-tated foreign policybased on the alliance withthe United States, itsmembership in the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organiza-tion (NATO), and theprospect of EuropeanUnion membership. So farthe AKP has commenced

EU membership negotia-tions, contributed to

NATO forces in Afghanistan, and has generallybeen on good terms with the Obama administra-tion; its previously good relationship with Israel,though, has been significantly damaged asErdoan has openly cultivated closer ties withsome of the regions other states and organiza-tions, notably Iran, Syria, and Hamas.

Some of the retired diplomats who have

been highly critical of Erdoans foreign poli-cies hold top positions in the opposition politi-cal parties, such as the Kemalist RepublicanPopulist Party. According to a senior ambassa-dor, it was these individuals and other like-minded ambassadors that Erdoan was actuallytargeting when he used the term mon chers.Thus, for example, the December 2009 resigna-tion of Turkeys ambassador to Washington,Nabi ensoy, during Erdoans visit to the U.S.capital, was officially attributed to a dispute overprotocol. In fact, behind the resignation lay theambassadors subscription to the ideas of theconservative camp within the Ministry of For-eign Affairs, his being bypassed by the AKPsown foreign policy team, and his disagreement

with the governments Middle Eastern policy.7

Indeed, the AKPs policy toward the Middle

East has been a rupture point between the twoparties since for secularists it defines Turkeyscore orientation and continued subscription tothe democratic legacy bequeathed by its found-ing father. While they concede that Turkey hassignificant interests in the region, they are dedi-cated to Atatrks vision of transforming Turkeyinto a part of Western civilization and, therefore,place great emphasis on ties with the Euro-At-lantic community. By contrast, Erdoan viewsOttoman history as the admired past of a great

empire that once shaped the world order, as inthe era of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66). Inhis opinion, Turkeys (supposedly) unsuccess-ful foreign policy stems from mon chers passiv-ity inspired by an overly pro-Western orienta-tion and their inability to appreciate the Ottomanpast, which prevent them from understanding thegovernments strategies. According to him, theAKP has initiated a strong and honorable diplo-macy that reflects the Turkish nations true iden-

tity and the countrys historical and geopoliticalrealities.8 For instance, when retired diplomatscriticized Erdoan for his attack on PresidentShimon Peres during the World Economic Forumin Davos in January 2009 over the Israeli opera-tion in Gaza, he angrily retorted, I came frompolitics; I dont know about the ways mon chersbehave. And I dont want to know.9 He laterdismissed their criticism as demonstrating theimproper attitude of the obsolete mon chers as

opposed to his righteous stance in Davos.10

DEMOCRATIZATION OR

CIVILIAN DOMINANCE?

The tension between the AKP and the re-tired diplomats is but one aspect of the wider

7 Abdullah Bozkurt, Conduct Unbecoming a Gentleman Am-bassador, Todays Zaman (Istanbul), Dec. 12, 2009; TodaysZaman, Dec. 11, 2009.

8 Ergin, 2002 ncesinde izlenen diplomasi onursuz muydu?

9 NTV(Istanbul), Jan. 31, 2009.

10 Cumhuriyet(Istanbul), June 2, 2009.

Erdoan views

Ottoman history

as the admired

past of a great

empire that once

shaped the

world order.


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/ 49

polarization in Turkish state institutions andpublic opinion at large, reflecting concerns

about the AKPs ulterior motives. Accordingto some, AKP initiatives aim at a civiliandominance under the disguise of democra-tization and at transforming Turkey into astate governed in accordance with Islamicvalues, if not Sharia law.11 Yet some liberalsregard them as important improvements forTurkish democracy and view objections tothem as simple anti-government prejudice.12

For instance, the government reforms onthe organization of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in July 2010 include several improve-ments, such as the creation of new depart-ments, area specialization, and foreign lan-guage education. The new law stipulates thatthe diplomats will represent not only the Turk-ish Republic and its president but also thegovernment. It also allows appointment ofnon-ministry individuals as ambassadors andthe recruitment of graduates from severalfields, including theology.13 According to a

senior diplomat, these modifications will giveall bright graduates a chance to enter the min-istry and will break the elitist and status-relatedapproach of the old school. However, others main-tain that these changes may facilitate the entranceof the AKPs own cadres into the foreign ministry(e.g., through political appointments and the re-cruitment of theology graduates) and tighten itsgrip over the foreign policymaking process.

Similar reservations and debates revolve

around other key state organizations. The AKPhas dominated the Turkish parliament with 341out of 550 seats since the 2007 elections, whichenabled the election of a prominent AKP figure,Abdullah Gl, as president. This exacerbated thesecularists fears, who argued that his electionendangered one of the fundamental principles ofdemocratic governance, namely the separation of

powers, and that the constitutional reformsap-proved in a referendum in September 201014would strengthen the presidents authority. InJune 2010, several members of this camp ap-plauded the constitutional courts rejection of theAKPs proposed changes in the election of mem-bers of the legal system, including the constitu-tional court itself, the supreme council of judges,and public prosecutors, which they believed

would consolidate the executives control overthe judiciary.15 The new constitutional packagealso foresees a more transparent and account-able military, which is considered by both the AKPand liberals a sine qua non for democratization.On the other hand, many regard this change asan attempt to weaken the military, the bastion ofKemalist principles and thus impregnable to theIslamists.16

Aras: Turkish Foreign Policy

11 See, for example, the debate between academic and colum-nist Nuray Mert and Mustafa Karaaliolu, editor ofStarnewspa-per, Basn Odas program, NTV, Jan. 19, 2010.

12 Ismet Berkan, Balyoz ve askeri atamadaki sknt,Radikal,Aug. 7, 2010.

13 Gazete Port(Istanbul), June 8, 2006;Brokrat Haber, June9, 2010; Odatv (Istanbul), June 10, 2010.

14 Milliyet, Sept. 13, 2010.

15 Mehmet Tezkan, Anayasa mahkemesi demokrasiyi korudu,Milliyet, July 7, 2010.

16 Hrriyet, July 9, 2010.

Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, founding father ofmodern Turkey, sought to extricate the country

from its imperial past and transform it into anintegral part of Western civilization.


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THE AMBASSADORS

STATEMENT

Prime Minister Erdoan has recently made ahabit of using foreign words in his speeches. Itstarted with the English words one minuteat Davos. Then he recently began to fancy theterm mon cher. This term means my dear,my friend in French. In Turkish slang, how-ever, the word pejoratively means mothersdarling. Yet next to the military and police,

the diplomatic service at any level is the mosthazardous civil service. Which of our diplo-matic representatives, who serve permanentlyor temporarily in conflict zones in the mostdangerous parts of the worldwho representour country, provide humanitarian aid, main-tain political contacts, and furnish administra-tive, technical and communicative support tothe diplomats at any rank, level and age, youngand olddeserve this jeering?

Our long standing diplomatic tradition obligesus not to shirk away from any danger and tohold our heads high without being defeated by

anyone in the interna-tional community. Theattitude of the Turkishambassador [who dem-onstrated self-sacrifice,devotion, and dignity] inmer Seyfettins Robewith Pink Pearls is oneof the stories of our col-lective tradition, whichour ambassadors areproud of having. Nor is

there any elitism amongst our diplomats.Many of our diplomats who have risen to thehighest positions in the ministry needed schol-arships in order to pursue their higher educa-tion. Among them are foreign ministryundersecretaries.

Old stories and novels attest to the use of such

terms as mon cher during the Ottoman pe-riod. One cannot resist asking: Like the for-eign policy axis that the government has beenforging, does it dignify the prime minister totake a fancy for neo-Ottomanist vocabularyas well? We would like to remind him that the

Turkish Republics foreign policy and diplo-macy were rebuilt on strong foundations as aconsequence of lessons learnt from the actionsof some Ottoman diplomats who served theinterests of those foreign powers they fancied,which had become an Achilles heel of the em-pire in its final years.

The big foreign policy gains of our republichave been achieved thanks to the Turkish dip-lomats of the republican era. Turkish diplo-mats have been loyal practitioners of the peaceat home, peace in the world principle, whichAtatrk stipulated for our foreign policy, and

they have been loyal to the key principles ofour state.

In-house training is conducted diligently [atthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. Importantpromotions are also made on the basis of de-manding examinations. Nepotism has nevercome into play during these exams, which iswhy Turkish diplomats are remembered withadmiration. Their achievements were confirmedby the establishment of the Balkan (1934) and

Saadabad (1937) pacts, which aimed at build-ing a security and cooperation zone aroundour country; the signing of the Montreux agree-ment (1936); the resolution of the Hatay prob-lem (1939); the saving of the country from thedisaster of a new war by staying out of theSecond World War; Turkeys participation inNATO; the ongoing negotiations for member-ship in the European Common Market andthe EU for the last fifty years; and the variousstages of the negotiations within the U.N.

framework, beginning with the London andZurich agreement (1959), to resolve the Cy-prus issue in favor of our national interests.

Foreign policy is not about displaying cavalierattitudes and ignoring past achievements withstatements like those before us didnt do any-thing. The honorable period has started withus. [Erdoan, TRT Haber TV, June 6, 2010]Foreign policy is a long-term, serious endeavor.It is a serious mission which requires knowl-edge, accumulation of knowledge, vision, andlevelheaded analytical skills. Foreign policy isabout making levelheaded decisions and takinginto account the intricacies of a chess game aswell as the past in its strategic depth while atthe same time calculating the future.

Foreign policy

is not about

displaying

cavalier attitudes

and ignoring past

achievements.


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/ 51

As a matter of fact, Turkishdiplomats saved Jews fromNazi concentration camps atthe cost of their own livesduring the Second World War.By the same token, the wivesand the children of our diplo-mats lived in the eye of thestorm. Our Consul GeneralSelahattin lkmen inRhodes lost his wife in a Naziaerial bombardment whilstsaving the Jews on the is-land. Our ambassador to

Madrid Zeki Kuneralpswife, Necla Kuneralp; ourcharge daffaires to LisbonYurtsev Mholus wife,Cahide Mholu; adminis-trative attach to LisbonErkut Akbays wife, NadideAkbay; secretary to theTurkish Embassy in Tehranadiye Ynders husband,Ik Ynder; ambassador to

The Hague zdemir Benlersson, Ahmet Benler; and ad-ministrative attach to Athens Galip zmensdaughter, Neslihan zmen, were martyred byArmenian terrorists. It is clear that the hon-orable prime minister is ill informed, not onlyabout our difficulties but also the difficultiesendured by our families as a result of ourprofession.

Turkish diplomats have continued to do their

jobs with courage and levelheadedness at thecost of their lives in Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Leba-non, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Somalia. It mustbe noted that courage and dynamism in foreignpolicy do not mean adventurism. Those whoclaim to know history well should always re-member the misfortunes wrought on our coun-try by such cheap promises as to performprayers together in Jerusalem. Making ourinnocent people pay for the cost of such cheapbravery [i.e., the Gaza flotilla incident whichended with the killing of nine Turks by Israelisoldiers] is an additional reason for sadness.The republics foreign ministry corps has neveracted as the hands, arms, and eyes of othercountries or circles. It has been proud of itshigh self-esteem engendered by the long-stand-

ing accumulation of the nations history andmorality and its existence in this land freelyfor centuries.

Until now we assumed that it was only Arme-nian terrorism that targets Turkish diplomats.During the past year, we have had difficultiesexplaining the behavior of our honorable primeminister, who has been verbally attacking hisown countrys diplomats on every available

opportunity. Foreign policy cannot be con-ducted through the misuse of a few foreignwords, scornful statements against diplomatsand commoditized initiativeswhich are incontradiction with each otherfor the sake ofshort-term expediency. Should [our foreignpolicy continue to be] conducted in this fash-ion, there will be a heavy cost. The sad part isthat the cost will not only be paid by thosewho have adopted a thoughtless, shallow ap-proach, but also by our entire nation. We would

like to end this statement with a short rhymeinspired by one of our late ambassadors, whichdemonstrates our sadness: No fairness is leftin human beings/ We were considered martyrswhen it suited them/ And mon chers when itdidnt/ In this disloyal world.

Aras: Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkeys prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan (left) stormedout of a debate on the Middle East after a clash over Gaza with

Israels president Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forumin Davos, January 2009. Retired diplomats criticized Erdoan

for his attack. He dismissed their criticism calling them theobsolete mon chers.


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Ambassador Pamir

Retired in 2007, mit Pamir was am-bassador to Athens during the Kardak

crisis in 1996; foreign policy adviser toPrime Minister Blent Ecevit when Ab-dullah calan was captured in 1999;Turkeys representative to the U.N. at thetime of the 9/11 attacks, the Afghanistanand Iraq wars, and at the Burgenstocknegotiations on the Annan plan to re-solve the Cyprus dispute. He was amongthe twelve wise men who reshaped

NATOs new strategic concept in 2009.He was interviewed by Damla Aras onJuly 15, 2010, by telephone and e-mail.

The Editors

Middle East Quarterly: What do you think ofForeign Minister Ahmet Davutolus foreignpolicy strategies?

mit Pamir: There are some realistic componentsin his policies though not all are so well-rounded.

It is true that Turkey follows a practical foreignpolicy; that it is an important player in its region;that it needs to use its soft power; and that itshould use its cultural and historical bonds withthe surrounding region. However, these issues

mit Pamir

knowledge, and familiarity with Turkish soci-ety. The entrance examinations are rigorous,

and only the best are accepted. Many comefrom modest backgrounds and are self-madeindividuals. Given their chronically low sala-ries, most Turkish diplomats never become rich,and, after retirement, live ordinary lives. If,however, their education, career, and experi-ences make them different from the averagepolitician, that should be taken as a fact of life,not as a pretext for denigration.

MEQ: Is Turkey in the midst of an orientation

shift as some argue?

Loolu: There is certainly a paradigm shift inTurkish foreign policy away from its traditionalmoorings in the Euro-Atlantic community andtoward new directions, mostly the Muslimworld. This change is a consequence of thefundamental shift of Turkish polity as awholeaway from a secular democracy towarda regime that will continue to resemble democ-

racy in some formal aspects, but one with pro-gressively non-secular underpinnings. Thespace of Islam and religious precepts, rules,and norms is growing at the expense of otherspaces and societal points of reference. Thereis thus a coherent and consistent mindset andoutlook driving Turkish foreign policy today.

MEQ: Would you care to elaborate?

Loolu: Should the current political dynam-ics and trends persist, Turkey will be a verydifferent country in both domestic and exter-nal terms. Seeking partnerships and joining orcreating new schemes, Turkey will probablyabandon its EU accession drive altogether. Itwill be a power not just from, but also, of theMiddle East region. Its ties with NATO maycome under increasing questioning. In short,Turkeys place may no longer be in the Euro-Atlantic community, but elsewhere. The mean-ing of such an eventuality may differ in accor-dance with ones outlook. Yet it is certain thatTurkey will no longer be the secular democ-racy it has been since its foundation, a societywith a commitment to progressive civilization.


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must be approached from a realistic perspective.It would be a mistake to claim that we are not

only a regional but also a global power asDavutolu does in his book, Strategic Depth[Stratejik Derinlik(Istanbul: Kre Yaynlar, 2009)].

MEQ: Why that?

Pamir: Turkey simply doesnt have the capac-ity to act as a global power. It can analyze issuesfrom a global perspective, but to claim the roleof a global power is a different matter altogether.The current policy gives the impression that Tur-

key is not trying to become a regional power butrather a global one. It is true that a new worldorder is being established, and it is sensible toseek a regional power position. But claiming arole to influence the global checks and balancesis beyond Turkeys capacity, and it is an unat-tainable goal.

MEQ: Could you give an example?

Pamir: A good exampleof this approach is theGaza flotilla crisis be-tween Turkey and Israelin May 2010. Israel is theoccupying state in Gaza,and, therefore, it has tobe consulted and nego-tiated with.1 An opera-tion or action cannot be

initiated without consul-tations with this country. Israel made a big mis-take by attacking a civilian ship in internationalwaters. Yet this does not mean that Turkey couldtake any initiative without thinking about theconsequences.

MEQ: It was a civilian initiative. What could theAKP do?

Pamir: Turkey gave the impression that it sidedwith Hamas, which had hurt Israel. If Turkey

wants to become a soft power and use suchpower, it must act as a mediator rather than achampion of an ideological stance. For instance,the peace initiative that Turkey started betweenIsrael and Syria as a facilitator was wasted sinceIsrael declared that it didnt want Turkey in thisrole anymore. Even the Gazans ultimately askedthe Egyptians to resolve their problem. If Tur-key wants to act as a facilitator and a mediator,it must take the middle ground vis--vis thetwo sides, regardless of its affinities. But Tur-

key sided with Hamas, which raised questionsabout its policy direction and ideologicalstance.

MEQ: Could you give another example?

Pamir: Take the Armenian question. It is un-doubtedly positive to state that we are goingto resolve our problems with our neighbors.[Ahmet Davutolu, Samanyoluhaber.com, July

14, 2010] But this statement is not enough on itsown since the other parties should reciprocatethis intention. By signing the October 2009 ac-cord on the normalization of Turkish-Armenianrelations, Turkey offended Azerbaijan, whosedispute with Armenia on Nagorno Karabakh re-mains unresolved. Ankara initiated this processon the basis of a promise by third parties, espe-cially the United States, that Armenia would bepersuaded to withdraw from Karabakh. But in

foreign policy, states cannot act on mere prom-ises, especially when dealing with a superpower.There must be a detailed action plan. When thatplan materializes, then the other statein thiscase, Turkeywould take the necessary steps:in this context, signing the accord and taking itto parliament for approval.

MEQ: What is your take on Turkish-Iranianrelations?

Pamir: Turkey cannot improve its relations withIran on the basis of pure friendship. Irans trans-formation into a nuclear power will create a seri-ous problem for Turkey. Though the two coun-tries have lived as neighbors for a long time and

1 Israels occupation of the Gaza Strip ended in May 1994 withits withdrawal from the strip (apart from various Israeli settle-ments), leaving the area under the control of Yasser Arafatsnewly established Palestinian Authority. In August 2005, Israelunilaterally evacuated its remaining 8,000 citizens in the strip.Eds.

Believing that

Iran will not

harm Turkey

because of

brotherhood is

not a realistic

strategy.


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do share a broadly commonhistory, they have always been

competitors. Believing thatIran will not harm Turkey be-cause of brotherhood is not arealistic strategy. In interna-tional relations, capabilities areas important as intentions,hence no one can be sure ofwhat the future will bring. Inshort, Turkeys use of softpower is important, but it hasto be based on a realistic vi-

sion and on foresight.

MEQ: And has it?

Pamir: The impression amongmany people is that Turkeyused to have its own clear-cutnational interests. These ob-

jectives, such as Cyprus andthe Armenian issue, were ex-

plicitly clear to everyone.Other states might agree ordisagree with them, but they recognizedTurkeys vital interests. The question that manypeople are asking now is: Has Turkey changedthe definition of its national interests? They won-der whether Turkey is redefining these interestsin accordance with religious motives. At times Isuspect that myself. For instance, Turkey cameto the forefront because of the governments

stance toward Hamas whereas we havent donemuch about the problems in Kyrgyzstan andUzbekistan despite our kinship and historical tieswith them. Is this not a contradiction?

MEQ: Following on the previous question,should Turkey consider, for instance, the Pal-estinian problem as part of Turkeys nationalinterest?

Pamir: The Palestinian problem is part ofTurkeys international agenda but not part of itsnational interest. On this international issue, Tur-key sides with the Palestinians and their justcause. In the event of the signing of an agree-ment between the two sides, east Jerusalem will

probably become the capital of the Palestinianentity and west Jerusalem will remain in Israel.However, Davutolus address to Arab minis-ters during the Turkish-Arab Business Forummeeting in Istanbul in June 2010 when he as-serted that soon al-Quds will be the capital [ofPalestine] and we will go there together and prayat the al-Aqsa Mosque [Milliyet, Aug. 30, 2010]

implies that all of Jerusalem will belong to thePalestinians. This is not a realistic approach, andit is reminiscent of the crusaders struggle tosave Jerusalem from the hands of the [Muslim]infidels and make it a Christian capital. It is asimilarly disjointed policy if the intention is tosave Jerusalem from the Jews and make it aMuslim capital.

As for Erdoans statements [in April 2010,he declared that Istanbuls destiny was inextri-cably linked to Jerusalem and Gaza, and in Junehe stated that Gazas destiny couldnt bethought of as distinct from that of Istanbul, mak-ing the same analogy between Ramallah andAnkara, and Bethlehem and Konya], especiallyon Jerusalem, it is an international problem but

In his seven years at the helm, Turkeys prime minister RecepTayyip Erdoan (left), here with Irans president Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad in Tehran, October 28, 2009, has systematicallyemasculated the countrys secularist legacy, distancing Turkey

from the West and aligning it with the regions Islamist regimesand groups.


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not a national issue for Turkey. Istanbul is animportant city within the borders of Turkey and

it cannot be compared to Jerusalem. The conse-quences of using foreign policy issues to boostdomestic political support and votes can be dire.

MEQ: How do the EUspolicies toward Turkeyaffect its foreign policy?

Pamir:The EUs policiescontributed to the shiftof Turkish foreign policy

toward the Middle East.However, this shouldntmean turning ones backon the EU. The responseto the EU must be, Do

not keep us hanging on by putting several con-ditions that you do not ask of other candidatecountries. It is necessary to settle all thesescores with the EU, to frankly state that a privi-leged partnership is unacceptable, and that the

EU must apply the same entrance requirementsto Turkey as to other countries. It is necessaryto get the message across to the EU that Tur-key wants to enter this club, but additional re-quirements specifically for Turkey indicate thatthe EU may have ulterior motives such as re-modeling Turkey, which is something that Tur-key cannot accept.

Particularly in the field of foreign policy,Turkey has to explain to the EU that its strate-

gic position is different from that of the rest ofits members. Indeed, Turkeys borders with re-gions such as the Caucasus and the MiddleEast are an advantage for the EU as it can con-tribute to EU policies significantly. But in otherrespects, to close the doors to the EU would bea mistake.

MEQ: But Turkey has seen real improvement inits relationship with the EU during the AKP era,such as the opening of membership talks in 2004.

Pamir: True enough, but the governments ef-forts toward EU membership have significantlyslowed down since 2005. Furthermore, ratherthan discuss the points of disagreement in the

accession partnership document, it seems thatthe government has initiated the reforms that

suit its own interests and ignored any otherissues.

MEQ: What is your view on drawing parallelsbetween the Ottomans and the AKP, neo-Ottomanism?

Pamir:At times, the AKPs foreign policy is remi-niscent of that of the Ottoman Empire. Its for-eign policy impulses give the impression thatthey are predicated on ideology. For instance,

the AKP rightfully argued that Hamas waselected through democratic elections and that itshould be, therefore, recognized by other states.But if it were to follow this line to its logical con-clusion, the AKP should have commented onthe rigging of the Iranian elections in June 2009.Similarly, Erdoan participated in the Srebrenicamemorial in July 2010 and rightfully declared thatthe massacre had become a dark stain on theBalkans, Europe, and the entire world. Yet in

November 2009, he invited to Turkey theSudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, who is ac-cused of committing genocide. These contradic-tions inevitably raise questions about the role ofreligion in Turkish foreign policymaking.

MEQ: Do you think the AKP started a new erain Turkish foreign policy?

Pamir: In the last decade there has been a con-

siderable increase in the social, economic, andcultural standards of Turkey, which led to therealization that it could act as a regional power.The AKP contributed to the awakening of thisconsciousness. It used soft power in the Is-raeli-Syrian conflict, in Lebanon, and amongvarious factions in Iraq. Yet none of these de-velopments mean that Turkish foreign policyhas become multidimensional under the AKP. Ithas been multidimensional since the Atatrkera. For example, in the 1930s, Turkey estab-lished good relations with the United Kingdomand France even though it fought against themduring World War I and the Turkish war of in-dependence. Similarly, Turkey established goodrelations with the West in general as well as

Erdoans

contradictions

raise questions

about the role

of religion inTurkish

foreign policy.


11/11


with Iran. It signed the Saadabad pact with itsMiddle Eastern neighbors in the 1930s and es-

tablished the Baghdad pact with them in the1950s. Being aware of its unique yet sensitivegeopolitical position, Turkey has always triedto establish a security zone around it. It hasbeen close to the Arabs, too. There are somehistorical facts that no one can deny, such asthe Arabs collaboration with the British Empireagainst the Ottoman Empire, as in the case ofHussein ibn Ali, the sharif of Mecca. Neverthe-less, despite the protests of some circles, Tur-key entered the Organization of the Islamic Con-

ference in the 1970s. Similarly, Turkey disagreedwith Israel on the Palestinian issue right from the

beginning. It has been defending the Palestin-ians rights and cooperating with them for years.The only difference that the AKP has brought tothis policy was to define this issue as Turkeysnational interest. In the final analysis, Turkey isa country with a deep-rooted history and tradi-tions. And the AKP years will be remembered asa limited period within this long history.

CIA Rainmaker Causes Pakistan Floods

On August 6, 2010, a Pakistani website released a report titled Pakistan Flood: HAARP Used in

Pakistan? Urgent, accusing the CIA and its alleged use of the High Frequency Active Auroral

Research Program (HAARP), the Alaska-based U.S. Air Force program, to artificially cause the

flooding.

We have investigated this matter and concluded that HAARP is being used in Pakistan; and of

course how can we ignore Indias Baglihar and Kabuls Sarobi dams contribution in this perfect

plan!

This Flood Disaster is More Manmade than Natural. The choice of starting point was perfect

... all the flood is going ... downstream, i.e. Khyber [Hills] to Karachi [Sea] ... It is designed to

submerge all of Pakistan and produce the worst crises and chaos ever ... They know they cant win

a war with nuclear-armed Pakistanit would be mutual destruction, so they have other ways to

do it!

Andrei Areshev, a renowned Russian scholar and the deputy head of the Strategic Culture

Foundation, warns that the current devastating fires raging throughout Russia could have beentriggered by American weather weaponswhat is now becoming the infamous HAARP Technology.

It isnt just conspiracy theorists who are concerned about HAARP. The European Union

called the project a global concern and passed a resolution calling for more information on its health

and environmental risks. Despite those concerns, officials at HAARP insist the project is no more

sinister than a radio science research facility.

HAARP (High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program) is a little-known yet critically

important U.S. military defense program which has generated quite a bit of controversy over the

years in certain circles. Though denied by HAARP officials, some respected researchers allege that

secret electromagnetic warfare capabilities of HAARP are designed to forward the U.S. militarys

stated goal of achieving full-spectrum dominance by the year 2020. Others go so far as to claim that

HAARP can and has been used for weather modification, to cause earthquakes and tsunamis, to

disrupt global communications systems, and more.

Pakalert Press, Aug. 6, 2010

turkey's ambassadors vs. erdoğan meq winter 2011

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