trust and commitment

7/28/2019 Trust and Commitment

1/11

Trust and Commitment: Reciprocal andMultidimensional Concepts in DistributionRelationshipsGregory S. Black, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi

IntroductionExchanges between organizations are oftentreated by scholars as discrete events in whichindividual entities are characterized as rational,calculating, and self-interested, with exchangebehaviors unaffected by social relations (e.g.,Frenzen and Davis, 1990). One of the basicassumptions is that parties of an exchange rela-tionship will act opportunistically without regardfor their exchange partners whenever they canfurther themselves or their organizations by sodoing (John, 1984).

Despite the one-time prevalence of this view,closer, deeper inter-organizational relationships(i.e., distribution channel relationships) arereceiving increasing attention by both practitio-ners and leading marketing scholars (e.g.,Gundlach and Murphy, 1993; Welch, 2006).Among the most frequently examined variablesthat affect the developmen t of such relationshipsare trust (e.g., Bakk er et al., 2006; Wang, 2006)and commitment (e.g., Anderson and Weitz,1992; Lehtonen, 2006; Tumm ala et al., 2006).Understanding the important roles of trust andcommitment in distribution channels is crucial inunderstanding channel relationships. However,we still have only a superficial know ledge of thecomplexities and subtleties of trust and commit-ment in these relationships.

Blau (1964) contends that a major function ofexchange is the creation of trust within andbetween organizations. Trust is viewed by someas social capital that gains value as it deepensbetween two business partners (e.g., Bakker etal., 2006). Some research even suggests thattrust in a channel relationship increases channelperformance (Child et al., 2003; Lin et al.,2005). Morgan and Hunt (1994) suggest thattrust must be present in a channel relationship

before comm itment can be developed, and morerecent research concurs with these findings (e.g.,Kilbum et ai., 2006; MacMillan et al., 2005).Supporting this relationship, Moorman et al.(1992) suggest that trust is a major determinantof commitment.

Like trust, commitment is an essential ingredi-ent for successful distribution channel relation-ships (Lehtonen, 2006; Tummala et al., 2006).Committed partners are willing to invest invaluable assets specific to an exchange, demon-strating that they can be relied upon to performessential functions in the future (Anderson andWeitz, 1992). Indeed, the concept of commit-ment is becoming a focal point in explainingmarketing even as the very nature of marketingmoves further away from the transactional viewof exchange and toward the concept of relation-ship marketing (Gundlach et al., 1995). Commit-ment, like trust, is reciprocal in nature (Ander-son and Weitz, 1992; Gundlach et al., 1995).Comm itment is also a complex variable com-posed of more than one dimension (Ozag, 2006).

Therefore, this study includes multiple dimen-sions of both trust and commitment in a trust-commitment cycle and assesses the relationshipbetween them. This examination uses data fromrelationships between manufacturers and dis-tributors in distribution channels. Though previ-ous work has explored the dimensions of thesevariables and other work has examined therelationship between trust and commitment, noprevious research has done both. |Literature ReviewMorgan and Hunt (1994) suggest that trust andcommitment should be important to understand-ing close, long-term marketing relationships.These concepts arc key for three reasons. First,


2/11

they encourage managers to work at preservingrelationship investments by cooperating moreclosely with exchange partners. Second, theyencourage managers to seek long-term benefitsby staying with existing channel partners insteadof being attracted to short-term profits. Finally,trust and commitment encourage managers to hemore willing to take high-risk actions becausethey beheve their partners will not act opportu-nistically. In summary, trust and commitmentlead directly to cooperative behaviors that areconducive to relationship maintenance within amarketing channel.Trust is a prerequisite for the development ofcommitment between two channel partners. Inaddition, the commitment of one channel partner(i.e., the huyer) will enhance the other partner's(i.e., the seller) trust in that partner (i.e., the buyer).

TrustTrust is an essential ingredient in cooperationand agreement between two parties (e.g.. Leeand Dawes, 2005; Wang, 2006). It is importantin exchange relationships because it leads toconstructive dialogue and cooperative problemsolving (Pruitt, 1981). Thu s, it plays a criticalrole in the development of long-term relation-ships because short-term inequities are inevi-table in any relationship (Wilding andHumphries, 2006). At this most basic level, oneparty m ust act before the other party, and there-fore, must rely on the other party to honor itsobligations (Kronman, 1985). Consequently, anytype of coordination between parties leave themopen to exploitation.

Similarly, through trust, channel partnersdevelop confidence that, over the long-term,short-term inequities will be corrected to yield along-term benefit (Wang, 2006). In addition,mutual, or reciprocal, trust is more likely thanone-way trust (Burgess and Huston, 1983). Sincetrust is a multidimensional concept, all dimen-sions must be considered when attempting todefine it (McAllister, 1995).

Dispositional trust. Interpersonal trust is abasic feature of all social situations that dem andcooperation and interdependence. Whether loan-ing money, forming a car pool, or visiting aphysician, individuals must decide whether therisk of becoming vulnerable and dependent isworth the risk involved. This element of risk isthe foundation of dispositional trust. The predi-lection of individuals and organizations to trustis known as dispositional trust. When individu-

als or organizations choose trusting over nottrusting a vast majority of the time, they have ahigh level of dispositional trust. Though disposi-tional trust held by an organization, such as abusiness firm, operates similarly to dispositionaltrust in individuals, this idea of an organization'spredisposition to trust has been almost totallyneglected in business academic literature(Lewin, 2003).With the ever-increasing reliance on inter-organizational relationships to become competi-tive, firms face the "trust or not to trust" choicewith increasing frequency. Firms might tend tobe risk-averse or conservative; in other words,they may be unwilling to put their fate in thehands of another firm. This loss of control canbe a disincentive to trust. Also, firms may justhave a tradition of not trusting. In these cases,the firms would have low dispositional trust. In

order for a distribution relationship betweenfirms to deepen (for firms to even considerrelying on one another), the participants must atleast be moderately predisposed to trust. Basedon this discussion, dispositional trust in theinter-organizational setting can be defined as thegeneral tendency of a company to rely on thewords, promises, and deeds of another firm,whether contractually controlled or not. In addi-tion, dispositional trust occurs before the com-pany becomes familiar with these other firms.Credibility trust. Most popular definitions oftrust in the literature tend to define trust from areliability perspective. For example, brandnames, trademarks, logos, etc. are symbols thatpromise a certain kind of service or product.Guarantees are more explicit antecedents oftrust. Experience with a distribution partner isanother basis for trusting that partner (Schurrand Ozanne, 1985). Schurrand Ozanne (1985)conclude that necessary communication andconcession-making processes in a distributionchannel are influenced by beliefs about apartner's trustworthiness.Credibility trust, then, is the extent to whichone party b elieves that the other party in a chan-nel relationship has the required expertise toperform the jo b effectively and reliably and iswilling to use that expertise in the channel rela-tionship (cf., Ganesan, 1994). In other words,the relationship with a channel partner is moreattractive when the partner is more trustworthybecause, by definition, the trustworthy partner'sword is reliable and exchange obligations will befulfilled (Schurr and Ozanne, 1985).

WINTER 2008


3/11

Benevolent trust. Though some scholarssuggest that trust does not include an "altruisticor benevolent" component, Larzelere andHuston (1980) contend that mutual trust exists tothe extent that one party believes another to bebenevolent and honest. McAllister (1995) ac-knowledges the importance of this affectivedimension of trust and defines it as the emo-tional bond between parties. Affective trust isinfluenced by how one firm view s the fairness ofits distribution p artner and by the treatment itreceives as a legitimate and respected member ofthe distribution channel (Korsgaard et aL, 1995).This benevolent dimension of trust focuses onthe motives and intentions of the channel partner(Kiessling and Harvey, 2004). It includes thequalities, intentions, and characteristics attrib-uted to the partner rather than its specific behav-iors (Rempel et al., 1985). Thus, a channelmem ber w ho is concerned with the outcomes ofits partner, along w ith its own, will be trusted toa greater extent than one concerned solely withits own welfare (Ganesan, 1994). Benevolent

trust, therefore, is the extent to which one partybelieves the other has intentions and motivesbeneficial to it when new conditions arise, con-ditions for which obligations did not previouslyexist (cf., Rempel et al., 1985).CommitmentAs the discipline of marketing moves furtheraway from the discrete and contractual exchangeview, commitment is likely to become increas-ingly important in the examination of distribu-tion channel phenomena (Gundlach et al., 1995).Commitment, which is an essential ingredientfor successful long-term channel relationships(e.g., Lehtonen, 2006; Tummala et al.. 2006),has been defined as "an implicit or explicitpledge of relational continuity between ex-change partners" (Dwyeret al., 1987). Commit-ment implies a willingness to make short-termsacrifices to realize longer-term benefits. OthersFigure 1. Model of Hypothesized Relationships

have indicated that commitment is associatedwith motivation and involvement (Mowday etal., 1982), positive effect and loyalty (Kanter,1972), performance and obedience to organiza-tional policies (Angle and Perry, 1981). andseveral other positive distribution channel out-comes (Cullen et al., 1995). Like trust, under-standing the nature of commitment requiresrecognition that it is complex and multidimen-sional (Gundlach et a l , 1995).Calculative commitment. Two dimensions ofcommitment have dominated the literature. Thefirst sees commitment as calculative. Becker(1960) regarded this dimension of comm itmentas behavioral rather than attitudinal. This dimen-sion is also referred to as behavioral commit-ment and continuance commitment. Calculative

commitment is the extent to which one firm isbound to another through extraneous interestsrather than favorable affect toward the organiza-tion (Srinivasan and Brush, 2006).

Attitudinal com mitment. Known as attitudinalcomm itment, this dimension suggests that com-mitment has an affective or attitudinal compo-nent. One firm will identify with the distributionchannel partners and, therefore, is committed tomaintaining mem bership to pursue the channel'sgoals (McGee and Ford, 1987). Attitudinalcommitment is specifically defined as an affec-tive or emotional attachment to the distributionchannel such that the strongly committed firmidentifies w ith, is involved in, and enjoys m em-bership in the channel (Allen and Meyer, 1990).HypothesesThe trust-commitment cycle is an importantstep in understanding the trend toward closerinter-organizational relationships. Firms in-volved in or seeking such relationships shouldunderstand the necessary components ofdeveloping and maintaining them. In addition.

DispositionalTrust r

N

CredibilityTrust CalculativeCommitmentr

BenevolentTrust| / AttitudinalCommitment

ReciprocalCredibility Trust(Perceived)

ReciprocalBenevolent Trust(Perceived)


4/11

scholars should be interested in this study'sclarification of the dimensions of trust andcommitment and the relationships among thevarious dimensions (Figure 1). The buyer's trustTrust is a multidimensional construct. Indeed,some scholars have suggested that in interper-sonal settings these dimensions may even behierarchical and act as phases in the evolution oftrust (e.g., Gulati, 1995). Tbese arguments positthat trust progresses through the dispositional,attitudinal, and cognitive dimensions by meansof mutually rewarding and satisfying interac-tions and increasing confidence in the relation-ship (Driscoli et al., 1972). Further, Gulati(1995) suggests that trust "emerges betweenorganizations over time through repeated ties."The starting point is dispositional trust, with themost evolved component being the affectivedimension (benevolence). Trust, then, expands toinclude the affective component rather thanmoving away from the cognitive component.This higher evolution of trust includes both thecognitive and the affective elements.

Like interpersonal relationships, trust incooperative distribution relationships may berooted in the predisposition of tbe members toengage in deep and close inter-organizationalrelationships. Not all organizational culturespermit such closeness and the requisite intentionto trust (Larson, 1991). Individual firms vary intheir inclination and willingness to trust in inter-organizational settings. Some firms have aninherent tendency to seek and forge strong,mutually beneficial alliances, wbile others donot appear disposed to this under any circum-stances. Firms without the disposition to trustwill not look for close relationships with channelpartners, and relationships between tbem andtheir exchange partners will remain at arm'slength, based in transactions or discreet contract-ing (Williamson, 1985). How ever, firms that arepredisposed to trust otber firms (dispositionaltrust) will tend to develop inter-organizationalrelationships that are deeper in general andexhibit certain characteristics, including themore evolved dimensions of trust. Thus, theevolution from dispositional trust in a distribu-tion channel relationship to credibility trust, andthen to benevolent trust is a process wherestrong deveiopment of each lower dimension oftrust increases tbe likelihood of m oving to thenext level. Therefore, the following relationshipsare hypothesized.

//,. The higher one company's dispositionaltrust for a cha nnel partner, the higher itscredibility trust for that channe l partner.H^: The higher one com pany's dispositionaltrust for a ch annel partner, the higher itsbenevolent trust for that channel partner.H^: The higher one company's ciedibility trustfor a channel partner, the higher its benevo-lent trust for that channel p artner The buyer's trust and commitmentCommitment to a channel partner is manifestedin part by engaging in consistent types of activi-ties based on the recognition of the costs associ-ated witb discontinuing tbe relationship (Kilbumet al., 2006). Specifically, calculative commit-ment is demonstrated when a firm (i.e., tbebuyer) consciously performs activities that willallow its channel p artner (i.e., the su pplier) to"calculate" the amount of commitment it hastoward it. These calculations can be based onissues sucb as the amount of resources expendedin maintaining the relationship, the number ofother channel partners, and the resources ex-pended on these relationships (MacMillan et al.,2005).

Channel partners consider com mitmentamong partners as key to achieving their goalsand outcomes. Thus, they will strive to developand maintain this asset in their relationships. Forexample, if buyers in channel relationships havecredibility trust for their suppliers, they havemonitored the reliability and other characteris-tics of those suppliers and have determined themto be trustworthy. As the amount of evidenceabout the trustworthiness of a supplier increases,the buyer w ill see more potential benefit fromthe relationship and be more willing to commitresources to the relationship. Likewise, the buyerwill tend to have fewer relationships so they canbuild and maintain commitment to that supplier.Tbese activities are based on calculative com-mitment, the cognitive component of com mit-ment. The buyer has determined that the supplieris credible through cognitive "calculations"(credibility trust) and is now willing to demon-strate its commitment in a cognitive manner(calculative comm itment).

Similarly, benevolence, the affective compo-nent of trust, should result in the development ofthe cognitive component of commitment (calcu-lative commitment). A buyer will have a greatertendency to commit to tbe relationship with asupplier if the trust for tbat supplier is internal-ized. In addition, tbe buyer that has internalized

WINTER 2008


5/11

the trust for a supplier will be willing to forgorelationships with similar suppliers to concen-trate on the relationship with the trusted supplier(e.g., MacMillan et a l, 2005). Thu s, if a buyerfeels trust for the supp lier at the most evolved ,internalized, and affective level (benevolenttrust), this feeling of benevolence will enter intothe "calculations" of whether to be committed tothe supplier and whether to devote resources tothe relationship. When the buyer feels that thesupplier is empathetic and sensitive to thebuyer's position and needs, even when condi-tions change, the buyer will likely commit re-sources to build the relationship because of thesignificant benefits.

Attitudinal commitment requires channelpartners to look beyond contractual requirementsand calculations of benefits. The attitudinallycommitted partner feels obliged to the relation-ship itself. It is comm itted to what the relation-ship represents and entails (Cullen et al., 1995).It implies that channel partners view their owncompany goals as secondary to the goals of therelationship.

The type of commitment that needs to beconstantly and consciously demonstrated is alower ieve! than is possible in an ongoing rela-tionship (Shore and Wayne, 1993). A higherlevel of commitment moves beyond this need toconsciously demonstrate by comm itting re-sources and foregoing other relationships. Thishigher level, attitudinal commitment, is the stateof internalizing the commitment toward anotherparty. It moves beyond m ere economic rewards,costs, and benefits that may come from a rela-tionship. Intemalization means that a party feelsa part of the partnership, future plans w ill natu-rally include the partner, and the temptation toseek other relationships in hard times is dimin-ished. Partners are willing to make efforts toresolve problems rather than exiting the relation-ship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992).This evolved dim ension of commitmentdepends on the amount of trust one partner feelsfor another. A firm must feel secure with apartner before attitudinal commitment can occur.For example, a buyer must be confident that thesupplier will consider the buyer's interests andneeds, even through changing conditions. If suchtrust exists, the commitme nt will take the formof a desire to develop a stable relationship, awillingness to make short-term sacrifices tomaintain the relationship, and an internal confi-dence in the stability of the relationship (Ander-son and Weitz, 1992). Based on this discussion.

the following hypotheses are indicated.//^.- The more positive a firm's credibility trust istoward a channel partner, the more positiveits calculative commitment toward thatpartner.H^: The more positive a firm's benevolent trustis toward a channel partner, the more posi-tive its calculative com mitment toward thatpartner.H^: The more positive a firm's benevolent trustis toward a channel partner, the more posi-tive its attitudinal commitment toward thatpartner. The buye r *s c ommit me ntWhen a relationship between two parties is firstbeginning, one party will feel bound to itthrough extraneous or external interests (e.g.,financial rewards) rather than favorable affecttoward their partner (Reichers, 1985). However,as the relationship goes on, the external interestswill be taken for granted, and identification withthe relationship as well as an intemalization ofthe relationship w ill occur. In other word s, if therelationship, which is at first based on calcula-tive commitment or external interests, consis-tently results in these external rewards, a partywill eventually view the partner and the relation-ship as "part" of themselves, and future plansand strategies will include that party (Nelson andQuick, 1991). However, note that commitmentcannot expand to include this higher level (attitu-dinal commitment) without the presence ofcalculative com mitment.

In a channel situation, the buyer will be com-mitted to a relationship with a supplier becausethe supplier provides some type of financial orother external reward. As this level of commit-ment embeds, the channel partners will acceptthe joint goals and values of the partnership astheir own. In other words, attitudinal commit-ment requires that channel partners look beyondcontractual obligations and their estimates ofbenefits to their own companies. As buyers areable to determine the consistency of the externalbenefits from the supplier, they will begin tocount on them and internalize the supplier andrelationship goals (Gulati, 1995). Indeed, theywill even begin to considered their own go als andobjectives as secondary to those of the relation-ship. If a buyer never develops this calculativecommitment, it will never be able to approachthis evolved level of attitudinal commitment.Therefore, the following hypothesis is offered.


6/11

//^; The higher one compa ny's calculative com-mitment toward a channel partner, thehigher its attitudinal commitment towardthat partner. The buyer's comm itment and the supplier's

trustTrust is reciprocal (e.g., Hingley, 2004). Inaddition, as a buyer demonstrates calculativecommitment in a relationship, the supplier willcome to trust the huy er as reliable, willing., andable to deliver on role performance in the rela-tionship. Supp liers are aware that firms will notseek to bond to other exchange partners unlessthere is some level of comm itment. The buye r'sattempts to bond will convey to the supplier thatthe buyer is willing to forgo other considerationsso they can com mit to that particular supp lier. Ifthe buyer demonstrates consistency in thesebonding attempts that signify calculative com-mitment, the supplier will begin to trust (cred-ibility trust) the buyer. In other w ords, the buyersees the benefits and rewards that can resultfrom a relationship with the supplier. The buyercommits resources to build the relationship andinvests in the relationship in other ways. Be-cause of these efforts by the buyer, the suppliersees that the buyer has expertise and competencein performing important channel tasks. In addi-tion, the supplier sees that the buyer will applyexpertise in a conscientious and consistentfashion.Through the course of the relationship and thenormal interaction, the buyer's attitudinal com-mitment to the supplier will become apparent.This occurs when the buyer demonstrates thatthe goals of the relationship have become inter-nalized and supersedes any individual firm goalsthe buyer may have. In other words, as the buyerbegins to internalize the relationship goals andidentify with the supplier and the relationship,the supplier will become aware of this higherlevel of commitment. As this occurs, the sup-plier will develop trust toward the buyer on thebenevolent dimension. The supplier will feel likethe buyer is really committed to the relationshipand is not in it merely for the econo mic benefits.The supplier will begin to have more confidencethat the buyer will not act in a harmful mannertoward the supplier, regardless of the circum-stances that arise. The supplier will also realizethat the buyer is sensitive and empathetic to thesupplier's position in the relationship and willconsider the supplier's interests. Therefore, thefollowing hypotheses are proposed.

H^: The higher a firm's calculative com mitmenttoward a channel partner, the more its part-ner reciprocates with credibility trust towardit.H.' The higher a firm's attitudinal commitmenttoward a channel partner, the more its part-ner reciprocates with benevolent trust to-ward it.

MethodologyMany measures in the study were derived fromthose used in previous research, while otherswere developed specifically for this study orwere slightly modified to fit the study's objec-tives. The completed questionnaire was reviewedby a panel of research experts and refined on thebasis of their feedback. In addition, telephonecalls to all manufacturers in the selected industry(electronic components) determined tbe rel-evancy of the research hypotheses under investi-gation. The manufacturers in this SIC (3679) areoriginal components manufacturers. Table 1summarizes conceptual definitions and sourcesof the various measures. For the last two hypoth-eses, the respondents were asked to answerquestions about their perceptions regarding theirpartners' levels of trust for the respondents'firms.Each of the firms in the chosen sample (elec-tronic components manufacturers) was initiallyscreened by telephone. According to Heide andJohn (1992 ), collecting data from manu facturersand buyers from a single industry is important tolimit extraneous sources of variation. This pre-liminary screening served two purposes: ithelped identify key informants who were mostknowledgeable about the relationships and theissues being investigated (Anderson et al., 1994;Kumar et al., 1995); and it boosted the responserate by getting prior commitments to participate.The screening shortened the list of potentialrespondents. Of the 1,062 original firms, 768were deemed suitable for the study and tenta-

tively agreed to participate. Subsequently, eachcompany was sent a prenotification letter thatexplained the study, emphasized its importance,reminded about the agreement to participate, andurged in a timely response. Several days later,the questionnaire package was mailed to the keyinformants in each organization, including thequestionnaire, a cover letter explaining the studyand assuring confidentiality, and a postage-paidreturn envelope.The steps in the data collection procedurewere expected to result in a respectable response


7/11

Table 1. Definitions, Sources, and Reliabilities of MeasuresConceptual Defnition Source AlphaTrust Dispositiotial TrustA general tendeticy held by a company that the words, promises, anddeeds of another firm, whether contractually controlled or not, can berelied upon. Credibility TrustThe extent to which one party believes that the other party in achannel relationship has the required experience to perform the jobeffectively and reliably and is willing to use that expertise. Benevolent TrustThe extent to which one party believes that the other party hasintentions and motives beneficial to it when new conditions arise,conditions for which obligations did not exist.

New wit!) Rotter1967;1980

McAllister 1995;Rempeletal. 1985

McAllister 1995;Rempeletal. 1985

.63

.90

.90

Commitment Calculative Comm itmentThe extent to which one party is bound to the other party throughextraneous intersts rather than favorable affect toward the other partyand is willing to invest resources on behalf of the relationship. Attitudinal CommitmentThe extent to which a partner internalizes the goals and values of thepartnership and is willing to expend effort on the relationship and itsgoals above its own goals.

Meyer and Allen 1984 .80

Meyer and Allen 1984 0.63

rate, equivalent to similar channels research.Acceptable rates run from 25% to 36% (e.g.,Boyle et al., 1992). Of the 768 companies, 107returned usable questionnaires, resulting in aresponse rate of only 1 3.9%. Two factors thatmay have contributed to this lower response ratewere the length of the questionnaire and theperceived sensitivity of the information in thisparticular industry, according to comments ofseveral respondents.The first step in data analysis is to make themeasures as parsimonious and unidimensional aspossible. To this purpose, exp loratory factoranalysis and reliability analysis were used toreduce the scales. The resulting measures wereall acceptably above the suggested Cronbach'salpha level of .70 showing suitable reliabilities(Cronbach, 1951; Nunnally, 1978). The onlyexception was the measure for dispositionaltrust, with a Cronbach's alpha of .63. However,since it was a new measure developed for thisstudy, and based on guidelines suggested byother scholars (C hurchill and Peter, 1984), it was

deemed sufficiently reliable to proceed with theassessment of the hypotheses.ResultsOrdinary least squares (OLS) regression wasused to examine the individual hypotheses. Eachwas assessed individually because preliminaryevaluation indicated that examining them incombination sometimes weakened the results,thus causing concern about isolating the exactimpact of the independent variables on thedependent variables. In addition, this phenom-enon is common when there is a relatively smallsample size. In summary, the hypotheses wereexamined individually to more accurately assessthe influence of the independent variables. Theresults of hypotheses testing are summarized inTable 2.

The effects of dispositional trust on the moreevolved forms of trust first, cred ibility trust,and second, benevolent trust were mixed. Thepredisposition of a company to trust does notaffect the development of that firm's credibility


8/11

Table 2. OLS R egression Results of Hypotheses TestingHyp.

NumberHIH2H3H4H5H6H7H8H9

IndependentVariable

Dispositional TrustDispositional TrustCredibility TrustCredibility TrustBenevolent TrustBenevolent TrustCalculative Comm itmentCaleulative Comm itmentAlliludinal Conimitment

DependentVariable

Credibility TrustBenevolent TrustBenevolent TrustCalculative CommitmentCalculative Comm itmentAttitudinal CommitmentAttitudina! CommitmentReciprocal Credibility TrustReciprocal Benevolent Trust

ParameterEstimate

0.050.070.830.260.420.650.450.140.29

t-Value0.421.16*14.19***1.95**2.80***7.85***4.67***1.30*3.80***

p < . 1 0 ** p < . 0 5 *** p < .0 1trust, indicating no support for H,. However, aspredicted, higher dispositional trust does lead tohigher benevolent trust (t = 1.16, p < . 10); thus,H, is supported. Further, a high level of credibil-ity trust (the mid-level of the three trust levels)was shown to have a positive effect on the devel-opment of benevolent trust (the uppermost levelof the three trust levels) (t = 14.19, p < .01),supporting H ,.All three hypotheses predicting that the uppertwo levels of trust would lead to both levels ofcommitment were supported by this research.First, support for H^ was found by show ing thatthe more positive a company's credibility trusttoward its channel pa rtner, the mo re positive thatcom pany's calculative comm itment toward itspartner will be (t = 1.95, p < .05). Second, acompany's benevolent trust for its channelpartner also leads to higher levels of calculativecommitment toward that partner (t = 2.80, p


9/11

maintaining long-term channel relationships,making it less necessary to constantly find newpartners. Since a significant switching cost isinvolved every time a channel partner must bereplac ed, trust is crucial to the efficiency of adistribution channel operation. Trust should beviewed by managers as an evolutionary phenom-enon, and longevity in these distribution channelrelationships is necessary before the evolutioncan occur and the efficiency of the highest levelof trust is realized.Of course, as trust evolves between two chan-nel partners, the desire for managers to commitmore resources to one another to maintain theserelationships efficiently will increase. A com-pany will begin at the lower-level, cognitive stateof commitment, known as calculative com mit-ment. During this time, managers of one com-pany will be constantly checking to ensure thatresources committed to the relationship are wellexpended. However, over time, the relationshipwill evolve toward the higher-level, affectivestate of commitment, known as attitudinal com-mitment. At that point, managers will be able towithdraw resources from the "checking-up "process and will feel that they should commit tothe relationship.

Of course, no relationship between two orga-nizations is likely to evolve to the point wh ereno checks and balances are required. However,at the higher levels of trust and commitment,these efforts (and resources) can be minimizedby managers, making the distribution channelmo re efficient overall. The confirmation thatboth trust and commitment are evolutionaryconcepts further implies to managers that main-taining long-term relationships (relationshipmarketing) is desirable to allow these phenom-ena to occur. This, in turn, will make the distri-bution channel and the process of distributingprodu cts as efficient as possible.

Dr. Black's research focuses on marketing strat-egy, business-to-business marketing, consumerbehavior, and electronic marketing. His findingshave been published in various journals andpresented at conferences.R E F E R E N C E S

Allen, N. J., and Meyer, J. P. (1990). Organizational social-ization tactics: A longitudinal analysis of links to new-comers" commitment and role orientation. Academy ofManagement Review, 33{4), 847-858.

Anderson, E., and Weitz, B. (1992). The use of pledges tobuild and sustain commitment in distribution channels.

Journal of Marketing Research, 29(1 ). 18-34.Anderson, J. C, Hakansson, H., and Johanson, J. (1994).

Dyadic business relationships within a business networkcontext. Journal of Marketing, 58(3), 1-15.

Angle, H. L., and Perry, J. (1981). An empirical assess-ment of organizational commitment and organiza-tional effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly. 26 ,1-14.Bakker. M., Leenders, R. A.. Gabbay, S. M.. Kratzer, J.. andVan Engelen, J. M. L. (2006). Is trust really social capi-tal? Knowledge sharing in product development projects.The Learning Organization. 3{6}. 594-605.

Becker, H. S. (1960). Notes on the concept of comm itment.American Journal of Sociology. 6, 32-40.

Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. Ne wYork: John Wiley.

Boyle, B.. Dwyer, F. R., Robicheaux. A., and Simpson, J. T.(1992). Influence strategies m marketing channels: M ea-sures and use in different relationship s tructures. Journalof Marketing Research, 29(4). 462-73.

Burgess, R. L., and Huston, T. L. (1983). Social exch ange indeveloping relationships: An overview," in Social Ex-change in Developing Relationships, R. Burgess and T.Huston, eds-. New York: Academic Press, 3 -28.

Child, J., Chung, L.. and Davies , H. (2003). The performanceof cross-border units in China: A test of natural selection.strategic choice and contingency theories. Journal of In-ternational Business Studies, 34(2), 242-257.

Churchill. Gilbert A., and Peter, J. Paul. (1984, November).Research Design Effects on the Reliability of RatingScales. Journal of Marketing Research. 2!, 360-75.

Cronbach, L. J. ( 1951 ). Coefficent alpha and the internal struc-ture of tests. Psychomctrika. 16. 297-334.

Cullen. J. B., Johnson. J. L., and Saka no. T. (1995). Japa neseand local partner commitme nt to IJ Vs : Psychological con-.sequences of outcomes and investments in the UV rela-tionship. Journal of International Business Studies. (1).1-25.

Driscoli. R., Davis. K. E., and Lipetz. M. E. (1972). Parentalinterference and romantic love. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology. 24. 1-10.

Dwyer, F. R.. Schurr. R H., and Oh. S. (1987). Developingbuyer-seller relationships. Journal ofMarketing. 51(2), 11-27 .

Frenzen, J. K.. and Davis, H. L. (1990). Purchasing behaviorin embedded miykets, Journal of Consumer Research.77(2), 1-12.

Gan esan.S .(1994). Determinants of long-term orientation inbuyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing. 22 (2). 1 -19.

Gulati, R. ( 1995), Does familiarity breed trust? The implica-tions of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances.Academy of Management Journal. 38(]). 85-112.

Gundlach, G. T.. Achrol. R. S., and Mentzer. J. T. (1995).The structure of commitment in exchange. Journal ofMarketing, 59(\),1S~92.

Gundlach. G. T . and Murphy. P. E. (1993). Ethical and legalfoundations of relational marketing exchange. Journal ofMarketing, 57(4). 3 5 ^ 6 .

Heide, J. B., and John, G. (1992). Do norms matter in


10/11

marketing relationships? Journal ofMarketing,56(2), 32 -44 .

Hingley. M. (2(X)4). Relationship development in the UK freshproduce supply chain. Journal of Marketing Channels./2( l) , 27-37 .John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some anteced-ents of opportunism in a marketing channel. Journal of

Marketing Research, 2/(3), 278-289.Kanter, R. M. (1972). Commitment and Community. Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Kiessling, T., and Harvey. M. (2004). Global marketing net-works and the development of trust: A dynamic capabili-ties perspective. Journal of Marketing Channels, 11(4).

21-38.Kilbum, A .. Thieme, J.. and Boiler, B . (2006). The positiveand negative consequence.s of Internal customer orienta-tion on internal customer-.supplier relationship quality.American Marketing A.-isoviation Summer Educators'Conference Proceedings, 17, 101-107.Korsgaard, M. A., Schweiger, D. M., and Sapienza, H. J.

(1995). Building commitment, attachment, and trust instrategic decision-making teams: The role of proceduraljustice. Academy of Management Journal, 38{ 1 ), 60-84.Kronm an, A. T. (1985). Contract law and the .state of nature.Journal of Law. Economics, and Organization, 7(3), 5-

32 .Kumar. N.. Scheer, L. K., and Steenkamp, J. E, M. (1995).The effects of supplier fairness on vulnerable resellers.Journal of Marketing Research. 32(\), 54-65 .Larson, A. ( 1991 ). Partner networks: Leveraging extemal tiesto improve entrepreneurial performance. Journal of Busi-ness Venturing, 6(3), 173-88.Larzelere, R. E.. and Huston. T. L. (1980). The dyadic trustscale: Toward understanding interpersonal tmst in close

relationships. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 2/ ( 3 ) ,595-604.Lee. D. Y., and Daw es. P. L. (2(X)5). Guanxi . trust, and l on g-term orientation in Chinese business markets. Journal ofInternational Marketing, 13(2), 28-39.Lehtonen. T. (2006). Collaborative relationships in facilityservices. Leadership & Organizational Development Jour-nal. 27 (6). 429 ^ 3 7 .Lewin, J. E. (2(X)3). An empirical investigation of the effectsof downsizing on buyer-seller relationships. Journal ofBusiness Research, 56( 1 ). 283-294.Lin. F. R., Sun g. Y. W., and Lo . Y. P. (2005). Effects of trustmechanisms on supply-chain performance: A multi-agent

simulation study, tnternational Journal ofElectronic Com-merce, 9{2),9\-\04.MacMillan, K., Money. K.. Money, A., and Downing, S.(2005). Relationship marketing in the not-for-profit sec-tor: An extension and application of the com mitm ent-trusttheory. Journal of Business Research, 58(2). 806-825.McAllister, D. J. ( 1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust asfoundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations.Academy of Management Journal, 38 ( I ), 2459.McGee, G. W. and Ford. R. C. (1987). Two (or more?) di-mensions of organizational commitment: Reexaminationof the affective and continuance scales. Journal of Ap -

plied Psychology, 72(4), 638-641.Moorman. C . Zaitm an. G.. and Deshpande. R. (1992). Rela-tionships between providers and users of marketing re-search: The dynamics of trust within and betweenorgan7Mions. Journal ofMarketing Research, 29(3), 3\4-329.Morgan. R. M., and Hunt. S. D. (1994). The commitment-

trust theory of relationship mark eting. Journal of Market-ing, 58(2), 20-38.Mowday. R. T, Porter. L. W.. and Steers. R. ( 1982). Organi-zational Linkages: The P.sychology of Commitment. Ab-senteeism, and Turnover. New York: Academic Press. Inc.Nelson. D.. and Quick. J. (1991). Social support and new-comer adjustment in organizations: Attachment theory atwork? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 12,543-554.Nunnally. J. C. (1978). Psychometric Theory. 2nd ed. NewYork: McGraw-Hill.Ozag. D. (2006). The relationship between the trust, hope,and normative and continuance commitment of mergersurvivors. The Journal of Management Development,25(9), 870-883.Pruitt, D. G. ( 1981 ). Negotiation Behavior. New York: Aca-demic Press.Reichers. A. E. (1985). A review and reconceptualization oforganizational commitment. Academy of ManagementReview. 0(2). 465^76 .Rempel, J. K., Holm es, J. G., and Zanna. M. P. (1985). Trustin close relationships. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology. 49(i). 95-112.Schurr, P. H., and Ozanne. J. L. (1985). Influences on ex-change processes: Buyers' preconceptions of a seller'strustworthiness and bargaining toughness. Journal of Con-sumer Research, / / ( I ) . 939-953.Shore. L. M., and Wayne, S. J. (1993). Commitment and

employee behavior: Comparison of affective commitmentand continuance commitment with perceived organiza-tional support.yoHrA/o/"A/)/)/'/P.Vf"/)ofof>',7S(5). 774780.Srinivasan, R., and Brush, T.H. (2006). Supplier performancein vertical alliances: The effects of self-enforcing agree-ments and enforceable contracts. Organizational Science,/7 (2) . 436-454.Tummala, V. M. R.. Phillips. C.L. M.. and Johnson, M. (2006).Assessing supply chain management success factors: Acase study. Supply Chain Management, 11(2), 179-192.Wang, Y. (2006). Inside contractual joint ventures in China:Ownership advantage, resource contribution and m anage-

ment control. Asian Business & Management, 5(3), 379 -394.Welch, M. (2006). Rethinking relationship management: Ex-ploring the dimension of trust. Journal of Communica-tion Management, 0(2), 138-155.Wilding. R., and Humphries, A. S. (2006). Understandingcollaborative supply chain relationships through the ap-plication of the Williamson organizational failure frame-work. International Journal of Physical D istribution &Logistics Management, 36(4), 309-317.Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capi-talism. New York: The Free Press.

WINTER 2008 55


11/11

trust and commitment

Documents