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ForewordThe matter of transportation at home and abroad becomes one of first

importance when war strikes. The strain on the transportation systems and theconflict of civilian and military demands become immediate and serious problems.In two world wars the United States has had to solve many of these problemsafter hostilities began, and therefore to solve them in haste, by trial and error.

As new and improved means of transport are introduced, the questions ofmilitary transportation become more difficult. The horse and mule had theirshortcomings, but their use involved few of the complications that bedevil themilitary in this machine age. The armed forces must have not only adequate

equipment but also replacement parts to keep that equipment operating in thefield. Efficient use of transportation necessitates co-ordination within the armedforces and between military and civilian agencies. During World War II muchwas done to increase effective use of ships, railway cars, and motor vehicles, butefforts to balance the competitive demands of civilian and military traffic inthe zone of interior were only partially successful.

Careful planning is necessary to reduce difficulties such as those which besetus in 1917 and 1941. The present volume, first of this series to deal with theArmy's technical services, begins an account of the transportation problems ofthe Army and their solution in World War II, including those of inter-Allied

co-ordination. Between the covers of this book is to be found information thatwill contribute substantially to our planning and preparation for transportationemergencies in the future.

Washington, D. C.1 August 1951

ORLANDO WARDMaj. Gen., U. S. A.Chief of Military History

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war and others were not. Though an attempt has been made not to give undueprominence to these differences, their historical importance is obvious. Sometimesthey explain why things were done in a certain way, or were not done. Often theypoint to potential disputes, even weaknesses, which should be taken into account

in planning fo r possible future emergencies.Although this discussion covers a broad field in presenting the significant

developments which affected the movement of troops and military supplies, itis in no sense a full history of the nation's wartime transportation effort. Theprimary purpose is to present the experience of the Transportation Corps asreflected in Army records, which in itself is a broad assignment. In such a studyit is inevitable that the views of the Chief of Transportation and his associatesshould be more fully stated than those of other officers and agencies. Wherecontroversial matters are involved, however, the basic issues should appear withfairness to all parties.

While the general plan has been to present only facts and opinions foundin the records, there has been some digression from that procedure. The recollec-tions of Transportation Corps officers and of civilians who held responsiblepositions under the Chief of Transportation have been used to supply details notfound in the records and to clarify obscure passages. Reports of the interviewswith those consulted are on file. The author's experience as a member of theexecutive staff of the Chief of Transportation throughout the war has helpedhim greatly in understanding and evaluating developments, but recollections ofevents and attitudes have not been allowed to take the place of documentaryevidence. Personal observations are confined almost entirely to the commentson policies and methods of the Chief of Transportation and his relationships withArmy Service Forces headquarters that appear in Chapter III and to the generalconclusions presented in the final chapter.

Many of the statistical data which have been used, while from responsiblesources, were compiled during or shortly after the war and so may differ some-what from figures which more deliberate research may make available. It isbelieved that these variations are inconsequential. Readers interested in datawhich have a greater degree of finality will be able to find them in the statisticalvolumes that are being prepared for publication as part of the series, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR ILIt is impossible to acknowledge in detail all the generous assistance whichthe author has received, during the preparation of this volume, from military andcivilian colleagues and from the staff of his own office. Aside from acknowledg-ments made in the footnotes, special thanks are due to the following: Dr. HaroldLarson, who prepared a number of monographs on Army transportation bywater, and who at present is working on the third volume of the TransportationCorps trilogy; Dr. Harold H. Dunham, Dr. James R. Masterson, and Mr. JosephBykofsky, who have written monographs on Army transportation in certain over-sea theaters; and Capt. William H. Schmidt, whose wartime monographs deal withvarious aspects of Army transportation in the United States. Final editing of thevolume was in charge of Mr. W. Brooks Phillips, who was assisted by Miss Michael

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Burdett and Mrs. Pauline Dodd; Mr. George Powell was most helpful in thechecking of charts and statistical data; and Mr. David Jaff prepared the index.Miss Marie Premauer, Mrs. Lois Riley, and Mr. John Lee performed many serv-ices indispensable to preparation of the manuscript and production of the book.

Since the account in this volume is necessarily compact, rather extensive foot-notes have been provided. In connection with the effort which is being madeunder the Secretary of Defense to develop greater integration in the transportationservices of theArmy, the Navy, and the AirForce, many aspects of transportationare currently undergoing careful study. Should the nation become involved inanother major war, the records pertaining to transportation in World War IIwill take on added significance. The author believes that the documents cited inthis volume, and the files in which they are located, will be of considerable assist-ance to future students of military transportation.

Numerous technical terms have been used in the text and the footnotes. Ratherfree use has been made of abbreviations, especially to avoid too frequent repeti-tion of the long titles of wartime agencies and officials. The identification of thenumerous files and records in which cited documents are located also has involvedthe use of terms and abbreviations which are not generally familiar. The readerwill be aided in these respects by reference to the Glossary of Technical Terms,the List of Abbreviations, the Bibliographical Note, and the Guide to Footnotes,which are appended.

Washington, D. C.1 February 1951

CHESTER WARDLOW

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Chapter Page

VII. OPERATION OF THE ARMY'S LARGE AND SMALLVESSELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228Civilian Crews on Ocean-Going Vessels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Maintenance and Voyage Repairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239Supplies for Vessels ..................................... 241Food Service on Transports and Hospital S h i p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243Armament and Gu n Crews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245Radio Service an d Radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247Assignment and Operation of Small Boats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249Manning of Small Boats ................................. 255Proposals Regarding Marine Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

VIII. OTHER MARINE OPERATIONS AND P R O B L E M S . . . . . . . 262Pier Operation and Stevedoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Efficient Utilization of Vessels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271Control of Ship Utilization in the Theaters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282Ship Conversions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

IX. UTILIZATION OF DOMESTIC COMMERCIALCARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Distribution and Control of Inland Traff ic .................. 308Basic Relations with the Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312Wartime Expansion of Railroad Traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319Limited Capacity of the Western Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323Procurement of New Railroad Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328Railroad Manpower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335Efficient Utilization of Railroad Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341Temporary Government Control of the Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . 349Th e Highway Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353Inland Waterways and Airways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367Relations with Federal Regulating Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

X. THE ARMY'S RAILWAY AND HIGHWAY OPERATIONS. . 375Utility Railroads ....................................... 375

Army Tank Cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381Army Hospital Cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385Railroad Repair Shops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1Motor Buses for Local Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394Administrative Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402

XI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406

Appendix

A. FUNCTIONS OF SUPERVISORY OFFICERS ANDDIVISIONS, OCT, 1 JULY 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415

B. WARTIME COMMANDERS,PORTS OF EMBARKATION,ZONE OF INTERIOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

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Appendix Page

C. TRANSPORTATIONZONE TERRITORIES ANDOFFICERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424

D. INSTALLATIONS SUBORDINATE TO ZONE TRANS-PORTATION OFFICES, AUGUST 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425

BIBLIOGRAPHICALN O T E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426

GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICALTERMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435

I N D E X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

TablesNo.

1. Distribution of Personnelof the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tation: Designated Dates in 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

2. Personnel Employed at Port Installations: 31 December 1944. ... 1103. Distribution of Personnel Among Transportation Zones:

31 March 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

4. Employment of Ocean-Going Passenger and Dry-Cargo ShippingUnder U.S. Control on Selected Dates: 1943-1945. . . . . . . . . . 1755. Average Tons of General Cargo Loaded per Net Gang-Hour at

U.S. Ports on Vessels Loaded for the Army by ContractingStevedores: July 1943-March 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

6. Average Cost per Ton of Loading Army Cargo by ContractingStevedores at Principal U.S. Ports: 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

7. Analysis ofCost of Loading Army Cargo by Contracting Steve-dores at U.S. Ports: 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

8. Time Spent at U.S. Loading Ports by Dry-Cargo Vessels Loadedat Army Ports of Embarkation and Sailed During the PeriodFebruary-December 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

9. Percent Distribution of Intercity Passenger and Freight Traffic inthe United States, by Type of Carrier: 1940-1945. . . . . . . . . . 309

10. Indexes of Passenger and Freight Traffic in the United States:1940-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

11. Equipment Requirements of the American Railroads (All Classes)as Stated by the Office of Defense Transportation, and ActualProduction: 1942-1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

12. Production of Nonmilitary Trucks, Trailers, and Buses in theUnited States: 1936-1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

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ChartsNo. Page

1. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation:30 June 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

2. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation:1 July 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

3. Typical Organization for Ports of Embarkation, Approved by theChief of Transportation: 1 July 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

4. Typical Organization for Zone Transportation Offices, Approvedby the Chief of Transportation: November 1 9 4 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

5. Utilization of Deadweight and Bale Cubic Capacities of ShipsLoaded by the Army at U.S. Ports: December 1941-August

1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2776. U.S. Dry-Cargo Ships Employed in Transoceanic Service for the

Army Held in Oversea Ports More than Ten Days: February1943-July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

7. Status of Dry-Cargo Vessels Loaded by the U.S. Army at U.S.Ports for Discharge in Northern Continental Europe: 1 Sep-tember 1944-31 March 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

IllustrationsMaj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, Chief of Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiAmphibious OperationsNormandy and Leyte. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Oversea PortsKhorramshahr and N a h a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Battered Railroad Yards in France and I t a l y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Peacetime Ports of E m b a r k a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Troop EntrainmentDecember 1 9 4 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Military Railway Service Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Hard Going on Oversea Highways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Wartime Army Ports of EmbarkationOakland and Newport N e w s . . . . . . 98Reactivated Army BasesBoston and New O r l e a n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108Transportation Corps Field Installations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Prewar Army Transports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137Convoy Forming off a U.S. Atlantic Port. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150War-Built Cargo Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Troopships in the U.S. Pool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Troopships Operated by the Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202Largest Troopships Afloat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223Instruction in Navigation and Marine Engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Boats Built for Theater Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

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Page

Tight Stowage of Packaged Freight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275Crated and Uncrated Equipment Stowed on Deck. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278Army Hospital S h i p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2

Flatcars Moving Bulky Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322The Bracing and Lashing of Large E q u i p m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346Motor Transport for Short Hauls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360Locomotives for Utility Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377Army Hospital C a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388Army Buses for Local Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399

Most of the illustrations in this volume were supplied by the Department ofDefense. Of these, all are U.S. Army photographs except the following.U.S. Navy: pp. 89 (bot tom), 150, 166, 202, 302 (bottom)U.S. Air Force: pp. 98 ( top ) , 118 (bottom), 137 (bottom), 275(bot tom).

Photographs from other sources:U.S. Maritime Commission: p. 157.U.S. Maritime Service: p. 234.Higgins, Inc., New Orleans, La.: p. 252 (bottom).

Association of American Railroads: p. 346 (top).Stage and Howe, Los Angeles, Calif.: p. 360 (top).General Electric Company: p. 377 (bottom).

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THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS:

RESPONSIBILITIES,

ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS


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CHAPTER I

Transportation Implications

of Global Warfare

The ability of the United States to turnthe course of World War II toward victoryfor the Allies was dependent on the ade-quacy of the transportation facilities madeavailable to our armed forces and the effi-ciency with which those facilities were used.Manifestly, success was dependent also onthe training and skillful employment ofmilitary personnel and on the quantity andquality of the war matriel produced for

the use of our own forces and those of ourallies. Yet our forces could not accomplishtheir mission until they had been trans-ported to the combat areas overseas, andamong the several elements which enteredinto the formula for victory itfairly may besaid that transportation, especially shipping,was the most critical.

Shipping was a constant source of con-cern to those planning military operations.

There never was serious doubt that, giventhe time necessary for recruitment andtraining, the United States could develop afighting force capable of coping with theforces of the enemy. Nor was there anydoubt that, allowed a sufficient period forconversion from a peacetime to a wartimebasis, American industry could outproducethat of the hostile powers. But for more thana year after our entry into the war therewas grave doubt as to our ability to con-struct troop and cargo vessels rapidlyenough to offset the losses inflicted by sub-

marines and build up a shipping capacityadequate for the defeat of Germany an dJapan.

In June 1942 Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somer-vell, commanding the Army's Services ofSupply, said, "The losses by submarinesinkings threaten failure of our wareffort ."1 In the spring of the followingyearhe reported, "Our plans to carry out adetermined and effective offensive during

1943 and to strike further decisive blows in1944 are measured almost entirely by theshipping which can be made available formilitary operations." 2 Later in 1943 theSenate Subcommittee on War Mobilizationannounced, "We can never have more shipsthan are needed fo r all-out offensive war-fare," and warned against allowing ourincreasing output of merchant vessels to lullus into an attitude of complacency. 3 In

October 1944 General Somervell stated toGen. George C. Marshall, the Army Chiefof Staff: "Operations in both the Atlanticand the Pacific are accepting monthly defi-cits in their shipping schedules. Yet, new

1 Memo for CofS USA, 18 Jun 42, OCT 569. 14Losses.

2 Memo for CofS USA, 25 Mar 43, sub: ProposedAllocation of U.S. Shipping, ASF Hq CofS file

1942-43.3Report from the Subcommittee on War Mobi-

lization to the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S.Senate, October 7, 1943, pp. 3, 5.


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TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL WARFARE 3

the greater weight of weapons and ammu-

nition, and the fact that little or nomatriel was available in many areas whereour troops fought, meant that for the sup-port of each soldier sent into a theater ofoperations far more equipment and supplieshad to be shipped from the zone of interiorthan in any previous war. 7

Following the Japanese attack on ourPacific outposts and our precipitation into atwo-ocean conflict, military demands on theUnited States far exceeded resources. Onthe Atlantic side there was the necessity ofsupplying Britain and the Soviet Unionwith war matriel to enable them to con-tinue their resistance against the Germanforces, together with the desirability ofopening an active second front as soon aspossible in order to relieve the pressure onour European allies. On the Pacific sidethere was the need of checking the extensionof Japanese aggression with as little delayas possible and of preventing the consolida-tion of gains already made. These jobscould not be tackled equally without dangerof failure in both. The preponderance ofour limited strength had to be thrown inone direction or the other. The decision toattack Germany first and assume a strategicdefensive in the Pacific was made initiallyon purely military grounds before PearlHarbor, but when the matter came up fordiscussion at the British-American confer-ences in late December 1941 it was evident

that transportation was an important con-

sideration favoring that decision.8

The transportation considerations in -cluded more than simply the limited num-ber of ships available for a two-ocean war. 9

Since distances were much shorter in theAtlantic than in the Pacific, a given numberof vessels could transport more men andsupplies to the combat areas in a givenperiod. Large-scale operations in the Pacificwould involve many assault landings andthe discharge of troops and cargo at poorlyequipped ports and over beachheads, whichmeant slow dispatch of the vessels andcorrespondingly longer round voyages. Thecapacities of the ports on our Pacific coastand the rail lines which fed those portswere not then equal to the task of handlinga major offensive to the west. The natureof the war in the Pacific required thepresence of the major portion of the UnitedStates Fleet in that area, and therefore ourwestern ports were required to handle alarge supply operation in support of ournaval forces in addition to whatever de-mands the Army might make upon them.

From the beginning of World War II itwas a generally accepted doctrine thattroops would not be sent overseas unless

there was assurance that they could be

7 Rpt, Transportation, Comparative Data, WorldWar I-World War II, pp. 12, 16, prepared by ContlDiv OCT, Jul 43, OCT HB MPR. The report in-dicates that during 20 war months in 1917-18 theArmy shipped 2,052,830 troops and 8,883,297 MTof cargo to oversea destinations, while in a corres-ponding period, 1941-43, it shipped 1,769,901troops and 26,688,794 MT. Recent research inOCMH has refined the 1941-43 figures to 1,761,132troops and 26,573,995 MT.

8 Rpt of U.S.-British Stf Convs, Jan-Mar 41, 27Mar 41 (ABC-1), P&O GSUSA; ARCADIAProceed-ings, 24 Dec 41, An. 1. Mark Skinner Watson, Chiefof Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washing-ton, 1950), Ch. IV, indicates that in the summerof 1940 General Marshall already had concludedthat in a war against Germany and Japan the de-feat of Germany should be the first objective.

9 See typescript monograph, Col M. B. Stokes, Jr.,

C of Plng Div, OCT, Shipping in WarThe Re-lationship Between Shipping and the LogisticalOperation s and Strategy of World War II, 21 Mar46, OCT HB Topic Logistics Gen.


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4 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

supplied adequately at all times. 10 This was

a departure from the plan which had beenfollowed in the first world war, and itreflected the conviction which prevailedafter Pearl Harbor that virtually all equip-ment and the great preponderance of othersupplies required by the American expedi-tionary forces would have to be shippedfrom the zone of interior. Under thesecircumstances it was necessary to establishand maintain a careful balance betweentroop and freight carrying vessels. Suchbalance did not exist when the UnitedStates entered the war, and even after apractical balance had been achieved it wasdifficult to maintain, because of changes instrategic plans and the variation of shipcompletion and ship loss figures from theforecasts. An approximate balance was heldby emphasizing the construction of cargoships and converting such ships to troopcarriers when the need for additional troopcapacity became apparent. The alterationson cargo ships were begun while the shipswere under construction, and the timerequired to place such vessels in service wasmuch less than that required to build vesselsdesigned as regular troopships.

Continuance of the lend-lease policy ofsending large quantities of food, rawmaterials, and equipment to the SovietUnion and the nations of the British Com-monwealth after our entry into the war wasa strategic decision of major importance,since it not only diverted supplies from ourown armed forces but deprived them ofsorely needed shipping. The officers respon-sible for Army transportation took anextremely serious view of this situation. A

few days after the declaration of war they

gave the Chief of Staff a summ ary inwhichshipping was termed the bottleneck in theoversea effort, and the conflict between theshipping requirements for the lend-leaseprogram and those for the maintenance ofUnited States forces in the theaters waspresented in bold terms. 11 Despite theextreme seriousness of the situation in theFar East during the winter of 1942, amovement of additional troops to that area

received a shipping preference secondary tothat for Russian aid. The early planningfor the dispatch of American and Britishtroops to French North Africa was gov-erned by a ruling of President Rooseveltand Prime Minister Churchill that thereshould be no stoppage in the flow of sup-plies to the Soviet Union and the MiddleEast. 12 In March 1943 the Chief of Trans-portation indicated that the increasingdemand for shipping aid to the British, ifaccepted, would imperil military opera-tional plans resulting from discussions atthe Casablanca Conference during the pre-ceding January. 13

At times during the critical year 1942 asmuch as one-third of the ocean-going drycargo fleet under the control of the WarShipping Administration was allocated tolend-lease services. While the conflict be-tween Army and lend-lease shipping pro-grams eased somewhat as the output of theAmerican shipyards mounted and the rate

10

See Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4,21 Dec 41, sub: Estimate of Shipping Available forU.S. Overseas Effort 1942 and 1943, Sec. IV, par.1, G-4/29717-116.

11 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 11 Dec 41,sub: Shipping Situation, OCT HB Gross Day File;see also Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 12Jan 42, p a r . 5d, s u b : Capacity of Shipping,G-4/29717-116.

12 Memo, ACofS G-4 for Rear Adm SherwoodeA. Taffinder USN, 14 Feb 42, OCT HB Gross Day

File; CCS Mtg, 23 Jan 42, Item 5.13 Memo, CofT for CofS USA, 17 Mar 43, sub:CCS 183/1-Review of Availability of UN Shipping,OCT HB Gross Day File.


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for Belfast, Ireland. A second group of nine

vessels with 8,555 troops sailed from NewYork for Belfast on 19 February 1942.During the ensuing two months only smallnumbers of casuals left New York for theUnited Kingdom, and the next consider-able movement was on 29 April, when13,924 Army personnel were embarked oneight vessels, among them the British linerAquitania which had just been returnedfrom the Pacific. The large British linersQueen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, afterthe completion of assignments in thePacific, entered the New YorkUnitedKingdom service in May and June, res-pectively. For several months thereafter themammoth "Queens" and an increasingnumber of smaller vessels landed substantialcontingents of American troops in theUnited Kingdom. 21

After a slow start because of the criticalsituation in the Pacific, the build-up ofAmerican strength in the United Kingdomagain was delayed because of the invasionof North Africa. The North African ex-pedition had been discussed by the UnitedStates and British Chiefs of Staff on num-erous occasions during the winter andspring of 1942 under the code names GYM-NAST and SUPERGYMNAST,and agreement

to proceed with the undertaking, under thenew name TORCH, was arrived at in thefollowing July. 22 The earlier discussions hadcontemplated the landing of limited numbersof American and British troops with French

collaboration. 23 The plan finally adopted

called for larger task forces, prepared toland against French resistance. The threatto the British position in Egypt from Axisforces based on Italian Libya, the possi-bility of a German invasion of Morocco andAlgeria through France and Spain, and thestrategic advantage of opening the Medi-terranean to Allied ships serving the Middleand Far East were factors in this decision. 24

The period 27 October 1942 to 30 April

1943 witnessed the embarkation of 761,000American and British troops destined toNorth Africa and the forwarding of8,195,-000 measurement tons of matriel for theirsupport. 25 These were men and supplieswhich otherwise might have been sent to orretained in the United Kingdom. A total of73.869 U.S . troops had been landed atBritish ports in August 1942, but this sub-stantial flow declined thereafter; it becamea mere trickle during the winter of 1942-43and did not again attain the August figureuntil a full year had passed. 26 A correspond-ing reduction took place in the movementof cargo from the United States to theUnited Kingdom. Accordingly, a cross-Channel operation to establish an invasionforce in northern France, which had beenplanned originally for the summer of 1943under the code name ROUNDUP, was de-

21 For list of troopship sailings, see Summary ofHistorical Events and Statistics, NYPE, 1942, pp.10-11, OCT HB NYPE.

22Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943,pp. 18-19. Two such reports were issued by Gen-eral Marshall during the war period, cited here-after as Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1943, or 1945.

23ARCADIAProceedings, 24 Dec 41, pp. 4-5, and

26 Dec 41, An. 2.24

Biennial Rpts, CofS USA, 1943, p. 18, 1945,p. 9. OCT estimated that opening of Mediterraneanwould reduce shipping requirement 30 percent forshipments from U.S. and 40 percent for shipmentsfrom UK by eliminating long voyage around Cape.Memo, DCofT for Gen Moses, 9 Dec 42, sub: Sav-ing of Ships when Allies Contl Med, OCT 563.5.

25 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, May 43, pp. 85-86.26 Historical Report of the Transportation Corps

in the European Theater, Vol. III, Ch. V I I , p. 16,OCT HB ETO; for schedule of BOLEROtroop move-ments prior to decision on TORCH, Stf Conf, CGSOS, 26 Jun 42, Sec. 6, OCT HB ASF.


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ferred until the spring of 1944 and renamed

OVERLORD.27

While many considerationscontributed to this deferment of the mainassault on the Continent, including the

demands for men and matriel for combatareas in the Mediterranean and the Pacific,ocean transport was fully committed duringthe period and was in itself an effectiveblock to the more rapid accumulation ofstrength in Great Britain. 28

After the surrender of enemy forces in

North Africa in May 1943, the operationswere carried across the Mediterranean inan effort to force Italy out of the war. Atthe TRIDENT Conference of American andBritish leaders held in Washington in thatmonth, when the strategic plans for thecontinuance of the effort in the Mediter-ranean and in northern Europe were out-lined, it also was decided to maintain anunremitting offensive pressure on the Japa-nese in the Pacific and to increase the flowof matriel to China. 29 It was feasible atthat time to plan with reasonable definite-ness for all of these undertakings because ofthe improvement in the shipping situation.American shipyards had so greatly in-creased their output that the total comple-tions for 1943 were expected to be morethan twice those in 1942. Also it was fairlyevident that the efforts of the Allies to curbthe submarine were becoming increasinglyeffective. Nevertheless it still was necessary

to use the available shipping most judicially,

and those concerned with planning forocean transport constantly were engaged incalculating what deployment of vesselswould accomplish maximum results.

The increased volume of shipping whichbecame available to the Army during 1942and early 1943 was all needed fo r TORCH,BOLERO, and support of the bomber offen-sive from the United Kingdom, designatedSICKLE. On 30 April 1943 the tonnage ofthe merchant vessels serving the Army inthe Pacific was slightly less than it hadbeen a year previous, whereas the tonnageemployed in the Atlantic had increasedmore than five-fold.30 Very soon, however,because of the continued growth of themerchant fleet and strategic decisions of theAllies, the volume of shipping employed inthe Pacific began a steady rise.On 30 April1945, with Germany still putting up a last-ditch resistance, the shipping that served theArmy was divided about equally betweenthe Atlantic and the Pacific, with just under7,000,000 deadweight tons employed ineach area. 31

The steadily increasing volume of ship-ping assigned to the Pacific by the Army,together with the merchant vessels servingthe Navy, 32 made possible the vigorouscampaigns northward from Australia andwestward from Hawaii that enabled theAllied forces to advance within easy strikingdistance of the Japanese homeland evenbefore the termination of hostilities inEurope. The end of German resistance setin motion a carefully laid plan for the re-deployment of troops, matriel, and ship-

27 Biennial R p t , CofS USA, 1945, p. 11.28 Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS USA, 18 Dec 42,

sub: Shipment of Trs to UK, OPD 370.5 ETOSec 1, stated that additional troop lift would beavailable if (1) escorts could be provided fromBritish or other sources, (2) cargo shipping couldbe augmented by reducing lend-lease or other re-quirements, (3) initial equipment of troops could

be reduced.29 CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, s u b : Final Rpt toPresident and Prime Minister, Sec. IV 3a, b, andSec. V9; Biennial Rpt , CofS USA, 1945, p. 11.

30 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Apr 43, p. 16.31 ASF MPR, Sec. 3; Apr 45, p. 55.32

There was a high degree of interchangeabilityin the utilization of the ships assigned respectivelyto Army and Navy in Central and Southwest Paci-fic, a fact which later chapters will amplify.


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ping in order to place the preponderance

of our war strength in the Pacific with theleast possible delay. This operation was wellunder way when Japan surrendered.

One of the essentials in the preparationfor the final assault on Japan was theestablishment of an advance base or basesadequate for the build-up of personnel andsupplies and the eventual launching of theinvasion. In May 1944 the Joint StrategicSurvey Committee suggested that the sei-zure of Formosa and the bypassing of thePhilippines might hasten the end of hostili-ties in the Pacific. 33 Despite the shorterdistance from Formosa to the objective, therecapture of Luzon was considered thesounder strategy, and among the advan-tages taken into account were the betterport and inland transportation facilitieswhich Luzon offered.34

Strategic considerations were reflected ina number of transportation projects on theNorth American continent. Alaska was thenorthern anchor of our war operations inthe Pacific. Even before Pearl Harbor thepotential importance of Alaska was recog-nized and the strengthening of our militaryposition in that territory was begun. Menand matriel were moved by the water route,but the feasibility of establishing a highwayconnection from a point on the CanadianNational Railways to Fairbanks was givenpreliminary consideration. 35 Soon after ourentry into the war, the possibility that theJapanese might attempt an invasion of

Alaska and that their submarines might

seriously interfere with our shipping serv-ices, as well as the desirability of conservingshipping wherever possible, brought the so-called Akan Highway project to the fore.In February 1942 the Chief of Engineerswas instructed to prepare plans for such ahighway, and by October 1942 initial con-struction work had been completed overthe entire length of the 1,480-mile pioneerroad. 36 The Canol project, under which the

United States financed pipelines connectingNorman Wells, Watson Lake, White Horse,Skagway, and Fairbanks, and a refinery atWhite Horse, also was an attempt to pro-vide against the day when the movement ofgasoline and other petroleum products toAlaska by the water route might be limitedby enemy action. 37 Since the Japanese madeno attempt to invade the Alaskan mainlandand since the anticipated submarine menacedid not eventuate, neither the Akan High-way nor the Canol installations played animportant role in the supply of our forcesin that area. A barge line which was op-erated by the Army from Seattle and PrinceRupert over the inside passageway to Juneau,Excursion Inlet, and Skagway handled anappreciable tonnage, but it did not attainthe importance which was envisioned in theearly days of the war. 38

The strategic importance of Alaska as avantage point from which to move supplies

33 JCS 713/6, 29 May 44; JCS 713/15, 22 Sep44. Both in P&O GSUSA, ABC 384 Formosa (8 Sep43) , Sec 1c.

34Logistics in World War II, Final Report of the

Army Service Forces ( 1 9 4 7 ) , p. 52.35 Memo for file, Trans Br G-4 WDGS, 8 Dec 41,

sub: Alaskan International Highway, summarizedactions taken to date, OCT HB AlaskaAlcanHwyand Ry. See also Charles B. Quattlebaum, "MilitaryHighways," Military Affairs (Fall 1944).

36 Memo, CofT for ACofS SOS, 27 Aug 42, sub:Org and Opn of Alcan Hwy, OCT 611 Alaska 1942Alcan Hwy. File G-4/30436-21 includes numerousdocuments on early phases. For summary of cost,maintenance, and operation see Lt r, Julius H. Am-berg, Asst to SW, to Sen James M. Mead, 26 Apr45, ASF Contl Div 032.3 Mead C o m .

37 See Plng Div ASF file, Canol Project, 1942and 1943-44. See also Report of Senate Special

Committee Investigating the National Defense Pro-gram, The Canol Project, January 8, 1944.

38 See file AG 567 Alaska 1942 for pertinentdocuments.


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to the Soviet Union and China gave rise to

a number of other transportation projectswhich were not actually undertaken. Aproposal was brought forward in 1942 toconstruct a standard gauge rail line con-necting the Canadian National Railwayswith the Alaska Railroad at Fairbanks. 39

Although the project was believed to befeasible from an engineering standpoint, itwas dropped because of the length of timethat would be required for completion, the

great quantity of strategic materials in-volved, and the fact that it did not appearto be a definite military necessity. Thefeasibility of extending the railway and thehighway from Fairbanks to a port on thewest coast of Alaska was explored to someextent but not seriouslyconsidered. 40

The Panama Canal's great stategic signi-ficance, the possibility that communicationswith Central America might be seriouslycurtailed by submarine activity, and theimportance of maintaining stable condi-tions in the Central American countries ledthe United States to take an interest in thecompletion of the Pan-American Highwayas far as Panama. In July 1942 the Chief

of Engineers was instructed to initiate con-

struction work on completion of pendingnegotiations with the countries concerned.The movement of construction materialsfrom the United States proceeded slowlybecause of the scarcity of such materialsand of shipping. By mid-1943 the curbingof the submarine had canceled whateverimmediate military importance the under-taking may have had, and Army participa-tion was terminated in October of that

year.41

The danger that the National Rail-ways of Mexico would prove inadequate tohandle the traffic in which the UnitedStates was interested, particularly the stra-tegic materials imported from Mexico forour war industries, led to an undertaking toaid the rehabilitation of that system byproviding technical personnel and equip-ment from the United States. 42

After the confusion incident to the transi-tion from peace to w a r , and with theestablishment of an adequate system for thecontrol of portbound traffic, the railwaysand the ports in the eastern part of theUnited States proved capable of handlingall oversea movements promptly. Such wasnot the case in the west, however. In peace-time a much lighter export traffic hadmoved through the Pacific coast ports, andtheir railway facilities in particular requiredconsiderable expansion in order to properlyhandle the volume of freight which wasexpected to move that way when a full-scale o f f e n s i v e against J a p a n waslaunched. 43 Correction of this situation be-

39 Memo, ACofS G-4 for WPD, 7 Jan 42,G-4/33820; Memo, the President for SW, 12 Feb42, OCT HB Alaska-Alcan Hwy and Ry; Ltr, SW

to Secy State, 28 Apr 42, OSW C&R Railroads;Ltr, Gen Somervell to F. A. Delano Chm NatiResources Plng Bd, 15 May 43, ASF Hq Alaska.

40 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 10 Sep 42, sub:Northwest Route via Alaska-Siberia, OCT 370.5Russia; Memo, Admiral King for JCS, 21 Sep 42,sub: Campaign against Japan via Northern Route,ASF Hq Navy 1942-44; Memo, Somervell forCofS USA, 5 Oct 42, OPD 520 Sec 1 (Cases 1-24 ) ; Memo, CG SOS for CofS SOS (Sty er), 6 Oct42, AG 611 Alaska (8-11-42) ( 1 ) ; Memo, ColR. T. Maddocks OPD for ACofS OPD, 4 Jan 43,sub: Northwest Route to China via Russia, OPD

520 Sec 1 (Cases 1-24). Admiral King's memosuggested value of this route in attacking Japan viaKamchatka Peninsula. Maddocks" memo cited prob-lem of obtaining Soviet concurrence.

41 See files OCT 611 Pan-Am Hwy and ASF HqPan-Am Hwy. General Gross states that he neverconsidered the highway necessary from TC stand-point. See Ltr to author, 7 Dec 49, OCT HB TC

Gen Gross.42 See files OCT 000.900 Mexico 1942 and AG617 Mexico 1942.

43 Subject more fully discussed in Ch. IX.


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gan in 1942 with the installation of addi-

tional storage tracks at the principal portsby joint action of the Army and the rail-roads. The transcontinental carriers alsotook steps to increase their line haul. Theseimprovements continued throughout thewar. Nevertheless, in planning for the finalblows against Japan it was necessary toprovide for the routing of some of thecargo destined to the Pacific bases throughGulf and Atlantic ports.

The foregoingbrief review illustrates howbasic transportation was to the conduct ofthe war and how the adequacy of the trans-portation facilities available to the Armyconditioned strategic planning and opera-tions.

Magnitude of the Army'sTransportation Task

The task which fell to the TransportationCorps in World War II was described byRobert P. Patterson, the Under Secretaryof War, as one "entirely without precedentin the history of our country." 44 It was infact a transportation task without precedentin the history of the world. This was due tomany conditions and circumstances, but pri-marily to the scope of hostilities and to re-cent developments in the art of warfare. Itwill aid in the understanding of the Trans-portation Corps' operating problems andaccomplishments to review these conditionsand circumstances briefly.

World War II was actually global in itsscope. The first world war had been sodesignated because the belligerents includednations from all continents, but the focalpoint of the fighting during 1914-18 was

Europe. In the second world conflict every

continent was an actual or potential battle-

ground, and many an island which pre-viously had been known only to historians,geographers, or explorers flashed into thenews headlines as the scene of bitter fight-ing. In addition, numerous continentalareas and islands were garrisoned and forti-fied either to prevent their seizure by theenemy or to secure them as bases for ourglobe-girdling aerial operations.

Hostilities on such a wide scale naturallycalled for large armed forces. In order tocarry out its mission in World War II, theU.S. Army inducted roughly two and one-half times as many troops as it had calledup in World War I. On 31 October 1940,just before the drafting of recruits underthe Selective Service Act began, the strengthof the Army was 519,805. Thenceforwardto 31 May 1945, when the Army reacheda peak strength of 8,291,336, nearly tenmillion men and women were placed inuniform.4 5 This huge army had to be trans-ported during the various stages of training,moved to the oversea theaters and bases asstrategic and logistic plans required, andeventually returned to the zone of interior.At all stages it had to be provided withsupplies and equipment adequate for thetask at hand.

The more elaborate training given by allbranches of the Army before the men weresent overseas resulted in more domestictravel per man in World War II than inWorld War I. Basically, the training of1917-18 called for three moves in the zone

44 Ltr to CofT, 15 Aug 45, OCT HB TC GenCommendations.

45 Rpt, STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 Jul 45,p. 61; WD press release, 14 Feb 46, gave accessions1 Nov 40 through 30 Jun 45 as 10,033,640, andseparations as 2,279,700, but it is believed that

these figures include some duplications; LeonardP. Ayers, The War with Germany (Washington,1919), Ch. I, states that about 4,000,000 served inU.S. Army during WW I.


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of interiorfrom home to cantonment,

from cantonment to specialized trainingcamp, and thence to the port of embarka-tion. 46 The typical trainee of 1941-45made five basic movesfrom home to in-duction station, and thence successively toreception center, replacement trainingcenter, unit training center, and port ofembarkation. Furthermore, in World WarII many soldiers had to be transported tospecialized training centers for desert,

mountain, jungle, and amphibious warfare;to schools for the study oftechnical subjectsand military occupational specialities; andto maneuver areas. 47

Almost three and one-half times as manysoldiers were sent overseas in World War IIas in World War I. The Army embarkedroughly 7,293,000 passengers for overseadestinations during the 45-month period,December 1941 through August 1945, ofwhom 6,902,000 were officers and enlistedmen. 48 About 350,000 of these soldiers weremoved to stations on the North and SouthAmerican continents or to near-by islandbases, but the great majority crossed the At-lantic or the Pacific. Approximately 4,300,-000 troops were transported to Europe,Africa, and the Middle East over distancesranging from 3,100 to 12,000 nautical miles.About 2,000,000 were transported to sta-tions in or across the Pacific where the sealanes ranged up to 6,500 miles. About 250,000 were transported halfway around theearth to India. In all cases the troops were

accompanied by their initial supplies and

equipment and were supported subse-quently by regular shipments of mainte-nance matriel.

Delivering the men and their matriel tothe respective theaters and bases was onlypart of the ocean transportation job. Oneof the distinguishing characteristics ofWorld War II was the repeated advancesfrom established bases to new combat areaswithin the theaters. These intratheater op-erations might involve ocean voyages of afew miles as in the invasion of Normandy,several hundred miles as in the Mediter-ranean, or several thousand miles as in someof the Pacific operations which weremounted in Hawaii and Australia. Thefloating equipment which had to be pro-vided fo r such operations ranged fromnative outriggers used off the coast of NewGuinea to large ocean liners and includedmany types of transports and landing craftwhich were specially designed to meet thepeculiar requirements of amphibious war-fare. This large and complex task of oceantransportation may be compared with therelatively simple task of 1917-18, whichinvolved moving the American Expedition-ary Forces directly to Europe by steamshipservices which operated in shuttle fashionover distances averaging about 3,300 nauti-cal miles.

Intratheater movements of men andmatriel in some instances involved longoverland hauls. The use of Casablanca asone of the discharge ports for the NorthAfrican expedition necessitated rail andhighway movements up to 1,400 miles. Thedelivery of supplies to Kunming over theBurma Road, and later over the Stilwell

Road, called for truck hauls of 710 and1,070 miles respectively.Lend-lease suppliessent to the USSR through the Persian Cor-

46 Crowell and Wilson, The Road to France, pp.51-67.

47 Because of lack of uni formi ty in actual trainingan accurate comparison is difficult, but this is be-lieved to be a fair presentation. In addition to theseofficial moves, each soldier made one or more fur-

lough trips.48 Gross final rpt, p. 42. Slightly over 2,000,000troops were carried to Europe in 19 months ofWW I. See Ayers, The War with Germany, p. 37.


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ridor moved over 575 miles of railway to

Tehran and 636 miles of highway toKaz-vin, where they were turned over to repre-sentatives of the Soviet Union. In these andother instances, because of the inadequacyof the local transportation systems, Ameri-can personnel, equipment, and supplieswere required in order that the operationsmight be accomplished efficiently.

The fact that World War II requiredgarrisons to be established in so many prim-

itive and undeveloped places added to thetransportation load, because the largeamount of construction work required tomake those garrisons effective had to beaccomplished chiefly with personnel, equip-ment, and materials shipped from theUnited States. Docks and warehouses hadto be constructed at ports and beacheswhich previously had handled little or nodeepwater shipping. Roads had to be builtthrough tropical jungles and over arcticwastes. Airstrips, gun emplacements, andhousing had to be provided. Machinery forgenerating electric power, distilling water,and refrigerating foods had to be installed.Storage tanks for oil and gasoline had to bese t up, and pipelines laid. Bulldozers, con-crete mixers, pile drivers, and other heavyequipment were needed to facilitate thework. A competent estimate places thenumber of installations built by the U.S.Army Engineers in oversea areas duringthe war at over 4,000. 49 The Corps ofEngineers shipped more than 18,000,000measurement tons of cargo overseas duringthe war. The highest monthly movementwas 775,000 tons. 50

Aside from the fact that their use in-volved extensive construction work, the new

oversea ports were slow in discharging armycargo while they were being developed,with the result that round voyages for theships were unduly prolonged. This problemwas encountered on a wide scale in thePacific, but it was present also in Alaska,Greenland, Iceland, the Antilles, West Afri-ca, the Persian Gulf, and wherever militaryport operations were undertaken beyondpeacetime capacities. It existed also at largeand formerly well equipped ports, such asNaples, Marseille, Cherbourg, and Manila,which were in badly damaged conditionwhen they were seized from the enemy andrequired extensiverehabilitation before theycould be used effectively by Allied shipping.

Among the new developments in war-fare which added to the transportation loadwas the amphibious assault. Although landand sea forces had co-operated in suchassaults down through the centuries as cir-cumstances required, the military exigen-cies of World War II dictated a much moreextensive use of this tactic than had beenknown before, and with greater use camea vast improvement in technique, includingthe addition of air power. 51 Large amphib-ious operations required the assembling ofhundreds of vessels to move troops andmatriel during the assault and supportphases. Many of these vessels had to bewithdrawn from regular transoceanic serv-ice for weeks or even months, and some hadto be altered to prepare them for thisspecial type of service. Since most amphib-

49 Ltr, Hist Div OCofEngrs to Hist Br OCT, 21Mar 47, OCT HB Topic CofEngrs.

50 ASF Statistical Review, World War II, p. 129.

51 For general description of mounting large am-phibious force see Roy E. Appleman, James M.Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Oki-nawa: The Last Battle, UNITED STATES ARMYIN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp.36-43; for technical details see WD FM 31-5,

Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, Nov 44,and Transport Quartermaster Manual, issued byArmy Port and SvC, Honolulu, Nov 44, OCT HBTopic Amph Opns.


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AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS such as these marked the opening of numerouscampaigns in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas. Landing supplies and equipment

on the coast of Normandy (top). Beach operation at Leyte (bottom).


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ious operations were launched from bases

outside the United States, the troops andsupplies reached the objective by two ormore voyages, rather than a single directvoyage.

The ships employedin assaults on enemy-held positions were combat loaded, whichmeant that insofar as possible the troopunits and their organizational equipmentwere placed in the same vesselsand that theimped imenta w ere stowedin such a mannerthat they could be unloaded quickly and inthe order required. 52 The impedimentaincluded not only the strictly military equip-ment necessary to the capture of the ob-jective but also a great number of smalllanding boats for putting men and ma-triel ashore, and a great variety of wheeledand tracked vehicles needed to give theattacking force mobility after landing. Forthis type of cargo and stowage it was nec-essary to sacrifice up to 35 percent of thenormal cargo capacity of the ships, as com-pared with commercial loading. 53

World War II was the first great conflictduring which the U.S. Army was exten-sively motorized. Men, artillery, and sup-plies literally went into action on wheels,powered by internal combustion engines.With the Allied forces in France andFlanders on 31 October 1918 the ratio ofmen to motor conveyancestrucks,auto-mobiles, and motorcycleswasabout 37 to1.54 With the American forces in the Euro-pean Theater of Operations on 30 April

1945 the ratio was about 4.3 to 1.55 During

World War Ithat is, up to the Armisticethe United States Government accepted lessthan a hundred tanks from Americanmanufacturers, and no other self-propelledmotor-propelled weapons were completed,whereas during the five-year period ending31 July 1945 about 136,000 tanks and otherself-propelled weapons were produced forthe Army. 56 These comparisons illustratethe increase of motorization as between the

tw o wars. The significance of the increasefrom a transportation standpoint lay in thefact that such equipment was bulky andtook up a large amount of space whenmoved by ship or rail; the requirements ofpersonnel, tools, and spare parts for assem-bling and maintenance work were heavy;and the engines consumed fabulous quan-tities of motor fuel and lubricants. 57

World War II brought military air powerto maturity. The United States Army,which had less than 3,000 aircraft on handat the beginning of 1940, received morethan 227,000 new aircraft during the five-year period ending 31 July 1945, and onthe eve of V-E Day the military personnel

52 As the war progressed increasingly large per-centages of the vessels used in assault operationswere specially designed naval vessels rather thanmerchant types. See Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1945,p. 73, for types of vessels used in seizure of Leyte.

53 In the assault on Makin 46 percent of basic ship

capacity was sacrificedan unusually high percent-age due to extensive use of cargo pallets. See Makin,Hist Div SSUSA, American Forces in Action Series(Washington, 1946), p. 27.

54 Report of the Military Board of Allied Supply(Washington, 1924), I, 49, indicates that on thatdate the Allied forces numbered 8,516,678 officersand men and had a total of 229,452 motor con-veyances.

55 American Enterprise in EuropeThe Role ofthe SOS in the Defeat of Germany (Paris, 1945),pp. 16, 64, gives the number of men as 3,065,505and the number of motor vehicles as 710,650. Com-pare Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe(Garden City, 1948), p. 501, n. 21.

56 Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, TheArmies of Industry (New Haven, 1921), pp. 132,199; Rpt, Munitions for the Army, prepared inOUSW, 9 Apr 46, p. 4, OCT HB WD Gen USW.

57

Against the increased transportation loadcaused by motorization, there is a partial offset dueto the great reduction of animals and forage asmilitary cargo.


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of the Army Air Forces exceeded 2,300,-

000.58

By way of contrast, during WorldWar I the United States produced less than14,000 trainer and service planes, and AirService strengthat the time of the Armis-tice was under 200,000. 59 With their equip-ment and personnel deployed around theglobe, the Army Air Forces in World War IImade heavy demands on land and watertransportation. As in the case of motorvehicles, aircraft were bulky cargo and the

requirementsof personnel,spare parts, gaso-line, and lubricants were heavy. In theUnited States railroad cars and trucks werespecially equipped to assure the safe trans-portation of delicate assemblies. Thirty-sixcargo ships were converted to accommodateassembled planes in their holds, while hun-dreds of cargo ships an d tankers were spe-cially fitted to carry aircraft as deckloads.Although the Air Transport Commandhandled an increasing amount of passengerand freight traffic as the war progressed,and emergencymovements by air were ofutmost military importance, the volume ofair traffic was small compared with ArmyAir Forces' movements handled by surfacecarriers.

The destructiveness ofwarfare reacheda new level in World War II. It was a warof movement and the tempo of the fightingwas high. Aided by motorizedequipment,the combat units moved fartherand fasterthan ever before and were on the movemore of the time. 60 The greater weight andaccuracy of artillery fire produced devasta-

tion wherever th e ground forces went into

action and called for an amount of ammu-nition hitherto undreamed of. 6 1 The rangeof the bomber subjected military objectiveswithin and far outside thecombat zones toattack from the air. 62 The swifter tempo ofthe fighting produced greater attrition inweapons and other mechanisms.6 3 It wascommon practice for a retiring force to de-stroy or damage local facilities which mightbe of service to aninvading force. Insofaras this greater destruction and attrition af-fected the facilities, equipment, or suppliesof our own armies, it meant that promptreplacement had to be made in order tomaintain fighting efficiency, and this wasan added burden on transportation. Thesame was true in the case of facilities suchas docks, railroads, and power plants whichwere demolished while in enemy hands andwhich had to be rehabilitated by our ownadvancing forces with materials broughtforward over our own lines ofcommunica-tion.

In a report following th e defeat of theAxis Powers, General Marshall referred toour superiority "in mobility and in firepower." 64 This phrasing concisely setsforthone of the most important of the manytactical accomplishmentsof the warthesuccessful combination of power and mo-bility. Until recent timesweight of weaponsand flexibility were thought to be antagon-istic factors in combat; it seemed that onehad to be sacrificed in favor of the other.But the larger actions of the war, particu-

58 Rpt, Munitions for the Army, prepared inOUSW, 9 Apr 46, pp. 3, 5, OCT HB WD GenU S W; United States Air Force Statistical Digest,1947, pp. 27, 28.

59

Ayres, The War with Germany, Ch. VII .60 See Maj B. Corol and Maj I. Agibalov, "Tempoof Offensive Operations," Military Review (Sep-tember 1944).

61 See statement by USW, WD press release, 13Nov 44.

62 On 9 Jul 45 the AAF dropped the 2,000,000thton of bombs on enemy objectives, WD press re-lease, 10 Jul 45.

63 See Donald M. Nelson, "The High Cost ofVictory," The Reader's Digest (December 1943) .

64 Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1945, p. 95.


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TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL W ARFARE 17

provide the troops with hot meals, including

fresh meats and vegetables, wherever thecircumstances of their employment madethis possible. The bulk of such supplies, aswell as the equipment for preserving andpreparing them, was shipped from theUnited States. Good shelter was important,particularly in cold and rainy areas, and athundreds of stations throughoutthe worldmobilization type barracks were built, fre-quently with American lumber, and thou-sands of quonset huts and prefabricatedhouses of American manufacture were setup. Supplies for up-to-date medical careand complete hospital facilities followed thetroops wherever they went, and The Sur-geon General's shipmentsto oversea stationsamounted to 50,000 measurement tonsinthe peak month, or the capacity load of fivelarge cargo vessels.69 The American youthis accustomed to a full quota of recreation,and supplies forthat purpose were providedat all Armystationsathleticgoods, motionpicture equipment, theatrical properties,books, magazines, soft drinks, icecream, etc.The best builder of soldier moralemailf rom homewas encouraged, with onlymoderate restrictions on the size of pack-ages. The Army ports of embarkationshipped a monthly average of about 65,000measurement tons of mail during the winterof 1944-45, and in November 1944, whenChristmas mail was moving, theyshippedmore than 178,000 measurement tons. 70

These and other provisions for the welfareof soldiers created demands for transporta-tion, within the zone of the interior and tothe oversea bases, in addition to the de-mands for the movementof strictly militarymatriel. 71

The possibilityof a broken supply line to

one of our transoceanic theaters was athreat which had to be taken into considera-tion until the war was well advanced. Withour troops deployed to many distant landsand largely dependent on supplies shippedfrom the zone of interior, thisperil was veryreal. The Army's task was not only to sup-ply the current needs of the fighting forcesbut to establish in them a confidence thatall future needs would be met. Such con-fidence contributes to the soldier's will tofight, and lack of it may lower his effi-ciency.72 It cannot be claimed that Armytransportation never failed in this respect.Surrender of the Philippines was hastenedby inability to move matriel to that distantoutpost through the enemy blockade. Suc-cess in the campaigns at Guadalcanal andBuna was seriously threatened by difficul-

tiesin

gettingsupplies to the

troops. Afterthese early campaigns, however, our sup-ply lines to oversea combat areas werequickly established and were maintained in-tact. This became possible in part becauseof the effective protection given to our ship-ping and the great shipbuilding achieve-ment which added many more vessels thanthe enemy sank, but it was due in largemeasure also to effective strategic and lo-gistic planningin which transportation wasalways a basic consideration.

69 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Sep 44, pp. 26-27.70 Tabulation, Cargo Shipped by Army, in ASF

MPR, Sec. 3, for respective months.

71 Shipment of morale items was not entirely atthe expense of military items, since some could bestowed as filler cargo in spaces left empty by stow-age of b u l k y equipment.

72 Maj. Gen. J. C. F. Fuller of the British Armyhas presented this point in a dramatic manner. InThe Reformation of War (London, 1923) , p. 164,he says: "In war, the chief concern of the soldier isnot to kill, but to live. He fixes his eyes on thecommunications of the army to which he belongs,and is terrified if they are threatened by theenemy."


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The Role of Long-Range Planning

World War II, because of its geographicscope, the complexity of its military opera-tions, the strain which it placed on the re-sources of the Allied nations, and othercharacteristics which have been mentioned,called fo r planning of great range and per-spicacity. This planning had to be broadenough to comprehend the entire field ofhostilities and meticulous enough to insure

that the requirements of each operationwere provided for. Improvisation and op-portunism had no place in the strategicconcept, though they might become neces-sary in the executionof that concept. 73 Care-ful calculation and recalculation were thebasis of each military undertaking. Theplanning embraced th e build-up of ourtroop strength, military supplies, and meansof transportation, together with the co-ordination of these elements to avoid idle-ness and waste.

The object of transportation planningwas first to determine the deployment offorces that could be undertaken with thetransportation resources likely to be avail-able, and then to assure that when the timeto launch an operation arrived the com-mander could proceed boldly and with con-

fidence in his logistic support. The AxisPowers had failed in certain aspects oftheir long-range planning, including thatfor transportation. The swift victory inFrance in June 1940 found Germany withno well-developed program for the inva-sion of Britain and no suitable and adequatemarine equipment for the purpose, a failurewhich had a pronounced influence on the

course of the war. 74 Germany also under-

estimated the transportation problems in-volved in carrying the invasion of the SovietUnion to a successful conclusion. The Jap-anese occupied numerousbases in the Paci-fic and the East Indies which proved to beof little or no value to them strategically butrather created logistic problems with whichthey eventually wereunable to cope becauseof their shrinking merchant marine. 70 It wascareful long-range planning on the part ofthe Allies which enabled them to avoid suchmistakes and to perform huge transporta-tion tasks repeatedly and with conspicuoussuccess.

Planning for Allied operations proceededon three levelsinternational,national, andwithin each armed service. The work oneach level contributed to that on the levelabove and conditioned that on the levelbelow.

Although certain general understandingshad been reached earlier, American-Britishplanning for specific military operations wasinitiated during the first month of the warwhen the Prime Minister and his militarystaff met with the President and his advisersin Washington to discuss the Allied strategy.It was continued at the frequent meetingsof th e Combined Chiefs of Staff, which be-gan funct ioning early in 1942, and at theoccasional conferences between the Presi-dent, the Prime Minister, and the heads ofother Allied powers. The broad strategic

73 JCS 30, 5 Apr 42, JSP Rpt. On general subjectsee Col G. C. Shaw, Supply in Modern War (Lon-don, 1938), pp. 334, 340,

74 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Interv 55, 27Jun 45, with Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel,pp. 10, 11; postwar essay by Admiral Karl Doenitz,"Conduct of the War at Sea" (Div of Naval IntUSN), 15 Jan 46, pp. 9, 10; stat emen t by BritishPrime Minister, in Hansard, Parliamentary Debates(House of Commons), 18 Nov 46, pp. 52-53.

75

Regarding Axis failures, see Biennial Rpt, CofSUSA, 1945 , pp. 1-4; also, Hanson W. Baldwin,"Foe's Errors Aid Us," The New York Times,August 30, 1945.


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programs and agreements resulting from

these conferences and meetings were de-signed to utilize the combined resources ofthe participating powers to the best advan-tage of the Allied cause as a whole. Fromthe beginning, transportationparticularlyocean transportationwasone of the basicingredients of every strategic plan; and itwas one of the most difficult to deal with be-cause of the critical shortage of ships, theuncertainty as to the extent of ship losses

by enemy action, and the competing de-mands of the lend-lease and civilian ship-ping programs. The operation of the mer-chant fleets of the United States and theBritish Commonwealth, together with suchneutral passenger and cargo vessels as couldbe brought under Allied control, as a largeand flexible pool of shipping was one ofthe more notable logistic accomplishmentsof the war. 76

On the national level, long-range militaryplanning was fostered by and centered inthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, which also func-tioned as the American component of theCombined Chiefs of Staff. JCS exercised abroad control over the strategic and logisticplanning and operations of the U.S. armedforces, with direct responsibility to the Presi-dent as Commander in Chief. One of thebasic tasks of JCS, as the over-all planningand co-ordinating agency for the militaryefforts of the Army and the Navy, was toinsure that the armed forces had the oceantransport needed for their operations. Onthe one hand this involved determining asfa r in advance as possible the amount andtypes of merchant shipping required andarranging with the U.S. Maritime Commis-

sion for the construction of such new vessels

as were needed; and on the other hand itinvolved arranging with the War ShippingAdministration for the allocation of specificamounts of shipping to the Army and theNavy from the pool of vessels which wasoperated under the control of that agency. 77

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also undertook toco-ordinate Army and Navy supply andtransportation operations, particularly inthe Pacific, in order to avoid unnecessaryduplication and waste, but it was less suc-cessful in this than in other endeavors be-cause of basic differences in the logisticpractices of the two services.

On the War Department level the pri-mary responsibility for transportation plan-ning naturally rested with the Chief ofTransportation. He worked in close co-ordination with the elements of the ArmyService Forces headquarters and the Op-erations Division of the War DepartmentGeneral Staff, which were concerned withplanning for the movement of militaryper-sonnel and matriel within the zone of in-terior and to oversea stations. It was histask to seethat numbers of men and tons offreight were translated into terms of ship-ping space and to arrange that adequatetransportation should be available for the

execution of each projected operation. TheChief of Transportation was the most ac-tive War Department representative on theJoint Military Transportation Committeeand the Combined Military TransportationCommittee, which prepared studies andproposals for consideration by the JointChiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefsof Staff.

76

For discussion of pooling under the Allied Mari-time Transport Council in WW I, see J. A. Salter,Allied Shipping Control (Oxford University Press,1921), Pt. IV.

77 The work of CCS and JCS and their subsidiaryorganizations in regard to transportation will bemore fully discussed in Ch. V.


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A strong planning staff, maintained in

the Office of the Chief of Transportation,kept abreast of military developments andprovided both General Somervell and Gen-eral Gross with transportation da ta for theirplanning activities on the War Department,national, and international levels. Gross hadestablished this staff in the spring of 1941as a section of the Transportation Branch ofthe Supply Division in the War DepartmentGeneral Staff. At that time the shippingshortage already was felt and a more crit-ical situation was foreseen. During themonths preceding entry of the United Statesinto the w a r, this section developed dataand techniqueswhich were of great serviceduring the difficult days following PearlHarbor. Eventually it became the PlanningDivision in the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation, Army Service Forces. It pre-pared, as frequently as circumstances re-quired, studies covering future shippingrequirements, the volume of shipping likelyto be available, and the capability of thatshipping to effect movements of men andmatriel under various plans for their utili-zation. 78 Its studies covered also the capa-bilities of the inland transportation systemsand the ports of the United States to handlethe projected traffic.

The Chief of Transportation's PlanningDivision collaborated extensively with theplanning staff in Arm y ServiceForces head-quarters, and one or more of the division'smembers accompanied the War Depart-ment representatives to the meetings of theheads of Allied governments to assist themin dealing with the ubiquitous transporta-tion problem. The inseparability of trans-

portation and supply matters, and the need

for continuous co-ordination, led to a pro-posal in the fall of 1943 to absorb the Chiefof Transportation's Planning Division intothe Army Service Forces headquarters staff.General Gross vigorously opposed the sug-gestion on the ground that it would weakena vital working relationship which had beenbuilt up between himself, his Director ofOperations, his several operating divisions,and his planning organization. His opposi-

tion was successful, for although the trans-fer was ordered, th e order was rescindedbefore actual transfer and the necessarychanges in procedures had been effected.79

The planning for ocean transportationinvolved many factors which were subjectto fluctuation, and a change affecting onefactor might, and frequently did, necessitatecomplete revision of earlier calculations.The introduction of a new military under-taking calling for a goodly number of shipsnecessitated a revision in the allocation ofvessels to other projects. Estimates of thefuture output of American shipyards wereimportant factors in determining what over-sea operations reasonably could be pro-jected, and any failure to realize those esti-mates had a disturbing effect. Possiblevariation in the rate of ship losses was takeninto account, and changes in the tactics andlocations of enemy submarines were care-fully watched. When sinkings off the coastof Norway made the northern route to theUSSR untenable, that route was abandonedtemporarily andmore lend-lease supplies fo rthe Soviet Union were routed through Per-sian Gulf ports. When it became apparentthat the shorter route through the Medi-terranean would become available forAmerican and British movements to the

78 For activities of Plng Div see its Annual R p t ,

FY 1945; Memo, Plng Div for Exec O C T, 3 Oct45, s u b : Accomplishments and Handicaps; HistSummary, by Plng Div, 26 Jun 46 . All in OCT HBPlng Div G e n .

79 ASF Adm Memos S-72, 21 Oct 43, and S-85,10 Nov 43, OCT HB Plng Div Gen.


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OVERSEA PORTS. The Army-operated port of Khorramshahr, Iran (top).First large vessel to dock at Naha after the invasion of Okinawa (bottom). Thecapacity of ports to discharge and forward cargo had to be carefully calculated in

planning military operations.


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Middle and Far East, full advantage of the

resultant saving in ships was taken in plan-ning future operations. The same was truewhen the possibility of moving lend-leasesupplies to the Soviet Union through BlackSea ports rather than the Persian Gulf be-came reasonably certain. No transportationpolicy or program was considered inflexible;it was always subject to adjustment in thelight of new conditions.

It was part of the planning task to esti-mate the capacities of oversea ports to dis-charge cargo and clear it to dumps and de-pots. This was an especially difficult tasksince the estimates so frequently had to takeinto account the extent of damage and theamount of rehabilitation work likely to berequired at ports captured from the enemy,and also the uncertainties of discharge op-erations at beaches and in primitive har-bors. Similar estimates had to be made asto the capabilities of railways, highways,and inland waterways in the areas to beinvaded and the amount of reconstructionand new construction likely to be requiredin the establishment of adequate lines ofcommunication in those areas. The operat-ing divisions in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, which were concerned withthe respective types of transportation, con-ducted initial research into these questions,utilizing whatever sources of informationcould be tapped, in or out of the War De-partment. This information was co-ordin-ated and adapted to the use of the Chief ofTransportation by his Planning Division.

The progress of military operations in theprincipal theaters was followed closely bythe Planning Division, and revised estimatesof the capabilities of lines of communication

were made from time to time. Such studiesthrew light not only on the quantities ofsupplies which the Transportation Corps

would be requested to move to the theaters,

but also on the ability of the theaters toproperly handle the supplies which theyhad requisitioned and their ability to dis-charge vessels promptly and return them totheir home ports. The studies also forecastth e future requirements of the theaters fo rtransportation troop units and transporta-tion equipment, for the procurement ofwhich the Chief of Transportation was re-sponsiblea matter concerning which the

Planning Division had a co-ordinating re-sponsibility that called for close collabora-tion with the Director of Military Trainingand the Director of Supply in the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation.

Long-range planning for transportationin the zone of interior proceeded less au-spiciously than planning for ocean trans-portation and for the lines of communica-tion in oversea theaters. This was due partlyto differing opinions regarding the extentof the need for additional domestic trans-portation facilities and partly to disagree-ment as to whether the government or in-dustry should assume the cost. 80 After theUnited States had entered the war the pro-duction of ships, tanks, aircraft, and otherstrictly military items made such heavy de-mands on the supplies of steel and otherstrategic materials that only limited amountsof these commodities could be made avail-able for the manufacture of equipment fordomestic carriers. Planning for zone of in-terior transportation, therefore, was directedtoward the judicious utilization of thelimited materials that were available andthe efficient employment of existing trans-portation resources, including both equip-ment and manpower. The Chief of Trans-portation took an active interest in all thesematters, and his planning and operating

80 Fuller discussion will be found in Ch. IX.


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staffs co-operated closely with the other fed-

eral agencies concerned, as well as with theseveral branches of the transportation in-dustry.

Relative Advantages of the ContendingPowers

Since transportation is so vital an ele-ment in a nation's ability to wage modernwar, an appraisal of the relative transporta-

tion advantages of the Allies and the AxisPowers is of basic importance. From thestandpoint of geography the advantage wasstrongly with the Axis. Germany and Japanhad shorter lines of communication, whichmeant that they required less transportationequipment and had less military manpowerand matriel tied up in the "pipeline" fromthe zone of interior to the combat areas.Germany also had inside lines of communi-

cation radiating from the homeland to thecombat areas, a situation which affordedgreater flexibility in the redeployment oftroops and supplies. The fact that Ger-many's lines of communication were mostlyoverland meant that her war potential wasless affected by the hazards which besetocean shipping and that her army couldemploy short-range transport planes moreextensively in its logistic operations. Thesenatural transportation advantages whichthe Axis Powers enjoyed in the beginninghad to be offset by the Allies before thewar could be won.

Germany's transportation systems hadbeen carefully planned with a view to theirutility in time of war. The railways werewell laid out and highly efficient. AfterHitler's accession to power a system of

superhighways had been constructed whichenabled mechanized forces and supplies tobe moved north, east, south, or west with

remarkable speed. 81 It was reported from

various sources that during the 1933-38period the German railways were neglectedin favor of highway development, and con-sequently were under a handicap when warcame. 82 Thereafter, railroad equipment hada high priority in the production program,and as late as January 1944 United Statesmilitary intelligence reports indicated thatthe rail lines were functioning effectivelyand were being maintained well. 83 Their

services were largely at the disposal of themilitary establishment, since civilian use wasseverely curtailed.

It is clear, on the other hand, that theGerman transportation systems at all timeshad a very narrow margin of safety. Bothimmediately before and during the war theproduction of railway and motor equipmentwas limited by the over-all scarcity of ma-terials and the heavy requirements for

strictly military items. While the Reich ac-quired a considerable number of locomo-tives, cars, and trucks in the conquest ofwestern Europe, her needs on the easternfront were large and her losses there ex-ceedinglyheavy. 84 The lack of readily acces-sible crude petroleum was a serious handi-

81 See Charles B. Quattlebaum, "Military High-ways," Military Affairs (Fall 1944), p. 227 .

82

Ltr, AAR to Gen Gross, 11 Aug 42, and at-tached digest of rpts, OCT HB Gross Rail AAREquip Program.

83 Rpt 86, OSS, 20 Oct 42, sub: The LocomotivePosition in Axis Dominated Europe, OCT 453 RRRequirements; Col Curtis H. Nance, War Report,Min of Army-Navy Conf of Industry, Labor, andother Leaders, Los Angeles, 7-8 Jan 44, p. 21, OCTHB Topic Logistics Ge n; U.S. Strategic BombingSurvey, Trans Div Rpt, Th e Effects of StrategicBombing on German Transportation, 20 Nov 45,pp. 1, 2.

84 Regarding German transportation problems on

eastern front and in Balkans, see study, Advantagesand Defects of European Transport Networks, Ger-man Air Hist Br, 30 Oct 44, Translation VII/IV,OCMH.


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RAILROAD YARDS at St. L, France (top) and Battipaglia, Italy (bottom) showthe cumulative effects of Allied bombing and German demolition. Aerial bombard-ment of railroads in Europe seriously disrupted enemy military and industrial

transportation.


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cap, and the reserves of both natural and

synthetic oil fuels and lubricants were verysmall from the outset. 85

Despite the strain which war on severalfronts imposed on the transportation sys-tems of Germany, there is no basis for stat-ing that her lines of communication inwestern Europe would have failed frominherent weaknesses or internal causes.Their failure in the late stages of the warresulted from the terrific aerial bombard-ment to which transportation and its sup-porting industries were subjected. Duringthe latter half of 1944 and the early part of1945, Allied bombers subjected Continentalrailways, highways, waterways, oil wells andrefineries, synthetic oil and rubber plants,railway equipment and motor vehiclemanufac tur ing plants, steel mills, and ballbearing works to a merciless pounding,which in the end largely immobilized trans-portation and in consequence seriously af-fected all branches of industrial activity. 86

Up to the spring of 194

transportation corps responsibilities organization and operations

Documents