transnat outline part two
TRANSCRIPT
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Introduction to Part Two
Proliferation of Nation States: Statehood Revisited
James Crawford, Creation of Sates in International Law (2006)
Universality is a core principle of the United Nations
General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI) has not resolved the issue of the
representation of the people of Taiwan
Taiwan is a sovereign state and a constructive member of the international
community
Taiwan is a vibrant democratic society and an active international partner
UN General Assembly letter 11 August 2006
Protocl
WTO (23 Nov. 2001) Accession of the Sperate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen,
and Matsu
Congressional Findings and Declaration of polciy
Implementation of United States policy with regard to Taiwan
Application of Taiwan of laws and international agreements
The American Institute in Taiwan
Taiwan instrumentality
Defintions
Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
Admission of Palestine as a member of UNESCO
Constitutive Effect
Confrimation of the Objective legal situation
Declaratory Effect
Stefan Talman, The Constitutive Theory versus Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium
non Datur? (2004)
State recognition: Taiwan
Antonio Cassese, International Law (2005)
Introduciton
Russia - Successor Stateto the Soviet Union or its Continuation
Conclusion
Rein Mullerson, The continuity and Successsion of States, By Reference to the Former USSR
and Yugoslavia (1993)
ILM Background
Declaration by the Heads of State of the Repblic of Belarus, the RSFSR and Ukraine
Agreement eastblaishign the commonwealth of independent States
Agreemnts Establsihing the Commonwealth of independent States (armenia, azerbaijan,
belarrus kazakhstan, russian federation, ukraine, Turkmenistatn, etc (1991)
State Succession: The Break-up of the USSR
Intergovernmental organizations
Actors: State Clubs and Non-State PlayersSunday, September 30, 2012
2:47 PM
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They are outside the Wesphalian system
IO's are what's really different about the modern era
Lots of them - numerically iportnat
No treaties- corporations not bound
And use UN Material as ammo to show this is customary law
Look to customary international law
How to show
Ex: sue domestic corporation under alien torts act for violations of human rights
laws
UN Security Council sometimes freezes assets of clients
Does the UN matter in typical legal practice
Contra sovereignty
Can't create a super stae- in westhpalia states don't recognize super state
But could have an agreement amongst nations in which they agree to forgo
wars, soe disputes with peaceful means and have amechanism to enforce it
Here is where the original idea for the UN is usually located
Immanuel Kant, On Perpetual Peace (1795)
The League of Nations (1919=1946)
We often look at these things as legal douments (and it is)
Thus security council with veto powers
Driven by attempt to organize world in a way that prevents
future war
But Primary Function: A Political world order in which the big
powers unabashedly play the lead role and preseve the world order
So see how the political reality drives this
Meant by founders as a political club
Note: emphasizes that
Antonio Cassese, International law
The creation of the Un
Note: not rule of law
Make international peace and security
Develop friendly relations among nations
Establish platform for international cooperation
Purposes
Settle disputes peacefully
No
Non-intervention -un will not interfere with domestic things
Principels
Have to be a state to be admitted
Everyone has a seat here
Often soft
Powers:
General assembly
Organs
Charter of the United Nations
The United Nations
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"it may"
Elects members of other organs
Budgetary
Unless matter specifically binding
GA resolutions usually not binding
But that's an expression of an opinion by the world
community
Even if sot - still a lot of power
Secretariat
Victoriolus powers form wwII
Veto power
5 permanent
10 rotating
Resolutions are binding internaitonal law (Article 25)
A lot of power
Then can decide on measures
Can authorize use of force
Determines if there's a threat to internatioanl security
Security Council
Eco-Soc (Economic and Social Council
Internatioanl Court of Justice (ICJ)
Charter prevaisl against other itnernataional agreements
Supremecy clause type thing
Article 103
Nuked Japan
What did US do 41 days after signign the UN Charter?
UN envoy deployed to keep peace in Israel/Palestine
Brits given mandate to run occupying government (Ottoman
empire had broken down)
But ran it sort of effectively
Palestine governed under mandate of league of nations
Immediataley war with surrounding arab countires
UN got involved, sent diplomat to seek peace solution
Israel declared indpendnce may 14th, 1948
Radical isreali faction that didn't want UN involved
(Not in case)
Diplomat murdered
So at the time of the events, Israel not yet a member, but will be soon
Case was decided while Israeli's application to the UN for membership
F:
See Harry Roberts
A state could - established intenraitonal law that if a citizen is damaged by
a different state, his nation can bring a claim under interntational law
Can the UN bring a claim for reparations?
Could just be a bunch of states sitting together- a talking club with some
rules, but nothing with legal personality, nothing that is an entity in its
Options for what the UN is:
What is the core question:
Reparation for the injuries suffered int eh Service of the United Nations (ICJ 1949)
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own right
Note: WTO agreement says the WTO is - the UN charter is si lent
Couldn't protect personel
But nee to protec them because need to send them
So that they can make a legal claim like what's here
i.e. it has to be that way, therefore it is that way
Necessary
Has rights and obligations
Reads almost like a state constituion
That indicates an entity that is creaed
And constituions usually constitute something
If they can make agreemetns with states, hire peopele
The organization's charters
Even vis-a-vis non-members
b/c israel isn't a member yet
This fly's against the idea of consent
Objective personaltiy - it's there
Yes: UN has legal personality
The state has acquired competition
States no longer amongst themselves
Now- someoen on the world stage other than a state
What happens when the UN acquires legal personaltiy?
They compete
Once you recognize legal personaltiy for itnerntaional organizations- states are
no longer alone on the world stage
Court probably didn't think of this
But really changes the composition fo the world legal order
No longer the Wstphalian system
MR: still - court goes pretty far out here:
No territoryNo population
Compare sovereign states- all powers not prohibited by
international law
No residual power
Only has powers in the Charter, none others
For example: if wanto claim sovereignty, can't just appeal to customary
law, need text
Does it have sovereign power?
In what sense is the UN still different from a state?
Not saying reparations would be paid twice
Sweden or UN could make claim
MR: this case is loosely reasoned
You can use internal powers, processes to change it
But not judiciable stuff- internal decisions
Bound by the system
When yoou're in it, you're in it
If you're in the UN , and you don't lie what they're doing, you can't just say no
Note on the 'certain expenses" case
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Works in Legal Office
BIO
Very political organization
6th Committee - the legal committee
5th Committee- approves the budget
In reality, many more
Offices away from HQ
Head quarters based in NY
Secretariat
But also other tribunals and special courts
ICJ
Peace Keeping Forces
6 organs according to charter
Overview of UN System
Office in UN secretariatAdvises secretary general
Role of Legal officer
Anything UN officers do in offical functions has imunity
Under convention
Functional immunity
For local staff, contractors
Under conetion
Limited immunity
No choice of law
Can complain to UN if lose out on bidding for procurement contract
But conditions to be met
Very new
Procurement:
Note: here- treaty between natiosn and an internatnaionl organization
Convention on the Privilgeges and Immunities of the United Nations:
UN Relationship with other coutnries set by treaty
Guest Speaker: United Nations
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Paris
December 1960)
Agreement Establishign the World Trade Organization (1995)
Note: internationl Standard Settign Organizations
The Purposes, Structures, and Powers of International Organizations: Comparing the UN, OECDand WTO
Why do we have Ios? What is their purposes( See UN Art1: OECD Preamble, Art. 1: WTO
Questions
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UN: Peace
OECD: increase wealth amongst wealthy countries
WTO: bring down trade, facilitiate world trade
Premable, art III
International cooperation
Not cheap- have to contribute to operating charges
Have to comply with rules of club
i.e. if you join th eUN, give up right to go to war at wil l
Join the WTO: give up subsidies, customs tariffs
Give up some indpendence
Cost:
Why do states and other enties join?
More like a constitution - builds an entity
Treaty usually does what UN charter does
Almost always come into being via treaty
How do IOS come into being and what is their legal stauts?
UN - open to all nations who will comply
Somone open only regionallly,
Who can be a member of these Ios? Is membership defined globally, regionally, by subject
matter or by a comibnidation of these (oand other?) Criteria?
Usually large club + smaller executive committee( like the security council)
Secretariat (UN)
Beauracy
Note: OECD has no judicial branch
Differences: some have judicail branch, some don't
What are the Principle organxs? Is there a standard pattern? (Compare graphs provided for
all three orgnaizations at the end of this chpater (See UN Art. 7; OECD arrts 7-11; WTO arts
IV, VI)
But see UN - that for GA, but relaly sec council members more powerfulOften 1 nation one vote
See World Bank - weighted by financial contribution
Some naitons weight the vote
How do Ios make decisions? By (Qualified?) majority? Consensus? How do votes count? Are
Ios (internally) democratic) (see UN arts. 18, 27; OECD Art 6; WTO Art IX?
So about military and poltiical power balanced against democracy
Security Council - world powers
Each reflects different puproses
These aren't per se democratic insitutions
What underlying facts and considerations do the voting structures and procedures reflect?
Played only a small role in Westphalian order
Because of cheaper global communication networks
Proliferation lately
Exist on national and international level
See trade advocates
Human rights
All over political spectrum
Types of things
Increasing official recognization of NGO's
Benefits
Non-Governmental Organizations
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Sometimes trigger treaty making with activism
Sometimes particiapte in disputes via amicus briefs
Shape international law
Must acquire legal personality in at least one country
Clubs- usually chartered
Who NGOs are and What they do
Based in one coutnry (or several countries)
No official international standingLegal status of NGOs
NGO personality
NGOs as consultation Partners
Publish a lot of reprots and things
Publicity/transparency
Small governments often lack expertise
Provide expertise
Governemtns have perspective of local consitiuency
Particularly important for environemental mattersRepresent global view of things
Do a lot of things govenremtns don't do that should be done
If fail through the state - then some NGO can pop up supported by a small
section of the population
Second-bite at the apple for special interest
Democratic processes?
The Legitimacy of NGO Participation
Lots of them, how to manage
Not democratic
Legitiamcy
Often overrepresent western rich countriesBiased
Problems with NGO's
Steve Charnovitz, Non Governmental Organizatiosn and International Law (April 2006)
Given access to things then
UN certifies certain NGO's
Note: NGO's status with UN
World Trade ORganiation: EC- Asbestos - additioanl procedure adopted under rule 16(1)
Note: The Special Case of the Red Cross
Individuals
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Obligatons for individuals mostly in criminal law, but some viil law
Did not direclty recognize indivduals
Did not direclty sanction individuals
Westphalian system
But there were anti-slavery provisions
But never gave them direct access
(for the most part)
Individuals become endowed wihtown rights and obligations: this is the end of
the Westphalian system
Also- international economic actors- corporations
Compete with Clubs (Ios) NGOs, and individuals
States are no longer among themselves
Today: individuals paly a very significant role in the international system
Most important rights
In many instances, parts of populations from one countries
ended up on other side of the border
Compare Harry Roberts (foreigner in another country)
Here: citizens within a country
States recognized they wanted to porect populations against
their own governments
Idea that international law should protect the ctiizens agaisnt
heir own govenrment is arevolution
After WWI: redrew boundaries of Europe
So not a full f ledged human rights mechanism yet
Still needed special enforcement mechanism and no direct
representation for individuals
System, run by league of nations, protecting minorities that ended up in
particular states
Precurser to human rights: Inter War Minotiries Treaties
James Hathaway, Rights of Refugees under Itnernational Law
Need to understand the status of these thigns, not the indivdual articles
Note: no sovereign immunity in this area
Largely the work of Eleneor Roosevelt
No binding legal force
General assembly has no itnerntaional law making power
General Assembly Resoltuion (1948)
Not a treaty
Not a bindign UN Resolution
Legal status:
Creates a text htat looks and souns like a treaty
Maybe influential
But soft
Functions:
What is this thing in legal terms
Universal Delcaration of Human Rights (GA Res. 217)(1948)
The Emergence of the Global Human Rights Framework
Rights (Protections)
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So countyr has to go in front of the GA and apologoize/
explain
So it's like a personal promise- still a sort of moral obligation
Makes it more difficult for a country to be blase about human rights
violatiosn
Effects
Right, liberty, slavery
i.e. stuff you find in constituions/ declarations since the age of
enlightenment
Typical
Housing
Work
Protections against unemployment
Rest and leisure
education
Social welfare
Democratic rights
What sorts of rights are in here:
These are nice thigns -not going to happen
Put in the bill of rights sort of stuff- actually enforceible
Includes soic-econoic rights
But this goes well beyond western veiw
One view
RM: what do we think about these
So no internal force (in US)
But not self-executing
Binds member states vis-a-vis other states to abide by these human righs
Legal Status: Treaty (a real treaty!)
Includes the liberal defense of western types rights
This is put in a sepearte treaty
b/c western side really digs these politicalrights
While eastern bloc much more into the social and
cultural rights
So split of delcaration into two UN convetntions
But trend in that direction
Lots of countries sign up to both
But coutnries did just sign onto one, and not the other
Not a clean split -not all west on one side and all east on the
other
Does not include the Socia Welfare
First half of the UN delcaration
What kinds of rights does it have?
What do we do with this/ how do we enforce it?
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in force 1976)
An annex treaty to the ICCPR
Members of ICCPR don't need to submit to this sytem, but can sign on
US never signs on to this
Creates an institution/compalint mechansims for enforcement of ICCPR
Optional Protocol to the Internaitonal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976)
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About half of the people who sign onto the ICCPR sign the optional
protocol
Submit complaints
Individuals can:
Court decides in written procedure
Austrial signed optional protocol to the ICCPR
Province in Australia crminilizes homosexual acts in private
F:
Exhaust domestic remedies
Files complaint
Not making a decision in the sense of a jdugment
An advisory opinion from an expert body
Only giving their views
Forces member state to respond
All written procedure
Note:
Power of the Huma rights committee:
Rules
Indiviaul launches compalint agaisnt own government in internaitoanl
forum under internatioanl law
Mechanism holds governemtns repsonible in itnernatioanl forum under
internatioanl law
This is radical
Toonen v. Australia (Human Rights Committee, Comm 488/1992: 4 April 1994)
Larger than EU - includes Russia, Turkey
Not done by the European Community, instead the Council of
Europe
Regional Convetnion
Every member state delegates a judge
Exhaust domestic remedies
Indiviuals can complain - their state or another state
Actual internal review
Results final, binding udgment that states actually do abide by
Court has power to:
Enforcement: collective enforcement - a Court
Note: very different form above:
European convetion for the Proteciton of human rights and fundamental freedoms(1950, in force 1953)
Gays in the army
Asking about sex life
Etc. very intrsuive
Privacy
Violates human rights
Case of Smith and Grady v. The UK (Euorpean corut of human rights 1999)
The European Convention on Human rights
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They've people have chosen a career in the army, not easing for
them to find jobs after dismissal
Dismissal from armed forceds
Civil law tradition - very structured way
Describe what's hahpepnign
Yes
In accordance with the law
Except to the extent it is necessary in a democratic
soceity for national security
Except:
Article 8: everyone has a right to privacy
Are we eithing this article- do we have a problem
Article implicated
Keep armed services read
Legitiamte purpose?
Liberal, enlightened society that calls for certain values
Puaralism, tolerant, broad mindedness
Court is certain these are the values to enforce
They mean a liberal society, not a democratic socirety
Utlimatley court says they're not buyign the
arguemnt
Level of review: higher than abuse of discretion-
ultimatle; we would call it strict scrutiny
So given the intensity of intrustion, UK must come up with
some compelling reasons
Justif iable in a democratic society?
Court puts gays as protected category
Can the government justify it's actions
Court's approach
Now integrate uk armed services
Result: heavy invasion into sovereign perogative of the state
And it's activitst to the point that would freak out US judges
So signign onto a human rights system like this subjects you to massive
intrusions in state sovereignty
This system is sort of super-constiuional-super national
The Inter-American Human Rights System
The African Human Rights System
Internatioanl criinal law
Nerve gas and things
Still conencted to war fare, not holocaust sized offensive
But these crimes weren't as bad as we saw in WWII
So there wasn't that much real wil l to do that
losing powers leaders held responsible for wwI
Abuse of state power in eruope has been massive
Bad guys so clearly bad- enough world consenus to do something about it
1945
Malcolm Shaw- Int Law
Responsibilities
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Some acquitted
Most hung
US wanted to show that Law scould handle this
One surviving particpatn: Thomas Maryland
Not a show trial
No- international law requires consent of those involved
That's how the cookie crumbles when you start a war
But when you win a war- victor's justice
Can you do this: can you make a treaty agreeign to do something to a 3rd
party
But deals with non-members
Legal nature of document: Treaty
Establishes a tribunal
In international law, officials acting in official capacity usualy get
immunity
These nazi's don't
But today, this is what the internatioanl criminal court does
This would have been unthinkable 50 years earlier
Sets up individual resposnbiliteis for crimes doen in official capacities
Starting war of aggression as a crime for individuals
Differs from standard dmoestic criminal law?
What does this thing do?
Charter of Nuremberg Tribunal
Modern version of the nuremberg trial
Multileateral treaty
Own legal perosnalityNot UN entity, indpendentas
Clinton signed
That's the right thing to do if you do not intend to ratify
But Bush withdrew
US not a party
What is the legal status of this:
If they do, the ICC stays back
Or if you're just faking the prosecution
If the meber states don't, ICC steps in
Preference for member states themselves to prosecute the
itnerntaitoanl criminals
Subsidiary jurisidciton/prosecution means
Rules
Rome Statute of the Itnernational Criminal Court (adopted 1998, in force 2002)
Conscription and Enlistiment of Children under 15 or using them to Participate
Actively in Hositlities
Can't handle a lot of cases l ike this
Q: why is this deicsion so long
Situation in the Democratic Republic Of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor V.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC)
The International Criminal Court
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The weight of the system is enormous
Could put more money on the ground
Money invested may be totally out of proportion to the actual
effect
So although while a big success to have one of these trials
Non citizens have standing in federal court for violations
of international law
Alien Torts Act
2 federal statutes
War crimes, genocide, slavery
If this is the sort of violation that sounds in internatioanl
law when done by idnividuals
Even when acting in a pivate capacity -don't need to be state
actors
Individuals, non-state actors, can be liable for tort in international
law
Hooks hereHere: Fed Corut endoreses tort liability of an individaul under itnernatioanl law
Massive human rights abuses commited, arguably tby the heads of states
Foreign plaintiffs/victims
Events on foreign soil
US has nothing to do with this case
Tort law sutis in american district court
f:
1789
Dormant for a long timeCame back in 1980
District courts have jurisdiction for any alien, in tort only commited
in violation of international law or a treaty of the US
Question here: jurisdiciton - can the court proceed to tdiscovery,
the merits
Alien Tort Claims Act
Federal Torture Victim Act
2 statutes at place
An alien sues
For a tort
Committed in vioaltion of the law of nations
Alient Torts claim act jurisdiction establisehd when
Court: no- tort liability, even for individauls
D: only applies to tort
Threshold issue re: Jurisdiciton: (Al ien torts act)
Because international law applies only to state actors
Is Sprska a state?
Theshold issue: is Akrdzic a state actor (Torture Victims Act)
Kadic v. Karadic (2d 1995)
Jose Francisco Sosa v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Souter 2004)
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No cause of action directly in ATCA
Cause of action comes from background common law
Violations have to be as serious and uncontestedas thigns like priacy were in 1789
So for Human Rights violations, if hardcore, that's
okay
Like can't include racial discrimination
So cases like Karadic are okay
But no judicial adventurism
Cause of actions only for hardcore vioaltions of
international law
But not still born
But merely jurisdistical
Court affirms Alien Tort Claims Act alive
Didn't claim they crossed border and abducted
Couldn't locate this in international law
Instead, claim centered on him being held without due
process for a 24 hour period
Problem with his case:
But didn't make that argument
Note- clearly a treaty between the united states was violated
Issues: unkind court and weird posture of cliam
Alvarez-Machain has no claim here
Summary:
Follow-up from Mexican Abduction case
F:
Note: first time SCOTUS faces ATCA
Note: in Kadic, Unocal, and other cases thought the ATA implied a
cause of action
The ATCA gives you a jurisdiciton only - does not create a cause of action
i.e. a cuase of action from outside the Alien Torts Act
Comes from common law (federal common law)
Where the cause of action comes from:
Have to be violations of international law, not limited to 1789, but
the violations have to be as clear and generally accepted as those in
1789
Rape
Torture
Genocide
So we can have things like
Court is being politically cautious- critimiscism over ATCA
cases
But can't push the boundaries, nothing seriously debatedable
So no doubt about these
In fact cited in footnote with approval
Causes of action: mass rape, murder, torture, summary
execution, war crimes
Q: is does anything change in Kadic in light of this?
This is what we're talking about with aiding and abedding and
bsiness enterprise
Q: how much further beyond this stuff can you go?
What are the causes of action
Important things about the ATCA from here:
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Agaisnt individuals
Clear violations of international law
First generation of Alien Torts Acts cases
People started suing corporations
Later:
Are corporations liable for intenrational alw
Can you do it beyodn actual perpetrator and hold liable for aiding and abedding
Opening questions
More murky water here
But still through the state - states must esposue claims
See Barcelona Traction - corporations deserve some minimal protections under
international law standards
Corporations acquire their own international rights
Summary
Yes corpoartions have rights
But only home state may espouse claims
Summary
Company goes under because spainish governemnt doesn't authorize transfer
of funds
Note: Canada could have sued ICJ
Company is candaien, but lots of beligiun shareholders
F:
Does not extend to coutnries with sharehodlers
That would be lots of companies
Under international law, the right to diplomatic protection for coproaiton is
limied to home of corporation (where incorproated, maybe wehre
headquartered)
Can Belgium sue spain
Deserve protection under internaitonal law
But can't act indpendently, have to make their governemtn do
something
Home governemtn can sue on their behalf
Corporations matter-
Important
Case concernign the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, limited (Belgium v.
Spain (ICJ 1970)
MFN
Natioanl Treatmnet
Tax equality
With these rights, corporation can represent itself - go to arbitration itself, etc
Corporations get a lot of rights through bilateral treaties
Bilateral investment treat -this changes things from the case above
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (1991)
Rights
International Business Entities
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Facilitate foreign investment by protecting foreign investors
Get work visas
Can bring in perosnell worldwide
Management can come in and out
Fair compensation
Due process
Legal remedites
Protection against appropriation
National Treatment
Most Favored Nation
So now, under bilateral treaties, corporations have direct rights
Almost like human rights on the economic side
So corporations acquire rights in internaitonl law
Corporation can take coutnry to binding arbitration
Have a remedy outside of your home country
Rights these treaties get:
So corporationsget right to due process
Corporations have indiviaul, human rights
Went beyond warrant
French corproaiton subject to searches by own country
F:
You are legal entity, have human rights to due process
French company wins
Soceite Colas Es and others v. France (Eruopean Court of Human Rights 2002)
Here- the emphasis not done on cirminal law, mostly on civil and tort liablity, almost all
action in the US
Outlines reasons corporations should be held accountable under internatioanl law
Try to induce corpoations to sign up to UN program asking them to keep self
respsonbile, reporting requirements
Soft law
So clearly need to deal with what they do
Well, we may have nothing else
q: is private litigation through tort law the best way to do that? Reactive l iablity?
50 of the largest 100 economies in the world are corporations
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: a Theaory of Legal Responsibility (2001)
UN Global Compact-Ten Pricniples
Yes corporations can be liable under ATCA and inteernatioanl law
Can even be liable as aiders and abbetors (b/c recognized under
itnerantioanl law
Yes, enough to go back to trial
Is there enough issues to overturn SJ for corporation
Summary
John Doe, Individual and As administrator of the estate of his deceased child baby doe
I and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Unocal Corp (9th cir 2002)
The Un Global Compact
Responsibilities
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So unocal went on to settle
So now: the plaintiffs have a lot of alw on their side
Soverieng immunity, politicall impossible
Can't sue in US because of sovereign immunity
Can't sue their own military
Bu tthey didn't violate directly
Need aiding and abedding liablity
Basically only potential forum is US, only potential defendant
is corparotion
So maybe sue corporation in cahoots with them
Victims of miliatry action in own coutnry seeking remedies for human
rights violations
Aiding and abbedding
Suing corporation for these violations
Note: issues before supreme court
F:
PP: summary jdugment 12-b 6
Thus yes, can sue corporations for aiding and abedding
This pusehs the limits of the law and the facts
Court: yes- this cause of action survives
Have to be adventerous in terms of poltiical risks
Resource company has to go where the resources are
Had success entering countires earleir than competitors
Myanmar:
Foru reasons this case should be interest
John Imlet
Was that aiding and abedding
Do we want to hold companies liable for investing in coutnries
with these sorts of governments
They did know slave labor used in connection with the railroad
project a few hundred miles away
Assuming everthing he said was right about nothing bad happened with
the pipeline,
Reactions
Note on challenges to the Alien Tort Statue: kiobel and ExxonMobil
Note on the Chevron v. Ecuador Litigation
See assumption of against extraterritorialtiy jurisdiciton
And the ATCA doesn't' say so
And if the court finds that the ATCA doesn't apply
So SCOTUS has asked the parties to brief this question
Also quesiton if ti can be applied extraterritoriality at all
Q: can corpraotiosn be sued under ATCA
2nd circuit says no corporate repsonsiblity under human rights/ internatioanl
law
Note: corproate liablity once again infront of supreme court
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Domestic something
They'll say it applyies extraterritoraitlly, bu
tneed some link to the US
Reimann thinks they'll do this
extraterritoriallly, it becomes defunct
Reimann thinks this remains- lots of itnernaitoanl law now
about corporations
Can corporations be sued under the act?
Note: See enforcement of interntaional Human Rights flowchart on CTools
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Now recognize some intenrtioanl law that is permanent, can't be changed
Happened because sovereign coutnries delegate a lot of sovereign power to
international organizations
Situations where sovereignty not respected
Overall: states no longer exercsiing sovereignty across the board in the
Westphalian way
Changes of sovereignty
So in some areas, ahave asserted sovereignty more aggressively by saying have
jurisdiction beyond their border
Expansion of Jurisdictional Claims
See Ctools overview of Ch. VIII Authoriyt: The Erosion of Sovereignty and the Expansion of
Jurisdicitonical claims
So in some cases sovereignty beign cut back while in other ways becoming more assertive
Preliminary notes:
A treaty is void if it , at the timeof its conlcusion, int conflicts with a preremptory norm
of general internataionl law
Article 53: treaties in Confl ict with Peremptory Norm of General International Law (Jus
Cogens)
Vienna Convention on th0eLaw of Treaties
These are made in normal way of itnerntiaonl law, treaties, custom, etc
i.e. can't make a treaty counter to one of these - if you do, it's void
States then can't say they don't consent
Some stuff in itnerntaionl law, that if sufficiently consolidated is removed
from the agreed consent of states
Just some norms of internatioanl law, so fudnamental that we render themnonderogable- states cannot derrogate from them
Not a soruce of law
Jus Cogen
Slavery
Genocide
Warcrimes
Extra-judicial killing
See also Kardic v. Karadic
I..e the stuff from nuremberg and subsequent
The hardcore human rights protections
Normativeist say yes, positivist say no
Racial discrimiantion
Beyond this - disputes:
What are these norms
Not so much that i t prohbits active, concious derrogation
Ups the psycholagical ante in the ligitagion
Creates pressuesure- accusign them of nuremberg type stuff
In litigation, when you invoke these
Main impact: visible in cases l ike Unocal
Other thing it does:
What is the effect of Jus Cogen
Hathaway, the Rights of Refugees under International Law
Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens)
Interaction: States in the Contemporary Global ContextMonday, October 08, 2012
1:23 PM
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Takes arguemnt that this is recognized ntenrtiaonl law, there is a treaty, etc, off
the table
No consitent self -practice, etc
Show stoppign arguemnt on this
Shows you're complaining about serious stuff - breaking fundamental
rules of the legal order
This is a bigger gun
Like constitutional arguments
Removed from usualy political process
Not subject to change by wil l of legisaltive majority
If you recognize norms that are removed from derrogation, tha's like
consitoutional law
Gives more weight to the proceedigns
Fundamental values of legal order
Jus Cogens norms are like constiutional norms of international law
What kind of arguments are like this in a domestic litigation?
If you compalin of Jus Cogens violatiosn, that's okay
See Sosa
In ATCA litigation, they do
Do they do a lot of work
It has limited it in a certain way
Certain things removed from sovereign choice
And think about what this does to the sovereignty of states
Understand Jus Cogens are about rank, not where the norms come from
Note: just because it seems important in your legal system, doesn't mean it's jus cogens
Chapter III: Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general
international law
Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (international law comission
2001)
Previously -states can wage just war at will
Self defense
Authorized by security council
Exceptions
Give up right to wage aggressive war
Now
Big deal-
Attempt to prevent conflicts like WWII
Used to be albe to use mi litary force, just within certain laws of war
Now: give that up- must use peaceful means, not using aggression
or threat of aggression
This part of sovereignty has been delegated to the security council
Note: major inroads on sovereign rights
If something bad happens, go to security council to authorize use of force
40: non force sanction -embargos, etc
The security council: if they determine threat to itnernational peace and
authority may take ajust about any steps
How is this supposed to work
Waging War: The United Nations System of Collective Security
The Delegation of Sovereign Powers
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When miliatry foce authorized- orignal idea was that member states
would make forces avialable to UN comman system
Really what happens, telsl member states to go out there and get
'em
41: if 40 fail s, authorize use of miliatry force
Inherent right of idnivaula or collective self defense if an
armed attack occurs agaisnt a member of the UN
Self defense
So an come to the aid of yoru allyIndivual or colelctive
Exception: article 51:
If not authoirzed by 41 or 51 when using force, then violation of international
law
David Bederman, International Law Frameworks
Charter of th eUN
No
Imminent
No other means left
But requries
Pre-emptive strike may be allowed
Q: can the US justify iraq invasion under article 51, collective self defense
Q: but maybe necessity (terrorism) means you can't rely on article 51 anyone
Here- resolution was political compromise to give both participants and
objectors policatal coverage
q: was the action authorized by the security council?
States have done thisk, see Kosovo and Nato
People said probably illegal, but nobody was
going to stop them
Grey zone
Reimann - this si an open quesiton
q: is that document final and conclusive - can't go outside of it/ can'tdo anything not provided by document, or is it more open ended ( if
silennt, not addressed, look elsewhere)
US charter doesn't say anything about it
Q: is it legal under UN charter or in international law to intervene internally to
prevent humanitarian disasters
Aug 190 Iraq invades kuwait
Aug 1990 Resolution 660: SC condmens, demsnds withdrawl
Nov 1990: resoltuion 678: final opporutnity, for iraq, then use all necessary
means
Jan 1991: First Gulf War
April 1991: Resoltuion 687 Formal cease fire, conditons imposed on iraq
Nov. 2002: Resoltuion 1441 (Citing 678, 687), Iraq in "material breach", "final
opporutnity to comply" Security Council Remains Sezied"
Mar. 2003: Second Gulf War
Time line
Once can show self defense, no need to appeal to security coucnil
Can the US justify based on 51:
Self Defense:
If you're the state departmetn and you want to justify 2nd iraq war as in compliance
of international law:
The 2003 Invasionof Iraq
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So wording of 51 doesn't halp you
Problem -no armed attack against US
Article 51 is si lent on this
But threat must be imminent and resposne necessary
Must have no other recourse
But lots of international law, some right to pre -emptive
mili tary rights
It's just a question of timing
Note: this is what's invoked by israel all the time
But can argue pre-emptive sel f-defense
Too far away
Can't plausibly make this arguemnt
Franck: hard to make arguemnt striek against US emminent
But this is moving beyond the UN Charter, nad you're pushing
But plausible arguemtns- rogue states with WMDs, wil ling to
give to terrorist
Article 51 is too narrow, have to take out terrorist early
Could say: producing weaposn of mass destruction, could give that to
terrorist
So Security council has authroized
Material breach of regimeunder 687, as noted in 1441, authorizesunilateral action, authorization of 678 back in effect
US Reasing of resolutions:
That's all used up
We did that
Scope of those earlier resolutions had to do with protection of
Kuwait
If you want new authorization, gots to go get that
"we remain sezied of the matter"
If you breach 687, 678 is only about the liberation of Kuwait
Other side:
Reimann: this sins't a clear vioaltion of itnernatioanl law, the USreading is plausible at least
Should have come to a clear resoltuion and said what the deal
is
But that's a stupid law professor perspective- there's a lto of
politics
US and UK ready to go to war, saying going to take the
motherucker out, what are you going to do about it
French and Germsans said no
Russians and Chinas said they'd veot eveyrthing
Something half can say authorizes, others say
doesn't
To give plasuible deniability to everyone
So, decided to draft something to keep things open
So this was a compromise, probably the only thing
security council could do
What happened on the Sec. council
Fact that security counicl doesn't reach agreement, the
world can't act
This is the problem with the securiyt appartatus- all the
eggs in one basket
Real problem: security council couldn't reach agreement what
to do
Problem: drafting 1441 is a disaster
Who is right
Security council authorized:
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So what do you don when the Sec Council system is shut down?
Frederic L. Kirgis, ASIL insights Security Council Resoution 1441 on Iraq's Final
Opporutnity to comply with disarmanement Obligations (Nov. 2002)
Will iam Taft IV and Todd Buchwald, Premption, Iraq, and International Law (AJIL 2005)
Thomas m. Franck, What happens now? The United Nations after Iraq (2003)
The Caroline Incident and the Right to Anticipatory Self -Defense
UN Report: A more secure World: Our Shared resposnbility; Reprot of the High Level Panelon Threates Challenges and Chains (2004)
If added more permanent members with veto power would probably we
worse
Big powers wouldn't assent to getting rid of veto power
But unlikely to change anytime soon
This is anarchonistic b/c of security council permanent members
Important to see how the security council stuff breaks away some sovereign power
Reimann overview
Including Dispute
Lots of organs
International organization
Underlying agreements are multilateral and pluralateral treaties
Legal personality
Almost all trade volume around the world
150 members
Platform to negotiate and enforce trade agreements to faciliate world
trade
Main purpsoe
What dos the WTO do?
Structure of the WTO
Sonia E. Rolland, WTO Law: an Overview
Right to make special deals
Right to regulate outflow and influx of foreign goods
Right to
Give up a lot of rights
How does this work
Small developing coutnries don't have the man
power at geneva to be present at every meeting
In order to say no, must be present at the meeting
Not clear it does work
Almost all decisions have to be unanimous
Consensus
Overview
Article I Establishment of Organization
Article I I Scope of the WTO
Agreement Establishing the WTO (1995)
World Trade Organization Agreements
Regulating Trade: The World Trade Organization
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Article IX Decision-Making
Makes bi llateral treaties have mulitlateral effect
If you give a trade favor to one country, must extend it to every other
member
No special deals
Article I General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
Treat imports the same as domestic goods once inside your country
Article III National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
Article XI General Elimination of Quantitati ve Restrictions
Article XX General Exceptions
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Article I Scope and Defintion
Article II Most-Favoured Nation Treatment
Article XIV General ExceptionsARticle XVI Market Access
Article XVII National Treatment
General Agreement on Trade in Services
Appraising Section 609 Under Article XX of the GATT 1994
Exhaustible natural resourcesArticle XX(g): Provisional Justification of Section 609
Small countries score a victory against US
Environmental policies
Plainti ff countries not all for this
NGO's let to f ile amicus briefs
Treaty interpretation
Dispute resolutiona nd appellate body relied on general internatioanl law
Why this case is important
Comes to recommendation
First- Panel (DSU)
AB
So this is almost unthinkable
Note: AB decisions adopted if no consensus not to accept
Procedural Posture
No restrictions other than tariffs
Article XI: General Elimiantion of Quantitative restications
Need to show justfied through article XX
So here- restrictions
Principle Argument of Claimants as to why the US is in violation?
XX(g) applies
US: likes formal equality - just treat alike
Cultural divide-De Facto - treatying countries in very diffent circumstances alike
Gave some coutnries more time to implement
But also not really treating eveyr country alike
Can't abuse these excpetions
Reads chapeau as good faith clause
Need due process like stuff
More powerful arguments: demandign same policy and not just any
equally effective policy, and not allowing shrimp trawled in
complaince from non complying coutnries
Arbitrary discrimination -treaty countries differently
But fails chapeau
Case:
The Shrimp-Turtles Case (US-Shrimp) (AB)
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See references to negotiatiosn and shits in the opinion
Give up right to act unilaterally
Must coopearte
Mexico: Extradition treaty is a platform for cooperation
Similarities with first Alvarez-Manchein case
Riemann: US gave up more sovereignty than they thought
Look at how the law making power of the EU has restricted the soveriegnty of
tis members
Just being swiss
Switzerland
Lots of oil money, doesn't want to share
Norway
Also a couple of Bulkan states- too much unrest
2 hold outs in western europe
Largest market in the world
Great supplier of jobs for translators
Quasi federation with 23 different languaes
These treaties are piled on top of each other.
All basically occurred under former article 117
Cases here are the defining cases
Doesn't decide these kinds of cases, gives a binding
opinion/recommendation
European Court of Justice
Overview
Art. 117 of the Treaty of Rome (now article 267 TFEU)
Art. 10 of the Treaty of Rome
Direct effect itn eh member states (rank left open)
Creates rights (And obligations) of ctizens
Overview
And if i t does, can indivduals make a direct claim under the treaty against its
own state?
Issue: does the treaty have direct effect in the Netherlands
Reimann: this is deviation from usual rule:
And here: this treaty has direct effect
b/c new international legal order, not usualy type treaty
b/c ECJ doesn't trust states to enforce agaisnt each
other, wants indivuals/commercial actors to be polciing
this
Aricle 12 gives individual rights
Reimann: integral part of estalbished legal order of member
states
Court: by joining European Community given up that right, this
court interpets the treaty
But Court: direct effect does not turn on domestic constituional order
Text: looks non-self executing
Flew out of the radar screen - was a small little organization type thing at
this point
Reimann: why didn't people freak out about this?
Summary:
NV Algemene Transport-En Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland
Revenue Administration (European Court of Justice 1964
Making Law: :The European Union
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By 1980, the deal was done, too far to go backwards
But before too long, turned the treaty into something quite different
EEC Art. 12: Member states shall referain from introducing between themselves
any new customs dusties on imports or exports or any charges having
equivalent effect and from increasing those which they already apply in their
trade wi th each other
European Econioomic Community
Netherlands institutes tariff against some belgium products
117: has jurisdiction for interpretation of treaty
And does it give individuals a cause of action
But this isn't a question of interpreation, it's a question of whether the
treaty obligation is part of dutch domestic law that can be enforced by
dutch court
Usually look to the constituional order of the countries
Is this self -executing or not/ i.e. does it have direct effect/ does it
penetrate domestic legal order
Reimann: where have we seen this before:
No Jurisdiction for the court here
Talks only about member states, not individuals
Says states "shall"
Marshall wouldn't find this self -executing
Issues
And gives indivudals a direct right to invoke
Reimann: why does the court want individuals to have
standing
Court finds direct effect b/c it's aboslute "shall"
Does this article 12 have direct effect?
Court: we have jurisdiction
Netherland:
Supremeacy over national law
Trums even subsequent national law
Even as a matter of domestic law (EC law is an integrated part of the domestic
legal order)
This means that natioanl legisaltors are unable to deviate foerm EU law- locked
in forever
Overview
Issue: Can Italy disregard treaty obligations with subsequent domestic legislation?
Compare US: treaties have same level as doemstic legisaltion, so last in time rule
applies
Would defeat purpose of community law if states could legilsate out of it
Community would erode- states could have subsequent legi saltion and
For EU law:
Constituionalizing EU law
So EU law is higher than domestic law
EU Treaties can't be superceded by domestic legislation
Flaminio Costa v. ENEL (European Court of Justice 1964)
Overview:
i.e. must go to Italian legal instiutions to get rid of conflicitn glaw (constiuional
court or legislature)
Issue: who makes the decision that a domestic law conflicts with EU law? Must Italy
get subsequent law off books?
Court: automatic- ultimately enforced by everybody- every judge in EU has to give EU
Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Simmenthal (European Court of Justice 1978)
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Must not get formally reviewed in domestic instituions
law direct, supreme effectwith indivual rights
Recent treaty wrote it in, but nothing in the original treaty
Based on the structure of the EC/EU
Almost no textual support for this supremeacy
Law above the states- more than just cooridnationSupremacy that states can't do anything about
Step from international alw to suprernational law
Eric Stein: wrote about constiutionalization of EU law- peple hadn't realized it(1978)
Oveveiw of thsese cases
Are positive oblgifations (of member states) direclty enforceable (by private
indiviuals)?
Does EC law have direct effect between private parties (horizontal effect)?
Effect of EC law outside of Treaties (regulaitons, directives)?
Open Quesitons: after Simmenthal
Cosntiounal law
Federal law And treaties
State law
US
European Union alaw
Natioanl Cosntional law (maybe same as Euroepan Union law, but maybe
below)
Natioanl Law (Federal/state)
European Union
Compare US
Why here: example
A treaty
Basically ensure full faith and credit for civil and commerical
judgments thorugh Europe
Rules for jurisdiciton and jugdgment enforcement
Free Judgment recognition
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgment in Civi l and
Commercial Matters (1968)
So now has direct effect in member states
EU - turnign treaty regime int o bidnign rgeuglations
End of horizontal cooperation, now top down direction from Brussel ls
that goes on to be turned into a federal statute with supremeacy
US equivelaent would be like a model act for state legislation
What's happening: movement from horiztonal coooperation to top-down
direction
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Jdugments in Civil and Commercial Matters
The Evolution of the European Regime of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment
Recognition
Filled with unelected buearucrats
Fundamental problem: bound by deicsions made by international organizations
Nobody's voted for them
Who do they answer to?
Unelected
Democracy problem:
Eric Stein: Delegation of Sovereign Powers and Democratic Legitimacy:
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The people who sent them?
Not subject to democractic or constiutional control
So there is a chain of legimitacy, but it is long, not very transparent,
hidden by public view
Further away instiutions are are harder to control
Lack of transparency
Internaional level: Germany v. Italy
Domestic level: Fisa e.g. Weltover
States: Foreign sovereigns (States etc
Domestic Level: act of State Doctrine
Acts:Certain acts of foreign governemnt
Interntaionl leel: e.g. Belguim Arrest Warrant
Domstic Level: Pinochet
Persons: Immunity of certain persons cahrged w// Governemtn Functiosn
Three kinds
Issue: when one state allows
F: Italy allowed some citizens to sue Germany for atroscities commited by Nazi
Regime
Consistent state practice
Sufficently long period of time
Customary International Law
Italy: agrees there is this rule of sovereign immunity as establisehd
customary interntiaonl law
From where:
Was it consistent state practice for a suff iceintly long period of time
Question here: is there a jus cogens exception to this for atrocities (crimes
against humanity) -today these are called Jus Cogens Violations
When this case was brought, no consistent state practice
Reimann: to win this argument Italy must show it is consistent state practice not
to allow sovereign immunity when Jus Cogens invovled
Germany: Sovereign Immunity
Court here: No exception to sovereign Immunity
But diffi cult to miantain in situaitons where governemtn admits to
violations and admits to Jus Cogens vioaltions
Open the flood gate to the kinds of litigation sovereign immunity wants to
prevent
argument not to:
So given their rank, maybe
Jus Cogens is non waivable - no derrivation is viable
Internaitoanl law is now ranked, and Jus Cogens is th ehighest
A state invoking internatioanl law on its side (sovereign
immunity) for vioation of itnerntaionl law that is supposed to
be higher
Dissenting opinion
See Princz case (n note
argument to allow exception:
Reimann: should there be an exception fro Jus Cogens Violations
Germany v. Italy
Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Limitations of Sovereign Immunity
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But we don't' do this domestically - still get procedrual rights
Implicit waiver of sovereignty to commit violations of Jus Cogens -
become a criminal, not awarded normal rights in civil society
Tries to judicial ize a formerly political game
Statute- poorly drafted
State i tself
Organs
Political subdivisoin
Issue with socialist companies
Better have an exception
See what happens if suing chinese ownedcompany
Private entity majority owned by state, organ or
political subdivision
Agencies or insturmentaliteis sperate legal persons
1604: foreign state
Gate keeping issue: what is a foreign state
1604: treaty
Probably want to put waiver in contracts
Waiver
Most litigated exception
This is cusotmary internaitonal law: no sovereign
immunity for commercial activity
Commercial activity
Property taken in violation of international law
Succession rights and real proeprty in the US
With excpetions to discretionary acts
Tort (in the US)
If arbitration clause - that's probably enforceable
Arbitration
No soverieng immunity to designated terroirst
states
Terrorist states (Designated
Special maritime rules
1605:
Once start suing someone, open yourself to coutner
cliams
1607: coutnerclaims
Exceptions
Note: no genreal exceptions for violation of fundamental rights
Fundamental rule 1604: subject to existing internatioanl agreements, a
foreign state shall be immune from jurisdiction fo the federal courts and
the states unless exception:
FSIA: Foreign Soverieng Immunities Act
Sovereign immunity in US almost exclusively turns on FSIA
Commercial activity?
Direct effect?
Issues:
Argentina: we're regulating currency, not commercial activity
Plainti ffS: raising capital, issuign tyrpcial commerical debt
Court: look at nature of acts, not purpose:
Commercial activity:
Republ ic of Argentina v. Wel tover (Sovereign Immunity of States:bonds, place of
performance NY)
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Garden variety debt
Any time acting like a commercial actor, waiving sovereign immunity
Here: private parties could do this
But maybe not fighter jets
Private parties can buy things (procurement)
Note: this expands this
Reimann: if other rule: if risk of sovereign immunity when raising
capital - that would increase cost of raising capital for thse organs
Test: commercial acvitity if a private party could do the same thing
Must be more than deminimis, but needn't be substantial
Here: place of performance was New York-should have paid into NY bank
account
Yes, default in US
Note: effect in US, not effect on US (or people)
Doesn't this put offending party at the mercy of the plaintiff?
Reimann: should this be enough?
effects in US
Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino (Harlan 1964)
Restatement of th eForeign Relations Law of the United States 3d Section 443 Act of State
Doctrine: Law of the United STates
The Act of State Doctrine
Territorialism
Nationalism
2 traditional basis
Effects Doctrine
Protective Principle
Modern
New grouds for Jurisidiction
402: Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Restatmetn of the Law Third Foreign Relations Law of th eUS
Can take Jurisdiction (contrary Holmes in American Bana) if the acts or the ffects take
place in US
Foreign D's acting abroad
But acts have effects on american Market
F:
Now recognized that the terrirotirality of effects on the receiving end are a proper
base for jurisidciton
Problem isn't that you're allowed to do it, problem is i f you want to do this as a
matter of federal legislation
Learned hand side steps this
Issue: doesn't deal with issue-
Substantial
Intended
real
Effects must be
US v. Alumininum Co of America (1945) (US . Alcoa)
15 US Code 6a: Conduct involving Trade or Commerce with Foreign Nations
German Antitrust Statutre
Eropean Regualiton unfair competion
The Effects Doctrine
The Expansion of Jurisdiciton
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Foreign natioanls abroad
Plan to blow up Amerian Planes
F:
Because aimed at foreign policy, goes to core of governemtn policy
Court: acts directed against security and soveriegnty of the US
Controversey: How far to do you push it
US v. Yousef (2d 2003)
The Protective Pricniple (see terrorism)
Can evoke jurisdiction b/c victims were yoru nationals
More debated than Protective Principle and effects test (ditto for universality)
Strong notions of sovereignty in Israel
Invokes Lotus Principle:
Reimann: but these weren't Isaeli citizens, no Israel at the time
Link between state of israel and victims of the holocaous
Special relationship between Israel and the Jewish People
Historical link between Holocaust and the state of Israel
Israel is a Jewish state
State claims Ethnic/religious connections
Who else is going to do it- we've got him, we're in the best position
How to justify
Issue: jurisdiction over German Naitoanl, dong nothing in Israel, no effects in Israel,
protective pricniple doesn't work b/c israel doesn't exist
Attorney General and the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichman (Int'l Law Reports 1962)
Jordanian Airliner hijacked abroad
A few american passengers
F:
Passiverpersonal pricniple- developed for hostage takingsIs it good enough that there are some US Ctiizens as victims?
They didn't know were laws governing them
Issue: don't want to surprise people for violating things
Issue: what if not a borderline case, def a crime,
If you take the rule to ts limit- then you can end up with lots liability in
foreign coutnries
Everyoen would walk around with risk of being subject to foreign
jurisdiction
Passive Persoanltiy is a risky source of Jurisdiciton
Reimann: what if it wasn't an airplane hijacking, more of a traditional crime. i.e. bank
robbery, gunman kil ls 2 American tourists
Heinous crime
Internationally recognized
Limits
Problem: line drawing problem
US v. Yunis (DDC 1988)
The Passive Personality Principle (victim based jurisdiction)
World wide open season
Certain crimes so universallyrecognized, (vioaltions of Jus Cogens Human Rights
norms) that whoever captures them can go and proceed on them
The Universality Principle
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Note: line drawing problem
Probably not
Then motivation for states to go on world wide hunts for people for
commiting crimes
Problem: what if you don't already have them, can you get an arrest warrant on
this gorund, try to catch them on this groun
Attorney General and the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann (1962)
3rd Restatmetn of Foreign Relations Law404: Universal Jurisdcition to Define and PunishCertain Offenses
US v. Yunis (1988)
German Code of Crimes Agianst Itnernaitonal Law (2002)
Comes from Barcelona Traction case
If you want to invoke them you have to be in that special realtionship if you want to
have standing
i.e. they didn't do it to me, they did it to the world at large
Q: are the norms of itnernaitonal law that relate to all states-give all states standing
Some norms of itnernational laws between parties
Reimann: li ttle analytical power, just out there as an assertion
Example: US boycotting /sanctioning because of pipeline throug afghanistan based onsoviet invasion of afghanistan - US said - this is Erga Ommnes
Because for these sorts of things, we give rules Erga Omnes effect
Universal Jurisdction strikes Reimann as the only place this works
In this sense constiutionalized
Jus Cogens- about rank of the law and making no derrogable
Erga Omnes- about the ffects of norms, who can complain about their vioaltiosn, who
has standing
Erga Omnes and Jus Cogens
Kadacic not in US prison
No US victims
Nothing directed against security of US
Almost always see these applied in criminal setting, very little
Butlwiggle room - lotus princple background for both criminal and civil
Problem: recognized in criminal proceedings, but not clear can base a tort law
suit on it
Could argue need to do it because no forum elsewehre
What are we left with: Universal Jurisdiction
Note: Kadacic case
Addendum: Erga Omnes (universal) Obligations
Lotus prinicple- do what you want
Traditonal terrorital
Traditonal natioanlity
Effects
Passive personality
Protecive prersonalitky
Universality
But now also 6 positive, aff irmative pricnples
Lots of options to exercise jurisdiciton
Parralel proceedign
Could have lots of coutnries, asserting different basis for jurisdiciotn over the same
incident
Problems:
Problem: 7 basis for jurisdiciton
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Judgment recognition problems
These cases all deal wi th problem above
Remember- used comity to recognized jduments from the courts of other coutnriesHere: - use comity as deference- we could take jurisdiciton, but maybe we shouldn't
Q: when and why should we defere?
Deal with Comity (and other things)
F: antitrust allegations
Holmes (Ame rican Banana): nope - no acts abroad covered
Hand (ALCOA): use the effects doctrine- but need to draw line
Whether Sherman Act applies extraterritorially to acts happening in Honduras
9th circuti- not good enoughLower court: direct and substantial
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, foreign commerce
of th eUS
Ois it of type an dmagnitude as to be cognizable as avioaltion fo the Sherman
Act
Degree fo conflict with foreign law
Natioaltiy or allegience of th eparties
Locaitons or pricnpel places of business
Signficance of effects in the US
Forseeabi lity of such effect
Relative importance
Factors: totality of circumsanstacnes(pg 582
Reimann: these go in all sorts of different directions
As matter of international Comity and fairness, hsoudl the extraterritoiral
jurisdiciton of the US be asserted to cover it
Three part test for applyign Sherman act extraterritorially
Where are the lines
Timberlane v. Bank of America (9th Cir 1976)(we now know the anittrust laws can be applied to
acts abroad (contra American Banana by way of ALCOA), american players (P and D), effects on US
maniarket, forseeable, manifest
Lots of factor above
Inderminacy high b/c these factors can go in all directions
Bad thing
Issue: different jduges looking at same rule and same facts could come up with different
resoltuions
Look at everything then decide whether or not to take up the case
It's a rule of reason/ mulitfactor test
Restatement on Foreign Relations: 403 Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe (codifies
Timberlane)
f:
As long as can comply with both our and theres, no conflict, dispaate punsihemnts
doesn't count
Only if theres a true conflict, no balancing
Question: whetehr "There is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. V. California (1993)
Comity Limitations on the Exercise of Jurisdiction
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No multifacctor test, no balancing, no comity
Given rights from one country isn't supposed to give you rights elsewhere
Reimann: would be a rare case where you msut do something under foreign law that
violates our law
Wants to keep timberlane alive
Scalia wouldn't apply antitrust extraterritroriality but too late for that
So when Scalia says charming betsy says intenraitonal law says not
to apply, he's just wrong
Reimann- that's a C exam
He doesn't understand the difference between Internaitoanl
law and Comity
This sisn't the Charming Betsy Rule at all
Reimann: clealry no violation of itnernaiotnal law b/c of effects test, etcHere- violation of internaitoanl law
Charming Betsy rule- don't construe federal statue that violates international law
unless you have to
See also RST F P
Comity: (Sides with Timberlane balancing test) -maybe majority is too harsh
Scalia doesn't want to apply anttrust law
Scalia's concurrence/dissent
Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (Wood Pulp, Jurisidciton (European Court of Justice
Largely euopean producers of vitamin components
Internatioanl vitamin fixing cartle
Conduct b foreign parties done abraod
So would be there uner ALCOA, Timberlane, And Hartford
But clearly effects on US vitamin market (also intended
F:
Conduct abroad
By foreigners
Effects in other coutnries
F CUBED
But are they liable for the foreign effects in US courts
But from tehsame acts that also caused domestic harm
Should our antitrsut laws apply to
Whole thing is based on comity
Question: can US take jurisdiciton over the parts of the vioaltions effecting foreign
coutnries
To acts that have an effect int eh US
That cause a casue of action
6a: suggest the Sherman act applies
Does the broad langauge cover entirely foreign effects
Problem: congress dind't think about effects in foreign coutnreis
Problem: so condcut causes effects in a lot of other coutnries
Effects: not aplibcable here
Passive Personaltiy: no americans harmed
Protective: not directed against US State
Universaltiy: antitrust not unviersal human rights norms
Basically: no traditional soruces of jurisdciton
Can we get jurisdiciton
Yes, language of 6A says this would cover
Reimann: the opinion Breyer should have written
F Hofflmann-LA Rouche LTD v. Empagran SA (Scotus Breyer 2004)
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This is close to vioaltion of itnernaiotnl law- much clsoer than Scalia in Hartford
But , Charming Betsy-
Not a good idea, b/c different antitrust laws
Lets defer to these coutnries, they can handle their own markets
Instead, court gets into Comity Busienss
That's why these coutnires came here to try and get this forced
Note the claimant countries: weak legal remines, hard time reigning in itnernaitonal
antitrust violations
Effects in US covered by US antirsut laws
Hartfod
Won't cover effects in other coutnries
Spriti of scalia consent in Hartford
F Hofflemn
Hartford and F Hofflman
Class action for securities fraud
SEC rule 10(b)
Fraud based on acts in florida, but
F:
Substantial acts, central to the action
Core to the case, not just a stop over
acts in US, or
Ripple effecs won't do it
Fairly substantial
Effects in US,
Applyies extrattoriteiarleity if
We apply antitrust laws territoriality, so courts of appeals had sort of done the same
thing with securiteis
Balancing in Court of appeals, Said effects weren't substantial
How far do we go, jurisidcition wise, with our securities reuglation
Goes all the way back to holmes, embraces a STRICTLY TERRITORIAL APPROACH
Your result is right, but for much more categorical reasons
See 6a of the Sherman act, Blackmer(sp?) case - statute appleis to US
citizen wherever they roam
To go beyond that, need a strong message from congress
But if statute is silent, applies only to the US
Federal statutes applies only to the territority over which the US has plenary
juridsidcition
Traded in US
Sales conducted in the US (if not traded on SU stock exchange
Effects
Acts
Does not applie to things with
Here: applies to actions I
On the rise
Scalia says this rule makes sense, avoid international conlfict
Sends clear message to congress to give them a clear rulel
Strict territorialtity
Scalia:
Say construction is too narrow
But still majroity of court says connectons to US have to be pretty high
Concurring opinions
Morrison v. National Australia Bank (Scalia 2010)
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Expansive groudn rusles to apply our laws territoirlity
Balance on comity (timberlane)
Priamry look to see i f they can apply both laws and if no conflict, we apply our laws
Strict territoritliasm (we just don't apply our statutes abroad, see Morrison)
Then three reactiosn
No, it's allad hoc
No comity issues now
Clear rules mfers
No?- > then statute does not apply
Conflicts?
Foreing l icenses not recogniszed
Hartford: apply all the time unless true conflict!!!!
Messy , litigation intentse, intdetermianate
Throw it all in, mix it up and decide what to do
Timberlane: we're going to balance everything and decide
what to do (arguign based on Scalia's dissent in Hartford
Yes, clear intentioanl intents-> one of two things
Morrison: does this statute give any indiction to support extraterritorial
jurisidcition?
We apply terrotiraitlity if:
As best as he can piece ittogether, it looks like this:
Reiman: does this add up to a coeherent appraoch?
But that's all the human rights violatiosn, they all took place in some
foreign jurisdiction
At least not to acts committed extreerortialtiy
May not apply extraterrorialtiy
Alien Torts Claim Act Case before the supreme court
Why is this a hot topic?
What we have up to this poitn
But for SEC, not private parties
Mad eclear want some extra-territorial application for F-cubed cases
We shouldn't be world courts
Attracting foreigners suing based on acts in other coutnries, effects in other coutnries,
thigns we don't care about
Dodd-Frank Act
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Tratties
CustomsGeneral pricnipels
Writings of most immentn publcicist
Judicial opinions
Compare tradaitonal sources of law
More itnernational law, more things in play
Now: things much less clear
Introduction
Now a platform for coopeartion between nations
Yes, parties agree to them
Easily manageable
Old:
Multiparty
Global
Very raod
Put beforeteh world, that you can join
A club that is open for membership
More like model statutes
Now:
But far away from extradition traety in Alvarez-Machain, or theother bilateral
agreemetns
More foundational documents for subject specif ic orders than contracts between the
parties
No longer a contract between states
Increasing imporatnace
But this might mean this isn't really law in action, no real
traction
Aspirational documetns tryign to get everyone to join, don't ask
hard questions about compliance
See EU
High threshold before you can join
Expect to see compliance before jioning
2 views
Should you require compliance before joiing
Lots of members to conventions that still ignore them
Issues
Strong consensus to do something about genocide after WWII
History:
Pretty short docurment
Genocide Convention (1948 )
Worldwide Multi-Party Convetions
The New Generation of Treaties: "Platforms for internaitonal co-
operation"
Law: Diversification of SourcesSunday, November 11, 2012
1:44 PM
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That wil l force to to prosecute anyone guilty of genocide
States promise to make domestic law
What does it actually do? What obligations does it give rise to?
But hat's not new, knew that since nurmembeug trial
Genocide internaiton crime:
But note that this does have itnernaitonal force - vioaltiosn of thigns widelyaccepted treateis says is a vioaltion of intenatioanl law
Declaratory:
Reservations
Servia not legally repsosnbile for commititing the genocide
Knowledge
Dmeonstrated ability to exercise control
But violited its obligation to prevent genocidei
ALSO CONTINUED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PEPRETRATORS OF THE GENOCIDE AND TO
EXTRADIDE WAR CIRMIANSL CONSTITUTED FURTHER VIOLATIOSN OF THE GENOCIDE
CONVEIOSNT
Note on Genocide Case (applicaton of the convention on the prevention and punishiment of
the crime of genocide (2007 ICJ)
Reservations: I don't want this part to apply
Reimann: a lto of coutnries do this
Does not accept article IX, subjecting to jursidciton of th eICJ withotu the
specific consent of the US in each acse
So we want to avoid that
If a treaty conflicts wtit hthe consitution, the constituion wins (somecase (covert(Sp?)
Here- we don't want to do that, free speech here
herE: someone on the street corenr screaming "kill all jews"
probalby violates the genocide convention
Reimann: why'd they'd do that?
It makes it unclear what the parties are agreeing to, they'd need to
consult constitutional epxerts for each reserving country
Trouble with such a reservation:
We won't do anything the consitution forbids
US
Declarations and Reservations to the Genocide Convetin
You take or tleave the deal
Traditional sovereitny/contract theory
So don't want to make it take it o r leave it
This sort of treaty
Purpsoe of this sort of treaty is to get as many people onborad as possible
Here:
Can the reseving state be regarded as beign a party to the Convention while still
mainating its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the
parties to the Convention but not by others?
Reservations Case (excerpts) Reservatiosn to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the crime of gEnocide (Advisory Opinion) 1951)
The complexity of Multilateral Agreements
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Ones trying to get as many people as possible
Need to be more forgiving
Only those ccombiabile with the object and purpsoe fo the
convention
But also don't want to allow any resevatiosn
e.g. definition of genocide
Can't reserve anything core
Jurisdiction of ICJ
Other things, more forgiving
Where beign in is highly prized
See WTO, EU
Here: genocide- need to persuade people to sign on
Treaty can make clear no reservations are allowed, or limit the srots of
reservations
Rules
Reatry rule (Art 19(a) and (B)( VCLT
No Treaty rule-> Default rule: "Compatible with object and prupose of
treaty"?
Reservation
Accepatnace
Clause reserved with reciprocal effect (Art. 21 sec. 1 VCLT)
No objection (12 months silince)
No acceptance
Clause not resrved not in force between parties
Objection reservation oly
No acceptance and
Treaty not in force betweent he aprties (Arg. Ex art 20 sec. 4(b)
(VCLT
Objection declaring treaty not in force
Objectiosn (to reservations allowed in pricnple
Rules on reservations See course tools (didn't' type all
Chceck for treaty/ies (on the subject matter)
Genreally (enough members?)
For US ("ratified")?
For other coutnry/ies invovled?
Treaty "in force"?
Resrvations?
Objections
Ascertain applicalbe version
["Self-executig"?]
Steps of treaty research
Must look at their resrvations and objections
Version that applies between any two states may be different form te
treaty appleid to any two other states
Treaty may not even be in force betwee the parties, even if they're both
Treaty you read may not be the actual treaty in force between two parties to a
dispute
Issues:
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Arts. 1921, 23
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parties to the treaty
Moral: odn't just take the treaty text, li st of membership and say, "here
we go!"
Can't invoke it against that party
When a treaty not in force
Some members of Eurozone, some not
Some members of Shannen (sp? Aggreemtn) some not
Some are members to advance jurisdicitonal rules and som
eare not
See EU
End up with different versions of treaties
Problem: some maembmers want an updated member, but some don't
Ammending multilateral treaties
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts 30, 39-41
United Nations Charter Arts. 108-109
US a member
Passed provisons thorught the Intenraitonal Child abduction rememdies Act
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of intenraitonal Child abduction (convetnion)1980
Child must be immediately returend if aducted in violation of "rights of custody"
unless certain exceptiosn apply
Ne exeat - from chilean law (habitual residence of child)
Ne exeat: authority to consent before the other parent may take the child to
another country
Q: is a ne exeat right a right of custody
Looks to text, purpose of treaty
Because want to interpret the treaty as uniformly as possible
Court deicsions of other contracting parties
Court in interperpetign the treaty
Abbotv. Abott (2010)
Interpreting Multlateral Convetions
i.e. a claim, followed, states do it
See Truman Proclimantion
Fiat by politically powerful actor followed by acquiesence by other world actors,
followed by actual state practice
But overlayed by new things:
Old stuff still there
Jose E. Alvarez, the Internationalization of US Law (2009)
The Modern Improtance of Custom
Truman Proclamation on the Continetnal Shelf 1945)
But here- court doesn't actually do it
Have to stick to consistent state practice and opinio juris
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
US a ICJ 1986
New Modes of Customary Itnerantional Law Making
The Changing Face of Customary International Law
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Extracts pricinple