transition and village stability operations march 2012 classification: unclassified
TRANSCRIPT
Transition and Village Stability Operations
March 2012
Classification: Unclassified
2
Outline
•A Historical Perspective
• Implications for Transition
UNCLASSIFIED
3
Historical Themes
• Constant struggle between the center and periphery
• Most efforts to create stability from only the top-down have failed – and have triggered rural rebellions
– Amanullah Khan– Communist era
• Stability has generally required working from the “bottom up” and the “top down”
– Top-down efforts to establish security, legitimacy, governance in urban areas
– Bottom-up efforts to establish security, legitimacy, governance in rural areas, especially Pashtun areas
UNCLASSIFIED
4
Low
Pakistan
Wana
Miramshah
Chitral
Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901)
Bagram
Kokayty
Shindand
Abdur Rahman Khan
July 1880 Battle of Maiwand
July-Aug 1881Revolts in Kandahar,which were crushed
1891-93Wars in Hazarajat 1886-88
Wars against Ghilzai
1895-96Wars in Kafiristan
• Abdur Rahman Khan used force to centralize state power by co-opting and coercing Pashtun tribes
• Reduced autonomy of three groups Eastern Pashtun tribes Non-Sunni ethnic groups
• Crushed resistance with aid of British, who helped finance national army
UNCLASSIFIED
5
Low
Pakistan
Wana
Miramshah
Chitral
Amanullah (1919-29)
Bagram
Kokayty
ShindandAmanullah
1925Khowst Rebellion
1928Shinwari Revolt
1929Overthrow of
Amanullah
UNCLASSIFIED
• Amanullah attempted to establish order in rural areas from the top-down
• Began third Anglo-Afghan war• Many of his Western reforms were met with
rebellion in rural areas Established rural tax reform Curtailed polygamy, child marriage Enacted universal military conscription Abolished the veil
• But Pashtun areas revolted
6
Low
Pakistan
Wana
Miramshah
Chitral
Musahiban Dynasty (1929-1978)
Bagram
Kokayty
Shindand
Nadir Shah Zahir Shah
1945-46Safi Rebellion (Konar)
1959Kandahar Rebellion
1975Islamist Uprising in Panjshir
Daoud Khan
UNCLASSIFIED
• Established balance between top-down and bottom-up Eliminated rural taxation and raised
revenue through trade tariffs, foreign aid, large companies
Exempted key tribes from military conscription, and Ministry of Tribal Affairs tended to tribal needs
Established increasingly powerful national army and police force
“Since the people so designate me so, I accept. I will not be the king but the servant of the tribes and the country.”
– King Nadir Shah (1929)
7 Low
Pakistan
Wana
Miramshah
Chitral
Soviet Invasion (December 1979)
Kokayty
Shindand
Termez
Kushka
Jalalabad
Gardez
Chaman
365th and 66th Motor-Rifle Divisions
201st Motor-Rifle Division occupies NE Afghanistan
360th Motor Rifle Division secures Kabul after airborne assault
Special forces and paratroopers from the 105th and 106th Airborne Division
seize Kabul
Bagram
UNCLASSIFIED
8
Low
Pakistan
Wana
Miramshah
Chitral
Communist Era (1978-1992)
Bagram
Kokayty
Shindand
• PDPA launched a sweeping series of rural economic and social programs
• Goal was to increase central government power in rural areas Tried to break down qawms Enacted rural taxes, social reforms Allied with “Godless” Soviet Union
• Eventually turned to large, offensive urban and rural militias
• But rural population revolted, with help from Pakistan, United States, Saudis
Jalalabad
Mohammad Taraki
Hafizulla Amin
Babrak Karmal
Najibullah Ahmadzai
UNCLASSIFIED
9
Low
Afghan Civil War (1989-1992)
KABUL
JALALABAD
April - June 1990Afghan army clears
mujahedeen entrenchments at
Paghman
April 1991 Mujahedeen forces take Khost after 11
year siege
April 1992Kandahar falls to the
Mujahedeen
April 1992Helmand falls to the Mujahedeen
April 1992Kunduz falls to the Mujahedeen
April 1992Jalalabad falls to the
Mujahedeen
• Government abolished national army in 1992• Supported rural and urban militias
Sepayan-i Enqelab (Soldiers of the revolution) Hauza-i Amniyati (District security) Geru-i Defa-i Khodi (Self-defense groups)
• Government supported large, offensive militias under individual commanders Militias exceeded size of national forces Government lost preponderance of power
UNCLASSIFIED
10
Low
Pakistan
Beginning of Taliban Era (1994)
Chaman
October 12, 1994 – Taliban take Spin Boldak
Spin Boldak
KandaharNovember
1994
Charasyab
Bagram
Taliban tears down checkpoints around Kandahar that extort money from travelers, and dismantles criminal networks
• Taliban began insurgency• Developed a bottom-up strategy
Co-opted tribes, sub-tribes, clans, militia commanders
Coerced those that couldn’t be co-opted
• But their effort to impose a top-down, foreign Deobandi ideology was biggest weakness (most talibs trained in Pakistan)
• Pakistan government provides support
UNCLASSIFIED
11
Low
Pakistan
Taliban Controlled Most of Country by 2000
Chaman
Spin Boldak
Charasyab
Bagram
September 5 – Taliban take Taloqan
Taloqan
Most significant resistance led by Ahmed Shah Massoud in Panjshir Valley
UNCLASSIFIED
12
History of Local Forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Case Dates Objective EffectivenessAbdur Rahman
Khan1880-1901
Establish order with help of tribal forces
Effective in creating law and order
Musahiban dynasty 1929-1978Establish order with help of arbakai, chalweshtai, and others
Effective since forces were small, defensive, run by jirgas
Pakistan (Kashmir I) 1947-1948Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars
Ineffective since Waziris were used for offensive purposes
Pakistan (Kashmir II)
1965Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars
Ineffective since tribes were used for offensive purposes
Anti-Soviet war 1979-1989Defeat Soviet and Afghan armies with local forces
Effective in triggering Soviet withdrawal; had local support
Najibullah and Rabbani
1986-1996Establish order using urban and rural militias
Ineffective since militias were large, offensive, run by warlords
Operation Enduring Freedom
2001-2002Overthrow Taliban using local forces
Effective in defeating Taliban regime
Afghan National Auxiliary Police
2006-2008Establish order with help of local auxiliaries
Ineffective since forces were not integrated into local jirgas
Pakistan (FATA and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa)2008-
Establish order following Pakistan army and Frontier Corps operations
Partly effective, but lack of quick reaction force led to insurgent targeting
UNCLASSIFIED
13
History of Local Forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Case Dates Objective EffectivenessAbdur Rahman
Khan1880-1901
Establish order with help of tribal forces
Effective in creating law and order
Musahiban dynasty 1929-1978Establish order with help of arbakai, chalweshtai, and others
Effective since forces were small, defensive, run by jirgas
Pakistan (Kashmir I) 1947-1948Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars
Ineffective since Waziris were used for offensive purposes
Pakistan (Kashmir II)
1965Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars
Ineffective since tribes were used for offensive purposes
Anti-Soviet war 1979-1989Defeat Soviet and Afghan armies with local forces
Effective in triggering Soviet withdrawal; had local support
Najibullah and Rabbani
1986-1996Establish order using urban and rural militias
Ineffective since militias were large, offensive, run by warlords
Operation Enduring Freedom
2001-2002Overthrow Taliban using local forces
Effective in defeating Taliban regime
Afghan National Auxiliary Police
2006-2008Establish order with help of local auxiliaries
Ineffective since forces were not integrated into local jirgas
Pakistan (FATA and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa)2008-
Establish order following Pakistan army and Frontier Corps operations
Partly effective, but lack of quick reaction force led to insurgent targeting
UNCLASSIFIED
14
Village Stability Operations
UNCLASSIFIED
15
Afghan Local Police Sites StatusLocal Defense Forces: December 2009UNCLASSIFIED
16
11
5
16
8
6
4
314 1 2
7
1312
9
10
15
17
Afghan Loc..al Police Sites Status7734
43 33
2
18
19
66
21
22
23
29 35
24
26
28
27
3637
38
39
40
41
42
43
4445
46
47
48
49 50
51
52
5354
55
56
57
58
5960
61
62
63
In-Processed Sites Sites Validated Pending Validation Pending Tashkils ALP HQ
70
74
65 67
71
68
64
73
72
69
7775
20
30 31
32 33
34
76
25
Afghan Local Police: March 2012UNCLASSIFIED
17
Outline
•A Historical Perspective
• Implications for Transition
UNCLASSIFIED
18
SOF Will Likely Become More ImportantDuring – and After – Transition
Unconventional WarForeign Internal Defense
Counterterrorism
UNCLASSIFIED
19
Balancing Top Down and Bottom Up
Kabul
Provincial /Urban Centers
District Centers
Villages
UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
Transition = Helping Afghans Stand Up for Themselves
20
Not Just About Security
DevelopmentGovernance Security
UNCLASSIFIED
21
I. Governance Lessons
UNCLASSIFIED
A critical requirement is compiling information on government officials, tribes, clans, entrepreneurs, religious leaders, and other influential individuals.
This requires significant community engagement.
UNCLASSIFIED
22
Communities Prefer Traditional InstitutionsUNCLASSIFIED
2007 2008 2009 2010 201155
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
Local shura / jirga are accessible to me
Local shura / jirga are fair and trusted
Local shura / jirga follow the local norms and values of our people
Local shura / jirga are effective at delivering justice
Local shura / jirga resolve cases timely and promptly
Pe
rce
nta
ge
Perception of Local Shura / Jirga
Asia Foundation Poll, 2011
23
Communities Prefer Traditional InstitutionsUNCLASSIFIED
Are accessible to me
Are fair and trusted
Follow the local norms and values
of our people
Are effective at delivering justice
Resolve cases timely and promptly
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90 State Court
Shura / Jirga
Per
cen
tag
e
2007 2008 2009 2010 201155
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
Local shura / jirga are accessible to me
Local shura / jirga are fair and trusted
Local shura / jirga follow the local norms and values of our people
Local shura / jirga are effective at delivering justice
Local shura / jirga resolve cases timely and promptly
Pe
rce
nta
ge
Perception of Local Shura / Jirga
State Court vs. Shura / Jirga
Asia Foundation Poll, 2011
24
II. Security Lessons
UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
Initiative comes from local communities (grass roots), small, defensive, supported by legitimate local institutions (jirgas),
ANSF retain preponderance of power
25
Ali
(Shipper)
AFGHAN INSURGENCY TEMPLATE
LOCAL FORCEAUXILIARY
UNDERGROUND
Ghulam
-47Ak-47Ak -47Ak-47Ak-47Ak-47Ak
Security Is Not Just About A Local Force:Auxiliary, Underground
UNCLASSIFIED
26
III. Economic LessonsUNCLASSIFIED
27
Small, Localized Development Projects Are Particularly Effective
• Development to reduce insurgency should be small, localized, and done with development expertise
• According to one recent study of Iraq, CERP spending appears to be violence-reducing
– $1 per/capita in CERP predicts ~6 less SIGACTS per six-month period in average sized district (275,000 pop.)
– Non-construction projects ~2× as violence reducing
• Small-scale USAID spending also appears to help– $1 per/capita in Community Stabilization Program (CSP)
predicts ~20 less SIGACTS per six-month period in average sized district (275,000 pop.)
– Community Action Program (CAP) does not appear to help, nor do larger projects
Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and MindsBe Bought?” Journal of Political Economy
UNCLASSIFIED
28
• VSO / ALP have had positive effects– Contributed to a decrease in insurgent control of
territory– Undermined insurgency’s rural support base and
limited their freedom of movement– Improved governance – including traditional, informal
systems
• But challenges remain– Insurgent intimidation, assassination, infiltration– Ethnic and tribal imbalances and tensions– Variation in quality of district, provincial governance– Some media, other perceptions of 1990s-style militias– Information operations
VSO / ALP Effects and ChallengesUNCLASSIFIED
29
Help Afghans Stand Up for ThemselvesUNCLASSIFIED
30
Leader of al Qa’ida
Egyptian
Ayman al-Zawahiri
AQ Deputy Leader
Abu Yahya al-Libi
Libyan
AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Abu Du’a)
Afghan
Mullah Omar
AFGHAN TALIBAN
Hakimullah Mehsud
TEHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKISTAN
Pakistani Pakistani
Hafiz Saeed
LASHKAR TAYYIBA
Afghan
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Hezb Islami Gulbuddin
Yemeni
Nasir al-Wahishi
AL-QAIDA IN ARABIAN PENINSULA
AL-QAIDA IN ISLAMIC MAGHREB
Algerian
Abdelmalek Droukdal
Somali
AL-SHABAAB
Kenyan
Harun Fazul
AL-QAIDA IN EAST AFRICA
Why Are We Still In Afghanistan?Continuing Threats to the U.S. Homeland
Iraqi
Haqqani Network
Jalaluddin Haqqani
AFFILIATED GROUPS ALLIED GROUPS
Afghan
CENTRAL AL QA’IDAHassan Gul Hamza al-Ghamdi
Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi
Pakistani
ExternalOperations
Saudi
Top facilitatorfor Zawahiri
Moroccan
Media Committee
Ali ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Umar
ABDULLAHAZZAM BRIGADES
Saudi
Abu Khayr Al-Masri
IRAN DETAINEES
Egyptian
Nigerian
Abubakar Shekau
BOKO HARAM
Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohammed
UNCLASSIFIED
31
A Taliban Government in AfghanistanWould Almost Certainly Be An Al Qa’ida Ally
Faisal Shahzad: Times Square Bomb (2010)
Faisal Shahzad
Najibullah Zazi: Three Suicide Bombers in NYC Subway (2009)
September 11, 2001
UNCLASSIFIED
32
QUESTIONS?
UNCLASSIFIED