The  Conservative  Government’s  Proposed  Strike  Ballot  Thresholds:  The  Challenge  to  the  Trade  Unions    

     

Salford  Business  School    Research  Working  Paper    

August  2015      

Professor  Ralph  Darlington    Salford  Business  School,  University  of  Salford,    

and  Dr  John  Dobson    Riga  International  College  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration  

 Corresponding  author:  Professor  Ralph  Darlington,  Salford  Business  School,  University  of  

Salford,  Salford  M5  4WT;  r.r.darlington@salford.ac.uk;  0161-­‐295-­‐5456        

   

         

   

Ralph   Darlington   is   Professor   of   Employment   Relations   at   the   University   of   Salford.   His  research   is   concerned   with   the   dynamics   of   trade   union   organisation,   activity   and  consciousness   in   Britain   and   internationally   within   both   contemporary   and   historical  settings.  He  is  author  of  The  Dynamics  of  Workplace  Unionism  (Mansell,  1994)  and  Radical  Unionism  (Haymarket,  2013);  co-­‐author  of  Glorious  Summer:  Class  Struggle  in  Britain,  1972,  (Bookmarks,   2001);   and   editor   of  What’s   the   Point   of   Industrial   Relations?   In   Defence   of  Critical  Social  Science   (BUIRA,  2009).  He   is  an  executive  member  of  the  British  Universities  Industrial   Relations   Association   and   secretary   of   the   Manchester   Industrial   Relations  Society.    John   Dobson   has   published   widely   on   the   operation   of   labour   markets   in   Central   and  Eastern   Europe   and   is   currently   Associated   Professor   at   Riga   International   College   of  Economics   and   Business   Administration,   Latvia.   He   was   previously   a   senior   lecturer   in  Industrial   Relations   at   the   University   of   Salford,   where   he   was   Head   of   the   School   of  Management   (2002-­‐6)   and   President   of   the   Salford   Branch   of   the   University   and   College  Union  (UCU)  from  2007-­‐9.  He  also  served  on  the  UCU  National  Executive  from  2009-­‐11.      

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

       

CONTENTS    

Abstract  and  Summary  of  Key  Findings  

Introduction  

Justification  and  motivation  

Illogical  implications    

Competing  models  of  union  democracy  

Other  potential  factors  influencing  participation  rates  

Evidence  from  database  

Three  enabling  features  of  participation  

Union  responses  

References  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1    

Abstract  and  Summary  of  Key  Findings  

Persistent   disruptive   bouts   of   strike   action   in   recent   years   by   teachers,   civil   servants,  firefighters,   and   rail   and   London  Underground  workers   amongst   others,   sometimes   called  with  only  a  small  proportion  of  union  members  voting  in  favour  of  strike  action,  has  provided  the   backcloth   to   the   publication   on   15   July   of   a   Trade   Union   Bill   by   the   newly   elected  majority  Conservative  government.  The  Bill  promises  (amongst  a  variety  of  other  measures)  the  most   sweeping   and   radical   tightening   of   the   rules   on   industrial   action   seen   since   the  Thatcher   era   of   the   1980s   with   a   minimum   50   per   cent   ballot   participation   threshold  alongside  a  requirement  for  unions  in  ‘important  public  services’  to  obtain  a  minimum  40  per  cent  majority  of  all  those  eligible  to  vote.  It  would  have  a  devastating  effect  on  many  unions’  ability  to  take  lawful  industrial  action.    

This  Salford  Business  School  Research  Paper  explores  the  following  research  questions:  

• To  what  extent  are  the  Conservatives  justified  in  pointing  to  a  ‘democratic  deficit’  in  which   a   majority   of   indifferent   union   members   have   surrendered   control   over  whether  to  strike  to  a  committed  minority?    

• How  can  we  explain  strike  ballot  participation  rates?  Why  do  some  union  members  not  vote?    

• To  what  extent  does  the  secret  individual  postal  balloting  process  affect  the  level  of  participation?    

• What  other  factors  might  potentially  influence  whether  union  members  vote  or  not?    

• How  are   the  unions   likely   to   fare   in   the   face  of   the  Conservative  government’s   two  new  balloting  thresholds?  

To   answer   such   questions   the   paper   first   explores   the   justification   and   underlying  motivation   for   the   introduction   of   new   tougher   strike   ballot   laws,   and   the   illogical  implications   of   such   provisions  which   do   not   apply   to   any   other   ballots.   After   considering  some   alternative   ways   to   potentially   increase   ballot   turnouts   advocated   by   the   TUC   and  some  unions,  notably  online  voting,  the  paper  questions  whether  the  implementation  of  such  an  essentially  technical  and  procedural  measure  would  increase  balloting  turn-­‐outs  to  meet  the  Conservatives’  threshold  levels.    

Drawing  on  a  range  of  existing  academic  and  practitioner  literature  over  a  number  of  years,   it   compares   the   restrictive  parliamentary  model  of  democracy  underlying   the   secret  individual   postal   balloting   process,   compared   with   a   participatory   model   of   democracy  based  on  collective  decision  making  at  workplace  union  meetings.    

It   proceeds   to   identify   the   multi-­‐dimensional   enabling/inhibiting   factors   for   strike  ballot   participation,   including   both   general   factors   (economic/employment   restructuring,  employment  legislation,  strike  defeats  and  ‘demonstration  effect’,  and  electoral  and  political  disengagement  within  society  more  generally)  as  well  as  specific  factors  (size  and  nature  of  unions,   nature   of   the   workforce,   management   structures   and   behaviour,   role   of   national  trade  union  leadership,  and  health  of  workplace  union  organisation.    

2    

In  order  to  examine  the  potential  effects  of  the  proposed  legislation,  the  paper  then  retrospectively  applies  it  to  previously  held  ballots  by  analysing  a  database  the  authors  have  compiled   of   162   industrial   action   ballots,   158   of   which   are   strike   ballots,   involving   28  different   trade   unions   (including   BFAWU,   CWU,   FBU,  NUT,   RMT,  UCW,  Unison   and  Unite)  over   the   period   1997-­‐2015.   Although   the   database   confirms   Electoral   Reform   Services  statistics   which   show   unions   have   generally   been   overwhelmingly   successful   in   winning  majority   ‘yes’  votes   in  favour  of  strike  action  under  the  existing   legislation,   it  also  provides  evidence   to   suggest   they   have   often   failed   to   achieve   the   Tories’   proposed   50   per   cent  participation  threshold:  

• Only  85  of   the  158   strike  ballots   covered  by   the  database   reached   the  50  per   cent  target,   and   the   number   of  workers  who   failed   to   reach   the   target  was   completely  disproportionate   to   those   that  did  –  while  444,000  workers  could  have   taken  strike  action  because  they  had  a  turnout  rate  of  over  50  per  cent,  3.3  million  workers  would  have  been  prevented  from  going  on  strike.  Even  if  you  take  out  the  large-­‐scale  2011  public   sector   strikes,   it   still   means   880,000   workers   would,   under   the   proposed  legislation,  no  longer  have  been  able  to  go  on  strike.    

As  a  result  some  major  national  strikes  would  have  been  deprived  of  legal  protection  under  the  proposed  legislation,  especially  those  relating  to  national  bargaining  in  the  public  sector.  

Even  when  unions  have  succeeded  in  reaching  the  50  per  cent  turnout,  some  would  still  fail  to  obtain  the  40  per  cent  majority  threshold  of  those  eligible  to  vote,  although  these  would   not   necessarily   be   affected   by   the   proposed   legislation   which   only   applies   to   the  specified  ‘important  public  services’.    

• Out  of  90  strike  ballots  in  the  ‘important  public  services’  covered  by  the  database,  55  of   them  produced   turnouts   in  which  more   than  40  per  cent  of   the  electorate  voted  ‘yes’,  such  that  the  proposed  legislation  would  have  reduced  the  number  of  strikes  in  these  areas  by  nearly  40  per  cent.    

However  there  are  important  differences  by  sector:  

• The  proposed  legislation  would  have  had  no  effect  on  the  Fire  Service  because  all  11  strike   ballots   cleared   the   40   per   cent   threshold  with   an   average   of   54   per   cent   of  balloted  workers  supporting  strike  action.    

• The  picture   is   completely   different   in  Health  where   only   2   of   the   5   national   strikes  would  have  cleared  the  40  per  cent  threshold.  Of  those  that  failed  to  meet  the  40  per  cent,  only  20  per  cent  of  eligible  voters  supported  the  action.  It  is  the  small  specialist  unions  that  achieved  the  highest  turnout  and  high  support  for  strike  action.    

• The  picture  in  education  is  more  nuanced;  only  19  of  the  29  strike  ballots  would  have  been  able  to  go  ahead,  but  while  every  ballot  conducted  in  an  individual  school  would  have  passed  the  40  per  cent  threshold,  only  two  national  strikes  did  so  and  neither  of  these  involved  the  main  teaching  unions.    

3    

• In   transport,   only   23   of   the   44   strikes   cleared   the   40   per   cent   threshold,   so   the  proposed  legislation  would  have  prevented  half  of  transport  strikes.  However,  again  there  was  variation,  for  example,  while  the  BA  cabin  crew  ballots  easily  cleared  the  40  per  cent  hurdle,  a  recent  Greater  London  bus  workers  ballot  would  not,  and  while  the  proposed  legislation  would  have  little  effect  on  strike  ballots  in  the  railway  sector  it  would  have  prevented  most  strikes  on  London  Underground.    

• The   one   strike   ballot   that   could   be   regarded   as   border   security   would   have   been  prevented  by  the  new  legislation.    

On   the   basis   of   the   database   evidence   available,   while   the   50   per   cent   threshold  would   dramatically   reduce   the   number   of   legally   protected   strikes,   the   introduction   of   an  additional   40   per   cent   threshold   for   the   ‘important   public   services’   would   have   very   little  further   effect.   Nonetheless,   overall  many   unions  will   find   the   legislation  will  make   it   very  difficult  for  them  to  mount  officially  sanctioned  strikes  as  a  means  of  challenging  employers  in   national   negotiations   and   in   response   to   government-­‐initiated   austerity   measures,  especially  those  relating  to  national  bargaining  in  the  public  sector.    

The   paper   identifies   some   important   contributory   factors   to   more   positive   voting  participation  rates:  

• There   is   a   clear   overall   tendency   for  workplace,   area   or   single   employer   ballots   to  obtain  ‘higher’  turnouts  and  national  ballots  to  obtain  ‘lower’  turnouts.    

• Unions  with  members  who  have  close  occupational  identities  and  solidaristic  loyalties  also   appear   to   often   be   able   to   generate   relatively   higher   strike   ballot   votes   than  more  general  unions.    

• There  is  evidence  the  role  of  union  leadership  -­‐  specifically  the  influence  of  left-­‐wing  leadership  -­‐  can  also  be  a  positive  enabling  factor.  

The   paper   concludes   by   reflecting   on   the   unions’   potential   response   to   the  forthcoming   new   legislation,   including   official   union   opposition,   the   use   of  more   strategic  balloting  of  selective  groups  of  workers  confident  of  achieving  the  thresholds,    ‘leverage’  and  ‘citizen  bargaining’,  and  unofficial  and  ‘wildcat’  strike  action.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4    

The  Conservative  Government’s  Proposed  Strike  Ballot  Thresholds:  The  Challenge  to  the  Trade  Unions  

 

Introduction  

Even  though  strike  levels  in  the  UK  have  fallen  to  their  lowest  ever  historical  levels,  the  far  reaching  effects  of  persistent  bouts  of  strike  action  in  recent  years  (notably  within  the  public  sector),   sometimes   called   with   only   a   small   proportion   of   union   members   voting,   has  provided   the   backcloth   to   the   publication   on   15   July   of   a   Trade   Union   Bill   by   the   newly  elected  majority  Conservative  government.  National  strikes  by  teachers,  civil  servants,  and  firefighters,  a  threatened  national  strike  on  Network  Rail,  and  the  complete  shutdown  of  the  London   Underground   network   by   four   unions   engaging   in   24-­‐hour   strike   action,   have   all  served   to   illustrate   the   potential   disruptive   impact   of   strike   action   on   the   wider   public.  Hence  the  government’s  attempt  to  rush  into  law  the  most  sweeping  and  radical  tightening  of  the  rules  on   industrial  action  seen  since  the  Thatcher  era  of  the  1980s  with  new  voting  thresholds   in   trade  union  strike  ballots,1  as  well  as  a  variety  of  other   restrictive  measures  beyond   the   remit   of   this   paper.2   The   legislation   proposes   enormous   obstacles   to   unions’  ability   to   strike   and   may   produce   the   biggest   showdown   over   industrial   relations   for   a  generation.    

Between   1980   and   1993,   a   series   of   Conservative   laws  made   it   more   difficult   for  unions   to   take   strike   action   and   remain   within   the   law,   with   specific  measures   requiring  unions  to  organise  secret  postal  ballots  in  respect  of  industrial  action  contained  within  the  Trade   Union   Act   (1984),   Employment   Act   (1988)   and   associated   regulations   and   Code   of  Practice   (Undy   and  Martin,   1984),  which   the  New   Labour   governments   during   1997-­‐2010  and  the  Conservative/Liberal  Democrat  coalition  government  of  2010-­‐15  left  on  the  statue  book.   As   a   result   of   such   changes,   the   UK   laws   on   industrial   action   ballots   are   widely  regarded  as   some  of   the   strictest   in  Europe;  even   though  making  comparisons  with  other                                                                                                                            1  While  strictly  speaking  the  legislation  proposed  refers  to  ‘industrial  action’  and  thereby  embraces  both  strikes  as   well   as   action   short   of   a   strike,   this   paper   will   concentrate   attention   and   refer   from   here   on   to   ‘strike  ballots’.  

2  This  paper  concentrates  purely  on  the  strike  balloting  thresholds,  but  amongst  other  measures  included  are:  the   removal   of   the   ban   (in   place   since   1973)   on   using   agency  workers   to   cover   for   striking  workers;   a   new  requirement  for  14  days’  notice  (instead  of  the  current  7  days)  of  planned  strike  dates;  a  time  limit  of  4  months  after  the  date  of  each  ballot  to  prevent  unions  undertaking  action  based  on  historic  strike  ballots  and  to  make  it   harder   to  engage   in   rolling   strike   action;  making   it   an  offence   for   trade  unions  not   to   supervise  picketing  arrangements,  with   a   named   individual   required   to   be   available   to   ensure   union  members   comply  with   an  existing   Code   of   Practice   that   sets   a   maximum   number   of   only   six   pickets   and   requires   only   peaceful  persuasion   (rather   than   ‘intimidation’)   of   others   not   to   work;   moves   to   force   unions   to   make   members’  contributions   to   their   political   fund   an   ‘opt-­‐in’   arrangement   (rather   than   as   currently   ‘opt-­‐out’),   to   be  confirmed  every  5  years,  in  an  effort  to  reduce  the  ability  of  trade  unions  to  donate  money  to  the  Labour  Party  or  any  other  party,  as  well  as  a  wide  range  of  other  non-­‐party  political  activities;  regulations  requiring  public  authorities   to   publish   detailed   information   on   union   reps   employed   by   them   who   have   to   time-­‐off   work  (‘facility  time’)  to  carry  out  union  duties  and  activities,   in  a  bid  to  encourage  employers  to  set  a   limit  on  the  proportion   of  working   time   taken   and   the   total   amount   of  money   spent   on   such   facility   time;  measures   to  increase   the   remit   and   powers   of   the   Certification   Officer   to   investigate   alleged   breaches   of   statutory  provisions  and  to  impose  financial  penalties  on  trade  unions.  

5    

countries  is  not  straightforward,  in  some  countries  unions  are  not  required  to  hold  a  ballot  to  call  industrial  action,  and  of  those  that  do,  few  specify  a  turnout  threshold;  most  require  a  simple  majority  to  back  action.  

The  new  Conservative  majority  government’s  proposed  legislation  aimed  at  further  tightening   up   such   balloting   regulations   contains   two   aspects   with   respect   to   strike  mandates.  First,  all  unions  will  have  to  persuade  a  minimum  of  50  per  cent  of  their  members  eligible   to   vote   to   participate   in   any   strike   ballot   in   order   for   it   to   be   lawful   (currently  balloting  rules  do  not  require  any  specific  level  of  participation  by  union  members).  Thus  in  a   strike   ballot   of   1,000   eligible   union  members   at   least   500  would   have   to   participate;   a  participation   rate   of   499   members   would   be   invalid   on   the   basis   of   being   less   than   the  required  50  per  cent  threshold.  The  PCS  civil  servants’  union,  which  frequently  calls  strikes  amongst   its   members,   has   never   achieved   a   50   per   cent   turnout   on   a   national   ballot   in  recent  years;  neither  on  a  national  ballot  has  the  NUT  teachers’  union.  

Secondly,   in   six   specified   so-­‐called   ‘important   public   services’   –   health   services,  education   of   those   aged   under   17,   fire   services,   transport   services,   border   security,   and  nuclear  decommissioning  including  the  management  of  radioactive  waste  and  spent  fuel  –  an  additional  threshold  will  have  to  be  met.  As  well  as  obtaining  the  50  per  cent  minimum  turnout,  at  least  40  per  cent  of  those  eligible  to  vote  must  support  strike  action  for  it  to  be  lawful  (ballots  currently  require  a  simple  majority  to  back  action).3  Thus  in  a  strike  ballot  of  1,000  eligible  union  members  (embracing  such  workers  as  firefighters,  nurses,  teachers,  or  railways   and   tube  workers)   at   least   400  would   have   to   back   strike   action.   A   vote   by   399  members   in   favour   of   strike   action   and   no   votes   against   (in   other  words,   a   100   per   cent  majority  of  those  who  voted)  would  be  regarded  as   invalid  on  the  basis  of  being   less  than  the  required  40  per  cent  majority  threshold.  As  TUC  general  secretary  Frances  O’Grady  has  claimed:   ‘The   Conservative   Party   is   not   just   proposing   a   few  more   bureaucratic   obstacles  that  will  make  life  a  bit  more  difficult  for  trade  unions...  they  would  effectively  ban  strikes  by  the  back  door….[introducing  a]  threshold  no  other  ballot  in  Britain  is  required  to  meet  and  that  many  would  fail….effectively  end[ing]  the  right  to  strike  in  the  public  sector’  (BBC  News,  7  September,  2014).  

The  clamour  to  introduce  higher  strike  ballot  thresholds  gathered  pace  in  June  2010  with   a   Confederation  of   British   Industry   report   entitled  Making  Britain   the  Place   to  Work  (CBI,  2010)  which  aimed  to  set  the  agenda  for  the  new  coalition  government’s  labour  policy.  The  CBI  argued  that  the   individual  and  collective  rights   introduced  under  New  Labour  had  made  the  British  economy  uncompetitive  in  a  changed  global  economy.  Alongside  a  raft  of  measures  to  roll  back  the  new  employment  rights,  the  CBI  proposed  the  introduction  of  new  requirements   for  a  minimum  threshold  of  40  per  cent   support  among  members   for   strike  action.   The   right-­‐wing   press   (in   particular   the   Express   and   Times   in   their   editorials)  enthusiastically   took  up   the   campaign.  Mayor  of   London,  Boris   Johnson,   following   clashes  with  the  RMT  union  over  a  London  Underground  strike  organised  on  the  basis  of  a  relatively  low  ballot  turnout,  took  the  CBI  proposals  to  the  Conservative  Party  conference,  focusing  in  particular  on  the  restriction  on  the  right  to  strike  which  he  argued  was  needed  in  order  to  avoid  disruption  to   the  Olympic  Games   in  2012   (Daily  Telegraph,  4  October  2010).  Similar                                                                                                                            3   This   is   the   same   threshold   that   applies   in   ballots   for   union   recognition   under   the   statutory   recognition  procedure).  

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arguments   were   marshalled   in   a   Policy   Exchange   think-­‐tank   report   (2010)   and   Greater  London  Authority  Conservatives  Report  on  the  London  Underground  (Tracey,  2013).  

The   ‘democratic   legitimacy’   of   strike   mandates   and   the   debate   about   minimum  turnouts   in   union   ballots   was   subsequently   brought   into   sharp   relief   following   alleged  derisory  voting   levels   in  ballots  by  a  number  of  other  public   sector  workers.  For  example,  when  PCS  threatened  strike  action  over  cuts  to  jobs  and  a  pay  freeze  by  border  agency  and  passport  guards  on  the  eve  of  the  2012  Olympics  on  the  basis  of  a  20  per  cent  ballot  turnout  of   members   (on   a   57.2   per   cent   vote   in   favour),   Dominic   Raab,   Conservative   MP,   said:  ‘These   reckless   and   damaging   strikes   strengthen   the   case   for   a   voting   threshold,   so   the  militant  minority  can’t  hold  the  hardworking  majority  to  ransom.  It  can’t  be  right  that  union  bosses  can  paralyse  vital  infrastructure  and  humiliate  the  nation  on  a  malicious  whim,  when  just  11  per  cent  of  their  members  support  strike  action’  (Daily  Telegraph,  19  July  2012).    

With  such  considerations  in  mind,  this  paper  seeks  to  explore  the  following  research  questions:  

• To  what  extent  are  the  Conservatives  justified  in  pointing  to  a  ‘democratic  deficit’  in  which   a   majority   of   indifferent   union   members   have   surrendered   control   over  whether  to  strike  to  a  committed  minority?    

• How  can  we  explain  strike  ballot  participation  rates?  Why  do  some  union  members  not  vote?    

• To  what  extent  does  the  secret  individual  postal  balloting  process  affect  the  level  of  participation?    

• What  other  factors  might  potentially  influence  whether  union  members  vote  or  not?    

• How  are  the  unions  likely  to  fare  in  the  face  of  the  Conservative  government’s  two  new  balloting  thresholds?  

To   answer   such   questions   the   paper   first   explores   the   justification   and   underlying  motivation   for   the   introduction   of   new   tougher   strike   ballot   laws,   and   the   illogical  implications  of   such  provisions  which  do  not  apply   to  any  other  ballots.  After   considering  some   alternative   ways   to   potentially   increase   ballot   turnouts   advocated   by   the   TUC   and  some   unions,   notably   online   voting,   the   paper   questions  whether   the   implementation   of  such  an  essentially  technical  and  procedural  measure  would  increase  balloting  turn-­‐outs  to  meet   the   Conservatives’   threshold   levels.   Drawing   on   a   range   of   existing   academic   and  practitioner  literature  over  a  number  of  years  (including  Fairbrother,  1984;  Fredman,  1992;  Martin   et   al,   1991;   1995;   Simpson,   2002;   Undy   and   Martin,   1984;   Undy   et   al,   1996),   it  compares  the  restrictive  parliamentary  model  of  democracy  underlying  the  secret  individual  postal   balloting   process,   compared   with   a   participatory   model   of   democracy   based   on  collective  decision  making  at  workplace  union  meetings.    

It   proceeds   to   identify   the   multi-­‐dimensional   enabling/inhibiting   factors   for   strike  ballot   participation,   including   both   general   factors   (economic/employment   restructuring,  employment   legislation,   strike   defeats   and   ‘demonstration   effect’,   and   electoral   and  political  disengagement  within  society  more  generally)  as  well  as  specific   factors   (size  and  

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nature  of  unions,  nature  of   the  workforce,  management  structures  and  behaviour,   role  of  national  trade  union  leadership,  and  health  of  workplace  union  organisation.    

In  order  to  examine  the  potential  effects  of  the  proposed  legislation,  the  paper  then  retrospectively  applies  it  to  previously  held  ballots  by  analysing  a  database  the  authors  have  compiled   of   162   industrial   action   ballots,   158   of   which   are   strike   ballots,   involving   28  different   trade  unions   (including  BFAWU,  CWU,   FBU,  NUT,  RMT,  UCW,  Unison  and  Unite)  over   the   period   1997-­‐2015.   Although   our   database   confirms   Electoral   Reform   Services  statistics   which   show   unions   have   generally   been   overwhelmingly   successful   in   winning  majority  ‘yes’  votes  in  favour  of  strike  action  under  the  existing  legislation,  it  also  provides  evidence   to   suggest   they   have   often   failed   to   achieve   the   Tories’   proposed   50   per   cent  participation  threshold,  and  that  even  when  they  have  done  so,  some  unions  have  still  failed  to   obtain   the   40   per   cent   majority   threshold   of   those   eligible   to   vote,   albeit   there   are  significant  variations  across  different  sectors,  unions  and  ballots.  While  the  introduction  of  an   additional   40   per   cent   threshold   for   the   ‘important   public   services’   would   have   little  further  effect,  many  unions  will  clearly  find  the  legislation  will  make  it  very  difficult  for  them  to   mount   officially   sanctioned   strikes   as   a   means   of   challenging   employers   in   national  collective  bargaining  negotiations  and  government-­‐initiated  austerity  measures.  The  paper  identifies  some  important  contributory  factors  to  more  positive  voting  figures,  including  the  size   and   location   of   the   numbers   of   workers   being   balloted   (local   v   national);   degree   of  occupational   identity   and   solidaristic   loyalty;   and   the   link   between   left-­‐wing   union  leadership,   collective   mobilisation   and   strike   ballot   participation   rates.   It   concludes   by  reflecting  on  the  unions’  potential  response  to  the  forthcoming  new  legislation.  

 

Justification  and  motivation  

Not   surprisingly  many  business   leaders   have  welcomed   the  prospect   of   another   round  of  legislation  on  strike  action  with  its  introduction  of  ballot  participation  thresholds,  concurring  with   the   Conservatives   that   it   would   stop   strike   action   on   the   basis   of   ballots   that   only  involve  a  minority  of  members,  thereby  increasing  the  democratic  legitimacy  of  action  taken  by   unions.   As   the   new   Conservative   government’s   Business   Secretary,   Sajid   Javid,   has  claimed:  ‘We’ve  seen…in  the  last  five  years,  strike  action  that  took  place  where  perhaps  only  10  per  cent  to  15  per  cent  of  the  members  of  that  profession  actually  voted  for  it,  and  that’s  not  right,   it’s  unfair’   (BBC  News,  12  May  2015).   It  has  been  claimed  that  of  the  119  major  ballots  for  industrial  action  between  August  2010  and  December  2014,  nearly  three  quarters  would  have  been  invalid  under  the  proposed  rules,  with  strikes  in  some  cases  going  ahead  with  the  support  of  as  few  as  one  in  10  workers  (Daily  Mail,  12  May  2015).4  

In  addition,  business  leaders  have  welcomed  the  Conservative’s  plans  to  introduce  a  second  majority  vote  threshold  in  ‘important’  public  services,  on  the  basis  that  strike  action  in   these  areas  can  have   far-­‐reaching  adverse  effects  on  a  wide  range  of   third  parties  who  have  no  association  with  the  dispute,  with  a  strike  in  health  impacting  on  patients,  a  strike  in   teaching   affecting   parents   and   a   transport   strike   affecting   commuters   and   businesses  (DBIS,   2015a).   Thus   while   Simon   Walker,   director-­‐general   of   the   Institute   of   Directors,  acknowledges  the  right  to  strike  is  a  ‘fundamental  part  of  our  democracy’,  has  argued  ‘that                                                                                                                            4  It  should  be  noted  the  source  of  these  figures  is  unstated  and  is  unknown  to  the  authors.  

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does  not  mean  public  sector  unions  should  be  able  to  bring  mass  disruption  to  commuters,  parents   and   people   who   need   public   services   on   the   basis   of   …very   small   turnouts’  (Financial   Times,   10   January   2015).   Likewise   John   Longworth,   director-­‐general   of   the  Chambers   of   Commerce,   has   commented:   ‘When   it   comes   to   transport,   education   and  health,  which  individuals  and  business  depend  on,  the  right  to  strike  must  only  be  exercised  with   the   greatest   restraint.   So   higher   standards   should   apply   when   a   strike   would   put  people  at  risk  or  affect  the  ability  of  large  numbers  of  their  fellow  citizens  to  earn  a  living’  (Financial   Times,   10   January   2015).   As   Sajid   Javid   has   made   clear,   ‘by   increasing   the  thresholds   it  will   certainly   increase   the  hurdles   that  need  to  be  crossed’,  and  at   the  same  time  tackle  the  ‘disproportionate  impact  of  strikes’  in  these  areas  (BBC  News,  12  May  2015).  In   the   process   the   proposals   are   seen   as   a   ‘commonsensical   attempt   to   prevent  unrepresentative,   highly-­‐politicised   activists   from   hijacking   unenthusiastic   workforces’   on  the  basis  ‘there  has  always  been  a  gulf  between  union  leaders  and  their  membership…this  is  the  government’s  chance  to  isolate  and  discredit  the  headbangers’  (Daily  Telegraph,  13  May  2015).  

Katja   Hall,   CBI   deputy   director-­‐general,   has   welcomed   the   reforms   to   ‘outdated  industrial   relations   laws’   (Guardian,   15   July   2015),   with   the   introduction   of   balloting  thresholds  ‘an  important,  but  fair,  step  to  rebalance  the  interest  of  employers,  employees,  the  public  and  the  rights  of  trade  unions’  (Daily  Mail,  10  January  2015).  By  contrast  the  TUC  have   claimed,   imposing   such  minimum   turnouts  would   leave  unions  with   ‘about   as  much  power   as  Oliver   Twist  when  he   asked   for  more’   (Guardian,   12  May   2015).   Certainly,   as   a  recent  International  Labour  Organisation  report  (ILO,  2015)  has  reiterated,  the  right  to  strike  is  a  fundamental  right  to  free  association.  But  it  is  not  simply  a  right  to  come  together  as  a  discussion  group  or  to  advocate  an  idea  or  a  cause;  it  is  the  right  to  act  in  concert  as  much  as  it  is  to  combine.  With  the  social  and  economic  power  of  employers  much  greater  than  that  of   the   individual  worker,   the   right   to   strike   is  a  necessary   collective  means   to   redress   the  imbalance   of   the   employer/employee   relationship   (Kahn   Freund   and   Hepple,   1972;  McFarlane,  1981;  Wedderburn,  1995).      

From   this   perspective,   the   government’s   legislation   would   effectively   undermine  collective  bargaining  by  removing  the  implicit  strike  threat  from  the  union  side.  Such  a  shift  in  the  balance  of  power  away  from  ordinary  workers  would  further  undermine  the  pay  and  conditions  of  workers,  exacerbate   the  growing  gulf  between  wages  and   the  cost  of   living,  increase   inequality,   and   destroy   long-­‐established   workplace   rights   introduced   to   protect  employees  from  exploitation  (Labour  Research,  2014;  Centre  for  Social  and  Labour  Studies,  2015).   Ironically,   although   Prime   Minister   David   Cameron   has   declared   he   wants   the  Conservatives   to   be   the   ‘party   of   working   people’   (Daily   Telegraph,   12  May   2015),   he   is  committed  to  making  it  harder  for  those  people  to  organise  themselves  in  a  trade  union.  

In   some   respects,   the   pledge   to   introduce   further   restrictive   regulation   of   strike  balloting  might  seem  ironical  given  that,  according  to  the  three  different  main  indicators  of  strike   activity   in   the   UK   (number   of   strikes,   number   of  workers   involved,   and   number   of  strike  days  lost),  strike  activity  has  for  the  last  20  years  remained  at  historically  low  levels.  Of  course   there   have   been   some   very   large   set-­‐piece   one-­‐day   public   sector   strikes   over  pensions   in   June   and  November   2011   and   over   pay,   pensions   and  workload   in   July   2014  (Gall  and  Cohen,  2013;  Hale,  2007;  2008;  2009;  2010;  2012;  Lyddon,  1998;  2007;  2009),  but  such  spikes  have  not  altered  the  overall  trend.  Nor  has  sporadic  one-­‐day  national  strikes  by  

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civil   servants,   teachers,   firefighters,   and   rail   network   and   London   Underground   workers.  Whatever  the  public  profile  of  such  disputes,  levels  of  strike  action  remain  at  very  low  levels  compared  to  the  heyday  of  union  militancy  in  the  1970s  and  1980s,  with  average  number  of  working  days  lost  through  strikes  between  1980-­‐1989  at  7.2  million  compared  to  the  period  2010-­‐14  when  it  was  647,000,  albeit  slightly  higher  in  2014  at  788,000  (Office  for  National  Statistics,   2015).   Indeed   what   is   notable   about   when   the   Conservative   government  introduced   balloting   reforms   in   the   early   1980s   is   that   it   was   on   the   back   of   a   wave   of  industrial  discontent,  whereas  today  union  militancy  has  been  considerably  diminished.  So  what   is   it   that   actually   explains   the   pressure   for   legislative   change,   and   what   are   the  underlying  real  motivations?  Arguably  there  are  three  factors  at  play.    

First,  there  is  the  Conservatives’  ideological  agenda  of  seeking  to  utilise  austerity  and  the  government’s  neoliberal  offensive  as  a  means  to  impose  even  further  restrictions  on  a  relatively   weak   and   defensive   trade   union   movement   so   as   to   cement   that   weakness.  Second,   there   is   the   location   of   those   strikes   that   still   do   take   place,   namely   in   so-­‐called  ‘monopoly   sectors’   like   transport   and   communication   and   the   public   services,   and   the  nature  of   these   strikes,  which  have   tended   to  be   relatively   large  and  with   immediate  and  direct   effect   on   essential   services   and   the   public,   for   example   closing   down   schools,  disrupting   the   fire   service,   and   paralysing   the   railway   and   London   tube   networks   (Gall,  2010).    

Third,   notwithstanding   historically   low   levels   of   strike   activity   overall,   it   would  appear   the   Conservatives’   perceived   ‘problem’   is   less   one   that   exists  now   than   one   than  what   is   foreseen   and   feared   in   the   future.  With   an   economic   and   political   imperative   to  proceed   with   much   deeper   spending   cuts   than   previously   and   to   maintain   a   1   per   cent  freeze   on   public   sector   pay   over   a   4-­‐year   period,   the   new   Conservative   government’s  proposed   legislation   appears   to   have   been   principally   designed   to   try   to   make   it   much  harder   for  unions  to  take  strike  action  and  to  weaken  potential   future  union  resistance  to  more  austerity.  As  Dave  Ward,   the  new  general   secretary  of   the  Communication  Workers  Union   (CWU),   has   said:   ‘This   is   a   Tory   government   that   is   planning   to   undermine   the  incomes  and  conditions  of  working  people  whilst  at  the  same  time  cynically  sabotaging  the  very  means  they  have  to  speak  out  in  protest’  (Express  and  Star,  27  May  2015).  

 

Illogical  implications  

Stanley   (2014)   has   compellingly   pointed   out   there   is   illogicality   to   the   Conservative’s  requirements   for   strike   ballots   to   have   a   50   per   cent   turnout   before   they   are   considered  valid.  He  utilises  the  example  of  two  hypothetical  strike  ballots  of  two  different  1,000  strong  workforces.   In  Acme  Rivets,   there   is   an  overwhelming   vote   for   action,  with  495   in   favour  and  4  against,  whereas  in  Gradgrind  Mills  the  workforce  are  more  divided,  voting  for  action  by  just  one  vote,  251  in  favour  and  250  against.  Union  negotiators  might  be  wary  of  calling  action   in  Gradgrind  Mills  as  the  vote  reveals  a  divided  workforce,  and  the  employer  might  not   feel   under  pressure   to  make  a  much  better  offer.   But   in  Acme  Rivets   there   is   a   clear  mandate  for  action,  and  any  employer  would  find  the  vote  impressive.  However,  under  the  Conservative’s  plans,  a  strike  in  Acme  Rivets  would  be  illegal  as  the  turnout  is  just  below  the  50  per  cent  threshold  needed  to  make  action   lawful.  By  contrast,  despite  the  split  vote  at  Gradgrind  Mills,   and   even   though   244   fewer  workers   voted   for   action,   a   strike  would   be  

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legal.   But   if   only   one   person   who   voted   ‘no’   abstained   instead,   the   vote   would   become  invalid  as  the  turnout  would  no  longer  be  in  excess  of  50  per  cent.  

As  Stanley  (2014)  has  explained,  under  the  proposals  the  people  who  do  not  vote  in  a  strike  ballot  attain  a  special  status.  First,  they  are  assumed  to,  in  effect,  be  opponents  of  strike   action.   Yet   arguably  whilst   apathy   or   lack   of   opinion  might   be   anathema   for   active  trade  unionists,   it   is  nonetheless  a   legitimate  position,  and  does  not  equate   to  supporting  one  side  or  the  other.  The  fact  that  they  do  not  vote  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  if  they  had   they  would  have   voted  against   taking   strike   action.   Second,   the   special   status  of   the  person  who  does  not  vote  goes  further  in  that  they  can  potentially  have  greater  weight  than  those  who  oppose  the  action  and  take  the  trouble  to  register  a  vote.  So  if  there  were  1,000  people  eligible  to  vote  in  a  strike  ballot  and  499  voted  in  favour  it  would  nullify  the  validity  of  the  vote,  as  the  turnout  would  fall  below  50  per  cent  on  the  basis  of  one  abstention.  

In  reality,  we  cannot  really   infer   the   intent  of   those  who  do  not  vote.  All  we  really  know   about   non-­‐voters   is   that   they   don’t   know,   are   not   sure,   or   do   not   care   enough   to  participate  when  they  are  provided  a  chance  –  and  therefore   it  could  be  argued  that  they  should   not   get   to   help   to   decide.   In   fact,   thresholds   would   make   it   theoretically   more  beneficial   for   active   opponents   of   strike   action   to   collectively  non-­‐vote   if   they   knew   they  were   in   the   minority,   since   by   not   voting   they   could   prevent   it   reaching   the   imposed  ‘legitimatising’  threshold  and  thus  defeat  the  strike  decision,  whereas  by  actually  voting  ‘no’  when   they   knew   most   would   vote   ‘yes’   they   would   be   guaranteeing   passage.   In   other  words,  the  legislation  could  potentially  reduce  participation  rates.  

Strike   ballots   were   initially   enacted   in   the   early   1980s   with   the   expectation   that  union  members  would   generally   be   reluctant   to   take   action   and  would   vote   accordingly,  such   that   the   incidence  of   strikes  would  be   reduced.   Yet   the   argument   that   the   so-­‐called  ‘silent  majority’  would  vote   in  a  ballot  against   ‘hot-­‐headed’  militant  union   leaderships  has  proved  to  be  false;  since  strike  votes  have  been  formally  measurable  it  can  be  shown  that  most  members  support  their  leaders’  recommendations  to  strike.    

 Trade  union  strike  ballots  2007-­‐2014    Year   Ballots   calling   for  

‘strike  action’  Ballots  voting  FOR  strike  action  

Ballots  voting  AGAINST  strike  action  

Split  result  

         2007   713   637   64   12  2008   794   658   123   13  2009   561   458   93   10  2010   555   487   61   7  2011   964   904   51   9  2012   585   487   89   8  2013   469   417   48   4  2014   628   550   68   10    Source:    Office  for  National  Statistics,  2015  

 

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The  frequent  amendments  to  the  legislation  on  industrial  action  ballots  (of  which  the  threshold  measures   are   the   latest   initiative)   are   no   doubt,   in   part   at   least,   a   response   to  employers’   concerns   that   members’   support   for   union   claims   registered   in   ballots   can  actually  strengthen  unions’  bargaining  position.  Likewise  the  repeated  legal  challenges  and  threats   of   injunctions   to   trade  unions’   calls   on  members   to   take   strike   action  which  have  been  made   by   employers,   often   on   the   grounds   of   alleged   failure   to   satisfy   the   complex  statutory   prescription   for   ballots   and   associated   notices   to   employers   (Simpson,   2012;  2013).   Sometimes   this   legal   action   has   succeeded   and   resulted   in   the   ballot   being  suspended  or  strike  cancelled  (Gall,  2006);  for  example,  Unite  was  taken  to  the  High  Court  by  British  Airways  in  2010,  over  a  long-­‐running  dispute  with  cabin  crew.  Despite  eight  out  of  ten  workers   voting   for   strike  action  on   the  back  of  a  78  per   cent  ballot   turnout,   the  High  Court  judge  banned  the  strike  because  the  union  had  failed  to  give  notice  by  text  message  that  eleven  out  of  9,282  votes  had  been  spoilt.  But  the  employers’  use  of  legal  action  is  also  a  reflection  of  the  fact  that  the  introduction  of  postal  industrial  action  ballots  has  manifestly  failed  in  its  intention  of  preventing  workers  from  voting  in  favour  of  strikes.  

Unions   do   not   necessarily   take   strike   action   following   a   positive  mandate.   Indeed  there  have  always  been  far  more  successful  ballots  and  notices  of  strike  action  than  actual  strikes.  It  is  the  willingness  of  union  members  to  vote  in  favour  of,  and  participate  in  strike  action,   that   has   resulted   in   unions   using   ballots   as   a   negotiation   tactic,   as   a   means   of  attempting   to   force   employers   to   make   concessions   previously   denied.   Often   the   strike  threat,   stemming   from   a   successful   ballot,   can   act   as   a   proxy   for   a   strike   itself,   as   the  employer  becomes  willing   to  make  compromises  and   the  union   is  able   to  achieve  a  more  favourable   settlement  without   the  need   to   take  action   (Brown  and  Wadhwani,  1190:  62).  Nonetheless,  a  sizeable  number  of  ballots  will  result   in  a  credible  prospect  of  strike  action  occurring  (Gall,  2006:  335-­‐6).    

There   is  also  the  argument  that   it   is  not  reasonable  to   impose  electoral   thresholds  which  do  not  apply  to  the  UK’s  political  system  generally.  Thus  there  have  been  a  number  of  recent   local   elections   in  which   turnout   has   been   nowhere   near   50   per   cent.   In   the   2008  London  Mayoral  election  it  was  just  45  per  cent  and  in  2012  Boris  Johnson  was  elected  with  less  than  50  per  cent  of  both  first  and  second  preference  votes  and  on  a  turnout  of  only  38.1  per   cent.   The   lowest   ever   by-­‐election   turnout   of   18.2   per   cent  was   recorded   in   the   2012  Manchester  Central  by-­‐election   (with   the   incumbent  Labour  MP  Lucy  Powell  winning  with  just   12   per   cent   support).   Recent   local   Police   and   Crime   Commissioner   elections   have  resulted  in  turnouts  as  low  as  16.4  per  cent  in  Northumbria  and  10.3  per  cent  in  the  West  Midlands.    

A   similar   pattern   has   been   played   out   in   general   elections.   Turnout   for   the   2014  European   Parliament   elections  was   just   over   34.2   per   cent,   and   for   the   2012   Alternative  Vote   (AV)   electoral   system   referendum   it  was   just   41   per   cent.   In   the  May   2015   general  parliamentary  elections  only  37  per  cent  of  voters  and  less  than  25  per  cent  of  the  eligible  electorate  as  a  whole  supported  the  Conservatives.  David  Cameron  managed  to  obtain  60.1  per   cent  of   the   vote  on  a   turnout  of   70.2  per   cent,   but  only   41.1  per   cent  of   the  eligible  electorate,   and   the  Chancellor  George  Osbourne  managed   to   obtain   58.6   per   cent   of   the  vote,  on  a  turnout  of  70.2  per  cent,  but  only  41.1  per  cent  of  the  eligible  electorate.    

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Yet   despite   these   poor   turnouts   for   political   elections   the   Conservatives   have   not  proposed  similar  thresholds  to  those  that  trade  unions  are  going  to  be  expected  to  meet.  

 

Competing  models  of  union  democracy  

The   TUC   and   many   unions   have   pointed   out   that   there   are   more   proportionate   and  measured  ways  to  address  the  issue  of  low  ballot  participation  rates,  and  which  attempt  to  overcome  what   is   regarded  as   the  main  obstacle   to  higher   voting   levels:   secret   individual  postal  ballots  sent  to  the  home.  As  Frances  O’Grady  has  said:    

It   is  everyone’s   interest   to  ensure   that  as  many  people  as  possible  participate,  but   the  government  has  saddled  unions  with  twentieth  century  postal  balloting  methods  that  make  it  harder  for  working  people   to  do   just   that.  Online  voting   is   the  way   to  bring  balloting  bang  up   to  date  and  help  ensure  some  equality  in  the  workplace  (Independent,  21  March  2015).    

Removing  the  requirement  for  unions  to  post  ballot  papers  to  their  members’  home  addresses   (notably   in   an   era  when  most   post   tends   to   be   junk  mail   or   bills)   and   instead  allowing  union  members  to  complete  ballot  papers  electronically  via  a  secure  online  link  on  their   work   computers,   home   laptops,   tablets   or   smartphones   would   seem   likely   to  encourage   increased   voter   turnout,   as   well   as   reduce   the   cost   of   ballots   on   unions  considerably.5   Such   an   initiative   is   part   of   a   wider   drive   by   pressure   groups   such   as  WebRoots  Democracy,  who  campaign  for  the  introduction  of  an  online  voting  option  in  UK  elections  on  the  basis  that,  despite  being  able  to  email,  follow,  and  tweet  their  elected  MPs  online,  electors  are  not  yet  able  to  vote  for  them  online.  The  pressure  group  maintain  that  to  reverse  growing  political  apathy  and  low  electoral  turnout  in  the  UK,  particularly  among  young   people,   the   UK   needs   to   introduce   an   online   voting   option   in   time   for   the   2020  General   Election,   as   well   as   online   trade   union   strike   ballots   by   2016.   It   is   claimed   the  introduction  of  an  online  voting  option  could  increase  turnout  in  a  General  Election  by  up  to  79   per   cent,   with   up   to   an   extra   9   million   voters   (WebRoots   Democracy,   2015:   11-­‐13).  Likewise,  according  to  PCS  general  secretary  Mark  Serwotka,  turn-­‐out  in  strike  ballots  would  ‘rocket’   if  union  members  were  allowed  to  vote  electronically  or  by  phone  (BBC  News,  19  May  2015).  

However,  online  voting  does  not  always  increase  turnout,  with  data  from  Estonia  –  where  online   voting  has   been   available   since   2005  –   showing   that   it   is   often  people  who  were   voting   already   who   are   switching   to   the   service.   Evidence   from   the   University   and  College  Union’s   (UCU)   2014   post-­‐strike   action   online   consultative   ballot   (as   opposed   to   a  strike  ballot,  albeit  further  strikes  were  implicit  in  a  ‘no’  vote)  on  whether  to  accept  revised  pension  change  proposals  was  that  voting  levels  may  have  been  encouraged  slightly,  with  a  turnout   recorded  of   39.1   per   cent   (15,706   in   total),   involving   10,538   (67   per   cent)   voting  ‘yes’  to  accept  and  only  5,168  voting  ‘no’  to  reject  (32.9  per  cent).  (UCU  Circular,  26  January  

                                                                                                                         5   The   cost   of   strike   ballots   was   initially   borne   by   the   state.   The   1980   Employment   Act   encouraged   the  extension   of   postal   ballots   by   providing   state   funding   for   the   first   time  under   statutory   instrument;   initially  these  applied  to  closed  shop  ballots  but  were  extended  by  later  Acts  to  include  strike  ballots.  After  a  number  of  ballots,   including  strike  ballots,  had  been  made  effectively  compulsory,  state  funding  was  withdrawn  with  effect  from  1996  by  Statutory  Instrument  in  1993.  The  result  has  been  that  since  1996  unions  can  be  obliged  to  spend  many  thousands  of  pounds  on  the  balloting  process.    

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2015).   Yet   even   though   online   voting   would   undoubtedly   make   it   technically   easier   for  union   members   to   participate   in   strike   ballots,   it   is   not   does   overcome   the   inherent  fragmentation  and  atomisation  of  the  balloting  process.  

  The   more   fundamental   underlying   problem   is   the   way   government   legislative  initiatives  with  respect  to  strike  ballots  over  the  last  30  years  have  often  been  successfully  portrayed   as   a   necessary   means   to   increase   union   membership   participation   in   critically  important  decisions,  and  thereby  improve  democracy  -­‐  when  arguably  it  has  had  very  little  to  do  with  democracy,  the  objective  being  simply  to  make  strike  decisions  and  action  more  difficult  (McCrystal  and  Novitz,  2012).  This  linking  of  ballots  and  democracy  has  always  been  central  to  the  debate  about  secret  postal  ballots.  A  1976  Conservative  Party  manifesto,  The  Right  Approach,  argued  that  the  system  of  union  democracy  enshrined  in  union  rulebooks  did  not  function  in  practice.  Because  the  members  of  many  unions  were  required  to  attend  branch  meetings   if   they  wished   to   vote   on   policy   issues,   elect   their   general   secretary,   or  vote   for   industrial   action,   it   was   claimed   they   were   controlled   by   unrepresentative  minorities   of   militant   and   left-­‐wing   politically   motivated   activists.   The   vast   majority   of  members   were   not   willing   or   able   to   attend   branch   meetings   or   to   take   part   in   policy  debates  and  elections.    

The  solution  was  seen  to  lie  in  introducing  legislation  that  would  make  it  compulsory  for   unions   to   involve  members   through   secret   postal   ballots.   This  would,   it   was   claimed,  take   power   away   from   the   militants   and   ‘give   the   unions   back   to   the   members’.   Union  members  would   receive   a   ballot   paper   through   the   post   and   be   asked   in   the   isolation   of  their   own  homes   to   exercise   their   choice   as   to  whether   to   vote   ‘yes’   or   ‘no’   to   industrial  action   proposals   (Undy  And  Martin,   1984:   15;   Farnham   and   Pimlott:   1995:   127-­‐128).   The  presumption  was  that  decisions  would  be  made  on  a  more  ‘rational’  basis   if  the  individual  worker  was  insulated  from  the  direct  pressures  of  work  colleagues  and  union  activists  and  the  emotion  of  the  mass  meeting  (Martin,  et  al,  1991:  198).  

A   central   objective   of   the   legislation   was   to   sanctify   through   particular   ballot  procedures   union   members’   participation   as   individuals   rather   than   as   members   of   a  collective  -­‐  involving  a  separation  of  the  receipt  of  ballot  papers  from  the  workplace  and  the  elevation  of   individualist  over   collectivist   values  as  a  means  of   subverting  collective  union  organisation  and  orientations   (Smith  et,  1993;  Martin  et  al,  1995;  Undy  and  Martin,  1984;  Undy   et   al,   1996).   On   the   basis   of   what   could   be   viewed   as   a   parliamentary   model   of  democracy,  the  level  of  participation  in  strike  ballots  has  been  viewed  as  a  measure  of  union  democracy,   such   that   the   higher   the   participation   rate   the   more   democratic   the   union  (Edelstein  and  Warner,  1979:  63).  In  the  process,  it  effectively  dispensed  with  the  need  for  dialogue,   debate   and   continuous   involvement   by   an   active   membership,   and   replaced   it  with  a  highly  atomised  one-­‐off  vote  by  a  collection  of  aggregate  individuals  as  the  total  sum  of  membership  participation  (Davies  and  Freedland,  1993:  484;  Fredman,  1992:  29).  

Critics   of   this   parliamentary   model   of   democracy   argued   the   balloting   legislation  failed   to   recognise   trade   unions   as   collective   organisations   that  were   formed   in   order   to  increase   the  power  of   individual   employees,  with  union   strength  dependent  on  members  acting   collectively   to   organise   and   express   the   conflicts   inherent   in   the   employment  relationship   (Mcllroy,  1998:  154).  Replacing  collective  decision  making  by   individual   secret  ballots   undermined   (or   prevented   the   emergence   of)   the   solidarity   required   for   effective  

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strike  action.  It  essentially  counter  posed  the  idea  of  working  class  collective  strength  with  that   of   individual   rights   and   decisions,   thereby   fragmenting   and   isolating   union  members  away  from  their   fellow  workers  and   in  circumstances  where  they  were  most  open  to  self-­‐doubt  and  moderate  ideas  (Hyman,  1989:  247).    

Fairbrother  (1984)  advocated  an  alternative  participatory  model  of  democracy  which  emphasised   the   central   importance   of   collective   membership   participation   and   decision-­‐making   via   a   process   of   discussion,   debate   and   examination   of   policies   and   decisions  founded  on  the  continuous   interaction  between  union  members  and  their   reps.  From  this  perspective:  

Union   democracy   is…a   continuous   process   rooted   in   the   daily   experience   of   most   workers   and  involving  a  continuous  struggle  about  the  conditions  of  employment,  the  authority  of  employers  and  the  organisation  of  work…  

Disagreement  and  discussion,  argument  and  counter-­‐argument,  are  the  key  features  of  this  process  –  a   sign   of   the   vitality   and   indeed   the   essence   of   union   organisation.   The   reason   for   this   is   that   the  experience   of   members   is   often   varied   and   there   are   not   always   obvious   and   clear-­‐cut   ways   to  proceed   and   advance   the   interests   of   the  membership.   Through  meetings,   discussions   and  debate,  decisions  are  made  and  policy  formulated  (p.  23-­‐24).  

From  this  viewpoint   it  was  argued  that,  compared  with  the  secret   individual  postal  ballot,  a  much  more  effective  –  and  more  genuinely  democratic  –  channel  for  participation  would   involve  discussions,  debates  and  decisions   taken  at  workplace  union  meetings.  This  would   allow  questions   to   be   raised   about,   for   instance,   the   likely   length   of   the   strike,   its  objectives   and   the   ‘bottom   line’   for   a   settlement.   Under   such   circumstances,   in   which  members  were  encouraged  to  actively  participate  in  the  deliberations,  they  would  be  more  likely  to  understand  the  issues  and  arguments,  and  be  in  a  better  position  to  consider  their  collective   interests   than   if   they  voted  as   isolated   individuals  at  home,  and  where   the  only  real   ‘discussion’  of   the  proposal   for  many  members  would  come   in   the   form  of  a  positive  union   recommendation,  on   the  one  hand,   and  negative  media   campaign,  on   the  other.   It  would   vastly   increase   membership   participation   in   the   process   and   be   hugely   more  democratic.      

Certainly   when   the   Trade   Union   Act   1984   (TUA   1984)   introduced   a   statutory  requirement   for   trade   unions   to   hold   industrial   action   ballots   which   could   be   workplace  ballots   and   to   achieve   a  majority   vote   in   favour   of   industrial   action,   it   had   the   effect   of  increasing  the  levels  of  membership  participation,  according  to  an  analysis  of  the  turnout  in  workplace   ballots   between   1985   and   1993   (Undy   et   al,   1996:   p.   220).   A   number   of  interviewed   trade   union   officers   estimated   that   turnout   averaged   20   per   cent   in   union  branch-­‐based  systems  and  50  per  cent  when  conducted  at  the  workplace.  In  one  district  of  the  AEU  engineering  union  an  average  turnout  of  81  per  cent  was  recorded  in  17  workplace  industrial  action  ballots  held  during  1987,  similar  to  the  level  achieved  by  the  National  Union  of   Mineworkers’(NUM)     traditional   workplace   ballots.   But   in   1993   workplace   ballots   for  strike  action  were  banned  by  the  Conservatives  and  only  fully  postal  balloting  was  allowed,  with   the   effect   that   it   reduced   the   turnout   compared   to   workplace   ballots   (p.   242).  According   to   the   Electoral   Reform   Balloting   Services   (ERBS,   1994:   3)   who   looked   at   242  postal  ballots  in  1994,  in  ballots  of  over  1,000  members  it  fell  to  approximately  44  per  cent.  In  other  words,   if   the  concern   is   simply   to   increase   turnout   then  workplace   ballots  would  

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appear   to   represent   a   much   better   channel   than   a   secret   individual   postal   vote,   but   of  course  democracy  and  strike  ballot  legislation  is  not  simply  about  turnouts.  

As  for  the  type  of  direct  union  democracy  signalled  in  workplace  mass  meetings  and  show-­‐of-­‐hands  strike  votes,  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  these  were  often  either  held  in  canteens  or   in   the   car   parks   outside   car   factories   and   other   workplaces   (Thornett,   1987:   47-­‐8;  Darlington,   1994:   234).   They   were   an   expression   of   a   collective   form   of   decision  making  based   on   open   debate,   in   an   atmosphere   of   strong,   dynamic   worker   interaction   (Cohen,  2006:   166-­‐7).   The   NUM’s  method   of   holding   such   ballots   at   the   pithead  was   particularly  attractive,   as   it   gave   every   union  member   the   right   to   vote,   but   under   conditions   which  encouraged   voting   by   reference   to   collective   rather   than   merely   individual   self-­‐interest.  Indeed  one  commentator  has  gone  so  far  as  to  comment:  ‘…the  use  of  strike  meetings  for  reaching   strike   decisions…is   perhaps   the   clearest   expression   to   be   found   of   industrial  democracy  at  work’  (McFarlane,  1981:  92-­‐3).    

Yet   even   in   their   heyday   the   notion   of   such   mass   workplace   union   meetings  appeared  to  cut  against  the  grain  of  society.  As  Beynon  (1973:  305)  noted,  ‘it  is  anathema  to  many  people.  Few  things  raise  middle  class  Britain  to  a  greater  show  of  moral  outrage  than  workers  packed  into  large  halls,  voting  on  important  issues  by  a  show  of  hands’.  Despite  the  caricature  of  the  ‘bad  old  days  of  trade  union  militancy’  of  the  1970s  painted  by  the  tabloid  press,   in  which   allegedly   there  was   the   potential   for   ‘intimidation  by   union   firebrands’   at  such  open  mass  meetings   (Crossman,  2014),   it  was  not  always  the  case  that  militant  shop  stewards   were   able   to   win   support   amongst   shopfloor   members   for   strike  recommendations;  sometimes  the  decisions  made  at  such  meetings  involved  constraints  on  the  activities  of   stewards,  with   leadership   strike   calls  being   rejected   (McCarthy,  1967:  22;  Goodman  and  Whittingham,  1973:  191;  1999;  Batstone  et  al,  1977:  92-­‐3;  Darlington,  2006:  494-­‐497).  Conversely  although  postal  ballots  have  probably  reduced  industrial  militancy  by  denying  union  negotiators  the  opportunity  to  call  for  strike  votes  at  mass  meetings  in  which  appeals   for   solidarity   could  potentially  more  effectively  overcome  concern  with   individual  profit  and   loss,  postal  ballots  have  not  guaranteed  moderation,  such  that  the  method  and  location   of   voting   has   not   been   a   major   determinant   of   outcome   (despite   its   effect   on  participation)  compared  with  other  contingent  factors  (McCrystal  and  Novitz,  2012:  212).  

Moreover  there  is  much  justification  to  the  view  that  workers  should  have  the  right  to  take  decisions  at  open  workplace  union  meetings,  whether  this  is  by  a  show  of  hands  or  by  a  secret  ballot  held  after  the  meeting  -­‐  potentially   in  today’s  world  being  facilitated  via  online   channels   after   the   meeting   -­‐   with   all   such   elections   subjected   to   independent  scrutiny.   It   should   be   noted   as   a   result   of   the   New   Labour   government’s   Statutory  Recognition   Procedure,   under   which   unions   were   given   rights   with   respect   to   union  recognition,  balloting  takes  place  at  the  workplace,  in  secret  and  under  the  supervision  of  a  qualified   independent   person.   A   similar   procedure   in   the   case   of   industrial   action   ballots  could  be  introduced  in  a  fashion  that  would,  to  some  extent  at  least,  address  the  problem  of  low  voter  turnouts.  

But  even  if  such  alternative  ways  of  attempting  to  increase  ballot  vote  participation  are  both  justified  and,  if  implemented,  likely  to  succeed,  there  is  nonetheless  still  a  serious  doubt   as   to   whether   they   would   materially   increase   the   turnout   sufficient   to   meet   the  Conservatives  new  ballot  thresholds.  Even  if  many  unions  were  able  to  obtain  a  50  per  cent  

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participation   rate,   they  would   still   find   it   very   difficult,   if   not   virtually   impossible   in   some  cases,   to  obtain  the  necessary  40  per  cent  majority  vote.  Such  apparently   insurmountable  dilemmas  raise  the  more  underlying  question  of  why  exactly  turnouts  in  strike  ballots  are  not  higher,   and   whether   there   are   broader   problems   at   stake   for   the   unions   -­‐   than   merely  attempting  to  ameliorate  through  technical  means  the  method  and   location  of  voting  –   in  confronting  the  Conservative’s  proposed  stringent  legislation?  

 

Other  potential  factors  influencing  participation  rates  

How   can   we   explain   strike   ballot   participation   rates?  Why   do   some   union  members   not  vote?  What  are  the  different  enhancing  or   inhibiting   factors  affecting  participation?  There  are  many  potentially  related  and  complex  factors  that  could  explain  this.  As  we  have  seen,  if  unions   did   not   have   to   jump   through   the   hoop   of   a   bureaucratic   and   atomising   secret  individual   postal   balloting   process,   away   from   the   collectivism   and   solidarity   of   the  workplace,  it  is  likely  there  would  be  a  higher  level  of  participation.  But  beyond  the  balloting  process,   what   other   factors   might   come   into   play   to   explain   why   some   union   members  participate  and  others  abstain?  

The  apparent  apathy  of  some  union  members  in  not  voting  might  be  caused  by  the  fact   they  do  not   think   the   issue   is   important  enough   to   them,  or  because   they  have  busy  working   lives,   families   to   care   for,   and   a   social   life,   and   they   just   do   not   feel   motivated  enough  to  complete  a  voting  paper  and  then  take  the  initiative  to  post  it.  But  as  Paul  Nowak  (2011),   deputy   TUC   general   secretary,   has   suggested,   lack   of   participation   may   also   be  because  union  members  genuinely  can’t  make  up  their  mind,  and  so  decide  to  sit  out   the  vote  to  see  what  others  think;  or  whilst  they  may  be  very  sympathetic  to  the  union  cause,  they  hold  back  from  voting  on  the  assumption  that  strike  action  is  a  ‘big  deal’  and  will  cost  them   lost   wages;   or   they   may   balance   the   cost   of   the   substantive   issue   at   stake   –   for  example,   with   government   proposals   on   pensions   meaning   they   would   pay   more,   work  longer,  and  get  less  -­‐  with  an  understandable  reluctance  to  do  anything  that  could  impact  on  their  patients,  pupils  or  members  of  the  public  who  rely  on  them,  and  therefore  they  defer  their  decision  in  the  hope  that  an  agreed  compromise  settlement  might  be  reached.    

It   should  be  noted  when  proposals   for   strikes  were   voted   for   in  mass  meetings   in  factory   canteens   or   car   parks   in   the   strike-­‐prone   days   of   the   1970s,   anecdotal   evidence  suggests   few   people   abstained   (Thornett,   1987).   Of   course,   in   large   part   this   may   have  reflected   a  more   confident   belief   in   the   strength   of   unions   and   their   prospects   of   strike  success.   Nonetheless,   even   during   these   times,   some   people   in   mass   meetings   were   no  doubt  more  hesitant  to  put  their  hands  up  than  others.  When  it  comes  to  today’s  individual  secret  postal  ballots,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  at  least  a  significant  proportion  of  workers  do  not  necessarily  abstain  because  they  do  not  care  about  the  issues  at  stake,  are  opposed   to  strike  action,  or  are  opposed   to   the  potential   loss  of  wages   involved   in   taking  action,  but  because  they  are  unsure  whether  striking  is  likely  to  succeed  –  otherwise,  if  they  were   sure,   they   would   probably   vote   ‘no’   straight   off.   Instead,   they   often   feel   uncertain  about  whether  the  union,  or  the  workforce,  is  strong  and  determined  enough  to  make  the  strike  effective  and   likely  to  succeed.   In  the  past,  at  mass  meetings,  those  unsure  workers  might  have  decided  by  observing  others  and,   if  there  was  a   large  enough  body  of  workers  putting   their   hands   up   for   a   strike   straight   away,   then   casting   their   vote   in   favour  

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accordingly.   But   with   secret   individual   postal   ballots,   unsure   workers   are   probably   more  likely  not  to  vote,  and  to  wait  and  see  what  the  balance  of  opinion  is  among  workers  more  confident  than  themselves  (Dalcassion,  2011).    

Another  way  of  looking  at  the  problem  is  to  separate  out  some  general  and  specific  factors  that  may  influence  voting  levels.  

General  Factors    

• Economic/employment  restructuring  –  If  the  long  post-­‐war  boom  with  its  generation  of  full  employment  was  an  essential  underpinning  of  union  militancy  prior  to  1980s,  the   onset   of   serious   and   sustained   recession   from   the  mid-­‐1970s   followed   by   the  1980s   and   1990s   restructuring   and  massive   contraction   of   industries   where   trade  union  militancy  was  most  concentrated  (car  factories,  docks,  pits,  etc),  undoubtedly  undermined   this  militancy   (Joyce,   2015).   In   turn   it   seems   reasonable   to   assume   it  also  had  a  significant  deleterious  effect  on  the  propensity  of  union  members  to  vote  for   strike   action  and,  once   legislation  had  been   introduced,   to  participate   in   strike  ballots.   The   heavily   unionised   and   relatively   ‘strike-­‐prone’   industries   of   the   past  either  do  not  exist  or  are  significantly  smaller.  Likewise  restructuring  has  accelerated  the   long-­‐term  shift   in  UK  employment   towards   the  private   service   sector,  which   is  poorly   organised   and   has   continued   to   see   a   steady   decline   in   the   coverage   of  collective   bargaining   and   union   membership.   While   low   bargaining   coverage   and  union  density  in  the  private  sector  does  not  necessarily  negatively  affect  strike  ballot  participation  rates,  it  is  likely  to  reflect  the  extent  to  which  a  union  has  the  capacity  to   generate   the   necessary   mobilisation   to   obtain   a   high   turnout,   such   that   the  greater  the  union  density  the  greater  the  potential   for  ballot  participation  and  vice  versa.   In  addition,   there  has  been  a  significant  reduction   in   the  size  of   the  average  size   of   workplace,   which   has   also   impacted   in   a   negative   fashion.   Beyond   such  factors,  the  impact  of  economic  restructuring  will  have  affected  ballot  participation  rates  in  other  ways,  with  the  sustained  increase  in  unemployment  and  more  recent  neoliberal  austerity  measures  undermining  the  bargaining  power  of  the  trade  unions  -­‐   for   example,   reinforcing   fear   of   job   loss   in   the   event   of   strike   activity   and  encouraging  the  view  that  strike  activity  would  be  self-­‐defeating.    

• Employment   laws   –   As   we   have   seen,   the   current   Conservative   government’s  balloting   threshold   proposals   follow   on   from   a   series   of   employment   laws   which  since   the   early   1980s   have   progressively   limited   legal   immunity   from   claims   for  damages  by  unions  engaged  in  strike  action,  and  made  it  more  difficult  to  take  strike  action   and   stay  within   the   law.  Although   the   law  has  only   actually   been  used   in   a  minority   of   disputes,   unions   have   repeatedly   found   themselves   in   legal   difficulties  with   injunctions   leading   to   action   being   called   off   (Evans,   1987;  Gall,   2006;   Prassi,  2011;   Simpson,   2013).   The   (no   doubt   intended)   consequence   of   balloting  requirements  that  were  supposedly  introduced  to  ensure  union  democracy  have  not  only   increasingly   been   used   to   prevent   strike   action   directly,   but   are   also   likely   to  have  had  an  indirect  effect  on  workers’  willingness  to  participate  in  strike  ballots  and  vote  ‘yes’.    

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• Strike   defeats   -­‐   the   hugely   damaging   and   demoralising   strike   defeats   of   powerful  unions   in   the   1980s   both   by   the   employers   and   the   government,   including   key  groups   of   workers   in   the   car   and   steel   industry,   the   dockers,   print   workers,   and  notably  in  the  year-­‐long  1984-­‐5  miners’  strike,  has  had  a  significant  ‘demonstration  effect’,   whereby   it   seems   as   though   industrial   struggle   is   a   futile   exercise,  undermining  confidence  of  workers  in  their  collective  power  in  the  workplace;  in  this  period  of  ‘coercive  pacification’,  ‘each  strike  defeat  discourages  others  from  the  risk  of   a   strike’   (Hyman,   1984:   225).   This   has   also   contributed   to   the   level   of   strike  activity  having  dropped  to  historically  low  levels,  with  a  likely  negative  effect  on  the  willingness  of  workers   to  participate   in   strike  ballots  and  vote   ‘yes’.  Not  only  have  the   number   of   strikes   decreased,   but   also   their   character   has   changed,   such   that  those   strikes   that   do   take   place   are   overwhelmingly   official   and   top-­‐down  centralised   strikes   called   by   national   officials   following   balloting   procedures,   in  contrast   to   the   1960s   and   1970s   when   pressure   for   strike   activity   was   often  generated  from  below  by  rank-­‐file  members,  and  unofficial  strikes  were  common.  In  turn,   balloting   procedures,   while   they   have   allowed   unions   to   gain   some   limited  bargaining  advances  by  utilising   strike  mandates,  have  also  encouraged  negotiated  settlements   rather   than  strike  action  per   se,  with  most   strikes   that  do  occur  being  discontinuous,  and  with  large-­‐scale  public  sector  strikes  only  lasting  for  one  day  and  usually   being   of   merely   a   demonstrative   nature   (Lyddon,   2007;   Joyce,   2015).   All  these  features  are  reflective  of  a  strike  mobilisation  process  which  is  more  indicative  of   a   ‘managed   activism’   (Heery   at   al,   2000),   in   which   worker’s   confidence   and  willingness   to   take  action  has  been  undermined,  with   spill-­‐over  effects   in   terms  of  the  level  of  balloting  participation.    

• Broader   political   crisis   of   engagement   -­‐   the   massive   decline   in   the   level   of   trade  union   membership,   coverage   of   collective   bargaining   and   overall   strength   of  workplace  trade  union  organisation  over  the  last  30  years  has  been  accompanied  by  other   broader   political   developments   which   may   have   further   impacted   on   strike  ballot  participation  levels.  To  begin  with,  there  has  been  a  growing  disaffection  and  disengagement   from  political  elections   (Manning,  2015).  When  Harold  Wilson  won  the  1964  general   election,  more   than   three-­‐quarters  of  people   cast   their   vote  and  turnout  was  roughly  equal  across  the  generations.  But  according  to  data  from  Ipso  Mori,  at  the  2010  election  it  had  dropped  to  65  per  cent  (albeit  while  76  per  cent  of  over-­‐65s  were  still  voting  only  46  per  cent  of  people  aged  18-­‐24  were  going  to  the  ballot  box),  underlining  the  extent  to  which  the  many  millions  of  people  have  opted  out  of  the  process  for  one  reason  or  another.  While  one-­‐off  events,  such  as  the  Iraq  war,  or  MPs’  expenses  scandal,  and  the  impact  of  austerity,  may  have  contributed  to  disillusionment  with  the  political  system,  the  decline  is  undoubtedly  longer  and  more  structural,  although  the  reasons  for  such  lower  political  engagement  are  difficult  to  pinpoint   exactly.   Meanwhile,   according   to   the   Electoral   Commission   in   2011   less  than  1  per  cent  of   the  population  were  members  of  one  of   the   ‘big  three’  political  parties,  a  figure  which  has  fallen  by  more  than  half  since  New  Labour  took  office  in  1997  when  it  was  2  per  cent;  in  1983  it  was  twice  as  high  again  at  almost  4  per  cent.  In  addition,  local  Labour  Party  infrastructures  are  much  weaker;  whereas  in  1945  the  Labour  Party  had  almost  1  million  members  and  took  almost  50  per  of  the  popular  vote   in  general  elections,  by  2007  Labour’s  membership  had  hit   an  all-­‐time   low  of  

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177,000,  with   its   share  of   the  vote   in  2010  down   to  29  per   cent   (6.2  per   cent   less  than  in  2005  and  10.7  per  cent  less  than  in  2001).  The  remnants  of  the  Communist  Party  and  Labour  Left  are  considerably  diminished,  reflecting  the  wider  organic  crisis  of   the   Labour   Party.   Clearly   it   is   important   to   bear   in   mind   this   broader   political  context   in   understanding   low   voting   levels   in   strike   ballots   –   at   the   very   least   it  suggests   it   would   be   unfair   to   expect   trade   unions   to   pay   the   price   for   a   crisis  brought  about  by  myriad  broader  factors  beyond  their  control  (Lowe,  2014).  

Beyond   these   general   factors,   there   are   also   some   more   specific   explanatory  variables  affecting  strike  ballot  participation  levels.  

Specific  Factors    

• Size  of  the  union  –  it  could  be  that  that  within  relatively  small,  compact  unions  with  membership   restricted   to   a   single  occupation,   it   is   easier   to  obtain   a  higher  ballot  turnout,   and   a   higher   overall   percentage   of   voting   for   action.   Underlying   such   an  assumption  is  the  notion  that  a  smaller  union  (such  as  the  train  drivers’  union  Aslef)  is   likely   to   have   a   lower   ratio   of   members   to   full-­‐time   union   officials,   as   well   as  officials  who   are   have   closer   links   and   contacts  with   their  members,   and   a   higher  membership  identification  with  the  union  and  its  policies,  than  a  larger  union  (such  as   Unite   or   Unison),   (Farnham   and   Pimlott,   1995:   130).   However,   such   general  observations   could   be   misleading   as   clearly   even   smaller   unions   can   struggle   to  obtain   high   participation   rates,   and   anyway   levels   of  membership   participation   in  strike  ballots  cannot  simply  be  drawn  directly  from  the  size  of  a  union,  but  are  likely  to  depend  on  other  factors  as  well  (Gall,  2011b).    

• Nature  of  the  union  –  the  nature  of  an  individual  union  could  also  be  an  influential  variable   in   terms  of  ballot   turnout,   for  example  with  more  general  unions   (such  as  Unite   and   the   GMB)   which   organise   across   a   number   of   different   industries,  organisations,   employers   and   occupational   groups,   less   likely   to   obtain   as   high   a  ballot   vote   as   those   unions   (such   as   the   First   Division   Association,   or   National  Association   of   Probation   Officers)   which   are  more   specifically   focused   on   a   single  occupation   or   profession   and/or   where   their   members   are   characterised   by   their  occupational  homogeneity  (Martin,  1968).  Nonetheless,  if  the  nature  of  the  union  in  these  terms  were  the  main  factor  it  would  not  easily  explain  why  the  National  Union  of   Teachers’   strike   ballot   turnouts   have   not   necessarily   been   much   higher   than  general   unions,   so   again   other   factors  would   need   to   be   taken   into   account   (Gall,  2011b).  Moreover,   there   is   some   evidence   that   the   RMT,   a   specialist   (rather   than  general)   ‘industrial’  union   that  organises  across   the   transport   sector  and  embraces  all-­‐grades   of   employees,   provides   a   clear   identity   and   relatively   high   degree   of  attachment  and  loyalty  by  members  to  the  union,  that  can  be  reflected  (at  least  on  the  railways)  in  creditable  levels  of  strike  ballot  participation  (Darlington,  2009a).        

• Nature  of  the  workforce  –  there  could  be  a  number  of  potential   influencing  factors  here.   First,   employment   concentration   might   be   important   –   with   a   greater  propensity  for  higher  levels  of  ballot  participation  where  the  union  is  based  on  large  concentrations   of   members   in   a   few   worksites.   This   could   be   because   members  more  readily  identify  issues  and  grievances  as  collective  and  thus  as  union  problems,  

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act   together   to  deal  with   issues  at  meetings  or   together   in   industrial   action,   know  their  workplace  union  reps,  and  give  support  to  each  other  in  their  unionism,  and  are  therefore  easier  for  unions  to  mobilise  in  relation  to  strike  ballots.  By  contrast,  with  the  trend  towards  a  more  fragmented  and  dispersed  workforce,  it  can  be  much  more  difficult  in  the  case  of  workers  who  are  physically  isolated  and  separated  from  each  other,   as   for   example,   in   local   and   national   government   and   civil   service  employment.  The  problem  in  these  contexts  is  that  the  support  and  strength  gained  by   working   alongside   others   is   diminished   (Fairbrother,   1984:   84),   and   it   might  create   a   situation   in   which   it   is   harder   to   engender   the   collectivism   that   is   an  essential   foundation   for   workplace   union   mobilisation.   This   is   all   the   more  accentuated   when   the   ballots   are   postal   ballots   delivered   to   individual   members’  home   addresses.   Likewise,   it   seems   possible   the   smaller   the   bargaining   unit   being  balloted  (for  example,  in  one  individual  bus  garage,  bakery  or  fire  station)  the  more  likely   the   participation   rate  will   be   higher   than   compared  with   a   larger   bargaining  unit,   such  as  a  national  ballot  across  many  different  workplaces   that  are  dispersed  geographically   (for   example,   civil   service   benefit   offices   across   the   country).   But  again,   such   factors   relevant   to   the  nature  of   the  workforce  cannot  be   the  only   (or  necessarily  main)  ones  explaining  levels  of  balloting  participation  and  their  variation  in  different  unions  and  ballots.    

• Management   structures   and   behaviour   –   the   degree   of  managerial   authority   over  workers   and   extent   of   support   offered   to   local   union   representation   and  organisation  (Fairbrother,  1984:  84-­‐5),  in  terms  of  provision  of  facilities  (such  as  time  off  work  for  reps,  office  space,  etc)  and  leeway  for  independent  initiative  for  unions  to   take   up   their   members’   grievances,   could   be   a   significant   factor.   Likewise   the  severity  and  nature  of   the  perceived  managerial  attack  on  workers’  conditions  and  union  organisation  -­‐   for  example,  with  widely  acknowledged  managerial  bullying  at  British   Airways   contributing   to   widespread   union   discontent   (Taylor   and   Moore,  2015)  –  can  also  be  important.  To  what  extent  is  management’s  behaviour  viewed  as  being   unduly   unreasonable,   imposed   without   adequate   consultation,   and/or   far-­‐reaching  in  its  consequences  for  conditions  of  employment?  Not  that  such  perceived  injustices   would   necessarily   determine   a   high   balloting   participation   rate,   but   it  seems  likely  to  be  a  potential  ingredient  in  the  mix.    

• Trade  union  leaders  -­‐  Often  the  popular  media  claim  that  it  is  militant  union  leaders  and   activists   who   are   responsible   for   calling   ballots   and   trying   to   stimulate   strike  action.   With   reference   to   the   Conservatives   new   balloting   thresholds,   Jonathan  Isaby,  of  the  Taxpayers’  Alliance  has  commented:   ‘This  would  be  a  reasonable  step  to   ensure   a   minority   of   militant   union   activists   cannot   cause   misery   for   millions’  (Daily   Express,   10   January   2015).   The   assumption   that   it   is   militant   union   leaders  ‘egging  on’  their  more  moderate  members  was  often  brought  into  play  with  the  late  RMT  general  secretary  Bob  Crow.  Yet  such  an  analysis,  of  course,  often  ignores  the  fact  that  union  ‘bosses’  are  elected  and  accountable  to  the  democratic  procedures  of  their   union,   and   that   it   might   be   the   national   executives   of   unions   (or   section  committees)   not   their   general   secretaries  who  have   the   sole   authority   to  organise  strike  ballots.  Nonetheless,   it   is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  role  of  subjective  agency  can  be   central   to   transforming   collective   grievances   into   collective   action.  As   Kelly  

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(1998)   has   shown,   dissatisfaction   must   be   perceived   as   an   injustice;   the   injustice  must  be  seen  as  a  collective   issue;   the  cause  of   the   injustice  must  be  attributed   to  the  employer;  workers  must  make  a  calculation  about  their  chances  of  success  with  any   proposed   industrial   action,   and   must   decide   that   the   benefits   outweigh   the  possible  costs;  and  workers  must  have  sufficient  organisation   to  make  the  action  a  reality.  In  all  these  processes  the  role  of  official  trade  union  leadership  can  be  crucial.  It  seems  unlikely  there  would  be  high  ballot  results  unless  there  was  a  high  level  of  interaction   between   national   union   leaders   and   workplace   reps/members,   with   a  propaganda   and   organisational   campaign   at   every   level   of   the   union,   including  leaflets,   text  messages,   Facebook  and  Twitter   communication,  meeting  and   rallies,  etc.   Certainly   the   enthusiasm   and   willingness   of   many   thousands   of   workers   to  respond  to  official  union  calls  for  strike  action  over  recent  years,  is  a  clear  illustration  of   this   process.   Conversely,   where   union   leaders   appear   only   half-­‐heartedly   to  encourage  strike  action,  reflecting  a  pessimistic  outlook  which  assumes  that  strikes  cannot   win   and   that   workers   are   not   prepared   to   fight   (as   when   officials   call   for  strikes  but   then   retreat  as   soon  as  minimal   concessions  are  made  despite   the   fact  they  may   have   pushed   forward   and  won  much  more)   can   also   have   a   potentially  influential  impact  on  the  level  of  participation  in  strike  ballots  (Darlington,  2014a).    

• Workplace   union   organisation   -­‐   the   nature   and   health   of   local   workplace   union  organisation  is  also  likely  to  be  an  important  factor  in  the  extent  to  which  members  vote  in  strike  ballots.  The  key  factor  here  is  whether  union  reps  exist  and  operate  in  each  workplace   (or  section/department),  able  to  carry  arguments  and  mobilise  the  membership   in   a   way   that   backs   up   national   union   campaigns.   Where   there   are  active   workplace   reps,   where   workplace   union   meetings   take   place   reasonably  regularly,   where   more   union   members   are   encouraged   to   attend   meetings,   and  where  there  is  workplace  union  activity  involving  the  members,  it  is  likely  there  are  greater   levels   of   strike   ballot   participation   than   in   workplaces   where   workplace  union  organisation   is  poorly  organised.   Indeed  as  Fosh  and  Cohen   (1990:  138-­‐141)  have   argued,   there   is   a   link   between   the   extent   to   which   there   is   a   highly  participative  style  of  workplace  union  leadership  that  encourages  local  reps  to  place  an  emphasis  on  consulting  and  reporting  back  to  their  members  and  including  them  in   local   decision   making   as   much   as   possible   on   the   one   hand,   and   members’  commitment  to  collectivism  and  their  participation  in  union  organisation  and  activity  on   the   other.   Likewise,   in   general   where   the   momentum   for   a   strike   ballot   is  generated   from  below,  with  demands  on  union  officials   to   support   calls   for   action  (notably   if   this   has   been  expressed   through   rank-­‐and-­‐file   networks   of  members   at  local  or  national  level)  then  the  strike  ballot  participation  rate  is  likely  to  be  higher.  Yet   the   severe   weakening   and   atrophy   of   workplace   union   organisation   today  compared  with  the  past,  with  the  ‘challenge  from  below’  currently  at  its  lowest  ebb  since   the   1930s,   has   meant   that   even   though   many   workplace   union   reps   have  undoubtedly   displayed   an   extraordinary   level   of   commitment   to   holding   together  workplace  union  organisation,  some  of   them  have  also,  as  a   result  of  often   feeling  beleaguered  and  defensive  in  relation  to  employers  and  governments,  become  fairly  cynical   towards   their  members,   reflected   in   an   unwillingness   to  make   attempts   to  mobilise   them   into   taking   action.   The   unwillingness   of  many   national   trade   union  leaders   to   encourage   militant   strike   resistance   to   the   neoliberal   offensive   over  

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recent  years  has   in   turn   fostered  a  dependence  on  these  officials,  as  workers  have  rarely  been  willing  to  act  independently.  The  continuing  low  level  of  struggle  (and  its  limited   and   often   short-­‐lived   nature)   has   not   recreated   the   forms   of   rank-­‐and-­‐file  organisation   (typical   of   the   1970s)   that   could   exert   pressure   on   the   official   union  apparatus  and/or  provide  an  alternative  leadership  in  the  fashion  that  existed  in  the  past.  Nonetheless,   the   centrality  of  workplace   reps’   organisation   to   the  process  of  collective   action   has   been   demonstrated   in   the  winning   of   strike   ballot   votes,   the  mobilisation   of   hundreds   of   thousands   on   TUC   and   anti-­‐austerity  marches,   and   in  providing  leadership  in  national/local  disputes  by  rail,  tube,  postal,  fire  brigade,  civil  service,  university,  and  local  government  workers,  amongst  others  (Darlington,  2010;  2014).      To   sum   up,   clearly   each   of   the   general   and   specific   explanatory   variables   outlined  

above   interact   and   have   to   be   seen   as   collectively   contributing   to   explain   the   level   of  turnouts   in   strike  ballots,  and   the  differences  between  different  ballot   results.  Of   course   it  could  be  argued  there  is  a  problem  with  simply  listing  a  range  of  influencing  factors  without  assigning   weights   or   priorities   either   to   the   different   factors   or   the   various   interactions  between   them.   Yet   the   lack   of   agreement   on   the   relative   importance   of   such   different  factors   indicates   the   difficulty   in   achieving   a   satisfactory   explanation,   given   that   each  union/ballot   has   a   distinct   make-­‐up/dynamic,   so   that   while   there   may   well   be   some  common   patterns   there   is   considerable   complexity   and   variation,   involved,   which  means  there  could  never  be  one  over-­‐arching  explanation.      Evidence  from  database    We   can   now   turn   our   attention   to   our   empirical   findings   on   strike   ballots.   In   order   to  examine   the   potential   effects   of   the   proposed   legislation,   we   have   attempted   to  retrospectively  apply   it   to  previously  held  ballots.  Clearly  unions  are   likely   to  change   their  behaviour  once  the   legislation   is   introduced,  so  this  approach  has  the  advantage  of  better  capturing  the  effects  of  the  legislation.  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  publicly  available  database  of  strike  ballots,  so  we  attempted  to  compile  our  own  data  from  a  variety  of  sources.  Alas,  obtaining  information  on  strike  ballots  is  extremely  difficult.  Unions  have  to  notify  members  of   the   results   of   industrial   action  ballots   and   some  of   these  enter   the  public   domain,   but  only  rarely  do  these  disclose  the  number  of  workers  balloted  and  while  unions  are  required  to  notify  employers  of   the  workers  who  are  being  balloted,  only  a   few  employers  put  this  information   in   the   public   domain,   largely   to   contest   the   result   on   the   basis   of   the   small  percentage  of  workers  or  members  balloted  who  supported  industrial  action.  

  Some   unions   forward   the   ballot   reports   of   the   Electoral   Reform   Services   (ERS)   to  members,  and  again  some  of  these  are  publically  available.  Unfortunately,  for  our  purposes,  the  ERS   reports   follow  a   standard   format  and  give  numbers  voting   for,  against,  and  spoilt  papers,  but  do  not  give   the  numbers  of  workers  who  were  balloted.  ERS  supplied  us  with  data  from  2002  to  2014,  but  this  data  aggregated  all  monthly  strike  ballots,  and  therefore  could  only  provide  the  sketchiest  overview  of  the  likely  effects  of  the  proposed  legislation.    While   it   is   clear   from   this   data   that   when   unions   call   a   strike   ballot   they   invariably   win  support   for   strike   action   with   a   large   majority,   the   monthly   average   turnout   rates   vary  

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dramatically  from  25  to  67  per  cent,  clearly  indicate  that  the  proposed  legislation  is  likely  to  cause  considerable  problems  for  some  unions.       Our  own  database  of  individual  industrial  action  ballots  (see  Tables  1  and  2  below)  is  compiled   from   several   sources,   and   includes   the   numbers   of   union   members   voting   for  industrial   action,   the  percentage   in   favour,   total  number  of   votes   cast,   turnout   rates,   and  the  percentage  of  the  total  membership  balloted  who  voted  in  favour.  The  last  two  figures  are   rounded   down   on   the   assumption   that   any   future   legislation   is   unlikely   to   allow  rounding  up.  We  have  only  included  ballots  that  voted  in  favour  of  industrial  action.  A  few  unions   responded   to   our   requests   for   information   and   our   database   is   to   some   extent  weighted  to  these  unions  and  the  years  they  covered  (some  unions  gave  extended  periods,  others  only  a   few  years),  with  some  supplying  more  comprehensive  data   than  others.  We  supplemented   this   information   from   individual   national/local   trade   union   officers,   union  websites  and  press  releases,  employers,  and  news  media  reports.  This  sometimes  resulted  in   incomplete   information   derived   from   several   sources,   but   an   entry   was   only   included  when   we   obtained   enough   information   to   enable   any   missing   data   to   be   calculated.  Rounding  errors  are  present   in  a  number  of  entries,  and  reliability  checks   impossible.  As  a  result   of   this   data   collection   exercise,   we   have   evidence   on   162   industrial   action   ballots  between  1997  and  2015  conducted  by  28  different  unions,  158  of  which  are  strike  ballots.  We  have  the  largest  number  of  entries  for  the  period  2008-­‐2015.      

Given  that  most  unions  do  not  routinely  maintain  a  database  of  strike  ballot  figures,  some  unions  were  unable   to  accede   to  our   research   request   to   compile  one  on   the  basis  that  it  was  time  consuming  and  they  did  not  have  the  staffing  resources.  However,  it  is  also  possible   that   some   unions   were   reluctant   anyway   to   reveal   full   details   of   their   ballot  participation   figures   for   fear   it   would   reflect   negatively   on   the   union.   It   therefore   seems  possible  that  our  data  may  underestimate  the  impact  of  the  proposed  legislation.      Table  1:  Unions  with  successful  industrial  action  data  (strike  and  ASOS)    

Union  No  of  ballots    Union  

No  of  ballots    Union  

No  of  ballots  

AHDS   1   GMB   2   Prospect   1  ATL   1   NAHT   1   RMT   31  ASLEF   2   NAPO   1   SCP   1  BFAWU   18   NASUWT   1   TSSA   2  CPS   1   Nisa   1   UCATT   1  Community   1   NUT   33   UCU   20  CWU   8   PCS   3   UCAC   1  EIS   1   PFA   1   UNISON   4  FDA   1   POA   1   UNITE   12  FBU   11                   Total   28   162  

               

                     

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           Table  2:  Successful  industrial  action  ballots  (strikes  and  ASOS)  by  year  

           Year  

No  of  ballots   Year  

No  of  ballots   Year  

No  of  ballots  

                       1997   1   2003   1   2009   10  1998   2   2004   2   2010   9  1999   1   2005   1   2011   40  2000   0   2006   2   2012   23  2001   1   2007   4   2013   16  2002   5   2008   8   2014   19  

                2015   17  

       Total   162  

 

 

The  effect  of  introducing  a  50  per  cent  turnout  threshold  

Our   database   confirms   that   unions   typically   obtain   high  majorities   in   favour   of   industrial  action  (see  Table  3  below).  For  example,  in  June  2015  both  ASLEF  and  the  Community  union  achieved  very  large  majorities  for  strike  action  (ASLEF’s  majority  was  97  per  cent  on  London  Underground   and   Community   achieved   88   per   cent   in   Tata   Steel).   The   FBU   firefighters’  national   ballot   of   15,700  members   in   2014  achieved  an  85  per   cent  majority   in   favour  of  strike  action.  

 

Table  3:    Majorities  in  favour  of  strike  action  

   Majority  in  favour   No  of  ballots      50-­‐59   14  60-­‐69   15  70-­‐79   44  80-­‐89   51  90-­‐100   34  Total   158    

  However,  although  unions  achieve  high  majorities  for  strike  action,  they  often  fail  to  secure  a  high  turnout  (see  Table  4).  In  calculating  the  effect  of  the  50  per  cent  requirement,  we  have  restricted  our  analysis  to  strike  ballots  only,  excluding  action  short  of  a  strike  data  (ASOS).  Turnout  figures  vary  widely  and  in  our  data  range  from  a  low  of  just  19  per  cent  to  several   ballots   that   recorded   a   turnout   of   87   per   cent.   Overall,   only   85   of   the   158   strike  

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ballots  reached  the  50  per  cent  target  (with  a  tendency  for  workplace  ballots,  area  ballots,  single   employer   ballots   and   workers   with   a   close   occupational   identity   to   obtain   higher  turnouts,  while   national   ballots   usually   obtained   lower   turnouts   –   this   is   explored   further  later  in  the  paper).    

  Some  major  national  strikes  would  have  been  deprived  of  legal  protection  under  the  proposed  legislation,  especially  those  relating  to  national  collective  bargaining  in  the  public  sector.  In  its  high  profile  dispute  over  pensions,  the  UCU  ballot  in  December  2014  of  38,900  members  employed  in  69  higher  education  institutions  achieved  a  78  per  cent  majority  for  strike  action  but  the  turnout  was  only  44  per  cent.  Most  of  the  large  public  sector  unions,  who  held  one-­‐day  strikes  in  June  and  November  2011,  would  not  pass  the  50  per  cent  rule.  The  PCS  obtained  a  61  per  cent  vote  in  favour  of  strike  action  but  on  a  turnout  of  only  32  per  cent;  the  National  Union  of  Teachers  (NUT)  obtained  a  92  per  cent  ballot  vote  in  favour  of  strike  action,  but  on  a  turnout  of  only  40  per  cent  of  state  school  members  and  27  per  cent   of   private   school   members;   and   the   Association   of   Teachers   and   Lecturers   (ATL)  obtained  an  83  per  cent  vote  in  favour  of  strike  action,  but  on  a  turnout  of  only  35  per  cent.  GMB's   ballot   of   local   government  workers   achieved   an   83   per   cent  majority   in   favour   of  strike   action,   but   on   a   turnout   of   only   33   per   cent.   Similarly,   Unite's   ballot   of   local  government  workers  achieved  a  77  per  cent  majority  for  strike  action  but  only  on  a  31  per  cent  turnout.      Table  4:  Turnout  in  strike  ballots  

   Percentage  turnout  

No  of  ballots  

   19-­‐29   19  30-­‐39   27  40-­‐49   27  50-­‐59   28  60-­‐69   22  70-­‐79   25  80-­‐89   10  Total   158    

  Not  only  did  many  union  ballots  not  achieve  the  50  per  cent  turnout  threshold,  but  also   the   number   of   workers   affected   in   such   ballots   was   completely   disproportionate   to  those  that  did  reach  such  a  target.  On  the  basis  of  the  158  strike  ballots  data  we  compiled,  444,000  workers  could  have  taken  strike  action  because  they  had  a  turnout  rate  of  over  50  per  cent,  but  3.3  million  workers  would  have  been  prevented  from  going  on  strike  because  they  achieved  less  than  50  per  cent  turnout.  Even  if  you  take  out  the  large-­‐scale  2011  public  sector   strikes,   it   still   means   880,000   workers   would,   under   the   proposed   legislation,   no  longer  be  able  to  go  on  strike.    

   

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The  effect  of  introducing  a  40  per  cent  ‘important  public  services’  threshold    The   Trade   Union   Bill   confirmed   four   previously   identified   so-­‐called   ‘important   public  services’   are   to  be  covered  by   the  40  per   cent  balloting   threshold.  These  are   fire   services  (firefighters   and   fire   control   staff),   health   services   (NHS   and   foundation   trust   staff),  education  services  (staff   involved  in  the  education  of  those  aged  between  5-­‐16  year-­‐olds),  and  transport  services  (bus,  railway,  London  Underground,  and  some  aviation  and  maritime  staff).  Other  essential  services,  such  as  water,  gas  and  electricity,  have  not  been   included.  However  the  Bill’s  provisions  extend  wider  than  earlier  proposals  by  adding  two  other  public  services,  namely  those  occupations  engaged  in  the  'decommissioning  of  nuclear  installations  and   the  management   of   radioactive  waste   and   spent   fuel'   and   those   engaged   in   'border  security'.   Moreover,   the   exact   coverage   of   the   ‘important   public   services’   that   might   be  covered  by   the  Act  has  yet  been  decided,  but  has  been  opened  up   to  public   consultation  until   September   and   will   ultimately   be   subject   to   Regulations   issued   by   the   Secretary   of  State   (DBIS,   2015b).   There   is   always   scope   to   extend   the   Regulations   to   deal   with   other  perceived  potential  or  actual  strike  threatened  occupations.       Within   the   Bill’s   six   specified   public   services   there   is   still   uncertainty   about  which  occupations/activities   will   be   covered   by   the   Act.   This   will   only   become   clear   when   the  regulations  are  published,  but  it  is  clear  that  'public'  will  not  mean  'publically  employed'  but  will   include   workers   who   work   for   private   sector   companies   contracted   to   work   in   the  delivery   of   public   services,   as  well   as   to   completely   privatised   industries   such   as   rail   and  other  transport  workers.  In  addition,  the  balloting  requirements  will  apply  not  only  to  those  who  ‘provide’,  but  also  those  who  do  work  that  is  ‘ancillary’  to  the  provision  of  ‘important  public   services’;   for   example   in   health   this  would   embrace  not   just  medical   staff   but   also  hospital  cleaners  or  technicians.  The  provision  of  'education  under  17'  could  pose  problems  for  some  further  education  colleges  and  sixth-­‐form  colleges  who  may  have  a  small  number  of   students   aged   16.   It   seems   inevitable   there   will   be   extensive   discussion   during   the  passage  of  the  Act  about  which  workers  and  sectors  should  precisely  be  included.         In  order   to  consider   the  potential  effect  of   the   legislation,  we  have  again  used  our  database  of  strike  ballots  (ignoring  ASOS  ballots).   In  the  absence  of  any  information  about  how  wide  or  narrow  the  legislation  will  be,  we  have  looked  at  all  strikes  that  occurred  within  the  six  sectors.  We  have  no  strikes  within  our  data  that  relate  to  the  nuclear  industry.  Ninety  strike   ballots   would   have   been   covered   had   this   legislation   been   in   place;   29   in   school  education,  44  in  Transport,  11  in  the  Fire  Service,  5  in  Health,  and  1  in  border  security.  Out  of  these  90  strike  ballots,  in  only  55  ballots  did  more  than  40  per  cent  of  the  electorate  vote  ‘yes’   (see  Table  5).  The  proposed   legislation  would  therefore  have  reduced  the  number  of  strikes   in   these   four   sectors   by   nearly   40   per   cent.  However,   it   is   interesting   to   note   the  differential  impact  by  sector.  

 

 

 

 

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Table  5:  Yes  as  a  percentage  of  eligible  voters  in  ‘important  public  services’  

   Percentage  of  voters   No  of  ballots        11-­‐19   3  20-­‐29   15  30-­‐39   17  40-­‐49   20  50-­‐59   17  60-­‐69   11  70-­‐79   5  80-­‐89   2  total   90      Fire  Service      The  proposed  legislation  would  have  had  no  effect  on  the  Fire  Service  because  all  11  strike  ballots  cleared  the  40  per  cent  threshold  with  an  average  of  54  per  cent  of  balloted  workers  supporting  strike  action.  However,  the  9  regional  strikes  were  supported  by  56  per  cent  of  those  eligible  to  vote,  compared  with  43  per  cent  for  the  two  national  strikes.    For  example,  in  2011,  90  per  cent  of  London  fire  fighters  voted  in  favour  of  strike  action  on  a  54  per  cent  turnout  with  48  per  cent  of  those  eligible  to  vote  supporting  strike  action.  

 Health      The  picture   is   completely  different   in  Health  where  only  2  of   the  5  national   strikes  would  have  cleared  the  40  per  cent  threshold.  Of  those  that  failed  to  meet  the  40  per  cent,  only  20  per   cent   of   eligible   voters   supported   the   action.   It   is   the   small   specialist   unions   that  achieved  the  highest  turnout  and  high  support  for  strike  action.  For  example,   in  2011,  the  Chartered  Society  of  Physiotherapy  (CSP)  achieved  an  86  per  cent  ‘yes’  vote  on  a  66  per  cent  turnout.   Similarly   the   Society   of   Chiropodists   and   Podiatrists   (SCP),   and   Prospect,   also  overwhelmingly   voted   to   join   a   public   sector   strike  with  majorities/turnouts   of   85/52  per  cent  and  75/52  per  cent  respectively.        Education      The  picture  in  education  is  more  nuanced  and  provides  a  clear  indication  of  the  likely  effect  of  the  legislation.  In  education,  only  19  of  the  29  strike  ballots  would  have  been  able  to  go  ahead,  but  disaggregating  the  ballots  reveals  an  interesting  picture.  Every  ballot  conducted  in  an  individual  school  would  have  passed  the  40  per  cent  threshold,  with  an  average  of  59  per   cent   of   those   eligible   to   vote   supporting   strike   action,   whereas   only   27   per   cent   of  eligible  voters  supported  industrial  action  in  national  strike  ballots.  Only  two  national  strikes  cleared  the  40  per  cent  threshold  and  neither  of  these  were  the  main  teaching  unions  -­‐  the  

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small  EIS  (Scottish  teachers)  produced  an  82  per  cent  majority  for  strike  action  on  a  54  per  cent  turnout  with  44  per  cent  of  those  eligible  to  vote  supporting  strike  action  in  2011.      

 Transport    In   transport,  only  23  of   the  44  strikes  cleared   the  40  per  cent   threshold,   so   the  proposed  legislation  would  have  prevented  half  of   transport   strikes.  However,  again   the  breakdown  reveals   an   interesting   pattern.   The   long   running   dispute   involving   BA   cabin   crew   in  Unite  easily  cleared  the  40  per  cent  hurdle  with  an  average  of  60  per  cent  supporting  the  strike  action.   Similarly,   a   Unite   ballot   on   the  Manchester  Metro   easily   cleared   the   40   per   cent  hurdle   with   55   per   cent   of   eligible   voters   supporting   strike   action.   However   not   all   local  ballots   achieve   high   turnouts;   in   2015   a   Unite   ballot   of   Greater   London   bus   workers  (averaged  across  the  18  companies  involved)  produced  a  majority  ‘yes’  vote  of  some  85  per  cent,  but  on  the  basis  of  figures  well  below  both  proposed  balloting  thresholds.      

The  RMT  is  an  interesting  case.  Over  the  last  13  years  the  RMT’s  ‘brand  image’  has  essentially  been  that  of  a  striking  union  (Connolly  and  Darlington,  2012;  Darlington,  2014b),  conducting   well   over   250   strike   ballots   across   the   national   railway   network   and   London  Underground.   Per   thousand  members,   the   RMT   has   probably   organised  more   ballots   for  industrial   action   and   then   taken  more   strike   action   than   any   other   union   in   Britain   over  recent   years.   In   the   process,   almost   every   single   one   of   the   union’s   ballots   on   the  Underground   and   the   railways   has   returned   overwhelming  majorities   in   favour   of   action,  with  a  mean  of  79  per   cent  based  on  our  database.  Our  data   suggests   that   the  proposed  legislation  would  have  little  effect  on  RMT’s  strike  ballots  in  the  railway  sector  -­‐  with  12  of  the   14   ballots   clearing   the   40   per   cent   hurdle   easily,   with   an   average   of   49   per   cent   of  eligible  members   supporting   strike   action,   and   with   one   of   the   two   which   failed   coming  close  with  38  per  cent.  However  the  proposed  legislation  could  have  much  greater  effect  on  London  Underground,  where  in  spite  of  majorities  in  favour  of  strike  action  ranging  from  58  to  92  per  cent,  only  one  of  the  16  strikes  clearing  the  40  per  cent  threshold  (but  would  not  have  been  able  to  have  gone  ahead  because  it  failed  the  50  per  cent  test).6  Two  strikes  were  close  with  38  and  39  per  cent,  but  the  others  fell  well  short  with  an  average  of  31  per  cent  of  eligible  members  supporting  the  strike  action.    

 Border  Security    We  have  only  one  strike  ballot  that  could  be  regarded  as  border  security,  the  PCS  ballot  by  border  agency  and  passport  guards  in  June  2012,  which  would  have  been  prevented  by  the  new  legislation  because  just  11  per  cent  of  those  eligible  to  vote  supported  the  action.    The  case  for  a  separate  important  public  services  threshold      

Finally  we   can   consider  how  much  effect   the  40  per   cent   important  public   services  threshold  would  have  over  and  above  the  50  per  cent  overall  participation  rate?  The  short  answer,  on  the  basis  of  the  database  we  have  compiled,  is  not  very  much.  While  the  50  per  cent   threshold   would   dramatically   reduce   the   number   of   legally   protected   strikes,   the  

                                                                                                                         6  It  should  be  noted  the  database  does  not  include  the  July  2015  RMT  strike  ballot  on  London  Underground.  

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introduction  of   an  additional   threshold   for   the   important  public   services  would  have   very  little  further  effect.    It  would  have  no  effect  at  all  in  the  Fire  Service,  Health  and  Education.  Its  only  effect  would  be   in  Transport  where   it  would  have  prevented   just   three  of   the  20  strikes  which  could  have  gone  ahead  because  they  cleared  the  50  per  cent  threshold  -­‐  one  strike   in   London  Underground,   one   strike   of   railway   signal   staff,   and  one   at  Network  Rail  (albeit  the  Network  Rail  ballot  was  subject  to  a  legal  challenge  anyway  and  would  not  have  prevented   the  RMT  strike  which  was  called  at   the  same  time).  Of   these   three  strikes   that  would  have  been  potentially  prevented  by  the  introduction  of  a  40  per  cent  threshold,  two  achieved  38  per  cent.  Based  on  our  database,   it  appears  there  would  be  no  case  need  for  the  introduction  of  an  additional  ‘important  public  services’  balloting  threshold.    The  role  of  'no'  and  'non-­‐voters'    It  is  clear  that  the  legislation  is  likely  to  have  a  major  effect  in  reducing  many  unions’  ability  to   take   strike  action,  especially  national  or   large   strikes,  however   its  elevation  of   'no'  and  'non-­‐voters'  is  controversial.    Despite  the  fact  that  formal  voting  figures  in  strike  ballots  (as  well   as   in  union  elections)7  have  often  been   relatively   low,   this  has  not  meant   that  union  members  who   have   voted   ‘no’   or   did   not   participate   have   not   been  willing   to   take   strike  action  when  a  ballot  vote  has  produced  a  majority   in  favour  and  action  has  been  called  by  their  union.  On  the  contrary  the  custom  and  practice  in  the  UK  is  that  many  ‘no’  voters  and  most  of  the  non-­‐voters  have  often  tended  to  join  their  striking  colleagues.  For  example,  the  PCS,  RMT  and  NUT  have  often  been  able  to  mobilise  a  considerably   larger  constituency  of  their  members  than  merely  those  who  voted.   Indeed,   it  could  be  argued  the  real  test  of  a  strike  ballot  is  not  merely  how  many  people  vote  for  strike  action,  but  how  many  ‘vote  with  their  feet’  on  the  strike  day  itself.  Many  non-­‐voting  union  members,  no  doubt  out  of  respect  for   both   the   union   generally   as   well   as   the   majority   ballot   mandate   specifically,   have  participated   in   strike  action,   and   in   some  cases  actively   joined  demonstrations  and  picket  lines.   Thus   a   turnout   threshold  does  not  necessarily   test   the   level   of   support   for   a   strike.  However,   the   proposed   legislation   contains   complex   provisions   to   make   picketing   more  difficult.    

Moreover,   it   is   often   the   case,   particularly   with   large-­‐scale   strikes,   that   many  hundreds  or  thousands  of  non-­‐members  will  join  an  appropriate  union  in  order  to  be  able  to  strike.   In  other  words,   the   ‘political  punch  of  action  will  be  greater   than   the  ballot   results  alone  indicate’  (Gall,  2011a).  For  example,  in  the  run  up  to  the  2011  one-­‐day  public  sector  strike  over  pensions,  Unison  experienced  a  surge  of  new  members  across  the  country  as  a  

                                                                                                                         7   It  should  be  noted  that  such  relatively   low  trade  union  participation  rates  are  reflected  more  broadly  than  merely   within   strike   ballot   votes.   For   example,   within   PCS,   2014   National   Executive   Committee   elections  produced   a   turnout   of   just   8   per   cent,   with   no   less   than   92   per   cent   of   the   union’s  members   declining   to  exercise  their  vote.  Within  the  Home  Office  group  of  PCS  members,   the  position  was  hardly  much  better:   in  elections  for  the  Group  Executive  Committee  the  turnout  was  only  a  marginally  better  11.8  per  cent.  The  2014  RMT  general  secretary  election,  carried  out  in  the  wake  of  Bob  Crow’s  death,  and  with  a  strong  field  of  three  ‘hard  left’  candidates  and  the  acting  general  secretary,  produced  only  a  marginally  better  turnout  of  24.1  per  cent.  Likewise  within  the  NUT,  elections  for  the  senior  and  junior  vice  president  positions  in  2013  resulted  in  a  turnout  of  only  10.2  per  cent.  Within  Unison,  2013  elections  for  the  retention  of  a  political  fund  resulted  in  an  86.9  per  cent  majority  vote  in  favour  but  on  a  turnout  of  only  10.2  per  cent.    

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direct   result  of   the  dispute,  with  an  unprecedented   level  of   recruitment  activity  at  branch  and  workplace  level.  (Kimber,  2012:  22).  

 

Three  enabling  features  of  participation  

Having  considered  some  of  the  broad  figures  for  strike  ballot  participation  rates  drawn  from  our  database,  we  can  now  turn  attention  to  highlighting  some  of  the  contributory  factors  to  positive  voting  outcomes.  Three  enabling  features  can  be  identified.    

First,  there  is  a  clear  overall  tendency  for  workplace,  area  or  single  employer  ballots  to  obtain  ‘higher’  turnouts  and  national  ballots  to  obtain  ‘lower’  turnouts.  The   local  versus  national  difference  can  be  explored  in  the  case  of  a  number  of  unions:  

 • PCS:   While   its   strike   ballot   of   border   agency   and   passport   guards   in   2012   only  

achieved   a   20   per   cent   turnout,   its   ballot   of   staff   at   the   National   Gallery   in   2015  achieved  a  60  per  cent  turnout.      

• BFAWU:   13   out   of   17   ballots   cleared   the   50   per   cent   threshold.   All   were   single  employer  ballots,  often  at  a  single  workplace.    

• FBU:   In   its  area  ballots   the  average  turnout  was  over  75  per  cent,  whereas   its   two  national   ballots   achieved   60   and   48   per   cent.   The   latter   was   the   only   ballot   that  achieved  less  than  50  per  cent.    

• NUT:  The  average  turnout  for  its  national  ballots  was  under  31  per  cent  and  not  one  ballot   came   close   to   clearing   the   50   per   cent   threshold.   By   contrast   in   its   single  employer  ballots   it  achieved  an  average  of  over  64  per  cent  turnout,  with  only  one  ballot  falling  below  50  per  cent  (with  48  per  cent).  

 • UCU:  In  its  national  strike  ballots  it  achieved  an  average  of  32  per  cent  turnout  over  

11  ballots.  Even  its  2014  pensions  ballot  it  only  achieved  44  per  cent.  Not  one  strike  ballot   came   near   to   clearing   the   50   per   cent   threshold.   By   contrast   its   ballots   of  Further   Education   colleges   achieved  an   average   turnout  of   62  per   cent  with   every  ballot  clearing  the  50  per  cent  threshold.  Of  the  two  ballots  at  individual  universities  not  one  came  close  to  clearing  the  50  per  cent  with  37  and  42  per  cent.    

• UNITE:  In  the  long  running  dispute  involving  British  Airways  cabin  crew  the  turnout  averaged  77  per  cent  over  five  different  ballots,  and  the  union’s  ballot  of  Manchester  Metro  workers   also   achieved   a   75   per   cent   turnout.   By   contrast   its   ballot   of   local  government  and  health  workers  in  2011  only  achieved  a  31  per  cent  turnout.    

• RMT:   Only   one   ballot   on   London   Underground   cleared   the   proposed   50   per   cent  hurdle.  Yet  in  its  ballot  of  individual  railway  companies  it  achieved  an  average  of  66  per   cent   turnout  over  13   strikes.   In   its  only  national   railway   strike  ballot   (Network  Rail)  in  2015  it  achieved  a  turnout  of  59  per  cent.  In  only  two  of  its  railway  strikes  did  

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it  achieve  less  than  50  per  cent  turnout  and  then  it  came  close  at  47  per  cent  and  49  per  cent.    

 So  ballots  involving  single  workplaces  appear  more  likely  to  achieve  the  50  per  cent  

turnout  threshold.  The  database  evidence  confirms  the  picture  that  was  previously  recorded  in  Undy  et  al’s  (1996:  247)  study,  which  found  that  turnout  in  small  bargaining  units  (50  or  fewer  members)  recorded  very  high  turnouts,  averaging  over  75  per  cent,  whereas  if  there  were   1,000   or   more   members   in   the   ballot,   then   turn-­‐out   dropped   to   44   per   cent   on  average.  Nonetheless,  large  turnouts  did  not  correlate  with  the  rejection  of  industrial  action;  in  fact,  between  1987  and  1993  90  per  cent  of  those  balloted  voted  consistently  in  support  of   union   recommendation   for   some   form   of   industrial   action.   Likewise   our   own   data  suggests   large   turnouts   show   no   less   a   propensity   to   produce  majority   support   for   strike  action,  despite  their  differential  figures  for  participation.    

 Secondly,  unions  with  members  who  have  close  occupational   identities  also  appear  

often  to  be  able  to  generate  relatively  higher  strike  ballot  votes  than  more  general  unions.  Certainty,  it  is  noticeable  that  the  unions  who  obtained  some  of  the  largest  ballot  turnouts  for  the  30  November  2011  one-­‐day  public  sector  strike  were  specialist  unions  with  a  distinct  occupational   status,   such   as   Chartered   Society   of   Physiotherapists   and   Society   of  Chiropodists   and   Podiatrists.   Every   one   of   the   11   Fire   Brigades   Union   ballots   recorded  ‘above   threshold’   figures,   no   doubt   reflecting   the   close   social   interactive   nature   of   the  firefighters’   job,   as   well   as   their   collectivist   trade   union   forms   of   organisation   at  station/watch  level  (Darlington,  1998:  62-­‐63).  Likewise,  as  we  have  seen,  turnouts  by  cabin  crew  at  British  Airways  were   relatively  very  high.  Despite   the   fact   that   the  workforce  was  dispersed   into   small   groups   and   geographically   located   literally   across   the   world,   their  concentrated   ‘home’   base   at   Heathrow   and   Gatwick   airports,   deep   wells   of   informal  collectivism   springing   from  a  distinctive   labour  process  which   generated   social   bonds   and  work   solidarities,   and   role   of   BASSA   (section   of   Unite)   in   shaping   representational  effectiveness   and  providing   an   ideological   framework   through  which  BA’s   action   could  be  understood,  transcended  geographical  dispersion  and  gave  structure  and  meaning  to  cabin  crews’  collectivism  (Taylor  and  Moore,  2015).  

 However,  as  Hyman  (1975:  75)  has  suggested,  while  occupational  homogeneity  can  

be   a   positive   it  would   be   rash   to   conclude   it   automatically   acts   to   encourage   democratic  tendencies;  likewise  it  would  be  mistaken  to  assume  a  heterogeneous  membership  creates  irresoluble   tendencies   towards   sectionalism   and   fragmentation.   In   this   respect,   the   2015  RMT  ballot  result  in  Network  Rail  demonstrated  that  even  a  relatively  fragmented  workforce  (spread  across  numerous  different  work  sites  (involving  track  and  maintenance,  station  and  signal  workers)   can  still  produce  a   relatively  high   (59  per  cent   turnout  and  48  per  cent  of  those  eligible  to  vote),  particularly  in  a  context  where  the  decentralisation  of  bargaining  has  led  to  different  company  councils  and  union  reps  organisation  to  match.    

Thirdly,  there  is  some  evidence  the  role  of  union  leadership  (specifically  the  influence  of   left-­‐wing   leadership)  can  also  be  a  positive  enabling  factor.  Darlington’s  studies   (2009a;  2009b;   2012;   2014b)   have   shown   that   in   the   case   of   the   RMT   it   has   been   of   central  importance  that  most  of  the  union’s  national  and  regional  officers,  and  a  significant  number  of  local  reps  and  activists  have  held  fairly  explicit  left-­‐wing  values,  ideology,  motivation  and  

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commitment,  and  have  exercised  considerable   industrial  and  political   influence   in   shaping  the  union’s  antagonism  towards  the  employers  and  government  and  its  persistent  stress  on  the  virtues  of  militant  resistance,  collectivism  and  solidarity.    

 In  the  process,  this  network  of  assertive  and  combative  RMT  officials  and  lay  activists  

have  played  a  crucial  role   in  advocating  and  winning  support  for  the  mobilisation  of  union  members   in   strike   action   against   employers.   They   have   engaged   in   ‘collective   action  framing’  (Snow  et  al,  1986)  and  ‘repertoires  of  contention’  (McAdam  et  al,  2001)  by  deciding  what  issues  and  initiatives  to  take  up  and  pitting  them  in  antagonism  to  management  via  a  variety   of   propaganda   and   agitation   communication   channels   (such   as   section/mass  meetings   and   regular   company/grade/union   branch   newsletters,   leaflets,   emails   and   text  messages)   so   as   to   ‘mobilise  bias’   (Batstone  et   al,   1978)  by   articulating  workers’   sense  of  injustice   and   targeting   it   at   employers   and   the   government,   and   advocating   the   need   for  strike  action  as  an  effective  means  of  collective  redress.  Such  a  strike  mobilisation  approach  and   the   left-­‐wing   politically-­‐informed   objectives   that   has   crystallised   membership   anti-­‐government   sentiments   has   in   turn   helped   to   shape   membership   attachment   and  participation.   It   appears   to  provide   some   credence   to   the  notion  of   ‘political   congruence’  (Upchurch   et   al,   2012),   a   convergence   of   shared   political   frames   of   reference,   collective  identity,  expectations  and  intended  outcomes  between  left-­‐wing  union  leaders,  activists  and  a  critical  mass  of  members,  who  have  been  able  to  work  together  to  a  sufficient  degree  that  it  has  acted  to  subdue  the  inherent  bureaucratic  cleavages  between  paid  full-­‐time  officials  and  activists/members  that  in  other  unions  have  tended  to  be  much  more  pronounced.    

 Darlington’s   studies   also   provide   evidence   of   a   direct   relationship   between   union  

militancy,  effectiveness   in   ‘delivering’  collective  bargaining  gains,  membership  growth  and  the   development   of   relatively   vibrant   forms   of   union   organisation   and   representation.  Likewise   Carbo   et   al   (2015)   have   suggested   there   is   a   ‘virtuous   cycle’   between   union  strategies  of  democracy  and  militancy,  both  complementing  and  stimulating  one  another  to  achieve  union  revitalisation.  A  belief  that  a  movement  can  be  successful   is  a  critical   factor  driving  involvement  in  that  movement,  and  successes  of  militant  action  can  encourage  the  perception  of  potential  future  success,  thus  driving  involvement  (p.  16).  In  other  words,  on  the  one  hand,  militant  action  focused  on  members’  interests  and  driven  by  the  membership  is  not  only   likely  to  prove  successful   in   improving  the  lives  of  members,  but  also  in  driving  membership  views  of  instrumentality,  and  increased  membership  satisfaction,  while  on  the  other   hand,   the   activism  and  participation   that   is   needed   for   these   types   of   tactics   to   be  powerful   and   successful   can   only   exist   in   a   democratic   union   (member-­‐driven   decision  making)   where   members   have   a   say   in   the   battles   they   wage   (p.   23),   and   hence   the  importance  of  participative  union  leadership,  with  support  for  members’  direct  participation  and   freedom   to   voice   opinions   (p.   43).  Moody   (2007:   178)   has   also   suggested  workplace  union   democracy   is   not   just   about   structures   and   processes,   it   is   about   ‘developing,   a  culture   of   activism,   involvement,   transparency   in   union   governance,   and   openness   in  debate’.   In   this   respect,   workplace   union   organisation   that   is   directly   responsible   to  members  in  the  workplace  is  vitally  important.  

 However,   whilst   RMT   case   study   evidence   points   to   the   important   dynamic  

interaction   between   leaders   and   members   in   the   process   of   strike   mobilisation,   such   a  development  has  clearly  not  necessarily,   in   itself,  always  been  sufficient,   to  overcome  the  

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barriers  preventing  the  union  from  achieving  the  strike  ballot  turnout  thresholds  contained  within  the  Conservative’s  proposals  on  the  London  Underground,  albeit   it  has  had  a  much  more   positive   response   on   the   railway   network.   Similarly,   with   reference   to   the   UCU’s  ballots   at   Salford   and   Dundee   Universities   in   2014   and   2015   at   which   both   50   per   cent  turnout  and  40  per  cent  eligibility  thresholds  were  not  achieved,  left-­‐wing  workplace  union  leadership  by  no  means  guarantees  a  positive  outcome.  Notwithstanding  such  exceptions,  the   pattern   in   a   number   of   instances   does   seem   to   suggest   linkages   between   union  democracy,   left-­‐wing   leadership  and  collective  mobilisation,  and   strike  ballot  participation  rates.  

    In  this  respect,   it   is  noticeable  that,  apart   from  its  strong  occupational   identity  and  solidarity  union   loyalty,  the  coordinated  campaign  over  pensions  by   left-­‐wing  national  and  local  union   representatives  within   the  FBU  has  also  played  a   crucial   role   in  explaining   the  relatively   high   majority   votes   in   favour   of   strike   action   and   on   high   turnouts.   Likewise  important   contributory   factors   to   producing   an   89   per   cent   majority   on   a   71   per   cent  turnout,   representing   64   per   cent   of   those   eligible   to   vote,   in   the   UCU’s   2014   Lambeth  College   ballot,  was   the   presence   of   a   number   of   left-­‐wing   political   activists   and   the  well-­‐organised   campaigning   stance   by   the   local   union   leadership,   buttressed   by   widespread  external   support   generated   from   UCU   branches   and   other   trade   unionists   elsewhere.   In  PCS’s  2015  National  Gallery  strike  ballot,  in  which  some  94  per  cent  of  PCS  members  voted  in  favour  of  strike  action  on  a  61  per  cent  turnout  and  57  per  cent  of  those  eligible  to  vote,  the  politically-­‐influenced   local  union  branch   leadership  and  broader  support   from  national  PCS  officials  were  also  influencing  factors.  

 Union  responses  

How   have   the   British   labour   movement’s   leaders   responded   to   the   Conservative  government’s  Trade  Union  Bill  that  threatens,  along  with  the  legislation’\s  other  restrictive  measures,   to   undermine   effective   trade   union   organisation,   collective   bargaining   and   the  right  to  strike?  Significantly  all  the  Labour  Party’s  leadership  contenders  have  indicated  they  are  opposed   to   the  Bill,  notwithstanding   inevitable  accusations  of  being   ‘too  close’   to   the  trade   unions   and   encouraging   strike   action   that   negatively   impacts   on   the   economy   and  society.  

Not  surprisingly  the  TUC  general  council  and  other  individual  union  leaders  have  also  unanimously  opposed  the  measures.  Len  McCluskey  of  Unite,  one  of  the  UK’s  biggest  unions  with  nearly  1.5  million  members,  has  even  gone  so  far  as  to  suggest  the  unions  might  defy  the  new  laws  and  risk  imprisonment  (Guardian,  19  March  2015).  

People   have   intrinsic   rights   but   sometimes   these   are   violated   even   by   democratically   elected  legislatures  –  the  right  of  working  people  to  combine,  to  organise,  is  one  of  those  rights.  So  if  partisan  legislation   is   driven   through   parliament,   designed   to   push   the   legitimate   democratic  work   of   trade  unions  outside  of  the  law,  then  we  in  Unite  will  not  go  gently  into  the  night.  We  will  rage  against  the  dying  of  the  light.      A  union’s  job  is  to  fight  for  working  people’s  rights.  If  in  the  year  we  mark  the  anniversary  of  Magna  Carta,  the  government  wants  to  challenge  fundamental  rights  of  the  citizen,  then  I  believe  they  will  be  facing  not  just  the  trade  union  movement,  but  a  huge  section  of  our  civil  society  too.    

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When   the   law   is   misguided,   when   it   oppresses   the   people   and   removes   their   freedoms,   can   we  respect  it?  I  am  not  really  posing  the  question.  I’m  giving  you  the  answer.  It  ain’t  going  to  happen.    Unite’s  recent  rules  revision  conference  agreed  to  remove  a  clause  from  its  rule  book  

stipulating  protests   can  only   take  place   ‘so   far  as  may  be   lawful’,   thereby  opening  up   the  possibility   of   allowing   its   members   to   hold   illegal   industrial   action.   While   McCluskey  emphasised  that  the  rule  change  did  not  commit  the  union  to  defy  the  law  in  a  ‘reckless  or  impulsive’  way  and  promised  he  would  not  allow  that  to  happen,  he  also  stated:  ‘We  must  also  guard  against  simply  being  turned  into  an  advisory  agency.  What  would  be  the  point  of  that?  Unite  is  a  fighting  union’  (The  Times,  13  July  2015).  Meanwhile  Dave  Prentis  of  Unison  has  also  threatened  to  break  the  law  by  holding  illegal  strikes  to  fight  against  job  losses  and  pay   restrictions,   suggesting   ‘nothing   is   ruled  out’   in   the   long   conflict   against   a   ‘vindictive’  and   ‘hostile’   government   which   could   produce   the   kind   of   confrontation   between   the  government  and  the  unions  not  since  the  1980s  (Independent,  15  June  2015).    

It   remains   to   be   seen   whether   such   militant   rhetoric   by   trade   union   leaders   is  matched  by  action  in  practice.  While  they  will  campaign  vigorously  against  the  introduction  of   the   proposed   new   law,   they   will   also   be   confronted   with   the   dilemma   that   such   a  campaign  may  well  be  doomed   to  defeat  given   the  Conservatives’  majority   in  parliament.  From  the  stalling  of  the  public  sector  pensions  battle  after  the  mass  one-­‐day  demonstrative  strike  of  2.6  million  public  sector  workers  in  November  2011,  and  then  again  after  the  one-­‐day   strike   by   1.4   million   over   public   sector   pay   in   July   2014,   as   well   as   in   many   other  disputes,  some  have  argued  that  trade  union  officials  have  often  squandered  the  potential  to   encourage   action   that   could   effectively   resist   employers’   and   government   attacks   and  help  to  rebuild  the  strength  of  the  unions  in  the  process  (Kimber,  2012;  Darlington,  2014a;  Joyce,  2015).  Nonetheless   the   resilience  of  membership  bitterness   towards   the  burden  of  austerity   has   continually   created   pressures   for   the   unions   to   act,   such   that   when   official  action  is  called,  the  response  has  often  been  very  strong,  demonstrating  further  potential  in  the  future.  The  TUC’s  support  for  a  national  demonstration  outside  the  Conservative  Party  conference  on  4  October,  as  well  as  protests  against  the  passage  of  the  government’s  Trade  Union  Bill  through  parliament,  is  likely  to  reflect  the  mounting  level  of  opposition.  

 Yet  in  a  context  in  which  strike  action  which  lacks  the  support  of  a  legal  ballot  would  

leave  the  unions  exposed  to  injunctions,  claims  for  damages,  and  even  action  for  contempt  of  court,  it  seems  unlikely  that  union  leaders  will  defy  the  law,  rather  than  ‘bend  the  knee’,  unless  they  are  subject  to  enormous  pressure  from  their  members  from  below.  More  likely  is   that   unions   will   become  more   consciously   strategic,   by   only   balloting   those   groups   of  workers  who  they  can  be  confident  would  attain  a  50  per  cent  participation  threshold  and  40   per   cent   majority   threshold;   this   might   mean   identifying   particularly   strategic   groups  within  a  national  bargaining  unit  whose  action  could  then  be  supported  financially  by  other  sections.  Paradoxically,   if  unions  can  attain   the  new   thresholds,   it  may  make   it  harder   for  employers  to  defeat  strikes,  with  union  members  identifying  more  strongly  with  the  cause  and,   with   union   officials   being   less   willing   to   call   strikes   off   because   their   negotiating  position   is   stronger;   and   the   proposed   legislation   could   make   the   price   of   an   eventual  settlement  higher  (Emmott,  2015).    

Depending  on  if,  and  how,  the  Bill   is  amended  as   it  passes  through  parliament,  the  unions  may  have   some   leeway   to  mount   a   legal   challenge   to   the  new   restrictions   on   the  

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right   to   strike   based   on   the   Human   Rights   Act   unless   it   is   repealed   (manifesto  commitment).  The  government  could  be  forced  to   justify  whether  the  balloting  thresholds  are   a   proportionate   restriction,   and   also   justify   the   thresholds   in   the   context   of   a   postal  voting   system   that   appears   disproportionately   expensive   and   designed   to   produce   a   low  turnout  (Ewing  and  Hendy,  2015).  

 If  unions  find  their  ability  to  mount  strike  action  is  curtailed,  one  likely  prospect  is  an  

increased   tactical   reliance   by   unions   on   so-­‐called   ‘leverage   campaigns’   and   ‘citizen  bargaining’  –  whereby  unions  (like  Unite  in  the  Ineos  oil  refinery  dispute  at  Grangemouth  in  2014)  use  demonstrations,  protests,  boycotts,  and  social  media  campaigns  to  open  up  new  lines   of   attack   on   the   employers   and   its   senior   management,   with   the   aim   of   getting  shareholders,  customers,  suppliers  and  local  communities  to  put  pressure  on  the  employers  to   back   union   demands.   In   America   community   campaigns   have   been   used   to   help   win  improvements   in   pay   and   conditions   in   different   industries,   forcing   companies   such   as  Walmart  and  MacDonald’s  to  offer  pay  increases  after  customer  and  public  protests  outside  stores.   Likewise,   in   the   UK   staff   at   the   Ritzy   cinema   in   Brixton,   south   London,   fought   off  redundancies  and  won  the  living  wage  in  2014  after  the  threat  of  a  boycott  by  cinemagoers.  As  Frances  O’Grady  has  remarked:  ‘Imagine  if  we  could  scale  that  up  to  cinema  workers  in  the   whole   industry.   Imagine   if   we   could   win   systematic   broad   support   from   families,  communities  and  the  public.  Collective  bargaining  almost  becomes  “citizen  bargaining”  with  the  employer,  to  win  fair  treatment  for  workers’  (Observer,  14  June  2015).  In  the  face  of  the  tightening  of  the  rules  on  industrial  action,  such  campaigns  (which  operate  outside  the  law  on   industrial  action  ballots),  are   likely   to  become  even  more  a   ‘weapon  of  choice’   for   the  unions   (Pinsent   Masons,   2015),   albeit   their   limitations   compared   to   the   alternative  mechanisms   of   collective   bargaining   and   the   threat/use   of   strike   action   within   the  workplace  is  also  likely  to  be  stark.    

 Meanwhile,  it  is  possible  that,  against  the  backcloth  of  a  new  wave  of  deep  spending  

cuts   affecting   jobs   and  working   conditions,   combined  with   the   continued   imposition   of   a  public  sector  pay  cap,  some  groups  of  workers  coming  into  collision  with  the  legal  liabilities  of   organising   strike   ballots   will   take   unofficial   and   ‘wildcat[‘   strike   action,   thereby  undermining   the   legislation.   As   the   Financial   Times   has   commented:   ‘The   government  should  be  wary  of  making  it  so  hard  to  call  an  official  strike  that  employees  feel  justified  in  taking   unofficial   action’,   notwithstanding   the   potentially   severe   legal   penalties   against  unions   which   do   not   repudiate   unofficial   action   and   against   individuals   taking   unofficial  action.   In   other   words,   far   from   ‘improving’   industrial   relations   as   the   government   have  claimed,   the   proposals  might   create   a  more   bitter   and   destabilising   state   of   affairs,   with  unofficial  strike  action  likely  to  be  more  problematic  for  employers,  as  well  as  trade  union  leaders,  to  resolve.    

 

 

 

 

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References  

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Connolly,   H.   and   R.   Darlington   (2012)   ‘Radical   Political   Unionism   in   France   and   Britain:   A  Comparative  Study  of  SUD-­‐Rail  and   the  RMT’,  European   Journal  of   Industrial  Relations,  18  (3),  pp.  235-­‐250.      Crossman,   A.   (2014)   ‘Cameron’s   New   Strike   Laws   Are   More   Radical   Than   Margaret  Thatcher’s’,   The   Conversation,   21   July:   available:   http://theconversation.com/camerons-­‐new-­‐strike-­‐laws-­‐are-­‐more-­‐radical-­‐than-­‐margaret-­‐thatchers-­‐29457    Dalcassion   (2011)   ‘Unions   Must   Fight   for   the   Right   to   Strike’:  http://www.workersliberty.org/story/2011/05/10/unions-­‐must-­‐fight-­‐right-­‐strike      Darlington,  R.  (1994)  The  Dynamics  of  Workplace  Unionism,  London:  Mansell.    ______.   (1998)   ‘Workplace   Union   Resilience   in   the   Merseyside   Fire   Brigade’,   Industrial  Relations  Journal,  vol.  29,  no.  1,  pp.  58-­‐73.  

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