trade agreements, exchange rate disagreements
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Trade Agreements, Exchange Rate Disagreements. Eduardo Fernandez-Arias Ugo Panizza Ernesto Stein Inter-American Development Bank. Motivation. We study problems that arise when countries with trade agreements have exchange rate disagreements - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Trade Agreements, Exchange Rate Disagreements
Eduardo Fernandez-Arias
Ugo Panizza
Ernesto Stein
Inter-American Development Bank
Motivation
• We study problems that arise when countries with trade agreements have exchange rate disagreements
• Exchange rate disagreements: large swings in bilateral real exchange rates or, more generally, divergent exchange rate policies.
• We identify four types of problems– Increased protectionism / scaling back of trade agreement
– Effects on trade flows
– Relocation of investments
– Exchange rate crises
Motivation• Europe• Following 1992 ERM crisis we saw:
– Relocation of FDI from France to the UK (l’affaire Hoover)
– Reduction of exports to depreciating countries
– Strong tension between France and Italy and the UK
– Strong pressure on the French franc
Trade between France and Italy
18000
20000
22000
24000
26000
28000
30000
32000
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Exports from Italy to France
Exports from France to Italy
Motivation
• Mercosur• Following 1999 Real devaluation we saw:
– protectionist pressures, protectionist measures in Argentina
– reduction of exports to Brazil (some difficult to relocate elsewhere)
– relocation of firms to Brazil
– eventually contributed (among other factors) to end of convertibility
– Uruguay hit by double whammy
– talks of negotiating FTA with US outside of Mercosur
Trade between Brazil and Uruguay
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Exports from Brazil to Uruguay
Exports from Uruguay to Brazil
Two reasons to worry about signing RIA without considering exchange rate divergence
• Protectionist backlash and unraveling of RIA
• Joining a RIA would increase vulnerability to exchange rate misalignments
Exchange rate misalignments within regional integration agreements may be threat to RIAs
• McKinnon (1973) on necessity of coordinating policy
There is less need for independent monetary policies within the bloc and strong case to be made for imposing the uniform discipline that a common currency system would provide. Independent national policies are neither necessary nor desirable if exchange rate changes can upset carefully negotiated tariff, tax, and pricing policies.
R. I. McKinnon (1973)
Exchange rate misalignments within regional integration agreements may be threat to RIAs
• McKinnon (1973) on necessity of coordinating policy
• Eichengreen (1993) on European Union:
If national industries under pressure from removal of barriers to intra-European trade find their competitive position eroded further by a sudden exchange rate appreciation, resistance to the implementation of the Single European Act would intensify. The SEA might be repudiated. In this sense, and this sense alone, monetary unification is a logical economic corollary of factor- and product-market integration
Eichengreen (1993)
…but are these considerations important for all RIAs?
• The EU is a full blown single market with no restrictions of factor flows, no subsidies for domestic industries, no national preferences for public procurements
• Therefore, the impact of currency swings on firms’ profitability is larger than in less complete RIA
• .. and the larger the lobbying for protection and subsidies
…yes, but
• Emerging markets may have problems accessing capital markets and
• XR swings are not similar
Multilateral RER (Month before episode = 100)
80
85
90
95
100
105
t-12t-11t-10t-9 t-8 t-7 t-6 t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1t+2t+3t+4t+5t+6t+7t+8t+9t+10t+11t+12
France Uruguay Argentina
…yes, but:
• Emerging markets may have problems accessing capital markets and
• Currency swings are not similar
• EU has more power to enforce rules
• So more potential for protectionism in emerging markets
Two reasons to worry about signing RIA without considering exchange rate divergence
• Protectionist backlash and unraveling of RIA
• Joining a RIA would increase vulnerability to exchange rate misalignments
Overall (multilateral) exchange rate overvaluation causes
• Less exports
• Less FDI inflows
• More currency crises
Are effects more severe if the source of overvaluation is the RIA bloc?
We conjecture that:
• Overvaluation effects on exports are more severe when source of overvaluation is RIA bloc
• Overvaluation effects on FDI are more severe when source of overvaluation is RIA bloc
• Overvaluation effects on currency crises are more severe when source of overvaluation is RIA bloc
How do we test these conjectures?
TOTAL EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT =
REGIONAL MIS + NON-REGIONAL MIS
computed for 37 countries in 6 RIAs: EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, Andean Community, CACM, ASEAN, between 1989 and 2000
Conjecture 1: Misalignment effect on
exports more severe within RIAs • In particular, when external barriers are high, RIAs may allow
countries to export to their regional partners goods in which they are not competitive
• We call these goods “regional goods”
• Example: exports of autos from Argentina to Brazil
• If demand from partner falls, difficult to redirect regional goods to other markets
• Trade with other (non-RIA) partners should involve less “regional goods”, thus should be easier to redirect.
• We need to look at effects of overvaluation on total exports, not bilateral exports.
Effect of misalignment on total exports• We start from the following specification:
ln(EXPi,t) = + RERi,t + ln (Yi,t) + ai + tt + ui,t
• We decompose the misalignment into a regional and a non-regional component:
RERi,t wi R_RERi,t + (1- wi ) NR_RERi,t
• We define
REGi,t = wi R_RERi,t ; NOREGi,t = (1-wi) NR_RERi,t
• Finally, we estimate
ln(EXPi,t) = + REGi,t + REGi,tln (Yi,t) + ai + tt + ui,t
Multilateral exchange rate overvaluationreduces total exports...
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
All Countries
% (
EX
P)
Total Misalignment (10 percentage points)
…but more so if it comes from RIAs...
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
All Countries
% (
EX
P)
Total Misalignment (10 pp)Regional Misalignment (10 pp)Non Regional Misalignment (10 pp)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
All Countries
% E
XP
High Protection Regional MisalignmentLow Protection Regional Misalignment
Non Regional Misalignment
…offering high protection
All All Developing Developed AllLog(GDP) 0.433 0.433 0.23 0.42 0.429
(6.89)*** (6.85)*** (1.93)* (7.30)*** (6.81)***0.613
(3.09)***1.449 2.649 0.602
(2.19)** (2.31)** (1.20)0.347 -0.115 -0.304 0.321(1.35) (0.30) (0.86) (1.25)
2.9(2.93)***
0.572(0.72)
Observations 394 394 208 185 394R-squared 0.79 0.8 0.79 0.91 0.8
(a)-(b) 1.102 2.764 0.906[0.09]* [0.02]** [0.09]*
(c)-(d) 2.328[0.025]**
(c)-(b) 2.579[0.009]***
(d)-(b) 0.251[0.39]
Total Misalignment
(d) Low x Non Reg Mis
Tests on difference between coefficients
(a) Reg. Mis.
(b) Non Reg. Mis.
(c) High x Reg Mis
Table 1: Exports and Real Exchange Rate Misalignments
Conjecture 2: Real exchange rate effects on
FDI larger within RIAs • RIAs can create a space of intense competition for the
location of FDI.
• With economies of scale, elimination of trade barriers within RIAs induce firms to serve extended market from single location.
• Better market integration makes FDI more “footloose”.
• Thus, we expect relative FDI between RIA members to be more sensitive to exchange rate changes which affect relative costs.
Effect of real exchange rates on FDI
• We use the following specification:
ln(FDIi,t /FDIj,t) = + ln(Yi,t /Yj,t) + (OPENi,t - OPENj,t) +
(NOFTAi,t)(RERij,t) + (FTAi,t)
(RERij,t) + uij + ij,t
Impact of bilateral XR on FDI location larger between countries with RIA
0
2
4
6
810
12
14
16
18
20
All Countries South-South North-South North-North
% F
DI r
ati
o
Same RIA Not Same RIA
All S-S N-S N-N1.5169 1.1501 1.7225 2.0372
(16.386)*** (5.843)*** (13.513)*** (10.031)***0.001 -0.0127 0.0036 0.0143(1.01) (6.829)*** (2.650)*** (6.488)***
1.2991 0.7891 0.7142 1.8943(5.973)*** (2.604)*** (0.64) (5.234)***
0.119 0.097 0.304 0.4806(1.17) (0.55) (2.097)** (1.23)
Observations 6120 1654 3139 1327Number of pairs 630 171 323 136R-squared 0.094 0.096 0.127 0.107
(a)-(b) 1.18 0.69 0.41 1.41[0.000]*** [0.010]*** [0.355] [0.000]***
Tests on difference between coefficients
Relative GDP
Relative Openness
(a) FTA x RER
(b) NOFTA x RER
Table 2: FDI and RER
Conjecture 3: Misalignment effect on crises more severe within RIAs
• Misalignments within RIAs generate larger effects on the balance of payments both via trade and FDI.
• Thus, it can generate more pressure on the currency
• Especially when credit is not available to cope with stress
• Definition of crisis: monthly multilateral real depreciation of at least 5% (or 10%)
• We use the following specification:
EPi,t = + REGi,t + NOREGi,t + Xi,t + ij,t
Multilateral exchange rate overvaluation increases the risk of currency risk...
0
0.51.01.5
2.0 2.5
3.0
3.5 4.0 4.5
A crisis is a real depreciation greater than 5%
Mar
gin
al E
ffec
t o
f 10
% o
verv
alu
atio
n
Multilateral Misalignment (10 percentage points)
…but more so if it comes from within a RIA
0 0.5
1.01.5
2.0 2.5
3.0 3.5
4.0 4.5
A crisis is a real depreciation greater than 5%
Mar
gin
al E
ffec
t o
f 10
% o
verv
alu
atio
n
Multilateral Misalignment
Regional Misalignment
Non-Regional Misalignment
Table 3: Real Misalignments and Currency Crisis. Probit Estimates (marginal effects reported)
-0.2288(8.180)***
-0.4046(4.183)***-0.1652
(4.285)***
-0.0194 -0.0188 -0.0035(3.040)*** (2.977)*** (0.868)
0.0157 0.0166 0.0147-1.486 -1.563 -1.814
Observations 3848 3848 3848Rsquared 0.1368 0.137 0.158
(b) - (c) -0.24 -0.28
[0.046]** [0.005]***
Tests on difference between coefficients
5% 5% 10%(a) Multilateral Misalignment
(b) Regional Misalignment
(c) Non-Regional Misalignment
(f) Access to foreign credit
(g) Government Change
-0.3388(3.800)***-0.0598
(2.298)**
Exchange rate consistency is key for sustainable trade agreements:
• Unilateral policies (partner selection, XR regime, regional good policy)
• Policy coordination (macro coordination, currency union, RIA flexibility)
• Supporting international financial architecture (IMF monitoring/conditionality, regional Fund)
Trade Agreements, Exchange Rate Disagreements
Eduardo Fernandez-Arias
Ugo Panizza
Ernesto Stein
Inter-American Development Bank