Lebanon 2008 - 2009

The National Human

Development Report

toward a citizen’s state

toward a citizen's state

report summary

Lebanon National Human Development Report

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTSAND STUDY TEAMS

This project is the result of a collaborative effort between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) andthe Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) which composed the steering committee for the report andsupported the NHDR project team that directed the project. In addition, an advisory board that brought togetherpublic intellectuals, policy makers and academics from the public and private sector was established to guide thisvery complex process. We extend our deepest gratitude to them all for their cooperation, input and effort duringthis process.

Toward a Citizen's State is the outcome of three years of an elaborate participatory process that included multipleroundtables, focus groups, and brainstorming sessions with over 150 academics, experts and policy makers indifferent fields as well as a wide range of citizens. To all those who participated in these discussions, debates andespecially focus groups we would like to extend our sincerest thanks and appreciation for their contributionstoward making this project a success. We hope that our collective effort will indeed bear fruit.

The final version of this report is the intellectual product of four core authors who utilized the project outline, thework of participating authors that included background papers commissioned for this report, discussions fromfocus group meetings, the written inputs of discussants, the debates that took place during the workshops androundtables and their own knowledge. They were assisted in this process by the NHDR team. Our deepest thanksto those individuals for their considerable intellectual efforts. Without you this report would not have been possible.

To assess the status of human development and create a comprehensive statistical compendium on its variousaspects; political, social, economic, cultural, demographic etc., the project carried out considerable research andanalysis of existing and new data. The statistical compendium that resulted would not have been possible withoutthe technical advice and cooperation of a large number of individuals who gave of their time and knowledgegenerously. To all we extend our thanks.

The process of producing the NHDR also generated two other parallel projects that focused on specific aspectsof citizenship and also resulted in two independent publications; Education and Citizenship: Concepts, Attitudes,Skills and Action among ninth grade students in Lebanon and A Hundred and One Stories to Tell: Civic Initiativesin Public Life. While the first sought to assess concepts, attitudes and knowledge among ninth grade studentsacross the country on issues of citizenship and democracy, the latter collected, rewrote and publicized a hundredand one initiatives undertaken by individuals and organizations to make a difference in some aspect of public lifein Lebanon. We are grateful to the individuals and organizations that participated in the production of each of thesepublications and to all those who shared their stories with us.

Our sincere appreciation also goes to the advertising agencies, graphic designers and various media outlets thatwe partnered with as part of an extensive outreach component to generate debates on the rights and responsibil-ities of state and citizens. In particular our thanks go to Saatchi and Saatchi, especially Elie Khoury and to RanaYahya of Just Imagine who sponsored the visual communication components of this project and its multiplereports. Saatchi supported the audiovisual production of TVCs for One Hundred and One Stories to Tell and Towarda Citizen’s State as well as the launch event of this report, while Rana Yahya produced all three book covers andrelated brochures and posters. We would also like to thank our civil society partners who joined forces with us inorganizing diverse activities including workshops and roundtable discussions. Our gratitude also goes to the dif-ferent media outlets for producing documentaries, writing stories and lending us their platforms especially for ourOne Hundred and One Stories to Tell media campaign to highlight citizen initiatives in public life. Your enthusiasmand belief in the project’s message insured successful outreach and wide ranging discussions on the role of citi-zens in making a difference in their own environments.

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National Human Development Report

Steering CommitteeMarta Ruedas, Nabil el Jisr, Jihane Haidar, Hassan Krayem

Advisory BoardZiad Abdel Samad, Ahmad Beydoun, Randa Anton, Jihad Azour, Adnan el Amine, Raghid el Solh, Nabil Fahd,Youssef Fawaz, Bashshar Haydar, Khaled Kabbani, Mona Khalaf, Clovis Maksoud, Tarek Mitri, Nada Mughaizel,Salim Nasr, Armand Phares, Makram Sader, Nawaf Salam, Paul Salem, Riad Tabbara, Ghassan Tuéni

Project DirectorMaha Yahya

Project TeamDima Kharbotli, Pauline Farah

Core AuthorsAhmad Beydoun (Chapter 3: Political Citizenship), Kamal Hamdan and CRI (Chapter 4:Socio-EconomicCitizenship), Abbas Beydoun (Chapter 5: Cultural Citizenship), Maha Yahya (Chapter 1: Nation, State andCitizenship; Chapter 2: The status of Human Development; Chapter 6: Toward a New Civic Contract, and substan-tive input into the rest of the report).

UNDP TeamSeifeldin Abbaro, Amal Deek, Nour Dia, Guilnard el Asmar, Mona el Yassir, Michella Haddad, Nick Rene Hartmann,Hassan Krayem, Ghada Naifeh, Marta Ruedas, Mirna Sabbagh, Elite Shehadeh

Authors of Background PapersAbbas Beydoun, Kamal Abou Chedid, Jad Chaaban, Melhem Chaoul, Adnan el Amine, Samer Frangiye, KamalHamdan, Karam Karam, Ziad Majed, Makram Oueiss, Wissam Saade, Nisrine Salti, Marie Rose Zalzal

Participating AuthorsSamir Abdel Malak, Kamal Abou Chedid, Lara Batlouni, Kawthar Dara, Chafiq el Masri, Antoine el Nashif, Raghidel Solh, Fares el Zein, Mona Fayad, Toufic Gaspard, Antoine Haddad, Bashshar Haydar, Hussam Itani, Ilham-KallabBisat, John Kazzi, Elias Khoury, Sawsan Masri, Mohamed Matar, Antoine Messara, Jean Mourad, Mounir Rached,Ramzi Salame, Ilina Srour, Issam Suleiman, Suleiman Taqeidine, Ibrahim Tarabulsi, Maissa Youssef

Cover DesignRana Yahya, JustImagine

PhotographsMaha Yahya

Layout Nadine Mobayed with the support from Pauline Farah

Editorial and Translation TeamArabic Version: Initial translation and editing: Mohamed Chouman

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSAND STUDY TEAMS

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Final review and editing: Said el Azem

English Version: Initial translation and editing: Marlin DickFinal editing: Humphrey Davies

Arabic Summary: Translation and editing: Iman Chamas

InternsZeinab Rahal, Nabil Khawaja, Sarah Zini, Reve Aoun

Statistical Compendium on Human Development in Lebanon

Core TeamPauline Farah, Dima Kharbotli, Mayssa Nahlawi, Maha Yahya (Lead)

Technical Advice and CollaborationMohamed Bakir, Chadi Bou Habib, Jad Chaaban, Kawthar Dara, Heba el Laithy, Ghassan Hemade, Sawsan Masri,Mirvat Merhi, Nada Mneimneh, Manal Musallam, Najla Nakhle, Order of Physician, Lebanon, Order of Physician,North, Nisreen Salti, Jihan Saoud, Rita Rahbani, Riad Tabbara, Najwa Yacoub

InternsAmin Qalawoun, Ghassan Abdel Kader

One Hundred and One Stories to Tell

Core TeamSheeraz Moujally, Rola Harb, Rena Temsah, Soraya Dali-Balta, Bayan Itani, Pauline Farah, Dima Kharbotli, MahaYahya (Lead)

Contributing AuthorsBilal Abboud, Nada Abdel Razzak, Philipe Abi Zeid, Christy Abou Farah, Rawia Aboul Hosn, Maya Ammar,Mohammad Antar, Huweida El Khoumassi, Nayla El Masri, Mahmood Fakih, Lamees Farhat, Hanan Haidar,Mohammad Jarady, Fatima Kassem, Zainab Mohsen, Nisreen Nasser, Amany Salloum, Nazih Sanjekdar, DenizeYammine, Anna Younes

Editorial and TranslationIman ChamasProof reading: Asad Charara

Design of Cover, Posters and BrochuresRana Yahya, JustImagine

TV and Radio CommercialsSaatchi and Saatchi

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Education and Citizenship

Steering CommitteeAhmed Beydoun, Adnan el Amine, Leila Maliha Fayyad, Nada Mneimneh, Nada Mughaizel, Khaled Kabbani, FadiaKiwan, Fadi Yarak, Maha Yahya (Project Director)

Survey Implementation and Unifying Data FilesCenter for Educational Research and Development (CERD)

Statistical SampleMarwan Houri

Analysis of Survey Results and Production of ReportAdnan el Amine, Kamal Abou Chedid, Maha Yahya

Statistical Programming and Data ValidationCosette Moaiki

Assessment of QuestionnaireLoubna Hassoun, Hussein Abbas, Mona Soaibi, Feda Malak, Jamal Arafat, Vicky Salame

Civic Education StudyMakram Oueiss

Editorial and TranslationArabic: Iman ChamasEnglish: Maha Yahya

Cover DesignRana Yahya, JustImagine

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ABBREVIATIONS ANDACRONYMSCDP Community Development ProjectCDR Council for Development ReconstructionCEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against WomenCERD Center for Educational Research and DevelopmentCivED Civic EducationCIESIN Center for International Earth Science Information NetworkEdL Electricité du LibanEPI Environmental Performance IndexESFD Economic and Social Fund for DevelopmentFHH Female-Headed HouseholdsFPL Food Poverty LineGDP Gross Domestic ProductGDI Gender Development IndexGEM Gender Empowerment IndexGFCF Gross Fixed Capital FormationGoL Government of LebanonHBS Household Budget SurveyHCE Household Consumption ExpenditureHDI Human Development IndexHE Household ExpenditureHHD HouseholdHLCS Households Living Conditions SurveyHPI Human Poverty IndexHRC Higher Relief CommissionIDP Internally displaced personsIEA International Association for the Evaluation of Educational AchievementIFC International Finance CooperationIMF International Monetary FundILO International Labour OrganizationIMF International Monetary FundIRFED Institut de Formation en Vue du DéveloppementKILM Key Indicators of the Labor MarketLCD Least Cost DietLDC Least Developed Country LED Local Economic DevelopmentMDG Millennium Development GoalMENA Middle East and North AfricaMHH Male-Headed HouseholdsMoEHE Ministry of Education and Higher EducationMoE Ministry of EnvironmentMoF Ministry of FinanceMoH Ministry of HealthMoL Ministry of LaborMoIM Ministry of Interior and Municipalities MoSA Ministry of Social AffairsMPHS Multi Purpose Household SurveyNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationNHDR National Human Development Report

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NSSF National Social Security FundODA Official Development AssistanceOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentPHC Primary Health CarePG Poverty GapPPP Purchasing Power Parity UBN Unsatisfied Basic Needs UNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNFPA United Nations Population FundUNICEF United Nations Children's FundUSJ Université Saint JosephUXO Unexploded OrdinancesWDR World Development ReportWHO World Health OrganizationWSSD World Summit for Social DevelopmentYCELP Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy

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PREFACE

Toward a Citizen's State is the fourth National Human Development Report (NHDR) for Lebanon. The first of thethree was published in 1997 on “A Profile of Sustainable Human Development”, the second in 1999 on “Youth andDevelopment” and the third in 2002 on “Globalization: Toward a Lebanese Agenda”. Work commenced on this currentreport at the end of 2005 in partnership with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). The themewas first chosen, the general framework for the development of key concepts outlined, a work plan was drawn upthat included a list of background papers and brainstorming workshops and discussion groups were organized.This took place under guidance of a steering committee that included the different concerned parties. Of coursethe project team faced a series of challenges connected to the political and military insecurity that Lebanonwitnessed during 2005-2008. Despite these exceedingly difficult circumstances, work continued diligently todevelop and produce the report, and gather the necessary statistical data and indicators needed to measurehuman development, human poverty and gender empowerment in Lebanon.

In parallel to working on this report, two other important and complementary reports were produced on citizenshipin Lebanon. The first was on Education and Citizenship that was published in partnership with the Ministry ofEducation and Higher Education. This report analyzes the results of a survey on ninth grade students and examinestheir knowledge of and attitudes toward concepts of citizenship and participation in Lebanon. It is also part of aninternational survey that follows a unified methodology and allows a comparison between Lebanon's results andtwenty eight other countries. The second book was launched in February 2009 under the title of One Hundred and OneStories to tell. It documents civic initiatives undertaken by individuals and civil society organizations in support ofcivic values and participation. It embodies the vibrant and diversified civil society that Lebanon is known for.

The launch of Toward a Citizen's State is particularly timely, since Lebanon is still searching for the appropriateformula for national reconciliation and has been living through continuous dialogue sessions in search of agree-ments that would reinforce partnership, participation, co-existence and political stability. This report has con-tributed to a certain extent, through the multiple and different roundtable discussions and focus group meetingsthat brought together policy makers, intellectuals, activists, academics and representatives from the differentgroups. We hope that through the discussions that will continue after the launch of this report, we are able tocontribute to a general reform agenda that would reinforce citizenship in Lebanon and enhance the role of the stateand of civil society.

Citizenship in Lebanon was addressed in this report from three principle perspectives. The first addresses citizenshipand the sectarian state. It explores the relationship of the state, its institutions, its constitution and its laws, includingpersonal status laws to citizens. This exploration also engages with Lebanon's system of consociational democraticgovernance in its different manifestations and therefore addresses the relationship of the state to the individualcommunities and their representatives and the impact this has on the relationship of citizens to their state. Thesecond perspective focuses on socio-economic citizenship rights and considers social policies from the view-points of citizenship rights and comprehensive social development at one and the same time. As such, it examinesthe relationship of state to citizens and focuses on the rights to education, health and employment, and addressesthe problems of poverty and social exclusion. The third perspective looks into citizenship, culture and educationand explores shared common cultural values as well as cultural differences that could have a negative impact onnational identity in relation to communal identities as sub-national modes of identification.

This report also explores the different roles of the state, civil society, and the private sector and presents specificrecommendations on the issues raised. These are presented in the last chapter of the report. The United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP), in partnership with CDR, hopes to engage with the executive and legislativebranches of government on the one hand and civil society organizations as well as academics, experts, the mediaand Lebanese citizens in general on the other hand, to support the general reform process and strengthen citizen-ship in Lebanon. Empowering citizens leads to a reinforcement of democracy, good governance, the rule of law

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and justice reform, as well as social equity toward a sustainable human development in Lebanon.

In addition to all this, this report also presents new statistical information that complement existing surveys thathave been conducted until 2004, the most important of which are the Mapping of Living Conditions (1998),Changes in the Map of Living Conditions between 1995-2004 (1997) and the Map of Poverty and Living ConditionsSurvey in Lebanon, 2004 that were produced in 2008 by UNDP in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairsand the Central Administration of Statistics.

United Nations organizations will also work to support Lebanon's governmental institutions to implement thenational statistical master plan in the coming few years so as to make available credible statistical information inall fields, economic, social and others.

UNDP also looks forward to a continued partnership with CDR for the production of the following National HumanDevelopment reports in Lebanon that would complement and support this current report and its efforts to becomea thematic studies series, and a general statistical reference for sustainable human development in Lebanon.

March, 2009

Marta RuedasResident Representative

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PREAMBLE

Lebanon today presents a paradox. On the one hand, it boasts a vibrant multicultural society, an active privatesector, and a liberal and democratic political system. On the other, in the last three decades, it has been plaguedwith civil wars, external wars, military occupations and acute political uncertainty. More recently, its citizens havecome together to achieve dramatic and relatively peaceful political change. Yet the country has also seen a rise insectarian divisions and animosity which have manifested themselves in periodic street clashes in Beirut andaround the country. These have brought Lebanon to the verge of renewed sectarian strife.

These seemingly contradictory elements cannot be explained away as symptoms of external interference ordeficiencies in the civic values of citizens. Rather, they are the result of complex and intersecting political, social,and economic factors that are directly related to the status of Lebanon's democratic institutions and system. Theyare also deeply rooted in the ways in which Lebanese citizens define themselves as Lebanese and the vision theyhave of their nation and state in a regional and global context. Toward a Citizen's State, the fourth National HumanDevelopment Report for Lebanon since 1996, tries to analyze some of these issues from three different perspec-tives -political, social, and cultural.

Written over the past three years and in the midst of ongoing political and military turbulence, this report tries tounpack the main elements of dissent and consent regarding what makes this country work. It represents a firstattempt to explore the questions of citizenship and identity- making as they relate to larger governance and poli-cymaking processes. It also opens up a political, social, and economic dialogue grounded in questions of justiceand equity and explores the impact of the latter on development in the country. The idea is to put forward strategiesfor reform, based on sound analysis and divorced from political grandstanding. The hope is to reinvigorate politicalengagement and debates over identity and visions for the country and set forth an agenda toward sustainablegrowth and peace based on values of justice and equity.

The basic premise of this report is that citizenship is the foundation of democracy, that democratic practices can-not be limited to the procedural dimension, despite its importance, and that effective citizenship concerns not onlyvoting without coercion, but also the formation of relations between citizens and the state and among citizensthemselves. The development of such relationships is an ongoing process and is closely connected to variousaspects of societal formations. As such, this report considers citizenship from a twin perspective-first, as a legalframework that regulates the interaction between citizens and the state and among citizens themselves, and sec-ond, as a lived experience or practice. While the former is regulated by the state, the latter is impacted by social,cultural, and, in Lebanon, religious norms.

In this regard Toward a Citizen's State seeks to unpack the different mechanisms that define citizenship anddemocratic practices in Lebanon and to propose an agenda for moving toward a citizen's state. As the HumanDevelopment Report 2002 argues, democracy is not only valuable in its own right but is also tied to human devel-opment. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, establishes a broad concept ofcitizenship, encompassing political, civil, and social rights. For UNDP, democratic governance is a key conditionfor human development, since it is through politics, and not just economics, that it is possible to create moreequitable conditions and to expand people's options. Here, political rights are intricately connected to democracy,social rights to human development, and civil rights to human rights, while all of these facilitate and promote theexercise of citizenship.

From this perspective, this report is a call to Lebanon's decision and policy makers, public intellectuals and tomembers of civil society to recognize that citizenship is an essential weapon not only in the struggle against socialand economic inequity but also in the attempt to widen the conception of politics itself. Here, it is important topoint out that politics is not only about what politicians do but the choices that citizens make when they decide toget involved in public affairs. In this sense Toward a Citizen's State attempts to go beyond a rights-based approachto citizenship to emphasize the importance of social practices that can generate or underpin such rights. In so

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doing, the report will explore each of the three different dimensions of citizenship-the political, the social, and thecultural-in an integrated manner.

Furthermore, irrespective of the differences between major philosophical perspectives on citizenship,1 they allshare a common interest in the rights and obligations of citizenship. Citizenship here is not a universal value freenotion, but rather carries within it the agenda of active participation (far beyond electoral seasons). Responsiblecitizenship is connected to civic values such as democracy, equity, human rights, tolerance and social responsi-bility, solidarity and justice. These values are also directly linked to the view of civil society as a form of associa-tional life that includes all networks, such as NGOs, political parties, social or economic associations, syndicatesor labor unions, etc that individuals participate in voluntarily. The idea is that such forms of active citizenship orconstructive participation in public life are what make for a productive social capital and economically competitivesociety. It is also the arena where politics are made through rational dissent, debate and non-violent conflict.2

On the methodological front, recognizing the difficulties of addressing the dilemmas of citizenship in a multi-ethnicand multi-religious context like Lebanon that is also witnessing political and military turbulence necessitated a flexiblemechanism that could adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and would allow the innovative integration of citizenconcerns and actions, beyond the norms of academic analysis, opinion polls and surveys. Taking cue from Bourdieu,it required an approach that would allow us to highlight contradictions without necessarily resolving them.3 In otherwords, it demanded a construct that was both top down and bottom up simultaneously.

In this spirit, we launched two separate projects that would shed light on different aspects of citizenship. Given thesignificance of education to the process of cultivating well informed citizens, the first project, Education andCitizenship, was undertaken with the aim of identifying where the youth of Lebanon are today with respect tonotions fundamental to democracy, citizenship and social solidarity and compare them to those of twenty eightother countries. The second, A Hundred and One Stories to Tell project sought to document civic initiatives in publiclife. These were complemented by a comprehensive Statistical Compendium that mapped out the status of humandevelopment in Lebanon in a wide variety of arenas; social, economic, political and cultural at national and gover-norate levels where possible.

Education and Citizenship considers that essential education comprises of the knowledge, concepts and compe-tencies that every citizen needs to earn to be an active citizen. As such it sought to gauge the extent to whichyoung people in Lebanon were equipped and ready to exercise the rights and obligations of citizenship and thedegree to which they were prepared to become active citizens. Covering over 3,000 ninth grade students, in publicand private schools in Lebanon, the project focused on what young people (14 year old) should know about a numberof topics related to democratic institutions, including elections, individual rights, national identity, political partici-pation, and respect for ethnic and political diversity. These concepts were deemed to be vital for democraticregimes such as the one in Lebanon. It also explored key factors in their educational setting that impact their civicattitudes and how they compare to their peers in different countries.

These questions are particularly relevant to a project whose primary theme is citizenship. The centrality of educationfor the promotion of democratic practices and the cultivation of civic identities is widely accepted. As muchresearch from around the world indicates, educational methodologies and practices in schools have a tremendousimpact on the values of students, their knowledge and sense of civic responsibilities. This surge of interest acrossthe globe in civic education has been ongoing for almost two decades; partly a result of globalization and partly aresult of the increased democratization in various countries. However, one of the most profound changes that isreorienting citizenship education, is the recognition that it is valuable for children as children. In other words,citizenship education is no longer considered solely as a content area designed to prepare young people for their

1 In political philosophy literature three major traditions can be identified: liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism.2 The two main schools of thought on civil society and associational life are represented by Robert Putnam and Jurgen Habermas. Thelatter in particular has come under extensive criticism for the exclusions that his theory of the politics and the public sphere embodies.3 Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, 1992, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Polity Press, London.

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adult roles in society, but, rather, as a tool that will help them improve and understand their lives and interactionsin society.4 What was evident from the study on Lebanon is that rather then prepare students in this manner,schools had to a large extent been transformed to spaces that are echoing the vertical divisions plaguing Lebanesesociety today.

These ideas about active citizenship are the reality of hundreds of individuals whose stories are included inA Hundred and One Stories to Tell book project that reflects a passionate belief in the positive contribution ofindividuals and groups towards the construction of their social realities. From Lebanon's northern border to itssouthern tip, it depicts a ground crowded with individuals and groups passionately invested in constructing hopeand seeking change in Lebanon. At a time of considerable political and social unrest in Lebanon, we found itparticularly pertinent to try and capture these passions and say, in a loud and collective voice, citizens still believe.They are making a difference and when they get together they do indeed change the world; at least their ownworld.

Acknowledging this central role of passion in the construction of social and political identities is also vital to a widerconception of democracy. Passion here is fundamental to notions of citizenship and civic agency that often takecenter stage in discussions about declining participation in democracy. Understanding such agency requires thatwe see citizenship not just in formal/legal terms but also with regard to meanings, practices, communication andidentities. From this perspective we are able to transcend restricted notions of civil society and in the processacknowledge the role of individuals and groups in making a difference. This acknowledgement also allows us togo beyond the different models of democracy that either sees political actors as being moved primarily by theirinterests or that just focus on the role of reason and moral consideration in the democratic process.5

In Lebanon, the 101 Stories to tell captured the deep sense of responsibility that citizens have toward each otherand toward their communities. They also showed the value of cumulative work in pushing and achieving greaterdemocratization and policy change. At the same time, they also highlighted disconnect between an active citizenshipon the ground, trying to make a difference and a polity that has flirted with civil conflict on several occasions inthe last few years.

Addressing these issues in today's world, let alone in a context like that of Lebanon of the past three years is noeasy task. The question “Are you from Mars?” became a favorite refrain during the production of this project. Whohas time to discuss the role of the state and of citizenship in the midst of one of the most acute political crises thatthe country has ever faced and in the aftermath of a string of assassinations that destabilized the country, a dev-astating war, a series of “mini” civil conflicts, and the gradual paralysis of all state institutions. Did the report dis-cuss the role of the state? “What state?” we were asked. “We cannot agree on who we want to represent us, letalone what role the state should play.” In this environment, organizing an event, no matter how big or small becamean unwelcome chore. Would there be a car bomb? An assassination? A parliamentary session for the election ofthe president that would shut down half the city, only to yield further political stalemate? Would there be a strikethat would escalate into conflict? Would there be riots and burning tires?

What kept this project going was the belief that this was indeed the moment to talk about citizenship and what theLebanese wanted of their country. This was the time to discuss the visions they have for their future and how torealize them. This was indeed the time to begin discussing what role citizens should play in the shaping of theirfutures and how to harness their energy for a more equitable and democratic system. In 2005, more than two thirdsof the Lebanese population took to the streets, in two separate rallies, in support of their beliefs. Since then, manyhave been increasingly disenfranchised and disappointed by 'politics as usual'. This 'politics as usual' is a productof the system that exists and the challenge today is how to bring those citizens out again, in support of something

4 See The Civic Mission of Schools, a report from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Center for Information and Research onCivic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), 2003. 5 Chantal Mouffe, 2002, Politics and Passions: The States of Democracy, CSD Perspectives, Center for the study of democracy, London.

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they can believe in. Can the energies of One Hundred and One Stories to Tell be collected and turned into onethousand and one? How can the positive and passionate belief and investment of the Lebanese in their country bedrawn upon in ways that will allow them to overcome the divisions that riddle their society and perhaps help Lebanonlive up to the myth of being a country that exemplifies the dialogue of cultures and their harmonious coexistence.

It was this belief in the capacity of individuals and groups to make a difference and in the ability of the Lebaneseto overcome their differences that allowed this journey to begin. We hope that the work we have done willinstigate some debate on the vision(s) of the Lebanese for their country and the means to be used in order to moveforward, for as Margaret Mead once said, “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens canchange the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”

Maha YahyaProject Director

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND STUDY TEAMS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

PREFACE

PREAMBLE

REPORT SUMMARY

PART ONE: NATION, STATE AND CITIZENSHIP

1.1 Citizenship, Democracy and the Role of the State1.2 Lebanon Overview1.3 Impact on Human Development1.4 Methodolgy and Structure

PART TWO: BALANCE SHEET ON CITIZENSHIP

2.1 Political Citizenship2.2 Socio-Economic Citizenship 2.3 Cultural Citizenship

PART THREE: ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZENS

PART FOUR: TOWARD A CITIZEN'S STATE

4.1 Bringing Meaning Back To Political Debate4.2 Establishing Irreversible Equity4.3 Democracy and Promotion of Civic Culture

List of Boxes

Box 1: Treating sectarianism in the ministerial declaration of the first post-independence government 1943Box 2: Select articles from the Preamble of the ConstitutionBox 3: Discrimination among womenBox 4: Dimensions of social citizenshipBox 5: Heart Beat (101 Stories to Tell)Box 6: A small loan for big dreams: Al MajmouaBox 7: Capital punishment: The penal code versus tribal justice

List of Figures

Figure 1: Trends in HDI value and rank for Lebanon (1985-2006)Figure 2: Distribution of children and public support to households for education, by household incomeFigure 3: Educational attainment by regionFigure 4: Distribution of health insuranceFigure 5: Distribution of extreme poverty and overall poverty, by governorate (2005)Figure 6: Interregional disparitiesFigure 7: Educational attainment and poverty (2004)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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List of Tables

Table 1: HPI-1 for LebanonTable 2: HPI-2Table 3: Gender development index (GDI) for LebanonTable 4: Gender parity index of gross enrollment ratesTable 5: Gender empowerment measure (GEM) for LebanonTable 6: Select international and regional comparisons in indicesTable 7: Male to female HDITable 8: Inequality measures by governorate, 2004-2005Table 9: Public expenditure, poverty and basic needsTable 10: Supply versus needTable 11: Beneficiaries allocation among governoratesTable 12: Input indicators by sector (2006-2007)Table 13: Health spending in OECD countries, 2004Table 14: Distribution of the labor force in the different Lebanese governorates (%)Table 15: Sectarianism and national unityTable 16: Attitudes toward a civic status lawTable 17: Attitudes toward religion and politicsTable 18: Attitudes toward sectarianism and the political systemTable 19: Attitudes of Lebanese youth

NATION, STATE ANDCITIZENSHIP

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1.1 CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY, ANDROLE OF THE STATE

A. Citizenship and Civic Myths

Citizenship is a social category that addresses the groupor communal nature of social life in a “universal” manner.The rights and obligations of citizens vary depending onthe history, cultural background, and sociopolitical con-text of each country. Irrespective of these differences,citizenship cannot be reduced to a set of services (rightsand obligations); to do so is to depoliticize it. Rather, cit-izenship is a way of being in public life.

The most common form of citizenship is national citizen-ship; a form that ties individuals to a sovereign politicalentity and to a socially and spatially bounded communi-ty. A series of actions that include identification docu-ments, taxation, and common history among othersconnect citizens to their nation-state.

Another central factor in the establishment andendurance of national citizenship is the founding civicmyth of the nation-state. These myths also allow thepolitical community to institutionalize the rights andresponsibilities considered key to nation-state citizen-ship and which include the actions mentioned above. Inthis context, citizenship can be understood as a set ofpractices (judicial, economic, political, social and cultural)which classifies members of society and directs the flowof resources to individuals and groups. However, none of

PART ONENATION, STATE AND CITIZENSHIP

those concepts have remained static over the last twocenturies. For example, and as Marshall and others haveargued, in several western countries, initial civil rights(for example liberty of person) were augmented withpolitical rights (for example right to vote) and socialrights (for example healthcare).1 The acquisition of thesenew rights brought with them new obligations wherebyfor example, increased social rights required greater tax-ation. The expansion of these rights strengthened themoral and functional ties between nation and state andby extension have reinforced the nation-state itself. Thisunderstanding of citizenship by necessity recognizesthe multiple forms of affiliations that characterize com-plex and heterogeneous societies such as the one inLebanon.

In Lebanon, even though multiple civic narratives suchas the maintenance of equal distance between the stateand the various religious groups, economic liberalism,and the state as patron of religious institutions, resonateand overlay each other, the most important and endur-ing of all is the myth of sectarian pluralism.2 This mythhas been the basis for public life and identity politics inthe country for more than a century. It tells the story ofLebanon as a country composed of different “natural”religiously defined communities. In this story, these reli-gious communities (or sects) are said to have preexist-ed the Lebanese state and have maintained historicalcontinuity and cohesion through time. One of the mostardent advocates of this myth, Michel Chiha, is alsoconsidered one of the main authors of the first Lebaneseconstitutions.

This notion of sectarian pluralism has dominated bothpublic and private life in Lebanon and has resulted in aparticular relationship between individuals, communalgroups and the state. It is enshrined in various articles ofthe constitution, and is apparent in the judicial organiza-tion of daily life that has allowed religious communitiesto mediate the relationship between citizens and thestate and among citizens. It is also visible in the troubledand sometimes contradictory relation between the civicnotion of the state and the inherent recognition of the“rights” of each of the eighteen legally recognized reli-gious communities. It also extends to the writing ofLebanese history which as Beydoun argues, expands

1 T.H Marshall, 1975, Social Policy in the Twentieth Century,London: Hutchinson; Albert O. Hirschman, 1992 Rival Views ofMarket Society and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA, HarvardUniversity Press

2 Also referred to as fragmented political culture, consociational, con-fessional, sectarian, plural etc.Suad Joseph (ed), 2000, Gender andCitizenship in the Middle East, Syracuse University Press, New York.

This summary report is in four parts. Part one outlines aconceptual approach to citizenship in a context likeLebanon, and its connections to democracy and the roleof the state. This is followed by an overview of political,social and economic events and their impact on HumanDevelopment as well as the methodology and structureof the report. Part Two then presents a balance sheet onthe elements of integral citizenship; political, social andcultural. Part Three outlines a general assessment of theattitudes of citizens toward key issues such as nationaland civic identities and democracy. Part Four presentselements of an agenda for progress Toward a Citizen'sState.

18

3 See Ahmad Beydoun, 1998, The Struggle Over Lebanese HistoryBeirut: Lebanese University Publications. See also Nawaf Salam,200, La Condition Libanaise, Communauté, Citoyens, Etat, Dar An-Nahar, Beirut. 4 This is evident in the minutes of parliamentary sessions, cabinetstatements, and speeches by President Bechara el Khoury from hiselection until 1948. Prior to this, a description of the first independ-ence government’s statement is found in a 1944 exchange of let-ters between the president of the republic and the mufti of therepublic as “a national charter.” The Charter is also mentioned in aspeech delivered by Riad Solh to Parliament in 1947. However, thisterm was not agreed upon prior to 1947-1948. Historians of theNational Charter have assumed, that the “charter” of 1943 becamethe “Charter” in that same year.5 See “Deux négations ne font pas une nation 1949”, in GeorgesNaccache, 1983, Un Rève Libanais 1943-1972, Editions FMA,Beyrouth, pp. 52-58.

and contracts according to the identity of its historianand his or her communal affiliations.3 More critically, thisnotion of sectarian pluralism has manifested itselfrecently in increasing polarization between differentcommunal groups and the marginalization of alternativeforms of identification.

What has supported the predominance of this civic mythand thus the infiltration of political sectarianism into allaspects of public life is the misinterpretations ascribedto the National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani). Even though itwas struck on the eve of Lebanon’s independencebetween the two main political leaders at the time,President Bishara el Khoury who was said to representthe Christians and Prime Minister Riad el Solh who wassaid to represent the Muslims, it was not publiclyacknowledged as a “Pact” until four years after itsannouncement.4 The content of the Pact was summa-rized by the two “nos” that were famously depicted byGeorges Naccache in one of his articles.5 These are theMuslim “no” to Syrian (or Arab) unity, and the Christian“no” to western tutelage. These two “nos” areeuphemistically presented as an attempt to safeguardLebanon’s future and independence by acknowledgingsolidarity with Arab states on their issues and confirmingits openness to western civilization and institutions.Lebanon’s independence was a prerequisite on this front.

The ministerial declaration of the first independencegovernment led by Riad el Solh (Box 1- see Chapter 3for fuller excerpts of this declaration) was meant toembody these principles and thus act as the definitiveauthority on interpreting the content of the Pact.However, in the decades following independence, theNational Pact was gradually reduced to a sectarianpower sharing formula for the major religious groups. Itbecame increasingly known as a charter of “sectariancoexistence,” or the “Pact of Coexistence” ( Mithaq al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak). Articles in the MinisterialDeclaration of the first independence cabinet, were high-lighted if they did not contradict the tenets of sectarian-ism. At the same time, a prominent paragraph empha-sizing the need to abolish sectarianism was overlooked,as was the fact that its author, Riad Solh, the then PrimeMinister, made serious though ultimately unsuccessfulefforts in support of this goal, returning to it repeatedlyin subsequent statements.

In time, this situation would extend to every facet of pub-lic life including the Taif constitution that saw the end ofthe fifteen year civil war in Lebanon. Taif was officiallyreferred to as the “Document of National Accord”(Wathiqat al-Wifaq al-Watani). Both the text of the accorditself and the preamble to the constitution, mention the“Pact of Coexistence,” holding that any political author-ity contravening this pact lacked legitimacy. However,“coexistence” was left undefined, as was the essence ofthe relevant “Pact:” Is it referring to the well-known Pactof 1943, or the recognized sectarian “formula” for thedivision of power, or something else entirely? The ambi-guity in what is meant by the “pact of communal coexis-tence” that is included in the preamble of the currentconstitution left the door wide open for alternate inter-pretations and facilitated the 2007-2008 controversy overthe “legality” and “constitutionality” of the current gov-ernment. During Lebanon’s recent political crisis, gov-ernment ministers who resigned believed that their veryact of resignation had robbed the cabinet of legitimacy.More critically this interpretation of the Taif as the “pactof communal coexistence” contravenes the general spir-it of the constitution that envisages the long term aboli-tion of sectarian based power sharing schemes.

This vagueness also has a negative impact on notions ofcitizenship and its presentation in the public sphere. Atbest it has led to considerable confusion in the ways inwhich citizens view their leaders and institutions andtheir understandings of concepts such as public ornational good and shared public space. This confusionhas solidified the position of the sect or community, asthe main authority or reference point for citizens and themandatory access point for citizens to state institutions.The sect in this regard becomes the principle conduitthat shapes the formation of citizens’ attitudes and that oftheir communities towards the state and its institutions. It

Ambiguity in the meanings of “communalcoexistence” in the preamble of the consti-tution facilitated diverging interpretationsand solidified the position of the sect, as themain reference point for citizens

“ “

The move from the National Pact (al-Mithaqal-Watani) to the “Pact of Coexistence”(Mithaq al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak) has reducedthe former to a mere power sharing formulabetween the major religious groups

“ “

19

Among the foundations of reform, which are required by Lebanon’s higher interest, is the treatment of sectarianism andthe abolition of its negative aspects. This foundation of sectarianism hinders national progress and hurts Lebanon’s rep-utation, not to speak of its poisoning the spirit of relations between various spiritual communities that make up theLebanese people. We have seen how, in most cases, sectarianism has been a tool to ensure private interests or sap thestrength of national life in Lebanon to the benefit of others. We are confident that when the people are filled by thenational sentiment that has arisen under independence and a system of popular rule, they will be reassured and acceptthe abolishment of the sectarian system, which weakens the nation.

The moment at which sectarianism is abolished will be a blessed moment in the history of Lebanon of comprehensivenational awakening. With God’s help, we will strive to see this take place soon. Naturally, its achievement will requirepreparation on various fronts; we will all cooperate to pave the way and prepare for this, so that all are reassured as tothe achievement of this critical national reform. What we have said about sectarianism applies also to regionalism, whichif it becomes stronger, will turn a single nation into many.

Box 1: Treating sectarianism in the ministerial declaration of the first post-independence government (1943)

is also the key lens through which the image that citizenshave of their own political identities and those of othersis refracted.

As we shall see in Section II of this summary, other fac-tors have also supported this infiltration of political sec-tarianism into every facet of public life. In short, differentsectarian communities developed different kinds ofinstitutions that in time have facilitated the transforma-tion of these sects into quasi-closed self-sufficient enti-ties often presented as alternatives to the state. Each ofthese communities also has extensive ties to foreignpowers. This situation has dual implications on the roleof the state. First, the state’s role as an arbitration forcebetween the different groups has been undermined andits powers to implement laws curtailed. Dissent by anycommunity against any law guarantees its paralysis orthat at the very least its implementation would be, per-force, inadequate.6 This situation includes constitutionalrulings as well. Moreover, in the absence of an arbitra-tion mechanism, the general “public good” is not repre-sented and the concept of “national interests” disinte-grates in the face of external interference in Lebanon’sinternal affairs particularly in times of crisis. Second, insuch a context, Lebanon’s political system has becomea tool for presenting the different communities as soci-ety’s primary social, political and civic units. This despitethe fact that religiosity has never a pre-requisite for par-ticipation in these units. Birth into a community is. As aresult most attempts to reform the system are then re-presented as an incursion into the private affairs of thevarious communities.

In a country like Lebanon where foreign influence playsa considerable role, both in socio-economic as well for-eign policy matters this issue is quite crucial. The loss ofpower and control at the national level has generatednew forms of power and politics at the sub-national

level. These have challenged traditional economies ofcentrality and marginality. This loss of power has alsogenerated a crisis in the political power of the Lebanesestate and in its claim to control borders, resources andforce.

In such a context, nation building and state sovereigntyand the emergence of citizenship as the basic tenet ofthe political system are undermined. What is meant bynation building here is the historic move from sub-national interests to the privileging of national identity ina public sphere that includes state institutions as well asNGOs bringing together both political and civil society. Itis a sphere in which citizens are equal before the law andenjoy public freedoms. State sovereignty is understoodhere as the ability to be above all internal forces withinthe limits of the law and to be independent of externalforces within the limits of the constitution.

The loss of power and control at thenational level has generated new forms ofpower and politics at the sub-nationallevel.

“ “

6 See “The Formula, Back and Front,” in Ahmad Beydoun, 1990,What You Have Learned and Tasted, Paths of the Lebanese (Civil)War, Arab Cultural Center, Beirut, pp. 133-142.

B. Citizenship and Democracy

Any discussion of citizenship and the rights and dutiesassociated with it also brings up a discussion of democ-racy and the kind of political framework necessary forthe guarantee of these rights. Moreover, various views ofdemocracy inadvertently deal with how citizenship rightsare claimed, attained and maintained. From this per-spective, citizenship is not just a legal norm, or a rightbestowed by the state but is something attained throughpractice. Citizenship rights are also often the outcomeof struggles around specific issues. As experience fromaround the world shows, citizenship action can alsobring significant changes to policy and help to build

20

7 See for example Naila Kabeer, 2005, Inclusive Citizenship:Meaning and Expressions, Zed Books, London; IDS, In Focus Issue5, Building Responsive States: Citizen Action and National PolicyChange, available on http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/citizens (accessedSeptember, 2008)8 See Saskia Sassen, 1998, Globalization and its Discontents, NewPress,New York among others.

C. The Role of the State

Debates over citizenship are also directly connected toquestions about the changing role of the state. In the lasttwo decades, globalization, the increased influence ofmulti-national companies, the growth of global risks(financial, ecological, human etc.), claims of minorities,the emergence of allegiances based on additional formsof identity such as gender, religion, and shared historicaltrauma, among other factors have placed additionalstrains on the traditional role of the state and on con-cepts of citizenship.8 In response, many theorists andactivists have tried to imagine new integrative mechanisms

9 There are multiple views on the role of the state in social devel-opment and welfare provision. See among others N. Yeates, 2001,Globalization and Social Policy, Sage, London; Maha Yahya, 2004,Towards an Integrated Social Development Policy, UN-ESCWA,Integrated Social Policy series, no. 8, Beirut.10 Nutrition studies for example indicate that investing in childnutrition results in stronger adult workers while increasing the laborforce’s average education by one year may increase GDP by 9 per-cent. This holds for the first three years of extra education. Returnsbeyond those years diminish to around 4 percent, thus pointing toa major opportunity for a country like Lebanon. UNDP, 2000,Linking Economic Growth and Social Development in Lebanon, p.41; see also Amartya Sen, 2000, Development as Freedom, Anchor,New York.11 See for example UNDP, 1998, Integrating Human Rights withSustainable Human Development, New York; UNRISD, 2000,Visible Hands: Taking Responsibility for Social Development,Geneva; Yahya, 2004, ibid.

responsive and accountable states.7 In other words thepractices of citizenship and democracy are closely inter-twined and build up on each other.

In this regard, a consensus within the international devel-opment community has grown around the role of democ-racy in the improvement of public policies. Considered asa core value, democracy offers prospects for better citi-zen participation in the formulation of government poli-cies. What is important in this process is that it is notenough for countries to be democratic; the substance orquality of their democracies is equally important. In otherwords, the question is not simply an issue of rights asmuch as it is of underlying societal structures.

From this perspective, this report concludes that build-ing a citizen’s democracy is not about adopting a stan-dard institutional definition of democracy be it participa-tive, representative, deliberative etc. as much as it is aprocess of struggle and contestations that takes placeover long spans of time. As such, this report analyzessome of the intrinsic properties of the democratic regimein Lebanon and the ways it which can be enhanced soas to improve the well being of its citizens and facilitateeffective social development. It also explores the condi-tions under which the Lebanese regime can deliver ade-quate social protection and provide equitable opportuni-ties for growth as a fundamental right of citizenship andthe role that such policies can play in consolidating thedemocratic regime in this transitional period.

…it is not enough for countries to bedemocratic; the substance or quality of theirdemocracies is equally important“ “

including alternative forms of citizenship. Many offer directcriticism of Marshall’s national trilogy of territorially groundedpolitical, social, and cultural citizenship.

In such a context, debates on the role of the stateacquire an additional dimension as social development,social justice, and social equity come to be regarded askey goals of macroeconomic policies.9 That healthy, welleducated populations have very productive impacts onthe economy is a well documented fact.10At the sametime, the growing recognition by various political schoolsthat sustainable peace and political stability are to a cer-tain degree affected by the policies enacted to addressbasic needs and equity has meant that socioeconomicrights have been recognized through both internationalaccords and constitutional rights.11 Many of thesedebates are entangled in debates on the meanings ofcitizenship rights and responsibilities

These issues are also directly connected to questions ofequity; a fundamental premise of citizenship. The issuehere is that while citizenship is directly linked to ques-tions of identity and is attained as several theorists haveargued through multiple sites of action and not just vis-à-vis the state, it is the role of the state to view all its cit-izens equitably and insure a level playing field amongthem. As is argued in Chapter Two of the main report,these issues are directly connected to equitable andsustainable human development and prosperity.

A concern with equity has also profoundly influenced theapproach of the United Nations to human developmentand questions of governance and justice. In today’smore integrated world, equity is considered a globallegal concept and social growth is considered importantto economic productivity. For the United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP) it led to the creation ofthe Human Development Index as well as a set of sup-plementary indices. Notwithstanding the shortcomingsof these indices, these showed disparities amongnations and regions and among segments of the popu-lation within countries.

2112 ibid

1.2 LEBANON OVERVIEW

Prime Minister Hariri launched an economic recoveryprogram. It solicited external support for this program atthe Paris II meeting in 2002 at which the internationalcommunity provided US$2.4 billion in direct financialsupport (non-project financing). Complemented by thecontributions of Lebanon’s financial sector, namely thecentral bank and commercial banks, Paris II boostedconfidence in the country and resulted in a significantdecline in interest rates on debt which fell from 17 per-cent of GDP in 2002 to about 10 percent of GDP in 2005.

In 2004, and despite increasingly detrimental politicalbickering, macroeconomic performance exceeded allexpectations with real growth at 7.4 percent, the overallbudget deficit declining to less than 8 percent of GDP(from 25 percent in 2000), and the primary budget sur-plus improving to 2.3 percent of GDP. The introductionof the Value Added Tax (VAT) benefited fiscal adjustmentbut impacted the purchasing power of Lebanese citi-zens. Because of political wrangling the structural com-ponents of Paris II, namely privatization, were never fullyimplemented. By the end of 2004, the level of gross pub-lic debt reached 165 percent of GDP and 175 percent ofGDP.

On the social front levels of satisfaction of unmet basicneeds declined even as income related poverty rose.Deprivation rates had dropped down from 30.9 percentof households in 1994/5 to 24.6 in 2004/2005. Thisimprovement occurred particularly in the fields of educa-tion (+9), housing (+9) and access to water and sanita-tion (+2). However, income related indicators especiallywith regard to employment and economic dependencyworsened during the same period from 43 percent to 52percent of the entire population. This improvement, aswill be discussed below, conceals a regression in thequality education as well as a mismatch between distri-bution of facilities and need.

A. Insecurity, Political Change and Conflict

These improvements in Lebanon’s economic outlookwere such that an average annual growth rate of 6 per-cent to 7 percent was officially expected for 2005-2007.Unfortunately due to a series of internal and externalshocks including the assassination of former PrimeMinister Rafiq al-Hariri, on Feb 14, 2005 along with MPBasil Fuleihan and 20 other civilians, the string ofassassinations of public figures and car bombings thatfollowed in the period 200-2008,13 the Israeli war of July

13 A string of politically motivated assassinations followed PrimeMinister al-Hariri’s murder and included in 2005 intellectual andjournalist Samir Kassir (June 2), George Hawi (June 21), MP JubranTueni, (Dec 12). In 2006 they targeted Minister Pierre Gemayel (Nov21). In 2007, MP Walid Eido (June 13), MP George Ghanem(September 19), Brigadier General Francoise el Haj (December 12)

This renewed attention to citizenship and equity is alsodue to its recognition as an essential weapon not only inthe struggle against social and economic inequity butalso in the attempt to widen the conception of politicsitself. The fact that political, social, and economicinequities feed off each other and often succeed in trap-ping families and individuals in an intergenerationalcycle of poverty and exclusion is no surprise. From thisperspective, the ideological and political framework ofthe state shapes social and other policies while theredistributive action by the state is tightly connected tothe broader conception of citizenship rights and entitle-ments.12

For Lebanon, the incorporation of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights into the preamble of itsconstitution has enshrined this principle of equity as anational tenant. However, its materialization on theground is another matter, as we shall see shortly. In whatfollows an overview of the general political, economic,and policy developments of Lebanon over the pastdecade or so is followed by a discussion of the status ofLebanon’s Human Development Indices today. Theycontextualize the presented balance sheet on integralcitizenship in Lebanon.

Lebanon has undergone profound political and econom-ic changes since the last National Human DevelopmentReport in 2001. These have impacted the human devel-opment situation in the country in various ways. In 2000,Israel withdrew from areas in the South and the Bekaa ithad occupied for over twenty-two years. Essential post-civil war reconstruction was almost complete and realper capita income had more than doubled from the 1990level but still stood a quarter below its pre-war level. Thehigh costs associated with post-civil war reconstruction,however, as well as recurring Israeli aggressions erodedthe revenue base of the state. To finance the reconstruc-tion program, the Government of Lebanon (GoL) fundedall capital expenditures during this period through mar-ket borrowing at high interest rates while internationalsupport focused on concessionary loans. As a result,total public sector interest payments were double thesize of capital expenditures during the 1990s. With rap-idly increasing interest payments absorbing over three-quarters of revenues, the overall fiscal deficit reachednearly 25 percent of GDP in 2000. Gross public debt,which a decade earlier stood at about US$2 billion, hadgrown to US$25 billion, equivalent to 150 percent ofGDP, and the economy was stagnant.

Against this background, the government of the late

22

2006, the Nahr el Bared crisis, and continued internalpolitical instability, Lebanon never achieved this growthrate. As a result, Lebanon’s socio-economic environmentover the past three years has been adversely affectedwith a devastating impact on the average annual growthrate that dropped to around 1.6 percent in the periodfrom in 2005 to 2007. As of June 2008, the gross publicdebt stood at US$44.5 and net public debt at US$ 40.4billion.14

At the same time, the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri was also a watershed in Lebanon’s political histo-ry. It prompted hundreds of thousands of people to taketo the streets in protest for the following two months,leading to the resignation of the government and theeventual withdrawal of close to 14,000 Syrian troops,stationed in Lebanon since 1978. It also curtailed thehegemonic role that Syria had taken in Lebanon’s inter-nal decision-making process particularly since the Taifaccords of 1990.15 Because of these events, the rate ofeconomic activity declined dramatically leading to anestimated real growth of 1 percent. The shock of theassassination, political turbulence and insecurity keptlarge investors away and consumers at home. Rising oilprices and increasing transfers to the ElectricityCompany (EdL) compounded this situation.16

The 2005 parliamentary elections transformed the powerbalance within parliament and led to the formation of anew Cabinet with broad support. Around fourteen dia-logue sessions aimed at national reconciliation wereheld between March and June 2006.17 These broughttogether the main religious and political leaders in thecountry. Lebanon seemed to be on the verge of a newbeginning. Confidence was high and despite the eco-nomic challenges that followed Prime Minister al-Hariri’sassassination, the incoming government of PrimeMinister Siniora exerted significant efforts to redress the

and in 2008 Captain Wissam Eid (January 25) were also killed.These assassinations and other bombings have also claimed thelives of countless citizens who were in their vicinity. Other attemptedassassinations in the same period included MP and MinisterMarwan Hemade (Oct 2, 2004), Journalist May Chidiac and MPand Minister Elias el Murr. In addition around 14 other explosionsoccurred in and around the Beirut over the same period (see annexfor timeline). 14 Ministry of Finance, 2008, Debt and Debt Markets, QuarterlyBullein, Issue no. 5, Quarter II, available athttp://www.finance.gov.lb/NR/rdonlyres/31BCB444-B1AD-44D4-86E2-2EDFF0F1F06A/0/DebtDebtMarketsQII2008.pdf 15 During the civil war Syria was also involved politically and mili-tarily. The tensions between Lebanon and Syria date back to theFrench mandate when Syria grudgingly accepted Lebanon as anindependent nation-state.16 In 2005, transfers to EdL from the budget reached aboutUS$650 million.17 These did not yield any results even though there was agree-ment over 4 out of 6 items on the agenda.

fiscal situation and rejuvenate the economy. BetweenJuly 2005 and June 2006, all public finance indicatorswere showing strong improvements and expectationswere that the real growth rate for 2006 would reach 5-7percent. A tourist season of record proportions wasexpected, exports increased by more than 30 percent,the primary surplus in the budget more than quadrupled,and the balance of payments, which had showed adeficit of US$1.5 billion in June 2005, recorded a surplusof US$2.6 billion twelve months later, on the eve of theJuly Israeli war.

Following the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on July12, 2006, Israel launched a massive offensive againstLebanon that inflicted substantial damage to lives andlivelihoods and had a devastating effect on Lebanon’smacro-economic and social environments. Around1,187 people mainly women and children were killedclose to 4,398 were injured (15 percent of those injuriesbeing permanent) and a quarter of the population or onemillion was displaced. Physical and civilian infrastruc-ture and public services and utilities were severely dam-aged. Aerial bombardment flattened entire villages in theSouth of Lebanon and the Bekaa valley and wholeneighborhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs and partiallydamaged or destroyed hundreds of others. Direct costswere estimated at US$2.8 billion while indirect costs orestimated losses in output and income for 2006 reacheda ceiling of USD 2.2 billion. (See Statistical Compendium)

Consequently, the economy over 2006 reported a com-bination of stagnation and inflation, governed initially bythe national dialogue that was taking place and then bythe fall out as a result of the Israeli war. Inflation rose by7 percent during 2006, the highest in a decade, and wasworsened by the shortage in supplies resulting from thewar blockade, leading to a situation of stagflation. Publicfinance deteriorated as the public deficit rose from itsexpected 8 percent in mid year to 12 percent by the endof the year raising the debt to GDP ratio to a record 181percent. Saddled by post-war reconstruction costs,public debt rose to US$41 billion.

To counteract this situation, on August 31, 2006, lessthan three weeks after the cessation of hostilities, theGoL presented a program for early recovery priorities atan international donor conference convened by theGovernment of Sweden and closely coordinated withUNDP. The conference succeeded in raising aroundUS$900 million for immediate and early recovery whilean Adopt a Village or Bridge scheme was also initiated.Within a year, close to 90 percent of the destructionwrought by Israel on the public infrastructure net-works had been repaired.18

18 For additional information on recovery programs seewww.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb.

23

Beyond wars and conflicts, the political polarizationbetween the two main political coalitions (the March 14majority and the March 8 “opposition”) which began tomaterialize after the 2005 parliamentary elections devel-oped into a harsh political conflict. Details notwithstand-ing, this conflict manifested itself in three grand ges-tures; each of which was to have a significant impact onsocial stability, economic prosperity and security. OnNovember 11, six ministers belonging to the coalition of“opposition” political parties known as “March 8,”resigned from government rendering the cabinet illegiti-mate in the eyes of some. Parliament was shut down forboth ordinary and extraordinary sessions to elect a newpresident. Effectively, the country remained without anacting legislative body for a year and a half and withouta president for six months leading to a paralysis of gov-ernment.

This situation was compounded by the one year and ahalf “sit in” by the March 8 coalition in Beirut’s down-town meant to pressure the government to resign. The“sit in” effectively shut down the center of the city andimpacted economic growth and investor confidence inLebanon. The opposition strike in January 2008 wouldherald the first of many sectarian skirmishes that culmi-nated in the May 7th civil conflicts that shut down thecountry followed by the August 2008 clashes in Tripoli.These led to multiple deaths and injuries. For the firsttime in many years, the prospect of a renewed civil warloomed close. (see Chapters Two and Three).

The Doha Accord, brokered by Qatar with explicit glob-al and regional support brought an end to these conflictsand ostensibly laid out the essential steps for long-termstability. Chief among these was the agreement to revivethe 1960 electoral law that is based on the qada (sub-districts) as the foundation for elections to take place in2009 and which consecrates communal rather thannational representation. The deal also paved the way forthe eventual election of General Michel Suleiman asLebanon’s new president.

B. Political Fallout (2006-2008)

Most worrisome, however, is the increasingly overt sec-tarian overtones to political discourse, action, and sub-sequent clashes. Politicians and the media (in particulartelevision stations), all emphasize sectarian representa-tion at the expense of national or civic representation.The ownership and direct financial sponsorship of polit-ical parties of specific TV stations meant that these out-lets subscribed directly to the political positions of theirrespective coalition. The public discourse and languageused to describe their opponents degenerated in directproportion to the political positions of those they repre-sented. Furthermore, the electoral law agreed upon inDoha also consecrates sectarian representation at theexpense of national or civic representation (see ChapterThree). These elements obviously have serious implica-tions for the long-term prosperity of the country.

In addition to the political deadlock and security crisis,policy choices made in the early nineties during post-civil war reconstruction, have also had an impact on thepolitical, social, and economic outlook for Lebanon. Onthe political front they influenced reform efforts andaggravated sectarian divisions in the country. On theeconomic front, they contributed to a drop in annualgrowth rates. And on the social front they led to animprovement in Human Development Indicators coupledwith an increase in income-related poverty.

Politically, the non-implementation of the Taif accordsand in particular the clauses dealing with decentraliza-tion and the de-confessionalization of parliamentthrough the establishment of a congress for religiousrepresentatives have further ingrained sectarian divi-sions in the country and bolstered the power of tradition-al sectarian leaders and war lords at the expense of thestate. Similarly, despite several attempts by civil societygroups and different political leaders, efforts to legislatea civil status laws have been unsuccessful. As a result,the relationship of Lebanese citizens to the state contin-ues to be mediated by the religious sect to which theybelong and Lebanese citizens remain unequal before thelaw in terms of personal status matters. These issues willbe discussed at length in Chapter Three.

Most worrisome, is the increasingly overtsectarian tone to political discourse, actionand subsequent conflict that for the firsttime in 15 years, brought the country to thebrink of the civil war…

“ “

C. Policy Choices (1993-2006)

In May 2007 another crisis erupted in north Lebanonwhen violent clashes broke out between the militants ofFatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army in and around thePalestinian refugee camp of Nahr al Bared. Losses inlives and livelihoods were high. (See Chapter Two of fullreport for further details) Recovery and reconstruction ofthe camp and surrounding areas are estimated torequire a total of US$445 million and will take severalyears to complete. Of this amount the GoL was able tomobilize US$ 123 million at the 2008 Vienna donor con-ference.

24

On the economic front the average annual growth rate inthe post-civil war period of 1993 to 2004 was less thanhalf the rate predicted by the various post-civil warreconstruction programs of the first half of the 1990s.While these programs set 8 percent19 (at constantprices) as an approximate target, the actual rate for theperiod was only around 3 percent.20 At the same time,public debt has increased tremendously since the mid-1990s. Public debt and public debt service rates (regis-tering successively 178 percent and 16 percent of GDPin 2006) tended to escape control because the primarysurplus turned, for the first time since 2002, into a pri-mary deficit in 2006. Although the Government restoredits primary surplus in 2007 and met key EmergencyPost-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) targets in the financialsphere, stagnation and/or deterioration have character-ized other critical spheres of the real economy such asexternal migration, unemployment and inflation rates,while the poverty headcount has risen, as we shall seeshortly.21

Among the policy choices that have had considerableimpact are the following, each of which has contributedto the overall situation with varying intensity:

Post-civil war reconstruction plans: Plans proposed for thereconstruction and reconstitution of state and society inthe post civil war period, aimed mainly to rehabilitateand develop infrastructure, particularly electricity,telecommunications, vital public facilities such as theairport and port, water and wastewater networks, hospi-tals, schools, and roads. Despite their impressivescope, these successive plans, set specific develop-mental targets that that were never fully realized whilethe implementation of the Paris I and II conferences thatfocused to a large degree on public debt-related issueswas hindered by political deadlock. Moreover, none ofthese plans presented a global approach for addressingmajor macroeconomic imbalances, enhancing sectoraldevelopment and reforming public institutions. In otherwords, while projects carried out contributed toimproved social and economic indicators, they lacked acomprehensive developmental vision for the Lebaneseeconomy; one that invests primarily in human capital andother sources of comparative advantage. This approachlimited the overall impact of the reconstruction processon economic growth. Only recently have social issues

Political deadlock and the non implemen-tation of Taif has meant that the relationshipof Lebanese citizens to the state continuesto be mediated by the different religiouscommunities

“ “19 CDR, 1994, Horizon 2000 – Plan for Construction andDevelopment, Beirut.20 Ministry of Economy and Trade, Lebanese National Accounts 1997– 2004, available at http://www.economy.gov.lb /MOET /English /Panel/EconomicResearchAndPrices/EconomicResearch/NationalAccounts.htm, accessed June 2008.21 Ministry of Finance, General Debt Overview,http://www.finance.gov.lb/Public+Finances/Public+Debt/Public+Debt+Overview/General+Debt+Overview.htm, accessed June 2008.

and the enhancement of private sector initiatives gar-nered interest through programs such as the CommunityDevelopment Project (CDP) and the Economic andSocial Fund for Development (ESFD) program bothhoused at the CDR.

Weak post-civil war social policies: Despite the rela-tively high jump in the share of public social expendi-tures as a percentage of public expenditures, post-civilwar social policies did not achieve their intended out-comes. Due to a variety of reasons including a frag-mented vision, overlapping jurisdictions, lack of cleartargeting criteria and duplication of initiatives and proj-ects, increases in public expenditures did not succeed inbridging the gap between economic growth and socio-economic deprivation and in alleviating various forms ofpoverty, vulnerability and social exclusion. Chapter Fourof this report addresses these issues at length.

Public deficit and public debt: These were in part the resultof an expansionary public expenditure policy coupledwith a rigid monetary stabilization policy instituted in theimmediate post war era (1990). However, the repercus-sions of this mix tended to decrease after 1997 as therapid rise in public expenditures slowed down. Domesticpolitical instability, the persisting conflict with Israel (flar-ing up in 1993, 1996, and 2006) with its considerabledamage to lives and livelihoods, and the slow pace ofpublic sector reform have further exacerbated the situa-tion.

D. Socio-Economic Outcomes

D.1 Overlapping geographies of poverty and ofconflict

Beyond the disastrous impact of wars and insecurity onLebanon, the overlap between the geographies of con-flict and the geographies of poverty means that thepoorest strata of the population in the poorest regions ofthe country have suffered the most. More than 60 per-cent of those living in the qadas of Bint Jbeil, Tyre,Nabatieh, Marjaayoun, and Baalbak, as well as thesouthern suburbs of Beirut—that is, in the areas mostheavily bombed during the thirty-three days of directconflict, lived in extremely poor conditions prior to the

25

22 These were identified as poverty pockets in previous assess-ments. See MOSA, UNDP, 1998, Mapping the Living Conditions inLebanon, Beirut, Lebanon; CDR, ESFD,2004, Social DevelopmentStrategy; MOSA, UNDP, 2006, Mapping of Living Conditions inLebanon between 1995 & 2004 23 The study notes that data on aid only includes support to fami-lies during the war, and the months immediately before and duringwhich the survey was carried out (Jan-Feb 2007). Consequentlyaid received after the survey was completed is not included and islikely to change the data included substantially.

conflict. This overlap exacerbated their adverse livingconditions, enhanced their vulnerability and accentuat-ed their exclusion. For example, a postwar survey con-ducted by MOSA, CAS, UNDP and ILO found thataround 80 percent of those living in the qadas men-tioned above were displaced by the 2006 war.22

Furthermore, close to 65 percent of families reported areduction in their incomes in the post war period ascompared to 2.9 who reported an improvement.

It is apparent that the level of deterioration was also deter-mined by pre-war income levels, in that 67.7 percent ofhouseholds with an income of less than LL400,000, orthe minimum wage, reported a deterioration in their sit-uation as opposed to 46.1 percent with incomes of morethan LL2,500,000 million. Those families became morereliant on external aid, particularly local politically affiliat-ed NGO’s. Close to 17.8 percent of families reportedreceiving aid from different political parties during thewar and 56 percent after the war.23 (See Chapter Two)

The same is true for the Nahr el Bared crisis and themore recent clashes in Tripoli and the Bekaa wheremuch of the damage and destruction also occurred inareas where the existing physical, economic and educa-tional capital is most depressed. These latter clasheshave further aggravated the living conditions of theirpopulations and enhanced their exclusion from bothaccess and opportunity.

Of note in this context is the remarkable solidarity thatemerged during the war showing itself in the ways inwhich Lebanese citizens rallied to provide support to theone million displaced individuals across the country.

… this period was also marked byremarkable social solidarity that emergedduring the war and beyond…“ “

D.2 Challenges to government reform initiatives:Paris III and beyond

Prior to the war, the GoL was in the final stages of a con-sultative process over a proposed economic and fiscalreform plan that was to be presented at the Beirut Idonor conference. Due to political instability, the confer-ence was held in Paris in what became known as theParis III conference. It succeeded in mobilizing close toUS$7 billion in grants and loans for Lebanon. While tooearly to assess, the actions taken on social service deliv-ery and poverty reduction strategy by the government inconjunction with the implementation of the Paris IIIagreement is bound to bear results in the near future.These include the institution of safety nets, the estab-lishment of improved targeting systems, and the imple-mentation of reforms in the ministries of Education,Health and Social Affairs. An inter-ministerial com-mittee for social issues that will elaborate a nationalsocial development strategy has also been created.

However, the prevailing political, economic and socialconditions in the country pose several challenges to theimplementation of this program. A major issue is how topreserve and sustain social stability while maintainingcommitment to containing current levels of expenditures,adjusting prices on key public goods and services(gasoline, electricity, etc.), accelerating the process ofprivatization of selected public entities, raising some keytax items (VAT, interest), and restructuring the govern-ment’s subsidy policy. These challenges are furtheramplified by the prevailing political and military instabili-ty. Although the Social Action Plan component is meantto minimize the impact of these fiscal and economicadjustments on the needy and vulnerable groups, thisoption is being hindered major obstacles as follows:

First, Lebanon’s profound on-going political divi-sions hamper the creation of an adequate climate foreconomic growth and development.

Second, current social conditions are tense and inse-cure, not only because of the destructive repercussionsof the July 2006 war but also due to rising inflation, nour-ished by internal, regional, and international factors.These are having a negative impact on the purchasing

Expatriates, professionals, students, and civil societyorganization came together to organize support systemsfor these families (see 101 Stories to Tell for further infor-mation on some of these initiatives). While this kind ofsocial solidarity is by no means a novelty for Lebanon,the context in which it occurred and which included pro-found disagreements over who was to blame for the war,was very important.

The overlap between the geographies ofconflict and the geographies of povertymeans that the poorest strata of the popula-tion in the poorest regions of the countryhave suffered the most

“ “

26

power of wage earners, who represent around two-thirds of the total active population. At the same time,although the lower poverty headcount is slightly aboveits 2002 level, rising inflation is and deteriorating socio-economic conditions are not only affecting those livingbelow the poverty line but is also threatening large socialgroups that are located immediately above the upperpoverty line and are highly sensitive to internal and exter-nal shocks. This issue is discussed at length below andin Chapter Four of the main report.

Against this backdrop of events how has humandevelopment in Lebanon faired? Has it departed frompast trends? How does it compare to other middleincome or Arab countries? What are the issues it mustnow consider to advance its human development in anequitable manner?

While the shorter-term impacts of events of the past fewyears have been outlined, their long-term impact on humandevelopment will take more time to assess. It is howeverapparent that despite political stability and military insecu-rity Lebanon has not fared any worse than other countriesin the MENA region. In fact, like many of those countries,Lebanon witnessed a paradox of sorts. While incomepoverty deteriorated in the last decade or so, human devel-opment indicators have improved as has access to basicservices and satisfaction in basic needs. Delivery of educa-tion and health services contributed to this developmenteven as they fell short of their declared targets. In short,empirical findings, as we shall see below, suggest that evenwith low-income growth levels, attention to education andhealth services can reap tremendous benefits for the over-all human development of the country.

A. Human Development Indices

Despite political stability and militaryinsecurity Lebanon has not fared any worsethan other countries in the MENA region“ “

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

020406080100120

1.3 IMPACT ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

* As reported in UNDP, 2007, HDR 2007/2008, Fighting Climate change.** As reported in UNDP, 2008, HDR 2008, The Human Development Indices: A statistical Update. Note: Based on data available in 2005, Lebanon was ranked 88 out of 177 countries and the HDI appears to have gained 0.024 points.However, had the most up-to-date data series from international data agencies, Lebanon’s HDI value for 2005 would have been 0.795; thiswould have positioned the country at 77 been available for the time.

Since the 1970’s and despite fifteen years of civil war andother conflicts, Lebanon has been making steady progresson all fronts. Key national human development indicatorshave improved. Life expectancy has risen and infant mortal-ity has dropped. In the last decade or so overall education-al delays have also dropped as have illiteracy levels from31 percent in the 1970’s to 11.5 percent in 1996 to 9.95percent in 2004. Not surprisingly, an examination of illiteracyper age group indicates that the largest portion fall withinthe higher age groups whereby 0.34 percent of those illiter-ate today are in the 15-24 age group as opposed to 4.27percent in the 65+ age bracket (Figure 1. See Chapter Twoin full report and Statistical Compendium)

Notwithstanding short comings in the data (see statisti-cal Compendium), calculations of the regional HDI at thelevel of the Mohafaza or governorate, (Lebanon’s largestsub-national administrative division) show the unevenspread of Human Development across national territory.While the Beirut and Mount Lebanon regions stand outwith human development values higher than the nation-al average (0.794 and 0.774 respectively), the North andthe Bekaa exhibit lower levels (0.705 and 0.713 respec-tively). Concerted national efforts are required toimprove the level of human development in the NorthLebanon, Nabatieh, Bekaa, and South Lebanon gover-norates particularly in terms of income generating activ-ities for the North and improvements in literacy levels inthe Bekaa and Nabatieh regions. These results confirmfindings in other poverty and deprivation-related studies,such as the Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) assessment.

These findings are also supported by calculations of theHuman Poverty Index (HPI-1) at national and governorate

Figure 1: Trends in HDI value and rank for Lebanon (1985-2006)

27

levels. Poverty is a multifaceted phenomena and meas-uring human poverty is a complex matter no matterwhich tool one uses. While approaches that measurevalue in terms of money fail to capture other dimensionsfundamental to basic standards of living, the capabilityand basic needs approach that focuses on assets andaccess suffers from a certain level of subjectivity.Collectively, these give an indication of the status of thepopulation, and particularly of its poorest and most vul-nerable segments.

While the data used should be treated with some caution(see note below table 2.5), HPI calculations for Lebanonbased on national data also indicate discrepancybetween the governorates with regards to poverty levelsas well as type of poverty. While Beirut and MountLebanon report levels lower than the national average,the rest of the governorates report considerably higherlevels. Further analysis also indicates that despite thefact that Lebanon is close to achieving its national MDGtarget on illiteracy, some regions continue to suffer fromunacceptably high levels. Further breakdown by genderindicates that a larger portion of those illiterate are

HDI and HPI calculations point to consid-erable regional disparity… and are support-ed by other poverty and deprivation relatedstudies… there is also inter-regional dispar-ity and multiple poverty pockets

“ “

Table 1: HPI-1 for Lebanon

Probability at birth of not

surviving to age 40

(% of cohort)a

(2000)

Adult illiteracyrate

(% aged 15 and above)

(2004)

Population notusing improvedwater sources

(%)(2004)

Under-weight children under

age five (%)

(2004)

Lebanon ALebanon BBeirutMount lebanonNorthBekaaSouthNabatieh

P2

9.99.96.17.5

10.016.812.216.7

P1

6.35.03.04.08.06.04.04.0

P31

00000000

P32

3.93.12.2

12.34.24.19.8

P3

2.03.91.51.86.06.34.58.2

HPI-17.47.24.45.58.0

11.88.6

11.7

Note: Lebanon A; Columns 1 and 3: HDR 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change; Column 2: calculated for the NHDR from the raw data of theMOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, Living Conditions of Households Survey 2004; Column 4: League of Arab States, MOSA, CAS, 2004, LebanonFamily Health Survey PAPFAM. Lebanon B since recent data at the level of the Mohafaza are not available, a mix of 1996 and 2004 data wasused for the sake of consistency. Columns 1 and 4 are based on 1996 values taken from the UNDP, 2000, NHDR, 2001/2002, Globalization:Towards a Lebanese Agenda. No adjustments were carried out to these values as they were meant to identify regional disparities rather thandepict an accurate HPI figure for the regions. Moreover any life table projections to measure life expectancy will not take into account thedifference that investments in the health sector over the last ten years may have made to mortality rates. Similarly available 2004 data forunder-weight children from the PAPFAM were not used since these seem to be over reported for Beirut and under reported for the regions;the South and the North in particular. Columns 2 and 3 ibid.

female. Similarly, even though, as the North reports thehighest levels of income poverty, other regions in thecountry, particularly the Bekaa and Nabatiyeh sufferfrom different kinds of exclusions that could potentiallymaintain families within a vicious poverty cycle (SeeChapter Two and Statistical Compendium). However,these findings also camouflage the problems of povertypockets that exist in each of these regions and that aswe shall see shortly point to considerable intra-regionaldiscrepancy.

A second Human Poverty Index (HPI- 2) was also calculatedsince it includes an additional dimension related to socialexclusion. Although normally applied to OECD coun-tries, this index was found relevant to Lebanon, whereinequity and exclusion are often more closely connectedto opportunity than to access and are directly related toquestions of citizenship rights. Even though we used dif-ferent criteria to assess functional literacy in Lebanonand thus values are more indicative than accurate, theexercise yields several interesting results.

As the table indicates, even though Lebanon is doing aswell as other OECD countries on issues of long-termunemployment and longevity, the country’s main areasof deprivation are to be found among that proportion ofthe population that lacks functional literacy skills and in the growing income gaps, as measured by the percentageof the population living 50 percent below the mediangap. Further disaggregation indicates that the largestpercentage of long-term unemployment levels is among

28

Table 2: HPI-2

Humanpovertyindex HPI-2

Probability at birthof not surviving to

age 60 (% of cohort)2000-2005

People lackingfunctional

literacy skills (% aged 16-65)

1994-2003

Long-term unemployment

(as % of labour force)

2006

Population livingbelow

50% of medianincome

2000-2004

NetherlandsGermanyBelgiumSpainUnited StatesUnited KingdomItalyLebanon

8.38.69.37.7

11.68.77.78.9

8.110.312.412.515.414.829.823.6

10.514.418.4

__20

21.847

36.5

1.85.84.62.20.51.23.42.9

7.38.4

814.2

1712.512.7

14.37

Note: International data are from HDR 2007/2008. Lebanon data: probability of survival are based on 1996 values. No adjustments werecarried out; functional literacy rates were estimated based on available information- see statistical compendium.

the youth (6.3 percent of total labor force) while data atthe Mohafaza level indicates that the North and Bekaaexhibit long-term unemployment rates lower than thenational average. At the same time, the growing impor-tance of specific skills in an increasingly knowledge driveneconomy and the changing demands of the labor mar-ket suggests the need to improve the functional literacylevels of Lebanese youth and building up their ability tocompete in today’s economy.

On the gender front, the Gender-Related Development Index(GDI) reflects inequalities between men and women. TheGDI for Lebanon roughly follows the pattern of the HDI,but is at a lower level, a phenomenon indicative of thepresence of gender inequality. While GDI trends showthat Lebanon has made some strides, it is still far fromdemonstrating gender parity. To measure the impact ofgender inequality on human development the value ofLebanon’s GDI value was compared to its HDI value andwas found to be 98.4 percent. Of the 157 countries withboth HDI and GDI, 107 countries have better ratios thanLebanon.24

It is important, never the less, to emphasize the consid-erable achievements made with respect to both higherfemale life expectancy and school enrollment andachievement. Despite higher illiteracy levels among olderwomen, female adult literacy levels have also increasedconsiderably in the past years especially in younger age

25 World Bank, 2006, The Road Not Traveled, Education Reform inthe Middle East and Africa, Washington DC, p. 30

24 UNDP, 2008, HDR 2008, Human Development Indices: A statisticalUpdate

The HPI-2 calculated for the first timeindicates that Lebanon’s main areas of dep-rivation are in the lack of functional literacyskills, growing income gaps, and long termunemployment especially among the youth

“ “

brackets and have led to gender parity in gross enrol-ment ratios (Table 4). Female students now outnumbermale students at secondary and tertiary levels at theratio of 1.12 and 1.19 respectively up from 0.68 and 032in the 1970’s. 25 However, female adult literacy levels stilllag behind those for males, particularly in outlying ruralareas. Another area of great inequity is in the gaps inincome and income-earning opportunities. The ratio offemale to male estimated income is 0.32.

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) focuses on women’sopportunities as opposed to their capabilities. Neither theglobal HDR nor previous NHDR’s have calculated thevalue of the GEM in Lebanon for more than a decade.Only one estimate of GEM, 0.212 for 1992, is availableand it is indicative of a very low level of achievement (atthe time, Lebanon ranked 103 out of 116 countries con-sidered). The situation has improved in the last sixteenyears and the GEM for Lebanon today stands at 0.350.Female participation in the political process hasimproved slightly, with an increasing number enteringparliament. Furthermore, 2004 saw the first timeappointment of two female ministers. Control over eco-nomic resources has also improved significantly in partdue to larger female participation in the work force andhigher rates of female enrolment in education. Clearly,however there are still possibilities for improvement, par-ticularly given the levels of female graduates at the terti-ary level, the increasing level of female participation inthe labor force and the rising number of female entrepre-neurs (See Statistical Compendium). Change can also beinduced by encouraging greater female participation inthe political process through the adoption of female quo-tas in parliamentary elections and making it possible forwomen to run in their areas of residence or birth.

Lebanon’s progress on the MDGs was also mapped outfor this report. These confirm the findings of the variousHDIs and allow the identification of a series of newissues. These include:

A weak employment to population ratio of 35.7 per-cent as compared to 47.8 percent for the MiddleEast, the majority of those employed working in thetrade and services sectors and more than two thirds(62 percent) in salaried employment. Youth sufferfrom higher levels of unemployment with youngwomen suffering the most from the consequences ofthe economic slowdown.

Growing poverty in terms of money, leading to

29

Table 3: Gender development index (GDI) for Lebanon

Life expectancyindex

Adult literacy index

Gross enrolmentindex

Educationindex

Income index

GDI

Female Male

0.770 0.782

Female Male

0.839 0.933

Female Male

0.742 0.726

Female Male

0.807 0.864

Female Male

0.646 0.835 0.779

Table 4: Gender parity index of gross enrollment rates

1970 1985 2003

Secondary

0.68

Tertiary

0.32

Secondary

0.98

Tertiary

__

Secondary

1.09

Tertiary

1.12

Source: World Bank, 2006

Table 5: Gender empowerment measure (GEM) for Lebanon

Seats in parliament held

by women(% of total)

Female legislators,senior officials and managers

(% of total)

Female professionaland technical

workers (% of total)

Estimated earnedincome

(PPP $US)a

Share of population

GEM

Female Male

4.7 95.3

Female Male

11.12 88.8

Female Male

46 54

Female Male

4537 15942

Female Male

0.502 0.498 0.349

The human development rank of Lebanon compareswell to that of Arab countries and developing states ingeneral (Table 6). Gulf countries such as Kuwait and theUnited Arab Emirates (UAE) have a higher HDI, in partdue to higher levels of income and increasing invest-ments in human capabilities. Despite all the upheavalsLebanon has managed a better performance than imme-diate Arab neighbors such as Jordan and Syria. This ispartly the result of major investments due to rehabilita-tion and reconstruction efforts and sustained high levelsof social indicators, which compare favorably even withcountries at the top of the medium human developmentgroup. In particular investments in education have had aconsiderable impact resulting in a combined enrolmentratio that is higher than that of all Arab countries in themiddle-income group except Jordan and comparable toif not higher than the ratios for countries in higherincome groups. Cyprus, in the high human developmentgroup of developing countries, shows a substantiallybetter human development performance than Lebanon,even though it share similar traits including the compa-rable basis of the two economies. Most higher income

B. Inter-Country Comparison

Both the GDI and GEM point to consider-able gender disparity on all fronts but edu-cation“ “ group countries address human development concerns

such as education and health more efficiently, and pro-vide better economic opportunities for all. Similarly,despite increasing poverty, Lebanon registers a relativelylow HP1 rank (18) in comparison with other Arab coun-tries including even those in the higher income bracket,such as the UAE. However, it is doing rather poorly onthe gender-related development index. In part, this isdue to the large difference between males and femalesin estimated earned income as well as to significant dif-ference in political representation.

C. Lebanon and the MDGs

30

Table 6: Select international and regional comparisons in indices

Human development

index value2006

HDI Rank

Human poverty index

(HPI-1) rank2005

Human poverty index

(HPI-1) value (%)

Gender-relateddevelopment index (GDI)

rank2006

Gender-relateddevelopment index (GDI)

value2006

Gender empowermentmeasure (GEM)

value2005

High Human Development29 Cyprus30 Kuwait35 United Arab Emirates40 ChileMedium Human Development77 Lebanon91 Jordan97 Tunisia107 Syrian Arab Republic116 Egypt

0.9120.9120.8950.874

0.7960.7680.7610.7360.715

----

173

1811453148

----

8.43.7

8.56.9

17.913.6

20

26313542

72828492--

0.910.8910.8760.866

0.7830.7540.7460.723

--

0.58--

0.6520.519

0.349*------

0.263

Note: * calculated by the NHDR- may not be comparable to other countries. All other data from HDR 2008.

increased regional and interregional disparities aswell as an increase in urban poverty pockets.

Elevated rates of illiteracy, particularly among womenover forty years of age, especially in rural areas suchas the Bekaa as well as regional and inter-regionaland inter-urban disparities in rates of completion ofprimary education. High drop out rates of 10.7 per-cent in basic education (primary and intermediatecycles) and repetition rates in public schools of 20-24percent are particularly problematic.26

Infectious diseases and under-five mortality ratescontinue to be a problem. High infant mortality ratesare related to inadequate neonatal care or insufficientimmunizations for children. These are in part thedirect result of the absence of a national health policyas well as unsafe environments. It is also due tounequal access to medical services across thecounty.

Improvements in maternal health, in pre- and postna-tal care as well as in increased dissemination of fam-ily planning methodologies also mask regional dispar-ities. Primary health care is also underutilized ashealth care tends to focus on curative rather than pre-ventive measures.

Improved incidence of tuberculosis and underreport-ing of HIV/AIDS cases, the latter being consideredtaboo socially. This makes it particularly hard to treatthe disease and to promote precautionary measuressuch as safe-sex practices.

26 Social Action Plan Report, Towards Strengthening Social SafetyNets and Access to Basic Social Services, sent to Paris III.

Despite increased efforts to improve environmentalperformance Green House Gas emissions (GHG)caused mainly by pollution from the energy sectorcontinue to rise. However the use of Ozone-depletingSubstances (ODS) has declined considerably due toincreasing use of alternative materials in industrialproduction and the encouragement of more bio-friendly agricultural practices. The use of CFCs hasbeen reduced by almost half, for example. Access tosafe drinking water also continues to be a problempartly as a result of interrupted services whilst accessto wastewater networks has improved. More critical-ly the problem of solid waste disposal continues to bemajor problem with more than 700 open dump sites.Devastating fires that hit the country in the past twoyears also pose an additional environmental chal-lenge.

Lebanon’s high debt to GDP ratio (one of the highestin the world) will hinder the implementation of a suc-cessful development plan. Debt servicing obligationswill reduce the effective capacity of the governmentto address growing development needs.

D. Mapping Inequity

Several issues are brought to light by analysis of theseindices. The first relates to gender inequities while thesecond relates to human poverty.

While some progress has been made on gender issues,considerable disparity in the human development of

D.1 Inequities of birth: Let the numbers tellthe story

31

27 See Jad Chaaban, 2008, The Costs of Youth Exclusion in theMiddle East, Wolfenson Center for Development, Dubai School ofGovernment.28 CERD, 2007, Statistical Bulletin for the Academic Year 2006/2007,Ministry of Education, http://www.crdp.org/CRDP/Arabic/ar-statis-tics/STAT_AR/2006_2007/PDF06_07/Tables_07/HigherEduc_07/Page113_07.pdf, accessed September 2008.

29 It rose in Category 2 civil service from 6.6 to 17.37 percent; inCategory 3 from 6.67 to 27.22 percent and in category 4 from 11.7to 28.7 percent.30 A non-Lebanese man married to a Lebanese woman will begranted residency only if he certifies that he will not engage in remu-nerated jobs, proves that he has a monthly income of LL5 million

* Estimated earned income substituted for the GDP per capita which is not available based on gender. Sources: All date is from 2004-2005. Columns 1, 4, 5, HDR 2008 columns 2,3 calculations based on National Household Survey.

Table 7: Male to female HDI

Lifeexpectancy

at birth (years)

Adult literacy rate(% aged 15and above)

Combined grossenrolment ratio forprimary, secondary

and tertiary education (%)

GDP per capita(PPP

US$ )*

Life expectancy

index

Educationindex

GDPindex

Humandevelopmentindex (HDI)

value

FemalesMalesLebanon

73.769.471.7

83.993.388.5

74.272.673.4

4.79214.8609.561

0.8120.7400.788

0.8070.8640.835

0.6460.8350.761

0.7550.8130.791

males and females in Lebanon remain. A comparisonbetween Male HDI and Female HDI, calculated for thefirst time in Lebanon, indicates considerable inequity.While male HDI stands at 0.813, considerably above thenational average of 0.792, female HDI rests at 0.755, isconsiderably below it. In other words, females havesome way to go, particularly where literacy for older pop-ulations and estimated earned income are concerned.

As discussed earlier, on literacy issues women are mak-ing better progress. When it comes to income, malescontinue to have the upper edge. Even though the salaryscale for entrants into the labor market is relatively gen-der blind, the discrepancy between male and femaleearned income increases the further individuals advancein their careers.27 Despite these and other cultural andlegislative obstacles to the participation of women in thelabor market (see Box 2.8 in Chapter Two), women areincreasingly asserting their economic independence,both as employees of the public and private sectors andas entrepreneurs (Statistical Compendium).

Furthermore, and as the GEM indicates, despite consid-erable gains, gender empowerment at decision-makinglevels remains pitifully low, particularly when the com-paratively high levels of females enrolled in and graduatingfrom tertiary level education are considered. For examplein 2006, 54.5 percent of university graduates were

The gender based HDI calculated for thefirst time for Lebanon and globally points toconsiderable disparity in the measuresbetween males and females especially onearned income

“ “

female and 45.5 percent were male.28 Yet, the appoint-ment of females to the higher echelons of the public sectoris scarce. Only 6.5 percent of Category 1 positions in thepublic sector are held by females at a time (1995-2006)when the total number of employees doubled (from 3.3percent to 6 percent). The same situation applies toCategories 2, 3, and 4 of civil employment and the foreignservice sectors as well.29 The judicial sector on the otherhand has witnessed notable developments. The numberof female justices has more than doubled in the lastdecade while the number of male justices has remainedapproximately the same.

Inequities in appointments also extend to the privatesector and institutes of higher education where in 2004,for example, only one out of sixteen deans and two outof thirty-one deans at the Lebanese University and theUSJ respectively were female. Three other universitieshave no female deans at all.

Another facet of gender inequity in Lebanon that has sig-nificant impact on the Human Development of the coun-try is connected to the citizenship rights of Lebanesewomen who are deprived of the right to pass on their cit-izenship to non-Lebanese husbands and to childrenborn of such marriages. Harsh residency rules for non-Lebanese husbands threaten the integrity of families30

For example, whereas a non-Lebanese woman marriedto a Lebanese man is granted residency and nationalityautomatically, a Lebanese woman married to a non-Lebanese man cannot grant him residency. Likewise, herinability to transfer her nationality to her own childrenrenders them stateless in cases where the father is alsounable to grant citizenship. It also deprives these chil-dren of other rights normally granted to Lebanese chil-dren. This situation leads to an increased number of

32

from transfers or pension fund and provides a bank statementproving he has an excess of LL300 million. Non-Lebanese womenmarried to Lebanese men are granted automatic residency. SeeRowad, Frontiers, January 2008, Women’s Rights in Lebanon,Gender Discrimination in terms of Nationality and Residency,Alternative Report to the Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination Against Women, 40th session. 31 Among others see MOSA and UNDP, 1998, 2006 and 2008;CDR and ESFD, 2004.32 This study uses expenditure data from the HouseholdPopulation Survey carried out by the CAS in 2004. MOSA, CAS,UNDP, 2008, Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon.33 ibid.34 ibid.

D.2 Life cycle inequities: The poverty trap

stateless persons in the country and deepens theirexclusion from society and impacts their future opportu-nities. Other inequities embedded in personal statuslaws also impact various aspects of human develop-ment. These are discussed at length in Chapter Three.

Even though the HPI tries to draw a composite profile ofpoverty in any given context, it fails to capture manyother elements related to this phenomenon, includingthe difference between quantitative and qualitativeaspects of deprivation. In the last decade, severalattempts were made to map income and standards ofliving inequity in Lebanon by different institutions.31

What most of these studies indicate is that Lebanon haswitnessed a growth of income-related poverty as well asof inter-regional and intra-regional disparities. Althoughthe percentage of poor individuals on a national scaledecreased from 31 percent to 24.6 percent, regional dis-parities have persisted and even grown, as has the per-centage of vulnerable population overall.

More recently, a Poverty, Growth and Income Distributionreport for Lebanon monitored poverty trends between1997 and 2007.32 According to this report, only 8 per-cent of the Lebanese population (or 300,000 individuals)suffer from extreme poverty (defined as living below thelower poverty line of US$2.4) and are thus unable tomeet their basic food and non-food needs, while closeto a third of the population fall below the upper povertyline (US$4 per day). Furthermore, the 2004-2007 periodsaw overall extreme poverty levels rise after they hadfallen between 1997 and 2004.33

The poverty headcount has also risen substantially insome of the regions particularly in the North, which has

Citizenship rights also reflect genderinequities and threaten the integrity offamilies“ “

a 52 percent poverty headcount using the upper pover-ty line, and 17.5 percent using the lower poverty line. Itis followed by the South, which has a 42 percent pover-ty headcount. (Table 2.19) The capital, Beirut, on theother hand has a low prevalence of extreme poverty(below 1 percent) and overall poverty (below 6 percent).

However, while such regional disparities are not uniqueto Lebanon, within-governorate inequality accounts formost of the inequity in Lebanon. Much of the recent dataindicates that inequality in Lebanon, using the GINIcoefficient, is relatively similar to other middle-incomecountries particularly in the MENA region (0.37) and sig-nificantly lower than Latin American countries (averageGINI is 0.55). It is estimated to be 0.37 for nominal con-sumption and 0.3 for real consumption in Lebanon.(Table 8) About 13 percent of aggregate inequality inconsumption in Lebanon is attributable to inter-gover-norate inequality, while the remaining 87 percent is dueto within-region inequality. In 2007, governorate intrastrata inequality ranged from 18 percent in North gover-norate to 9.7 percent in South and Mount Lebanon. (Seechapter 4 for further discussion of this issue). However,the distribution of expenditures among the population isrelatively unequal. While the bottom 20 percent of thepopulation expend only 7 percent of all consumption inLebanon, the richest 20 percent accounts for 43 per-cent.34

E. Beyond Inequity

Inequalities manifest themselves in a variety of dimen-sions, including health, education, and income. Thesedimensions do, however, interact with and reinforce oneanother. In other words, inequities in one dimensionoften translate into inequalities in other dimensions.Thus inequities in health impact the earning capacity ofindividuals while inequities in education impact theirfuture economic opportunities, and so on. For example23.3 percent of children under five born to illiteratemothers and 20.1 percent of those born to mothers whocan read and write but have not experienced secondaryeducation suffer from stunting, which is double thenational average of 11.5 percent. In comparison, only6.7 percent of children born to mothers with a second-ary education are stunted.35 Similarly, being disabledincreases the likelihood of poverty. Thus 50 percent ofthe disabled have a very low level of satisfaction with

While regional disparities are indicated bythe increase in the poverty headcount, with-in-governorate inequality accounts for mostof the inequity in Lebanon

“ “

35 League of Arab States, MoSA, CAS, 2004, Lebanon FamilyHealth Survey, p. 147.

Another study conducted for the NHDR on the civic edu-cation of ninth graders and their attitudes, knowledge,and actions in relation to key concepts found a directstatistical correlation between the educational attain-ment of the parents and the level of knowledge andunderstanding that students exhibited with regards tocivic concepts.39

Furthermore, these income and basic living conditionsinequities between and within governorates, point tomore embedded issues related to access and to oppor-tunity. For example, the improvement noted in the edu-cation sector actually conceals a regression in educa-tional quality and standards as well as a mismatchbetween regional distribution and need. This was alsoevident in the survey results of the NHDR’s Educationand Citizenship Study.40

The impacts of such inequity in access, resources, andopportunity for different strata of the population mayhave severe implications for the long-term prosperity ofthe country and the capacity of its population to realizetheir full potential. As experience from around the worldhas shown, inequality of opportunity traps people intopoverty cycles that often become inter-generational.Economic, social, and political inequalities are embed-ded in unequal social and cultural institutions. The socialnetworks that the poor have access to are considerablydifferent from the ones that the rich can tap into. Suchinequality traps affect not only the distribution but alsothe aggregate dynamics of growth and development. Inthe long run this may imply that equity and efficiencymay complement, rather than substitute for each other.Sustaining gains in human development and accelerating

33

36 Raw data of the Living Conditions of Households Survey 2004,calculated for the NHDR37 Jad Chaaban, 2008.38 League of Arab States et al, 2004, p. 156.

[1] The Theil index referred to measures the log deviation measure [is this correct], which is zero for perfect equality and for completeinequality (i.e., a situation in which one person consumes everything) and extends to infinity. It is most sensitive to inequality at the bottomof the distribution range. Source:MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution, p. 44.

Table 8: Inequality measures by governorate, 2004-2005

Governorate Gini index Theil index Within strata theilinequality index

Life expectancyindex

BeirutMount LebanonNorthBekaaSouthNabatiyehAll Lebanon

0.3410.3390.3730.3360.3470.2990.361

0.190.19

0.2270.1870.1920.1460.2150.1860.028

0.1870.1710.1870.1650.1920.1380.176

N/A0.0190.0410.0210.0030.0080.039

Within Governorate

Between Governorate

their living conditions, 41 percent have an averageincome of less than USD266 (which is less than the aver-age wage), 38 percent are illiterate, and 68.9 percenthave no medical insurance.36 Difficulties in accessingschools and societal stereotyping sustain their contin-ued exclusion. Similarly, youth tend to be the first to losetheir jobs when employment becomes scarce, leading toa youth unemployment rate of 19.2 percent as com-pared to a 7 percent adult unemployment rate. Amongfemale youth unemployment is significantly higher thanamong male (22.45 percent versus 18.51 percentrespectively).37 The conditions of working children can inthe future have adverse impact on their health and well-being. Around 26-30 percent of working children com-plain of having to endure adverse environmental condi-tions (loud noises, humidity, cold, and heat) for longhours, and this in turn may have long term impacts ontheir health and productivity.

Over time, this interaction between inequities leads towhat is often termed the intergenerational poverty trap.In such situations, gender inequities are very relevant tothe social and economic well being of families and, ifaddressed, can help pull individuals and households outof such cycles of poverty and help enhance the futureprospects of children. Countless studies today indicatethe direct causal relationship between improved educa-tion of the mother and better health and educational out-comes for their children. For example, a recent surveyfor Lebanon found that 40.7 and 31 per thousand chil-dren under five years of age and under 1 year respec-tively born to illiterate mothers die each year as com-pared to 13.9 per thousand, or one third fewer, born tomothers who have completed a secondary education.38

39 UNDP, MEHE, CDR, 2008, Education and Citizenship inLebanon, an NHDR publication.40 ibid.

34

Addressing citizenship is a difficult task anywhere in theworld, let alone a country like Lebanon that not only haseighteen legally recognized religious sects but has alsobeen the site of intense political and civil instability andmilitary conflicts. To begin with, both the concepts of‘citizens’ and ‘citizenship’ are highly contested in theoryand practice raising a lot of challenges for empiricalresearch. In a context as highly charged as Lebanon,addressing these challenges also means exploring waysto engage with discourses of citizenship that exclude ormarginalize segments of the population while at thesame time examining the different ways in which peopleposition themselves as citizens.

Recognizing the difficulties of addressing the dilemmasof citizenship in Lebanon and given the multiple politicaland social influences on citizen practices, as well as onthe practices of democracy, has meant a somewhatnovel departure for this NHDR from some of the normsgenerally followed in the preparation of such reports. Itnecessitated a flexible mechanism capable of adaptingto rapidly changing circumstances and of allowing theintegration of citizens’ concerns and actions, beyond thenorms of academic analysis, opinion polls and surveys.Taking our cue from Bourdieu, we have also felt com-pelled to adopt an approach that would allow us to high-light contradictions without necessarily resolving them.41

In other words, we have needed to develop a constructthat is simultaneously both top down and bottom up.

1.4 METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

the pace of growth means paying close attention to sev-eral new challenges, especially in health and educationas the Lebanese compete in a global arena.

The adverse impact of such inequity is not limited to thesocio-economic well being of citizens. Rather it goes tothe heart of notions of citizenship. As outlined in theintroduction to this chapter, democratic citizenshipincludes not only political and civil rights but social rightsas well. People’s understandings of these rights and fulfill-ment of their obligations as citizens are at the center of theiridentification as citizens with a particular national identity.

The impact of such inequity on access,resources, and opportunity for populationmay have severe implications for the long-term prosperity of the country… suchinequities also go to the heart of citizenshiprights

“

“

Accordingly, a multifaceted and outward lookingapproach has been devised. This aims to:

Engage the widest possible range of citizens Initiate discussion in a variety of forums on differentthemes related to citizenshipBring diverse citizen voices into the project

To achieve these goals and cover the three main aspectsof citizenship in Lebanon the study has used varioustools. These include the following:42

RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION FORUMS

Substantive desk research on the themeCommissioning twelve background papers, fourworkshop presentations and nineteen discussants todefine problems and concepts; Organization of thirty-seven discussion forums androundtables including academics, practitioners, andmembers of the general public. These included:

Twelve workshops and fifteen thematic focusgroups meetings (on six themes);Four general roundtables with specific groups; Two training workshops for young journalistsand university students;Partnership with a young NGO on three dis-cussion forums with university students;One discussion forum with high school stu-dents;

ENGAGEMENT AND OUTREACH

One major activity entitled One Hundred and OneStories to Tell that aimed to solicit citizenship initia-tives in public life. This entailed a wide scale campaigninvolving the distribution of 12,000 posters andbrochures across the country to all municipalities, pub-lic and private schools, MoSA’s NGO centers andhundreds of independent NGOs as well as Televisioncommercials that ran for 2 months on the five majornews channels in the country. A large media campaign on the one hundred and onestories that proved to be the most powerful advocacytools for the promotion of citizenship. The campaignhad a simple idea and included coordination with thefive major newspapers in Lebanon (three Arabic, oneEnglish, and one French) as well as with the sevenmajor television stations, which all featured thesestories in different programs. The idea was that notwo news outlets would carry the same story but allwould appear under the same title, of One Hundredand One Stories to Tell.Launch of a website to encourage forum discussions

42 See Annex for further details on the background papers, work-shops and focus groups.

41 Pierre Bourdieu, and Loïc Wacquant, 1992, An Invitation toReflexive Sociology, Polity Press, London.

35

on the theme and background papers. The websitehas become a major resource for researchers, policymakers, and members of the public seeking data andother matters related to the theme.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

A major survey on education and citizenship thatassesses the concepts, knowledge, attitudes, andactions of ninth grade students on citizenship anddemocracy. It included 3,111 students in 113 publicand private schools in the six governorates(mohafazat) of Lebanon. It also included question-naires for school principals and civic educationteachers.Preparation of a statistical compendium thatincludes political and cultural as well development indi-cators. The aim is to establish a reference point foracademics, policy makers, and researchers alike. Calculating new Human Development Indices forLebanon including the HPI-2 and the GenderEmpowerment Index (GEM) as well as disaggregatingthe HDI on both gender and regional bases.Preparing an updated Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) balance sheet.

IMMEDIATE POLICY OUTCOMES

Establishment of an Education and CitizenshipObservatory in partnership with the Ministry ofEducation and Higher Education and experts in thefields of education. The aim of this observatory is toassess the impact of civic education and pedagogicalcontext on the attitudes, knowledge and actions ofstudents using the education and citizenship surveyresults, co-organize workshops on the matter, makeresults with regards to the impact of educational pol-itics and practices on democratic citizenship andpeace building better known to decision-makers,researchers, specialists and teachers and monitorprogress, in coordination with concerned NGOsprogress on the impact of policy or curricularchange.

ADDITIONAL OUTPUTS

As a result of this approach, various supplementaryitems have also been prepared for dissemination inde-pendently and with the report, in addition to the NHDR.These include:

One Hundred and One Stories to Tell: CitizenInitiatives in Public Life (in Arabic and English)

Education and Citizenship: Concepts Attitudes,Knowledge and Actions of Ninth Graders in Lebanonfrom a National and International Perspective (InArabic and English)Statistical Compendium on Political, Socio-Economic and Cultural matters (In Arabic and English)

STRUCTURE

The full report is subdivided into six chapters. ChapterOne sets the conceptual and analytical framework forthe project and the elements for an agenda that wouldassist the shift referred to in the report’s title, Toward aCitizen’s state. Chapter Two analyses the status ofhuman development in Lebanon today. Chapters Threethrough Five consider the relationship between the stateand one of the three sets of citizen rights—political,social and civic/cultural. Chapter Six elaborates on theagenda needed for the achievement of the move to aCitizen’s state. The aim is to strive toward an inclusivedevelopment approach based on principles of citizen-ship, social justice, and equity, all of which need to besystematically internalized into national strategies andpolicies.

BALANCE SHEETON CITIZENSHIP

2

2.1 POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

37

Lebanon is an electoral democracy, with a universal rightto vote granted to all citizens over the age of 21 and reg-ularly occurring elections. Social citizenship rights suchas access to education and health are guaranteed whileon the cultural front, freedom of thought, worship andexpression are legally and constitutionally guaranteed.The preamble of the Lebanese constitution recognizesthe international declaration of human rights and holdsthe Lebanese state accountable for its implementation.Lebanese citizens enjoy a free if increasingly polarizedpress, freedom of association and protection of persons.Notwithstanding weak implementation, Lebanon hasalso ratified a good number of international agreementsand treaties with regards to international human rights,equality under the law, protection from discrimination,protection of labor rights and the rights of children, andguarantees of women's rights.

However, despite these universal rights, there continueto be considerable deficiencies in representative/activecitizenship. The emergence of a full civic culture and theestablishment of equity among citizens in Lebanon arehampered largely by the ways in which state citizen rela-tions are framed by the constitution and by personal sta-tus laws. In other words it is hindered by constitutionalclauses and actions that consecrate political and civil

divisions among the communal groups. As ChapterThree Political Citizenship of the full report discusses,while the constitution guarantees equity among allLebanese citizens, and in spite of contradictionsbetween some of its articles, the partial implementationof the Taif constitution, the selective interpretation ofcertain articles and the lack of a civic status law have allundermined equity among citizens as well as progresstoward a citizen's state. In particular the non-implemen-tation of clauses in the Taif constitution meant toaddress political sectarianism, such as those related to,the formation of the “National Commission” entrustedunder article 95 of the constitution with the task to“study and propose the means to ensure the abolition ofconfessionalism,”43 the implementation of administra-tive decentralization, strengthening the independence ofthe judiciary, and the enactment of a new electoral lawintended to insure the representation of the “differentcategories of the population” and to guarantee commu-nal “co-existence,” have left the door wide open for anincreasingly dysfunctional system. Several other clausessuch as appointments to civil service have also beendistorted in practice.44

Similarly, guarantees of equity before the law on a widerange of issues is undermined by the state's relegation ofthe private affairs of citizens to each of the 18 recognizedreligious denominations or sects coupled with theabsence of a civic status laws. Article 9 of the constitution

[….]b. Lebanon is of Arab affiliation and identity; it is a founding and active member of the Arab League and is bound by itscharter; it is also a founding and active member of the United Nations and abides by its charter and by the InternationalDeclaration of Human Rights. The Lebanese state represents these principles in all rights and domains with no excep-tion.c. Lebanon is a democratic, parliamentary republic founded on the respect for public liberties, the foremost of whichare freedom of opinion and belief; and on social justice and equality in rights and in duties among all citizens withoutdiscrimination or distinction.[….]f. The economic system is a liberal one that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.g. The balanced, cultural, social, and economic growth of the regions is a principal pillar of the unity of the state and ofthe stability of the system.

Box 2 : Select articles from the Preamble of the Constitution

43 Cf. article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution, as amended in 1990.(All references are to an English translation of the constitution, withall amendments since 1926, published by the Lebanese Ministry ofJustice in 1995).

44 Nawaf Salam, 2007, Taif's Dysfunctions and the Need forConstitutional Reform, Unpublished paper

PART TWOBALANCE SHEET ON CITIZENSHIP

38

consecrates the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis sectsand religions; i.e. they are all seen as equal. Individualreligious authorities are given full control over the affairsof individuals born to their community. Seven differentpersonal status regimes are applied to the 13 recognizeddenominations45 and four different regimes to citizensborn to the Muslim faith. To this, we can add an undeter-mined number of civil status laws. This has created adichotomy between the public and private identities ofcitizens as members of a national community and ofspecific religious communities at one and the same time.In the context of today it has meant that often the sec-tarian identity of individuals has overtaken all other iden-tities including familial, tribal and regional. However,while each religious authority controls the affairs of “its”citizens from the cradle to the grave and Judges in reli-gious courts enjoy great latitude in interpreting legisla-tion, oversight, by the state over their conduct takesplace through the General Commission of the Court ofCessation and is limited to monitoring competency inthe issuing of verdicts and whether determining theseverdicts violate a fundamental tenant of public order. Asa result, citizens often resort to changing their sects soas to bypass inheritance or other personal status lawsdictated by their sect. More importantly, this implies thatwhile article 9 of the constitution guarantees that “free-dom of belief is absolute” individual rights are onlyacknowledged if one belongs to a specific sect.

In this regard, different kinds of inequities between citi-zens are ingrained. On the one hand, women are sub-jected to legally condoned discrimination based on

patriarchal religious laws. In turn this impacts the familyparticularly with respect to child custody and inheri-tance. Women cannot pass on their nationality to chil-dren born to foreign fathers and are granted custody aslegal guardians in limited situations in cases of maritaldisputes and often suffer in issues of inheritance.Similarly, individuals born to different denominations aresubject to varied laws with regards to a vast array ofmatters such as divorce, children rights etc. ManyLebanese have resorted to civil marriage abroad whichthen “pits Lebanese judges against the world” in thewords of Judge John Kazzi.

In this context, the relationship of the state to its citizensis “legally confessionalized”. Sectarian communitieshave been tasked with mediating the relationshipbetween the state and “its” citizens, not only in practicebut through the law as well. This includes political, socialand cultural aspects of this relationship. As the stateceded more ground to the individual religious communi-ties, the internal sovereignty of the state has diminishedand the political process has tended to lose its effective-ness. From this perspective, personal status laws havealso become a source of political power over the variouscommunities.

The Lebanese system is also characterized by a specif-ic brand of consociational democracy whereby all par-ties govern together and minorities and majorities dis-solve into a greater power sharing scheme. Whileconsociational democracy is viewed as a way to “demo-cratically manage diversity” in countries where verticalsocietal divisions exist, its particular manifestations inLebanon have led to what Regis Dubray has termed a“catastrophic equality” between the different communalgroups. (See Chapter Three in full report). In this regardthe claim that consociational democracy has protectedminority rights leads to the question of which rights? Inother consociational regimes the minority rights thatneed to be protected are linguistic, ethnic, religious orcultural. In Lebanon such rights are protected by theconstitution. However, the power sharing scheme that

45 6 are catholic and so follow the same law

Individual religious authorities are givenfull control over the affairs of individualsborn to their community. This implies thatwhile article 9 of the constitution guaranteesthat “freedom of belief is absolute” individ-ual rights are only acknowledged if onebelongs to a specific sect

“

“

Women suffer degrees of discrimination in both rights and responsibilities that vary both from sect to sect and within thesame sect. The most prominent types of discrimination against women as individuals and as members of families include:

Deprivation of personal independence in issues like legal capacity and the need for a custodian (father, brother, hus-band, or son);Discrimination with regard to marriage contracts, and thus with regard to alimony, desertion, request for divorce andcompensation resulting from divorce;Discrimination with regard to relations with children, in issues of child custody;Discrimination with regard to the inheritance rights of women and their practical ability to exercise these rights.

Box 3: Discrimination among women

39

allocates government positions to different religiousgroups has strengthened vertical societal cleavages andtransformed communal groups into opposing parties. Ithas also reduced citizens to membership in smallerpolitical communities named sects that makes theirpolitical or their civic status, contingent on their submis-sion to this categorization.

In the same vein, political sectarianism in Lebanon hasproduced a division of power in the public domain thatscarcely resembles other consociational regimes. Otherforms of consociational rule involve high levels of politi-cal cohesion, represented by the unity of the State, anda central authority that is charged with the prerogativesof maintaining the sovereignty and cohesiveness of thenational State. Among the prerogatives of central gov-ernment are policies on citizenship, public finances, fis-cal policy, foreign policy, defense policy, and generalsecurity (particularly related to cross-border movement,controls on foreign nationals, national intelligence bod-ies, and so on) as well as the authority for assessing theconstitutionality of laws and regulations, the judiciary,and social security. With the expansion of developmen-tal decentralization central authority continues to orientnational growth, and ensure that local and regional gov-ernments abide by the law. Rather than safeguard thoseprerogatives of the national state, political groups inLebanon, in collusion with external powers haveassigned each of these 'national' tasks to a select reli-gious community. In other words, they have sought tocreate a political society based on “sectarian specializa-tion,” in state matters with the following division of labor:Shiite liberation, Sunni reconstruction, and Maronitesovereignty.

Over time, the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanonconsecrated the Shiites as the primary force of resist-

ance and liberation through one of their political parties,Hizbullah. Following the withdrawal of the Israeli army in2000, they maintained their control of the region and theLebanese army was prevented from commandingLebanon's borders with Israel. In time, the resistancehas come to be presented by one political group asLebanon's prime defense mechanism against the recur-ring incursions by Israel, thus totally appropriating thestate's normal hegemony over the means of violence,control of borders and foreign policy. The 2006 Israeliwar on Lebanon further highlighted the penalties of thisprocess. These consequences are not limited to thehuman and material damage or to future developmentinitiatives but touches on the unity of the country and therights of all citizens in a sovereign state.

While the Shiites, “represented” by Hizbullah came to beregarded as the “liberators” of the country, the Sunnis,personified by the late Prime Minister Rafic el Hariricame to be viewed as the prime engine for post civil warreconstruction, a paramount concern in the early 1990's.The successful post-war reconstruction of Beirut, partic-ularly its historic center and the massive infrastructureprojects that were undertaken, lead to a symbolic asso-ciation in the minds of many and in popular discoursebetween investments in reconstruction, mounting publicdebt and Gulf countries. More crudely the Sunnis weresaid to be “responsible” for a new Gulf aesthetic and forthe tremendous public debt. This perspective meant thatpublic discussion of money's spent (or wasted) in otherareas that were not viewed as “Sunni preserves”, suchas compensation for the wartime displaced, military per-sonnel, improving the situation of the electricity, state-financed hospitalization and medical care, the contract-ing operations of the Council for the South, etc were

suppressed.46 Political support for such readings notonly torpedoed all public debate of the post war recon-struction process or of the state's fiscal strategy. It alsoled, rightly or wrongly, to corrupting the political effect ofreconstruction itself. Reconstruction became a space forsectarian discrimination and division, rather than unitybetween a State recovering its power and a societywhose physical capital had been disseminated by thecivil war.

Along with national defense, post-war reconstructionand public finance, demands for State sovereignty andindependence was also associated with a specificsect/community; the Maronite community. From the endof the civil war in 1990 to Prime Minister Hariri's assas-sination in Feb 2005, Lebanese Christians, and particu-larly the Maronites had brandished demands for the sov-ereignty and independence of Lebanon. This was not

… the relationship of the state to its cit-izens is “legally confessionalized.” Sectariancommunities have been tasked with mediat-ing the relationship between the state and“its” citizens, not only in practice butthrough the law as well

“

“…sectarian and external forces com-

bined have assigned the different communi-ties particular national “tasks”; Shiite liber-ation, Sunni reconstruction, and Maronitesovereignty

“ “

46 This disparity led to a sectarian reading of reconstruction.However, it is also easy to overstate the case, as it ignores the factthat Beirut is the country's capital, and that the Sunnis make uponly part of its inhabitants..

40

new to the Christian community in general; the two slo-gans had been pillars of their political rhetoric since the1920's even if this vision of sovereignty and independ-ence changed over different historical moments. The Taifagreement that embodied the end of the civil war mar-ginalized a part of this community while the MaronitePartiarch became a key figure in this settlement.However support of this agreement was not a blanketendorsement of Syrian tutelage of the country.47 ManyChristian politicians boycotted the first and second par-liamentary elections in 1992 and 1996 consecutively. In2000 a statement of the Maronite patriarchy would formthe spark for the renewed demand for sovereignty andindependence. The formation of the (pro-sovereignty)Qornet Shehwan grouping in April 2001, brought togeth-er individuals whose political positions were close to thechurch and initiated the gradual return of the LebaneseForces militia to open activity, and launched efforts tocoordinate positions with the Free Patriotic Movementand its leader, General Michel Aoun. However, thechronic conflict over who would be considered the mainleader of all Christian groups and the entire independ-ence front would reignite with force in the aftermath ofthe assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and the entryof the Muslim Sunnis and the Druze into the fraydemanding liberation, independence and sovereignty.

The outcome of such a sectarian reading of eventstransformed the three most significant accomplishmentsof Lebanon in the post war period into massive burdensand a threat to its unity. The post civil war reconstructionof the 1990s, the liberation of the south in 2000 after 22years of Israeli occupation, and the withdrawal of Syriantroops from Lebanon and its release from Syrian tutelage

in 2005 after 30 years of direct and indirect hegemony ismajor accomplishments for which the Lebanese paid avery high price. Brandishing such sectarian overtones tothese accomplishments transformed them into signifi-cant threats to the unity of the country and a source ofdivision among its varied communities. Each of thesemomentous achievements has become a momentousburden for the country and its citizens.

This situation is facilitated in part by the influence of for-eign powers on Lebanon's internal politics. This influ-ence is well documented to the extent that most politicalparties proudly display their affiliations to each other.These connections go beyond ideological synergies.Rather they include material, political, symbolic andeducation mechanisms such as financial assistance, useof international connections to support the positions ofparticular political parties within the country, symbolicrepresentations, frameworks of analysis and thinking,and even modes of conduct that are transferred to mem-bers of the sect or community. Various facets of civic lifeand civic guarantees disintegrate in the process, asLebanon is transformed into an arena for external bar-gaining among regional and international powers.Internally, the conflict between the different groups is acontest over the state and its institutions. Maintaining aweak state in such a context benefits all the differentgroups and facilitated their control of access to its services.

Institution building has also suffered tremendous set-backs as political/sectarian conflicts materialize in polit-ical deadlock. State institutions, usually shaped bynegotiations between traditional political leadership overpolitical prerogatives, have been transformed into a pri-mary sphere of contestation between the main sectariangroups based on the projected “rights” of these groups.This has also led to the reproduction of traditional powerstructures and deficiencies in active / representative cit-izenship while clientelist networks are camouflaged asthe interests of specific communities.

The results of this contestation is that political powerstruggles over state institutions have been exacerbatedto the point where these institutions are considered mereinstruments in the larger negotiations between represen-tatives of the different religious/communal groups. Thisis particularly evident in two issues: 1) negotiations overthe appointments of civil servants whereby much of thedebate has focused on the “rights” of each religiouscommunity in terms of quality of posts and number

Brandishing such sectarian overtones tothe most significant accomplishments forLebanon transformed them into significantthreats to unity. Each of these momentousachievements has become a momentousburden for the country

“

“

The influence of foreign powers onLebanon's internal politics have transformedit into an arena for external bargainingamong regional and international powers

“ “

47 Syria's exclusive role as sponsor became stabilized withAmerican and Israeli support in the first half of the 1990s. MostChristians boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections, with theblessing of the Maronite Patriarchate. Progressively, this boycottwas enhanced by the exclusion of the Lebanese Forces frompower through the imprisonment and trial of its leader, SamirGeagea, and an official prohibition of the group in 1994. However,many Christian figures, both independent and close to the patri-arch, continued to cooperate with the president of the Republicand with the Government, as well as public officials who owed theirallegiance to Syria. This cooperation did not end what was calledat the time “Christian frustration” with their weakened politicalpowers established by the post-Taif Constitution as well as thelogic of Syria's management of these groups.

41

rather than the merit of the candidates and the require-ment of the job48 and 2) the statements made during theformation of new governments whereby political leadersare explicit in their demand for “service” ministries (i.e.ministries that render the maximum amount of servicesat a time of election) but also the rights of religious com-munities to specific ministries.

The former action is based on the transformation of the“transitional character of article 95 of the constitutionthrough an interpretation that extends its purviewbeyond grade one civil servants. The latter is an out-come of the increasing polarization between communi-ties and has resulted in political deadlock that is slowlyparalyzing the executive branches of government and itsability to effectively rule the country. It has also material-ized in the paralysis over Lebanese University reformand thus negatively impacted educational standards. Inthis context clientelism is camouflaged as the interestsof sectarian communities.

At the same time, in the last few years, new and detri-mental constitutional customs have been emerging asdifferent groups vie for political power and attempt toreshape political territory in the post-Syrian era. AsThomas A. Baylis observes in his comparative analysisof executive power in the emerging democracies ofeastern Europe, “new rules and institutions … do notinstantly produce firm realities but rather create a loosestructure that political actors seek to shape in the interestof their own power and policy objectives”.49 In Lebanon,and despite the emergence of cross religious politicalblocs, these practices have reinforced sectarian politicalpower over the different communities. One example ofsuch practices are the different interpretations of theconstitution in 2006-2007 that led to a year and a halflong hiatus in the work of the parliament and paralysis ingovernment procedures and actions. These have alsoundermined the power of the constitution as the singlemost binding legal text that governs the state and nationand have led the country to the brink of the civil conflict.

The electoral law, another sphere of contestationbetween religious communities has changed 9 times inthe 13 parliamentary elections Lebanon has had since

independence. As a result, and even though electionstake place regularly (with the exception of the civil warperiod between 1975-1990), Lebanese citizens have hadto rely on a deficient and unstable electoral systemmarked by constantly changing administrative divisions.The law has served to reproduce traditional power struc-tures and hindered the emergence of new, independentpolitical leadership. Despite these shortcomings, dataindicates that voter turnout and participation in the 2005elections, was adequate, around 42.9 percent of theelectorate. It ranged from 36 percent in Beirut to 55.5percent in Mount Lebanon.

More recent attempts at electoral reform represented bythe Botrous commission assigned by the government ofPrime Minister Sanyoura to draft a new electoral law hasbeen blocked by a political agreement to end the politi-cal deadlock and civil conflict that was brokered inDoha, Qatar this past May. The law's proposed dual vot-ing system insures that a little less than half the parlia-ment is elected based on the principle of non-sectarianrepresentation in the six historic districts of Lebanon,while the rest are elected through majoritarian votingbased on the smaller regions. In this, the Botrous lawencapsulates the two opposing directions that theLebanese polity is pursuing. It tries to marry two votingsystems with the dual identity of voters as citizens andas members of specific religious communities or geo-graphic regions. Moreover, it does not reflect the currentdemographic and geographic distribution of the popula-tion by keeping citizens connected to their places of ori-gin it reinforces their primal loyalties. The proposed lawalso includes other reforms such as lowering the votingage to eighteen, placing controls over campaign fundingand spending, and so forth. Recently, some elements ofthe law were adopted by parliament but the key reforms,such as proportional representation, that would haveallowed the emergence of new national political leader-ship were sidelined. Other clauses to lower the votingage to 18 and assign a quota for women were also notadopted. In their place, a return to the 1960 electoral lawwas voted in; one which relies on small districts and

48 As a result, appointments of public sector employees, recruitedthrough a recent mechanism put in place by the government ofPrime Minister Sanyoura and which relies on the professional qual-ifications of candidates rather than their religious affiliation hasbeen blocked. 49 Thomas A. Baylis, “Presidents Versus Prime Ministers: ShapingExecutive Authority in Eastern Europe” in World Politics, 48.3(1996) 297-323, p. 302

In the last few years new and detrimen-tal constitutional customs have emerged asdifferent groups vie for political power in thepost- Syrian era

“ “

Institution building has also sufferedtremendous setbacks as political / sectarianconflicts materialize in political deadlock“ “

The electoral law, another sphere of con-testation between religious communitieshas changed 9 times in the past 13 parlia-mentary elections…

“ “

42

insures that parliamentarians are voted in by their reli-gious compatriots.

In many ways this act points to the close affiliationbetween political parties and specific religious commu-nities. Rather than being agents of change, these partiesare infact falling deeper and deeper into crisis, unable torenew their discourse as more and more people loseconfidence.The absence of laws guaranteeing nationalpolitical parties has further hindered the ability ofLebanese society to produce new, “nationally oriented”leadership.

In addition to elections, other mechanisms of politicalcontrol are also being challenged. While some progresshas been made on constitutional reform, aimed at sup-porting the independence of the judiciary, political inter-ference continues openly in some cases. At the sametime, progress on other fronts has also been made withthe creation of a new oversight body for the electoralprocess and a new inter-ministerial committee for socialreform.

The Botrous law encapsulates the twoopposing directions that the Lebanese polityis pursuing “ “

Rather than being agents of change, polit-ical parties are falling deeper and deeper intocrisis, unable to renew their discourse asmore and more citizens lose confidence

“ “Social citizenship rights are a fundamental componentof integral citizenship and necessary for the full exerciseof democratic citizenship and expanding people'scapacities. The consensus reached on the basic compo-nents of citizenship considers the rights to educationand health as crucial. Likewise, elements that hinder thefull integration and participation of individuals in societysuch as unemployment, poverty and inequality are con-sidered basic to the practice of effective citizenship.50

2.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP

50 See UNDP, 2005, Democracy in Latin America, Towards aCitizen's Democracy; p. 118-129

Dimensions

Basic NeedsSocial Integration

Components

Health, EducationEmployment, poverty and inequality

Box 4: Dimensions of social citizenship

Social citizenship rights in Lebanon have a long andcheckered history. The Lebanese state has been histori-cally identified with a laissez faire economic approachwhere much is left to market forces. At the same time,this liberal and open economic system includes sub-stantive investments in various social sectors such ashealth, education and a wide range of social welfare andprotection policies. Moreover, these rights as well asother fundamental human rights are enshrined in the1990 Preamble of the Constitution, which recognizes theInternational Declaration of Human Rights as a funda-mental pillar for all citizen rights (Box 4).

However, the translation of these rights into laws andprograms has been beset by a series of issues that feedoff each other. A large number of these issues are relat-ed to the internal structure of Lebanese policy making aswell as the particularities of the Lebanese political sys-tem where clientelist networks frequently overlap withsectarian identities and in the process hinder the imple-mentation or enactment of national policies seen tothreaten the interests of particular groups. As such,social development has been hampered by the absenceof a social policy framework, weak coordination, politi-cally-influenced targeting of development aid and thepaucity of reliable data, including post project or crisisevaluations. Rather than a comprehensive vision/agenda,a piecemeal approach to social development was institut-ed. Furthermore, the involvement of alternate considera-tions in public allocations has undermined governmentdelivery in the social sphere as well as the connectionsbetween the state and its citizens causing considerableinequity among citizens. Other factors are related to politi-cal and military instability, including a 15 year civil war andseveral Israeli invasions, as well as a series of other inter-nal factors have resulted in a muddled institutional contextwhere the state's capacity to lead the developmentprocess has been undermined.

As a result, and even though, the post-war period inLebanon is characterized by a succession of govern-ments that have viewed social rights as part of a largerdiscourse of balanced development and growth, dispar-ities in growth and development across Lebaneseregions, districts and classes have persisted and evengrown in some areas. While it is in no way a foregoneconclusion that it is government policy that is directlyresponsible for the exacerbated inequalities andinequities, it remains an open question whether the allo-cation of public resources has, in fact, been guided byconcerns for balanced capacity-building, or whether thechanneling of public funds was in fact constrained byother political considerations having to do with sectarianbalance, clientelism, and/or other factors.

43

In the absence of this framework or vision, the bound-aries of state and non-state intervention have beenblurred and the role of different public, private and civilsociety stakeholders with respect to major public socialservices (health, education, social welfare) ill-defined.Like many other countries around the world the provi-sion of social services in Lebanon is characterized by amultiplicity of stakeholders that includes a wide range ofstate institutions, international NGOs, family and com-munal organizations, and national NGOs, as well as pri-vate institutions. A large number of the latter two cate-gories are affiliated with particular religious groups orspecific political parties.

Given the delicate sectarian balance required by thedominant political system this has lead to a situationwhere vested political interests are closely intertwinedwith sectarian clientelist networks. Often the legacy andpower of communitarian factions, in addition to theirvested interests, tend to be stronger than those of thestate itself.

This has a profound effect on the equitable and ade-quate delivery of services. Much decision making withingovernment is subject to a process unrelated to the mer-its of the proposed policy at a national level. Rather,more often than not, discussion revolves around how thedifferent private/sectarian interests might be affected.This negotiation takes place through the designated rep-resentatives of the different sects within government andin turn allows for the institutionalization of confessional/clientelist networks within state institutions. In such acontext procedures and mechanisms of the decision-making process are often subject to confusion and alack of transparency, and thus leave room for consider-able questions such as: on what basis is the sectoral,and sub-sectoral allocation of direct social public invest-ment decided? What is the rationale behind the geo-graphic and spatial distribution of such investments? Towhat extent are these investments subject to regularoutcome evaluations that assess their impact on benefi-ciaries? These questions highlight issues related to thepublic supply side of social services, which, is greatlyaffected by the entanglement of formal and informaldecision-making processes: the government, concernedministries and/or public entities, donor countries oragencies, CSO's as well as national and international

…the delicate sectarian balance requiredby Lebanon's political system has created acontext where vested political interests areclosely intertwined with sectarian clientelistnetworks in the provision of all services

“ “

NGO's. The result has been that the distribution of socialexpenditures by governorates is not consistent with theregional share of deprived populations.

Social sector spending in Lebanon is high, in nominalterms and as a proportion of GDP, with more than 70percent of that spending coming from the private sector.According to the World Bank,51 the sum of public andprivate social spending stood at approximately 21 per-cent of GDP in 2004, of which 15 percent was suppliedby the private sector. The Ministry of Finance estimatesthat public social expenditures (defined by the opera-tions of ministries of Education, Health and Social Affairsand expenditures channeled through related agencies)stood at 6.75 percent of GDP in 2006 which represents35 percent of primary expenditures in 2006. When pub-lic pensions and end-of-service indemnities are alsotaken into account, total social expenditures rises to8.32 percent of GDP, with public social expendituresrepresenting more than 25 percent of government pri-mary expenditures in 2006.52

This high social spending is not commensurate with out-comes. A comparative study undertaken by Herrera andPang (2005), estimates that input efficiency; that isexcess public input for a given level of public and privateoutput is of the order of 79-87 percent for education53

and 71-75 percent for health.54 In other words, Lebanonuses at least 25 percent more inputs (public spending) toproduce the same health outcomes as best practicescountries55and at least 13 percent more inputs for edu-cation. And this does not account for the fact thatLebanon's share of private spending in total socialspending, at least for health - but probably also for edu-cation, is much higher than most of the 180 countriesconsidered in this study.56

This mismatch between spending and outcomes is part-ly because it is not based on need. Between 1995 and2005, total public spending on infrastructure related tosocial outcomes totaled more than US$ 4.4 billion.57

51 World Bank, 2005, Lebanon Public Expenditure Reform Prioritiesfor Fiscal Adjustment, Growth and Poverty Alleviation. Report No.32857 - LB. Washington D.C.52 Ministry of Finance, www.mof.gov.lb53 As measured by net primary and secondary school enrolment.54 Life and life disability-adjusted expectancy at birth and immu-nization rates (DPT and measles). 55 These countries are: Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Trinidad andTobago, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, Kuwait and Chile.56Private spending on health over GDP averages 2.3 percent forthe 187 countries sampled - to be compared with 10.2 percent inLebanon. There is no similar figure for private education. Publiceducation spending averages 4.5 percent of GDP for 166 countriessampled.57 Total spending by the CDR excludes projects that are national bynature such as airports, highways and the Lebanese University.

44

However, the allocation of this spending did not matchthe distribution of poverty (measured by the low satis-faction of basic needs index) in 1995: Beirut received 16percent of total public investment spending while it onlyhad 8 percent of total households with low satisfactionof basic needs in 1995. Nabatieh was home in 1995 to11 percent of the households with low basic needs sat-isfaction; however it received during the next 10 yearsonly 1 percent of total public spending.

In the education sector for example, data across gover-norates shows that the supply of public education (proxiedthrough school capacity created per 10,000 students)was not commensurate with the variance in schooldropout rates. In fact, the North received much less newschool capacity than the Bekaa and the South, yet thisregion had the highest school dropout rates in 2004. Thesituation is quite similar in the health sector. Regionalvariability in the supply of public hospitals was inefficientin targeting the regions with the highest health needs(these needs are proxied by using the percentage ofindividuals with at least one chronic illness). (Table 4.2)

Table 9: Public expenditure, poverty and basic needs

Total public invest-ment expenditure

(Million US$)1995-2005

Poverty incidence

(%)2004*

Allocation of publicinvestment expenditure

Distribution of lowsatisfaction of basic needs

1995**

Distribution of

poverty2004*

BeirutMount LebanonNorthBekaaSouthNabatiehTotal

5.8519.5652.5729.3642.2152.5728.55

7341,1111,415

24791842

4,467

1625326

211

100%

83026151011

100%

227381316

4100%

* Compiled from the MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution** Compiled from UNDP, 2005

Table 10: Supply versus need

BeirutMount LebanonNorthBekaaSouthNabatiehTotal

School capacity per10,000 students

1995-2005

School drop out rates (%)

2004

New hospital beds per10,000 persons

1995-2005

Population with at leastone chronic illness (%)

2004

557691

1581892599

67

117

1098

5326494

25161313191717

Source: Jad Chaaban and Nisreen Salti, Social Citizenship and the Economy:The Role of Sectarianism in the Allocation of PublicExpenditure, Background paper prepared for the current NHDR 2008/2009. Author computations are based on data from the MOSA,CDR, UNDP.

While inter-sectarian considerations strongly influencethe scope and profile of the public provision of socialservices, (such as the decisions to establish a publicschool, a university branch, or a hospital in this or thatarea), the state also indirectly generates public servicesthrough non-state actors; NGOs and private sector serviceproviders. However, this public financing of services pro-duced by the civil and private sector does not seem tobe based on needs assessments either and any opendiscussion of these policies is immediately viewed fromthe perspective of inter-sectarian considerations.

NGOs, some of which are affiliated with particular sec-tarian institutions get government funding for the provi-sion of some services to poor and vulnerable groupsirrespective of how efficient the results may be. Theseservices include free private education, medical centers,orphanages, and elderly care. For example, the Ministryof Social Affairs (MOSA) mostly provides support tounemployables (orphans, the elderly, the handi-capped, and so on), encompassing on average 35,000cases per year, through transfers to non-governmental

45

organizations.58 In addition, it supports the creation anddevelopment of social development centers, as well associal and health centers run in partnership with NGOs.A total of 360,000 individuals benefited from these serv-ices in 1998, but the regional balance appears uneven,as most of the beneficiaries are from the relativelywealthier region of Beirut. Based on the living conditionsindex from MOSA-UNDP, the World Bank (2005) esti-mates that 10 percent of the poor benefited from MOSAservices in Beirut, in contrast to a fraction of less than 2percent in the Nabathieh and North Lebanon regions.There were respectively 4.1 and 3.6 social and healthcenters per 10,000 poor in the regions of South Lebanonand Beirut, but only 1.4 and 1.6 in the Bekaa and NorthLebanon regions (table 4.3). Another program which hasa social assistance component is the producers' subsidyfor certain crops (wheat, sugar beet, tobacco). In total, itis believed that around 60,000 small farmers, mostlyfrom the Bekaa Valley and the South benefit from suchassistance.

The private sector is the other major provider of statefunded services. However, the generally weak controland regulatory mechanisms by the state of this processhas led to a general excess in supply. This is evident inthe health sector, for example, where Lebanon's hospi-talization rate, consumption of pharmaceuticals andgeneral per capita health expenditures, subsidized bythe state, are noticeably higher than in other countries inthe region. Instead of a lean health sector, thanks to non-state participation and competitive pressures, demandis artificially stimulated, leading to an excess in supply.In general, public policies have failed to either determinethe exact scope of services that should be contractedwith private providers or adequately control the quantity,quality and costs of these services.

Table 11: Beneficiaries allocation among governorates

Governorate

Beirut Mount Lebanon North Lebanon South Lebanon BekaaNabatiehAll Lebanon

Population with low satisfaction of basicneeds (poor)

Beneficiaries of social assistance

Share in governorate19.226.048.939.043.851.435.2

Total78,221

297,819327,928110,392175,152105,581

1,095,363

Total8,211

16,6085,5556,6214,9341,832

43,761

Share in poor10.5

5.61.76.02.81.74.0

Source: World Bank, 2005.

The weak capacity of Lebanese citizens to directly

The right to education is enshrined in Lebanon'sConstitution. Similarly, the Lebanese Government iscommitted to providing full access to basic educationfor all Lebanese citizens and has ratified internationaland Arab agreements pertaining to education-relatedissues. However, over the last two decades, theLebanese educational system was turned progressivelyinto a “dual system,” in which private education hasbeen sought mostly by the middle- and upper-middle-income groups - with the exception of free private edu-cation, which is focused on the very poor - while publiceducation has attracted lower middle-income and poorsocial groups.

A. The Pillars of Social Citizenship

A.1 Education

SITUATION ANALYSIS

While access is not a major issue in the education sec-tor in Lebanon, quality and opportunity is. While mostclose to 98 percent of students have access to basiceducation, this figure is significantly lower for intermedi-ate and secondary level schooling. Moreover, the qualityof education varies between schools within the publicsector as well as between public and private sectorschools. These deficiencies are caused by a number ofissues. The government's scope of coverage of educa-tional needs is one problem; another is the lack of spe-cific strategic management approaches to mobilizinghuman resources (both quantitative and qualitative),

58 The Ministry of Social Affairs' annual budget is US$60 million, ofwhich 80 percent is spent on the care of 30,000 children, most of

them through NGOs (Social Welfare Institutions) that contract withthe Government. These reached 156 institutions in 2005.

secure their social citizenship rights in education, healthand employment raises a series of crucial questionssuch as what are the conditions that shape the specificdomains of these different rights? How efficient andequitable is the provision of these rights? Is the currentsituation addressing or contributing to vulnerability andsocial exclusion? What reforms are needed to insure theguarantee of social citizenship rights and thus sustain-able and equitable long-term development?

46

capital investments as well as oversight of methods ofoperation and maintenance. This can be attributed tothe frequent change in governments, and the differentstrategies employed by each.

More recently, the Ministry of Education and HigherEducation (MEHE) established a National EducationStrategy that was sent to the Cabinet for endorsementin September 2007. The National Education Strategytakes its cue from the Lebanese Constitution, theDocument of National Accord (the Taif Agreement), andlaws and regulations governing educational matters.These emphasize the freedom of and the right to educa-tion and ensuring equal access and opportunity to allcitizens. However, various conflicts of interest betweenpublic and private stakeholders and postponed theimplementation of this national strategy.

At the same time, relatively high levels of spending oneducation are not commensurate with outcomes. Eventhough the GOL spends close to 3 percent of its GDP onEducation, drop out and repetition rates are still consid-erably high. As a result, many households have turnedto the private sector despite the corresponding increasein their expenditures. In 2005-2006 close to 11.4 percentof GDP was spent on public and private education.59 Ofthis percentage, the government's share was only 4.4percent and the higher burden was borne by house-holds (7.0 percent). While public spending is similar toOECD counties, private spending is 2-3 times higher.Household expenditure on education reached as muchas 13 percent out of total expenses in 2001 (comparedto 8 percent in 1966).60 The high level of householdexpenditure on education in Lebanon, as compared toother countries may be attributed to the considerableimportance given to education. Many families are willingto provide children with a good quality of education,even if high costs are involved. (See Chapter Four)

High levels of spending on education arenot commensurate with outcomes while theGOL's dual role as both provider and funderof services is reinforcing inequitable accessto opportunity among citizens

“ “

Today citizen access to education is characterized by thefollowing:

The GOL's dual role as both provider and funder ofservices is creating market distortions that lead toinequitable access among citizens. Through its educa-tional subsidies for the children of civil servants, the GOLis supporting the private school system. In 2007, 90 per-cent61 of the children of civil servants, whose educationis financed by the government, attended privateschools. Up to 19 percent62 of public spending on edu-cation was channelled through scholarships to thesechildren. At the same time, even though lower-middle-income and poor families are the main beneficiaries ofpublic education, related expenditures favor relativelyhigher-income households. Figure 2 below, which showsthe distribution of the Government's cash grants as apercentage of public resources across households ofdifferent incomes indicates that 30 percent of Lebanon'sstudents are in households with monthly incomes thatare less than L.L.600, 000, but this group of studentsreceives only 9.6 percent of public support.Furthermore, as the income brackets of householdsrises, the level of public support it receives also increases.

Enrollment, success, grade-age delays and drop-outrates, point to significant geographic and socio-eco-nomic and public/private disparities. These disparitiesreflect problems of equity and efficiency. Private andpublic education exhibit significant differences when itcomes to quality. A study on “Free CompulsoryEducation in Lebanon”63 shows that 9 out of 1,000 stu-dents from public schools obtain the Baccalaureatewithout repetition, while 255 out of 1,000 from privateschools reach this level. This is not to say that all privateschools are superior to public ones, as there are differ-ences in the quality of education provided by privateinstitutions as well. However, overall as a sector, itseems to be functioning more efficiently. In response,civil society organizations have tried to address thisdeficit either through direct partnerships betweenschools where for example some private schools areproviding support to public school students in Beirut, orthrough partnerships between the MEHE and NGO's.

These discrepancies are also evident on a geographiclevel. Like many developing countries, Lebanon is char-acterized by regional and inter-regional disparities ineducational attainment levels. Illiteracy rates are higherin the more socio-economically deprived regions, wherethey reach their highest levels in the Bekaa (14.45 per-cent), followed by South Lebanon (12.42 percent). North

60 Public expenditure: World Bank, 2004; Private expenditure:OECD, 2003.61 Ministry of Finance, 2007, Public Services and Support:Outreach and Gaps.62 Ibid.63 MEHE, 2000.

Per capita expenditure $1,926 Total expenditures $6.1Bn MEHE expenditures as percent of GDP 3.0

Major public expenditure indicators (2005-2006)

59 MEHE, Figures provided to the NHDR

47

Lebanon has the highest concentration of students whofinish elementary education and then drop out of school(43.22 percent). Meanwhile, Beirut and Mount Lebanonexhibit the highest ratios of university education attainment,as the ratios stand at 25.77 percent and 17.06 percent,respectively.

Central urban areas also have better results in terms ofeducational attainment, as well as better outcomes interms of success rates whereby urban regions in Beirutand Mount Lebanon graduate a significantly higher num-ber of students without repetition than the more periph-eral and less-developed regions. Existing studies sug-gest that a lack of schools is not the cause since almostall parts of the country enjoy a sufficient number ofschools and in some cases, there is even a surplus.64

However, the quality of education in these schools variesacross sectors and regions. A large number of privateschools are concentrated in and around the capitalBeirut or in other central cities in the regions. As the ratioof public school to private school students by gover-norate indicates, central urban areas, which have bettersuccess rates and higher educational attainment levels,exhibit higher private-to-public attendance ratios (4 inthe Beirut suburbs of Mount Lebanon as compared to0.7 in Nabatieh for example) (Figure 4.3 in Chapter Four).

Student/teacher ratios at public schools also contributeto this discrepancy in quality of education and geo-graphic disparity. Table 12 below shows that the ratios ofstudents per class and students per teacher in publicschools falls below international standards, while privateschools record a more acceptable level. In addition, thequality of teachers (educational attainment, average age,competence in their subject, and so on.) is lower in publicschools, especially pre-secondary schools. For instance,

Source: MEHE, 2004, Survey Report, Rationalizing the Education System's Financing, Education Development Project.

64 CRI, 2005, Development Program: Horizon 2006 - 2009, Finalreport for the CDR.

Figure 3: Educational attainment by region (%)

Source: The National Survey of Household Living Conditions 2004.

25.77

21.19

25.12

19.272.346.20

17.0618.21

25.89

25.19

6.976.59

9.69

14.83

21.57

43.22

3.007.63

9.91

16.52

29.63

23.86

5.6214.45

10.36

14.54

25.42

31.15

6.0212.42

14.55

17.06

25.37

28.87

5.378.71

one-third of the teachers in public schools, have, at themost, a baccalaureate degree. Moreover, privateschools also seem to be attracting younger profession-als whereby 32.1 percent of teachers in public schoolsare above fifty one years of age, as opposed to 14.9 per-cent in public schools. However, this distribution alsocamouflages inefficiencies within the system wherebysome public schools exhibit outrageously high stu-dent/teacher ratios mainly due to the political /clientelistconsiderations that generated their establishment in thefirst place.

Harsh socio-economic conditions further aggravatethese disparities. Lead by the belief that they are receivinga lower quality education that will make little differenceto their futures, students in poorer areas tend to drop outof school early to join the workforce. For them, the tradeoff between the opportunity cost of this education andthe value added is significantly low.

Many poor students drop out of schoolbecause they believe that they will occupythe same jobs irrespective of their educa-tional attainment…

“ “

Figure 2: Distribution of children and public support to households for education, by household income

48

Table 12: Input indicators by sector, 2006-2007

Number of teachersNumber of studentsNumber of schoolsRatio of students per class Ratio of students per teacherBreakdown of teachers by age (%)

<30 years31-40 years41-50 years51-60 years61 years and olderTotal

Public schools “Free” private schools Private schools39,945

326,5031,393

198.2

19.923.324.727.64.5

100.0

6,626124,281

37924

18.8

37.630.920.38.92.3

100.0

41,186467,093

1,04021

11.3

32.130.723.211.2

3.7100.0

Source: CERD 2006 - 2007.

In other words, they believe that they will occupy thesame jobs regardless of the level of education that theyattain and so prefer to gain additional years of income.From this perspective any attempt to increase educa-tional attainment in rural areas should concentrate onenhancing quality and spread public awareness aboutthe importance of education and its potential to booststandard of living. Civil society and the private sectorhave paved the way as they try to improve the access ofcitizen's in remote areas to the knowledge economy(See One Hundred and One Stories to Tell)

The educational sector, with few exceptions, also suf-fers from the exclusion of specific population groupssuch as the disabled. They are characterized by high illit-eracy rates (38.2 percent) and only 5 percent attain sec-ondary level schooling while 2.9 percent graduate fromuniversities. (See Statistical Compendium for a full pro-file). This is mainly due to the failure to integrate the dis-abled successfully in mainstream schools. Lebanon hasrecently enacted a series of laws pertaining to the rightsof disabled individuals to quality education in a barrier-free environment. This is also a core tenant of theNational Education Strategy. A study conducted in200765 estimated that the cost of creating a barrier-freeenvironment in all public schools within a six-year plan,would not exceed 1 percent of the MEHE's budget perannum.

The relationship of state to citizen is being underminedthrough state support for private sector intermediaries,particularly those with specific communal affiliations. Agood number of private educational institutions are polit-ically and religiously affiliated. Many of these institutionsprovide education primarily to their supporters, thusreinforcing the allegiance of citizens to their closed com-munity or religious sect. This in turn weakens the bond

between citizens and their state. However, many ofthese same educational institutions are being funded bythe Government. In 2008 the GOL of Lebanon spent L.L.45 billion, or 5 percent of the total general Educationalbudget66 on 379 free private schools that cater to KGcycles 1 and 2.67 They include more than 124,000 stu-dents- almost the same number as those in publicschools- that are being subsidized at the rate of aroundLL480, 000 per student (or 160 percent of the minimumwage). The number of students in these schools is onthe rise. However, those who enroll their children in suchschools are often unaware of Government funding andbelieve their religious community or institution to be pro-viding this support. (See governorate indicators in statis-tical annex for regional and religious distribution ofschools).

Inefficiencies and sectarian based interference alsoextends to Higher Education as is evident in the situationof the Lebanese university. The only state sponsoreduniversity in the country and once the pride of the aca-demic community the LU has been beset by a series ofissues in the war and post period that have weakened itsstatus as a bastion of learning and undermined its char-acteristic as a melting pot for Lebanese of all walks oflife. These include the establishment of multiple branch-es for the same discipline to satisfy the region-al/sectarian demands of different groups (See boxes3.14 and 4.6 in the full report)

65 CRI, 2007, Towards an Accessible Environment: An Architecturaland Budgetary Approach, Final report for the LPHU.66 Excluding University or Vocational and Technical Education67 MEHE, CERD, Budget 2008.

The relationship of state to citizen is alsobeing undermined through state support forprivate sector intermediaries, particularlythose with specific communal affiliations

“ “

49

68 WHO, 2007, National Health Accounts series.69 ibid70 ibid71 These are estimated to represent 35 percent of public spendingon health in 2005. ibid

A.2 Health

Today, the right to health in Lebanon is more of a right tomedical coverage and assistance. In other words, ratherthan focus on the necessary pre-emptive care that guar-antees a long and healthy life, far more attention andresources have been allocated to costly after-the facthealth care or what is often labeled as curative healthcare. Despite a variety of issues, the main obstacle tothe right to health is also one of opportunity rather thanaccess.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

The health sector has fallen short of the twin goals ofaccess and opportunity. In 2005, per capita expenditureon health in Lebanon was USD 693,68 while total healthcare expenditures amounted to USD 2.49 billion or 11.2percent of GDP.69 This percentage was the highestamong all countries of the Eastern Mediterraneanregion. Although many European countries spend acomparable percentage of GDP on health care, thevalue for money (in terms of quality of care and extent ofcoverage) is far superior to that of Lebanon.

As such Lebanon suffers from low returns on healthspending. Although it exhibits acceptable percentageson major health indicators, the latter are similar to neigh-boring countries that may spend less on this sector.Moreover, the relatively high per capita expenditure onhealth, on a national level does not adequately reflect theunequal access to health care by poor and vulnerablesocial groups. (See table D3 in Statistical Compendium)

Table 13: Health spending in OECD countries, 2004

HDI Rank

710122288

Public expenditure onhealth (% of GDP)

20046.78.26.98.23.2

Private expenditure onhealth (% of GDP)

20044.82.38.52.48.4

Source: HDR 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change

Per capita expenditure US$ 693Total expenditures US$ 2.5 BnExpenditures as percent of GDP 11.2 percent

Major expenditure indicators (2005)

Today citizen access to health services is impacted by thefollowing:

The state's role and involvement in the health sector isgenerally weak in many respects. Government contribu-tion to the total health care bill is quite low. In 2005, itpaid 28.3 percent of the total health care bill in 2005 afigure that is far lower than that of developed countries,where public involvement reaches more than three-quar-ters of total health expenditures.70 If NSSF expendi-tures71 are removed from the Government's contribution,

72 National Social Security Fund (NSSF)

the above figure of 28.3 percent would drop to 18.5 per-cent, indicating an even lower contribution by the publicsector and a greater burden being placed on the privatesector, particularly households, when it comes to healthcare financing. However, even this contribution is notreaping the benefits it should as a result of various fac-tors that have a direct impact on citizen access to healthservices and the quality of these services including polit-ical/clientelist considerations.

The government's contributions are also inefficient. Forexample, in-hospital medication represents more thantwo thirds of the NSSF coverage with higher ratios inregions characterized by high poverty rates and in small-er hospitals where there is minimal government over-sight. In 2004 it reached a national average of 63 per-cent. This is in part due to the minimal out - of pocketexpenditure associated with in-hospital care for poorhouseholds as well as the common practice adopted bymany hospitals of increasing the utilization rate of theirbeds so as to augment the rate of their compensation bythe NSSF. Another common practice is the high level ofin-hospital medication that reached a national aver-age of 63 percent72 in 2004 according to the NSSF.This figure is quite high when compared to other con-texts such as European countries where it does notexceed 45 percent. There are also major regional varia-tions in the share of in-hospital medication. Higher per-centages can be found in peripheral regions that arecharacterized by higher poverty rates, smaller hospitalsand minimal government oversight.

The weak regulatory role of the state also lead to a highlyfragmented and uneven health insurance framework.

Inefficient contributions and a weak reg-ulatory role have led to inequities in accessand opportunity for citizens and consider-able leakage in spending

“ “

50

73 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, Living Conditions of Households.74 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008.

Health insurance in Lebanon today includes four majortypes of financing agents (two public and two private)while the public sector contains six different programs,two of which are direct funded by the Ministries ofHealth and Social Affairs. The multiplicity of healthfinancing providers, especially in the public sector leadsto disparities in terms of eligibility criteria, target groups(different demographic and social characteristics),degree and quality of coverage, beneficiary contribu-tions, and subscription conditions. For example, theeligibility criteria pertaining to each insurance plan havediffering procedures, tariffs, contracts and monitoringeven though around 95 percent of the service providersare private. Contract conditions are negotiated directlyby the private sector with the respective state fund, giv-ing private interests leverage and say over public funds.In addition to its inefficiencies this situation generatesconsiderable inequity among civil servants. They areoffered significantly different levels of coverage eventhough they are employees of the same entity. (Table 4.9in main report)

As a result, more than half of Lebanese citizens (53.3percent) do not enjoy any form of health insurance,whether public or private.73 Lack of health coverage isdirectly correlated with income and poverty levels. Therecent MoSA, UNDP study on Poverty, Growth andIncome Distribution indicates that of the total 8 percentvery poor individuals in the country, only 16 percent haveinsurance. This figure increases to 25 percent among therelatively poor, i.e. those who fall between the lower andupper poverty lines.74

Regional disparities are also evident in the degree andquality coverage for individuals and households. Beirutand Mount Lebanon enjoy the highest percentage ofinsured individuals (59.1 percent and 53.8 percentrespectively), while Nabatiyeh has the lowest, at lessthan one-third (31.5 percent). Although the NSSFaccounts for the highest share of insured population,coverage also varies by region, depending on the rela-tive weight of declared wage earners out of the totallabor force. Many NGO's, whether civic or those affiliat-ed with political parties have stepped in to cover for dis-parities in insurance coverage or to supplement them.(Box 5)

…more than half of Lebanese citizens donot enjoy any form of health insurance“

“

Combining a unique talent for music, singing and sur-gery, Heart Beat was founded in 2005 by a group of sur-geons. They organize and perform in fundraising con-certs for children who suffer from heart diseased butwhose families cannot afford the costs of treatment.The same doctors and support staff also go on to per-form these life saving procedures free of charge. HeartBeat also partners with private sector entities over spe-cific activities. In addition to various public and privatebenefactors, concerts are their window onto the world.Their first Deir al-Qamar, concert supported three oper-ations, the 4,000-person concert in Biel in 2006 fundedseventy operations, and the Faqra concert in the sum-mer of the same year gave another 135 children a sec-ond chance at life. Their most recent 2008 concert atthe Casino du Liban was a raging two-day success andwill fund another 100 or so surgeries.

Heartbeat is not the only one. Braveheart is anotherNGOs established by parents whose children were bornwith this disease.

Box 5: Heart Beat (101 Stories to Tell)

The Ministry of Health (MoH) has taken responsibility forindividuals not covered by any insurance plan, whetherpublic or private, irrespective of their income or assetstatus. It also covers costly health services that the pri-vate sector tends to avoid. In 2007, hospitalization con-sumed most of the MoPH's expenditures as it covered27% of hospitalizations, compared to 15% coverage ofservices in 2005. Salaries and pharmaceuticals, did notexceed 30 percent75.Yet the government's weak regula-tory oversight means that it is unable to curb hospitaliza-tion costs. Hospitals tend to price their own services andrequire the MoPH to cover the costs according to theirset price-list. In addition, the high out of pocket costs foroutpatient care drives many to resort in-hospital carefurther increasing its share of the bill. As its financial obli-gation accrue over the years the Ministry has tended todelay payments. For example, the National SocialSecurity Fund (NSSF) currently owes private hospitalsand outpatient facilities a total of LL 500 billion.76

Payment of this money continues to be deferred indefi-nitely.

Out-of-pocket spending for households is also quitehigh reaching about 60 percent of total health careexpenditure, which is equivalent to about 82 percent oftotal private expenditures.77 On average, a Lebanesehousehold spends LL 2.609 million78per year on healthcare, which equals 14.1 percent of total household yearlyexpenditures, or more than eight times the official minimum

75 MOSA, CAS, UNDP 2006, ibid76 World Bank, 2008 , Towards Financial Equilibrium in the Sicknessand Maternity Branch of the NSSF. 77 WHO, National Health Accounts series.78 MoPH, 2001, National Household Health Expenditures andUtilization Survey.

51

wage. Moreover, the burden of out-of-pocket health careexpenditures (as a proportion of household expendi-tures) is not equitably distributed. Poorer families spenda relatively larger portion of their income on health careservices than higher-income families. For example, indi-viduals earning LL 300,000 to LL 500,000 per monthspend as much as 17 percent of its expenditures onhealth services as compared to a 14.1 percent nationalaverage. This declines to 8.1 percent for the highestincome group who make more than L.L. 5 million permonth.

The relationship of state to citizen is also being under-mined by the overlap between political sectarianism andclientelism as well as by state support for private sectorintermediaries, particularly those with specific commu-nal affiliations. Several public hospitals have been con-structed and equipped for operation but divergent polit-ical interests or bureaucratic reasons have delayed theiropening, effectively wasting the huge investments madein these facilities. Similarly, many religious / politicalgroups find it easier and more profitable to constructand run new tailor-made hospitals rather than operateexisting non-functioning ones. Encouraged by currentpublic heath financing plans, these groups usually devel-op private hospitals. However, given the government'sweak regulatory role, the actual quality of health servicesin hospital located in peripheral regions is uncertain.

79 MOSA, CAS, UNDP 2006, ibid.

A.3 Employment

The right to decent work is guaranteed by the more than50 treaties that Lebanon has ratified among which are 7principle agreements. However, the absence of a mod-ern institutional framework for the Lebanese labor mar-ket and the persistent application of long-outdated laborlaws has hindered the implementation of these treaties.This situation has also delayed the ratification of othertreaties such as syndicating the rights of civil and agri-culture sectors as well as foreign labor. A new labor law

was proposed by the Ministry of Labor over ten yearsago and several versions of it have been discussed yetit remains un-ratified by Parliament. Other proposals toupgrade the legislative framework for the labor markethave suffered a similar fate. This situation has aggravat-ed existing problems in the labor market with negativeeconomic and social repercussions that affect poor andmiddle-income groups in particular.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

In 2004, 44 percent or 1.2 million of Lebanese residentswere economically active. However, the general rate ofeconomic activity in Lebanon is lower than that of otherdeveloping countries for several reasons: (1) rising emi-gration particularly by males of different age categories,(2) weak participation of women in the economic sector,and (3) under-declaration of female labor engaged inartisanal, agricultural and rural labor.

At the same time, Lebanon today is also characterizedby a younger labor force due to demographic shiftssince the 1970s. The highest rate of economic activity(61.4 percent in 2004), is among the 25-29 age group inpart as a result of a significant increase in female eco-nomic activity from 20.2 percent in 1970 to 37.3 percentin 2004. Higher education is a key factor for female entryinto the labor market.The percentage of female employ-ees with a university diploma or higher has reached 34.1percent, as compared to only 15.9 percent of males.

Today citizen access to employment is impacted by thefollowing:

There is a significant gender gap in the rates of eco-nomic activity. Despite considerable gains in genderparity in education whereby the gender gap that wasevident in the 1970s' has been almost eliminated andeven surpassed to the advantage of females in second-ary and tertiary level education, these gains have notbeen reflected in the labor market. Only 19.6 percent offemales aged 15 to 64 are working and they form 21.5percent79 of the total labor force. The rate of economicactivity in the 15-64 age group is 76 percent for men ascompared to 25 percent for women. Two out of everythree women work in administration or education, com-pared to one out of every four men.

Figure 4: Distribution of health insurance

Economically active Population 1.2 million (44 %)Female share 21.5 %Unemployment rate 7.9 %

52

80 CRDP, UNESCO, PNUD, Programme d'Appui à la Réforme duSystème Educatif Libanais- LEB/96/005, 200281 Only 1997 data is available on this issue. The household surveyof 2004 does not include such information.

Low female participation in the labor force is due in partto prevailing societal values that are also reinforcedthrough the current educational system that tends toreproduce the same limited pattern of gender roles. Forexample, an examination of the current civic and historytext books taught in all schools found that women areonly portrayed in traditional gender roles while all lead-ership roles are relegated to males.80 In addition,employed women face wage discrimination. The 2004national household survey found the ratio of estimatedfemale to male earned income was 0.31.81 These differ-ences tend to be more pronounced in the private sectorand in the agricultural sector.

At the same time, the number of female owned enter-prises is on the rise for middle and upper middle incomegroups (See Indicators on status of Women) while a largenumber of lower income women are turning to smallscale enterprises and micro credit programs. For exam-ple of the approximate 10,000 clients of Al Majmoua, amicro credit NGO, 50 percent are women from differentregions in the country (box 4)- Significant structuralchanges in the labor market in Lebanon also impactaccess to employment. The active population is shiftingfrom a production-driven market to a services-drivenone. Between 1970 and 2004, the number of laborers inthe agricultural sector fell from 18.9 percent to 8 percent,while the percentage of laborers in the industrial sectorfell from 18.8 percent to 15 percent. The share of serv-ice sector workers has also risen to approximately halfthe total labor force, while the share of the constructionindustry has increased from 6.5 percent to 9 percent.

Leila did not know what the future would hold. For years her ambitions were limited to supporting her husband providefor their family through her old sewing machine. In 1995 she participated in a communal loan with a group of womenfrom her village. “The idea of getting a loan through a collective guarantee to four women seemed quite strange. Banks,if they agree to see someone poor like me would request impossible guarantees.” Leila now runs a small sewing factorythat employs eight women and she owns twelve sewing machines. When asked about her family, she replies, “Thanks toGod and the support of al Majmoua, my son graduated from university recently, my other children are in school, and weare saving for the marriage of our eldest daughter.”

The Lebanese Association for Development - Al Majmoua - an independent, apolitical, NGO is a leading micro financeagency in Lebanon. Given that the informal sector is the backbone of the Lebanese economy Al Majmoua's core busi-ness is to provide micro loans to individuals who have limited or no access to formal lending channels. They target thepoor in general, and focus especially on women micro-entrepreneurs. Al Majmoua is active across Lebanon, includingthe Palestinian Camps. To date, Al Majmoua has disbursed 90,000 loans for a total amount of USD 85 million andoffered non-financial services to more than 2,500 women. It currently has 11,500 active beneficiaries, including morethan 5,000 women, for a total outstanding portfolio of USD 8.25 million. In addition to loans, beneficiaries profit fromother non-financial capacity building services and other activities, many of which are specially designed for women. Todate, Al Majmoua has directly impacted, more than 20,000 households economically and socially. Al Majmoua's partnersinclude a wide spectrum of international and regional donors.

Box 6: A small loan for big dreams: Al Majmoua

Similarly, the percentage of independent self-employedworkers has risen by 3 percent (25 percent in 1997 to28.5 percent in 2004) accompanied by a fall in the shareof salaried employees in the total labor force (67 percentto 62.1 percent). At the same time, high levels of emi-gration, especially of younger and highly skilled workershave historically played an important role in keepingunemployment levels down. However, they have alsodrained the country of its highly skilled workforce. Thesehave impacted the supply end of the labor market. It isnot clear what the recent global financial crisis and theforeseen return of emigrants from the Gulf in particular,will have on unemployment levels in the country.

The concentration of the Labor force has shifted. Thecity of Beirut's share of the total workforce fell from 25.4percent in 1970 to 13.1 percent in 2004. Comparatively,the share of the labor force in Beirut's suburbs and thesurrounding areas of Mount Lebanon increased from 40percent in 1970 to 44.1 percent in 2004. Similarly, theshare of the labor markets in the governorates of SouthLebanon and Nabatiyeh and North Lebanon haveincreased in the same period. The latter are compara-tively higher than the Bekaa. (Table 14) This shift implieseasier access by citizens to employment in their regions.

The Lebanese labor market exhibits sharp disparitiesbetween supply and demand. Even though demand forskilled labor in the knowledge industry among othernewer skills is increasing at a considerable pace, thenumber of graduates from the requisite faculties is notcommensurate. At the same time, the labor market is

53

unable to absorb the large number of graduates from thefaculties of literature, law and the social sciences.Similarly graduates of vocational and technical institu-tions are not necessarily addressing changing marketneeds. This situation is further aggravated by two dis-tinct characteristics of the Lebanese Labor market Onthe one hand, 88 percent of businesses in Lebanon havefewer than five employees. These businesses usuallyperform simple functions and their ability to expand theiremployee base is rather limited. On the other hand, larg-er institutions, characterized mainly by an oligopolisticstructure82, are unable to provide employment opportu-nities even for the current number of highly skilled andcompetent graduates with competitive and technicalareas of expertise.

This weak relationship between educational and voca-tional institutions and the business community has neg-atively impacted the performance of the labor market.Training, orientation and preparation of students prior tograduation as well as mid career training are almost non-existent. More than 87 percent of institutions claim theydo not need to train their employees83.

The weak wage structure, especially in the private sec-tor also impacts labor market. This weakness in thewage structure can in part be explained by the deterio-ration in the current conditions of enterprises (informalones in particular). The 2006 average wage, of LL1,180,00084 is low when compared to the cost of living

Table 14: Distribution of the labor force in the different Lebanese governorates (%)

Area Administrative Beirut Mount Lebanon - suburbs Mount Lebanon excluding suburbs South North Bekaa

197033.5012.2

1310.20

127.70

20019.30

28.4017.9014.6018.80

11

200413.1044.10

__14.4017.5010.90

Citizen rights to employment have beenimpacted by geographic and gender dispar-ities, a weak relationship between educa-tional institutions and the business commu-nity and the lack of a pension system for theprivate sector

“

“

82 CRI, 2003. Competition in the Lebanese Economy, a back-ground report for a competition law for Lebanon. 83 National Institute for Labor, UNDP, 1997, A Study of the LaborMarket: Results of the Statistical Investigation on Institutions84 NSSF

and there has been no official wage adjustment in theprivate sector since 1996, while the general consumerprice index rose roughly 58 percent85 during 1996-2007.

The absence of a pension system for the private sectoralso has significant repercussions for citizen rights toemployment. Lebanon is characterized by a multiplicityof its retirement systems; two public and one privateeach of which has different eligibility and funding criteria.According to available statistics, the three retirementplans cover less than 40 percent of the labor force, whilesalaried workers make up more than 60 percent86 of thistotal. Moreover, these plans ingrain inequity among citi-zens in that the rate of return differs from one system toanother and some restrict labor mobility etc. draft lawwas put forward by the Ministry of Labor to theGovernment two years ago, but remains in Parliamentawaiting ratification.

The labor market in Lebanon is also characterized bythe presence of large numbers of formal and informalforeign laborers and domestic workers. The size of thelegally registered labor market tends to fluctuate anddepends on specializations (See statistical compendiumand CAS website). However, legal domestic workers,mainly from countries of Asia, face a significant amountof discrimination that needs to be addressed.87

At the same time, available data on formally registeredforeign employees does not reflect the actual size of for-eign labor in Lebanon. For instance, unofficial estimatesof low-skilled Syrian and Asian labor suggest that thereare 100,000-150,000 Syrian construction workers alone.Iraqi and Palestinian refugees fleeing war and insecurityform another pool of foreign informal labor. However,Both population groups lack basic civil and social rights.The Iraqi refugee population for the most part has beenin Lebanon for the last decade and a half and is currentlyestimated at 50,000, with a steady flow back to Iraq

Source: 1970 data: Direction Centrale de la Statistique, 1970, Population active au Liban, p.126; 2001 data: USJ, 2001, L’entree des jeunesLibanais dans la vie active et l’emigration, p.151; 2004 data: MoSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006.

85 CAS86 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, Living Conditions of Households. 87 ILO, 2001, Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon,Beirut, Lebanon

54

88 Suheil Al-Natur, “Munaqasha filastiniyya li-qarar al-haqq bil-'amal” (A Palestinian Discussion of the “Right to Work”Memorandum), in An-Nahar newspaper, 7 July 2005.

depending on security conditions.The Palestinianrefugee population that originally fled to Lebanon in twowaves in 1948 and 1967 is currently estimated at around250,000 individuals living in different refugee campsaround the country. Despite the length of their stay inLebanon, Palestinian refugees continue to be regardedas resident foreigners and are excluded from theLebanese labor markets by two legal considerations.The first is the legal categorization of Palestinianrefugees as foreigners as defined by the 1964 Law thatstates, “foreigner is understood to mean, in this law, anynatural or juridical person who is not a Lebanese citi-zen.”88 The other legislative item that limits the accessof Palestinians to the Lebanese labor market is theirexclusion even from the category of “foreigner” by thelegal concept of reciprocity, which holds that favors,benefits, or penalties that are granted by one state to thecitizens or legal entities of another should be returned inkind. In Lebanese labor laws, foreigners are grantedwork permits only if their country of origin grantsLebanese citizens work permits. In this regard Palestinianresidents fail to meet the concept of reciprocity, as theydo not belong to any recognized state and thus fall undera de facto category of “stateless foreigner” which has notbeen addressed in Lebanese legislation89. Recently, theLebanese government has ratified a new law which per-mits Palestinians to be employed in 72 new professions.(See Tables B.15 in statistical compendium for popula-tion characteristics).

Freedom from poverty, vulnerability and social exclusionis also a basic social citizenship right. Even thoughclosely correlated, one phenomena does not necessarilylead to the other. Vulnerability does not necessarily implypoverty. Similarly while poverty either may cause socialexclusion or be caused by it, social exclusion is not nec-essarily determined by poverty. Each of these phenom-ena has its own determinants, specificities and manifes-tations. As such, strategies to address questions ofsocial citizenship rights in Lebanon must consider pop-ulations that are poor, vulnerable and / or sociallyexcluded. This differentiation should take into consider-ation the following:

Poverty in Lebanon is not a major concern. However the

B. Poverty, Vulnerability and SocialExclusion

89 Khalil Shatawi, “Al-filastiniyuun wa haqq al-'amal” (Palestiniansand the Right to Work), Al-Safir newspaper, 2 July 2005.90 ibid.91 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, ibid.

risk of falling into poverty is. In 2004, extreme poverty waslimited to 8 percent of residents90 Another 20 percent laybetween the lower and the upper poverty lines placingthem at great risk of falling into poverty in the event ofany shock, political, social or economic. Both categoriesrepresent around one-third of the resident populationand are mainly concentrated in the peripheral areas ofthe country, especially the north.

Vulnerability concerns segments of the population thatare at risk. Unlike poverty, it is a transversal phenomenonthat appears among different social groups. In additionto specific vulnerable groups such as people with dis-abilities, orphans, working children, female heads ofhouseholds, etc., vulnerability also affects social seg-ments that lie immediately above the upper poverty line,representing around one-third of the resident populationwhere 32 percent of households have a total monthlyrevenue less than 1.5 times the upper poverty line.91

Social exclusion is to some extent distinct from povertyand vulnerability, even though these two phenomenacan sometimes lead to the exclusion of some groupsfrom access to a decent quality of social services. In thissense, social exclusion as compared to poverty and vul-nerability is intended to focus more on structural bottle-necks to equity and social injustice. While the majority ofLebanese citizens do not face systematic deprivation ofsocial rights, different kinds of exclusion do exist. As inother countries, the vulnerable and the poor in Lebanontend to be excluded not from access, but from opportu-nity. In Lebanon, problems in the State's social servicesdelivery systems (mainly education and health), includ-ing the sectarian / clientelist interests and the uncoordi-nated involvement of private sector entities all contributeto the creation of an inequitable and inefficient mecha-nism for social service provision. As a result, somegroups tend to be “left out” and are thus subject to oneform of exclusion or another. It should be noted thatlong-time resident Palestinian refugees, Iraqi and otherrefugees as well as foreign labor face forms of exclusionthat Lebanese citizens are not subjected to.

While only 8 percent of the Lebanese arepoor, one third of the Lebanese population isvulnerable to falling into poverty. Such con-ditions sometimes lead to limited socialexclusion

“ “

55

B.1 Characteristics of poverty and vulnerabilityin Lebanon

The latest studies on poverty in Lebanon indicate that7.9 percent92 of the population lives in extreme poverty,i.e., below the lower poverty line,93 which is equivalentto USD 2.4 per capita per day. This portion of the popu-lation, which numbers about 300,000 people, cannotmeet their most basic needs for survival. Using theupper poverty line94 of USD 4 per capita per day,increases those affected by poverty to 28.5 percent ofthe population.95 Therefore, 20.5 percent of Lebaneselive between the lower and upper poverty lines.

The poverty gap index measures the mean distancebelow the lower poverty line as a proportion of thepoverty line. Therefore, it depicts the mean shortfall fromthe poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zeroshortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line.The overall poverty gap index in Lebanon was measuredat 8.1 percent,96 which means that a large segment ofthe poor are far below the upper poverty line. Thismakes them highly prone to falling into extreme povertyif they are subjected to an external shock. SinceLebanon faces a high risk of such political or militaryshocks, the possibility of falling into severe poverty isquite high for many of those currently considered in the“near poor” segment of the population.

Vast regional disparities also characterize the incidenceof poverty in Lebanon. Poverty levels are least signifi-cant in Beirut, where extreme poverty is 0.67 percent ofthe population and overall poverty at 5.18 percent. Incontrast extreme poverty in the Governorate of NorthLebanon is as high as 17.75 percent and overall povertyreaches 52.27 percent. The South, which includes twomajor urban areas (the cities of Sidon and Tyre), is thesecond poorest governorate in the country, with anextreme poverty rate of 11.64 percent and overall povertyof 42.21 percent.

There are also inter-regional disparities, particularlybetween urban and rural areas. This implies that boththe inter- and intra-regional differences should be takeninto consideration when enhancing social rights anddesigning poverty reduction policies. For example,Akkar has the highest percentage of lower and upperpoverty lines (20 percent and 62 percent respectively) ascompared to Koura/ Zghourta area where poverty rates

are 4 percent and 25 percent respectively. These dispar-ities are verified by both qualitative and quantitative meth-ods for measuring poverty. In general, and with fewexceptions, mapping the poverty headcount at the stra-ta level against the unmet basic needs results indicatesimilar levels of deprivation at the qada level.

95 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, ibid.96 Ibid.97 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, Living Conditions of Households.98 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2008, ibid.

Poverty is also closely correlated with unemploymentand low levels of education. Basically, the poorer youare, especially if female, the more likely you are to beofficially unemployed. In 2004, the unemployment ratewas estimated to be 7.9%. Estimates that consider theimpact of political turbulence and global financial crisishave yet to be undertaken.97 However, a recent studyestimated the total percentage of unemployment amongthe poor to be 14.9 percent, and 14 percent among thenear poor, falling to 6.7 percent for the better-off portionof the population. Poor females register an unemploy-ment rate of 26.6 percent, while only 8.2 percent of bet-ter-off females are unemployed. Unemployment amongbetter-off females is lower than the national average offemale unemployment (9.4 percent).98

Similarly, poor youth are also vulnerable to unemploy-ment. The unemployment rate among young peoplebetween the ages of 15 and 24 is 20 percent, and ismeasurably higher among the poor. For every two pooryoung people holding a high school diploma, one is fac-ing the prospect of unemployment. One out of threepoor youth with a university diploma is unemployed,compared to one out of five among non-poor universitygraduates. Solutions for breaking the cycle of poverty forthese individuals must address the very structure of thelabor market and economic enterprises. The role of non-governmental organizations here has been quite criticalin providing economic support and training to poor indi-viduals as well as students from across Lebanon'ssocio-economic spectrum.

Education is also strongly associated with the incidenceof poverty. As indicated earlier, the education sector suf-fers mainly from problems of opportunity, or the provi-sion of quality education. While the distribution of better-off individuals across the various levels of education issimilar to the national average the poorer an individual is,the lower the level of education he/she is likely to haveachieved. A total of 15 percent of the poor are illiterateand 6.44 percent are barely able to read and write, while43.62 percent have only reached elementary levelschooling. Similarly 18.63 percent of better-off individuals

92 ibid93 The lower poverty line is the share of non-food expenditures forhouseholds whose total expenditure is equivalent to the foodpoverty line (the cost of minimal essential calorie requirements). 94 The upper poverty line estimates the non-food component of thepoverty line as the non-food expenditure of households whosefood expenditure is equal to the food poverty line.

56

Figure 5: Distribution of extreme poverty and overall poverty, by governorate (2005) (%)

Figure 6: Interregional disparities

have a university level education as compared to only3.24 percent of the poor. Many studies suggest thateven a moderate improvement in the quality of educationcould contribute to a significant reduction in poverty.

Figure 7: Educational attainment and poverty (2004)

Source: MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006, Living Conditions of Households.

B.2 Vulnerable groups and exclusion

Vulnerability a transversal phenomenon affects a crosssection of the population as well as specific socialgroups. In Lebanon these include female-headedhouseholds, the disabled, working children, fishermen,agricultural and seasonal workers, the elderly and theunemployed. (See statistical compendium for key char-

acteristics of the main vulnerable groups in Lebanon)

Female-headed households represent 14.2 percent99 oftotal heads of households in Lebanon. More than threequarters of female-headed household are widows. Onethird of these women are illiterate and close to 60 per-cent are without health coverage. They also suffer fromreduced economic activity, low-income levels, and oldage. Close to 40 percent exhibit low and very low UnmetBasic Needs and more than 50 percent make less than$400 a month. Civil society initiatives to address someof these issues are apparent in the One Hundred andOne stories to tell.

99 ibid

Lower Poverty LineUpper Poverty Line

57

100 MOSA, CAS, UNDP, 2006,ibid.101 CDR, ESFD, 2004, Poverty Mapping & Profiles, Volume 2.102 UNDP, 2005, Millennium Development Goals: MDG Costing -Lebanon.

Working children between the ages of 10 and 19 areestimated at around 45,000. The largest number of work-ing children is in the North, namely Minyeh and Tripoli,where poverty headcounts are also the highest. Close to80 percent of working children are male and more than88 percent of these children are 15-19 years of age.Working children face various difficulties, particularlywhen it comes to their education and health conditions.Around 77 percent have no medical insurance, andalmost half have only elementary school education andanother 30 percent have secondary school education.More than 44 percent of those report psychologicalpressures in their work environment and another 45 per-cent report work long hours in adverse in environmentalconditions.

The elderly defined as the segment of residents whoare aged 65 constitute 7.5 percent of the total Lebanesepopulation, or 277,000 individuals. Fewer than half ben-efit from medical insurance even though close to halfsuffer from 1-2 chronic diseases. Limited economicactivity renders them dependent on others for support.Around 40 percent are illiterate and close to 50 percenthave a monthly income less than $400.

Approximately 75,000 citizens (about 2 percent of theLebanese resident population) are disabled, of whom84.8 percent suffer from one disability and 10.5 percentfrom two disabilities. More than one quarter (27.3 per-cent) are above the age of 64. Close to 70 percent do nothave medical insurance and 38 percent are illiterate.More than 55 percent survive on less than $400 a month.Of those 21 percent have a monthly income of $266.

Agricultural workers make up an estimated 7.5 per-cent100 of the total active population. Many farmingoperations are small-sized, which limits the volume anddiversity of production and hence depresses revenues.Similarly, fishermen, estimated at 6,550 in 2004, sufferfrom high levels of deprivation101, They earn little revenuein a very seasonal sector.

Deprivation levels are high for both population groups inmoney metric and unmet basic needs terms. Close to 67percent of agricultural workers and fishermen are overthe age of 50 and almost 80 percent do not have healthinsurance. One third are illiterate and another third haveonly elementary school education. Civil society organi-zations have actively helped both improve their skillsand promote their produce both within Lebanon andabroad.

103 MoSA, UNICEF, 2007, Children Deprived of Family Care inLebanon.

2.3 CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP

Among the employed, non-salaried workers, especiallythose in the agriculture and construction sectors, face ahigh risk of falling into poverty. Recent data indicatesthat the qadas exhibiting a high concentration of agricul-tural employment are the ones where the incidence ofpoverty is the highest. For example, the populationinvolved in agricultural activity ranges between 33.1 per-cent in Hermel and 18 percent in Akkar (with the excep-tion of Batroun),while the national average is 8 per-cent.102

Institutionalized children are another vulnerable group.These include orphaned children or those at risk ofabuse or neglect and who are assigned to residentialcare. However, most children placed in residential careinstitutions come from poor families that cannot supportthem. There are currently 23,463 institutionalized chil-dren below the age of 18, or 1.92 percent of all childrenin the same age group in Lebanon.103 In its current form,institutionalization is not a last resort. Rather, it is utilizedby families to alleviate economic constraints.

On the civic/cultural front, Lebanese citizens enjoy con-siderable freedoms. Freedom of association is guaran-teed as are freedom of opinion and personal liberties (thelatter are protected by the constitution through articles 8and 13). The same cannot be said of the right to life,humane treatment, and security. Human rights violationscontinue to occur, albeit in a downward trend, while thelack of resources has weakened the administration ofjustice. Around 17,000 individuals remain “disappeared”from the era of the civil war and despite considerablepressure by concerned civil society groups, limitedaction has been taken to identify their whereabouts.Prison populations are of particular concern here sincetheir rights are frequently violated and prisons tend to besignificantly overcrowded and physically run down.Refugees, particularly Palestinian and Iraqis, have veryfew guarantees and even though the right to work forPalestinians was enlarged recently, the latter still sufferfrom a considerable civil rights deficit.

Similarly, even though some progress has been maderegarding the rights of women, of labor, and of children,these remain deficient. Honor crimes and domestic vio-lence against women and children and crimes againstforeign labor persist in the absence of adequate legislativeframework and protection and the relegation of family

58

According to court records, nearly fifty executions havetaken place in the period 1947-2007. They were allmen. However, in the name of honor, women are fre-quently the victims of extra judicial executions often byfamily members. The murderer in these cases is grant-ed extenuating circumstances and often serves a lightsentence. In the period between 1995-1998, the stateexecuted six men. During this same period, thirty-sixextra judicial executions of women under the label of“honor crimes” were also committed. This figure is notnecessarily accurate, given that often these sudden“deaths” are underreported. Here the “penal code” ofthe family has precedence over that of the state.

Box 7: Capital punishment: The penal code versustribal justice

matters to the different religious courts is not helpful. Inthe absence of civic legal reference-points for dealingwith family violence, authorities refrain from stepping inunder the pretext of not wanting to interfere in the pri-vate affairs of the different sects. The limited capacity ofthe state to enforce protection and its inability to claim amonopoly on the use of force in these spheres and oth-ers remain a source of concern. Perhaps a comparisonbetween “honor crimes” and the Penal Code provides amost telling example of this phenomenon, along withdisparities in wages, social security, and stereotypes inschool textbooks, and so on (see Chapters 2, 3 and 5 inmain report).

Lebanon enjoys one of the freest presses in the Arabregion and right to freedom of the press is widely imple-mented. Most of the visual, audio, and written media inLebanon is privately owned and politically independentof the state, with significant margins of freedom andmaneuver. However, the right to freedom of informationfor citizens is undermined by the undue influence ofbusiness/political/sectarian interests on this sectorwhere all the major media outlets are owned by politi-cal/sectarian groups. This overlap means that the role ofthese outlets has become increasingly circumscribed bythe interests of these parties and that, as a result, theyact as a reflection of social structures rather than a pub-lic arena for open debates over matters of public interestor for holding public servants accountable. Legislativereform would go a long way toward breaking the monopolyof these groups over this sector.

In this regard, freedom of the press has also been cur-tailed in the last three years by the assassination of twowell known journalists; Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueniand assassination attempts against others. Attacksagainst journalists perceived to be on the opposite polit-ical side have also increased. Several journalists forexample were forced to flee their homes during the May7th, 2008 civil conflict in Beirut and one TV station wasburnt and shut down. The regulatory legislation govern-ing the media sector has also been applied selectivelywith some outlets being sent to court for specific infrac-tions but not others.

Similarly, censorship over artistic activity by the inter-nal security is common. These organizations ban the

distribution of books and magazines with anti-regimecontent, or ban artistic events and plays that are deemedto harm religious feelings.104 Despite these attempts thecultural scene is thriving with a wide panoply of literary,artistic and poetic production. The myth of sectarian plu-ralism and a nation representing a universal message ofhumanity have also pervaded Lebanese literary writingssince the 19th century. Lebanon's position as the Arabregion's capital for translation has also enhanced thisability to play a trans-cultural role, a conduit betweencultures and civilizations. Even though a quasi-archivalliterary culture that reveled in its parochialism developedduring the period of the civil war, it still refrained fromdelving into the sectarian overtones of the ongoing con-flict. The post-war period however has seen an eruptionof post-modern artistic practices that use a wide rangeof artistic techniques to open Lebanon's contemporaryhistory and with it the history of its recent conflict toquestioning. Recent attempts by the Internal Securityapparatus to censor such practices were blocked by theMinister of Culture at the time, Tarek Mitri.

Sectarian interests have also spilled over into the writingof history and have undermined the right of Lebaneseyouth to an adequate and equitable education whilstreinforcing existing societal and communal divisions.Continued disagreement over a revised and “unified”history book has meant that schools have resortedto supplementing the currently sanctioned history

104 For example, university professor Adonis 'Akra, was preventedfrom signing his book of memoirs of prison; the publisher, Dar al-Tali'a, was ordered shut. See www.amnesty.org/report2004/lbn-summary-ara. In addition, the musician Marcel Khalifeh was pros-ecuted for signing the verse “I am Youssef, My Father” byPalestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, then cleared by a Beirut judgeon December 14, 1999. The films The Da Vinci Code and Jesus ofNazareth were also banned.

…freedom of the press has also beencurtailed in the last three years by the assas-sination of prominent journalists and threatsagainst others

“ “

59

105 Schools are still teaching books first published in 1968 (forsecondary classes) and 1970 (for primary and intermediate class-es), the latter produced in conjunction with decree number 14528,dated 23 May 1970. Official government exams are for ninthgraders and the Lebanese Baccalaureate are based on thesebooks.106 UNDP, MEHE, CDR, 2008, Education and Citizenship inLebanon; CRDP, UNESCO, PNUD 2002, Programme d'Appui à laRéforme du Système Educatif Libanais.

Sectarian interests have spilled over intothe writing of history “

“

curriculum, which dates back to the 1970s,105 and thusleaves untouched some thirty-five years of contempo-rary history, with alternative histories. As a result, variousstudies, including the Education and Citizenship Surveyconducted by the National Human Development Report(NHDR), show a fundamental disagreement in politicalculture among Lebanese youth around ancestors (goodor bad historical figures) and Lebanon's geopolitical con-text (including which countries are to be considered itsfriends or enemies).106 These absences lay national historyopen to manipulation and reinterpretation based on var-ied ideologies and different political agendas. Such anapproach further reinforces existing divisions among dif-ferent Lebanese communities. In the absence of alterna-tive approaches that help students acquire the analyticaland critical skills to make informed opinions, popularstereotypes that have permeated students' immediateenvironment are reinforced, as are differences in whatchildren are taught about nation, identity, and civic val-ues at various schools.

Consequently, and even though some progress hasbeen made in different arenas, serious deficiencies con-tinue to plague the ability of citizens to hold state repre-sentatives accountable. These deficiencies have alsomanifested themselves in other spheres of public lifeand have further accentuated political and social insta-bility among citizens.

One of those spheres is civil society. Citizenship is notsimply about the role of the state in ensuring citizenrights. It is also about the partnerships and the initiativesthat citizens undertake to improve their lives and thelives of those around them. These may be initiated asindividual initiatives, as an effort undertaken by a partic-ular non governmental organization or by leaders in theprivate sector. All those actors are considered as mem-bers of civil society.

Lebanon boasts a large network of civil society organi-zations classified as non-governmental organizationsand also include political parties, business and family

107 MOSA, June 2008, Evaluation of the Non-GovernmentalOrganisations National Survey : A Community Development Projectof the Council of Reconstruction and Development (Draft report)prepared by Karin Seyfert based on field work implemented byEtudes et Consultations Economiques (ECE) in association withPADECO Co. Ltd.

based associations or religious organizations. More thantwo thirds of those organizations are considered generalNGOs that offer a wide range of services. At the sametime, family associations seem to be more numerous inthe Mohafazat of the South, Nabatiyeh and MountLebanon (15 percent, 16 percent and 12 percent respec-tively); the same areas where a larger percentage of reli-gious organizations are also based. Further analysis indi-cates that on a national level close to 21 percent ofNGOs have a self declared religious affiliation. The high-est percentage are in Mount Lebanon and Nabatiyeh (25percent each) followed by the Bekaa (21 percent), theSouth (18 percent), the North (15 percent) and Beirut (18percent). (see indicators section for the sectarian break-down of those NGOs).107

Despite the differences between these types of organi-zations, along with the private sector, they have playedand continue to play a considerable role in addressingsome of the adverse outcomes of the security and eco-nomic crisis. Civil society organizations do so as part oftheir daily mandates, businesses in the private sectorundertake such activity as part of specialized programsand often in partnership with local or internationalNGO's, while individual initiaitives are carried out on adhoc basis. The variety of services that these organiza-tions offer ranges from the artistic and cultural to socio-economic development and advocacy work. Eventhough impossible to quantify in terms of scope, out-reach and efficacity the impact that some of theseorganizations are having on the ground is evident. TheNHDR's 101 stories to tell documented a fraction ofthese initiatives, many of which have also been includedthroughout the report.

The Lebanese private sector has also demonstrated astrong commitment to addressing key issues that inhib-it socio-economic development. Through various inter-nal measures and external outreach, it is playing a vitalrole in enhancing econonmic development and inaddressing some of the chronic problems facing differ-ent communities. In part this is evident in some of the

Civil society organizations have playedand continue to play an important role inalleviating some of the prevalent social andeconomic conditions

“ “

60

initiatives that key members of the business communityhave undertaken to address perceived needs. Amongothers, these include efforts to support innovative devel-opment and entreprenurship skills among the Lebaneseyouth in particular partnerships with a variety of NGOs torehabilitate and beautify postwar Beirut; efforts toaddress regional disparities in literacy and access to IT,a media program to generate national and communalsolidarity and help those in need, and a variety of proj-ects for environmental sustainability as well as smallgrants programs to small-scale enterpreneurs in variousregions. In 2006 the private sector was quick to getinvolved through the Adopt a Bridge scheme thatinsured the reconstruction of what was damaged byIsrael.

Despite this range of actitivties and growing practice ofphilanthropy and corporate social responsibility, pro-development activities are still viewed by the privatesector mainly as voluntary or 'add-on' activities ratherthan a tool with which they can advocate for long termdevelopment of the country and thus of their own busi-nesses. Many of these efforts have yet to move beyondvoluntary philanthropic contributions to become struc-tured community investments with proactive manage-ment. As a result, these efforts remain scattered andfragmented, with limited investments in partnershiptoward development.

Collectively, it is difficult to assess the reach and impactof these initiatives on development for a variety of rea-sons. First, given the fragmented nature of these initia-tives, it is complicated to estimate the exact dollar figureof what is being spent by these organizations andassess their outomes. Second, no monitoring and eval-uation scheme exists that can assess the effeciveness ofthese interventions, and whether they reached their tar-get populations and stated aims. Third and most impor-tantly, in the absence of a larger framework for develop-ment, many initiatives end up duplicating each other.

Finally, the efforts by members of civil society, whetherindividuals or CSOs have also been impacted by theintersection of sectarian/political interests with clien-telism and at times regional and global political strug-gles. In turn this has often subordinated the civil to thecommunal and political in many arenas. While someCSOs are directly connected to sectarian based political

The Lebanese private sector has alsodemonstrated a strong commitment toaddressing key issues that inhibit socio-economic development

“ “

parties and form the social arm of these parties, othersplayed a large role in the democratization of public life inthe early 1990s and the acquisition of various politicaland civil rights, such as the right to monitor parliamentaryelections, or the re-establishment of municipal electionsafter a 36 year hiatus.108 This period also saw the launchof associations that were largely independent of sectar-ian political structures and, given the professional back-ground of many participants, did not seek the approvalof sectarian leaders to advance their demands. Thesecampaigns focused on civic rights and exhibited newways of organizing civil action. As such they attractedvarying levels of media coverage and support fromdiverse groups. However, despite their accomplish-ments, many were unable to withstand the rise of sectar-ian polarization at the end of the 1990s and have sincebeen considerably weakened particularly on issues ofnational interest. Although, as the 101 stories to tell proj-ect indicates, many such organizations are still activelytrying to address local issues or perceived gaps in dailylives, overall they seem to have resigned from broadbased organization over political issues that may serveto deepen democratic processes in the country. Themeager attendance to events organized by civil societyactivists in protest of renewed conflict is but one example.

This intersection between sectarian, political and clien-telist interests has also undermined the role of profes-sional syndicates as engines for social and economicreform. Historically, professional syndicates have alsoplayed a significant role in the development of the coun-try. Duing the 1960's and 1970's reform attempts ofstate institutions and systems of governance were inpart taken as a result of pressure from labor unions anddifferent syndicates. Widespread movements by civicand social organizations, particularly among laborers,agricultural workers and students prompted governmentreconsideration of a large array of policies. In otherwords, social gains were in part the result of class-basedsocial movements as they were of sectarian or elite-based struggles. In the postwar period syndicatesbecame increasingly politicized and their role as agentsof change has diminished considerably. Electoral cam-paigns are focused on political positioning rather thanreform programs addressing the needs of their member-ship. Given the nature of Lebanese society and themakeup of its political parties as described in ChapterThree, this politicization carries overt sectarian over-tones. The extent of their paralysis is evident in theways in which demonstrations by the General LaborUnion on socio-economic issues become fodder for

108 Karam Karam, 2006, Le Mouvement Civil au Liban.Mobilisations, protestations et revendications associatives dansl'après-guerre, Karthala-IREMAM, Paris

61

political bickering between the different political parties.These have sometimes disintegrated into civil conflict;the most recent of which are the events of last May thatbrought the country to the verge of civil war again.

In this regard, and despite this critical role played by civilsociety in increasing democratization they are alsoplagued by many of the same problems that affect soci-ety at large, including sectarianism and nepotism. In thisregard, and as in other contexts, civil society is not anautonomous agent separate from existing social con-structs and networks in Lebanon. Rather it remains justas embedded as the latter in the social and politicalpower structures that make up the country. Evidenceindicates that it is only when civil society groups havebeen able to bypass their primal identities as membersof religious communities that they have been able tomake a difference on a national scale. In other words, inmany ways it is the embeddedness of social actors andmembers of civil society organizations in the very socie-tal structures that many of them are seeking to changethat has reduced the power of these groups.

The intersection of sectarian/politicalinterests with clientelism and at timesregional and global political struggles hassubordinated the civil to the communal andpolitical

“ “

ATTITUDES ANDPERCEPTIONS OFCITIZENS

3

65

In this overall framework, the question is where do theLebanese stand on issues related to their civic statusand to the question of national identity and what impactdoes this have on the vision they have for their country.Despite advances made on the political, social and cul-tural aspects of citizenship, Lebanon remains in crisis inpart due to regional and global power struggles, militaryconflicts and, more recently, widespread economic cri-sis, which is itself in part due to precarious internal con-ditions such as those mentioned above. Polls also indi-cate that Lebanese citizens across the board are con-cerned about the future of their country.109 This has hin-dered progress toward democratic citizenship and eco-nomic, social, and political development.

Various surveys and polls conducted by different agen-cies indicate that the Lebanese are, at best, confusedabout the status of citizenship rights and are tornbetween wanting a civic state and considering the cur-rent sectarian system necessary to maintain nationalunity and guarantee the rights of minorities. For exam-ple, asurvey conducted in 2004 by faculty at theUniversité St. Joseph (USJ) found that around 45.5 per-cent of Lebanese believe that confessionalism directlycontradicts national unity and another 42.3 percentbelieve that it contributes to this unity. These figures dif-fer considerably from one sect to another. However,when the question is applied to Lebanon as a whole, thepercentage of those who believe that confessionalism isin direct contradiction to national unity rises to 63.3 per-cent while 25.4 percent considered that it contributespositively and another 11 per cent abstained fromresponding. Within communities, the percentage of thosewho consider confessionalism contradicts national unityis also high.110

However, these results are belied by answers to otherquestions related to civic status laws in the same survey.More than two thirds of Lebanese believe in the right notto be subjected to the power of confessional authorities.Yet only half of those asked expressed support for acivic status law, while 11.7 percent did not respond. Thewide popular support for civic status laws is no surprisegiven that the 1998 campaign on this issue garneredclose to 50,000 signatures from citizens and the supportof around seventy-five organizations. It is still not clearhow far the Lebanese will go in their demands for sucha law. (Table 16)

Another study conducted by Theodore Hanf in 2006 toexplore the attitudes of Lebanese towards a variety ofissues related to identity and the state support thesefindings. Results indicate that despite an increasingacceptance of the enforcement of the 1936 law thatestablishes a secular community that one can opt into,enjoying the same rights as other religious communities,an equal percentage believe that the current sectarianstructure is one that can neither be bypassed nor over-come. This latter figure is interesting in itself, since itindicates the first instance of clear majority support forthis policy since 1987. To a certain extent, these resultsindicate tendencies among Lebanese, who, on the one

The Lebanese are, at best, confusedabout the status of citizenship rights and aretorn between wanting a civic state andconsidering the current sectarian systemnecessary to maintain national unity andguarantee the rights of minorities

““

Table 15 : Sectarianism and national unity

Sectarianism contradicts national unity in LebanonSectarianism contributes to national unity in LebanonNo response

Christians66.4225.87

7.7

Muslims60.66

25.713.62

Druze69.614.316.1

Source: Jean Mourad, 2006, p.18 - Note: Given the dramatic political crisis that has plagued Lebanon since the survey was conductedand the current political polarization in the country these figures may have changed.

109 See polls conducted by the Lebanese Opinion Poll Committee,available on www.lebaneseopinion.org

110 Jean Mourad, 2006, Les Sentiments d'appartenance : la sociabilité,Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines, Université Saint-Joseph, Beyrouth.

PART THREEATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS OFCITIZENS

66

hand, would like a modern, functioning, and sectarianstate and, on the other, accept the reality of the sectarianstructure in Lebanon.

Results of this same study also indicate that the largestportion of respondents supported a division between

Table 16: Attitudes toward a civic status law

Right to adopt a civic status law (National)Strongly agreeAgreeDisagreeStrongly disagreeNo response

Right to adopt a civic status law (by Religious Community)

Strongly agreeAgreeDisagreeStrongly disagreeNo response

Christians19.4738.827.65.958.13

Muslims11.1821.1

3323.2611.34

15.828.929.814.810.6

Druze35.716.112.5

5.430.4

Source: Ibid

Source: Theodor Hanf, 2007, E pluribus unum? Lebanese Opinions and Attitudes on Coexistence, International Centre for Human Sciences &Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Source: ibid.

Table 17: Attitudes toward religion and politics

"One should not mix religion and politics.""The best solution to Lebanon's present dilemma is a com-pletely secular state and society.""Every Lebanese should have the right to join a secularized community that has the same rights as the other communities -personal status law, political representation, etc.""It doesn't matter what anyone wants, secularization doesn'tseem to have a chance in Lebanon. Community membership is a reality you have to accept."

198184__

__

__

19848475

__

__

19868752

__

__

19879363

50

54

20027857

54

64

20067965

70

69

Table 18: Attitudes toward sectarianism and the political system

“The system has been flawed from its inception because it institutionalises the separa-tion of the various communities. For this reason it should be replaced by a system moreappropriate for a country aspiring to modernity.”“The Lebanese have reached a level of maturity that helps them get past sectarian isolation. And we will be able to build a new political system in the near future.”“Come what may, our communities are rooted in society and are not going to disappear.In the long run their power and resilience will stand in the way of important changes.”“Considering the reality of Lebanese society, this system is acceptable, and if correctlyapplied, it can work.”

"Perhaps it doesn't look like it, but it is possible that the political system can bechanged in the near future.""The strength of the different communities makes fundamental long-term change in thepolitical system impossible."

198735

52

200250

62

200683

78

76

75

200677

71

state and religion. However, the percentage of thoserequesting this separation seems to have decreasedfrom an overwhelming 93 percent in 1987 during the civilwar to 79 per cent in 2006. This decrease correspondsto the increase of respondents who believe that the sys-tem is flawed and cannot be dealt with. (Table 17 and 18)

67

Similarly, the attitudes of the Lebanese toward democra-cy are ambiguous at best. In 2006, close to 70 percentof Lebanese polled seemed to accept the particular formof consociational democracy (power sharing) that char-acterizes Lebanon. At the same time, more than 50 per-cent also accepted a majoritarian system of governancewhile another third considered the one party systemadequate. Responses to other statements, however,indicate that a large portion of those polled advocate apower sharing system for reasons other than conviction.As Hanf states “… the Lebanese are in favor of a systemof democratic power-sharing because they do not seeany alternative. A majority are democrats by conviction,and a larger majority by necessity.”111

This confusion with regard to democracy coupled withthe ongoing political and economic crisis has alsoundermined the belief common among many Lebanesein the superiority of a free-market system and in the wis-dom of laissez-faire policies. Naturally, this also influ-ences people's choice of government. In a question ask-ing respondents whether they would prefer, “an honestand clean government that rules with a firm hand” or “agovernment that is perhaps a bit corrupt but respectscivil freedoms?” an overwhelming 85 percent favored anhonest and clean government that ruled with a firmhand, up from two thirds who favored the same in 2002.Only 15 percent want more freedom even if a degree ofcorruption is its inevitable accompaniment.112

These findings are confirmed in another more recent pollconducted by the Lebanese Opinion AdvisoryCommittee (LOAC) which indicates a rise in support forthe equal representation of Muslims and Christians inparliament as mandated by the Taif agreement. In tan-dem, the number of individuals who do not support thisarrangement and believe in a non-confessional parlia-ment, also as required by the Taif constitution, hasdropped almost by half in 2007 to rise again in 2008.Support for the distribution of parliamentary seats basedon proportional representation of each confession, how-ever, has remained steady.113 These results can perhapsbe explained by the rise in sectarian tensions and skir-mishes in the aftermath of the July 2006 war on Lebanonand the opposition sit-in. These results also indicate theextent to which attitudes toward democracy in Lebanon,as in other parts of the world, are driven by politicalevents. Lebanon's political and military turbulence of thepast three years has played a particularly big role.

These positions are also largely reflected in the attitudesof Lebanese youth toward citizenship, democracy, inter-communal coexistence, and the culture of law.114 Thesurvey, undertaken by the NHDR in partnership with theMinistry of Education and Higher Education, to assessthe knowledge, attitudes, and concepts of students withregard to citizenship and democracy, found that thegrasp of Lebanese students of the three concepts of cit-izenship covered in the study, namely democracy, goodcitizenship, and state responsibilities, was uneven. Theyindicated that students seemed to be responding in anacademic manner perhaps either due to their desire tosay answer correctly or to their limited experience indemocratic decision-making, or perhaps to the highdegree of polarization in the country.

National sentiment among Lebanese students is verystrong, with a powerful penchant toward protectionismand sovereignty. There is no consensus, however,among youth on political options that may be describedas national or common.

A question on Lebanon's most important historic leaderproduced ambiguous results at best. Only one figure,Emir Fakhreddine, had any direct historic connection toLebanon and was named by around 6.5 percent of thestudents. Around 34 percent of students named toomany figures to be classified in one particular categoryand another 35 percent did not name anyone. Thevagueness of the preferred historical leader suggeststhat the powerful national sentiment evidenced in theirresponses owes more to a desire to glorify the nationthan to civic culture. A similar ambiguity was evidencedin student responses to questions asking them to identifycountries considered friends or foes of Lebanon.

On the social front, the tendency to favor social cohe-sion and the preservation of the current sectarianpolitical system ranges from moderate to strong among

111 Theodor Hanf, 2007, E pluribus unum? Lebanese Opinions andAttitudes on Coexistence, Centre International des Sciences del'Homme/International Centre for Human Sciences & Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Byblos (Jbeil), p.42.112 Ibid.113 LOAC, IRI, Statistics Lebanon, Perceptions of Politics,Leadership and Current Events in Lebanon, fieldwork conductedMay 14-June 11, 2007, p.11. Available onhttp://www.lebaneseopinion.org/ upload/Analysis-WITH_SLIDES.pdf 114 UNDP, MEHE, CDR, 2008, ibid.

National sentiment among Lebanesestudents is very strong, with a powerfulpenchant toward protectionism and sover-eignty

“ “

A majority of the Lebanese are democ-rats by conviction, and a larger majority bynecessity “ “

Table 19: Attitudes of Lebanese youth

F1b:

F2b:

F7b:F3b

F4b

Candidacy and voting in parliamentary elections should be based on support of / from clergymenWhen I can vote, we - my family and I - should vote for the same candidateEach sect should educate its own and provide scholarships for themMinistries and civil sector posts should be equally distributed amongthe zaimsThe State's top three posts should go to the leaders of the three main sects

Don'tagree55.8

63.5

29.419.3

28.7

Agree

33.4

23

64.672.6

58.4

Don'tknow9.6

12

56.8

11.8

Noanswer

1.2

1.4

11.2

1.2

68

Lebanese youth. More than a third of students agree thatelections and voting should be condoned by religiousleaders while around a quarter believe that voting inelections should take place based on overall family pref-erences. Furthermore, almost two thirds (64 percent) ofthe student population believe that each religious sectshould educate its own 'followers' and should provideeducational grants for them. This reflects the currentstrength of religious leaders as the place of first ratherthan the last resort for the provision of services as wellas for guidance on political choices across all sects. Inthe same vein more than 75 percent of the surveyed stu-dents agreed that ministries and positions in govern-ment should be distributed between political leadersequally while more than half agreed that the three toppositions in government should be distributed amongthe three main religious sects. These responses indicatenot only an understanding of the state as an arena wherespoils are subdivided among the religious sects and theirleaders and thus an acceptance of the current statusquo but also points to an alarming endorsement of thisstatus quo by the youth of today based on criteria thathave nothing to do with merit.

On the culture of law there also seems to be some con-fusion. Reponses indicated that while students seem toexpect others to respect the law, their criticism of viola-tions of the law are quite limited. In other words, viola-tions of the law do not solicit strong adverse reactionsfrom students and seem to be at least partially endorsedby them, reflecting perhaps a confused understanding oflegal sanctions. This is also a possible reflection of politicalconditions in Lebanon today, where breaking the law is

The tendency to favor social cohesion andthe preservation of the current sectarianpolitical system ranges from moderate tostrong

“ “sometimes sanctioned by those elected to condone it,and of students' inconsistent expectations of them-selves and others.

Finally, the study makes clear that Lebanese youthderive their political positions for the most part fromimmediate family contexts and not from a larger networkof peers. It also indicates that their positions on issuesof public interest are gleaned from their home environ-ments and that schools in general are basically the placeto study and master the requisite responses to pass theirexams. In addition to their poor exposure to differentmedia outlets, this situation reinforces their tendencytoward uncritical engagement in politics.

TOWARD A CITIZEN'S STATE

4

71

Moving toward a citizen's democracy requires concert-ed efforts on several fronts. This section will review thebroad principles necessary for this move in Lebanon andmake a series of short and medium term policy recom-mendations fundamental to this process.

These recommendations is that they are the outcome ofthree converging factors; a specific understanding of cit-izenship in relation to democracy that goes beyondrights and responsibilities; analysis of the particular con-text of Lebanon and empirical findings. The question tobe asking is what mix of policies will strengthen demo-cratic traditions, insure equity and fortify Lebanon'sdynamic market, lead to widespread economic andsocial security, and encourage entrepreneurial innova-tion and upward mobility, while insuring long lastingpeace and stability. Some of these recommendationsare also necessary to strengthen the allegiance of citi-zens to their state and to each other as citizens.

The principle idea that governs these recommendationsis that achieving a citizen's state requires a change invalues and a change in policy. In other words, achievinga citizen's state will require government action as well ascultural transformation. The protection of ethnic and reli-gious identities and of minorities in a country with eight-een different religious communities can only take placeby insuring irreversible equity among all citizens. At thesame time, instating the different policy changes andreforms needed also requires a new social contractbetween the state, the private sector, and civil society.From this perspective these recommendations will focuson three main principles:

Restoring relevance to political debate; Establishing irreversible equity among citizens; Promoting democratic cultural practices. They shouldbe considered as a package deal and not as piece-meal efforts at reform.

The report argues that the first step in the transitiontoward a citizen's state in Lebanon should be to restore

4.1 BRINGING MEANING BACK TOPOLITICAL DEBATE

content and relevance to politics at all levels. Politicaldiscussion in Lebanon has become increasingly limitedto negotiations between representatives of the differentsectarian communities and the public good is definedprimarily as the maintenance of balance between theprojected interests of the different communities withoutregard for efficiency, long-term sustainability, or devel-opment imperatives. In this context, the interests of citi-zens as part of a communal grouping have replaced theirinterests as individual members of a larger national polity.This has made it increasingly hard for independent indi-vidual and collective voices to be heard.

To restore content to politics beyond these narrow con-fines, a discussion of what it means to be a citizen inLebanon needs to take place. Such a discussion will bynecessity begin from the question of what type of nationdoes Lebanese society aspire to and what sort of stateshould it thus have? In the process, it must focus on howto reform institutions to make them more effective, equi-table, and transparent and how to promote responsiblepolitical parties and practices. This would also includeparliamentary reform as well as electoral reform.

A key issue in this process is the legitimacy and role ofthe state. Without the capacity to guarantee the rights ofcitizenship, sustainable development and democracycannot be maintained. In this regard, Lebanon needs tomove beyond the framework of electoral democracy,which, despite its importance, is not enough. This reporttherefore calls for a wide reaching and honest debatenot only on the role of the state, but on the ways in whichit can respond to the nation to which the Lebaneseaspire. Such a debate would have to tackle the placeand role of Lebanon's confessional communities, theeconomy, social development, and cultural pluralism.

A. Vision for Lebanon and Role of the State

The NHDR calls for a wide reaching andhonest debate on the role of the state andthe ways in which it can reflect the vision ofthe nation to which the Lebanese aspire

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PART FOURTOWARD A CITIZEN'S STATE

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This debate on the vision for Lebanon needs to respondto the question of what makes Lebanon a nation andhow it can achieve a balance between the rights of indi-vidual citizens and those of sectarian communities, ormore broadly between the demands of citizenship andsectarian pluralism. In such a context, sectarianism is aform of political ideology that is only possible within thestate and not outside of it. The political role of sectarian-ism is its most important role and the one that allows itsreproduction at different levels of society and in otherarenas.

In a sense the Taif Accords tried to respond to this issueand reconcile the two philosophical traditions that havegoverned Lebanon regarding the relationship of commu-nities to the state; the first a form of pluralism that advo-cates consensus between the major confessionalgroups (consociational democracy)115 and the second auniversalism that supports the rights of individuals asindividuals and not as members of a community. Itincluded articles that guaranteed the rights of communi-ties as well as the rights of individuals in the politicalprocess. These revisions of the Taif Accord were basedon the premise that democratic citizenship rights arewhat make pluralism possible. However, the partialimplementation of the Taif Accord, the contradictionsamong some of its articles, and political/sectarian inter-ference in the process of institutional reform and in thejustice system have all undermined civic state building inthe last eighteen years.

What has become clear is that even though theLebanese agree that the country is suffering from asevere political and national crisis they do not agree onthe means to emerge from this crisis. In this respectthere are two main tendencies:

A constitutional-legal-civic approach that believes institu-tion building and equity among citizens are the only wayout of this crisis. Lebanon's true role here is as anemblem of inter-religious coexistence and tolerance.Only through de-confessionalizing the system canLebanon live up to this role.

Sectarianism is a form of political ideol-ogy that is only possible within the state andnot outside of it“ “

A sectarian-pact approach that believe the National Pactbetween the main religious groups as the guarantee forpeaceful coexistence among communities and as suchthe best entry point from which to address the ongoingLebanese crisis. Here the rights of individuals are assumedto be the same as those of their religious communities. Inother words, for advocates of this position, ignoring thesectarian reality of Lebanon is a jump into the unknown.

Of note is that these positions do not correspond to thepolitical divisions in the country as proponents of bothpositions cross over the current political divide. At thesame time, advocates of the first position are consider-ably weaker politically and are unable to force a politicaldiscourse that can identify ways out of this crisis and themeans to implement them.

From this perspective, this national debate also needs toaddress the specific characteristics of consociationaldemocracy in Lebanon. As practiced in Lebanon today,consociational democracy has become a tool that con-tradicts fundamental tenants of democracy such astransparency and promotion of public over private good.It establishes a ruling cartel that could potentiallyincrease the risk of greater societal conflict through itsneglect of social and economic issues vital to the every-day lives of individuals. In this the Lebanese experienceis similar to that of Venezuela and Austria where politicalparticipation effectively became the political distributionof state institutions among key groups.

This debate also needs to address the ways in which thestate can effectively guarantee the security of all its citi-zens, insure a functioning legal system, settle conflicts inaccordance with democratic rules, and establish macro-economic balance whilst strengthening social securityand development options for its citizens based on theprinciple of universality. From this perspective, it alsoneeds to include a discussion of the economic optionsthat exist for Lebanon and on which the social rights ofcitizenship depend. The report contends that there aredifferent ways to guarantee social citizenship rights inkeeping with a mixed market economy model. Thisdebate, however, must be at the center of public discus-sion and not limited to technical circles.

Differ at positions on the best approach toaddress this relationship do not correspondto the current political divide in the country“ “

115 Ibid.

The Taif Accords tried to reconcile the twophilosophical traditions that have governedLebanon regarding the relationship of com-munities to the state

“ “

As practiced in Lebanon today, consoci-ational democracy has become a tool thatcontradicts the fundamental tenants ofdemocracy

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This leads us to the fundamental question of whether theLebanese can achieve consensus between citizenship(as equal rights, obligations, and opportunities) andpolitical sectarianism or between their civic and politicalidentity and their societal or communal/sectarian identity.In other words, can they live together as both equal anddifferent?

Responding to this question and thus identifying a visionfor Lebanon that moves toward a citizen's state presup-poses a more basic discussion of a series of intercon-nected questions that have had and will have a deter-mining impact on any vision for Lebanon and on the roleof its state and citizens. Among these are:

Is Lebanese society composed of individuals with noconsideration for communities or communities withno consideration for individuals? Or is it a social con-struct seeking to establish different ways of beingthat do not necessarily eliminate each other? Should state/citizen relations be governed by theconstitution or by the national pact? Or should it begoverned by both in such a way that the constitutionframes the relationship of the state to individuals andthe National Pact to communities? What are the les-sons to be learnt from the civil war and more recentcivil conflict?In this regard, what are the determinants of democracyin Lebanon? To what extent are political practicescommon to the country since independence effectivein sustaining democracy in Lebanon? If Lebanon is toadhere to the current consociational model, thenwhat are the pitfalls that need to be addressed?What is the role of the state in this context? The state,as outlined in Chapter One of this report is both theoutcome of societal struggles (be they economic,religious, or other) and the site of that struggle andnegotiation. In such a context, is the state a tool in thedistribution of power among confessions, as is thecase today, and thus unconcerned with citizens asindividuals? Or should the state be focused on therights and obligations of its citizens irrespective oftheir multiple identities. The rights of communities inthis latter perspective are limited to a freedom of exis-tence and expression that is binding for both stateand religious communities. What are the specific social and economic rightsassociated with each of these choices? Who controlsthe instruments of force and monopolizes the meansof violence?

What role is Lebanon to play in the region? IsLebanon to be the bridge between differing groups?Is it to offer a message of peaceful coexistence? Is itto work on bridging differences among others? Or isit to be the stage upon which regional conflicts areplayed out? What is the role of the state in thisprocess and what are the roles of the different com-munities and political parties?

The debate also needs to address theways in which the state can effectively guar-antee the security of all its citizens“ “ B. Political Culture

An informed public is a key constituent of democraticsystems. Citizens play a critical role in overseeing theaction of their state and holding their public officialsaccountable. In Lebanon, and despite the high levels ofsocietal politicization, political culture is considerablyweak. In this regard, a concerted and sustained effort isnecessary for the enhancement of political culture inLebanon around key themes generally accepted as fun-damental to the Lebanese polity.

These include the constitution, particularly the preambleand its commitment to the International Declaration ofHuman Rights, the First Ministerial Declaration which, asdiscussed in Chapter One is different from the NationalPact and the Taif Accord.

Strengthening political culture can take place on severalfronts, including education, the parliament, civil society,and the media.

Education: The Ministry of Education and HigherEducation can integrate these issues into education-al curricula (civic education, history) in a systematicand comprehensive manner.Parliament: The Lebanese parliament can work towardthe creation of an institution whose role is to enhanceand improve political culture among the public andpolitical elite. The role of such an institution would beto act as a conduit for partnership with civil society, toprovide policy direction and research on democraticgovernance in Lebanon to parliamentarians, and topublicize the work of parliament to the public at large.Civil Society: Civil society organizations (NGOs, politi-cal parties, syndicates, and so on) can play an activerole in spreading these principles across all sectors ofsociety. This can take place through:

Organization of local grass root workshops ondemocratic governance and the meanings of

An informed public is a key constituentof democratic system“

“

telism has greatly impacted these rights. Restoringsome balance to state-citizen relations requires achange in values and culture or a move from a logic ofsectarian subdivision of state institutions to institutingguarantees for sects and minorities that they will not bediscriminated against. To aid this process the followingactions need to be taken:

A new citizenship law should be created; one thatgrants expatriates the rights to Lebanese citizenship ifthey meet a collective set of criteria (such as havingbeen born in Lebanon, having lived in Lebanon for a setnumber of years, having a permanent residence, and soforth). Under this new law, Lebanese women would alsobe granted the right to pass on their nationality to for-eign-born spouses and children. In parallel, a revision ofprocedures granting large groups Lebanese citizenshipin the early 1990s should be undertaken to make surethey meet with the new criteria. Following the passage ofthis law, a population census should be undertaken. Itwould be the first since 1932.

Full implementation of the Taif Accord in particular theclause related to the establishment of a senate com-posed of religious leaders followed by a de-confession-alization of all public offices.

Implementing the recently established criteria for theselection of public sector employees, which are based onprofessional merit. This process includes the vetting ofapplicants anonymously and through selection commit-tees of qualified and non-partisan individuals. The selec-tion process must be transparent and open to publicscrutiny. The Council of Ministers should be required toimplement the recommendations of the selection com-mittee.

Creation of a new law for political parties that encouragesthe establishment of inter-sectarian parties. Such a lawshould also subject these parties to close public scrutiny.

Reinforcing the judicial system in ways that guaranteeits independence and its oversight over executive power.

Revision of the electoral laws is perhaps the mostimportant of these reforms. The right to vote, to run for

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citizenship. By necessity these would include discus-sions of the rights and obligations of citizenshipand the role of citizens in a democratic context. Partnerships with advertising agencies and differ-ent media outlets to promote the main articles ofthese texts and make them available to as wide apublic as possible.Partnerships with parliamentarians and otherstakeholders to enhance civic over sight over stateperformance in the areas of human rights. The aimwould be to build partnerships between parlia-mentarians and international and national organi-zations working on human rights issues. Specificindicators that would measure performance onthese issues could be established. These wouldalso help ingrain international human rights anddemocratic standards into everyday practices.

4.2 ESTABLISHING IRREVERSIBLEEQUITY

Clearly, a debate on the vision for Lebanon will impactthe role of the state in all sectors. The establishment ofirreversible equity among citizens is a cornerstone of thisagenda without which the country cannot move forward.This means that state/citizen relations need to be rede-fined on the basis of equity, justice, and sustainability,which in turn requires a reformed constitution-al/legislative framework. This would include a civil per-sonal status law, an electoral law that allows non-sectar-ian representation, and a focus on quality rather thanaccess in social and economic reform. All of these poli-cy recommendations are based on the current constitu-tional rights guaranteed to Lebanese citizens. They aregeared toward the empowerment of citizens and givingthem greater control over their own lives and insuring adirect relation to their state.

The establishment of irreversible equityamong citizens is a cornerstone of thisagenda without which the country cannotmove forward

“ “

A. Political Rights and Public Office

The political rights of citizenship extend beyond theelectoral process and encompass a range of other rightsthat include the right to fair and equal treatment and toaccurate representation. As discussed in Chapter Three,the rampant spread of political sectarianism and clien-

The political rights of citizenship extendbeyond the electoral process and encom-pass a range of other rights that include theright to fair and equal treatment and toaccurate representation

“ “

the following legislative and judicial changes should beundertaken. Even though some of these proposals enjoyconsiderable support from a substantial part of theLebanese population, implementing them will requireconsiderable political will and consensus building effortsparticularly among the different religious leaders.116

CIVIC LAWS

Create a family court system that has legal jurisdictionover family matters including child custody and alimonyas well as the power to protect women and minors incases of domestic or child abuse. It would include socialspecialists and doctors amongst other human resourcesneeded for it to function. In the process the minimumage for child custody should be increased and unifiedwhile alimony may be connected to an objective norm orstandard such as the minimum wage.

Implement an optional civic status law. Such a lawwould uphold the freedom of choice for Lebanese citi-zens whilst maintaining the integrity of the different reli-gious communities. The need for such a law is evident inthe considerable inequity among citizens in personalstatus matters and the increasing number of civil mar-riages that are taking place outside of Lebanon. From alegal perspective, the establishment of such a law is anecessary step to insure the coherence of the Lebaneselegal system on family and personal matters. As it is rightnow, and to quote Judge John Kazzi, the Lebanese sys-tem “pits Lebanese judges against the world”117 as theyfind themselves forced to become experts in the legalsystems where civil marriages are conducted. It is alsoparamount for the establishment of a common ground ofcivic action for Lebanese citizens and to undermine thehold of political sectarianism and its divisive and violentresults over the country.

Such a law would also institute equity with regard to per-sonal matters both between the genders and betweenindividuals of different religious denominations. Forwomen, this is critical since the current laws rob femalesof their independence by requiring a guardian, who isusually a male member of the family, with regard to spe-cific issues. It undermines their relationship with their

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B. Personal Status Laws

public office, and to representation are inherent rights ofcitizenship. In Lebanon, as discussed in Chapter Three,these have been undermined by an unstable electorallaw that has changed nine times in the thirteen electionssince independence and by an insistence on applying alaw that considers communal representation only.Furthermore, requiring citizens to vote from village of ori-gin rather than place of residence undermines their abil-ity to influence their immediate environments.

In parallel, the non-implementation of the Taif Accord inthe form of establishing a senate of religious leaders asa first step to de-confessionalizing parliament hasundermined the civic status of citizens and imprisonedthem within predetermined units and identities. It is onlyby de-confessionalizing parliament that the non-sectari-an considerations for the election of candidates willcome into play and meaning will be restored to politicsand the political process.

At this stage, such a revision entails the passing of theBotrous law, despite some of its shortcomings, as apackage deal and not in a piecemeal manner. Thisshould be considered a first step toward the full de-con-fessionalization of parliament. At the very least, the law'sproposed dual voting system insures that a little lessthan half the parliament is elected based on the princi-ple of non-sectarian representation in the six historic dis-tricts of Lebanon, while the rest are elected throughmajoritarian voting based on the smaller regions.

The 1990 Lebanese constitution redefined the role of thestate to some degree in that it enshrined the state's pos-itive neutrality toward all religious communities while atthe same time establishing the international declarationof human rights as a fundamental principle of Lebanesepolicy-making, thus recognizing the rights of individualsas individuals separate from their communities.However, the current organization of personal statuslaws relegates control of all personal and family mattersto the eighteen officially recognized religious sects inLebanon. This creates substantial inequity among citi-zens on a wide variety of matters including divorce, childcustody, inheritance, and so forth. Critically, it is alsoused as an argument for the continued denial ofLebanese women's right to grant Lebanese citizenshipto their non-Lebanese spouses or to children born tonon-Lebanese fathers.

To achieve equity among citizens on this front and thusmeet the standards required by the Lebanese constitution,

116 See Ahmad Beydoun, 1999, Nineteen Surviving Sects: TheLebanese and the Battle for Civil Marriage. See for details on thevaried positions of the different religious leaders on the question ofcivil marriage.

117 John Kazzi, 2007, Civil Marriage, The Lebanese Judge againstthe World.

To achieve equity among citizens andthus meet the standards required by theLebanese constitution, a series of legislativeand judicial changes should be undertakenon civil and personal status laws

“ “

include opportunity and quality, or what Sen calls thecapability approach. It means expanding people'scapacities through investments in their health, educa-tion, and ability to manage risks.

Such an approach has dual implications. On the onehand, it necessitates a new social contract that wouldgovern the relationship of the state, private sector, andemployees. It also assumes that social policy cannotsubstitute for development. In Lebanon, this would needto occur on several parallel tracks that include rethinkingsocial rights from three interrelated perspectives:

Equity and cohesion of service standards that wouldinclude the integration of marginalized and vulnera-ble groups Coordination and efficient targeting of social deliveryservices that in turn improve social outcomesAn integrated social development approach wouldneed to maintain fiscal sustainability and avoid possi-ble adverse effects such as high inflation and lowergrowth rates. Here there is a need to include pro-poor growth policies and partnerships with the pri-vate sector particularly with regards to higher educa-tion, vocational training, and employment and jobcreation issues.

With this in mind, the policy recommendations belowalso have the twin aims of 1) enhancing socio-economicequity among citizens and 2) reinforcing the direct rela-tionship of the state to citizen, as well as improvingtransparent and democratic governance modalities.They rest on the assumption that the state's role is toguarantee these rights, provide the regulatory environ-ment for the different stakeholders and insure the imple-mentation of all legislative decisions taken in thatrespect.

At the same time, as a provider of some of these servic-es, the performance of state institutions needs to beimproved with the aim of achieving greater efficiency inthe allocation of resources and in social outcomes. Assuch they include sectoral and inter sectoral recommen-dations. The purpose is to enhance the quality of publiceducation, replace the various health insurance fundswith one unified health care insurance system that cov-ers the entire population, develop an efficient and equi-table pension scheme and follow a national pro-poor

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children particularly in situations of conflict and placesthem at the mercy of others on issues of inheritance, insome cases even sanctifying the culturally based crimeof honor killing, among other forms of violence. In effect,sectarian violence often has a gender component.

Grant citizens the right to resort to the constitutional court.

Grant women the right to pass on their citizenship to non-Lebanese spouses and children.

Establish a Judicial Observatory as a partnershipbetween the Ministry of Justice, international organiza-tions, and civil society. The role of such an observatorywould be to monitor progress on personal status laws,document and publicize new rulings on various issues,and, in the process, cultivate a culture of precedent andcumulative work.

RELIGIOUS COURTS

Alter Article 63 of the legal system so as to strengthenjudicial oversight over the proceedings of religious courts.This would give the General Commission for the Court ofCassation the right to verify that the various sectarianlaws are being applied equitably by the religious courts.At the same time, the jurisdiction of this court also needsto be expanded to insure that all laws respect interna-tional human rights, particularly on the issue of familyviolence.

Unify court fees between the different sectarian courts.

Publicize the rulings of the different religious courts (afterremoving the names of those involved to protect theiranonymity) so that these rulings can be a matter of pub-lic debate and discussion especially among experts andpolicy makers

On the social front, investment in integrated socialdevelopment is an investment in stability. By reinforcingthe direct relationship between state and citizen andembedding equity, citizens gain the opportunity to rede-fine their relationship with each other on a new, moreuniversalistic and humane basis. This implies anapproach that goes beyond access to basic services to

C. Socio-Economic Citizenship Rights

Investment in integrated social develop-ment is an investment in stability. This neces-sitates a new social contract between thestate, the private sector, and employees

“ “

Policy recommendations below aim towardenhancing socio-economic equity amongcitizens, reinforcing the direct relationship ofthe state to citizen, as well as improvingdemocratic governance modalities

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growth strategy. While these are not comprehensive,they create a roadmap of sorts for generating greatersocio-economic equity among citizens and in the longrun improving economic productivity.

However, prior to the implementation of sector specificstrategies, loopholes at the macro level of decision-mak-ing, social service delivery, and implementation mustalso be taken into account. This includes some of theoverlap between ministries in different areas of serviceprovision and which has begun to be addressed throughthe Inter-Ministerial Social Action Plan committee.Further support to this committee should be extended toinsure the full implementation of its proposed course ofaction. There is also a need for greater regulation andclearer partnership criteria between state agencies andNGOs. The basis on which NGOs are allocated fundingis murky at best and even though many services provid-ed by them are funded by the government, this is rarelyevident in their outreach programs. In other words, theyappear to be the direct service providers for servicesthat are in reality government-based. Given that a largeportion of those NGOs are affiliated with a political orreligious entity, this process further undermines trust instate institutions whilst making these groups the naturalconduit for access of citizens to their state. A project toregulate this relationship was undertaken by MoSA buthas since been neglected.

C.1 The right to education

The right to education should be about opportunity aswell as access. Improving the educational system canhave a significant impact on building human capital,insuring an effective and well trained labor force and inthe process decreasing poverty. The major challengefacing the Lebanese educational system is not access,which as discussed is guaranteed by the Lebanese con-stitution but quality, particularly of the public school sys-tem. In what follows are a series of policy proposals thataim to strengthen the regulatory role of the state,improve the efficiency of the current system as well asits effectiveness so as to foster civic attitudes and valuesamong students, strengthen state/citizen relations andimprove access/opportunity. Some of these proposalsmay also be a catalyst for fostering a more tolerant soci-ety and help build a more lasting civil peace.

To be effective these proposals should be taken as acomprehensive package. Many build up or include pro-posals made by other stakeholders including theEducational Development Program (EDP) at the MEHE.In addition to basic education, these policy recommen-dations also address vocational training and higher edu-cation. The underlying principle is that school education

should also prepare students to be responsible andactive citizens of the future while vocational and univer-sity education should give them the tools needed to beproductive.

Improving access as a basic right

Insure the implementation of the free and compulsory pri-mary education law and extend it to become a UniversalBasic Education (UBE) for ages 6 to 15.

Insure access of excluded groups, such as the disabledthrough educational grants or making schools accessfriendly. Special measures to address the needs of learn-ing challenged children including school counselors andsupplementary classes should be encouraged at theschool level. Given the over staffing of the educationalsystem a number of those teachers can be retrained toact in this capacity.

Enhancing opportunity: Improving the pedagogical environment

Enhance the quality of education: develop a new curricu-lum based on analysis of Learning Achievement, build anExamination Management System, generate automatedofficial exams based on a developed Question BankSystem, introduce a drop-out prevention program, unifyand standardize psycho-social assistance, and intro-duce a school rating system to monitor the quality ofeducation.

Improve effectiveness and competence of Public SchoolPrinciples by ensuring that public school principalsundertake a leadership development program. Provideadditional training on participatory methods of decisionmaking and on ways to increase the involvement of par-ent councils in schools.

Promote the professional development of teachersthrough additional training. This includes training for civiceducation and other teachers on participatory rather thanindoctrination teaching techniques. Such training shouldalso include suggestions for teachers on how to createlow budget extra curricular activities related to the cur-ricula that enhance the civic values and social solidarityamong students.

Review the History and Civic Education Curricula toaddress the gaps identified in the Education andCitizenship Survey. Addressing gaps in the history cur-ricula is central to establishing a unified platform fromwhich to discussion national issues while addressingidentified gaps among other issues in the civic educationcurricula is instrumental for fostering communal coexis-tence, democratic participation and long term peace. In

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the case of the History curricula, such a history bookcould conceivably include alternate points of view oftroubled periods in Lebanon's contemporary history.

Work with international and other civil society organi-zations to undertake extra curricular activities thatencourage civic values and attitudes among citizens.

Establishment of an Education and Citizenship Observatoryto monitor the impact of education on civic values, gen-erate requisite studies on the matter and provide policyrecommendations for necessary change. The observa-tory would also conduct a communication and outreachprogram to sensitize the public on the importance ofthese issues.

Interventions at the level of higher education to enhanceopportunity should focus on reform of the LebaneseUniversity which guarantees universal access to allLebanese citizens at minimal costs. This university hasbeen beset by a series of issues, many of which arestemming from political/sectarian interference in itsoperations and the clientelist networks they generate.These have undermined its position as a bastion of high-er education and have badly impacted its administrativeand pedagogical value. From this perspective, theautonomy of the university needs to be affirmed. Mergingthe different branches into 3 or 3 major campuses may bea first step in this direction and would allow theUniversity to re-occupy its pre-war role as a space thatbrings together students of different political affiliations,sectarian backgrounds, and regional difference. Anotherstep in enhancing student opportunity is to improve aca-demics by encouraging research and quality publica-tions. Raising promotion criteria for professors in termsof their research activities would also advance this goal.A third step would be to reconsider some of its academ-ic programs in an effort to meet market demand. This willbe elaborated upon further.

C.2 The right to health

Like education, reform of the health sector needs achange of focus. Stark differences in health outcomesbetween the regions and groups reflect disparities inaccess to information, facilities with reasonable stan-dards and protection from risks. Such inequity in turnleads to vastly different opportunities in life. From thisperspective, in addition to coverage and assistance, theright to health should be considered as a right to preven-tive rather than curative care. This would not onlyenhance the general health and longevity of the popula-tion but would also improve the efficiency and equity ofthe system. As such a revised health care sector shouldfocus on expanded knowledge, access and financing of

affordable care. This would entail the following:

Finalize the reform strategy that strengthens the regula-tory role of the state its capacity to implement all legisla-tive decisions, defines the role of the different public andprivate stakeholders, monitors their performance andthe financing of health services. National Healthaccounts should also be updated.

Review the current geographic mapping of hospitals andprimary health care centers. The aim is to avoid construc-tion of new facilities in areas that are over served anddirecting donor investments towards primary healthcare. Such a mapping exercise would also allow deci-sion makers to consider needs based on populationsize, geographic location and the optimal size of neces-sary hospitals in order to improve health and equity out-comes..

To insure citizen access to adequate health care andreinforce the regulatory role of the state, the accreditationprogram proposed by the MoH should be implemented infull. This program emphasized a broader multidimen-sional approach that included managerial processes,and clinical outcomes. Based on a new interpretation ofan existing legislation, the accreditation standards weredeveloped using international standards with the aim ofstrengthening quality assurance.

Develop a unified health care insurance scheme that is tobe financed through tax reforms. Such a scheme shouldreplace all existing schemes and cover resident popula-tions in Lebanon. Based on a suitable managementinformation system, such a proposal would harmonizecosts, prices and quality of health services whilst insur-ing transparency of the system. This approach wouldalso need to take into account ongoing studies forreform of the NSSF.118 These will include proposals forimproving the administrative and technical efficiency aswell as ensuring the NSSF's financial sustainability.

Strengthen primary health care (PHC) facilities and expandtheir scope by increasing their geographic distribution.This would also guarantee access of citizens in ruralareas to immediate health care when needed whilstreducing the need for curative health care proceduresand their associated costs. The current hospital accred-itation system should also be expanded to PAC facilities.At the same time, the distribution of drugs/medicine inPrimary Health Care Centers (most of which are con-tracted by NGOs) should also be regulated and free

118 In collaboration with the World Bank, the NSSF is undertakinga study entitled “Reforming the NSSF Health Insurance Branch:How to Provide High Quality Health Services in a Sustainable andEquitable Way”.

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citizen access to these drugs insured.

Expand knowledge of health care among the populationat large through outreach programs, public informationcampaigns and partnerships with civil society organiza-tions. Lack of knowledge leads to underinvestment inhealth care as well as payments for inappropriate healthcare. Community based health personnel can providecost effective instruction in disease prevention andhealthy behavior particularly to mothers.

C.3 Beyond basic needs: The right to socialintegration

Social Citizenship rights, as outlined in chapter fourextends beyond basic needs to include the right tosocial integration in its various dimensions of employ-ment, and freedom from poverty and vulnerability.

THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT

As outlined in chapter four of the report, the right toemployment and thus decent living is a fundamental cit-izenship right. Like many other countries around theworld, access to labor markets- both formal and informal-determine economic opportunities for a large segmentof the population. The functioning of this market, wagesand employment conditions, deeply impacts the qualityof life for workers and their families as well as equityacross workers and between workers and employers.Imperfections in the labor markets can lead to inefficientand often unfair outcomes affecting economic growthand productivity.

Addressing the deficiencies in the right to employmentand thus lead to significant equity gains and improvemarket outcomes requires public intervention in thelabor market, that would take shape through the:

Instigation of a tripartite dialogue between represen-tatives of governments, employers and workers tojointly shape labor standards, policies and pro-grams. The aim would be to address the currentimbalances that limit regulations and standards to formalsector workers thus leaving a large segment of the laborforce unprotected. By necessity such an approachrequires a fundamental shift in values by making surethat the informal economy is regarded as a fundamentaland complementary (some would even say entrepre-neurial) part of the formal economy. The informal sectorhere includes different income groups and individualswho chose to be there voluntarily such as young profes-sionals and others who are there by necessity such asseasonal agricultural workers.

In this regard, the goal of this commission would also becurb unemployment and facilitate citizen access to labormarkets by addressing legislative bottlenecks that hinderemployment for various categories of the population.The challenge here is to design programs that balanceequity and efficiency. More critically, it requires a com-prehensive a consistent and coherent policy packagethat may include macro-economic reforms and adjust-ments such as (1) improving the overall investment climate,(2) developing well-defined sectoral policies, and (3)reassessing fiscal and monetary policies.

Addressing the gap between supply and demand in labormarkets is also a key cornerstone in facilitating the rightto employment for citizens. This implies addressing theshortcomings in vocational and technical education sys-tem and higher education curricula. Vocational trainingprograms are key for the economic sustainability ofmany industries in the country. If implemented, the fol-lowing measures can improve vocational training and inthe process insure their effectiveness in meeting marketdemands. These include:

Rationalize Vocational and Technical Education (VTE)system by revising school distribution, upgrading cur-riculum, teaching methods, and learning assessmenttools, and recruiting competent human resources basedon VTE system needs.

Restructure VTE programs based on an assessment ofcurrent and future market demand and collaborate withbusiness owners to redefine the VTE program frame-work credential levels and demands. Programs that havevery low or no demand should be eliminated and newprograms created that cater to new labor marketdemand based on new technologies, Additional retrainingprograms for specific sectors where new technologiesare constantly developing (the printing houses sector forexample) should also be implemented.

Develop a more market-oriented curricula at theLebanese University by focusing on the introduction anddevelopment of more applied and technology-relatedmajors and specializations. Liaising with private sectorand key economic sector representatives in the processwould aid in reorienting the necessary programs.

Establish an intermediary matchmaking entity betweenemployers and employees. Several stakeholders suchas associations and unions, the National EmploymentOffice (NEO) and the Directorate General for Vocationaland Training Education (DGVTE) can play such a role.The role of this entity is to insure that the labor force isbeing trained based on contemporary market need. Itwould also investments in new industries and by exten-

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sion job creation in fields that currently lack the neces-sary human resources.

The creation of an unemployment fund is an integral partof social contracts, particularly in the context of height-ened political uncertainty. This fund would build onexisting background documents and legislation such asthe background documents of the law for the creation ofthe National Social Security Office in the mid-1960s thatexplicitly raised the possibility of broadening the scopeof this law to include an unemployment insurancebranch. Unfortunately, several factors have delayed theimplementation of this scheme (1) the outbreak of thecivil war in the mid-1970s, (2) the huge economic andsocial costs resulting from the war, and the (3) differentpriorities set in the post-war reconstruction agenda.

Implementing an unemployment fund also requires anaccurate and updated database, an institutional frame-work, and relevant human and administrative resourcesresponsible for following-up, monitoring and assessingthe impact of the goals of the unemployment fund.Conditions, regulations, eligibility criteria and soundfinancial regulations should be determined. It is alsoimportant to consider the successive phases and timeframe required for the policy's implementation with ade-quate time for concerned stakeholders (employers,employees, the Government, etc.) to prepare for itsimplementation.

FREEDOM FROM POVERTY

Addressing disparity, inequity, poverty and social inte-gration through social protection and pro-poor policiesare also central principles of socio-economic citizenshiprights. Social protection policies present a crucial oppor-tunity-enhancing role for the poor and vulnerable. Theyhelp families avoid hardship whilst expanding theiropportunities and giving societies the ability to embarkon the necessary reforms, especially ones intended tohave beneficial impacts on the government's fiscal posi-tion. Moreover, such social protection programs, if prop-erly defined and implemented can eliminate the need forspecial compensatory programs each time reform isinstigated.

In such a context the first step to be taken is the estab-lishment of a long-term social development strategy thatincludes short and medium term goals with a relatedworking plan to reduce poverty. These should comple-ment ongoing efforts by the GoL to expand existingsafety nets to vulnerable populations and create newones. This strategy should involve all stakeholdersincluding institutions (local and national), internationaland national organizations and NGOs, local communities

and members of civil society and strengthen coordina-tion among all these actors. It would also establish anefficient mechanism to measure poverty using bothmoney metric indicators and the Unsatisfied BasicNeeds approach on regular basis in order to be able tocarefully assess the impact of economic and social poli-cies and reforms (such as increase in VAT, reform ofNSSF, increase in fuel prices, reform in social ministriesetc.) on poverty and inequality. It should also include acommunication and outreach program in partnershipwith various media outlets.

A key node in any socio-economic strategy that aims atgreater equity in rights and in access is a pro-poor growthdevelopment strategy. This includes giving special priorityand focus to the economic and fiscal policies that serveto reduce poverty and that ensure pro-poor economicinterventions. This should include tax and wage reformplan especially since the minimum wage remains belowthe poverty line. It can also include support for small andmedium enterprises (SME's that dominate the Lebaneseeconomy and generate the majority of employmentopportunities in Lebanon. Such support may increasetheir access to financial resources, particularly femaleled enterprises, support the regularization of landowner-ship in rural areas and facilitate the bureaucratic proce-dures associated with the formal registration of suchenterprises.

In addition to poverty reduction and sectoral enhance-ment measures the aim of this strategy would also be todevise and implement a job creation policy focusing onempowering and enhancing productive sectors. Thiswould follow the outcomes of the social dialogue onemployment issues and reform of the vocational trainingcurricula. Access to employment through communitydevelopment programs is an important pillar in thisprocess. It would:

Devise a sound targeting mechanism that would insureboth geographic and population targeting. Such amechanism would give priority to addressing regional dis-parity and the needs of identified vulnerable groups. In thiscontext, special attention should be given to peripheralregions such as Akkar, Bint Jbeil, Ba'alabak, Hermel, andso on, and specific poverty pockets within these regionsincluding urban poverty zones as well as specific vulner-able groups such as female heads of households, elderly,unskilled laborers, farmers, etc.

Use public works programs where possible to supportthe working poor or the unemployed.

Involve municipalities in the implementation of interventions.This would insure the sustainability and institutionalization of

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these initiatives. In this regard, some capacity buildingfor local municipalities will need to be carried out.

Managing life risks is also key to preventing individualsand families from falling into destitution. In this context,there is a need to accelerate the implementation of thenew pension program law, whose aim is to replace the

three existing funds.119 This program should alsoinclude mechanisms for the protection of low-incomeearners by proposing a better balance in their retirementschemes. Despite some drawbacks (see full reportChapters Four and Six) this scheme would shift the bur-den on the budget imposed by pension payments in thelong run, extend social protection to workers currentlynot covered and promote equity among public and pri-vate sector workers in terms of income replacement.During the transition period some creative solutionscould be proposed such as making the transfer to thenew system optional or restricted to certain age brack-ets (usually young) or issuing bonds that mature uponthe entitlement of the employee to retirement.

119 The private sector end-of-services indemnity, the Civil ServantsCooperative (CSC), and the Security Forces Fund are the currentsources of retirement pensions.

4.3 DEMOCRACY AND PROMOTION OFCIVIC CULTURE

The move toward a citizen's state is not possible withoutthe promotion of a civic culture and expanding the realmof politics. This necessitates larger support for demo-cratic processes within and among institutions (be theystate or non-state) and a more concerted promotion of acivic culture. The aim is to put in motion a course ofaction that enhances democratic empowerment amongcitizens, allowing for greater participation and better bal-ance between representation and governance in associ-ation with ongoing reform efforts.

First, whilst Lebanon boasts an active civil society,attested to by the larger number of non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and extensive civic initiatives that

exist,120 there is still a considerable deficit in civic atti-tudes. This deficit is apparent in various aspects ofsocial formations and thus requires action on severalfronts. First, reform efforts must also be extended to civil

The move toward a citizen's state is notpossible without the promotion of a civicculture “ “

120 See UNDP, CDR, FES, 2009, 101 Stories to Tell: Civic Initiativesin Public Life, an NHDR publication, Beirut, Lebanon.

society organizations. This can take place throughstrategies that aim at greater transparency and account-ability within non-state institutions be they syndicates,NGOs, private sector entities, or political parties. Theseinstitutions are the key to the larger process of demo-cratic and civic transformation and a pre-requisite forembedding a culture of democracy at all levels of socie-ty. In tandem, additional strategies to strengthen therelationship with state institutions should also be put inplace.

Second, promoting civic culture requires sustained atten-tion to the education of Lebanese children and youth, interms of curricula, pedagogical approach, and generalschool environment. As the NHDR study on educationand citizenship made evident, while students seem tounderstand what democracy and citizenship mean, suchan understanding is not necessarily reflected in their cur-rent behavior or intended future participation. Toaddress the lapses identified in the Education andCitizenship survey, the following actions need to beundertaken:

Improving students' Knowledge, Concepts, Attitudes,and Actions in the area of citizenship needs greaterattention at the educational level. Contradictory answersin various areas and the mismatch between concepts,attitudes, and actions indicate that in various instancesstudents, teachers, and school principals respond tocertain questions in an academic manner (i.e., the waythey think they should respond) whereas current orintended actions fall within a different sphere of theirvalue system.

The prevalence of social variables over educationalvariables, which may at the present time be attributed inpart to the political tension in Lebanon, points to a gen-eral weakness of the educational system and in embed-ding civic knowledge and values among students.Addressing these weaknesses in the educational systemrequires a comprehensive review of the educational con-text and of the Civic Education curriculum. Such areview would also need to encourage students (as wellas teachers and principals) to communicate their opin-ions with greater freedom and transparency and to pro-vide them with the tools to express themselves withoutconcern for what should be said.

Of all the apparent educational variables, the educa-tional environment (student activities, elections, etc.)seems to be extremely important for the development of

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citizenship education among students. Specific effortsto cultivate these values need to be undertaken. Hereteachers may be trained to develop extracurricular activ-ities that address perceived gaps in the curricula or thatengage students further in more abstract concepts.

Revision of the educational context should addressboth the legislative framework that guides teachingpractices, the revision of the existing Civic Educationand general school curricula, as well as teaching methodsand training of teachers.

The creation of an Education and Citizenship observa-tory, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education andHigher Education should be pursued. The role of thisobservatory would be to conduct annual or bi-annualevaluations of progress in citizenship education and thepromotion of civic values among Lebanese students.

Finally, a more concerted sponsorship of civic culturemust include a national strategy for the promotion of artsand cultural activities, the practice of which is a right ofall citizens. On the media front, access to knowledge isa fundamental right to citizenship, enshrined in theLebanese constitution. At the same the media plays acritical role in the formation of public opinion. The follow-ing are some of the steps that may be taken to addressshortcomings in the right of access to knowledge and inthe development of an informed public.

Elimination of the distinction between the political andnon-political press. This distinction opens the media topolitical manipulation, particularly given that there is noset interpretation of what “political” means.

Penalties for media outlets should be related to thenature of the accusation and not a general temporaryclosure of the outlet as is the case now. Journalistsshould also be given some legal protection when report-ing on a story related to persons bearing diplomaticimmunity.

Preparation of a law that supports investigative jour-nalism with the aim of combating corruption and pro-moting greater transparency in public life.

Censorship by the internal security services of artisticand literary works should be cancelled. A new lawshould be drafted through a committee composed ofmembers of civil society, particularly artists, writers, playwrites, Civic Education teachers and leading intellectuals

whose role is to monitor the post-production impact ofworks of art based on clearly identified criteria. All deci-sions made by this committee should be consideredtemporary pending their revisions by the judicial system.In this regard, a special court for cultural and artisticwork should be created, similar to the court specializingin printed media.