torts midterm reviewr

8/8/2019 Torts Midterm Reviewr

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TORTS MIDTERM REVIEWER

I. INTRODUCTION: TORTS AND DAMAGES

1. Classes of TortsArt. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts.

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this

Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which

establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties

and should be complied with in good faith.

Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1,

Title XVII, of this Book.

Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,

subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary

Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.

Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2,

Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.

Tort A civil wrong, other than breach of contract for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of anaction for damages (Jarencios definition)Atty. Abaos definition: A tort is an act which causes damage to another person. [Therefore, under his definition,a tort encompasses a broader concept than a quasi-delict; it also includes breach of contract and crimes]The tort is the cause, while the effect is manifested in damages.Classes of Actions

1. Quasi-Delict : based on negligence2. Breach of Contract: based on the existence of a contract3. Torts in Human Relations: based on intentional acts of the tort-feasor4. Crime: based on a violation of a penal statute2. Twofold Meaning of Damages1. Damages as the loss, prejudice, or injury resulting from the act of a person; and2. Damages as compensation for such loss, prejudice, or injury3. Culpa Aquiliana/Contractual/CriminalDigests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 1Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas ReviewerProblem: A bus falls off a cliff due to the drivers fault. What actions may be filed by the heirs of the passengerswho died in the accident?Answer: Three actions may be filed based on culpa aquiliana, culpa contractual, and culpa criminal. The

distinctions among the three are as follows:

CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA

CONTRACTUAL

CRIMINAL

PROSECUTION

OBJECT Complaint is againstnegligence

Violation of contract ofcarriage

Criminal negligence

ACTION Damages for quasidelict Breach of contract withdamages

Criminal prosecution,which includes civilliability under Art. 100of the RPC

AGAINST Driver,Bus Company, orBoth

Employer bus company Driver

QUANTUM OF

EVIDENCE

Preponderance of

Evidence*once the driver is

proven negligent,employer is presumednegligent (rebuttable

presumption)

Preponderance of

Evidence

Proof beyond

reasonable doubt

DEFENSES Exercise of ordinarydiligence on the part ofthe driver;Exercise of diligence inthe selection andsupervision of the driveron the part of theemployer

Exercise ofextraordinary diligence(in contract of carriage,the diligence required ofthe common carrier isextraordinary)

If driver cannot pay thecivil damages, theemployer is subsidiarilyliable. The employerdoes not have anydefense in this case.The negligence of theemployee is conclusiveas to the employer for

purposes of subsidiaryliability

Note: You can file more than one of these cases. You can file any or all, depending on the circumstances. Theonly limitation is against double recovery. (SeeImson case).

CASES

BLTB v. CA

Quasi-delict is different from criminal negligence; it is an independent source of obligation.

Aboitiz Shipping v. CA

A common carrier is bound to observe extraordinary diligence. If a passenger dies or is injured in the course ofthe voyage, there is a presumption of fault or negligence. This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of


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carriage.

Dangwa Transport v. CA

Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 3Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas ReviewerIn an action based on contact of carriage, the court need not make an express finding or fault or negligence inorder to hold the carrier liable. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transportthe passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence. Any injury that might be suffered

by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.

II. QUASI-DELICT

1. ElementsArt. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is

obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual

relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this

Chapter.

The elements of a quasi-delict are:

1. Fault or Negligence2. Damage3. Causal connection between the negligence and the damage

Problem: X was driving a car when he ran over a stone. The stone hit a pedestrian on the head. The pedestriandied. Is X liable for quasi-delict?Answer: No, because there was no negligence on the part of X.Problem: A suppliers employees went on strike, as a result of which the supplier failed to deliver his goods to hisclient. Can the client sue the supplier for quasi-delict?Answer: No. Although there was damage, there was no negligence. [Client should sue based on breach ofcontract instead]

CASES:

Andamo v. IAC

Emmanual and Natividad Andamo owned a parcel of land adjacent to that of the Missionaries of Our Lady of LaSallette. Within the land or Our Lady, waterpaths and an artificial lake were constructed, allegedly inundating anderoding the Andamos land. This caused a young man to drown, damaged the Andamos crops and fences, andendangered their lives. The Andamos instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of Our Lady fordestruction by means of inundation under Art. 324 of the RPC. Subsequently, they filed a civil case for damagesagainst the respondents. Upon motion of respondents, the civil case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since

the criminal case instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. This was based on the provision of theRules of Court which provides that criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be institutedseparately, but after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final

judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.ISSUE: Whether the civil action should have been dismissed.HELD:No. The civil action should not have been dismissed since it was based, not on crime, but on quasi-delict.All the elements of a quasi-delict are present:1. damages suffered by the plaintiff;2. fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and3. connection of the cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damagesincurred by the plaintiff.In this case, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent are alleged to have inundated the land of

petitioners. This was caused by the failure of the defendant to install drainage pipes that could have preventedthe inundation. There is therefore a causal connection between the act of building the waterpaths without

providing for an adequate drainage system and the damage sustained by the petitioners.

Article 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentionaland voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is notallowed to recover damages on both scores and would only be entitled to the bigger award of the two.

2. No Double Recovery Rule

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and

distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot

recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Broader concept of Civil Liability

A single act can give rise to two kinds of liability civil liability for quasi-delict and liability for crime. Under theliability for crime, the defendant has two kinds of liability criminal liability and civil liability. This is illustrated by

the following diagram:Civil liability| |Quasi-Delict Crime| |Criminal liability Civil liabilityProblem: X filed a claim for 100K in damages in an action for quasi-delict. The judge awarded 50K. Can X filed acriminal action to recover the remaining 50K?Answer: No, this would violate the principle of res judicata. The victim had the opportunity to present evidence inthe criminal case. If he files another case, he will be merely presenting the same evidence.


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CASES:

Jarantilla v. CA

Jose Kuan Sing was crossing the street when he was sideswiped by a Volkswagen Beetle driven by EdgarJarantilla.Sing instituted a criminal action against Jarantilla for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.Sing intervened in the prosecution through a private prosecutor and did not reserve his right to institute aseparate civil action. Jarantilla was acquitted because of reasonable doubt.Sing subsequently instituted a civil action for damages involving the same subject matter and actcomplained of as in the criminal case.The trial court found in favor of Sing and awarded actual and moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs.The CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether Sing could have filed the separate civil action despite Jarantillas acquittal in the criminalaction.HELD: Yes, the civil action was properly filed.The same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create twokinds of liability on the part of the offender: civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Sincethe same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of thesetwo types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article

2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of

liability.

The only instance where a civil action cannot be instituted after the dismissal of the criminal case is wheresuch dismissal was accompanied by a statement of the court declaring that the act complained of neverhappened.

1. Concept of NegligenceArt. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is

required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of

the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and

2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that

which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

Negligence Want of care required by the nature of the obligation and the circumstances of the persons, time,and place.

Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an

absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and

vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.

What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require? At half past 1:00 o'clock in the morningalong an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance would suffice. This may consist of keeping a

watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed, right of way and traffic light. The claim ofpetitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible since a U-turn is done at amuch slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Nonetheless, noevidence was presented showing skid marks caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that hewas driving at a fast clip in negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his carappears to be the prime cause for his inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. His assertion that he drove atthe speed of 40 kph. is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked at the opposite lane for any oncomingcars, e saw none; then a few seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara's car. The extent of the damage on the car ofMartinez and the position of the cars after the impact further confirm the finding that petitioner went beyond thespeed limit required by law and by the circumstances.

Picart v. Smith

The test for determining negligence: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom the negligence isattributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? Ifso, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous

results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring ofthe admonition of this provision, is the constitutive fact in negligence.2. Negligence as Proximate CauseProximate Cause that cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficientsupervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.

Subido v. CA

This case involves an accident between a truck [or bus] belonging to Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (LTB) anddriven by Mudales and a truck owned by Sabido and driven by Lagunda.The two vehicles were going in opposite directions when they met at a curve in the road. Custodio, a passenger ofLTB was hanging [sabit] on the left side of the vehicle. He died after being sideswiped by Sabidos truck.The CFI held the vehicle owners and the drivers solidarily liable. LTB and its driver were liable for violating thecontract of carriage; Sabido and his driver were liable for quasi-delict.ISSUE: Whether Sabido and his driver were guilty of negligence; whether they should be held solidarily liable withLTB.

HELD: They are both guilty of contributory negligence.Though LTB and its driver were guilty of negligence for allowing Custodio to hang from the left side of the bus,Sabido and his driver were guilty of contributory negligence because the truck was running at a considerablespeed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of theroad, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the oppositedirection as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.Though the negligence of LTB and its driver are independent from the negligence of Sabido and his driver, bothacts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first twowould not have produced this result without the negligence of Sabido and his driver. What is more, Sabidosdrivers negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bussometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, Sabidos truck hadthe last clear chance.Even though LTBs liability arises from breach of contract and Sabidos arises from quasi-delict, they are solidarily


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liable because the rule is that where both negligent acts, in combination, are the direct and proximatecause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each

contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might

not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other

tort-feasor.

3. Proof of Negligence

Food Terminal Incorporated vs. CA. and Basic Foods Corp.

Food Terminal Incorporated (FTI) is engaged in the business of warehousing storage of goods or merchandise forcompensation at its refrigerated warehouse in Taguig, Metro Manila. Basic Foods is engaged in the production offood and allied products.

In its manufacture of food, Basic Foods uses Red Star compressed yeast, which requires storage in a refrigeratedspace to avoid spoilage. It deposited 1,770 cartons of yeast with FTI for cold storage. 383 cartons worth P161kwere damaged, allegedly because of FTIs failure to maintain the proper temperature.Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 12Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas ReviewerFTI claims that it exercised utmost diligence; that any damage sustained was due to the fault of Basic Foods; thatunder the contract, FTI would not be liable for damage to goods beyond its reasonable control; and that BasicFoods was estopped from filing the action because it acknowledged receipt of the yeast in good order.The RTC dismissed; the CA held that there was negligence.ISSUE: Whether FTI was guilty of negligence in the storage of Basic Foods yeast.HELD: FTI was negligent.In the first place, the issue is factual, thus, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is binding on the parties andmay not be reviewed on appeal via certiorari.In the second place, petitioner practically admitted that it failed to maintain the agreed temperature of thecold storage area at 2 to 4 degrees centigrade at all times, and this caused the deterioration of the yeaststored therein. Nonetheless, petitioner claimed that temperature was not the sole cause for the deteriorationof respondent's goods. Since negligence has been established, petitioner's liability for damages isinescapable..4. Presumption of Negligence

The plaintiff may invoke the following principles in order to impute presumed negligence on the defendant:a. res ipsa loquitur

b. respondeat superiorc. violation of traffic rulesd. dangerous weapons and substancesIn these cases, there is no need for the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent. There is a rebuttable

presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant. It is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that heexercised the degree of care required by the circumstances. If he fails to prove this, he shall be liable fordamages.

a. Res ipsa loquitur

Statement of the rule: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under themanagement of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things

Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 13Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas Reviewerdoes not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable

evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

Elements:1. the thing which caused the injury is under the exclusive control of the defendant;2. ordinarily, such event will not happen unless there is negligence;3. defendant fails to give an explanation for the happening of the event.

CASES:

Africa v. CaltexA fire broke out at a Catex station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck intothe underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose wasinserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses.The owners of the burned properties filed a complaint for damages against Caltex, as the owner of thestation, and Boquiren, as the agent in charge of operation.ISSUE: Whether Caltex was negligent under the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur.HELD: Caltex was negligent.First of all, it was necessary to rely on the doctrine ofres ipsa loquiturbecause certain reports made byofficers of the police and fire departments were ruled to be inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.

Res ipsa loquituris a rule to the effect that Where the thing which caused the injury complained of isshown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary

course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affordsreasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.The rule applies in this case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was

under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses.The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, butthey gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incidenthappened because of want of care.The station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises. Asidefrom this, it is used as a carbarn for around ten taxicabs owned by Boquiren. Also, there is a store locatedaround one meter from the hole of the underground tank. At this store, people hang out and possibly smokecigarettes. It was even alleged that the fire was caused by a match which came into contract with the densefumes.Furthermore, the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 meters high at most and cannot

prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.Another issue was whether Caltex should be liable as the principal of Boquiren. It was held that Caltex wasliable because there was an agency relationship and Boquiren was not an independent contractor. Caltex


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owned the station and exercised control over it.

Batiquin v. CA

Dr. Batiquin performed a Caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas. After the delivery of her baby, Mrs. Villegas beganto suffer abdominal pains and fever. When, despite taking medication prescribed by Dr. Batiquin, she still did notget well, Mrs. Villegas consulted another doctor, Doctor Kho. Doctro Kho suggested that they open her up again.During surgery, Doctor Kho found lots of pus and several cysts in Mrs. Villegass ovaries. She then discovered a

piece of rubber which seemed like a part of a rubber glove or a rubber drain stuck near Mrs. Villegass uterus.This rubber glove was the cause of the infection of Mrs. Villegass internal organs. After it was taken out, Mrs.Villegas regained her health.Mrs. Villegas filed an action for damages against Dr. Batiquin.

ISSUE: Whether Mrs. Villegas is entitled to damages.Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 14Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas ReviewerHELD: Yes. The rule ofres ipsa loquitur(the thing speaks for itself) is applicable in this case. Under this doctrine,the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence thatthe injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of thedefendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonablecare had been used. The doctrine ofres ipsa loquituras a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligencewhich recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute forspecific proof of negligence. The doctrine can be invoked only when, under the circumstances, direct evidence isabsent and not readily available.In this case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of thecaesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. Mrs. Villegas did not have any direct evidenceas to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into her body, which could not haveoccurred unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarean section, Villegasunderwent no other operation which could have caused the piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands toreason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. Dr.Batiquin failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.She is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in Villegass abdomen and for all theadverse effects thereof.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and

foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all

the circumstances.

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been

at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as

prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 15Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas Reviewer

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, arebound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the

passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734,

1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers

is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.

Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the

negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted

beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence

of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

Respondeat superior means let the employer/principal be responsibleUnder this principle, if the negligence of the employee has been proved, there is no need to prove the negligenceof the employer. The employer is already presumed negligent in the hiring and/or supervision of the employee.

This presumption is, however, rebuttable and not conclusive.As will be shown in the following cases, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable not only to commoncarriers but to other instances where an employee or agent, not necessarily of a common carrier, is negligent.

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who

was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is

disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or

violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n)

Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle

has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

The driver is disputably presumed negligent if:1. he had been found guilty ofreckless driving at least twice within the next preceding two months;2. he had been found guilty ofviolating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two

months; or3. at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Manuel v. CA

There was a drizzle at around 4 pm when the Scout car, driven by respondent Fernando Abcede, which wasnegotiating the zigzag road in Camarines Norte, was hit on its left side by a bus. The bus was owned by petitionerSuperlines Transportation, Co., Inc. and was driven by petitioner Emiliano Manuel. Due to the impact, the Scoutcar was thrown backwards against a protective railing. Were it not for the railing, the Scout car would have falleninto a deep ravine. All its ten occupants, which included four children, were injured, seven of the victims sustainedserious physical injuries.Emiliano Manuel, the driver of the bus, was prosecuted for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence.As he could later on not be found, an action for quasi-delict was filed against the Bus Co. and its insurer, and wasordered to pay P49, 954 in damages.


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On appeal they contended that it was actually Abcede who was at fault, being only 19 yrs old and having nodrivers license. Proof of this according to them was a woman passenger heard saying . 'Iyan na nga ba angsinasabi ko, napakalakas ang loob, when the passengers alighted from the Scout car.Likewise, petitioners questioned the accuracy of the pictures and sketches submitted by private respondents asevidence that the Superlines bus encroached on the lane of the Scout car. According to them, the sketch made bythe police investigator showing flue skid marks of the bus, is inadmissible as evidence because it was prepared theday after the incident and the alleged "tell-tale" skid marks and other details had already been obliterated by theheavy downpour which lasted for at least an hour after the accidentISSUE: Whether the Bus Company is liable.HELD: Yes.There is strong presumption of regularity of functions of the policemen. Granting however that the placement of

skidmarks were inaccurate, nonetheless, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the collision took place within thelane of the Scout car was supported by other conclusive evidence. "Indeed, a trail of broken glass which wasscattered along the car's side of the road, whereas the bus lane was entirely clear of debris.Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 18Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas ReviewerFurthermore, the fact that the Scout car was found after the impact at rest against the guard railing shows that itmust have been hit and thrown backwards by the bus.Finally, the evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed,

was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the accident, could not simply exempt petitioners'

liability because they were the parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane.

d. Dangerous Weapons and SubstancesArt. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or

injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison,

except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.

RA6969 Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990Defendant is disputably presumed negligent if death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons orsubstances.The defendant may invoke the defense that possession or use of such dangerous weapons or substances isindispensable in his occupation or business.

Smith Bell Shipping v. Borja

Smith Bell requested Customs for inspection on its vessel M/T King Family which was due to arrive containing 750metric tons of alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. Catalino Borja, Customs Inspector was then on

board the vessel to perform his duties.At around noon, while M/T King Family was unloading chemicals unto 2 barges owned by respondent ITTC, asudden explosion occurred setting the vessels afire. Upon hearing the explosion, Borja who was at that time insidethe cabin preparing reports, went outside to check what had happened, and another explosion was heard, seeingthe fire and fearing his life, jumped overboard to save himself. However, the water was likewise on fire due

mainly to the spilled chemicals. Despite the tremendous heat, he swam his way for 1 hour until he was rescued bythe people living in the squatters area and sent to San Juan De Dios Hospital.After weeks of intensive care at the hospital, he was diagnosed as permanently disabled due to the incident. Hemade demands against Smith Bell and ITTC for the damages caused by the explosion. However, both deniedliabilities and attributed to each other negligence.Trial court ruled in favor of Borja and dismissed all counterclaims and such of Smith Bell to ITTC. Contrary to theclaim of petitioner that no physical evidence was shown to prove that the explosion had originated from its vessel,CA held Smith Bell liable following the findings of the investigation conducted by the Special Board of MarineInquiry.ISSUE: Whether Smith Bell whose cargo on board contained dangerous chemicals is liable.HELD: Yes.Smith Bell cannot shift the blame to ITTC, as it stated that all the explosions erupted from outside its vessel andnot aboard. Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe thatdegree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffersinjury.

Petitioners vessel was carrying chemical cargo -- alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. Whileknowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all thenecessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore, negligent.As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of the chemicals from petitioners vessel, RespondentBorja suffered burns that will permanently disable him Hence, the owner or the person in possession and controlof a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property byreason of negligence in its management or navigation.

Problem: Due to recent bank robberies in the metropolis, a bank issued a circular to all its personnel, includingsecurity guards (contracted out through a security agency), to tighten security. X, a security guard at the frontdoor of the bank, takes this to heart and has his shotgun ready. A, a customer of the bank, arrives at the frontdoor and opens her bag to take out a gun for the purpose of surrendering it to the guard. The guard, upon seeingthe gun, instinctively shoots at A. A dies. Is there a presumption of negligence on the part of (a)the guard? (b)the bank)? (c) the security agency?

Answer: The guard is presumed negligent. But under what doctrine? If you answered under Article 2188(possession of dangerous weapons), you are wrong. The guard cannot be presumed negligent merely because he

possessed a gun because his possession of it was indispensable to his occupation as a security guard. This is oneof the defenses that may be invoked by the defendant against the presumption of negligence under Article 2188.Rather, the guard is presumed negligent under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.The security agency is presumed negligent under the doctrine of respondeat superior.The bank is not presumed negligent, since there is no employer-employee relationship between it and the guard.In order to attribute negligence to the bank, such must be established by proof.

5. DefenseWhen the defendant is presumed negligent, he may invoke the following defenses:a. contributory negligence

b. assumption of risk


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c. last clear chanced. prescriptione. fortuitous eventsf. diligenceg. mistake and waiverh. others

a. Contributory negligence

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,

he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and

proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover

damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.2179 talks of two cases:a. The defendant can show that the immediate and proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of the

plaintiff himself. In this case, the defendant is not liable at all.b. The defendant can also show that although the proximate cause of the injury was the defendants lack ofdue care, the plaintiff also contributed to the injury with his own negligence. In case of contributorynegligence on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant is still liable, but his liability may be mitigated by thecourt.Atty Abao: There was a case where the victim was a child below 9 years old. The defendant wanted his liabilitymitigated on the ground that the victim had contributed with his own negligence. The court held that a child below9 years old is incapable of contributory negligence. Therefore, the damages cannot be mitigated.CASES:

Phoenix v. IAC

Dionisio was driving home from a cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down a streetwhen his headlights [allegedly] suddenly failed. He switched them to bright but it was too late for him to avoid adump truck looming 2 meters away from his car. He crashed into the dump truck, which was parked on theright side of the street in a manner as to stick out and partly block oncoming traffic. The truck had no lights,reflectors, etc. Dionisio, however, admitted to having had a shot or two of liquor.The dump truck was owned by Phoenix but it was driven home by an employee, Carbonel, because the latter hadan early morning job.Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a nervous breakdown and loss oftwo gold bridge dentures, thereby impairing his million-dollar smile.The trial court found that the sole cause of the accident was Carbonels negligence and rendered judgment in favorof Dionisio. The CA affirmed but slightly reduced damages.ISSUE: Whether the there was contributory negligence on Dionisios part.HELD: There was contributory negligence and the award of damages should be reduced by 20%.Dionisios claim that his headlights suddenly failed was not believed by the SC. The more plausible explanation wasthat he had no curfew pass and so, along that stretch of road, which, incidentally, had a police station on it, he

switched off his lights and sped to avoid detection. This is corroborated by the report of the police officer whofound him and brought him to Makati Medical Center.The officer reported that Dionisio had no curfew pass on his person and that when he appeared on the scenemoments after the collision [he was manning the nearby police station] people who witnessed the accident toldhim that Dionisio was driving fast and without headlights. This testimony was an exception to the hearsay rule for

being excited utterances of the bystanders.However, there is no doubt that the reckless parking of the truck was the indispensable and efficient cause of theaccident.Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to theaccident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause it was merely a foreseeable consequence of therisk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain ofcausation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the jurisvinculum of liability.* There was no evidence to prove that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his

driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.

LBC Air Cargo v. CA

Rogelio Monterola was riding his motorcycle along a dusty highway. At about the same time, a cargo van ownedby LBC Air Cargo driven by Jaime Tano Jr. was coming from the opposite direction, on the way to the airport. Onboard the van were Fernando Yu, manager of LBC, and his son. When Tano was approaching the vicinity of theDigests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 21Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas Reviewerairport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tanostopped the van and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass. The racing vehicles produced a cloud of dust thatmade visibility extremely bad. However, instead of waiting for the dust to settle, Tano started to make a sharpturn towards the airport road. Suddenly, the motorcycle driving by Monterola emerged from the cloud of dust andsmashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died. The heirs of Monterola filed a case for homicide throughreckless imprudence against Tano and a civil case against against Tano, Yu, and LBC Air Cargo.ISSUE: Whether LBC, Tano, and Yu are liable to the heirs of Monterola.

HELD: Tano and LBC are liable Tano for his negligence as driver of the van, and LBC for its presumptivenegligence as employer of Tano. Yu is not liable, there being no employer-employee relationship between him andTano.The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastilyexecuted a left turn without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had placedthe LBC van directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneouslycaused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after itwould have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as "superveningnegligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both parties arenegligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossibleto determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clearopportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. In this


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case, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in aninstant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact, thatcould have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. Therefore, the doctrine is notapplicable.It is true, however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely

behind the vehicle he was following. There was contributory negligence on the victim's part that could warrant amitigation of petitioners' liability for damages. Hence, the damages due the heirs of Monterola should be reduced

by 20%.

b. Assumption of Risk

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by

stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall beresponsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were

inevitable.

Assumption of risk involves an action to which one consents, and the injury suffered is due to a risk involved inthat action.Example: Engaging in contact sports In this case, there is an assumption of risk, but there are still rules whichmust be followed in order to minimize the risk. The defense of assumption of risk by the plaintiff cannot beinvoked if the defendant was guilty of violating these rules.CASES:

Afiada v. Hisole

Loreto Afialda was employed by the Hisole spouses as caretaker of their carabaos. While tending the carabaos,Loreto was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries.This action for damages was brought by Loretos elder sister, Margarita, who depended on him for support. Sheseeks to hold the Hisole spouses liable under Article 1905 [now Art. 2183] of the old Civil Code, which reads:The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if suchanimal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the personwho may have suffered it.The lower court ruled that article 1905 [2183] does not apply where damage is caused to the caretaker.Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 22Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas ReviewerISSUE: Whether Article 1905 [2183] makes the owner of the animal liable where the injured party is thecaretaker.HELD: Article 1905 [2183] does not apply.The statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for any damages it may cause, andthis is for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is thereforethe one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for hiswork as such. Obviously, it was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or

damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was oneof the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take theconsequences.

Manresa, citing the Spanish Supreme Court says that such an accident should come under the labor laws.However, Afialda brought the action only under the Civil Code.*Atty. Abao In light of recent labor legislation, such as the Workmens Compensation Act, this ruling would

probably have been different had it been decided today. Under current laws, the employer has the duty to adaptthe necessary safety measures to protect his employees.

c. Last Clear Chance

Statement of the Principle: A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent

is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. [Therefore, in this case,there is no mitigation of the liability of the defendant even if there was contributory negligence on the part of the

plaintiff]

The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appearsthat the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences tothe plaintiff, notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence.Even though a persons own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured

person is entitled to recovery.Elements:1. prior negligence on the part of the plaintiff2. defendant is aware of the plaintiff3. defendant had the last clear chance/opportunity to avoid the peril by taking the necessary precaution, butfailed to do so4. accident occurs because of the negligence of the defendant.CASES:

Bustamante v. CA

A collision occurred between a cargo truck and a passenger bus. The cargo truck and passenger bus were

approaching each other, coming from the opposite sides of the highway. The bus driver claimed that from 30meters away, he could see that the front tires of the truck were wriggling, and that the truck was rapidly headedtowards his lane. He thought that the truck driver was a jokester, so despite the circumstances, he downshifted toincrease his speed on the ascending road in order to overtake the vehicle in front of him. At this precise moment,the cargo truck and the passenger bus sideswiped each other. Several passengers of the bus were thrown outand five people died as a result of the injuries they sustained. The heirs of the victims filed an action for damagesagainst the drivers and owners of the truck and bus. The CA held that the truck driver and owner were not liableto the heirs because the driver of the bus had the last clear chance to avoid the accident but failed to do so.Hence, only the bus driver and owner are liable.ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable.HELD:No, the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable onlyin a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. It does not apply where a

passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.


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In this case, the action is not between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but is one brought by theheirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, thedoctrine is not applicable. The truck driver and owner should be solidarily liable with the bus driver and owner,since the truck driver was found to be negligent as well.

McKee v. IAC

Koh was driving his car when two kids suddenly crossed his path. He swerved to the opposite lane to avoid thetwo kids and collided head-on with a truck. Koh and two of his pasengers died, while three others were seriouslyinjured. One of the survivors, McKee, filed a civil action for quasi-delict against the trucks owners. Despiteevidence showing that the driver of the truck was driving over the speed limit and failed to step on the brakeseven if he had enough time to do so as he saw Koh swerving in his direction, the IAC held that Kohs negligence

was the proximate cause of the accident. It dismissed McKees complaint for damages.ISSUE: Whether the driver and owner of the truck are liable to McKee.HELD: Yes. Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and is required toact without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty ofnegligence. In this case, any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over thetwo boys by swerving away. Hence, Koh cannot be deemed negligent.And assuming that Koh was negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance provides that the contributory negligenceof the party injured will not defeat his claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise ofreasonable care and prudence, have avoided the negligence of said injured party. In this case, it was proven bythe testimony of an uninterested party that the driver of the truck had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap ifonly he stepped on the trucks brakes as he had time to do so. Since he failed to do so, he is considered by thelaw as solely responsible for the damage caused.

d. Prescription

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;

(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer

involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention

and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.

The four-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date when the tortious act was committed.But, according to the DISCOVERY RULE: if the injury is discovered after the four-year period, the reckoning pointis the date of discovery and not the date of commission of the act.Problem: X worked in an asbestos factory. Ten years after his repeated exposure to asbestos, he showssymptoms of asbestosis. Can he still file an action for damages against the employer?Answer: Yes. The prescriptive period begins to run from the discovery of the tortious act and not from itsoccurrence.Consumer Act of the PhilippinesThe consumer may sue not only the manufacturer but also the importer and seller for defective product, design,

packaging, and lack of information. The prescriptive periods for bringing the action are:If the defect is apparent: 4 years from purchaseIf the defect is hidden: 2 years from the purchase OR discovery of the hidden defectPrescription v. LachesPrescription pertains to the extinction of the right to file an action after the lapse of a definite period. Laches, onthe other hand, is a relative term. It means the inaction of someone who has a right; it is the failure to exercisethis right.CASES:

Capuno v. Elordi

* A civil action based on a quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years.* An action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Art. 1150of the CC as to the question when the prescription

period of 4 years shall begin to runthat is from the day the action may be broughtfrom the day the quasi-delictoccurred or was committed.

e. Fortuitous EventsAccording to Atty. Abao, the requisites of a fortuitous event, as a defense, are:1. The event must be unforeseen, or if foreseen, inevitable;2. There must be no concurrent negligence on the part of the offended party.*If an accident is caused by a tire blowout, there is a presumption that there was negligence.CASES:

NAPOCOR v. CA

In the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon "Kading", a massive flood covered thetowns near Angat Dam, particularly the town of Norzagaray, causing several deaths and the loss and destructionof houses, farms, plants, working animals and other properties of the people residing near the Angat River.The victims of the flood, private respondents herein, blamed the sudden rush of water to the reckless andimprudent opening of all the three (3) floodgates of the Angat Dam spillway, without prior warning to the peopleliving near or within the vicinity of the dam.Among the defenses of NAPOCOR were: it observed the necessary diligence, it gave written warnings of theopening of the floodgates, there was no causal relationship between the damage and the acts or omissions, there

Digests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 27Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas Reviewerwas assumption of risk on the part of the victims, and the damages were caused by fortuitous event andhence, damnum absque injuria, and respondents have no cause of action.The RTC and CA awarded damages in favor of the victims.ISSUE: Whether NAPOCOR is entitled to the defense of fortuitous event.HELD: NAPOCOR is liable, the defense of fortuitous event does not apply.

NAPOCOR cannot escape liability by invoking force majeure. Acts of God or force majeure, by definition, areextraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event could not have been foreseen or anticipated, as iscommonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. As a general rule, no person shall beresponsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable.However, the principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely


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by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of themischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his activeintervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rulesapplicable to the acts of God.In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape

liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage

(1) They had sufficient warning of the typhoon and they should have taken action by decreasing the water level inanticipation of the coming rain;(2) The release of the water was not gradual; the lower court found that the opening of the spillways was suddenand abrupt;(3) The spillways were opened in the wee hours of the morning and without sufficient warning to the townsfolk;

(4) Though written warnings were dispatched, they were given to ordinary town employees and policemen, andnot to responsible city officers who could have relayed the warning to everyone concerned.Clearly, the requirement that the fortuitous event not be humanized is absent in this case.

f. diligence(pater familias)

Art. 2180 (last par.) The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein

mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Fabre v. CA

As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of thepassengers to their destination. This duty is of care is NOT excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of agood father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing

which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both

parties to enter into the contract.

Gatchalian v. Delim

Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's "Thames" mini-bus. While the bus was running along the highway "asnapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus. The bus driver dismissed it as a normal occurrence.Shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turnedturtle and fell into a ditch.Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to the hospital for treatment.While injured passengers were confined, Mrs. Adela Delim, visited them and paid for their hospitalization andmedical expenses. She also gave Gatchalian P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in going homefrom the hospital. Mrs. Delim also asked the injured passengers to sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit whichstated That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner ofthe said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the

extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.Notwithstanding the document, Gatchalian filed an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moraldamages. (inferiority complex, lost beauty and employment opportunities)Delims averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that Gatchalian had already been paidand had waived any right to institute any action against them.ISSUE: Whether the Delims are liable to Gatchalian, notwithstanding her waiver.HELD: Yes. The Delims are liable. The waiver executed by Gatchalian was not a valid waiver.A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leaveno doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver maynot casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent toabandon a right vested in such person.Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect ofwhose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purportedwaiver most strictly against the common carrier.For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. We

believe this purported waiver is offensive to public policy because it dilutes the degree of care required of commoncarriers.In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault orhad acted negligently unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733and 1755.

h. Others

Damnum Absque Injuria (damage without injury): There is damage but no liability because the person whocaused the injury was exercising a legal right.

Simon v. David

The dismissal by the office of the fiscal of the complaint for estafa filed by the plaintiffs insufficient to warrant ajudgment for damages in defendant's favor, in the absence of competent evidence that in filing the complaint,plaintiff had acted in bad faith, knowing that the charge was groundless.

Proline Sports v. CABy virtue of its merger with A.G. Spalding Bros., Inc., QUESTOR became the owner of the trademark "Spalding"appearing in sporting goods, implements and apparatuses. PRO LINE is the exclusive distributor of "Spalding"sports products in the Philippines.UNIVERSAL, on the other hand, is engaged in the sale and manufacture of sporting goods while co-respondentMonico Sehwani is impleaded in his capacity as president of the corporation.16 years ago(1981), Edwin Dy Buncio, General Manager of PRO LINE, sent a letter-complaint to the NBI regardingthe alleged manufacture of fake "Spalding" balls by UNIVERSAL.The NBI conducted a search (by virtue of a warrant) on the premises of Universal. Basketballs and volleyballsmarked "Spalding" were seized and confiscated by the NBI. UNIVERSALS factory was sealed and padlocked as thematerials & machineries were too heavy to be removed from the premises and brought under the actual physicalcustody of the court.Upon motion of UNIVERSAL, Judge ordered the lifting of the seal and padlock on the machineries. The petners


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filed a petn for certiorari in the CA. Also, the petners filed a criminal complaint for unfair competition againstSehwani. The complaint was dropped but an info was later filed by the Ministry of Justice. The case againstSehwani did not propser b/c they were unable to prove that Sehwani sold the fake Spalding products (-- theselling being an essential element of the crime).UNIVERSAL and Sehwani filed a civil case for damages (malicious prosecution) charging that PRO LINE andQUESTOR maliciously and without legal basis committed acts to their damage and prejudice.

ISSUE: Whether Proline and Questor are liable for damages.HELD: PROLINE & QUESTOR NOT liable for damages.There was no malicious prosecution. The elements of malicious prosecution are:(1) absence of probable cause(2) legal malice on the part of the defendant.

The filing of the crim case was based on probable cause: that a corporation other than the certified owner of thetrademark is engaged in the unauthorized manufacture of products bearing the same TM engenders a reasonable

belief that a crim offense for unfair competition is being committed.A resort to judicial processes is NOT per se evidence of ill will upon which a claim for damages may be based;Malice is an inexcusable intent to injure, oppress, vex, annoy or humiliate. Proline and Questor, in filing theaction, were merely exercising their legal rights. Hence, they are not liable for damages.Amonoy v. Gutierrez

* Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons right is a loss withoutinjurydamnum absque injuriafor which the law gives no remedy.* Even if the acts of a party may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance ofthe TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his righthis acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but aninvalid exercise of a right that had been suspended.* The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others.

IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY

1. Vicarious LiabilityArticle 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own

acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the

damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are

under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed

or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers

acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any

business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the

damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case whatis provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages

caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned

prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may

recover from the latter what he had paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardians, the

minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a

guardian ad litem shall be appointed.

PERSON VICARIOUSLY LIABLE NEGLIGENT PERSON REQUISITE CONDITION

Father/Mother Minor child (below 21 years old) Living with parents

Guardian Minor ward or incapacitated

person

Under the custody of the guardianthis means that there must be acourt appointment

Owner and manager ofestablishment

Employee In the service of the branches oron the occasion of their functions(whether or not acting within thescope of their assigned tasks)It is necessary to prove that thereis an employer-employeerelationship

Employers even though notengaged in business or industry

Employees and household helpers Acting within the scope of assignedtasks

State Special agent Definite order to do some task,foreign to his usual functions

Teachers

Heads of Schools

Student or apprentice Student or apprentice must be intheir custody

Teacher-in-charge is liable if theschool is an academic institution;Head of school is liable if theschool is an institution of arts andtrades

a. parents and guardians

RA 6809

- amended Article 234 of the Family Code. As amended by RA 6809, Article 234 now reads as follows:Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majoritycommences at the age of eighteen years.

- Effects of emancipation: Terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, whoshall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, EXCEPT:1. Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of 21.


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2. Parents and guardians are still responsible for their children and wards below 21 years of

age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Cuadra v. Monfort

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade 6. They were assigned to weedthe grass in the school premises. Monfort found a plastic headband and jokingly said aloud that she had found anearthworm. To frighten Cuadra, Monfort tossed the headband at her. The headband hit Cuadra in the eye.Cuadra rubbed the injured eye and treated it with some powder. The eye swelled the next day, and Cuadra wastaken to the doctor. She underwent surgical operation, but eventually, she lost sight in her right eye. Cuadras

parents filed a civil suit against Monforts father for damages.ISSUE: Whether Monforts father is liable for damages.

HELD:No.Article 2176 provides for liability in case of fault or negligence. When the act or omission is that of one person forwhom another is responsible, the latter becomes himself liable under Article 2180. The basis of this vicariousliability is also fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission.The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted.In this case, there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Monforts father could have prevented the damage

by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failingto foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was hisduty to send her, and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision ofthe teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusualamong children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate, muchDigests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 36Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas Reviewerless guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character whichwould reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.Dissenting opinion, Barredo, J:Monforts father should be liable. There was no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave

properly and not to play dangerous jokes on classmates and playmates.

General Rule: The State cannot be sued without its consentExceptions:1. When the state is performing a proprietary function2. When the state enters into a contract with a private person3. Under Article 2180 when it acts through a special agentDigests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 41Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas Reviewer

Fontanilla v. Maliaman

A pick-up owned by the National Irrigation Administration driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of the NIA

as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo. As a result, Fontanillaand Deligo were injured and brought to the hospital. Fontanilla died.The parents of Fontanilla filed an action for damages against the NIA in connection with the death of their son.ISSUE: Whether the NIA is liable for damages.HELD: Yes, the NIA is liable.The liability of the State has two aspects, namely:1. its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only; and2. its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as anordinary employer.Under paragraph 6 of Article 2180, the State assumes liability for acts done through special agents. The statesagent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task, but such task must beforeign to said officials usual governmental functions. If the states agent is not a public official, and iscommissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the state assumes the role of an ordinary employerand will be held liable as such for its agents tort. When the government commissions a private individual for aspecial government task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.

When the state is performing governmental functions, it is immune from tort liability. When the state performs aservice which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and when it collects revenues therefrom, thestate is performing a proprietary function. It is in this instance where there may be liability for the torts of agentswithin the scope of their employment.The NIA is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be liable for damagescaused by accidents resulting from the tortious acts of its employees. It assumes responsibility as an ordinaryemployer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages, if it fails to prove that it observed due diligence in theselection and supervision of its employees.In this case, the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact. The pick-up suffered substantialdamage, but the people on board did not even bother to stop to find out what they had bumped. There are thusstrong indications that the driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. Evidently, there was negligence in thesupervision of the driver for the reason that they were traveling at a high speed within city limits and yet thesupervisor of the group failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper speed limit. The negligence isfurther aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehiclesuffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence on the part both of the driver and the

supervisor of the group. Even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision of theemployee, if he ratifies the wrongful acts or takes no step to avert further damage, the employer is still liable.

e. Teachers/heads of establishmentsAmadora v. CA

Alfredo Amadora was a student of the Colegio de San Jose Recoletos. While in the auditorium, he was shot todeath by his classmate Pablito Daffon. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The

parents of Amadora filed an action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against Colegio de SanRecoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffonand two other students, through their parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.Amadoras parents contend that their son was in school to finish his physics experiment; hence, he was then underthe custody of the school. The school, on the other hand, claims that Amadora had gone to school only for the

purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had


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already ended.ISSUE: Whether private respondents are liable to Amadoras parents.HELD:No.Article 2180 should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic ratherthan technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to theteacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case ofestablishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception tothe general rule.The student is deemed in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence ofthe school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. During all theseoccasions, it is the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts. He is the one designated by the

dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes orsections to which they are assigned. It should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to falldirectly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, theschool, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof underthe general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it hadexercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly heldto answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken thenecessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed byArticle 2180. It should also be noted that the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the studentunder him regardless of the student's age.In this case, the rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of themwas the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over thestudent body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classesor sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who theteacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that dayin connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,the teacher-in charge of Alfredo's killer.At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent inenforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school orcondoned their nonobservance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him

because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offendingstudent was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort wascommitted, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student.On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through theenforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline. The Colegio de San JoseRecoletos cannot beheld directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is maderesponsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.

Salvosa v. IACThe Baguio Colleges Foundation was an academic institution and also an institution of arts and trade. It had anROTC Unit. Jimmy Abon, the appointed armorer of the ROTC unit was a commerce student of the BCF. Abon shot

Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio in the parking lot of BCF with an unlicensed firearm takenfrom the armory of the ROTC Unity of the BCF. Castro died, and Abon was prosecuted for and convicted ofhomicide. The heirs of Castro sued for damages, impleading Abon, the ROTC Commandant, the officers of BCF,the Dean of BCF and BCF itself. The RTC found them all solidarily liable for damages. Salvosa, President of BCF,and BCF appealed.ISSUE: Whether Salvosa and BCF are liable for damages.HELD:No. Considering that the shooting happened after classes, at around 8 pm, Abon cannot be considered tohave been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Therefore,Salvosa and BCF cannot be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under Article 2180. Besides, the recordshows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Abon "notto leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded." Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon wasunder the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable,

this circumstance shows that Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from hissuperior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

2.Primary Liability

a. Possessors/Users of AnimalsArt. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the

damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in

case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered

damage.

Damage caused by: an animalPerson primarily liable:

a. the possessor of an animal; orb. whoever may make use of the sameDefenses:

a. that the damage was caused by force majeure

b. that the damage was caused through the fault of the person who suffered damage

Vestil v. IAC

Three year-old Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog named Andoy while she was playing with a child of theVestils in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, father of Purita Vestil. Theness was rushed to the hospital whereshe was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead and was given an anti-rabies shot. She wasdischarged after nine days but was re-admitted a week later. She died the following day, due to bronchopneumonia.Seven months later, the Uys sued the Vestils for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable tothem as the possessors of Andoy. The Vestils denied liability, claiming that the dog belonged to the deceasedVicente Miranda. Purita Vestil insisted that she was not liable since she was not the owner of the house or of thedog, as his estate had not yet been partitioned.ISSUE: Whether the Vestils are liable for damages.HELD: Yes, the Vestils are liable for damages.


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Ownership of the house or of the dog is immaterial in this case. What must be determined is the possession of thedog, since Article 2183 holds liable thepossessorof the animal that causes damage. In this case, Purita Vestil andher husband were the possessors of the house at the time when the incident happened. Meanwhile, the dogstayed in the house and even remained there after the death of Vicente Miranda, up to the time when it bitTheness. Hence, the Vestils are deemed in possession of the dog and are liable for the damages that it caused.The Vestils raised the defense that, assuming that they were in possession of the dog, they were still not liable

because there was no causal connection between the broncho-pneumonia that caused the death of Theness andDigests by Sheryl, Cayo, Rosa 44Lecture Notes and Notes from Jona Bautistas Reviewerthe dog bite. Moreover, they argued that the dog was tame and was provoked by Theness into biting. The courtrejected these defenses. It held that the broncho-pneumonia suffered by Theness was a complication of rabies.

The Vestils contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog was also foundunacceptable. Article 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the animal should escape or be lost and so beremoved from his control. It does not matter either that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the childinto biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they causeinjury. As for the alleged provocation, Theness was only three years old at that time and cannot be faulted forwhatever she might have done to the animal.

b. Owners of Motor Vehicles

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who

was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is

disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or

violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

Damage caused by: driver of a motor vehiclePerson solidarily liable: owner of the motor vehicleRequisites of solidary liability of the owner:

1. owner is in the vehicle at the time of the mishap2. the owner could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due diligenceDisputable presumption of negligence of driver: If driver had been found guilty of reckless driving orviolating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall

be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no

contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.

RA 7394: The Consumer Act of the Philippines

The manufacturer, importer, and seller can be held liable for actual injury or damage incurredPrescriptive period is 2 years.Problem: A father buys ice cream for his children from a supermarket. The kids eat ice cream. The ice cream hasshards of glass. One of the children swallows the glass and wounds his throat. How can the father prove liability?

Answer: Present the following evidence:a. Testimonial the father, the kids, the doctorb. Documentary doctors bills, x-ray, receipt from the store (the receipt is the best evidence ofthe sale; need to prove the purchase and connect the seller to the injury)c. Real the shard of glass taken from the throat of the child, the container of the ice cream

d. Municipal Corporations

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries

suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public

buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Damage caused by: defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public worksPrimarily liable: Provinces, cities, municipalitiesCondition: the road, street, bridge, public building, or other public work must be under the control or supervisionof the province, city, or municipality in question

Defense: Due diligenceNote: Municipal corporations are liable only for damages for the death of or injuries suffered by persons and notfor damage to property.Guilatco v. City of Dagupan

Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a national road) when sheaccidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her hospitalization and continuingdifficulty in locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable to go to work, thereby losing her income.She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial self since she is unable to perform her religious,social, and other activities. She filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan.The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the manhole was located on a national road, which was notunder the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan.ISSUE: Whether the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco.HELD: Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 to apply, it is not necessary for the defective road orstreet to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or supervision isexercised over the defective road or street.

In this case, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the CityEngineer, whose duties include the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charterof Dagupan provides that the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys andsidewalks and the regulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charterclearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage holeis located.The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or

property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter cannot be used to exempt thecity. The charter only lays down thegeneral rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand, Article2189 applies in particularto the liability arising from defective streets, public buildings, and other public works.


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e. Building Proprietors

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its

total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (ESTE)(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the

inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;

(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without

precautions suitable to the place.

Art. 2193. The head of

torts midterm reviewr

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