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I. QUASI-DELICT (ARTS. 2176-2194, NCC)I. Quasi-Delicta. Introductory conceptsa.1 Nature, Scope and Coverage

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.*DOLO VS. CULPA In Article 3, you find 2 ways of committing a crime under the RPC:1. Dolo something that is done with intent2. Culpa or Fault done through negligence

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.* When we say quasi-delict based on fault or negligence, is it something that is done intentionally? Atty says, because precisely otherwise, it could have been dolo, but its really culpa.*So if its not intentional, can you say its voluntary? YES, Except that they are unintentional because they are not based on intent, but on fault, negligence, lack of foresight, lack of skill.*What did SC say about quasi-delict vs. torts? Quasi-delict, as defined by Article 2176, is homologous but not identical to torts.*Why is it homologous but not identical? Like quasi-delict, torts can embrace the concept of negligence. You can as well file an action based on negligence and say its torts. It can cover even intentional acts like battery, deceit and false imprisonment.*Why is torts broader than quasi-delict? Torts broader than quasi-delict because it is based on common law. Torts has been a matter of bread and butter for common law jurisdictions like the US, you just read their McDonalds Case, or Philip Morris Case, or the Oil Spill Case before. You have a judge who can award millions of punitive damages based on tort because it can be any case that the court says it is. Whereas, the concept of quasi-delict being civil law in character, is limited by what the law says. Precisely why SC said that tort would have to be broader than quasi-delict.*When we say therefore torts, as compared not just to quasi-delict but to our laws on reparation, which one would be broader? Our civil law on wrongs. This takes us back to the case of Baksh, what did SC say there? Our concept on reparation for civil wrongs is broader than torts. Because for instance, Baksh would take us to Article 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code which would otherwise not have found as in equivalent in common law jurisdictions.

*What would be the importance of our laws on quasi-delict? Because you have a law on quasi-delict you are able to get reparation. So provisions of quasi-delict allow us to have a civil redress.*What do you think does this law achieve?1. Reparation or civil redress because of the law on quasi-delict, you are able to get reparation or civil redress.2. Corrective justice case of Baksh3. Optimal deterrence - (attitude of Iranians after reading the case of Baksh)4. Loss distribution example you have an employee committing an act or omission causing damage to another, that you can as well hold liable the employer. And what is very good atleast for the victims because they can sue not just the one who is at fault and who generally doesnt have the money, but also the one who hired the one at fault and who generally has the money. 5. Civil law concept when you announce in the cases what should be the proper conduct to follow, the courts can shape social norms or may be obtain social redress.*Is Fault and Negligence the same?NO. When we say fault, it is the performance of an act. Negligence, is the non-performance of the act. If you look at Article 3 of RPC, Fault is there whenever there is negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, lack of skill. Precisely why in your Criminal Law you have this crime known as culpa criminal. If it is based on fault, the crime is known culpa criminal.TortsQuasi-delict

Common LawCivil Law

May be intentionalUnintentional (may or may not be voluntary)

May be criminalMay be criminal (such as criminal negligence)

No pre-existing contractual obligationNo pre-existing contractual obligation

Common LawCivil Law

Customs and usages (broader)Enacted by Congress

Elcano vs. Hill Held: Article 2176, when it refers to fault or negligence covers not only acts punishable by law but also acts in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. The acquittal of Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence not a bar to the instant action. Furthermore, in a civil action, only preponderance of evidence to make the defendant pay in damages is needed.The sons emancipation by marriage cannot free the father from responsibility. Under Article 397, by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. (Under the Family Code, it is stated in Article 236 that nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below 21 years of age mentioned in the 2nd and 3rd paragraph of Article 2180.) Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

Difference between Quasi-delict (Article 2176) and Torts:

Article 2176: QUASI DELICT It is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept TORTS an Anglo-American or common law concept much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Vs. CA Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.a.2 RequisitesArt. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.Requisites:1. A civil wrong2. Arising from an act or omission3. Amounting to fault or negligence4. Where there is no pre-existing contractual obligation (since quasi-delict is essentially extra-contractual in nature. See however the case of Air France vs. Carrascoso)Child Learning v. Tagorio

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:

(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

Difference between fault and negligence: FAULT voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such damage. requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another NEGLIGENCE failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to another.

b. Quasi-delict distinguished fromb.1 culpa criminalCulpa criminalCulpa aquiliana

As to interestPublicPrivate

As to purposePunitive / CorrectiveReparation through indemnification

As to basis of liabilityThere must be a law which punishes the act or omissionInclude all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario ( DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CULPA-CONTRACTUAL AND CULPA-AQUILIANA)

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:

(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."

Joseph vs. Bautista

The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.

The trial court was correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp vs. People

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between:

(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.

In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability."

In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law. Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty.

Spouses Santos vs. Pizardo An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery.

Manliclic vs. Calaunan A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

b.2. culpa contractual (ARTS. 1172-1173, NCC)

Culpa contractualCulpa aquiliana

As to liabilityIncidentalDirect

As to cause of actionMust prove:1. Existence of contract2. Breach of contractNegligence

As to diligence requiredExtraordinary diligence (in case of common carriers)Ordinary diligence

As to defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employeesNot availableAvailable

Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)

Guiterrez v. Guiterrez, 56 PHIL 177In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the bus driver on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.Philippine School of Business Administration, et. al. v. CABecause the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contractAir France v. CarrascosoThe manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".Regino v. PangasinanIn Non v. Dames II, the Court modified the "termination of contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete it." Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the school-student relationship as contractual in nature.

In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents "inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;" as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and "demoralization of unimaginable proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.Manila Railroad Co. v. La Compania TrasantianticaIt is desirable, however, in this connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the distinction between negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and neligence considered as an independent source of obligation between parties not previously bound (culpa aquiliana).

This distinction is well established in legal jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the provisions of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this, we quote the following passage from the opinion of this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., and in this quotation we reproduce the first paragraph of here presenting a more correct English version of said passage.The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give arise to duties, whether springing form contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.We see with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses, either as culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between two person not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation.

Calalas v. CAThe first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.

Construction Dev. Corp. of the Philippines v. Estrella, et. al.Can one institute a civil action against different sets of defendants, one based on culpa contractual and the other based on culpa aquilina? Supreme Court held that the owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held, thus:

The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.

II. ACT OR OMISSION

ART. 1173, NCC

The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

TEST TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF NEGLIGENCE:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligence act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE:

Slight Negligence- the failure to exercise great or extraordinary care.

Ordinary Negligence- the want of ordinary care and diligence, that is, such care and diligence as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.

Gross Negligence- materially greater than ordinary negligence, and consists of an entire absence of care or an absence of even slight diligence; it implies a thoughtless disregard for consequences or an indifference to the rights and welfare of others.

ART. 3, REVISED PENAL CODE

Definitions. Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

ACCIDENT

An occurrence by chance, and not as expected. (Ballentines Law dictionary)An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; sometime that does not occur in the usual course of events or could be reasonably anticipated. (Blacks law dictionary)An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented. (Nakpil & Sons v. CA)

GAID v. PEOPLE

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.

DYTEBAN v. CHING

The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation.It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national highway posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or atleast minimize it.

DAYWALT v. CORPORACIO DE PP. AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS

Whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes himself liable for damages to the vendee, beyond the value of the use and occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the efforts to resist an action for specific performance. The right which was here recognized had its origins in a rule, long familiar to the courts of common law, to the effect that any person who entices a servant from his employment is liable in damages to the master (illegal to interfere with any relation of personal service). The right of action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract is not confined to contracts for personal services, but extends to contracts in general. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by working mischief to the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not essential.Upon the question of legal justification, if a party enters into a contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthy climate, and a third person, with bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no action will lie. But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for the indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, the intermeddler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract is broken.

PICART v. SMITH

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger.Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guarantee against that harm.Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion borne of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

UMALI V. BACANI

The series of negligence on the part of the defendants employee resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution, to wit: the defendant did not cut down the banana plants which are taller than the electric posts to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line; that after the storm they did not cut off the flow of electricity from the lines pending inspection of the wires to see if they have been cut; and lastly, in not taking precautions to prevent anybody from approaching the live wires. Cause was negligence of employee and not fortuitous event of storm.The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employee. The liability of the employer is primary and direct.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION v. CA

Foreseeability of the harm is therefore an indispensable requirement. Thus, in a case where the SC found that the actor could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, it was ruled that he was not guilty of negligence.

RAKES v. AG & P

Professional Risk. Employer-Employee Relation.This contractual obligation, implied form the relation and perhaps so inherent in its nature to be invariable by the parties, binds the employer to provide safe appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely corresponding to English and American Law. On these principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and maintain its tracks in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. IT is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred, consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his employment and, as such, one assumed by him. It is evident that this can not be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to duly inspect it for the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be excused ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant of the injured man. It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a 3rd person can relieve the defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as the fellow-servant rule, we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence. Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in 1837 it has been effectually abrogated by the Employers Liability Act ad the Compensation Law. xxx

ASSOCIATED BANK v. TAN

Our SC has emphasized that the banking business is impressed with public interest. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care.

S.D. MARTINEZ v. BUSKIRK

Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom, can not be held to be unreasonable or imprudence and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.

PACIS v. MORALES

A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs or life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. For failing to ensure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.

YLARDE v. AQUINO

The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult , but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience under the same or similar circumstances.

PHILHAWK CORP v. LEE

Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employees, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the case and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.

REGALA v. CARIN

Respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of petitioners act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead look into the manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to determine whether this was directly responsible for any distress respondent may have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal act or omission must have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack of permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.

FRANCISCO v. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS

One who is physically disabled (blind) is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.

VAUGHAN v. MENLOVE

The standard of care under negligence is not based on the judgment of each individual. A landowner is under a general duty of care to use his land without negligently causing injury to others. The standards of negligence is that of a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances.The court held that even though D did not light the fire, he was as much responsible for it as if he had put the candle to the rick himself, and noted that it was a well known fact that hay will ferment and take fire if nor carefully stacked. There was gross negligence because S had been warned repeatedly of the risk and chose to ignore that risk.

HAZING AS NEGLIGENCE: VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE

In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. Here a person performs an initial lawful deed, however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa. Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done with grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence in attributed foresee the harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence. For a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who choses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort. The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Villa, the cardiac failure was caused by blood clots all over the body of the accused as a result of the paddling and blows. And evidence shows that some accused fraternity members were drinking during the initiation rites.Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Villa culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.

IV. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE1. Doctrine of Proximate CausePROXIMATE CAUSE that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy andprecedent. (American Express International Inc. v. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, Oct. 14, 2005)Q: When may a person be held liable for his negligent act?A:A person may be held liable for his negligent act if such is the proximate cause of the injury, even though it is merely one of many concurring efficient causes.TISON ET AL. VS. SPS. POMASIN GR NO. 173180, AUGUST 24, 2011FACTS:Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.The jitney on the opposite lane, going downhill, was falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.The appellate court noted that the restriction in Jabon's driver's license was violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident.ISSUE: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?RULING:We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code 8 which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision. Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In said case, Aonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist' s own liability." 30We took the occasion to state that:The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other. In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.OCEAN BUILDERS v. SPS. CUBACUB, GR NO. 150898, APRIL 13, 2011FACTS:Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company's general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company's "barracks" where he lives free of charge.Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimir's intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company then transferred to Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH). However, he died.The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir's immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.Bladimir's parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir's condition leading to his death.ISSUE:WON the employer is liable/negligentRULING:At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Hao's advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted "adequate and immediate medical" attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate court's ruling. AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of negligence.

Fernando v. CA, 208 SCRA 714FACTS:On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically onNovember 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernandoand Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expiredthere. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victim sentered the septic tank without clearance neither from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank. Petitioners, children of the deceased, file a complaint for damages. TC: Dismissed. CA: In favor of petitioners, based on social justice. CA on MR: Reversed, in favor of Davao City.ISSUE:W/N Davao City is liable.HELD:No. We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm.While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed.In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.Dyteban v. Jose Ching, supra.ISSUE:W/N prime mover driver Limbagas negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.HELD:SC held that the skewed parking of the prime mover (negligence of the driver) was the proximate cause of the collision.Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that causeacting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission.Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van.Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil 181FACTS:The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the CA forwarded the case to the SC due to the amount involved.ISSUE:What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers?HELD:We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. At the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 am), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.Manila Electric Co v. Remoquillo, 99 Phil 117FACTS:Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house of his brother-in-law on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila. While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which he was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2-1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. The electric wire was already in the premises at the time the house was built. This distance of 2-1/2 feet of the media agua from the electric wire was not in accordance with city regulations which required a distance of 3 feet but somehow or other the owner of the building was able to have the construction approved. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against the Manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages holding that although the owner of the house in constructing the media agua exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still after making that finally approved because he was given a final permit to occupy the house and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence nor take other precautionary measures as may be warranted. Said decision was appealed to the SC.HELD:SC held that the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself.When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.But even assuming for a moment that the defendant electric company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and mediaagua in question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latters length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If not danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of prior defection condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 16 Phil 8FACTS:The defendant left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age, in company with another boy 12 years of age, entered the premises of the defendant, saw the fulminating caps and carried them away. Upon reaching home they made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.ISSUE:W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitionersHELD:No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover."But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him.Sanitary Steam Laundry v. CA, 300 SCRA 20FACTS:This case involves a collision between a truck owned by petitioner and a cimarron which caused the death of three persons and injuries to several others. Petitioners truck crashed the cimarron when the driver stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. RTC found Petitioners driver to be responsible for the accident and awarded damages in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations (overloading, had only one headlight on) at the time of mishap. He also argued that sudden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. He further argued that the driver should be exonerated based on the doctrine of last clear chance, which states that the person who has the last clear chance of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed that the cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding an accident.ISSUE:1. W/N the cimmaron was guilty of contributory negligence due to violation of traffic rules and regulation which added to the proximate cause of the accident or such was based solely on the negligence of the panel truck driver.1. W/N petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.HELD:1. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during night time certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuver ability." We are convinced that no maneuvering which the Cimarron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial. All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioners driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.2. With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it, such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence. As the trial court said:. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, were conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job training and seminars reminding employees, especially drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done. There were no instructions given to defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor what to do after an emergency occurs. All these could only mean failure on the part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the sense. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law. But petitioner did not show in what manner drivers were supervised to ensure that they drove their vehicles in a safe way.Mercury Drug v. Baking, GR No. 156037, May 25, 2007FACTS:Sebastian M. Baking, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Respondent was given two medical prescriptions Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded topetitionerMercury Drug Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription forDiamicronas a prescription for Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. On the third day of taking the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta due to falling asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sys clinic. Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent and this was affirmed by the CA in toto.ISSUE:Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of respondents accident.HELD:Article 2176of the New Civil Code provides:Art. 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.Requisites under Art. 2176:(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.Petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. Proximate CauseProximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision. Complementing Article 2176is Article 2180 of the same Code.The employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Thus, petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter. BPI v. Suarez, GR No. 167750, Mar 15, 2010FACTS: Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current accounts with petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several parcels of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred not to deal directly with the land owners. They agreed that the client would deposit the money in Suarezs BPI account as payment for the Tagaytay properties and then, Suarez would issue checks to the sellers. An RCBC check was then deposited to Suarezs current account in BPI. Suarez instructed his secretary, Garaygay, to confirm from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC check was already credited to his account that same day it was deposited. It was alleged that BPI confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check. With this, Suarez issued on the same day five checks for the purchase of the Tagaytay properties. Days after while in the U.S. for vacation, he was informed by Garaygay that the checks issued were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds with penalties despite an assurance from RCBC that it has already been debited in his account and fully funded. Claiming that BPI mishandled his account through negligence, Suarez filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages. The TC rendered judgment in favor of respondent which was affirmed by CA.ISSUE:W/N the erroneous marking of DAIF (drawn against insufficient funds), instead of DAUD (drawn against uncollected deposit)on the checks,is the proximate cause of respondents injury.HELD:In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks. Proximate Cause has been defined as any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred. There is nothing in Suarezs testimony which convincingly shows that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks, not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the justified dishonor of the checks. In short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence. Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty, GR No. 184905, Aug. 28, 2009FACTS:A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"). (C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection. Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. MeTC rendered the decision exculpating Ramos from liability. RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC. The CA affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). ISSUE: Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty for damages suffered in a vehicular collision. HELD:Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:Article 2179.When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.Article 2185.Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.It is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.VALLACAR TRANSIT v. CATUBIG, GR NO 175512, MAY 30, 2011FACTS:Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with