TomyFather’smemory

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ContentsListofPlatesMapsIntroductionJerusalemAcrosstheBattleLinesTheQuadrilateralof

PowerNur-ad-DinandthePropagandaoftheJihadTheFamilyofAiyubVizirofEgyptTheCriticalYearsTriumphintheNorth

DynastandHeroOh!SweetVictoryTheThreatfromtheNorthAcre,theCityforwhichtheWorldContendedSaracensandCrusadersTheDeathofaHero

EpilogueNotesandSourcesSelectBibliographyGlossary

ListofPlatesA dramaticmonument toSaladin erected inDamascus intwentiethcentury.This famous imageof Saladin, dating

fromabout1180, isattributed to anartistoftheFatimidschool.Built between 685and 691, the Domeof the Rock,sometimes calledthe Mosque ofOmar,istheearliest

great architecturalmonumentofIslam.The interior of theDomeoftheRock.The Citadel atJerusalem, showingfortifications fromthe time of theCrusades.

This nineteenth-century print ofJerusalem depictsthe Holy Citywithin its wallsmuch as it musthave looked toSaladinpreparingtolay siege to theplacein1189.

The interior of thegreat mosque atDamascus, theMosque of theUmayyads.A view of theMosque of theUmayyads atDamascus, showingthe colonnaded

courtyard with thecity laid outbeyond.Anineteenth-centuryview of the ruinedclassical temples atBaalbekoverlooking theBeka’avalley.A watercolour view

of Tyre, seen fromits isthmus, by thenineteenth-centurytopographical artist,DavidRoberts.The ruins of thecrusader castle ofBelvoir, known tothe Muslims asKaukab.

The most famous ofall crusader castles,Krak desChevaliers.Thecrusaders’castleofMontreal,knownto the Muslimforces as ash-Shaubak.The siteofSaladin’s

great victory of theChristian forces at‘The Horns ofHattin’ overlookingthe Lake Tiberias(theSeaofGalilee)in1187.

MapsTheQuadrilateralofPowerandCairoCairoandDistrict,about1170Saladin’sVictoryattheHornsofHattin,1187

TheBattleofAcre,1189

IntroductionSaladinisoneofthoserarefigures in the long historyof confrontation betweentheChristianWestand theworldofIslamwhoearnedthe respect of his enemies.Thisalonewouldmakehislife worth investigating.For the English-speakingworld at least his name is

firmly bracketed with thatofRichardI theLionheart,in a context of romanticclichés which form one ofthe great images of themedievalworldofchivalry.The identification beganduring the livesof the twomen and has continueddowntothepresent.Ofthetwo we know very muchmore about the Muslimhero than about hisChristian rival, thanks to

the eulogising biographiesof his secretary Imad-ad-Din al-Isfahani and hisloyal minister Baha’-ad-Din, the numerous butmore critical references tohim in the HistoricalCompendium of Ibn-al-Athir (1160–1233), thegreatest historian of histime, and detailedtreatment of aspects of hiscareer in othercontemporary Muslim

sources.Ofthesethree,thefirst two began theircareers in the service ofSelchük Turkish princeswho represented the rulingestablishment that Saladinwas to displace, while thethird,althoughheremainedloyal to the Selchükdynasty of Zengi andregarded Saladin as ausurper, was too honestand objective a man todenyhisgreatqualities.

And this brings us to thesecondfascinatingfocusofSaladin’scareer.Hisfather,Aiyub, rose high in theservice of Zengi and thenof his sonNur-ad-Din, butasaKurdinaSyrianworldthen ruled by Turkishdynasties he could hardlyhope to win the supremepower.Thefactthathissondidsoisoneofthegreatesttributes to his abilities andwasanunforgivableactof

presumption in theeyesofthe old-school Turkishofficials.AfterthedeathofNur-ad-Din in the year1174 Saladin was to forcehis claim to suzeraintythroughout Turkish Syria,from Mosul to Damascus,and in his last years wasthe acknowledged arbiterof the rivalries among thedescendants of the greatZengi.Fordie-hardsitwasbitter proof of the

decadence of the world,epitomised in a story toldto Ibn-al-Athir by one ofhis friends. In the autumnof 1191 the Zengid princeMoizz-ad-DinhadcometoSaladin to beg hismediation in a family landdispute. When the youngmancametotakehisleaveof the great king, he gotdown from his horse.‘Saladin did the same tosayhisfarewells.Butwhen

he prepared to mount hishorse again,Moizz-ad-Dinhelped him and held thestirrupforhim.ItwasAla-ad-DinKhorremShah,sonof Izz-ad-Din prince ofMosul (another Zengid),who arranged the robes ofthe sultan. I wasastonished.’ Then Ibn-al-Athir’s friend concludedhis horrified account withan invocation. ‘Oh son ofAiyub, you will rest easy

whatever manner of deathyou may die. You forwhomthesonofaSelchükkingheldthestirrup.’To hold the stirrup was

one of the most potentsymbols of submissionthroughout thecontemporary world,Christian West as well asMuslim. Admiringcontemporariesnotedwhena pope was powerfulenough to exact such

tribute from an emperor.Yet it is surely remarkablethatafteradecadeinwhichhe had ruled from Aleppoto Cairo and had led thearmiesofIslamintheHolyWar against the Infidel,Saladin’sKurdish ancestryand his triumph over thedisunited Zengids stillrankledwithhisopponents.When the great ruler diedhisdoctornotedthat inhisexperience it was the first

timeakinghadbeen trulymourned by his subjects.His justice and gentlenesswere recognised by allthose who came intocontact with him, but hissuccess was jealouslywatched by the caliphs ofBaghdad,nominalheadsofthe Islamic community,and dourly resisted by theZengidrulersheeventuallyovercame. Seen from theWestSaladinwasthegreat

champion of the jihad insuccession to Nur-ad-Din;to his opponents in Syriahis espousal of the HolyWarseemedanimpertinentusurpation. The ThirdCrusade, which came soclose to recoveringJerusalemforChristendom,drew its contingents fromFrance, Germany andEngland – to oppose itSaladin had only troopsfrom the territories he had

forced to acknowledgehim.But despite the jealousy

and opposition heprovoked in the Islamiccommunitytherewerefew,even among his enemies,who denied Saladin’sgenerosity, religiousconvictionandevennessoftemper. There were thosewho accused him ofassumed piety for politicalreasons, but then both

Zengi andNur-ad-Din hadhad such charges levelledagainstthem.ItmaybethatSaladin’s strict observanceof orthodox Sunnite Islamwas in part caused by thewish to emulate the dourand extreme religiosity ofNur-ad-Din. His treatmentof his Jewish subjectsoffersagoodillustrationofhismeticulousadherencetothe letter of Islamic law.Beforehecametopowerin

Egypt as vizir in 1169 theShi‘ite caliphs of Cairo(considered heretics byBaghdad) had often usedJewish and Christianadvisers in preference totheir Sunnite Muslimsubjects. In consequencethey had relaxed some ofthe restrictions on non-believers. Saladinreimposed many of theseregulations,suchastheonethat forbade Jews from

riding horses. But hescrupulously upheld theirright to present petitionsfor the redress of wrongsunder the law and theirright to have disputesbetween Jews tried byJewishjudges‘asinformertimes’.Saladin’s genuine if

legalistic tolerance inreligious matters isconfirmed by the GermanDominican Burkhard, who

visited Egypt in 1175 andobserved that people thereseemedfreetofollowtheirreligious persuasions. Tothe Jews indeed Saladin’slater career seemed toforeshadow great things.The1170sand1180swerea period of strongMessianic hopes andSaladin’s crushing victoryover the Christians at thebattle of Hattin in 1187seemed to herald

marvellousthingstocome.A modern biographer ofthe great Jewishphilosopher Maimonideseven suggested that hisdigest of the law, theMishna Torah, may havebeen written as theconstitution of the newJewish state then beingpredicted. When Saladinproclaimed the right ofJewstoreturntoJerusalemand settle there after his

conquestofthecityatleastone observer, Y’hudahal-Harizi, compared thedecree to thereestablishment of JewishJerusalem by the Persianemperor,CyrustheGreat.Few figures in thewhole

history of theMiddle Easthaveearnedtheadmirationof Jews, Christians andMuslims, and it is, ofcourse, because of hisassociation with this

ancientandhistoriczoneofconflict that Saladin hasspecial interest for amodern writer. For all butone of twenty years heruled Egypt andDamascene Syria asprovinces of a singleempire; for much of thattime he was also overlordof thewestern seaboard ofArabia, northern Syria,with its capital at Aleppo,andtheNorthAfricancoast

as far west as Tunisia,while his authority wasrecognised in the distantnorth-east at Mosul. Forthese critical decades thenSaladin achieved a unitedIslamic state fleetinglyparalleled in our time bythe United Arab Republic.The last six years of hisarduous and ambitiouscareer harnessed thecombined resources ofthese wide territories in a

campaign which shatteredthe Christian Latin statesestablished in Palestine inthe wake of the FirstCrusade.Most dramatic ofall he recovered the holycityofJerusalemforIslam.Because of this great

victory and because of theheady rhetoric of theHolyWar which so obsessedChristian and Islamicthinking during the laterpartof the twelfthcentury,

itwasoftensupposedatthetime and has beensupposed since that theconquest of Jerusalemwasthe only objective ofSaladin’s career. Hisbiographers have too oftenignored the realities ofpowerintheregionandthepressures they put on him.Saladincameat theendofa period in the history ofthe Middle East duringwhich the Sunnite caliphs

of Baghdad had beenworking unrelentingly butwith slight success toestablish their supremacyin the heretical Shi‘itecapital of Cairo; and heoperated in a world wherethecrucialcentresofpowerwere the cities ofDamascus, Aleppo, Mosuland, to a lesser extent,Baghdad. These were theformative factors behindhis own slow yet

inexorable drive againstChristianPalestine.The first edition of thisbook was one of just twobiographiesofitssubjectinthe English language formany decades; newresearch and a number ofnew biographical studiessince are outlined in therevised bibliography. Ihavecorrectederrorsinthefirst edition. I retain the

word ‘Saracen’asausefulgeneral term used in theWest for the variouspeoples, Arab, Turk,Turkomanetc.,recruitedtohis armies by Saladin.Conventions on thetransliteration of Arabicand other Middle Easternlanguages have changedover the years; usage hasalso changed from‘Moslem’ to ‘Muslim’ and‘Qur’an’ is increasingly

commonfor‘Koran’.By and large, however,

thebookhasstood the testof time fairly well – inparticular, its contentionthat in 1188 Saladin didright to concentrate hisenergies on the threatposed by the advancingGerman army of theEmperor FrederickBarbarossa rather than onthe capture of the city ofTyre. The collapse of the

German crusade could nothave been foreseen, whileTyre had never beensignificant in previousEuropean campaigns. Myanalysis of Saladin’sstrategy to lure theChristian army into thecampaign that ended in itsdefeat at Hattin is nowgenerallyaccepted.I presented the book as

part of a survey I had inmind of the encounter of

religious cultures in thetwelfth century MiddleEast: Sunni Islam, ShiaIslam, OrthodoxChristianity and RomanCatholicChristianity.Iwasinvited to prepare anoutlineforaprojectedpart-work publication on theworld cultural importanceof Islam in its earlycenturies. In the 1970s,such ‘multi-culturalstudies’wereaheadoftheir

time.Teaching a course inEuropeancivilizationattheUniversity of Le Havre inthe 1990s I devoted anelement to thecontributionmadeby theIslamicworldto the medievalWest – inthe context of the upsurgeof ‘Islamism’ at that timevery topical in Franco-Algerian relations. Eventsof recent years havebrought such studies ahigher profile in the

Westernworld.Saladin should be central

to an understanding ofIslamic religious attitudesofhistime,beingamanofhonour and integrity who,even if able to respect hisChristian enemies, wasimplacably hostile to themas agents of irreligion – aman for whom jihad wasvery much an armedstruggle against the‘infidels’(al-Kuffar).Inthe

twenty-first century, thisterm jihad has powerfulresonance outside theIslamic world. AlthoughthewordisnotfoundintheQur’an, itwas inuse froma very early date and theconcept evolved in thework of Islamic legalists.Two types aredistinguished:‘thegreater’,al jihadal-akbar,which isthestruggleagainsttheselfto establish the way of

Islam in one’s own life;and ‘the lesser’ al-asghar,which is struggle orwarfareinthewayofGod.In a famous personal

testament, Saladin set outhis dedication to the jihadand summed up all hisearly achievements asmeans for the recovery ofJerusalem, i.e. al-Quds. Inthe view of somehistorians, he took powerin Egypt (Chapter 6) to

provide himself with apurely dynastic powerbase. It certainly servedthatpurpose,buthehimselfpointedout thatassoonashewasestablishedtherehebegan regular incursionsagainst the infidels,recovering from themstrongholds lost to Islam.Among these he lists thefortress at Aila (Eilat,modernIsrael)on theGulfofAqaba,builtbyBaldwin

I of Jerusalem back in1116, giving the Crusaderkingdom a strategic baseagainst the roads fromDamascus to Egypt andagainstMeccaandMedina.Critics have accused

Saladinofconductingwarsof self aggrandisement ashe battled against Muslimrivals simply to build apersonal empire: from thispointofviewtherecaptureof Jerusalem was,

apparently, more a luckybreakthantheoutcomeofacarefulstrategytobringthearmyof thekingdomtoitsknees.But Saladin’s claimthat his campaigns wereessential to theconsolidation of Muslimstrength for that conquestwas utterly justified.Thereafter it was, reportshis secretary, adviser andbiographer, Ibn ShaddadBaha-ad-Din, his heart’s

desire to fight the infidelsuntiltherewasnotoneleftuponthefaceoftheearth.For generations of

admirers, Saladin hasrepresented the intriguingparadox of a man ofpersonal humility, honestpurpose and warmhumanitywhoneverthelesswon and held greatpolitical power and whodied an ornament to hisreligion, loved by his

friendsandadmiredbyhisenemies. His careersignificantly shifted thebalance of power againsttheenemiesofIslamintheHoly Land of threereligions. But in his ownestimation, he left thisworld with the work ofAllahbarelybegun.

Peterborough,June2006

Chapter1

JerusalemOn Friday, 4 September1187, the triumphant armyofSaladinstoodbeforethegatesofAscalon.Itwasthemajor port of southernPalestine which for fortyyearshadbeeninChristian

hands. Now it was to behanded back to Islam. Itwas the last in a series ofcapitulations which hadfollowedamassiveMuslimvictory at Hattin twomonthspreviously.Onthatfateful field the power ofthe Christian kingdom ofJerusalemhadbeenbrokenand its morale entirelyshattered. As the Saracensoldiers watched thedefeated garrison file out

on their way to captivity,they could look back oneight weeks of knife-through-butter conquest.Towns and fortressesthroughout the kingdomhadopenedtheirgateswithbarely a struggle. OnlyJerusalem and a scatteringofcastlesnowremainedtothe enemy. Defeat wasclosing in on theChristiancause in Palestine and,ominousofdisastersstillin

store,aneclipseof thesundarkened the sky overAscalonasMuslimbannersbroke out on herbattlements.The general of this

victorious army, Salah-ad-DinYusuf ibn-Aiyub,wasfiftyyearsofage.Hewasashortish man, his roundfacecomingtoatrim,nowgrizzledbeard,butthehairbeneaththeturbanwasstillblack. Black too were the

eyes,keenandalert.Forsogreatapotentatehisclotheswere simple andunostentatious, but he sathis horse with the ease ofthirtyyearsofsoldieringinthe saddle and thestylishness of a polochampion. As the eclipseslowly darkened the sun’sglare an officialapproachedandannouncedthe arrival of Frankishenvoys, summoned from

Jerusalem to discuss termsfor the surrender of thatcity.ItwascleartoSaladin,as

itmustsurelyhavebeentothedefendersofthatcapitalnow without a kingdom,that thecity’spositionwashopeless. The nearestChristian forces of anystrength were a hundredmiles away to the north inthe coastal city of Tyre.Behinditswallstheshaken

survivors from the field ofHattin, together withthousandsofrefugeesfromthe surroundingcountryside, drew whatcomfort they could fromthe fact that the Muslimarmy had abandoned itssiege for the time being.But, for the moment, theycould be discounted as amilitarythreat.While Ascalon had held

there had been some

glimmerofafutureforthecapital. But now Ascalonhad fallen and the Gazagarrison, some twentymilestothesouthofit,wasalso on the verge ofcapitulation. The FrankishtroopsinJerusalemheldanisland in a hostileMuslimsea and even within thewalls there were enemies.Thousands of EasternOrthodoxSyrianChristianslooked to a Muslim

conquest as a liberationfromtheritesoftheChurchof Rome. In fact thecitizenry could reasonablyhope for clemency. In thelightning campaign thathad followed Hattin, townaftertownhadbeensparedand Saladin’s advance hadseemed more like theprogress of a king throughhis dominions than thebloodytriumphmarchofaconqueror.

AshefacedtheChristianembassythesultansawtheprize of a lifetime withinhis grasp. For years hisdeclared aim had been theliberationofIslamfromtheinfidel and above all therestoration of Jerusalem,holycityofthreereligions,toMuslimrule.Hewanteda peaceful surrender. Thiscitywasnot justaprizeofwar to be plundered andmade desolate. ‘I believe,’

hetoldtheenvoys,‘thatthecityisGod’sabode,asyoubelieve. It would bemuchagainstmywilltolaysiegeto the house of God or toputittotheassault.’To the Christian leaders

the case was somewhatdifferent. Theyremembered that theirpredecessorshadwonbackthe Holy City forChristendom and that theywere now its guardians.

TheyhadcomeatSaladin’scommand but they had nointention of surrenderingthecitywithoutafight.Tohis offer of terms theirreply was brave anduncompromising. ‘Ourhonour lies here and oursalvationwiththesalvationof the city. If we abandonher we shall surely andjustly be branded withshame and contempt forhere is the place of our

Saviour’scrucifixion....Weshall die in the defence ofour Lord’s sepulchre, forhow could we dootherwise.’Our reporter for this

interview is Imad-ad-Dinof Isfahan, Saladin’spersonal secretary. Hisstyle is florid and hiscommitment to his mastercomplete,butthewordsheputsintothemouthsoftheChristianembassyringtrue

andbehindhisaccountliesrespect for men who,however misguided, werefighting like him in whattheybelieved tobeaHolyWar. Saladin had offeredgenerous terms to thebeleaguered city ‘to obtainit in peace and amity’, butnow that diplomacy hadfailed he swore a solemnoath to take the place bythe sword, andprepared tomarch from Ascalon

immediately.Sometwoweekslater,his

army appeared before thewalls of Jerusalem.MarchingupfromAscalonalong the coast road andthen striking inland, it hadcome on the city from thewestand,on20September,the troopsbegan todeployagainst the western walls,expecting to overrun themeasily after a barrage ofstones and fire canisters

laid down by the siegeartillery. Ingeneral, beforelaunching an attack,Saladinmadeameticulousinspectionof the lieof theland but, on this occasion,underestimating perhapsthe strength anddetermination of theopposition, he openedoperations against thenearest sector. It was amistake. Sorties from thegarrison were able to

harass the Saracenengineers as they tried tobring the mangonels intoaction;missile throwersonthegreattowersofTancredandDavidcommanded thewestern approaches andswept the Muslim ranks.Until the early afternooneachdaytheattackerswereblindedanddazzledbythesun rising slowly up theeastern sky behind thebowmen and the artillery

onthebattlements.After five days Saladin

called off the action. Onthe evening of 25September, the defenderssaw the army strike campand begin to move offnorthward. That night thesounds of the distantchanting and the woodenprayer clappers of theChristians could be heardacross the hillsides. ThechurchesofJerusalemwere

filled with worshippersgiving thanks for thisround-one victory; someapparently even thoughtthat the Saracens hadwithdrawnentirely.But Saladin had merely

shifted the point of theattack. Seeing that thestrong westward defencescould hold him to aprotractedandcostlybattlehehadpersonallyinspectedthe rest of the perimeter.

On the morning of 26September the citizensawoke to find thatMuslimbanners were now onMount Olivet and that themangonelswerealready inposition for an attack onthe weaker northern andeasternwalls.Given conditions within

the city, the defence ofJerusalemwas surprisinglytough. In addition to thecitizens,thesupplieshadto

feedthousandsofrefugees,few of them able-bodiedmen. When the city waspreparing for the siege, ithad been found that therewere only two knights inthegarrison. In the twelfthcentury the knightwas thebestequippedaswellasthemost thoroughly trained ofallfightingmen,notsimplya member of a sociallyprivileged group. The newcommander knighted all

the men of the garrisonabove the age of sixteen;thegesturemayhaveraisedmorale but it did little toimprove the fightingqualityoftheforce.In fact the city only had

anexperiencedcommanderthanks to thegenerosityofSaladin. Hewas Balian ofIbelin, one of the finestsoldiers in the Christianarmy. After Hattin he hadtaken refuge with the

remnant of that army atTyre, but his wife, theByzantine princess MariaComnena, and his familywere still at Jerusalem;Balian begged a safeconduct from Saladin totravel to the capital andarrange their journey toTyre. Thiswas granted oncondition that Balianstayed only a single nightand that he swore neveragain to bear arms against

Saladin. Balian took thesolemn oath. Yet when hearrived in Jerusalem thepleasofthepeopleandthepressure of the patriarchpersuaded him to stay. Aman of honour, heprotested he had given hisoath,butthepatriarch,withthe bland disregard forcommitments made to theinfidel that most Christianclericsshared,absolvedtheknight from thisobligation

with the words ‘I absolveyoufromyoursinandfromyour oath which it were agreater sin in you to keepthanbreak’.For Balian it was a real

conflict of loyalties.Knightly honour requiredthat he observe his oathpledged to a nobleantagonist; Christiandevotionand loyalty tohisown people made itvirtually impossible for

him to refuse the pleas ofthecitizens.Buthisfamilywas still not out of dangerandheneededthegoodwillofSaladin.Hewrotetohimprotestingthathehadbeenforcedtobreakhisoathandbeggingthathislovedonesbe given protection.Saladin not only did notreproach him but evendetached fifty of his finesttroopstoescorttheladyofIbelin and her children

northwardstoTyre.So it was that when

Saladin’s army began itssiege,Jerusalemwasledbya determined and capablegeneral.Butunderthenewattackonthenorthernwallsthere was little thedefenders could do. In thewordsofanArabhistorian,the arrows were as tooth-pickstothewalls,pluckingdefenders out of theembrasures like unwanted

pieces of meat. With themissiles and canisters ofGreek fire hurled by thesiege engines they forcedthe defenders back fromthe battlements. Tenthousand horsemen, drawnup just out of bow-shot ofthecitywalls,watched thegatesofJehoshaphatandStStephen, dashing in tocontainanddrivebackanyattemptatasortiefromthegarrison.

Imad-ad-Din describeswith obvious relish thefearful havoc wrought bythe engines of war, andbehindtheclangourandthescreams of the combatantsinhisnarrativewehearthecrack and whirr of thewood and ropes as theclumsymachinescrashouttheir murderous missiles.Still more disturbing forthegarrisonwastheringofirononstonecomingfrom

the base of the walls.There, protected by thecovering fire from theirarmy and by a roof of theshieldsoftheircomrades,agroup of sappers weresteadily working on thelower courses of themasonry, others excavatedthe foundations, proppingthem with wood as thework progressed. Withinforty-eight hours nearly ahundred feet of wall had

been undermined, themasonryweakenedandthewoodenpitpropsunderthefoundations surroundedwith brushwood and othercombustibles.Evenbeforethewallfell,

those within the city werepreparing for defeat. Thechurches were crowdedwith penitents seekingforgiveness for their sins;the priests made solemnprocession through the

streets; mothers shavedtheir daughters’ headshoping to make them sougly that they would beignored in the pillage andrape they feared couldfollowthecapture.Saladinhadsworntotaketheplaceby sword and there weremany in both armies whohad heard reports andmemories of the days ofbloodthathadfollowedtheterrible Frankish conquest

of the city, eighty-eightyearsbefore.On 29 September the

props under thefoundationswerefired, theweakened wall fell, and agreat breach was openedup. The hard-pressedgarrison had to man itunaided since the citizenmilitiamen, who had beenprepared to fight frombehind the comparativesafety of the ramparts,

refused to defend thesuicidallyexposedpositionon the crumbling stone-work.Publicopinionbeganto clamour for surrenderandanappealtothemercyof Saladin. But the newknights of the garrisonwere eager for a lastglorioussortie, tosell theirlives as dearly as possibleandtowinmartyrs’crownsfor themselves. The resultwouldhavebeenadisaster

for Jerusalem.The lawsofwar permitted unrestrainedrightsofpillagetoanarmythattookacitybystorm.Infact the plunder from suchoperations was one of themore valuable profits ofwar-makingfortheaveragesoldier and no commandercould hope to control hismen in the heat and bloodofbattle.WhateverSaladinmight have wished, theoutcome of a heroic last-

ditch stand by the Frankswould have meantslaughteranddestruction.Inside the city, the

patriarch Heraclius fullyrealised the potentialthreats in the situation,notonly to life but also to thepriceless treasures and theholy relics in the city’schurches.Hepersuadedtheknights to reconsider theirdecision, pointing out thatwhiletheheroesmightfind

themselves in paradise atthe end of the day, theirwives and children would,in all probability, bebrutalised, tortured andenslaved. Balian himselfapparently came to sharethis view, and thefollowing day he led adeputation to Saladin’sheadquarters in the valleyof the Brook Kedron todiscussterms.Thebattle ragedover the

breachinthewallsevenasthe pourparlers wentforward, and in the midstof the negotiationsSaladinpointed out to Balian thatMuslim standards werealready fluttering on thebattlements. ‘Doesavictorgrant terms toaconqueredcity?’ he drily enquired.Soon after, a desperatecounter-attack from thegarrison pushed theinvaders back, but the fall

of Jerusalem was only amatter of days, perhapshours, away, and it isdifficultatfirstsighttoseewhat the Christians couldhopefor.Saladin’s first instinct

was to harden his heartagainst mercy. ‘We shalldeal with you just as youdealt with the people ofJerusalem when youconquered the city withmurder, enslavement and

atrocities.’ But there wereother factors. Despite hisoath,SaladinstillpreferredthatthecityreturntoIslamspared the worstdisfigurements ofwar.Hisemirs and advisers couldsee other advantages in anegotiatedsurrender.Inthemayhem of a sack muchwealthwouldbedestroyedandmore be looted by thecommon soldiery. But inan orderly transfer of

ransom money, supervisedof course by officers andgentlemen, a perfectlysatisfactory percentagecouldbecreamedoffonitsway to theofficial coffers.Their advice was tonegotiate from thepremisethat the enemy werealready prisoners and toagree the terms of theransoms.But it was Balian who

provided the clinching

argument. The Frankishgarrison had agreed toforgo the glory ofmartyrdom to save theirfamilies – if now theenemy refused terms, theirdesperation and fanaticismcouldbereliedontomakea shambles of Jerusalemand the shrines itcontained. Moreover therewere 5,000 Muslimprisonersandslaveswithinthe walls whom Balian

now used as hostages.AccordingtothechroniclerIbn-al-Athir, he addressedSaladin in the followingwords:‘Manyofthepeopleinthecityarefightinghalf-heartedly in the hope thatyouwillgrant themmercyas youhave to other cities– such people fear deathand desire life. But forourselvesassoldiers,whenwe see that death mustneeds be, by God we will

slaughter our sons andwomen, we will burn ourwealthandpossessionsandleaveyouneitherdinarnordrachma for plunder, normannorwomantoenslave.When we have finishedthat, we will destroy theRock and the al-Aqsamosqueand theotherholyplacesandwewillslaytheMuslim slaves who are inour hands. Then we willsally out to fight against

you;eachmanamongstuswilltakehisequaldowntodeathwith him so that weshall die gloriously orconquerwithhonour.’Whether in fact Balian

and his men would havebeen able to hold theperimeter long enough tocomplete this scenario ofdestructionisdoubtful.Butthe possibility was thereandneitherSaladinnorhisemirs wanted to put the

issue to the test. Thereremained the question ofthe sultan’s oath. Hisreligiousadvisersproposeda formula. If the garrisonwould make a formalsurrenderatdiscretion,thiswouldbeconsideredastheequivalent of conquest bythe sword and the oathwouldbefulfilled.The terms of the ransom

were not over liberal norwere they impossibly

harsh. More to the point,once the fighting hadstopped, not a singleChristian was harmed bythevictorioustroops.Emirsand officers patrolled thestreets to prevent outragesagainstpropertyorperson.As we shall shortly see,they made theadministration of theransom pay, but the factremains that when theMuslim reconquered

Jerasalem the handoverwas civilised and orderly.The contrastwith the FirstCrusade could hardly havebeen more complete. It isnot surprising thatChristian chroniclers andcitizens alike blessed thename of Saladin for theirlives.Each man was to be

ransomed for ten goldpieces, each woman forfive and each child for a

single gold piece. Becausethere were thousands ofpoorwhocouldnothopetoraise this kind of money,Saladin released 7,000peoplefor30,000bezants–raisedincidentallyfromthebalance left from thetreasure presented to theHospitalsomeyearsbeforeby King Henry II ofEngland.Theransomingofso vast a population –estimates range from

60,000 to 100,000 – wasclearly going to take time.Forty days were allowed;anyonewhoafter that timehad still not found themoney shouldbe sold intoslavery–thenormalfateofa defeated population. InfactmanySyrianChristianspreferred to stay and paytheMuslimtaxfortherightto practise their ownreligion.Payments and releases

were controlled as closelyaspossible.Thegreatgatesofthecitywereclosedandattheposternsofeachgatestood a Muslim officialcollecting the ransommoney from each head offamily as he left. Thosefreed were to carry withthem as much of theirpersonalbelongingsastheycould. This applied fromthe lowest to the highest.The Muslim camp was

furious that the PatriarchHeraclius, though he paidonlythestandardcapitationfeeforhispersonalliberty,left the city accompaniedby pack animals andporters carrying off thetreasures of the city’schurches, the gold platefrom the Holy Sepulchreandavasthoardofhisownwealth.Urgedbyhisemirstostop this flagrantbreachof the treaty spirit Saladin

refusedto‘breakfaithwiththem’ even though theymight take advantage ofhimat theexpenseof theirownhonour.ManyChristianstoowere

outraged at the patriarch’sbehaviour. After the 7,000poorhadbeen released forthe 30,000 bezants therewere still thousandshardlyabletoransomthemselves,while they could easilyhave been boughtwith the

Church’swealth.Asitwasthey sold their fewpossessions at rock-bottomprices to the enemysoldiery to raise the priceof their bare freedom andleft the city destitute.Below them camethousands of beggars andlabourers. Yet many ofthese found mercy at thehands of the conquerors.Saladin’s brother, al-Adil,touched by the misery of

the refugeesand theplightofthoseleftinsidethecity,beggedagiftofathousandslaves from Saladin inreturnforhisserviceinthewars. When they weremadeover tohimhe freedthem at once. Thepatriarch,seeingthechanceof cheap altruism, asked asimilar boon and wasgranted 500 to release,while Balian begged thefreedom of a similar

number. When thesearrangements werecompleted Saladin said tohis courtiers: ‘My brotherhasmadehis almsand thepatriarch and Balian havemade theirs; now would Ifain make mine.’ And hethenorderedthatalltheoldand infirm and poor stillleft in the city should beliberated. In the words ofthe Christian chroniclerErnoul, ‘they came forth

from the rising of the sununtil night fell. Such wasthe charity of whichSaladin did to poor peoplewithoutnumber.’When the great exodus

wascomplete,itwasfoundthat there were still some15,000 able-bodied poormenandwomenwhoweredivided as slaves amongtheconquerorsorsent intotheirharems.Saladin’swarchest had received, it was

calculated, 100,000 dinars,and his reputation aninvaluable lift. But whileall the chroniclers, friendand foe alike, sang thegenerosity of the highcommand in their dealingwith the defeated city,some Arab commentatorsdescribed in bitter termsthefraudthatwaspractisedby many of the emirs incharge of the ransoms.Imad-ad-Dindescribes just

how one of the tricks wasworked.Saladinhadsetupoffices

which issued receipts forfull ransom payments.These receipts were validat theexitpoints in lieuofcashpayments, but a clerkworking in one of theoffices, ‘a person whoseword I do not doubt’, toldImad-ad-Din just howthings were done there:‘often they would write a

receipt for someonewhosemoneywentintotheirownpockets and their deceitwent undiscovered’. Thoseoutside the civil service,unable to conduct theirfraudintheprivacyoftheirown office, developedother techniques. Afavourite one was tosmuggleaChristianoutofthe city disguised as aMuslim and then take himfor all he had under threat

of reporting him to theauthorities for evading theransom collection. Thiskind of petty fraud wasovershadowed by themanoeuvres of the bigoperators. Emirs claimedhundredsoftheinhabitantsbyrightasescapedslaves–there were many refugeesin Jerusalem from thesurrounding districts andclaims like these wouldhave been difficult to

check. They then liberatedthese slaves with apparentgenerosity, though in factatthestandardransomrate,or more, which wentstraight into their ownpockets.Self-interest no doubt

prompted the emirs toagree with Saladin’s plansfor ransoming the city andspeculation played a largepartintheircarryingoutofthoseplans.Howeverthere

is no indication thatSaladin himself had anyulterior motives and muchto show that his behaviourwas as uncomplicated andhonourable as it appears.Ernoul, the Frankishchronicler in Balian’sentourage,hadnodoubtatallaboutthenobilityoftheMuslim general. Heconcludes his account ofthe surrender with anexample of the ‘great

courtesy which Saladinshowed to the wives anddaughters of the knightswho had to flee Jerusalemwhen their lords werekilledormadeprisonersinbattle’.Theywerenaturallyable to find their ransommoneyoffivegoldpiecesahead, but the Muslimreconquest of the landsformerly held by theirmenfolk meant they werenowdisinherited.Theyhad

ransomed themselves fromslavery–weretheynowtobecome paupers? Theybegged the conqueror to‘counselandtohelpthem’.Those whose men werestill alive as prisonerspiteouslybeggedtobetoldwhere they were. Saladinpromised to trace asmanyoftheprisonersashecouldand return them to theirfamilies. In addition, andfrom his own treasury, he

distributed cash grantscalculated according toeach lady’s status. ‘Theygave praise to God’ and‘published abroad thekindness and honour hehaddonethem’.Thiscouldof course be construed assome kind of publicrelations exercise.Certainly the towns of theFrankish kingdom hadcapitulated easily toSaladin because of his

reputation for clemency.But thisgenerositywasonan unheard-of scale; theenemy was virtuallyfinished and in any case itisdifficult tosee justwhatadvantageSaladinhopedtobuy. The fact is thataccounts of his career,whether by friend orenemy,describedactsbothgenerous and honourablewhichitishardtodiscount.The possibility must be

entertained that Saladinwas a good, honest andhumaneman,althoughinapositionofgreatpower.Whatever his motives,

Jerusalemhad been sparedthe destruction andmiseryproper to war and thecelebrations on her returnto Islam were not marredby memories of anybrutality. But thereremained the job ofcleansing the city and the

HolyPlacesofIslamofalltraces of the Christiandefilement.Evenwhile theforty-day process of theransom was going on, thegolden cross over theDome of the Rock hadbeen brought down andbroken up. Christianchurch furniture wasunceremoniously clearedoutof thebuilding aswellas from the al-Aqsamosque. The Rock itself,

from which Muslimsbelieve Muhammad madehis mystical ascent toheaven,hadbeenbuiltoverwith a Christian chapel,andontheplacewheretheprophet’sfootwasbelievedto have rested there nowstood a shrine embellishedwithmarbletohonouritasa place where Christ hadstood before his Passion.The Rock had beensheathed in marble slabs

which seem to have beenput in place to protect itfrom relic hunters. Itappears that portions hadbeen cut from it and soldby its Christian guardianstobehousedinthealtarsofnewly dedicated churchesinEurope.Saladinorderedthatthemarbleberemovedandthesacredsitebeoncemore exposed to the viewof the faithful.Themihrabin theal-Aqsamosquehad

beencoveredoverandthistoo was laid bare. Theoutsideof themosquewasobscured by livingquarters, a granary andeven a latrine built by theTemplarswhohadbeenthecustodiansoftheplace.Allthese buildings weredemolishedandtheinteriorof the mosque richlycarpeted, in place of therush-matting that theChristians had used;

magnificent candelabrawere hung from the roofand illuminated texts fromtheKoranhunginplacesofhonour round the walls.FinallySaladinhadbroughtfromAleppoanexquisitelycarved pulpit which hadbeen commissioned byNur-ad-Din twenty yearsbefore for the Mosque ofUmaratJerusalemwhenhehimself was planning theconquestofthecity.

Jerusalem capitulated onFriday 2 October / 27Rajab, by Tradition theanniversary of theProphet’s mystic ascent toheaven from the SacredRock. In the ensuing daysreligious sites werecleansedofdefilement andrededicated for theceremony of thanksgivingthat took place at theFriday prayers on 9October in the al-Aqsa

mosque.Atthecompletionof the formal prayers thevast congregation heard asermon preached by thechief qadi of Aleppo. Hissermonwasaniceblendofvenerationfortheholycityand eulogy of the son ofAiyubwho had returned ittoIslam.‘WithGod’shelpyou have brought thisstrayed camel back fromthe profane hands of theInfidel.Itwasthehomeof

our father Abraham, andthe spot whence theProphet Muhammad,God’s blessings on him,ascended into heaven. Itwastheqiblatowhichmenturned to pray in the earlydaysofIslamandtheplacewhere all mankind willgather on the Day ofResurrection and ofJudgement.’On the day that the

capitulation of Jerusalem

had been assured, thescribes and clerks in thesultan’s chancellery hadworked into the smallhourswritingdispatches toevery part of the Muslimworld. Imad-ad-Din hadwritten no fewer thanseventy to various emirsand city governors beforehe turned in that night.When the news reachedBaghdad the rejoicingwasspontaneous and exuberant

and thecaliphwas to sendthe victorious hero richgifts and signs of hisfavour.ThewholeMuslimworldrangwiththepraisesof the noble Saladin, andeven opponents who hadlongbeensuspiciousofhisambitions grudginglyconceded that it was amagnificent achievement.Ibn-al-Athir, loyal to theZengid dynasty whichSaladin had replaced,

comments simply, at theend of his account of thefall of Jerusalem, ‘Thisnoble act of conquest wasachieved by no one afterOmar but Saladin,sufficient title togloryandhonour.’ After nearlyninety years of Christianoccupation the recovery ofthe holy city of Jerusalemseemed to most Muslimsan historic achievement ofself-evident importance.

But this had not alwaysbeen the view, and it istime to leave Saladin withhis triumph and toinvestigate a little why hecame to be in Jerusalem,and the developments inmiddle eastern history thathadledtoitsbecominghistalisman of success. Whatwas the exact importanceof the city to Islam? Howlonghaditbeenrevered?Jerusalemcanmakemany

claimstovenerationbytheMuslims. First as thecapital of David andSolomon, respected byMuslims as well as Jews.Second as the home ofprophets of the OldTestamentandthesceneofChrist’s death – allregarded as thepredecessors ofMuhammad.Itwasthefirstqiblaordirectionofprayerfor the faithful and even

when it had been replacedin thathonourbyMecca itwas still revered as thesecondhouseofGoduponearth after the Kaaba atMecca. The Prophet hadalsonameditasoneofthethreedirectionsofprayerinwhichthehorsemanshouldface before mounting.Anyone who passedthrough theGateofMercy(knowntoChristiansastheGolden Gate) in the

Temple precincts wasassured of an eternity inParadise. It was alsobelieved by many thatJerusalemwouldbethesiteoftheLastJudgement.Butmore important than allelse it was here that theProphet had made hismysterious ascent intoheaven.FortheKorantellsthat while praying in themosque at MeccaMuhammad was

transported in spirit toJerusalem and there,mounting the chargerBuraq on the Rock, hadbeencarried to the regionsbeyondthetomb.Naturally enough such

beliefs were very much tothe fore in the fervour thatfollowed the recapture ofthe city. Koranic doctorsand Muslim divinesflocked to Jerusalem totake part in the festival of

liberation. Yet in theprevious century the claimthat it ranked third amongtheholycitiesafterMeccaand Medina had beendismissedby somedoctorsof religion as a mysticalerror derived from Judaic-Christian perversions. Theclaim that the dead shouldbejudgedtherewassaidtorest on one of the sayingsof Muhammad, but it toowasdiscountedbysomeas

an apocryphal tradition‘invented by the people ofSyria, for Allah wouldresurrectthedeadwhereverit pleasedhim’.Even afterSaladin’s triumph and thefinal restorationof thecityto theFaith thirteenth-andfourteenth-century writersare found belittling thesupposed sanctity ofJerusalem and Palestine.One bluntly accusing thelocal inhabitants of

fabricating any ‘tradition’thatwouldattractpilgrims.Modern scholarship adds

itsowndoubts.TheFrenchscholar Emanuel Sivanfinds the earliest mentionofJerusaleminthecontextof Holy War exhortationsoccurring as late as 1144,nearly half a century afterthe city had fallen. In facthe proposes the view thatthe whole notion ofJerusalem as specially

sacred to Islam wasdeliberately built up bypropagandists as aconsciouscounterweighttotheimportanceplacedonitby the Christians. Yetundoubtedly the city hadalways had sacredassociationsforMuslims.Itis referred to as the HolyLandevenintheKoranandin early Islamic literature,and the mystical sect ofSufism was convinced of

its sanctity. In publicstatements and privatecommentsandinafamousletter to Richard I ofEnglandSaladinrepeatedlycommitted himself to thebelief in Jerusalem as oneof the three great cities ofIslam.Ofcourse therewasspecial pleading andmuchardent propaganda behindthe claims for the citywhichfloweredsostronglyin themid-twelfth century.

But the soil from whichthey grew was fertile,waitingonlytobewatered.Bytheendoftheeleventh

century religious fervourhad waned in thetraditional heartlands ofIslam.WhenJerusalemfellto the First Crusade in1099, Muslims were moreshocked by the massacrewhich followed in thestreets of the Holy Citythan by the religious

implications of its loss. Itwas to be more than agenerationbeforetherulersofSyriaandPalestinewereto see the expulsionof theFranks as a priorityoverriding their ownpolitical objectives. Yet,just as the motive powerfor the First Crusade hadbeen built up by pilgrims’tales and priestlyexhortation in eleventh-century Europe, so

gradually, from the early1100s, the fires of faithbegan to burn up morebrightlyinSyria,fuelledbythe passion of religiousleaders.The crusaders had won

their success through thedisunity of the enemy;religionwastheonlythingthat could restore unity toIslam.Asitbegantodoitswork, three great leaderswere to emerge to use the

fire for forging a hammerto smash the invader. Thelast and most glorious ofthem was Saladin. HiscaptureofJerusalemsettheseal on a struggle that hadfor sixty years flowedacross the frontiers ofreligion and rival cultures.To understand hismotivation, hisachievement, and indeedhis personality, we mustfirst investigate a little the

worldhewasborninto.In the 1930s, in his

monumentalHistoryof theCrusadesandtheFrankishkingdom of Jerusalem, theFrench historian RenéGrousset summarised thehistorical developments inPalestine and the MiddleEast from the1090s to the1290s in his volume titles:Volume I, ‘Muslimanarchy and the Frankishmonarchy’; II, ‘Frankish

monarchy and Muslimmonarchy: theEquilibrium’; III, ‘MuslimMonarchy and Frankishanarchy’.‘In1092,thatisfiveyears

beforethepreachingoftheFirst Crusade,’ he wrote,‘virtually the whole ofMuslim Asia … stillconstituted a vast, unitaryempire from the frontiersofAfghanistantotheseaofMarmora; from Turkestan

tothefrontiersof[Abbasid,Shia] Egypt: a Muslimempire inwhichaSelchükTurkish sultanate wassuperimposed upon theArabcaliphate,….toformaunitedSunniempire.Butin 1092 the great SultanMalik Shah died and theempirewasdividedamonghisfamily.’Therivalrythatfollowedwas finally to bebrought to a new unity bySaladin. Arab historians,

Grousset thought,conferred upon him theposthumoustitleof‘sultan’as if looking among therecords of earlier Turkishrulers for a titleworthy ofhis stature. In fact, likeAlexander the Great, theKurdish conquerorsurpassed all precedents.Like Alexander in his era,Saladin embodied theconsequence of cause andeffect in his, personifying

the irresistible force of thecounter-crusade.

Chapter2

AcrosstheBattleLines

For seven hundred yearsEuropeanfolkmemoryhasringedthenameofSaladinwith a double aura ofmartial brilliance and soft-

tonedchivalry.InhisbookIslam and the West: themakingofanImage,N.A.Daniel wrote, ‘The legendofthetrueSaladinhasbeenknown over a wider areaand for a longer time thanany figure in westernmemory than perhaps StFrancis.’ That claim reallyisratherastartlingone.Yetstill more remarkable thanthe wide currency of hisname is his good

reputation. After all, bydestroying theachievements of the FirstCrusade and conqueringagain for Islam the holycity less than a centuryafter it had been won forChristendom, he struck aharder blow at Europe’sself-esteemthananyAsianwarrior since Attila theHun. Nevertheless, withinyearsofhisdeath,romanceand rumour in the West

were claiming that therewere great men in Europewho could trace theirancestry from the amoursof the famous sultan.Centuries later, in hisNotable History of theSaracens, published inLondon in 1575, ThomasNewtondescribed theheroof Islam as ‘a man ofsurpassing and politic wit,stoutevalyantandofnaturefrank and liberal. A man

veryprudentandwise,onefor excellent actes,moderationandvaliantnessgreatlyrenowned.’Just why Saladin,

although he decisivelytrounced Christian armiesand drove them from theHoly Places, has neverbeenpigeon-holedwiththeother monsters of nurseryhistory is one of themanyintriguing facts about theman. The encounter

between Christians andtheir enemies was closeand continuing. A numberof Europeans met Saladinand many more saw hisconduct of affairs at closequarters. They had fineopportunities for verifyingthe hoary legends of thebestiality of Muhammadand his followers. In factEuropean attitudes to himswitched during hislifetime from stereotyped

abuse to poorly concealedeulogy.Perhaps it was merely a

matter of saving face.Europe could not ignorethefactofdefeat,andsomeChristians thought it welldeserved. Muslimsnaturally believed that theFrankshadbeenhumiliatedbythewillofGodfortheirwickedness and corruptionand the view is echoed inEurope. From the south of

France, friars reported thatas they preached theiropen-air sermonsbystanders ostentatiouslygavealmstobeggarsonthefringesof thecongregationwith thewords: ‘Take thisinthenameofMuhammadfor he is more powerfulthanChrist.’In fact voices had been

raised against theCrusading movement forsome time before the loss

of the kingdom. Summingup the Second Crusade of1147–8, the anonymousauthor of the AnnalesHerbipolenses, writing inWürzburg, concluded thatthe enterprise had beendirectly inspired by thedevil. But the writer alsoprobed the motives of theCrusaders and found themsadly inadequate. ‘Withdifficulty,afewcouldhavebeen found who … were

kindled by love of DivineMajesty.’ But many more,hewenton,onlysimulatedreligious zeal while theyhurriedofftojointhearmyfor a variety ofdiscreditable reasons.‘Some, eager for novelty,wentforthesakemerelyoflearning about strangelands; others, driven bywant and suffering fromhardship at home, wereready to fight not only

against the enemies of theCross of Christ but eventheir fellow Christians, ifthis seemed to offer achance of plunder. Otherswere weighed down bydebt or thought to evadetheservicetheyowedtheirlords while some wereeven known criminalsflying from the deservedpenaltiesoftheircrimes.’No doubt it was all very

reprehensible, but there

were respectableauthorities to support theirattitude. Fulcher ofChartres, the historian ofthe First Crusade hadwritten: ‘Every day ourrelationsandfriendsfollowus willingly, abandoningwhatevertheypossessedinthe West. For those whowere poor there, God hasmaderichhere.Thosewhohadafewpencetherehavenumberless gold pieces

here;hewhohadavillagethere, possesses, with Godas giver, a whole townhere. Why then return tothe West when the Eastsuitsussowell?’Being a churchman

Fulcher no doubt felt itright to mention the nameofGod from time to time,but without overstrainingthe imagination one canalmost hear the explosionofdisgust that thispassage

must have touched off inthe library atWürzburg. Itwas not only the morehonest Christian observerswho commented on thesewordly ambitions, theirMuslim enemiesrecognised the facts easilyenough.Before beginning the

siegeofLisbonintheyearof1147,theAnglo-Flemishleaders called on theMoorishcommanderofthe

town to capitulate. In hisspeech rejecting hisenemies’ demand hepoured scorn on the high-sounding principles thatthey pretended to. ‘Bycalling your ambition zealfor righteousness, youmisrepresent vices asvirtues,’ he cried from thewalls.‘Itisnotthewantofpossessionsbutambitionofthe mind that drives youon.’

TheCrusadesforeshadowthe European imperialimpulse, ‘the ambition ofthemind’,thatbeganinthefifteenth century. But inthis first venture Europehad to retire before anopponent that wasmilitarily superior andmaterially more advanced.The Muslims classed theFranks quite simply asbarbarians. At the end ofthe eleventh century

European culture couldoffer little in the arts, inscience,orinscholarshiptomatchthesophisticatedandmature civilisation of theAbbasidcaliphate.Tousitseems obvious that thisoncegreatculturewasdueto be superseded, but tocontemporaryArabs itwasby no means obvious.What was quite apparentwas that the rough, toughsoldiers of Christ who

cameoutoftheWestwereneither literate, courtlynorhumane.Thebarbaricsackof Jerusalem by theCrusaders brought a newdimensiontowarfareintheMiddleEast.ForthreedaystheChristianarmyhadrunamuck; sober eye-witnesses recalled wadingthrough streets up to thekneesinbloodandseveredhuman remains. It wouldrequire a powerful act of

imaginationforanArab totreat these newcomers ascivilised.But as the Frankish

settlement in Palestineconsolidated itself, and asthe newcomersincreasingly adaptedthemselves to the facts oftheir new situation,FrankishandMuslimrulerscametolookoneachotherinpoliticaltermsfirst,withreligion generally a poor

second. Even the originalcrusading army had beendivided by the self-interested policies ofambitious men. But whilethe simple overridingobjectivewas theconquestof Jerusalem conflict hadremained more or lesssubmerged. However,during the twelfth centuryPalestineandwesternSyriawere divided between fourChristian rulers. To the

north-east the County ofEdessa lying across theupper Euphratesencompassed some tenthousand square miles ofwhat is nowTurkey.Westand south of it was thePrincipality of Antiochcalledafteritscapital,nowAntakya inTurkey.To theeastitborderedthelandsoftheMuslimrulerofAleppowhile southwards it shareda frontier with the third

Frankish state, the CountyofTripoli.Takingitsnamefrom its capital city itstretched about a hundredmiles along the coast toJabala in the south,occupying the modernSyrian coastal province ofLatakia and the northernterritory of modernLebanon. Across itsbordersitfacedtheMuslimArab rulers of Shaiza,Hamah and, most

important,Homs.Standingsentinel against these wasthesiteknownastheCastleof the Kurds which theKnights of the HospitalrefortifiedastheseeminglyimpregnablecastleofKrakdesChevaliers.SouthfromTripoli lay thekingdomofJerusalem. Its southernfrontier with Egypt, fromthe gulf of Aqaba and theGaza strip, was almostidentical with the frontier

established by the State ofIsrael in 1948, buteastwards the kingdom ofJerusalemextendedbeyondtheDead Sea to Petra andKarak. It included thewhole of the territorieswest of the river Jordannow disputed between theIsraelisandtheJordanians.Northwards the kingdomenclosed the southern halfof modern Lebanon withtheLebaneseportofBeirut

as its northernmost city.These frontiers wereachieved during the firsttwentyyearsofthetwelfthcentury by and large,thankstothemomentumofthe Crusade and thedisunity of the Muslims.The first state to sufferfrom the Muslim reactionwas Edessa. After barelyhalf a century it wasoverwhelmed by forcesfrom the great city of

Mosul in northern Iraq. Itscapture in1144sentshockwaves across ChristianEurope and prompted themobilisationof theSecondCrusade. This disastrousexpedition did nothing tostop the gradualrecrudescence of Muslimpower and the remainingFrankish stateswere undergrowing pressure. Aleppo,Shaizar,Hamah,Homsandeventually Damascus

became engrossed in thewar to expel the Franks.Southwards, Egypt,governed by the Fatimidcaliphs and once supremethroughout the Syriancoastlands, still mountedthreatening expeditionsagainst the kings atJerusalem. Sometimes thekings had to fend offskirmishing attacks fromthe Bedouin of the Jordandesert.

Ancient traditionscomplicated society andreligion within the newChristianstates.Beforetheexplosion of Islam in theseventhcentury,theregionhad been within thefrontiers of the Byzantineempire and owedallegiancetotheritesoftheEastern Church. In thecenturies since the Araboccupation the populationhad been allowed freedom

ofworshiponthepaymentof the standard tax leviedon unbelievers. Manyfoundtheintolerantsingle-mindednessoftheFrankishrulers an unwelcomechangefrommodusvivendithe worked out with thepragmatic Islamicrulersofformer times. The LatinChurch moved into theorganisational structure ofthe former EasternOrthodox Church. The

Patriarchs of Antioch andJerusalem, once greatdignitaries of the EasternChurch, now owedallegiance to Rome; theHoly Places in Jerusalemwere in the custody ofCatholic priests and thechurches in Jerusalemcelebrated Catholic rites.Many native Christiansbelonged to the JacobiteChurch of Syria. Itsdoctrine on the single

divinenatureofChristwasconsidered heretical byLatins and Orthodox alikeand the language of itsliturgywas ancient Syriac.The other chief nativeChurches were theArmenian Church and theMaronite Church, whichheld that although thenatureofChristwasdual–bothhumananddivine–itwas governed by but asingle divine will. These

groups, all of whichsurvive to this day, weremore angered by thesupremacy of the CatholicChurchthantheyhadbeenby theMuslim.Theywerepotential fifth columnistsshouldtheFrankseverfindthemselvesunderpressure.As the century advanced

a growing number of theintruders themselves cameto terms with the ancientcivilisation they had

disturbed. Many learnt tospeak Arabic, dressed ineastern fashion – if onlybecause such dress wasmore practicable thanEuropean fashions in theclimate – and revelled inthe luxuries of easternhygiene and cooking.Visitors from Europelooked on them askancejust as during thenineteenth centurymembers of the British

imperial administrationfrowned on those of theircolleagues who ‘wentnative’.Such visitors included

thousands of pilgrims tothe Holy Places, some ofwhomstayedonforayearor two to fight in thearmies of the kingdom. Infact the Christiansdepended heavily onmanpower from Europe,since the climate, exotic

diseases, as well as thewastageofwar,drasticallyarrested thenaturalgrowthofthepopulation.Itwasinthissituationthattheordersof the Temple and theHospital, founded toprovide accommodationand medical care forpilgrimstotheHolyPlaces,rapidly grew into militaryorders. In fact the Templehad from its beginningsundertaken to protect the

traffic on the roads frombrigands and maraudingbands of Muslims. Theorders maintaineddiscipline and their espritde corps by vows and alife-style modelled on theobedience and vocation ofthe monastery. Thesesoldiers of Christ soonbecamethecracktroopsofthe kingdom of Jerusalem.They also became, thanksto vast endowments from

Europe, the richestinstitutions in FrankishPalestine.With the advantage of

hindsight we can see thattheexpulsionoftheFranksfrom Palestine was only amatterof time.The time ittook for their Muslimenemies to find a leaderunder whom they couldunite.But, so strong is theinevitabilityof thepresent,so strong is the belief of

mostpeoplethatthingswillalways remain much astheyare,andsoengrossingis the day-to-day businessof one’s own life andambitions, that very fewamong the Franksthemselves regarded theChristian states in theMiddle East as historicalanomalies. Knowingnothing about the politicsof the land before theirarrival they assumed

reasonablyenough that thedividedruleofcitybycityand the rivalries of thevarious potentates was apermanent feature. Theymay have been aware ofthe large claims touniversal authority madeby the caliphs atBaghdad,butthenthereweresimilarclaims made on behalf ofthe German emperor who,as the self-styled heir ofRome,was supposed tobe

the overlord of even thekings of France andEngland. In any casemostof the Crusaders werethemselves the feudalsubordinates of the Frenchking and so were quitefamiliar with a polityheaded by a ruler of largetheoretical authority butlittle practical power. Thecounts of Flanders and thedukes of Burgundy andAquitaine all owed

allegiance to Paris but rantheir affairs independently.Their cousins who joinedthe First Crusadediscovered that evenbeyondtheremotefrontiersofChristendomthingswererun on much the samelines. Just as the Christiankings of England andFrance were prepared tofight one another for gainso were theMuslim rulersof Damascus or Aleppo.

The newcomerswere soonallying themselves to suittheirpoliticaladvantage.The king of Jerusalem

claimed supremacy overtheotherChristianstatesinthe Middle East, overEdessa, Antioch andTripoli. He found it anauthority hard to exert.EdessafelltotheInfidelatleast in part because hercoreligionists were unableorunwillingtocometoher

aid. Even within thekingdom itself rivalry andinsubordination ran deep.The vast estates of theTemplars and theHospitallers were outsidethe royal control, beingendowments to a spiritualcorporation. As for theknights themselves, thefinest soldiers inPalestine,theyjealouslyguardedtheirindependenceofactionandcouldnotberelieduponto

take orders of the king ashighcommander.The divisions within the

Christian lands werematched at first by therivalries in Islam.The twotraditional centres ofMuslim authority in theMiddleEastwereBaghdadand Cairo. Baghdad, acapital of learning andculture, had been foundedbytheAbbasidcaliphswhoduringtheeighthandninth

centuries had claimedsupremacy throughout theMuslimworld.Thatpowerhaddeclinedbuttheclaimsremained. They rested notonlyinaoncerealpoliticalandmilitary force but alsoin religion, for theAbbasids headed theorthodoxorSunnitebranchof Islam. In the tenthcentury their weakenedposition had come underheavy challenge when the

Shi‘ite sect, the chief rivalto Sunnite orthodoxy,found powerful championsinaNorthAfricandynastywho rapidly establishedtheir power along thewholeNorthAfricancoast,and then in 973, after aneasyconquestofEgypt,setup their capital at the newcityandpalacecomplexofCairo. Tracing theirdescent from Fatima,daughter of Muhammad,

theseShi‘iteFatimidrulersclaimed to be in the trueline of succession of theprophet, and the contestbetweenthemandtheheirsto the Abbasid caliphateovershadowed the politicsof theMiddle East for thenexttwocenturies.Inmodernterms,itwasa

power struggle betweenIraqandEgyptforultimatehegemonyintheheartlandsof Islam; control of

Palestine was the focus.Seen from Baghdad,Saladin and his two greatpredecessors Nur-ad-Dinand Zengiwere the agentsof orthodoxy in its age-long attempt to crush theusurpingFatimids.InCairothe objective was torecovercompletecontrolofthe Syrian coast as apreliminary to a drive onBaghdad.Palestinewasthecockpit of war where the

intrusionoftheFrankswasa regrettable diversion; itand north-western Syriaconstituted a powervacuuminwhichtherulersof Aleppo, Homs andDamascus battled foradvantage,disregardingthegreat powers – theChristianstatessoonjoinedthem.Theyhadacommoninterest in opposing theencroachmentsofthe‘greatpowers’ and the pattern of

allianceoftenreflectedthis.Saladin’s predecessors hadgradually forced unity onthe lesser Muslimpotentates of the Syrio-Palestine system; when inthe 1170s he successfullytook control of Egypt andyokedittothenewalliancetothenorththeoutlookforthe kingdom of Jerusalemwasblack.Saladin’s religion was of

course central to his life.

His biographer Baha ad-Din noted that one of theHadith, the canonicalTraditions, attributed thesewords to the Prophet:‘There are five pillars ofIslam: the affirmation thatthere is no god but God;prayer; the paying of thelegal tithe; the fast ofRamadan; and thePilgrimagetoGod’sSacredHouse (at Mecca).’ Theoverridingarticleoffaithis

the belief in God as theonlycreatorandlordoftheuniverse, absolute inpower, knowledge, gloryand perfection, and in hissingle indivisiblenature. Itis an uncompromisingmonotheism; whichlabelledtheChristianbeliefin the Trinity aspolytheistic. Secondly, theMuslim believes in theangelsofGod, immaculatebeings and created from

light, below them the Jinncreated from smokelessfire, and in devils whichare evil Jinn. Third comesbelief in the prophets andapostlesofGod.Inorderoftime these are Adam,Noah, Abraham, Moses,Jesus and Muhammad.Christ holds an honouredplace.Thegreatestprophetbefore Muhammad, he isbelievedtohavebeenbornof a virgin and a spirit

proceeding from God butnot sharing in his natureand certainly not to becalled the son ofGod.Hisrevelation has beensucceeded by Muhammadwhoisseenas thelastandgreatestoftheprophetsandthe most perfect of allGod’s creatures. Belief inthescripturesofGodisthefourth item of faith. Theseincludethefirstfivebooksof Moses, the Psalms of

David and the Gospels,thoughallthesearethoughttohavebeencorruptedanddegraded from theiroriginal inspiration. In anycasetheyareallsupersededby the Koranwhich is theuncreated word of Godproceeding directly fromhim through themouthpiece of his prophet(the very word koranmeans recitation). It is notsurprising in view of this

that the actual text of theKoran has always beenheld in the greatestreverencebyMuslims.Thecopying of the text is atraditionalexerciseofpietyand the finest examples ofIslamic calligraphy are tobe found inKoranscopiedby scholars and culturedlaymen. Where theChristians decorated theirchurcheswiththestatuesofsaints and earned thereby

the additional jibe ofidolaters, the mosques ofthe faithful wereembellished with tiles andmosaics bearinginscriptions from the textoftheHolyBook.Fifthly, the Muslim

believes in theresurrectionofthedeadandtheDayofJudgement and in a futurelife of rewards andpunishments. But thoughevil-doerswillbepunished

in theafterlifeallMuslimscan expect, eventually, toenter a state of happiness.Thisunbelievers canneverhopefor.LikeChristianity,then, Islam is an exclusivereligionand this factalonedoes much to explain thebitter conflict between thetwo.Theothergreatarticleof faith is in thepredestination by God ofall events both good andevil. The development of

the jihad in the conflict inPalestineanditspartinthecareer of Saladin is soimportant that it will bedealt with at length inChapter4.Born in the late sixth

century of the Christianera,inMecca,acityonthefringes of the late Romanworld and with a largeJewish population,Muhammadwas inevitablyinfluencedbythetwogreat

religions thathadprecededhim. Like Christians,Muslims believe that therevelation of their prophetsupersedes what has gonebefore.LikeChristianstoo,they hold a faith that hasmuch in common withwhat went before. To themedieval mind thesimilarities between Islamand Christianity were acauseofscandalleadingtothe view that Muhammad

was a renegade hereticfromtheChurchandavileperverter of the true faith.It becomes a little morepossible to understand theheat and the fury thatgoaded the passions ofenthusiastsoneithersideofthereligiousdivide.ItistoSaladin’s credit that whilehiscommitmenttohisfaithwas total it never blindedhim to the fact that hisopponents were men and

the possibility that theymight, against all theevidence, be men ofhonour. For while he heldtohisoathonceithadbeenpledged, no matter towhom,theChristiansmadeno scruple about breakingtheir word if it had beengiventotheinfidel.Besidesthearticlesofthe

faith the Muslim had alsofour chief duties. Thesewere the obligation to

observethefivedailyhoursof prayer; to give alms tothe poor at least once ayear and at least a fortiethpart of his wealth; to fastduring the hours ofdaylight in the month ofRamadan, and, if possible,to make the pilgrimage toMecca–theHajj–atleastonce in his life. Nur-ad-Din, Aiyub, Shirkuh: allhad gone. As to theRamadan fast, religious

dispensation was allowedduring illness or time ofwar. Saladin’s spare frameand tired features testifiedto his frail constitution,while war-making in thecause of Islamwas almosthiswayoflife.Evenso,hissecretaries had a standinginstruction to keep a tallyof fasting days he missed,sothatthearrearsmightbemade good at the firstopportunity.

It weighed heavily withSaladin,during theclosingyearsofhislife,thathehadnevermadethepilgrimage.Butinallotherrespectshewas a model of the faithfrom thatdaywhen, inhisthirty-third year, heemerged as the master ofEgyptandbeganhiscareeras the champion of Islam.ThegloryofthecaptureofJerusalemwas his, but thetriumphhadbeenprepared

for by his greatpredecessors Zengi andNur-ad-Din.

Chapter3

TheQuadrilateralofPower

The world in which theyoungSaladingrewupwasa place of cosmopolitan

cities inwhichArmenians,Kurds and Turks, Syrians,Arabs and Greeks,Christians as well asMuslims competed incommerceandlearningandthe business ofgovernment.Itwasaworld– and Saladin’s father anduncle proved the point –where a man of talent,whatever his nationality,could hope to rise in theservice of the throne. But,

like the Austro-Hungarianempire of the nineteenthcentury,itwasalsoaworldofmaster races. Islam hadexploded from Arabia intheseventhcentury,butbythemid-twelfthcenturytheArab dynasties had beendisplaced by Turkishfamilies, of which thegreatestwas that ofZengi,tutor or atabeg of Mosul,and his son Nur-ad-Din.Their partisans criticised

Saladinasausurper tryingto supplant an historicdynasty. But there was astill deeper cause ofresentment, becauseSaladinwasaKurdandthefirstmanforoveracenturyto challenge and thenovertop the Turkish rulingclasses.Nevertheless, his career

can only be sensiblyinterpreted in terms of theTurkishworldheinherited.

Its power struggles weredetermined by aquadrilateral of citiesstretchingacrosstheSyriandesert and the head-watersoftheTigrisandEuphrates.The terminal points of thebase line of thisquadrilateralareDamascusandBaghdad,separatedbysome 420 miles. North ofDamascus170milesstandsAleppo, and from there,veeringslightlynorthwards

of due east and 280 milesdistant, lies the city ofMosul on the river Tigris.Baghdad is 230 milessouth-east of Mosul. And,in theory, it was Baghdadthatwas the capital of thisquadrilateral of forces. Itwasoneofthefabledcitiesof themedievalworld andalso the home of theAbbasid caliphs, thetraditional captains of theorthodox throughout Islam

and the implacable enemyoftheusurpingpretensionsof the Fatimid self-styledcaliphs of Cairo. LongbeforethebirthofSaladin,the power of these caliphsofBaghdadhadfallen intothe hands of Turkish chiefministers or ‘sultans’, yetthethrustoftheirpolicyinSyria was determined bytheCairo-directed thinkingofthetraditionalcaliphate.In the heady days of the

eighth century, when thearmies of Islam seemed tobe sweeping all beforethem, even Constantinoplehad seemed within grasp;but the threat had beenrepulsed and in theintervening centuriesMuslim and Christian hadfound a modus vivendi.Lifeandpoliticshadsettleddown either side of thegreat religious divide andthe overriding ideological

commitment had becomesomething of the past.BaghdadfoundCairoa farmore compelling problemthan Constantinople, andthe sultans followed theconventional wisdom. Asmight be guessed, they,like the caliphs beforethem,wentthroughperiodsof weakness, but thoughEuropean writers may betempted to discount theinfluence of the Baghdad

sultans in the westerntheatre itwas in fact quiteoftensignificant.All theTurkish dynasties

of the area traced theirancestry from nomadTurkoman tribes convertedtoSunniteIslamduringthetenth century. The naturalconsequenceofthiswastofocus the interest of thesesteppe peoples on theheartlands of their newreligion. As the vigour of

theAbbasidsand theotherArab dynasties weakened,they called in Turkishmercenaries, or boughtthem in the slave marketstoactaspalaceguards.Thenewcomers rapidlyexploited their position towin increasing power, justas the barbarians called inby the later Romanemperors had graduallyusurped control of thatimperialmachine.

The house of Selchükemerged as the leadingdynasty and its head,investedwiththegrandiosetitle of ‘King of the Eastand West’, was givensupreme authority over allthe lands that admitted thecaliph’s spiritualsupremacy.Thegreatestofthese early sultans, AlpArslan, conqueredChristian Armenia for thecaliphate and then at

Manzikert(westernmodernTurkey) in 1071 dealt theByzantines a crushingdefeat. The empire layopen but, true to thetraditions ofBaghdad,AlpArslan had Cairo as hislong-term objective andregarded these triumphsagainst the Christiansmerely as necessarypreparatory moves tosecure his position beforethe decisive campaign in

Syria, Palestine and thenfinally Egypt. The timewouldnodoubtcomeforawar against the infidel butthe first priority was tounite the followers of theProphetundertheorthodoxcaliph.The point is worth

stressing.For theChristianhistorian,Manzikert isoneof the decisive battles ofthe world. The emperorRomanus Diogenes had

mobilised a great armywith which he aimed tocrush Turkish power andhalt its encroachments intoeastern Anatolia once andfor all. These fertileuplands were traditionallythe power house of theempire and seemedessential to its survival.The obliteration of theimperialarmyputanendtosuch hopes, and, althoughthe day was far in the

future, did foreshadow thebirth of modern Turkey.But Alp Arslan had nothought of a drive onConstantinople. Thevictory was importantbecause it left him free toplan a strategy againstEgypt. This is theperspective in which weshallhave to learn toviewthe career of Saladin. Itstarted with a Turkish-inspiredconquestofEgypt;

only when that had beenachieved did he turn hisattentiontoJerusalem.AlpArslan died in 1072,

one year after his victory,and was succeeded by hisson Malik-Shah. At theopeningofhissultanatehefound himself faced,ironically enough for oneof his ancestry, with anomad problem. Newwaves of Turkoman tribeswere pushing against the

northern frontiers andMalik-Shah decided todivert their raids intoAnatolia, opened up ‘in afit of absence ofmind’ bythevictoryofhisfather.Hecommissioned his cousinSulaiman to mobilise thetribesmen for a systematicconquest of the peninsulafor Islam and Baghdad.Sulaimandulycarvedoutaterritory for himself withits capital at the ancient

Byzantine city of Nicaea.He continued toacknowledge the writ ofBaghdad but was alone inthe allegiance. TheTurkomans had littleinterest in grandioseschemes of conquest onbehalf of some distantsultan; they set aboutwinning independentstatelets for themselveswhilesomeeveninfiltratedthelordshipsofSyria.

There the authority ofBaghdad was strong andrapidly extending. In 1085treacherybrought thegreatChristian city of AntiochintoTurkishhands.Farthersouth,theforcesofFatimidEgypt, once supreme inSyria, were being pushedback to the Egyptianfrontiers by Malik-Shah’sbrother, Tutush. Pro-Fatimid factions remainedin some of the coastal

cities,while in exceptionalcases Arab dynasties stillheldsway–butduringthe1080s Syria came firmlyunder Selchükadministration.Under Malik-Shah that

administration was tightlyorganised. Headed by thesultan at Baghdad it wasdivided into provinces,each headed by a memberof the Selchük familybearing the titleofking. If

he was young orinexperienced the sultanappointed to his court anatabeg, responsible for histraining in military affairsand administration – thetitle rapidly becamesynonymous with‘governor’.Belowthekingand atabeg came districtand city governors,responsible, among otherthings, for raising andmaintaining the military

forces in their regions.When Malik-Shah died in1092thingsfellapartashissons struggled for thesuccession in Iraq andgovernors throughout theempiremobilisedtheforcesunder their command asprivatearmies.When Tutush died in

1095 the pattern of Iraqwas repeated in Syria.Hisdominions in Syria fellapartduringthesuccession

contest between his sonsRidvan and Duqaq;Antioch,Muslimforbarelya decade, threw off itsallegiance to Aleppo andJerusalem was retaken byEgyptian armies while anArab dynasty managed toestablish itself at Tripoli.Aleppo under Ridvan, andDamascus under Duqaq,reverted to the status ofindependent states. To theeast Kerbogha, the atabeg

of Mosul, continued towork for the conquest ofAleppo and now extendedhis ambition to the wholeof Tutush’s dividedterritories; Baghdad wasstillbeingcontestedbythesonsofMalik-Shah.This was the position in

the cities of thequadrilateralin1097,whenthe crusaders began theirtrek from Constantinopleacross Anatolia to

Palestine.Butfirsttheyhadto cross the lands of KilijArslan, son and heir ofSulaiman of Nicaea. Hehad usurped the title ofsultan and renouncedallegiancetoBaghdad–hecould expect no help fromthere. The crusadersreconqueredNicaeafortheempire and then destroyedhis array at the battle ofDorylaeum. The route tothe Holy Land was open.

Few of the Turkish rulersinSyriamournedthefallofKilij Arslan and none sawthe potential behind thenewChristian threat. Theyhad heard that the Frankswere marching under theprotection of the emperorandassumedthattheywerealso marching, asmercenaries, under hisorders.Since Antioch had been

lostbytheempireonlyten

yearsbefore, and since theFrankswereheadingforit,it seemed reasonable toassume that their objectivewas the recapture ofimperialterritoriesrecentlylost. The Egyptian régimeso far misunderstood thestate of affairs as to offertheFranksatreatywherebynorthern Palestine shouldreturn to Christianallegiance while Egyptmoved back to its ancient

centres in the south. This,of course, would havemeant the crusadersagreeing to Egyptiancontrol of Jerusalem. Theproposal, which madesense in terms of thepolitical map of Syriabefore the Turks came,must have struck thecrusaders asutterly risible.Yet the Franks themselvesreinforced the impressionthattheiraimswerelimited

in a letter to Duqaq ofDamascus. Anxious tokeep him out of the warthey assured him that theywere fighting to recoveronly the lands formerlybelonging to the Greeks –allotherterritorialfrontierswouldberespected.Noonecould suspect that theultimate objective of themailed knights could beJerusalem, for that hadceased to be in Greek

hands450yearsago.Yet in that autumn of

1098, with the Frankisharmy advancingremorselessly upon thecity, the governor ofAntioch realised thatwhatever their ultimateobjectivemightbehereandnowhedesperatelyneededallies. The bulk of hiscity’s cosmopolitanpopulationwasmadeupofChristians,whetherSyrian,

Armenian or Greek, andmany were summarilyexpelled.Butinadditiontopotential fifth columnistsinside the walls he hadmanaged to antagonise hisclosest neighbour, RidvanofAleppo, by allyingwithDamascus against him theprevious year. As a resulthe foundhimself forced toappeal for help toKerbogha of Mosul.Anxious no doubt to

preventtheChristiansfromrecovering Antioch,Kerbogha also calculatedthatonce inside thecityasits saviour he could easilymake himself its completemaster and that then histerritories would holdAleppo like a nut in anutcracker. He was notalone in seeing how thepossession of Antiochwould strengthen hispower.DuqaqofDamascus

and his atabeg Tughtiginmobilisedanarmyofrelief,though they were thrownback by the Franks. ThenRidvan, revising hisshortsighted andvindictivepolicy, tried to force theChristians back fromAntioch, but he too wasdefeated.The survival of Antioch

as a Muslim city nowdepended on Kerbogha.Earlyintheyearhesetout

from Mosul with a largearmyincludingcontingentsfrom Persia and Iraq, butfirst laid siege to Edessa,strategically sited somemiles north of the Mosul-Aleppo road and recentlycaptured by a Christianforce. After three weeksKerbogha abandoned theattack, but the delay hadalready given Antioch,also,totheChristians.Asitapproached the city, the

Mosul army was swelledstill further by thecontingentsofDuqaqfromDamascus and manyothers,thoughRidvanheldback.Hefearedtheimpactof a great victory byKerbogha on his ownposition in Aleppo. Otherallies who had joined theseemingly invincibleMosul army were equallyapprehensive. When thedecisive battle came they

deserted, led by Duqaq.Andoch remained inChristianhands.It was the first of many

occasions when apromising Islamiccounterattack foundered intheshiftingsandsofSyrianpolitics. As the crusadersmarched south toJerusalem, the coastaltowns of Palestine boughttheir short-term immunityonebyone.WhentheHoly

City had fallen and it wasobvious the Franks hadcome to stay, emirs andgovernors still attemptedpiecemeal independentresistance rather thanuniteagainst the commonenemy. Inevitably theygradually fell to theChristians.The future lay with the

big four and particularlywith Mosul, Aleppo andDamascus. But a united

front would not beachieved until one hadforced the submission ofthe other two. Formost ofthe century they foughtamongst themselves withonly intermittentcampaigns against theFranks. Ridvan ofAleppo,hemmed in by theChristians at Antioch andEdessaandalwayswaryofthe plans of Mosul, nevertook any consistent

initiative against theChristians, content if hecouldremainmasterofhisowncity.He even showedwillingness to cooperatewith the Franks and sodisgusted his subjects thatthey forced him to permitan appeal to the caliph inBaghdad to launch a waragainst the infidel. Thisarmywas led byMaudud,the new atabeg of Mosul.Again it seemed that fate

was driving Aleppo intothe arms of its traditionalenemy. When Maududbroughthis forceup to thewallsofAleppo,hopingforprovisions andaccommodation, Ridvannot only closed his gatesbut even imprisonedleading citizens whom hesuspected of pro-Mosulsympathies. He knew thatonce inside the cityMaudud could overthrow

himwithpopularsupport.Two years laterMaudud,

supported by the army ofTughtigin of Damascus,defeated the forces ofBaldwin of Jerusalem.Mosul was now thedominant city in theMuslim quadrilateral andMaudud the dominantfigure, but in theSeptember of 1113, theyearofhisvictory,hewasmurderedbyanAssassinas

he and Tughtigin enteredthe great mosque ofDamascustocelebratetheirtriumph. ImmediatelyTughtiginhadthemurdererexecuted, but rumour atonce accused him. It wassaid thathe toofeared thatMaudud had designsagainsthiscity.Thetheorywas better than plausible.Maudud had come topower in Mosul only sixyears before under the

patronage of the sultan ofBaghdad.Hefoundhimselfruler of a city with atraditional policy in Syriaand he acknowledged theauthority of Baghdadwhere the powers of thesultan were growing againafter the troubles that hadfollowed the death ofMalik-Shah.DamascushadlongbeenoneofthetargetsofMosulpolicyanditwasalso a vital factor in the

Baghdad strategists’ long-termdesignsonCairo.In the year that Maudud

wasassassinatedRidvanofAleppodied.Fiveconfusedyearsfollowedthereuntilafaction of citizens deposedRidvan’s successor andcalled in Il-Ghazi, ruler ofMardin some 180 milesaway to the north-east.Almostdespitehimself, hewas to fulfil thedreamsoftheAleppans for their city

to take the lead in thewaragainsttheFranks.Il-Ghaziwas delighted to addAleppo to his alreadyextensive dominions, butwould have preferred apeaceful border with theChristians. He was forcedto play champion of theFaith, however, by thesuccesses of the army ofAntioch. In June 1119,Christian and Muslim meton the plain of Sarmada –

the battle that ensued wasto be long remembered bythe Franks as the Field ofBlood.Apart from a troopof a hundred horse whobroke through theencirclingMuslimsearlyinthe battle, hardly aChristian survived. Thosenotkilledon thefielddiedin the aftermath, somebeing butchered as theytried toescape through thesurrounding orchards,

others being dragged inchains the fifteen miles toAleppo to be tortured todeathinitsstreets.Antiochwas now defenceless, butII-Ghazi did not follow uphisadvantageandpreferredto celebrate his victoryrather than look foranother.Hewastheheroofthe hour, but he soonreturned to his capital atMardin, and died threeyearslaterwithoutwinning

any other triumphs for thecauseofIslam.His brief period of

operations from Alepponevertheless did pull thatcityroundontothecoursethat military geographyseemed to have set for it.With Mosul it formed thebase of a Muslim trianglepushingnorthwardsagainstthe territory of ChristianEdessa;itwasalsothefirstbastion against Antioch.

ForeighteenyearsRidvan,perhaps naturally enough,hadrunthecity’saffairstoensure his own survivalagainst both Muslim andChristian powers. But forthenexthalf-centuryitwasto be controlled by menwhose capitals wereelsewhere and whoseambitions lay beyondAleppo. The trend beganwith Il-Ghazi and it wasstrengthened when al-

Bursuki, atabeg of Mosuland loyal lieutenant ofBaghdad, brought it, withthe rest of northern Syria,into his dominions. Hisassassination in November1126 shattered athreatening build-up ofSelchükpowerandbroughta sigh of relief from theFranks. But it waspremature. Yet two yearslater Aleppo fell into thehandsofanotheratabegof

Mosul who eventually didyoke the two cities to asinglepolicy.When, in 1128, Zengi

Imad-ad-Din came intriumph to Aleppo, it isdoubtful whether nostalgiafigured prominently in hisemotions. He was ahardened soldier,ostentatiously devoted topietismwhenitsuitedhim,as capable of doubledealingashewasskilledin

diplomacy, ruthless andmightily ambitious. Yetboyhood memories therecould have been, since hisfather had been thegovernorofthecityforthegreat Malik-Shah. He haddiedwhenhissonwasonlyten years old, but hishousehold had ralliedround the boy and, moreimportant,theyoungZengihad found a powerfulprotector and patron in

Kerbogha of Mosul,another veteran in theservice of the sultan and abosomfriendofhis father.Accordingly, in 1094,Zengi was called to thecourt at Mosul. He livedthere, a favoured courtierundersuccessiverulers,forthirtyyears.Intheirarmieshe won a reputation forbraveryandresourcewhicheven the Christianshonoured, and he came to

thenoticeofBaghdad.In 1122, when he was

thirty-eight,BaghdadmadehimgovernorofWasitandBasra, the chief Turkishgarrison towns in lowerMesopotamia. Thefollowingyearheplayedamajor role in the defeat ofanArabputschagainst theCaliph al-Mustarshid andhis Turkish-controlledrégime.Hardlyhadhewonthe caliph’s respect for

defending him than Zengifoundhimselfontheordersof the sultan, Mahmud, atwar with the caliph’sforces. Al-Mustarshid,more vigorous than hispredecessors, hoped to re-establish the old authorityof his office. But hisattempt to oust the sultanMahmud was foiled byZengi,whoseloyaltytothesultanwonhimthepostofatabeg of Mosul when al-

Bursukidiedin1127.Zengi was the first

Muslim leader of anystature to present himselfas fighting the Holy Waronanylong-termbasis.Hewas more brutal, lesssincereandmorepoliticallydevious than his son Nur-ad-Din, but men lookedback on his reign as theturning point of the tideagainst the Christians. Heand his son brought the

TurkishrégimesinSyriatothe pinnacle of theirprestige, and their renownwastoovershadowSaladinfor years. From Mosul, inaccordance with the city’straditional policy, ZengimarchedagainstAleppo,tobe welcomed by citizenseager for stronggovernment and effectiveleadership against theFranks. From here heforced the submission of

Muslim Syria as far southas Homs. Damascus stillremained, but Zengi wasneeded back at Mosul tosecurehispowerbase.In 1131 Sultan Mahmud

died.Thestrugglebetweenhis brothers Mas‘ud andTughrul for the successionwas joined by the Caliphal-Mustarshid, who hopedto outmanoeuvre both.Hisarmy, operating for thetime being on behalf of

Tughrul, defeated Zengi,whohadrallied to thesideofMas‘ud,forcedhimbacktoMosulandbesiegedhimthere for a few months in1133. Thus thecomplications of Iraqipolitics had direct bearingon events in Syria if onlybecause they distractedZengi for a time from hisobjectives to securing hispowerbase inMosul.But,early in 1135, he received

an appeal from a newrégime in Damascusoffering thehomageof thecity in return for hissupport. A ruler of Mosulwho already controlledAleppocouldhardlyrefusesuchanoffer.Although al-Mustarshid

was still threateninglystronginIraq,Zengisetoutin haste on the 400-milemarch to Damascus. Evenashewasenroute,acoup

overthrew his would-beclient.Zengiwasasabletotake advantage of hisexpedition to force thesubmission of the town ofHamah, but well-defendedDamascus was clearlygoing to present a tougherproblem. As preparationsfor the siege began Zengiwasastonishedtoreceiveanotificationfromthecaliphto leave the city in peace.Still more astonishingly,

thismostpowerfulTurkishprince obeyed the caliph’srequestandfelthecoulddoso without losing face.Clearly the Turkishestablishment was nowfacing the possibility thatthe moribund caliphate,which they had so longcontrolled,mightbeontheverge of a genuinerenaissanceofpower.However Mas‘ud, who

had been steadily

advancing his power,defeated, captured andarranged themurderof theegregiously ambitiouscaliph. He had littledifficulty in providinghimself with a compliantpuppet more in agreementwithSelchük ideasofhowa caliph should behave.The only remainingproblem for Mas‘ud, nowfirmlyestablishedassultanat Baghdad, was to buy

Zengi’ssupportforthenewarrangements there.At theendoffourtenseyears,theatabeg found himself oncemore the most powerfullieutenant of the Selchüksultan in thewest and freeto pursue his ambitionsthere.Within two years he had

forced King Fulk ofJerusalem to surrender thefortress of Montferrand,which was ideally sited to

overlook the doings of thelordsofDamascusand themovements of the Franksup and down the valley ofthe Orontes river. ForZengi still aimed toconquer Damascus. Hemarried the mother of theyoung ruler, he occupiedneighbouring Homs inforceand,nodoubthopingto terrify the Damascenesinto submission, heslaughtered the garrison of

Baalbek, after havingpromised them their safetyon the most solemn oathsknown to Islam. But thecity refused to yield eitherto diplomacy or violentthreats, instead it alliedwith Fulk of Jerusalem,whohadaslittleinterestasthey in seeing Damascusfall to Mosul. Thecombined forces wereenough to persuade Zengito withdraw to Baalbek,

andtherewasanewthreattohimfromIraq.Mas‘ud now felt sure

enough of his position todiscipline even thepowerfulatabeg.Itisreallyrather remarkable thatZengi, now a manapproachingsixty,lordofalarge province, once thechief agent of Mas‘ud’srise topowerandregardedas thegreatestpotentate inSyria,founditexpedientto

make a show ofsubmission. The tie withIraqwas still effectiveandinhibitingonhispolicies.Two years after this

improbable humiliation,Zengihadsailedclearofallcensure, to become themost renowned figure inIslam. Because of themagic that surrounds thename of Jerusalem, it iseasytolosesightofthefullextent of Frankish

penetration in the MiddleEast. The first majorachievementoftheoriginalcrusaders had been thecaptureofthegreattownofEdessa. Under successivecountsitconstitutedavitalbuffer province on theFranks’ northern frontierand a constant source ofharassment to Aleppo andMosul. While it was held,the strategic balancefavoured the Christians.

But thecityhademotionalas well as militarysignificance. It had beenestablished as a ChristiancommonwealthevenbeforeConstantinetheGreatmadeChristianity the officialreligion of the Romanempire. The Edessenesboasted themselves theoldest Christian polityanywhereintheworldand,even though the place hadbeen conquered for Islam

in the seventh century,there was still a large,mainly Armenian,Christian community thereatthetimeoftheCrusade.In the autumn of 1144,

Zengi launched a feintattackonthecityofDiyar-Bakr some eightymiles tothenorth-eastofEdessa.Itsruler had recently formedanalliancewithJoscelinofEdessa and, as Zengicalculated, the count left

his capital in force toharasstheatabeg’slinesofcommunication withAleppo. Immediately theMosul army turned backand by forced marchesreachedthecity,nowshornof its best defendingtroops. Christians were toblame Joscelin bitterly forwhat happened next.Insteadofmarchingatonceto relieve his capital heretired to another city,

confident that the massivefortifications of Edessacould hold out. The forcehe had led out made apowerful garrison behindthewallsbutwastoosmalltodefeat themassivearmyof Zengi. Now he had towait for Christianreinforcements fromJerusalem, 300 milesdistant.Having outmanoeuvred

the enemy, Zengi now

prepared for the siege. Hehada large siege train andan army at a pitch ofreligious fervour aftermonths of jihadpropaganda. The reducedgarrison, led by theCatholic and Armenianbishops,heldoutdoggedlyfor four weeks; but whenthe Muslim engineersbreachedamassivesectionof the walls the end wasonly hours away. The city

was sacked with aruthlessnessthatthreatenedto equal the ChristianatrocitiesatJerusalem.Butwhen he made his formalentry Zengi was soimpressed by the beautyand the richesof theplacethat he ordered an end tothe destruction. Withinyears the whole county ofEdessa, 10,000 squaremiles of vital strategicterritory, was once more

Muslim.The fall ofEdessa is one

of the great events oftwelfth-century history. Ifthe Franks in Syria werenumbed by the shock, theeffect in Europe was littleshort of traumatic. Fordecades men had beenwarned that withoutcontinuingaidfromEuropethe Holy Land would belost to Christendom, nowthe warnings struck home.

StBernard led the call foran expedition and hisfervent preachingprecipitated the SecondCrusade.In Islam the victory was

greeted with jubilationfrom Baghdad to NorthAfrica. The poet al-Qaysarani wrote: ‘Tell therulersoftheinfidelstofleethe territories they pretendtohold,for this landis theland of Zengi. Men said

that the atabeg would bepardoned all his sins forthisonedeedandwouldbeadmittedatoncetothejoysof paradise. During hisreign, fervour for the jihadhadgrownbytheyear,andthe capture of Edessa wasseen as its first greattriumph and Zengi itsgreatest hero. He hadknocked the coping-stonefrom the Christian edificein Palestine – it seemed

only a matter of momentsbefore the whole buildingshouldcrumble.ButtwoyearslaterZengi

was dead, murdered by aservant he had insulted; itwas aweightyblow to thehopes of the faithful. Yethe was to be followed byone more glorious, for hisson Nur-ad-Din was toprove a still more noblewarriorintheHolyWar.On Zengi’s death the

ruler of Damascusreclaimed the city ofBaalbek. But Aiyubretained his command. Inaddition, hewas granted amansion in Damascus andthe taxation from tenvillages as an iqta, therevenuebaseforanofficialincome. Baalbek, some4,800 feet above sea level,wasdominatedbythegreatRoman temples to Jupiterand Bacchus. Massive

columns still survive –beforethehugeearthquakeof1170,thebuildingswerevirtuallyintactandfortifiedwith towers and ramparts.BelowstretchestheBeka’avalley, rich in cereal cropsandorchardsoffig,apricotand mulberry trees, evenvineyards.(Itwassaidthatthe teenage Saladin wouldindulgeinwine.)Aged eight Saladin

moved to thefamilyhouse

inDamascus.Nodoubttheprivileged youth and hisfriendswouldbeseenofanevening riding and takingarcherypracticeorplayingpolo, as would his ownchildren.His father,Aiyubibn-Shadi Naim ad-Din(i.e. ‘Star of the Faith’)enjoyed respect fromNur-ad-Din,butitwasSaladin’suncle, Shirkuh, who keptthefamilynameprominentatthecourtinAleppo.

Chapter4

Nur-ad-Dinandthe

PropagandaoftheJihad

At a time when war not

onlywas,butwasacceptedasbeing,commonplace,theideal of the Holy Waroffered men a noblemotive. The prevailingmodern orthodoxy holdswar at best to be adisgusting necessity butmore usually simplydisgusting. It regards theconceptofaHolyWarwithparticular contempt.Murder and brutality, it isargued,areneitherexcused

nor elevated because theyarecommitted in thenameof the ultimate good.Religiousconvictionisthatmuch the worse if it leadsmen to kill one another,and the word ‘fanaticism’,which derives from theLatin meaning ‘divineinspiration’,isusedofsuchapparently warpedconviction. Our societydoes not of course live bytheseloftybeliefs–witness

the fascinationwithbooks,magazines and televisionprogrammesonwar,tosaynothing of our massivearmaments industries.Neither medievalChristianitynor Islamheldthem.For them warfare and

violence were not onlyfactsofnormallife,astheyarewithus,theywerealsolegitimate tools of God’spurpose. If we are to

understand Saladin, wemust live for a time in aworld where war can begood and Holy War thehighestidealamancanaimat.Itwasthefanaticismofthe crusaders whichinspired the slow swell ofsympathy for the HolyWar,or jihad, inSyria;bythe time of Saladin, it hadburgeoned into a powerfulpopular movement, thanksto a good deal of careful

propaganda during thereignofNur-ad-Din.At first, only a few men

saw the long-term threatthat the success of theCrusadeposedIslam.Evenbefore Jerusalem fell, ashrewd old imam fromDamascus was sizing upthepatternofthefuture,asit took shape in the hard-fought siege of Antioch.‘No single town will bestrongenoughtocheckthe

advance of the Infidel butall the Muslims of Syriamustcome to itsaid–andif thatbenotsufficient theobligation to help will lieon the Muslims of theneighbouring lands.’ Butthisanalysiswasfaraheadofcontemporarythinking.Rulers lost little time in

coming to terms with theChristians where it suitedtheir purposes. Tughtiginof Damascus settled his

boundarydisputeswiththekingof Jerusalemwith thegreatest amicability and tothe disadvantage only ofthe peasants of each side.In1108abattlewasfoughtbetween two armies eachof which comprisedChristian and Muslimcontingents – the outcomewasavictoryforRidvanofAleppo and his allyTancred of Antioch overthe army of the Turk,

Chavali ofMosul, and theFrank,BaldwinofEdessa.Onlyafewoftheimam’s

immediate disciples tookheed of his warnings.Among themwas ‘Ali ibnTakir al-Sularni whodeterminedtoawakepublicopinion to the Christianmenace. In 1105 hecompleted hisBook of theJihad, subtitled A Call totheHolyWar, theDuty toWage It and Its Rules,

together with a Eulogy ofSyria and the FrontierTerritories, and in thespring of that year gave apublic reading of the firsthalf in the mosque of aDamascussuburb.Itseemstohavemadesomeimpact,for the reading of thesecondhalf,intheautumn,was held at the greatmosque of the Umayyadsin the centre of the city.The following year al-

Sulami died, but eightyears later the work wasgiven a second reading inthe mosque of theUmayyads and jihadagitation seems to havecontinuedforatimeamongactivistgroupsofthecity’sintellectuals.Al-Sulami inveighed

against the inaction ofSyria’s rulers. ‘How canthe princes carry on theirpursuit of high living after

such a catastrophe?’ hedemanded.Itisforthemtounite in a jihad to‘exterminate these Franksand recover all theterritories they haveconquered’. Yet far fromdoingthis,hewenton,theyseemed to be paralysedwith fear at the verymentionofthenameoftheFranks. Though it wasbitterlyresented,thechargeofcowardicecamenearthe

mark.At their first impactthe mailed knights ofEurope made a deep andterrifyingimpressionontheIslamic rulers and theirarmies, so that years laterin his SyriacChronography Bishop BarHebraeusreckoned that ‘inthosedaysall theArabs inSyria trembled before theFranks’.The evidence of earlyjihad advocacy in

Damascus is of specialinterestsince itwas in thistownthatSaladinspenthisformative years. But inAleppo, too, isolated andsometimes influentialvoices were raised againstthe prince’s too easyacceptance of theFrankishpresence.Theqadi, Abu-l-Hassan used hisconsiderable prestige toforce Ridvan to take atougher line and pressure

mounted from otherquarters until the princereluctantlygavepermissionfor a party of pietists toseekaidfromthecaliphinBaghdadfortheHolyWar.An army was dispatchedfromBaghdad;butwhenitarrived before Aleppo itfound the gates lockedagainst it. Ridvan had nointention of admitting acaliphal army to his citywherethepietistswouldbe

a willing party ofrevolutionists.Fortwentyyearsormore

the cause of the jihadrested with ardent butisolated intellectuals andholy men, until thepoliticians foundthemselves graduallyforcedintothearena.Oftenenough theirmotiveswereself-interested. In1118 theTurkoman prince Il-Ghazicame to power in Aleppo

with popular backing as asupposed champion of theHolyWar. But in fact thehumiliation of the infidelwas the kind of diversionhe could well do without,andapeacefulborderwiththe principality ofAntiochwould have left himconvenientlyfreetoextendhis power among thesquabbling states ofMuslim Syria. Butsuccessful campaigning by

Roger of Antiochthreatened to encircleAleppoentirely.Even so Il-Ghazi moved

carefullyand in June1119wasintheplainofSarmadaawaiting the army ofTughtigin of Damascusrather than risk a single-handed encounter with theChristians. In the event,battle was forced on Il-Ghazi by the impetuosityofRogerandbytheurging

of his own Turkoman freelances. They were in thebusiness of soldiering towinbootyandransomsandwerequite innocentofanyideological commitments,butbeforethebattlestartedAbu-l-Fadl ofAleppo, oneof the moving spiritsbehind Il-Ghazi’s rise topower there, gained hispermission to preach thejihadthroughthearmy.Hisardour soon infected even

these scepticalmercenaries; strong menweptopenly,andaforceofprofessional soldiers wastransformed intoabodyoffiery fanatics. The battlewas long remembered bythe Franks as the Field ofBlood. The Turkomanswon a rich booty, but themassacre of the prisoners,carried out in the heat ofreligious fanaticism,robbed them and Il-Ghazi

of the huge profits inransoms and slaves.Antioch was nowdefenceless, but, as wesaw, Il-Ghazi did notfollowuphisadvantage.The impetus of the jihad

faded in Aleppo, butMuslimmoralesoared.TheField of Blood had beenwon in the name of theHoly War and was atriumph for the Faith. Thedeath of Roger ofAntioch

inthebattletookonadeepsymbolic meaning, for hehadbeenkilledat theveryfoot of the great jewelledcross that had been theChristians’ standard. Thevictor received a robe ofhonourandthetitleofStarofReligionfromthecaliphand basked in the eulogiesofthepoets.‘ThisRoger,’sangoneof

them, ‘has been cast intohell,but thouhastwonthe

eternity of paradise.Thanks to thee the pillarsof Infidelity have beenshattered and the seat ofmonotheismhasbeenoncemoresetupitsplace.’Foratime, the ‘terrifying soundof the Franks’ had beenexorcised.The scholars – once the

pioneers of the jihad –were now becoming theagents of princelypropaganda. Tughtigin of

Damascus, for example,was presented by hischroniclers, not entirelyaccurately, as a devoutchampion of Islam. Hisletters to the caliph werefulloftalkaboutthejihad,but in earlier days theatabeg had seemed lessinspired by religious zeal.In 1110, threatened by theFranks, the port of Sidonhad won his protectiononly by offering the

sizeable fee of 30,000bezants. When theSidoneserefusedtopayuponcethedangerwaspassedTughtiginthreatenedtocallbacktheChristians.AyearlateritwastheturnofTyreto face the infidel – itoffered to surrender itselfto Tughtigin if he savedthem.Infactthesiegewasraised by the Tyriansthemselves and thegovernor refused tosubmit

the town to the rule ofDamascus. Tughtiginthought it wiser not topress the point since thetown had proved itself tootough for the Christiansandtheyweremoreskilledin siege warfare than hisownforces.Concealinghisweakness under a show ofvirtue, Tughtigin provedhimself an expert in thevocabulary of the politicaljihad. Bridling at the

suggestion thathehadanydesigns on the town heprotested,‘IdidwhatIdidfortheloveofGodandhisMuslims,notinthehopeofmoney or power’,according to Damascus’shistorianIbnal-Qalanisi.Tughtigin’ssinceritymay

attimeshavebeenindoubtbut Damascus was at theheart of the growingmovement. Religiousfervour reached a peak in

1129 when a determinedChristian attack nearlycaptured the city. Thedefence,ledbyTughtigin’sson, was inspired by thepreaching of the Abd-al-Wahhabal-Siraziwhowasencouraged to journey toBaghdad to win thecaliph’ssupport.During the 1130s ardent

protestations of loyalty tothe Holy War became animportant part of a Syrian

ruler’s repertoire. Thefierce piety of the earlydays, reinforced byencouragement from thepoliticalestablishment,wasbeing transformed into apopular movement with amomentum of its own.Leaders often exploited it.ThetownofHamahfell toone of Zengi’s armieswhileitsgovernorwaswithhim and another armysupposedly on a jihad

campaign. Nevertheless itwas Zengi who really putthe jihad on the politicalmap with the capture ofEdessa.ShortofJerusalemno target held a higherplaceinMuslimhopes,andin calling up his alliesZengimadeexplicitappealtotheirobligationstowagethe Holy War. From thefall of Edessa writer afterwriter advocated a war tothe death against the

Franks and their expulsionfromthecoastofPalestineor‘Sahil’.Yet if the capture of

Edessa opened up a richvein of rhetoric, it did notherald the massive andunrelenting drive againstthe Christians that ardentdevotees lookedfor.WhenZengi died his lands wereparcelled out between hissons, the elder, Saif-ad-Din, taking Mosul and its

territories, while Aleppoand the Syrian domainswent to Nur-ad-Din. Thisarrangement cut theyounger brother off fromal-Jazirah, the great regionbetween the upper watersoftheEuphratesandTigris,dominatedbyMosulandavaluable reservoir ofmanpower to his father.But it also freed him fromthe in-fighting of Iraqipolitics that had so often

distracted Zengi from hisSyrianambitions.Furthermore, the fall of

Edessa eliminatedAleppo’s chief northernrival and left Nur-ad-Dinable to conduct an orderlyexpansionist policy: firstagainst the neighbouringChristian state of Antiochand then southwards toDamascus. The prize ofJerusalem,whichwas laterto seem so important, was

lefttoafutureinwhichtheZengid house should havecompleted its destiny andbecome master of MuslimSyria. When Nur-ad-Dindied,Christianprincesstillruled at Antioch andTripoli;thegreatfortressofKrak des Chevaliers stillheldthearmiesofIslamatbay; in the south, al-Karakand ash-Shaubak(Montreal) still plunderedtherichcaravanswhichled

up from the Red Sea portof al-Aqaba to Damascus;theHolyCitywasstillheldby unbelievers, its sacredal-Aqsa mosque stilldefiledbytheirrites.As the years passed, a

few isolated voices beganto question whether thechampion of Syria mightnot have lost sight of hispriorities. The samecriticisms were to belevelled at Saladin, with

much greater force, byadherentsoftheoldrégimeoutraged that this Kurdishupstartshouldhaveenteredon the Zengid inheritanceand overthrown a Turkishmastery that had lasted ahundredyears.Whydidhenot turn his might againsttheChristians?Whydidhedesert the sacred cause ofjihad proclaimed by Nur-ad-Din? The answersshould emerge in a later

chapter. Here, becauseSaladin was to modelhimself so closely on hisgreatpredecessor,wemusttake a look at the actualrecordofNur-ad-Din.Hewasafinesoldierand

won many a brilliantvictory against theChristians. Yet no singlefeat couldequal the takingof Edessa or Saladin’striumphatJerusalem.Afterfending off an attempt by

the Christians to reclaimEdessa, he set about themethodical elimination ofthewhole county from thepoliticalmap.Next,turningto Antioch, he launched aseries of sieges whichstrippeditofhalfitsstrongpoints and pushed thefrontiers back to theOrontes river, reducing theonce immense principalityto a coastal strip. In 1149,at the glorious battle of

Inab,RaymondofAntiochwasdefeatedandslainandhis skull, encrusted insilver, dispatched to thecaliph – a publicityexercise well calculated toappeal to contemporariesand ornately boost theprestige of the conqueror.A year later, Joscelin,titularcountofEdessa,wascaptured, blinded and senttoendhisdaysincaptivity.Yetanotheryearhadbarely

passed when the city ofTurbessel was snatchedfrom the hands of theemperoratConstantinople.It was a brilliant

commencementtothereignand the chancellery atAleppo ensured that itsmaster’svictorieswere thetalk of Islam, by a streamof proclamationsdispatched throughoutSyriaandbeyond.YetinawaytheseChristiandefeats

weremerely the gratifyingandprestigiousby-productsof a policy directed firstand foremost to theexpansion of Aleppanpower along the naturallines determined by thestrategic geography of itsposition. They werefollowed not by theproclamation of jihadagainst the great city ofAntioch herself but by adogged three-year

manoeuvre to overthrowthe ruler of MuslimDamascus. There weregoodreasonsnodoubt.Thecityshowedanunfortunatereadiness to ally with theChristians to preserve itsindependencefromAleppo.ThoughonemightobserveinpassingthathadNur-ad-Din concentrated on thecommon enemyDamascusmight not have felt theneed for its unnatural

friendship. The fact wasthat the logic of Aleppanexpansion pointed south,and in pursuing it Nur-ad-Din was only realising anambition that had directedhisfather’spolicy.Ifproofwereneededthat

Nur-ad-Din placed therequirements of hisevolving Syrian hegemonybefore the strategy of thejihad, it came in 1164. Inthat year, at the battle of

Artah, he won a crushingvictorywhich laidAntiochwide open to his armies.Bohemond, its prince,Raymond,countofTripoli,Hugh of Lusignan, and aprocession of otherChristiannotableswereledin chains toAleppo,whileNur-ad-Din found himselfsurrounded by a councilurging him to deliver thecoup de grâce. Thecapitulation of Antioch

wouldhavebeenaMuslimtriumph to match Edessa,and its skeleton garrisongirded itself for an heroicdefence. Yet the blow didnot fall. The city was stillviewed fromConstantinople as animperialdominion,andthe1160swerea timeofgreatByzantine strength. Nur-ad-Din calculated that tohold Antioch againstimperial counter-attack

might well stretch hisresources to their limits,andhehadnowishtogivethe Byzantines cause tointerfere in his affairs. Solong as it could becontainedagainstthecoast,asitundoubtedlycouldbe,the state of Antioch posedno immediate threat.Whatever the expectationsofthejihadenthusiasts,theDestroyer of the Infidelsand Polytheists now

directed his power notagainst the Franks butagainst the heretic caliphswho ruled the rich andstrategicallyimportantlandofEgypt.Itwas,ofcourse,virtually

impossible forany ruler togive the single-mindeddevotion to the Holy Warlooked for by the extremepietists.Thewholeconcepthad been born in simplerdays when the

stormtroopers of Islamwere fanatical, militaryadventurers with fortunesto make in the vastChristian heathendomnorth and west of Arabia.By the twelfth century theterritoriesconqueredbytheearly caliphs had settledinto a pattern of long-established, wealthy andsophisticated states wherethe strident idealism ofearlier times inevitably

jarred against complexpolitical reality. In anycase, the Zengids, as theself-proclaimed agents ofBaghdad,weretheheirsofa traditional policy thatantedated the revivedenthusiasm for the HolyWar. Long beforeChristians had arrived inPalestine, Turkish sultanshad been viewing Syria asthepowerbasefromwhichto oust the heretical

Fatimids from Cairo. Theforceofhistory,aswellasthe pricks of ambition,droveNur-ad-DinandthenSaladin to look first formastery in the Muslimworld before turning theirmightontheChristians.Tocharge them with carvingout great personaldominionattheexpenseofco-religionists is right in away which is quiteirrelevant.

Good Muslimsthemselves, both menwanted to see theextirpation of the Franks;as strategists they fullyrecognised the threat thatcould come from theirbeach-head kingdom andits principalities. But ashard-headed politiciansthey also recognised thatthe enemy, perenniallyshort ofmen and funds, atodds with the native

population, repetitivelyquarrelling amongstthemselves, and with theirwealthyportscontrolledbyItalians who would as liefdeal with Muslims asChristians for profit, wasthe least of their worries.While Syrian powercontinued in full andconfident spate, theChristiansseemedalmostaside-showcontingent,tobecontained on the defensive

anddealtwithatleisure.The French scholar

Emanuel Sivan developsthe convincing thesis thatNur-ad-Dinencouragedthepreachingof the jihadasatool of propaganda. Theaim was to force unity onSyria,IraqandthenEgypt,so that their massiveresources could becombined against theUnbelievers. But thereweretobeemirsandothers

wholearntthatthismilitaryevangelism could be usedequally well to subverttheir authority over theirownsubjectswhomightbeurgedtotransferallegianceto Nur-ad-Din in thecommon effort against theChristians.The revival of jihad

teachings began in thework of isolated pietistsand enthusiastic scholarsand the leaders of the

orthodox religiousestablishment had littleinterest in it at first. Theyweremore concernedwiththe struggle against heresyand the triumph of SunniIslam. But the twelfthcentury also saw a notablerevivalinpopularreligiousfeeling and it was thiswhich, harnessed to theidea of the jihad by Nur-ad-Din and hispropagandists, changed an

esoteric enthusiasm into apopularmassmovement.An important factor in

Nur-ad-Din’s success washispersonalreligiosity.Hisenemy, Kilij Arslan ofKonya, accused him ofhypocrisy,thoughhecouldnot fault his meticulousobservance of the faith.Even at this distance intimeoneiswillingtorefutethechargeofhypocrisyandto accept as something

more than flattery thewordsofacourtierthat‘heled a double jihad, againstthe infidel and against hisown soul, to deliverhimself from the snares ofevil.’ His austerityimpressed contemporaries.UnlikemostMuslimrulersof his day he strictlyobserved the injunctionagainst drink and imposedalmost puritanicalregulations both against it

and against all frivolousentertainments.Hefoundedinnumerable colleges fororthodox scholarship, heabolished the non-canonicaltaxesthatothers,less scrupulous than he,hadlevied,whilehisardentcampaign against heresy,which for an orthodoxSunni at that time meantprincipally Shi‘ism, wonhimthe titleofSubduerofHeretics.

Yet, in thirty years, hisactual achievementsagainst the Franks wereneithersonumerousnorsooverwhelming as mighthave been expected. Hiscourt eulogists, whodubbedhim ‘GuardianandClarion of the Muslims’,also urged him, ‘in thenameofGoddonotexposeyourself to danger. Wereyouovercomeinbattlenotaman inall Islambutwill

go in peril of the sword.’Butsuchprotestationswerea necessary part of theimage presented by thecourt of Aleppo to theworld at large. We knowthe names of eleven poetswho wrote elaborateeulogies of the ruler andalso tracts and treatises onthe Holy War, one ofwhich was commissionedby Nur-ad-Din himself.While the chancellery

dispatched its news oftriumphs and itsexhortations to others toshoulder theirresponsibilities, theencomiums of the poetswere given publicitythroughout Syria. Andwhen,atlast,hislieutenantSaladin overthrew theFatimid caliphate, Nur-ad-Din sent a proud embassyto Baghdad withinstructions to read the

proclamation of the greatevent in the towns andvillagesontheroad.At the beginning of the

reign this kind ofpropaganda had been usedto good effect againstDamascus. There theruler’s policy of shiftyfriendship with theChristians was alreadybeingviewedbyagrowingsectionofthepopulaceasashameful expedient when,

in 1148, by a decision ofincredible folly, theChristians threw theatabeg’s overtures back inhisteeth.TheEuropeanarmiesthat

haddescendedonPalestinein response to thepreaching of the SecondCrusade understoodnothingofthesubtletiesoflocal politics. Theiruncomplicatedcreedwastofight the Infidel wherever

he might be found, andamongst the lords of thecrusader states there werethose who lookedenviously towards the richlands of Damascus. Nur-ad-Din had not yet fullyestablished himself, but itcould already have beencleartothoughtfulmenthathewasthegreatestthreattothe Christian cause. Bypolitic alliance withDamascus they stood the

chance of strangling thegrowing power of Aleppoat birth. Instead, theChristiansmarched againstDamascus and forced it toappeal to the man it mostfeared.The siege was a fiasco

which spelt the end of theCrusade, but in the city itfired a fresh surge ofenthusiasm for the jihadthatwas to be a vital helptoNur-ad-Din in the years

ahead. The Damascenesfought off attack afterattack, rejoicing to playtheirpartinthesacredwar.Heroic episodes in thedefence were circulatinggenerations after. ‘Amongthe soldiers was the agedlawyer, al-Findalawi.When thegeneralsawhimmarching on foot he wenttomeethimandsaid:“Sir,your age is a sufficientdispensation from this

battle. I will concernmyselfwith thedefenceofIslam,” and he begged thevirtuous oldman to retire.But he refused, saying: “Ihave offered myself forsale and God has boughtme; I have not asked thatthe contract be annulled.”By this hewas alluding tothe words [in the Koran]“God has bought thefaithful, both them andtheir possessions and has

given them paradise inexchange.” He went on tofight the Franks and waskilled not far from thewallsofthecity.’Thiskindofthingbecame

partofthepopularfolkloreof Damascus, and thesacrifices of the people inthedayoftheirtrialbytheInfidelwererecountedwithincreasing bitterness astheirrulerrelapsedintohisold policy of alliancewith

them. Moreover theChristians had withdrawnfrom the siege when newsof Nur-ad-Din’s approachreached them and theaverage Damascene wasconvinced that the lord ofAleppohadbeen their truesavioureventhoughhehadnot joined battle. For thenext six years Nur-ad-Dinwas constantly on thelookoutforhischance.Hisagents trumpeted his

victoriesthroughthestreetsof Damascus and hisministersreproveditsruler,protesting that theirmasterhadnothoughtofconquestbut wished only for analliance to drive out theFranks once and for all.Usamah, the secretary ofNur-ad-Din, reproachedUnurofDamascuswiththechargethathewished‘onlytoplease theFranks, thosewho anger God with their

acts’.WhileIbn-Munir,thepoet, lamented: ‘Ah,Damascus,Damascus, is itnot high time thatJerusalemwasfreed?’Duly publicised, such

exhortations had theirintendedeffect and the riftbetween ruler and peoplewidened.Discontent in thecity reached a climaxwhen, in 1154, Mujir-ad-DinAbak,thenewatabeg,agreedtoayearlytributeto

Jerusalem.Thegroundhadbeen laboriously preparedfor the ideaofachange inrégime and now opened acalculated manoeuvrewhich combined highmoral talk with politicalchicanery.Themiseryofthecitizens

had been increased forsome weeks past by foodshortages and Nur-ad-Dinseized the opportunity. Hehalted the relief convoys

coming down from thenorth while his agents inthetownspreadtherumourthat the approachingfamine was the directoutcome of the ruler’sirreligious policies. Otherfifth columnists persuadedMujir-ad-Din that a groupof his own nobles wereplotting to overthrow him(atleastone,Aiyub,formergovernor of Baalbek, andnow in high command in

the Damascene army,probably was). The panicmeasures the distractedatabeg took against themisolated him from his fewremaining supporters. Thearmy of Nur-ad-Dinapproachedslowlytoallowdisaffection to do itsworkandon 25April, thanks totreachery, his troopsentered the city to jubilantdemonstrations. The take-over was bloodless.

Lootingwasforbiddenandwhen the delayed foodconvoysarrivedadmirationfor Nur-ad-Din theDeliverer was, at leastamong the more naivesections of the population,boundless.Aleppan propaganda had

described the Damascus-Jerusalem entente as theone remaining bar to aconquest of the Franks.And yetNur-ad-Din’s first

act was to reaffirm thetruce and then to pay afurther instalment of thetribute money. When hedied,twentyyearslater,thebalance in Syria betweenFranks and Muslims washardly altered. Thoughduring that time Zengidpower had won a furthermassiveextensionwith theconquestofEgypt.In thesecircumstances, it

comes as no surprise to

find a vizir of Egyptquestioning Nur-ad-Din’smotives.‘Saytoyourlord,’he wrote to Usamah thesecretary,‘howmanymoretimes will you delay thefulfilmentofyourpromisesto religion! AttackJerusalem.’ The vizir,Tala’i-ibn-Ruzzayak, waswellawareofNur-ad-Din’sdesigns on Egypt andhoped to defuse them byusing the kind of

propaganda that so farhadbeen the monopoly ofAleppo. In 1160 he evenwent so faras toappeal toAleppo and distant Konyato sink their differencesand join him in acommunal enterpriseagainst the Franks. ‘Doesneitherofyoufear theoneGod? Is there none amongyoursubjectswhoisatrueMuslim?PerhapsGodwilllendahandinthismatterif

we three take up armstogether.’ It was a daringmanoeuvretoupstageNur-ad-Din, the vauntedchampion of Islam, but itdrew only vaguegeneralitiesinreplyandthefollowing year the vizirdied.Ibn-Ruzzayak’s allusion

to Jerusalem was neatlyironical since it seems tohave been largelyAleppanpropaganda that had

brought the city to thefocus of jihad thought.Before the conquest ofEdessa in 1144, whenMuslimstendedtothinkofthewar against the Franksin defensive terms, al-Sulami’shadbeentheonlyinfluentialvoice tocall fortheliberationofJerusalem.Afterwards, it began to berealised that much of theimpetus of the Crusadingmovement had derived

from the Franks’ devotionto the Holy City. UnderNur-ad-Din’s patronagemore and more writersbegan to stress theimportant place the cityheld in Islamic belief as acounterbalance to itsChristianreputation.The orthodox men of

religion proved powerfulagents of Aleppo jihaddoctrines, especially in al-Jazirah. In 1164, the year

ofArtahandofthecaptureofthecityofBanyas,Nur-ad-Din imperiouslycommandedthecitiesofal-Jazirahtosendhimtroops.Appeals to religious zealalone were reinforced bymore persuasive pressurewhich decided at least oneemir, the lord of HisnKaifa, to answer thesummons. At first he hadrefused, but secondthoughtsledtoachangeof

policy which he explainedtohiscouncilwithacertainwrybitterness:It is likely that if I donot support the jihadproclaimed by the lordof Aleppo he willrelievemeofmyrealm.For he has written tothe holy men of ourcountry asking theirhelp in prayer andurging them to fire the

Muslims withenthusiasmfortheHolyWar.Eachoneofthesedivines is, at thismoment,surroundedbyhisdisciplesandahostoffollowersreadingtheletters of Nur-ad-Din,weeping tears ofdevotion and rantingagainst me. I greatlyfear that if I did notaccede to the requestfortroopsthesemenof

religion would unite toexcommunicate mefrom thecommunityofIslam.During the1160s, all but

Nur-ad-Din’s most fervidadmirers began to observethat his actions did notcompletely squarewithhisprotestations. In 1159 hefound it expedient to signanother truce with aChristian,thistimeManuel

of Byzantium. In 1162,when Baldwin III ofJerusalem died, he heldback, despite advice thatthe opportunity was idealfor an attack on themourning kingdom. Hewas unwilling, he said, togo to war on a peoplelamenting so great a king.Unquestionably it waschivalrous, but not in thespirit of the jihad, and wehave already seen the

equally puzzling decisionnot to attackAntioch afterthevictoryofArtah.Yet if his policy against

the Christians lackedincisiveness the sixties didwitness a series ofdetermined campaignswhich culminated in themastery of Egypt. Whenthe long-promised assaultonJerusalemstillheldfire,even loyal admirersbecame restive. Just after

the Egyptian triumph,‘Imad-ad-Din urged hismasterto‘purifyJerusalemof the ordure of the cross…nowthatyouhavewonSyria and Egypt for theglory of Islam.’ From onewhoasaclientofthecourtdependedon itspatronage,thismildremonstrancewasa sign of realdissatisfaction. Ibn-Asakirof Damascus, a man ofindependent means and

exaltedrank,wasforthrightto the verge of bluntness.‘There can be no excuse,’he wrote, ‘for you toneglect the jihad, now thatyou rule from Egypt toAleppo and now that eventhe sovereigns of Mosulobeyyourorders.’ButNur-ad-Dinwasonce

again consolidating hisposition. This time againstthe threat he suspected ofan independent Egypt

under the young Saladin.Once more the well-triedplea went out forreinforcementsfortheHolyWar and Ibn-al-Athir, achronicler generallysympathetic, tartlyobserved that though ‘hewrote to Mosul, Diyar-Bakr and to al-Jazirah,demanding troops for theHoly War, his true designwas quite different.’ Thetask was left to Saladin.

Criticisedbythecaliphforbeing dilatory when hefinally did take Jerusalem,Saladinwouldprotest:‘Fornearly a hundred years…thedesireforitsreconquestdid not come to anysovereign, until … Godcalled me.’ Imad-ad-Din,Saladin’s secretary whopenned this letter, hadserved Nur-ad-Din; nodoubt, he too had becomedubious as to his sincerity

ofpurpose.

Chapter5

TheFamilyofAiyub

We know almost nothingabout the personal life ofSaladin before, in histwenty-eighthyear,hetookhisfirstmajorcommandin

the forces of Nur-ad-Din.Eventheyearofhisbirthisuncertain in the Christiancalendar. He was born intheyear532oftheMuslimHegirabutthemonthisnotknown. The year 532A.H.ranfrom19SeptemberA.D. 1137 to 8 September1138. The statisticalprobabilitythereforeplacesSaladin’sbirth in the latteryear.Butif informationonthe young Saladin is

scanty, the careers of hisdistinguished father anduncle are comparativelywelldocumented.He was descended from

theKurdishRawadiyaclan.His grandfather, Shadhiibn-Marwan, launched thefamilyfortunesthroughthegood offices of a friend,Bihruz,who, from humblebeginnings, had risen tobecome governor ofBaghdad.Heplacedhisold

friend’s eldest son Aiyubas commander of theimportant city of Takritabout half-way betweenBaghdadandMosulontheRiver Tigris. By acombination of luck, goodjudgement and influentialcontacts, Aiyub was to gofar. In the year 1132 thewatchmen on his fortess’swalls saw a troop ofhorsemen flyingacross theplain towards the river. Its

general was the youngZengi, carving adistinguished career forhimself in the tangledwoodsofBaghdadpolitics,but just at thismoment onthe verge of catastrophe.He had been defeated bythearmiesofthecaliphandif his pursuers caught himhis career was liable tocometoanabrupthalt.Heneeded transportdesperatelyandAiyubsent

aboatacross.Since Zengi and Bihruz

hadlongbeenenemiesthiswasapuzzlingbutoutrightact of betrayal. Not longafter Aiyub again crossedhis superior, refusing toorder the execution of animportantpoliticalprisonercommitted to his custody.One supposes that therewere reasons for thesedaring acts ofinsubordination, and the

factthathecontinuedinhispost shows that hecalculated the politicalprobabilitiescorrectly.Thatatleastisintunewithwhatwe know of the man inlater life. It is possible toothatBihruzwasnotentirelysure of his own positionand that Aiyub had other,even more influentialpatrons in the capital.However, in 1138 Bihruzbecame military

commander in Baghdadand when, in that year,news reached him thatShirkuh, Aiyub’s brother,had killed a man in anaffray he finally relievedhim of his command.Apparently the brothersand their families had tomake their escape undercoverofdarkness;probablythey had enemies enoughby this time to make theirfallfromfavourasignalfor

thesettlingofoldscores.Itwas on this very night, soruns the tradition, thatAiyub’s third son, Salah-ad-DinYusuf,wasborn.Both probability and

historical opinion areagainstthetale,butSaladinwasnotthefirstnorthelastgreat man whose nativityreceived the attention ofthemythmakers.Withinayear of their humiliationthe family of Aiyub were

notabilitiesatZengi’scourtinMosul.Thegreatman’sstar was firmly in theascendant and he had notforgotten that day on theTigris, six years before. In1138hewentoncampaignagainstDamascusandtookAiyub with him. The cityheldout but its dependant,Baalbek, fell to the armiesof Mosul and as we haveseenAiyubibn-Shadhiwasleft there as commander.

Zengi was too hard-nosedto consign such a vitalstrongpoint – an advancepostinDamasceneterritoryestablished for the nextattack – on friendshipalone.ClearlyAiyubwasaman of considerableability.Hewasalsoamanof unconventional pietyand founded a college forthe Sufi sect ofmystics inthetown.For the next seven years

heheldBaalbekforZengi.When his patron wasmurdered in 1146 herapidlyadjustedtothenewsituation.Afteraresistancedetermined enough toestablishhisbonafidesasaloyal servant to the houseof his patron, hesurrendered the place backto Damascus. His newmasters recognised hisvalue and he remained inhispost,risingintimetoa

highplaceintheDamascusadministration. It seemsthat, although he waspatently unable to relievethe siege ofBaalbek,Nur-ad-Din resented Aiyub’sdefection, and it was hisbrother,Shirkuh,whonowmaintained the family’sstanding at the Syriancourt. After their father’sdeathNur-ad-DinandSaif-ad-Din hurried to securethemselves in the power

bases bequeathed them –Saif-ad-Din toMosul withhis father’s vizir and Nur-ad-DintoAleppowherehewas proclaimed byShirkuh.He was a very different

man from his brother.Aiyub emerges as ashrewd, calculating andcircumspectcharacter,wilyin politics but decisive inaction. Shirkuh, bycontrast, was boisterous

and impetuous. But heshared his brother’s abilityforpoliticalmanoeuvreandhis persistence and was tobecome Nur-ad-Din’sright-hand man. He wasshort, with a cast in oneeye, and, according tocontemporaries, had the‘coarse featuresof the lowborn’.Eveninanagewhengluttonywascommonplacefor thosewhocouldaffordit, Shirkuh won a

reputationforexcessand,itisstarklyrecorded,diedofover-eating. Yet thispaunchy, unprepossessinglittle soldier, could lookback on a battle career ofreal distinction. At thebattle of Inab in 1149 hekilledRaymondofAntiochin single combat, thegreatest feat of arms thatday. Loud mouthed andtruculent, tough andcourageous, Shirkuh was,

more often than not,victorious, and was athoroughly professionalsoldier with a careful eyefor details of supply andthe tactician’s feeling forterrain.After Nur-ad-Din’s

capture of Damascus in1154, the brothers onceagain found themselvesservingthesamemaster.Infact the capitulation of thecity smacks of a cosy

family arrangement. Sentaheadof themainarmyasan ‘ambassador’, with animpressive force at hisback, Shirkuh appearedbefore the walls tonegotiate the terms for thealliance of Damascus andAleppo. The ruler of thecity refused to let himwithin the walls, or to goout to meet him. He hadgood reason to be wary.While his heralds argued

withonebrotheracrossthefortifications, theagentsofthe other were fomentingdiscontent amongst thepopulace. As at Baalbekeight years before, Aiyub(now in the Damascusmilitary high command)correctly sized up the driftof events. The populacewas near rebellion and themassive army of Aleppowasboundtoovercomethedemoralised defenders

soonerratherthanlater.Heplayed the game ofturncoat with hisaccustomedaplombandhewonalargeprize.Hispartin the bloodless victorywas acknowledged by theunparalleled privilege thathealonewasallowedtositin the presence ofNur-ad-Din when the king gaveaudience. When hereturned to Aleppo, Aiyubwas left as governor of

Damascus. Saladin, nowsixteen,grewtomanhoodamember of the rulingfamily of the richest andthe secondmost importantcityinSyria.Saladin’s education

would have followed thetraditionallinesforanArabgentleman. By anadmonition of the prophet,the search for knowledgewas incumbent on everyman and woman. The

worlds of learning,philosophy, science andreligion were seen as anintegrated whole, butcentral to adab, agentleman’seducation,wasthe concept of zarf – ofelegance andrefinement.Adab wasfoundedinKoranicstudies,Arabic grammar, rhetoricand poetry. In later lifeSaladin showed a passionand proficiency for

theological debate. Hisfather being a patron ofSufimysticism,ithasbeensuggested thatSaladinwasbrought up in the Sufitraditionof renunciationoftheworldandtheself.Butthese facts do not supportthe idea, put forward bymany of Saladin’sbiographers since StanleyLane-Poole’sclassicof the1890s, that he led the lifeof a recluse and even,

according to the Frenchscholar Champdor, was atimid young man. Saladinmay have had more thanthe nodding familiaritywith theological debateexpected of a gentleman,but he was no stranger tothe social refinements ofzarf. He was described asthe perfect companion andconversationalist, being‘well acquainted with thegenealogies of the old

families and the details oftheirvictoriesandamasterof all traditional lore; hehad the pedigrees of thegreat Arab horses at hisfingertips.’He entered army service

at the age of fourteen,when in 1152 he leftDamascustojoinhisuncleatAleppo;herehereceiveda military ‘fief’ or iqta inthe service of Nur-ad-Din.Four years later, aged

eighteen,hewasappointedto a post in theadministration ofDamascusandshortlyafterthat entered the personalentourageofNur-ad-Dinasa liaison officer ‘neverleavinghimwhetheronthemarchoratcourt’.There is nothing to

suggestthathewasnotablypious during this period,and indeed some ratherconclusiveevidencethathe

wasnot.Between1157and1161,whenhewastwenty-three, his father and unclebetween them led three ofthe pilgrim caravans toMecca. On the lastoccasion Nur-ad-Din tookpart. But Saladin did not.Why is not recorded,thoughthereisnohintthathewas ill. The pilgrimageis binding on all Muslimsable to perform it;Saladin’s chief made time

for it, despite a heavyofficial schedule; the factthat he, a young courtierwith, one presumes, timeonhishands,didnotmightsuggest that there weremore engagements on thesocial calendar. In hisforties,hetoldhissecretaryBaha’-ad-Dinthatwhenhebecame vizir of Egypt, ‘inrecognitionoftheblessingsthatGodhadvouchsafedtohim, he gave upwine and

thepleasuresoftheworld’.Untilthattimeheseemstohave indulged them freely.His passion for huntingnever left him, and as ayoung man he had been arenownedpoloplayer.This game had a special

prestige in a militarysociety as a peacetimesport that kept men andhorsesfit–itcouldalsobehighlydangerous.Manyanoriental prince met his

deathinthemêléeasteamsof ten or twenty ridersclashedinthebattleforthetchogan orball. (AFrenchtraveller in theseventeenthcentury even recorded aPersian match involvingthree hundred riders withtwo or three balls in playsimultaneously.) Onemedieval Syrian aristocrathadthisadviceforhisson:‘Ishallhavenoobjectionifyouwishtoplaypoloonce

or twice a year, but eventhen,toavoidaccidents,donotplayinacrowdedfield.Sixplayersoneachsidearequitesufficient.’Such cautionwould have

beendespisedbytheyoungbloods at court. Thetchogandar, or polomaster, was a highlyrespectedofficer.Asinanyaristocratic society,diversions and etiquettewere part of politics, so

that when Saladin wasinvited by Nur-ad-Din tojoin his side in a polomatchitwasasignofhighfavour.During his life at

Damascus andAleppo, hisfather’s and his uncle’sstock continued to rise sothatwhen,in1157,Nur-ad-Din fell desperately ill, hedeputed Shirkuh tomobiliseDamascusagainstpossible crusader attacks.

Twoyears later the Syrianking again fell ill and thetwo brothers were onceagaintothefore–ahostilecommentator even accusedShirkuh of planning acoup.Althoughprobablyaslander it indicates theambitions of Shirkuh; inthe autumnof 1163 a newtheatre of opportunityseemedtoopenfortheminEgypt.In one of the periodic

upheavals in Cairo thevizir, Shavar, had beenousted after a rule of onlyeightmonths.HemadehiswaytoDamascusandthereofferedNur-ad-Din a thirdof the annual revenue ofEgyptplus thecostsof theexpeditioninreturnforhisreinstatement. The replywasnotimmediate,thoughmany of Nur-ad-Din’sadvisers, among themShirkuh,urgedhimtoseize

the opportunity. Then, anyreservations he may havehad about Shavar’sreliability were cut shortwhenheheardthatAmalricof Jerusalem, takingadvantage of the chaos inEgypt, had invaded andwon a large annual tributeplusapromiseofindefinitetruce from the Egyptians.Immediately the Syrianking prepared anexpedition under the

command of Shirkuh andin the following springDirgam, the new ruler inCairo, was defeated atBilbais.With the powerfulDamascene army at thegates of Cairo he foundhimself deserted by thecaliph and attempted toescape, but hewas thrownfrom his horse and killedbythemob.Shavar was back in

power,butShirkuhappears

to have consulted SunnitetheologiansinCairoonthefeasibility of ousting theheretical Fatimid régime.They advised against theattempt. Unaware of thesemachinations, Shavar nowmadeitclearthathehadnointention of keeping to theextravagantbargainhehadstruck with Nur-ad-Din.Very possibly he doubtedwhether he could.Committing a third of the

caliph’s revenues to aforeign power was easyenough in Damascus, butto force that commitmentthrough council was adifferentmatter.Evenifhesucceeded, hisresponsibility for such adrain on the nationalresources would be astrong argument in thehands of any rival lookingtosupplanthim.Takingthedilemma by the horns,

ShavardeniedShirkuhandhis troops entry to thewalled city of Cairo andrefused the indemnity. Itwas a sizeable piece ofbravado and provoked animmediateresponse.On18July, the Syrian forces,swelled by large numbersof Bedouin, defeated aforce of Egyptians andShavarhimselfwasalmostlynched in the mêlée. Heand his cause were saved

only at the last momentwhen the caliph threw inthepalaceguardagainsttheSyrians.Shavar had already

appealed for help toAmalric of Jerusalem.Unnerved by the prospectof Nur-ad-Din controllingboth Egypt and Syria herespondedwithalacrity.Byearly August the FrankshadforcedShirkuhbackonto the defence in the

fortress of Bilbais whichSaladin had alreadygarrisoned as a potentialfall-back point. Thecombined armies ofhimselfandhisunclewerebesieged there for threemonths. The pressure wasreleasedbyeventsinSyria.Taking advantage ofAmalric’sabsence,Nur-ad-Din had struck againstAntioch and won histriumph at Artah. Amalric

wassoonlookingfortermswhich Shirkuh, his forcestoo weakened andexhausted to takeadvantage of Shavar oncehis protector hadwithdrawn, was willing tosettle.ThisEgyptianexpedition,

undertakenagainstNur-ad-Din’s better judgement,had achieved nothingexcept to expose Shavar’sopportunism and to give

Shirkuh the opportunity tosize up the country andestablishcontactwithsomeoftheelementsopposedtothe régime. He wasconvinced that with betterpreparation and a largerinvestment in men andresources Egypt couldeasily be taken. He notonly argued his case inDamascusbutwrote to thecaliph’s court at Baghdad,describing the situation in

Egypt, the country’simmense potential wealthandthenumerousorthodoxMuslims there, subjects ofthehereticalFatimidrule.Baghdad’senthusiasmfor

the Egyptian campaign,which it elevated to thestatusofaHolyWar,wasabig factor in Nur-ad-Din’sdecision to venture southonce more. In the interim,moreover, Shavar wasfaced with further unrest

among the Bedouin. Ageneral persecution of themalcontents in Cairofollowed, and someescaped to the court atDamascus.InJanuary1167a well-found force ofKurds, Turkomans andBedouin set out for Egyptwith Shirkuh in commandand Saladin once more onthe staff. Shavar, withample warning of theinvasion, sent for help to

Amalric. At a meeting ofthebaronsatNablusitwasdecided to mobilise thewhole force of thekingdom. Once again theFranks saw themselvesfaced with the threat ofencirclement, but,rememberingNur-ad-Din’striumphsin1164whenthearmy was in Egypt, thekingdomwas to be put onfulldefensivealert.Evenasthemobilisationproceeded

news came that Shirkuh’sforce was entering Sinai.An attempted interceptionfailed.The Syrians were on a

desert route specificallychosen to avoid thepossibility of Frankishattack.Afewdays’journeyfrom the isthmus of Suezthe army was struck by atearing sandstorm. Giventhe time of year this wasprobably whipped up by

the fierce south windknown in Syria as thesimoom (‘evil’ or‘polluted’) and feared as acarrier of infection. Someof the troops seem tohavedied in the ordeal whilemany more were probablyweakenedby inflammationof the nose and throat andresulting infections. Inview of the convolutedcampaign that was tofollow it looks as though

Nur-ad-Din hadunderestimatedthestrengthof the Christian responseand his expedition mayhave been under strengthfor thework itnowhad todo. If, as seems likely, theunexpected disaster of thesandstormhadweakeneditstill further then Shirkuh’sstrategy in the weeksahead, otherwise ratherpuzzling, can perhaps beexplained.

After crossing the SuezisthmusShirkuhtookalineof march which, whileensuring him againstChristian harassment,brought him to the Nilesome forty miles south ofCairo. If the expedition’sobjective was theoverthrow of the Fatimidcaliphatethenitisdifficulttoseewhythearmydidnotmarch directly on thecapital. Once at the Nile

Shirkuh immediatelycrossed the river to thewest bank. Since thecaliphal palacewas on theeast bank, and since, ofcourse,theriverwidenedinits journey north andbecame increasinglydifficult to cross, one isforced to conclude thatShirkuh was moreconcerned to put aneffective barrier betweenhimself and his enemies

thantomakeanimmediatestrike against them. Heprobably knew that thecombined Frankish andEgyptian armies heavilyoutnumberedhisown.He made camp at Giza,

acrosstheriverfromCairo,andawaiteddevelopments.The most promising wasthathisenemieswouldfallout. At Shavar’sheadquarters theatmosphere was tense. By

involving Cairo inshamefuldealingswith theChristians he was riskingisolation from court, yet itwas the court party whichcontrolledthepursestringsand he needed money topay his unpopular allies.King Amalric had oncesaid that Egypt should bethemilchcowofJerusalemandnow,persuadedbyhisbarons, hewas threateningto withdraw unless

extravagantly well paid. Ifhe did, Egypt would haveto face Shirkuh alone andShavar’s policy would beutterly discredited. Whilehe argued terms with theChristians his totteringposition was underminedby a message from theSyrian camp, proposing ajoint Muslim allianceagainstthem.Perhaps Shirkuh had

scented a whiff of

desperation in the airwafting across the riverfrom Fustat, where Shavarhad his headquarters. Hisproposal ended with apersuasive plea for jointaction in theHolyWar: ‘Ido not think,’ heconcluded, ‘that Islamwillever have such a goodopportunity as this.’ Theimplied criticism of apolitician willing to allywith the infidel, followed

up with a lofty appeal tothe jihad, was in the besttraditions of Aleppandiplomatic technique. Butin the context the ployseems faintly ridiculous.The commander, who sixweeks before had set outwith the avowed intentionof deposing the hereticalFatimid vizir now appealstohim,andin thenameofreligion, to fight the allieshe had called in to protect

him – who were, in anycase,virtuallyincontrolofthecapital.Shavar’s reply to this

charadewasatetchy‘WhatiswrongwiththeFranks?’After all, Nur-ad-Din hadallied with them onoccasion. Unwisely theSyrianambassadorlingeredat Fustat, awaiting anotheropportunity to reopen thesubject. While he wasthere, a delegation of

palace officials arrived,with the crucial down-payment on the termsnegotiated with theChristian king. Before heand Amalric got into theirfinal discussions, Shavarordered the execution ofthe Syrian, to demonstrategood faith to Amalric andrejection of the Shirkuhalliance. What followed isreported only by WilliamofTyre.

WilliamsaysthatAmalricinsisted on dealing directwith the caliph. To thehorror of the court, theinfidelwasallowedintothesacred precincts and then,still more outrageous, thecaliphhimselfclinched thetreaty by shaking theChristian envoy’s handwith his own, ungloved,hand. A bargain had beenstruck which promised tobring Amalric 400,000

dinars, and in return heagreed to fight.But itwasnot so easy to come togrips with the enemy. Forweeksthearmiesfacedoneanother across the broadwaters of the Nile untilAmalric found a crossingdownstreamwherealargeislanddividedtheriverintotwo branches. Thecombined Egyptian andFrankish forces made thecrossing ingoodorderand

Shirkuh now began a longretreat south up the river.Eventuallyhecalledahaltmore thanahundredmilessouth of Cairo and was,apparently, preparing tocross the river. Themajority of his officersadvisedagainstafight.Butone, who had formerlybeen a slave of Nur-ad-Din’s, pointed out that ifthe expedition returnedwithoutvictoryandwithout

even having done battlewith the enemy its leaderswould be dispossessed oftheir lands and humiliated.Saladin was among thoseconvinced by thiscombination, and thecouncil decided, after all,in favour of making astand.Amalric was also

hesitant. He was quiteconfident of extractingmoney fromEgypt, oneof

his principal reasons forbeing there, and if hisenemy seemed likely toslink off without furtherpersuasion there seemedlittle grounds for a fight.The kingdomof Jerusalemwas not so full of soldiersthat it could afford tosquander its fightingstrength. However,according to the Christianhistorian William of Tyre,the king was visited by a

vision of St Bernard, thepreacher of the SecondCrusade,whoaccusedhimofcowardiceinthefaceofthe Infidel. Thus, thecommanderswhohadbothbeen at first reluctant tofight found themselveslocked in battle on 18March 1167. In aconventionalTurkishbattletactic, Shirkuh placed thebaggage behind the centreof the army. Saladin was

given command here withorders to retreatbefore theFrankish cavalry so as tolureitawayfromitsallies.The baggage wagonsprovidedanaturalfall-backposition round which theretiring troops could re-formifneedbe.Thebattlewent according to plan.The general’s nephewexecuted his manoeuvreefficiently, giving Shirkuhand his picked cavalry

ample time to scatter theEgyptians on the rightwing. When the Frankishhorse returned from theirpursuit itwas to find theirallies routed andthemselves in danger ofencirclement. KingAmalric barely escapedwith his life. Despite thisdecisive victory Shirkuhdid not feel strong enoughto follow it up with anattackonCairo. Insteadhe

marched rapidly toAlexandria.It was the second city of

Egypt, an immensely richtrading port and currentlythehavenofNaim-ad-Din,a refugee from Shavar’srégime in Cairo. He hadalreadypromisedfundsandsuppliestoShirkuhandthegeneralfoundthemwaitingforhim.Havingsupervisedthe organisation of thedefencesofAlexandria,he

leftSaladinincommandofthecity,withagarrisonofathousandtroops,whilehehimself set out for thesouth to recruit supportamong theBedouin and toplunder.This new command was

an important step inSaladin’scareer.Hispartinthe April battle had beeneffective,butthetext-booktactics had demandedneither initiative nor

improvisation.Heowedhisplaceinthehighcommandprimarily to his familyconnections and that wasenough.Buthewasalreadyin his thirtieth year and ifhe had any ambition toreach the top of hisprofession he would haveto prove outstandingability.So farhehaddonelittle more than conduct aroutine set-piecemanoeuvreinwhichfailure

wouldhavebeenridiculousand success was no morethan to be expected. Hiscompetent garrisoning atBilbais had shown someadministrativetalentinwarbut now, commanding agreat city against superiorforces,hefacedadifferentand much more testingsituation. Soon afterShirkuhhadquittedthecityShavar and Amalric cameup and prepared for a

methodical siege, ignoringShirkuh’s diversionaryexpedition to the south infavourofre-takingtherichprizeofAlexandria.Asthesiege lengthened,conditions in the cityrapidly worsened, and theenthusiasm which hadgreeted the Syrian armysoon evaporated. OnlySaladin’s firm commandand inspiring leadershipheldtheplacelongenough

forhisuncletoreturnfromthe south and even tothreaten a siege of Cairo.The Frankish-Egyptianhigh command decided toseekterms.Saladin had emerged as

thesecondmost influentialand competentman on theexpedition. Having heldAlexandria brilliantly, hewas left to organise itsterms of surrender. Withcharacteristic concern for

histroopsandsubordinateshe forced Shavar toguarantee immunity to allthecitizenswhohadhelpedthe Syrians and anarrangement with Amalricto transport the Syrianwounded to Acre in hisshipstosavethemfromtherigours of the long desertmarch. Unfortunatelyneither provision held forlong.Shavarquicklyforgothis assurances and Saladin

had to intervene withAmalric to persuade hisally to stop his reprisalsagainstcollaborators.Astothe wounded, those whohad recovered on thepassage were put to workin the sugar plantationsroundAcre andwere onlyfreed when King Amalricreachedtheport.During the negotiation,

SaladinmadefriendsintheChristian camp and was

entertained there forseveral days. The firstelements in the westernpictureofhimaresketchedaroundthisepisode.LateraChristian writer told howSaladin, the chivalrousinfidel, was knighted byHumphrey II of Toron.Fraternisation across thebattlelineswasnotunusualand William of Tyrespecifically refers to onefriendship of Humphrey

and a Saracen emir.Possibly, during somebanquetorformalreceptionthe Frankish knightshonoured their chivalrousopponent with someceremonyfromtheritualofknighthood, though ofcourse, as he was not aChristian, the oath couldnotbeadministered.After these courtly

diversionshemarchedbackwithhisuncletoDamascus

– Shirkuh with 50,000dinars as the price of hiswithdrawal. Once again acampaign had endedinconclusively.Butsolongas Egypt’s rulers were tooweak to resist ambitiousinterference, the countrywouldremainat thecentreof the fight betweenChristianandMuslim.Politics comes next to

religion for anunderstanding of the place

of Egypt and above allCairo in Saladin’s world.Cairo, standing aboutfifteen miles north-east oftheancientEgyptiancityofMemphis, originated withthe military base set up atal-FustatbytheArabarmythat conqueredEgypt fromthe Byzantine Empire inthe 640s. Under Egypt’sFatimid Shi’ ite regime(from 969) a new walledcity, al-Qahirah, was built

north of Fustat as thedynasty’s capital. Thenative Egyptians or Copts,practisingtheirownvariantof Christianity and payingthe official religious tax,remained important in thebureaucracy, sometimesbecoming vizirs. Saladinwould continue thistradition of toleration (atradition in decline, itseems, in our ownday). Itwas in Egypt that the

Jewish philosopher andpolymath, Maimonides, afugitivefromtheintolerantAlmohad regime of hisnative Cordoba, settled inthe 1160s. Here he wrotehis famous Guide for thePerplexed and in Cairo heentered the service ofSaladin as physician, laterservinghisson.Trade,favouritethemeof

the tales from the famous‘ArabianNights’collection

(many with Egyptiansettings),wascentraltotheIslamic world. The Hajjmade Mecca a hub ofroutes from the Red Sea;onepowerfulAdenitradingfamily, whose branchesand agencies dominatedthose routes, had its owncommercial enclave inCairo.TheFatimidcaliphs,tradingontheirownbehalfand creaming taxes fromothertraders,wereEgypt’s

most activemerchants; theprofits fed the opulence oftheir court. Saladincontinued the patternthrough his commercialagents but channelled theproceeds to the publicpurse, above all to hismilitary programme.Egyptians would grumblethat he used the country’swealth to win mastery inSyria, but no one woulddoubt that he had restored

herinfluence.

Chapter6

VizirofEgypt

The Kurdish commandershad extricated themselvesfrom near disaster, but theexpedition had not evenapproached its objectives,

The 50,000 gold piecessaid to have been paid toShirkuh were offset bylargeChristiangains.Theyinstalled a resident prefectat Cairo and a garrisonwhich controlled the city’sgates–theyalsoforcedtheEgyptians to double theirannual tribute to 100,000dinars. On his returnSaladin devoted himself topolitics and the diversionsof the court. Two

expeditions to Egypt hadbrought his family littlesuccess, and he put thewholeepisodebehindhim.ButthesituationinEgypt

could not be so easilydismissed. Shavar, beganto lose influence. TheFrankish garrison in Cairowas a standing indictmentof his policies and theheavy tribute still owingfedthegrowingoppositiontohim.Toplacate ithelet

the payments fall behind,but this merely infuriatedhis erstwhile allies andAmalric was soon underpressuretoinvadeEgyptinearnest. The king opposedan immediate expedition.He had recently concludedan alliance with theByzantines and wantedtime to involve them. Healsohadmorefundamentaldoubts. Egyptian tributemoney, even if delayed,

was a valuable addition toJerusalem’s war chestagainst Syria. He warnedthe hawks in the council,‘if we invade with theintention of takingpossession, the sovereign,thearmy,thecitiesandthepeasants will unite againstus and will fly into thearms of Nur-ad-Din. If heshould come to their aid itwillbetheworseforus.’Thefactthathelistedthe

‘sovereign’ as a power tobe reckoned with showsthat Amalric, who hadrefused to ratify his treatywith Shavar until it hadbeen approved in directnegotiationwiththecaliph,accepted that the Egyptiancourt still influencedevents. Perhaps Shavar’sposition was weakening,but the air was thick withstrange rumours – oneremarkable storygoing the

roundsclaimedthatKamil,the son of Shavar, wastrying to arrange themarriage of his daughterand Saladin. Whether trueor not it implied a movetowards rapprochementbetween Syria and Egyptwhich could harden intoalliance if the Christiansacted precipitately. Twicethey had had to withdrawfrom Egypt because ofSyrian threats to the

kingdom. If they nowbrokefaithwiththeirpartyin Cairo they might forcethe union of Muslimswhichwasthemostseriouslong-term danger. Amalricconceded that somethingwouldhavetobedone,buthe was overruled in thematter of timing. InOctober 1168 the Franksmoved south, this time astheinvaders,nottheallies,ofEgypt.Theyweremetin

the desert by anambassador from Shavarand answered his tiradewith the bland suggestionthat another two milliondinars might perhaps buythem off. Shavar orderedthe garrison of Bilbais toresist.It was under the

command of his son Taiy,and the stubborn defencesurprised the Christians,who generally despised

Egyptian troops. It alsoinfuriated the soldiery,which,onceinsidethecity,ranamuckand slaughteredthe population, the CopticChristians along with theMuslims. This massacreunited Egypt against theinvader even morecompletely than Amalrichad feared. MalcontentMuslims might havewelcomed the fall ofShavar, the Copts would

almost certainly haveprovided a Frankish fifthcolumn. Bilbais crushedany such hopes. On 12November Shavar orderedthe destruction of FustatoldcitywhereAmalrichadencamped on his earlierexpedition.Amalric had marched on

to surround Cairo andShavarhadsettleddowntothe congenial manoeuvresof bribery; his son, taken

prisoner at Bilbais, wasransomed for a sizeablefigure and it seemedpossible that even at thisstage the Franks could beboughtoffwithouttheneedto call in the dangeroussupport of Syria. Frankishcouncils were as everdivided. The warmongerswhohadurgedtheinvasionin the first place wantedfirst and foremost to gettheir hands on the plunder

and tribute money which,during peace, went directintotheroyalcoffers.Nowthat the vizir seemedwilling and able todisgorge vast sums to thearmy in the field, theyurged withdrawal a fewmiles from Cairo so thatnegotiations could proceedwithout duress on Shavar.The fact that the Frankswere only in Egypt tosecure long-term

advantages seems to havebeen forgotten. ThearrangementssuitedShavarwell enough, but his sonKamil, who was in closetouch with the court,agreed that the time hadcometocallinNur-ad-Dinto finish the Frankishmenace once and for all,and forced his father toconcur in the caliph’sinitiative.The palace

enthusiastically made theproposal its own. Duringthe first weeks of theFrankish campaignShavar’s chancellery hadbeen depicting him in theglowing imagery of theHolyWar,asthechampionof Islam.Now that he hadbeen forced to turn onceagain to bribery therhetoric died, yet even sohe had supporters amongthe religious establishment

and the administrationwhere some realised thatSyrian intervention wouldmean the end of theFatimid régime. Othersdespised the Syrian forcesfortheirmotleyancestryasTurks, Kurds, Armeniansand so forth and opinedthat ‘it would be better topay tribute to the Franksthan to let in the Ghuzz’.But popular feeling wasrunning so strong after the

massacre at Bilbais thatnegotiations with theChristians had becomedangerous as well ashumiliating.TheappealtoNur-ad-Din

was reinforced by a letterfrom the caliph himself.Thiswasaccompaniedbyalock of his wife’s hair, toshow that the Syrian kingcould hope to share thefavours of his still morecherishedbride–therealm

ofEgypt.Aletterwritteninthecaliph’sownhandwasremarkableenoughinitself– the eloquent token hesent with it and its potentsymbolism emphasised theinvitation in the strongestpossibleway.Nur-ad-Din’s immediate

response to the embassywas to send for Shirkuh.He mobilised a force of8,000 men, comprising2,000 troops from his

personal bodyguard plus6,000 Turkomans andKurds, officered by KurdsandTurks.Inadditiontoawar chest of 200,000 goldpieces he gave each mantwenty pieces as a bonus.HealsoorderedSaladin toaccompany his uncle. Thereply was a surprisingrefusal: ‘By God! evenwere the sovereignty ofEgypt offered me I wouldnotgo.’Yeteventually the

pleas of his uncle and theorders of his sovereign,who showered him withhorses and arms, forcedSaladintoreconsider.Laterheclaimed thathewent toEgypt ‘like one driven tohisdeath’.This reluctance is one of

thebestattestedepisodesinSaladin’scareerand it isapuzzle. The ’67 campaignhad been less thantriumphant and quite

possiblyhehadnowishtobe associated with anotherfailure;therewerealsobadmemories of the siege ofAlexandria.Yetbynowhewas a veteran soldier andno speculation can fill outthe skimpy contemporaryaccounts of the affairsatisfactorily.Thearmysetout on 17 December 1168andassoonasheheardthenews Shavar, hoping tosolve his dilemma by

having Frank and Syrianexhaust themselves farfrom his capital, warnedAmalric of the advance.The king withdrew fromCairo in a half-heartedattempt to intercept theSyrian army at Suez, butthetwoforcesdidnotmeetand Amalric’s withdrawalbecamearetreat.His aim had been to

secure theChristians’ holdon Egypt. Before he

invaded they had theirprefect in Cairo and agarrison there, and goodchances even though thetimes had been uncertain.Now things had hardenedbeyond recall in favour ofSyria. The atrocity atBilbaishadmuchtoanswerfor.In’67,facedbyafirmFranco-Egyptian front,Shirkuhhadbeenforcedtowaste his powers in ahazardous holding fight at

Alexandria and fruitlessraiding. Now, the Syrianswere no longer outsidersbut the favoured guests ofthe caliph; now Amalricfound himself allied to aweak vizir and robbed ofanyEgyptianfriendshipbythe brutality of his owntroops. He had to quit thefield and for a time thepalaceheldtheinitiative–-forShavar thewritingwasonthewall.

On 9 January Shirkuhentered Cairo to a greatwelcome as Deliverer ofthe Muslims. He hadaudience with the caliphand received from him arobe of honour which heproudly showed to histroops. For the momentShavar could do nothingbut concur in the generalenthusiasmandmadedailyvisits to the camp of hisunwanted ally with all the

pompandpanoplyhecouldmuster. At the same timehe tried to involve his sonin a plot to assassinateShirkuh at a banquet,pointing out quite rightlythat if theydidnotdisposeof the Syrian and hisofficers he would shortlyput an end to them and toall the Fatimid leaders.According to Ibn-al-Athir,Kamil replied: ‘What yousaymaywellbe right.But

inmyviewitisbettertobekilled leavingEgypt to theMuslims, than by theFranks who will certainlyreturn and deal with usonce Shirkuh is dead.’ Inthe event Shavar, theveteran plotter, was out-plotted. On 18 January,making a pilgrimage to amosqueon theoutskirtsofCairo,hewasarrestedbyaSyrian guard commandedby Saladin and beheaded

ontheordersofthecaliph.ThesamedayShirkuhwasinstalledasvizir.Topacifythe mob and win theirsupport,hepermitted themto loot the palace of thedeposed vizir, keepingnone of the treasures forhimself or his troops. Buthe permitted his emirs toseize the estates ofShavar’s officers. Thepalacesenta letter toNur-ad-Din to inform him that

henceforth the Egyptianmilitary would becommanded by hislieutenant, Shirkuh. Thereaction from Damascuswas immediate and angry.The caliph was urged toorder Shirkuh back to hismasterandwhenthisfailedNur-ad-Dinconfiscatedthecommander’s holdings inSyria.Itishardlysurprisingthat

Nur-ad-Din was

suspicious.Only twoyearspreviously Shirkuh hadargued him into acampaign blessed byBaghdad as a holy war tooverthrow the Fatimids.But now that theEgyptians’ allies weredriven from the field andhe himself was in fullcontrol of the capital,Shirkuh not only did notdepose thecaliphbutevenrecognisedhisauthorityby

accepting the appointmentashischiefminister.FromDamascus it looked asthough once free of hismaster a loyal servant hadseized the moment to turnrebel. The analysis mayvery well have been right,but since twomonthsafterhis appointment Shirkuhdiedofhisexcesseswecanneverknowhowhewouldhaveusedhisposition.Thesituation in Cairo was not

simple. The people hailedShirkuh as liberator fromthe Christians, the palacestill held the politicalinitiative. The caliph andhisadvisersweredelightedtohaveShavarremovedforthem, but could beexpected to oppose anyattempt by Shurkuh todisplace the Fatimidrégime. Shirkuh was notstrong enough to force theissue, and had little

inducement. While hemeticulously observedEgyptianindependenceandpermittedtheobservanceofShi‘iteriteshehadtherealpower of vizir and thecooperation of theestablishment.His death on 23 March

1169 meant theappointmentofanewvizir,Italsomeanttheelectionofa new commander of theSyrian army in Egypt; the

two posts need notnecessarily be held by thesame man. One palacefaction proposed that theSyrian troops be settled inEgypt as a powerfuladdition to the caliph’sforces but that the viziratebe given to an Egyptianarmy officer. The caliphand his advisers, however,recognised that althoughthey held the balance ofpower the new vizir must

be acceptable to the ‘armyofliberation’.Saladin had been

designated by his uncle tosucceedhimascommanderand he could count on thesupport of the Kurdishcontingent, but he hadstrong rivals among agroup of Turkish officers,aggressively loyal to Nur-ad-Din, who dubbedthemselves Nuriyah. Thepro-Saladin lobby was led

by ‘Isa al-Hakkari, whohad risen in the service ofNur-ad-Din. He had beennamed as the chiefnegotiator in the rumouredmarriage between Saladinand Shavar’s daughter in1168,whichat leastshowshe was popularlyconsideredaloyalfriendtoSaladin. Largely thanks tohimSaladinwon the armycommand.Butthedecisionwas not unanimous, and

the leading Nuriyahreturnedwith his troops toDamascus, where heaccused Saladin ofdisloyaltyandself-seeking.Meanwhile, Saladin wasinvited by the caliph tofollow his uncle as vizir.The palace may havehoped to spark off furtherSyrian defections.Immediately the newsreached Aleppo, Nur-ad-Din confirmed the

confiscation of Saladin’sand Shirkuh’s estates andoffices in Syria, includingthe town of Homs, andslightingly ignored theofficeofvizirandthetitlesgranted by the Cairorégime,referringtoSaladinsimply as ‘commander-in-chief’.By including Nur-ad-

Din’s name among thosementioned in the officialFridayprayersatCairoand

by other gestures ofsubmissionSaladin did hisbest to soften Aleppo’sattitude.At the same time,owing his appointment tothepalace,hewasaregularattendant at court andcompanionofthecaliphinceremonialduties.Thetwowere seen heading theRamadan processions andeach Friday made jointpilgrimage to somemosque.TheKurdishvizir

trod carefully between hisSunnite overlord andShi‘ite master, graduallyallaying the suspicions ofthe one and becomingstrong enough to overridetheother. If thecaliphhadhoped for a pliantsubordinate he soon foundhismistake.By the summer of 1169

Saladin had formed apersonal bodyguard; inJuly of the same year his

position was furtherstrengthened by the arrivalof his brotherTuran Shah.Even before Shirkuh’sdeath his nephew had hadto do a good deal of theadministrative work sincethe vizir was generallydrunkandincapable.WhenSaladin took the office heshowedthepowersitmighthaveinefficienthandsandreinforcedbythearrivalofhis family he began to

build a strong position.Worried, the court partydecided to call in theChristians once more. ButSaladin learnt of the plotbefore Amalric. An alertagent, intrigued by theunusual design of thesandals of a courtmessenger, had themunstitched and discoveredthe dispatch addressed toAmalric. A detachment ofSaladin’s guards was

orderedtothecountryvillaof the chief plotter, theblack eunuch, Moutamen,and killed him before hehad a chance to rally hisowntroops.Saladinnowdismissedall

thepalaceservantsloyaltothecaliphandalsoinstalledhis own ministers. For amoment it looked asthoughhehadoverreachedhimself. The displacedministersstirredup trouble

among the Nubian palaceguard who were alreadyfurious at the death of thegreat black minister; theyattackedSaladin’stroopsinthe palace area and thecaliph looked on at theseething struggle. Theoverwhelming numbers ofthe black guard foundthemselves congested inthe streets and courtyardsbut even so things werelooking dangerous for the

Syrians. At this pointSaladin callously orderedthat the barracks housingthe guards’ families andalso a contingent ofArmenians be set on fire.The mutinous troopsstreamed back to rescuetheir wives and childrenfrom the flames; manywere cut down in coldblood on Saladin’s orderswhile most of theArmenians perished in the

fire. Resistance continuedfor a further two days insomequartersandtherebelremnant was given a safeconduct out of Cairo, butthistoowasviolatedandinbloodyandruthlessfashionSaladin had put an end tothe threat of rebellion inCairo. The caliph, we areinformed, hastened toassure Saladin of hisloyalty.News of the Cairo crisis

had by now reached theChristians. Embassies toEurope urging immediatereinforcements while theenemy was in disarrayfound no support, butConstantinopledidagreetoa joint expedition withAmalric. On 10 July aByzantine fleet headedsouth. However, thekingdom had beenunsettled by the ’68campaignandAmalricwas

notreadytoleaveuntilthemiddle of October,crossing into Egypt on the25th. Saladin had hadample warning of theinvasion and hadconcentrated his army atBilbais. Unexpectedly, theChristians laid siege toDamietta.Perhaps a rapid assault

wouldhavewon theplace,but theFrankish commandintimidatedby themassive

fortificationspreparedforamethodical siege. Theircaution was utterlymistaken.Saladinhadbeenthrown temporarily offbalance by the Christians’choiceoftargetsothattheystill had some slightadvantage of surprise. Thedefendershadbeenable toblock the entrance to theriverwithaheavyboomsothat while Amalric wasdeprived of the support he

expected from the fleetSaladin was able to pourreinforcements into thetowndowntheopenbranchoftheNile.DaybydaytheGreekcommanderwatchedthe enemy garrisongrowing stronger in menand provisions, while hisownmen who had set outin Julywithprovisions foronly a three-monthcampaigngrewweakerandmore mutinous. He urged

Amalric to risk an all-outattack. But still Amalricheld off, and it graduallybecame obvious that theexpedition had failed. Inmid-December, for thesecond time that year, theChristians withdrew withnothingachieved.It was the end of an

eventful year. During thenine months since he hadtaken office as vizir,Saladinhadprovedhimself

a master in politics andwar. Despite the openantagonism of Nur-ad-Dinhis troops in Egypt hadremained loyal to him; adangerous plot had beenfoiled and a revival ofpalace influence nipped inthe bud; a threateningmutiny had been crushedand an army of invaderscomprehensively routed.Finally, and perhaps mostinteresting, Nur-ad-Din’s

promptreplytotheappealsfor reinforcements hadshown that, howeversuspicious he might be,Nur-ad-Din dared notabandonSaladintotheriskofaChristiantake-over.The way Saladin

weathered these earlytroubles revealed apowerful political talent.The vizirate of Egypt wasprobably themost insecurejob in the contemporary

Muslimworld.Intheyearsto come he was to showstill more impressiveadministrative skillswhichwere to bring the countryits longest period ofuntroubled government forhalf a century. Just now,however, there was morestormyweatherahead.Nur-ad-Din was

increasing the pressure forthe dissolution of theFatimid caliphate. But

before this could be done,andbefore thenameofal-Mustadi of Baghdad couldbesubstitutedforthatofal-Adid, there were powerfulvested interests thathad tobe negotiated.Once it hadbeen done, Saladin’s onlytitle to legitimate authorityin Egypt would be inquestion. He movedcarefully to secure hisposition, and began toreplace key figures in the

military and administrativeestablishmentwithhisownnominees. In the earlysummerof1170hewonanimportant new ally whenhis father, having at lastreceived Nur-ad-Din’spermission, came to joinhimatCairo.Theoccasionrevealed the measure ofSaladin’s ascendancy.Conferring an honourwhich no previous caliphhadbestowedonasubject,

al-Adid rode out to greetAiyub in person at theoutskirtsofthecapital.Withasuitablegestureof

filial obedience Saladinoffered to resign thevizirate to his father.Evenif the offer was genuine itwas not practical politics.Refusing the proposal,Aiyub remarked that Godwouldnothavechosenhisson for so great an officehadhenotbeenworthyof

it and added that it wasnever wise to play withone’s luck. But he didacceptthetreasurershipandAlexandriaandDamiettaasiqtas, while Saladin’sbrother, Turan-Shah, wasgranted Upper Egypt, asection of Cairo and thedistrict of Giza. With hisbrothersinvitalcommandsand the family patriarch,veteran in politics andmasterofadministration,in

a key post, Saladin beganto move with ever moreassurance. In Junehis firstson,Alial-Afdal,wasborntohiswife,Ummal-Afdal.Inthelastmonthsof1170

he took the offensiveagainst the Christians.Merely carrying the warinto the enemy territorywould raise Egyptianmorale considerably.Leaving Cairo on 26November he marched for

the Templar fortress ofDarum on the southernfrontier of the Christiankingdom. The attack waslaunchedon10December,buttheTemplarswereabletoholdoutwhile themainChristianarmyunderKingAmalric came up. TheEgyptians slipped awayunder cover of darknessandmarchedonthecityofGaza,puttingittothesack.The fortress there was too

strong for them, but theoperationhadservednoticethat Egyptwas once againa force to be reckonedwith. More important, itconcentrated Christianattention on theMediterranean frontiers ofthe kingdom whileSaladin’s forces weremounting a surprise andelaborate operation furthersouth.Aflotillaofprefabricated

ships had been transportedbycamelfromCairototheGulf of Suez, where theywere launched for thevoyageroundSinai.BytheendofDecembertheywereinpositioninthewatersofthe Gulf of al-Aqaba andon 31 Decembercooperated with the landforces fromSaladin’s fieldheadquarters for asuccessful combined landand sea attack on the port.

The recovery of this richtrading port and keystaging post in thepilgrimage route toMeccawas a major victory forIslam.Itwasalsoabrillianttriumphforanarmywhichforyearshadbeensatisfiedif it could defend its ownfrontiers – generally withthehelpofinfidelallies.Inrather less than two years,by efficient, well-plannedmilitary reform, Saladin

had made the Egyptianarmyafightingforce.He had also moved

steadily to strengthen hisposition as vizir. In thesummer of 1170 ‘Isa al-Hakkari was appointedchief judge in Cairo; inMarch 1171 the Kurdishqadi, al-Fadil, was madehead of the country’sjudiciary. A few monthslater more purges of themilitary seemed to give

himunassailablecontroloftheEgyptianestablishment.The moves were watchedwith cold suspicion fromDamascus and in August1171 Nurad-Din sent adirect command that theFatimid government andcaliph were to beoverturned forthwith, andthreatened that if nothingwas done he would comein person. Saladin ignoredthecaliph’sprotestsagainst

the purge and soon afterorderedmorearmyunitstothe capital. At about thistime al-Adid fell ill. OnFriday, 10 September1171,thefirstFridayoftheyear567A.H., thebiddingprayer in thechiefmosqueofFustatomittedthenameof the Fatimid caliph forthe first time in twocenturies.Aweek later al-Mustadiwas named in theprayersofthechiefmosque

of Cairo, and as theorthodox invocation wasechoed throughout thecapital the palace groundswere being methodicallytaken over by Saladin’stroops. The royal familyand its retinue wererounded up and placedunderhousearrest.The constitutional

arrangements of twocenturies had beenoverturned without a

murmur of protest. Therewere to be repercussionslater, but the onlyimmediate result was anenquiry on behalf of thedead caliph’s ten-year-oldson as to when he was tobe installed as successor.Saladincalmly replied thatthe boy’s father had givenhimpersonallynoauthorityin the matters of thesuccession and that wasthat. Barely a week after

the caliph’s death in thenightof12Septemberandbut a few days after thesolemn, religiousproclamation of theAbbasid house, Saladinmarched out of Cairo to anewcampaign.The objective was the

strategic Christianstrongpointofash-Shaubak(Montreal). About twenty-five miles to the south oftheDeadSea,itoverlooked

theroute fromSyria to theGulf of al-Aqaba, and thecommunications betweenSyria and Egypt. Amalric,caughtoffguard,couldnotcome at once to the reliefof the garrison and thecommander begged a ten-day truce.Nur-ad-Dinwasmarching south fromDamascus with a largearmy, and the fall of ash-Shaubak seemed certain.But a few days before the

trucewasduetoexpirethedefenders saw inastonishment that theEgyptianforcewasstrikingcamp. They were not theonly ones surprised by thewithdrawal. Even inSaladin’s own entourage itwaswhispered thathewasretiring to avoid a face-to-face encounter. If they didmeet, the speculation ran,thevizirofEgyptwouldbeforcedtoacceptthepostof

second-in-command in thefield army andmight evenberelievedofhisofficesinCairo.To Syrian noses the

wholethingsmeltranklyoftreason, and there can belittle doubt that politicalself-interest was animportant factor inSaladin’s decision. Thegivenreasonwasthatnewshad just reached the campof a rising inUpperEgypt

whichthreatenedthewholeSyrian position in thecountry. But Saladin’sbrother was handling therebellion effectively and itis unlikely Saladin reallybelieved his own presencewas needed. However, hedid have grounds to beangry and worried bothwith Nur-ad-Din’s attitudeandabouthisownsituationin Egypt. Acting oninstructions from

Damascus,hehaddeposedthe heretical caliph – andincidentally seen Nur-ad-Din receive the firstcongratulations fromBaghdad for the action –and, again ordered byDamascus, he had left hisowncapitalwithindaysofthe coup,whenunrestwasmost tobefeared, tomakean attack deep into enemyterritory. His withdrawalfrom ash-Shaubak may

have been calculating butthere were reasons for areturntoCairo.Newssooncame that Nur-ad-Din wasplanning a punitiveexpedition.Saladin called an urgent

conference of his familyandadvisers.Reactionwasmixed but generallydefiant, summed up inpassionatewordsbyoneofthe younger cousins Taqi-ad-Din‘Umar–‘Iftheking

of Syria comes, we willfight him and force himback.’ Saladin’s father,always the diplomat andnow perturbed at the kindof effect such hotheadedtalk would have inDamascus, brought theproceedings sternly toorder. ‘Know that shouldNur-ad-Din come nothingwould stop me or youruncle here fromdismounting and kissing

the ground at his feet,’ hesaidtotheyounghot-head.Then turning toSaladinhewent on, ‘Even if heorderedustotakeyourlifewe should do it. If wewouldactthushowdoyouthinkotherswould?Forallthe army and all yourcouncil here owe theirhomage to Nur-ad-Dinshouldhecome.Thisishisland and if it pleased himto depose you we would

immediatelyobeyhim.Weare all Nur-ad-Din’smamluksandslavesandhemay do with us as hechooses.’ Aiyub’s advicewas to conciliate the kingwith an offer of totalsubmission: ‘News hasreached us that you intendto lead an expedition toEgypt; but what need isthere? My Lord need butsenda courtieron a cameltoleadmebacktoSyriaby

a turban cloth about myneck – not one of mypeople would attempt toresisthim.’After the council had

dispersed Aiyub warnedSaladin against yielding toambitious talk. Therewould always be aninformer willing to reportback to Nur-ad-Din, andprovocation was pointlesssince timewason the sideoftheyoungerman.IfNur-

ad-Din could be placatedthere need be little fear ofanySyrian invasion, but ifthings should reach thatpoint Aiyub swore hewould fight to the deathratherthanthekingshouldtake even a single sugarcane of the rich crops ofEgyptfromhisson.Forthenext three years Saladinfollowed his father’sadvice. In April thefollowing year a caravan

left for Aleppo carryingmuch treasure from theFatimid palace including avaluable antiqueceremonialrobeandturbanbelonging to one of theearly caliphs and, more toNur-ad-Din’s liking,100,000 dinars. In 1173this Egyptian tributeconsisted of more richtreasure and a further60,000 dinars. Nur-ad-Din’s name was added to

the invocations in themosques at Cairo, and inhis dealings with hisoverlord Saladinmaintainedthemostcorrectprotocol.Butnothingcoulddispel Nur-ad-Din’ssuspicions or satisfy hisexpectationsforcashreturnfromtheEgyptianventure.Saladin was indeed

determined not to loseEgypt. In the summer of1173hewasorderedup to

besiege Karak in Moab, afew miles south of theDead Sea. He obeyed but,asin1171,retiredonnewsthat Nur-ad-Din wascoming to join him. Thistime he could show goodreason however; his lovedand respected father. Theaged Aiyub had beenthrown fromhis horse andin fact died before his sonreachedCairo.Butwhile he complained

bitterly against Saladin,Nur-ad-Din, who had theresources to take ash-Shaubak unaided,dissipatedhisstrengthwithcampaigns against thesultanate of the SelchükTurks of Konya. The realchargeagainstSaladinwasnot so much that he wasusing Egypt in his owninterestsasthathewasnotpreparedtosubordinatethecountry to the interests of

Syrian policy. Popularenthusiasm for his régimeflowedfromthefactthatitwas beginning to restoreEgypt to great-powerstatus. Nur-ad-Din hadhoped that Egypt wouldprovide a rich and docileprovince.ButSaladin,whohadsecuredhispositionatCairo virtually unaided,sawnoreasontocomply.The capture of al-Aqaba

and the attack on ash-

Shaubak, while theydemonstrated theeffectiveness of Egyptianarms, were operations ofequal advantage to Syria.In 1173 Egyptian armieswere driving westwardalong the North Africancoast into territories thathad not known rule fromCairo for a century and ahalf. This revival of theglories of the Fatimid pastbrought new sources of

revenue for the financingofthevizir’snewarmyandfleet and appealed stillmore powerfully to theEgyptian public.CommandedbySharaf-ad-DinKarakush,amemberofthe staff of Saladin’snephew Taqi-ad-Din, thearray advanced throughTripolitania, took Tripoliitself,andevenpushedintothe territoriesofTunis.Animportant part of the

Mediterranean littoral waswonbackforEgypt.Thefollowingyear,1174,

sawSaladinpresidingoverthe recovery of yet moreterritories of the formerFatimid empire. Early inFebruaryhisbrotherTuran-Shah crossed the Red Seato al-Hijaz. Then hemarched south into theYemen taking Aden andother major strongholds.These conquests remained

withtheAiyubidhouseforfiftyyears.With theNorthAfricangains theybroughtEgypttoapositionshehadnot known for generationsand,addedtohercommandofal-Aqaba,restoredhertothe prestigious position ofprotector of the pilgrimroutes to Mecca. In thepopular imaginationSaladin the conqueror wasnow Saladin Protector oftheFaith.

The people of Egypt hadreason to approve theKurdishvizir,who, in fiveyears, had brought thecountry so far back on theroad to glory. Thecomparison with thedevious and cloisteredintrigues of the Shavarrégime was startling. Ofcourse many ministers ofthe old régime wereincensed by the revolutionand plots were gathering

force to a countercoup.Upper Egypt, traditionallythe base for campaignsagainst a too-successfulvizir,hadbeentemporarilypacified by Turan-Shahbefore his Red Seaexpedition. In1172hehadrepulsed an invasion fromNubia and compelled itsruler to sue for terms.Thebrunt of that invasion hadfallenonAswan,wherethegovernor had fortunately

held loyal toCairo.But in1174hedecidedtojointhemembers of the displacedjudiciary, administrationand military now plottingthe overthrow of Saladin.They were led by the sonand grandson of twoformervizirs.Remarkably,they judged it safe toinvolve two men high infavour with the Aiyubidrégime. These were Ibn-Massal, who held a senior

post in the administrationandZain-ad-Din,a leadingdivine of the Sunniteestablishment.Itisdifficultnow to know why suchmen should have beenthoughtopentosubversion– in the light ofwhatwastohappen it seemsat leastpossiblethatthewholeplotwas set up by Saladin’ssecretservicetosmokeoutopposition.Following Egyptian

tradition in these mattersthe conspirators contactedthe Christians, and theNormans of Sicily agreedto launch an attack onAlexandriatocoincidewitha rising in Cairo; this wasplanned for harvest time,themost vulnerable periodfor any medieval militaryestablishment, whencommanders and troopsaliketendedtobeawayonthe estates. Saladin’s

situation was potentiallyvery dangerous. Followingthe North Africancampaigns of the previousyear a sizeable body oftroops had been detachedfor garrison duties in thenew provinces while theYemeni expedition ofFebruaryhaddrawnfurtherforcesoff fromthecapital.Possibly this was nocoincidence.Thecampaigninto the Yemen had been

planned and decided onlargely thanks to theurgings of a Yemeni poetand historian, Umarah, aprominent figure of theearlier régime. It was hewhohadpersuadedSaladinthattheregionwasripeforconquest and so hadensured that the vizir’selder brother, one of hisstrongest lieutenants,would be out of Egyptwhen the rebellion broke.

Umarahwasalsooneofthechiefplotters.It was an elaborate plan,

coordinatingattackson thenorthern coast and arebellioninthefarsouthatAswanwitha rising in thecapital.Butitwasbetrayedfromthefirst.Zain-ad-Din,the Sunnite divine, eitherbecause he foresaw failureor, as been suggestedabove, because he was anagent provocateur, made

contactwithSaladin’schiefsecretary al-Fadil andofferedtobetrayhisfellowconspirators in exchangefor their confiscatedestates. The fact that hewas able to bargain withthe administration is initselfsuspicious–asaself-confessed traitorhe shouldhavebeeninnoverystrongposition to negotiate.Whatever the secretsbehind the comings and

goings, Saladin movedwith precision and speed.On12Marchtheremainingroyalfamilymemberswereput under close housearrest, and early inApril awave of arrests brought inthe conspirators.A specialtribunal condemned themtodeathbycrucifixionand,beginningon6April, theywere publicly executed inCairo.The rising had aborted,

andwithitthemostseriousthreat of subversion. Butthere were consequencesstill to follow. KingAmalric, who had alsoagreed to lead an armyagainst Saladin, died earlyin July shortly before theplot should have matured.But King William II ofSicilysentafleetunderhisrenowned admiralMargaritus. In late July itwas seen standing in to

Alexandria. The forceconsisted of 200 galleyscarrying 30,000 men and80 freighters loaded withhorses, equipment andarmaments. But theChristians had hopelesslymiscalculated. Not onlyhad the Egyptian uprisingbeen quashed monthsbefore but the defences ofAlexandria were inexcellent repair and theharbour mouth blocked

with sunken ships. Saladinwas close at hand, with alarge army. After threeinglorious days duringwhich the garrison hadharried them withaudacioussortiesandnightattacks the Normans tookto their ships and fled,leaving 300 men strandedon the hostile shore. TheSiciliansheadednorth.Within days of the

Christian rout messengers

posting up from Aswanreported that the regionwas being terrorised byrebels led by the town’sgovernor. Saladin sent hisyoung brother al-Adil toputdowntherebellion,andearly in September thetrouble was over. Thecontemporary records donot specifically link theAswanrisingwiththemainplot but the timing couldhardly have been

coincidence. Had theNorman invasion notevaporated so quickly therégime would have beenfaced with simultaneousattacks north and south; asituationavoidedbyonlyafew days. But those fewdays were enough forSaladin to deal with thethreats piecemeal. Duringthe summer, news hadreachedCairo of the deathofNur-ad-Dinon15May;

Syria was wide open withpossibilities for Saladin,but it was not untilOctober, with the lastmurmur of rebellionsilenced, that he could setout for Damascus. Then,however, so complete hadbeen the pacification ofEgypt that he was able toleave his capital in thehandsofhisbrotheral-Adiland not return for sevenmoreyears.

Brutal when necessary,but always decisive andbold, Saladin had solvedthe Egyptian problem. Forgenerations vizirs hadcome andgone in a turgidsuccession of factionfights. The pieces on theboard were the vizir, thepalace party, Syrian orChristian intruders fishingin the troubledwatersand,as often as not, thegovernor of Upper Egypt.

Aseachpawnsuccessively‘queened’(itisthoughttheoriginal of the modernchess ‘queen’ was the‘vizir’) thepieceswere setup and the game begunagain. By outmanoeuvringhis enemies and at needliquidating them Saladinhad called a halt to thegame for a generation. Hehad, moreover, broughtbetter and moreenlightened government to

the country than it hadknown since the days ofthe great caliphs. Thetreachery and killings thatkept him in power tellagainst him in a modernevaluation.Butthedeathofcourtiers was toocommonplace to be ofmuch concern to thecitizenry of Egypt, whiletheendingoftheseeminglyendless feuds wasaccompanied by Egypt’s

return topower,prosperityandinfluenceintheworld.Biographers of Saladinanxious to hurry on to thegrand and chivalrousdoings of the Holy Warhave traditionally glossedover the early years of hisEgyptian rule.Yet the factisthatthesewereformativeto his career and revealqualities of decision andtenacity that were vital intheyearsahead.

In Saladin in his Time(1983), P.H. Newby notedthat at the height of hiscareer Saladin (vizir, latercalled sultan, of Egypt)would be known to hiscontemporariesasal-Malikal-Nasir Salah al-Din Abu’l-Muzaffer Yusuf ibnAiyub ibn Shadi. TheArabic‘al-Malik’isusuallytranslated as ‘king’; ‘al-Nasir’ as ‘defender of’ or‘victorious in (the Faith)’.

Ithasbeenclaimedthatthegreat man, son of Aiyubwhowas sonofShadi andgenerally called ‘thehonour’ (Salah) ‘ofreligion’ (al-Din), neverhimselfadoptedthetitleofking. Maybe not, but hiscontemporaries had nohesitationinawardingit tohim.HisfortificationsatCairo,

his capital from 1169 to1176, still testify to his

stature as a potentate. Theresult of the works heorderedwas to consolidatethe city’s defences. Firstthe existing walls werereinforced, but then a newcircuitwas constructed forthe capital and old Fustatwhile the immense workswere crowned with themajestic citadel on therocky promontory of theMuqattam hills. Theexpenditure in materials

and resources was ofcoursehuge,eveniftheuseofslavelabourintheformof Christian prisoners ofwaristakenintoaccount.The restoration of Sunni

rule in the city of theheretical Fatimids meantthe return of Egyptianpatronage of the holiestsites in Islam. WhenSaladin abolished the tollcharges levied on thepilgrims to Mecca and

compensated theauthorities there for theirloss in revenues, he hadrestored something of theancientprestigeofMuslimEgypt.HewouldalsorufflefeathersinBaghdad,wherethecaliphwas jealousofapossible challenge to hisstanding in the communityofIslam.

Chapter7

TheCriticalYears

TheperiodfromMay1174to September 1176 was adecisive one. It openedwith the deaths ofNur-ad-Din, his suspicious and

menacing overlord, andKingAmalric, Islam’s lastdangerous competitor onthe throne of Jerusalem. Itclosed on the distantbattlefield ofMyriocephalum where thesultan of Konya destroyedthe military capability ofthe Byzantine empire.During the two and a halfyears that lay between,Saladin, against difficultand shifting odds, made

himselfmaster of southernSyria; after that he couldturn against his remainingrivals in theMuslimworldknowing that the coastlinekingdom of the Christianscouldexpectnomorehelpfromthenorth.At thebeginningof1174

the future had lookedgloomy. The threateneddomestic rebellion hadbeencrushedbutduringthespring Egypt and her ruler

were facing up to almostcertain invasion fromSyria. Nur-ad-Din’ssuspicions of Saladin, fedbyhisleadingadviserswhohad come to hate and fearthe Kurdish upstart, hadcometoahead.Theking’snephew,therulerofMosul,had been ordered to bringan army to thewar and inApril was already on themove. On 6May, Nur-ad-Din moved south to

Damascus from his chiefcapital at Aleppo to planthe final details of theexpedition against Egypt.Although in his sixtiethyear hewas still vigorous,the undisputed lord ofSyria, and determined tobring Egypt under hisdirect rule. He hadthreatened interventionbefore, but this time thethreat was to beimplemented.

A man of deep thoughconventionalpiety,Nur-ad-Din was given tophilosophising, and oneMay morning, ridingthrough theorchards aboutDamascus with hisentourage, he might havebeen heard debating theuncertainty of life andhuman ambitions. Soon itwas to seem a propheticepisode,forwithindaystheking was brought to his

sick bed with an acuteinfection of the throat. Asuppuratingulcermadehisbreathing painful andbrought on a fever, ofwhich,on15May,hedied.He had been a goodMuslimandagreatandjustruler. His reputation, woninearlierdays,astheterrorof the infidels, and hisaustere piety had won therespect of his subjects andhis love of justice their

gratitude. More importantstill, the king’s firm andshrewd management ofmen and events hadbrought a generation oforderly stable andcentralised government toan area that had beendivided for centuries. Thequadrilateral of powerwasat last firmly based. Nur-ad-Din had enjoyed therecognitionandblessingofBaghdad; he was the ruler

of Aleppo and Damascusand had installed hisnephew at Mosul. Thanksalmost entirely to him, thegreatprizeofMuslimunityseemed to have been wonand thedaysof the Infidelto be numbered. To hisadmirers his death was abodyblowtoIslam.But,aswillbeargued,itcamejustin time to save thecommunity of the faithfulfrom a new period of

destructivecivilwar.For all his wisdom and

experienceNur-ad-Dinwasnever able to establish atrustingmodusvivendiwithSaladin, his most brilliantand powerful subordinate.The ambitions of theyoungermanwereobviousenough, and there was,perhaps,somejusticeinthecharge that he had notremitted as large a tributeas Aleppo had a right to

expect from the richprovincehegoverned.Andyet he had brought Egyptback toSunniteobedience,theage-oldobjectiveofthestrategistsofBaghdad,andthis had decisively tiltedthe power balance in theHoly War. The ambitionsthat Nur-ad-Din so muchfeared had been turned tothereconquestofterritoriesin Africa and Arabia thatEgypt could legitimately

claim, and so had furtherstrengthened the southernstate without encroachingon Syria’s sphere ofinterest. Saladin was tooclearheaded to risk a trialof strength with Nur-ad-Din, even had he wishedto, and there is nothing tosuggestthathedid.In 1171 Saladin’s father

had advised him againstopendefiance.Atthattime,outside theAiyubid family

even the most loyal ofSaladin’s commanderswould probably havedesertedhimif thekingofSyria had come in personto Cairo, while thenumerous displacedmembers of the Fatimidrégime would willinglyhaveabettedhisoverthrow.HadNur-ad-Dinactedthenon his first impulse hecouldnodoubthaveputanendtoSaladin’scareerand

with it what he and hisadvisers increasinglyregarded as a threat to thedynasty. Three years on,however, Saladin hadwonsuccess and acclaim inEgypt,hehadstrengthenedhis resources and securedhisauthority.Thetimehadpassed for a Syrian walk-over; invasion now wouldalmost certainly havesparkedoffawartoshatterthe unity of Islam in the

Middle East forgenerations.Throughout this bookwe

find the geography andpolitics of power cloudedby a rhetoric of the HolyWar, so eagerly employedby the chief contestantsthat it has coloured theviewofhistoriansas itdidthat of contemporaries.When Nur-ad-Din orSaladinpursuedpolicies toextend and consolidate

their own power – thetraditionalconcernofrulers– they were accused byopponents of betraying thecause of Islam. Nur-ad-Din’s projected campaignagainstEgyptwasjustsucha project, but, given hissuspicions of Saladin andhis obligation to hisdynasty, it is hard to seewhat alternative was opentohim.Solongashelived,Egypt and Syria were

certaintobeatodds,andashis son, eleven in 1174,grew into manhood andinherited the quarrel, therift in Islamwould widen.Paradoxically, for Nur-ad-Dintodiewhenhedidwasto the long-termdisadvantage of theChristians. It offeredSaladin a chance tocombine Syria with Egyptunder his rule whileAleppo and Damascus

were distracted by thepower struggle around theboyheir.The young king of Syria

was the focus of thatstruggle, but the real issuewas the traditional contestfor Syrian supremacybetween the two greatcities. Six days before hisunexpected death, Nur-ad-Din had given a boost tothe prestige of Damascuswhenheheldtheceremony

of his son’s circumcisionthere and had himproclaimed heir in thetraditional way, walkingbefore the boy as he rodethrough the streets andbearing before him theghasiyah, the banner ofoffice. A week later theyoungheirwasproclaimedking and the star ofDamascus was clearly inthe ascendant. The régimethere appointed the regent,

Ibn-al-Muqaddam, whoalso became commander-in-chief of the armedforces.Thenewsoftheoldking’s death was sent toAleppo by pigeon postwhere the governor of thecitadel swore the emirs tothe new allegiance, and itseemed that Aleppo wasgoing to accept the leadwhich Damascus hadassumed.As described by the

Aleppan historian, Kamal-ad-Din,theswearingofthenew allegiance was deftlyhandled by the citadelgovernor, Jamal-ad-Din.The news of Nur-ad-Din’sproclamationofhisheir inDamascus had only justarrived and had not yetbeen officially announcedin Aleppo. Realising theturmoil that might followthe announcement of theking’sdeath,Jamal-ad-Din

accordingly preceded itwith a proclamation of thesuccession ceremony. ‘Heimmediately ordered thatthe drums be beaten andthe cymbals and trumpetssounded; he convened thesuperior officers and thenotables at Aleppo, themen of law and the emirs,and said to them: “Ourmasterhasjustcircumcisedhissonandinstalledhimashis heir….” All expressed

their joy at the news andaddressed their praise togod most high. Then thecommandersaid:“Taketheoath to the son of ourmaster … as … heordained….” Then thedifferent classes of peopletook the oath.’ The waywasprepared fora smoothtransferofpowerinthecityto the powerful family ofIbn-ad-Dayah, formerlyone of Nur-ad-Din’s chief

advisers. The eldest son,Shams-ad-Din, assumedthepositionofgovernorofthe city and took up hisresidence with Jamal-ad-Din in the citadel; hisbrother, Badr-ad-DinHassan Ibn-ad-Dayah, wasnamed chief of police.Meanwhile Shihab-ad-DinIbn-al-Ajami, formerly anofficialofthetreasury,wasnamedthenewvizir to theyoung king. Damascus’s

claimsontheregencywerenottogounchallenged.Butnor were the ambitions oftheDayahfamily.It is reported that as he

laydyingNur-ad-Dinsaid:‘Onlyone thingcausesmeunhappiness,thethoughtofwhatwillbefallmyfamilyat the hands ofYusuf, sonofAiyub.’Shortlyafterhiskingdomwas indeedbeingplundered, but theaggressor was his own

nephew. Saif-ad-Din ofMosul was marching withhis army commander,Gümüshtigin, to join hisuncle’s Egyptianexpedition when the newsof his death reached him.The army at once divided,a detachment underGümüshtigin, pushing ontoAleppotowincontrolofaffairs there for Mosulwhile Saif-ad-Din turnedaway from the remote

prospect of Egypt to thecongenial business ofconquest in the nowleaderlesslandsofnorthernSyria.Sweepingwestward,he took Nisibin, Edessaand ar-Raqqa. At AleppoGümüshtigin soonestablished himself amongthe ruling clique and inJune he was made theleader of the delegation toDamascustobringas-SalihbacktoAleppo.

From the moment theyhadsecuredthemselvestheDayah family had beendetermined to recover theyoungking.Shams-ad-Dinhadwritten to him, urginghimtoreturntothecapital,to supervise the operationsagainst his cousin in al-Jazirah. It seems that theboy, prompted by hismother,favouredthemove.Damascus was obliged torecogniseShams-ad-Dinas

regentandtosurrendertheheir. In the escort, headedby Gümüshtigin, whichtook him to Aleppo, werenumerous Aleppan nobleswho had feared to returnbefore, expecting reprisalsfrom the régime of theDayah clan. They had noneed to worry. Once backwith theking firmly inhiskeeping, Gümüshtiginpromptly had the brothersthrown into the city’s

dungeons.Thenewrégimeat Aleppo began to lookmenacing to Damascus,andthecity’srulerslookedaboutfornewallies.Atfirstthey,likeNur-ad-

Din, had consideredSaladin the chief threat tothe Zengid establishment.Before evening fell on 15May a messenger wasriding post to Cairo todemand that Saladinrecognise as-Salih as

suzeraininEgyptaswellasin Syria. Whereas theZengid, Saif-ad-Din, hadrenounced his allegiance,Saladin ordered that thename of as-Salih beinvokedinall themosquesof Egypt and the NorthAfrican provinces. Theseloyal formalities werefollowedbyanembassytoDamascustodohomagetothe new king. As a tellingearnest of the Egyptian

ruler’s sincerity, it tookwith it coinage newlyminted in Cairo, bearingtheinscriptionofas-Salih.As Saladin’s embassy

was being prepared, therulers of Damascus werereverting to traditionalpolicyandnegotiatingwiththe Franks. Immediatelythe news of Nur-ad-Din’sdeath had reachedJerusalem, King Amalrichad seized his chance to

march on Banyas, thefrontier fortress betweenthe kingdom andDamascus. Ibn-al-Muqaddam hastened tomeet the invaders andoffered to buy them offhandsomely and to releaseall Frankish prisoners inDamascus.HealsopointedoutthedangerwhichEgyptcould pose to both Syriaand Jerusalem andproposed an alliance. The

terms suited Amalric’sstrategy – it seems likelythatthecampaignhadbeenprimarily intended toextractdanegeldratherthanconquer Damascus – theyalsosuitedhisinclinations.He was a desperately sickman, dying on 11 July ofdysentery, at the age ofthirty-eight. Thus by mid-summer, barely twomonths after the death ofthegreatkingofSyria,his

dominions were revertingto their constituent parts.Mosul was plundering theterritories of Aleppo;Aleppo was preparing toforce subjection onDamascus; Damascus wasinalliancewiththeinfidels.The death of Amalric,almost miraculouslyopportune,freedSaladinofthe fear of Christianinterventionashepreparedto intervene in the

crumbling situation inSyria.TheinterestofIslamrequired that he put a stoptotheopeningrivalries;hisown interests required thatheestablishhimselfbeforethose rivalries should besettled. The rulers ofMosul, Aleppo andDamascus,membersofthetraditional Turkish rulingclass, were agreed on onething, if on nothing else:that the inheritance of

Zengi and Nur-ad-DinshouldneverfalltoamereKurd,iftheycouldpreventit. As things turned out,their divisions andsuspicions were too deep,but to take advantage oftheir disunity Saladin hadto take the initiative oneverypossibleoccasion.When news reached him

of Saif-ad-Din’s northernconquests he wroteimmediately to Damascus

demandingtoknowwhyhehad not been officiallyinformed and his helpaskedfor.Healsowroteto‘Imad-ad-Din Zengi, whowasthebrotheroftherulerof Mosul and whom Nur-ad-Din had placed inchargeof theneighbouringcity of Sinjar. Playing onthe young man’s jealousyof his brother’s conquests,Saladinwasabletoopenasplit in the ranks of the

Zengid family, which wasto prove highlyadvantageous. In letters tootherSyrian townsSaladindeploredthealliancestruckbetween Damascus andAmalric, protesting hisown total commitment tothe Holy War. It was apropaganda linewhichhadbeenwellusedbyNur-ad-Din; few people in Syriawould have beenunfamiliar with it, and the

more cynical must havewondered how long itwould last this time.Saladin’sjihadpropagandawas a development ofthemes first sketched outby Nur-ad-Din’sapologists,buttheyweretobeusedtogreatereffect.InalettertoDamascushe

legitimately claimed therighttoactasregent.Therewasnoarguingwith this–infiveyearshehadproved

himselfamasterinwarandpolitics and was now thegreatest figure in theMuslim world. But whenhewenton tospeakof therelations between himselfand his overlord, hestrained credulity: ‘… ifNur-ad-Din had thoughtany of you capable oftaking my place, or beingtrustedashetrustedme,hewould have appointed thatmangovernorofEgypt,the

most important of all hispossessions.’ But it wasprecisely Nur-ad-Din’sdilemma that although histrust in Saladin had sunksteadily since he becamevizir, the king could thinkof no way of displacinghim short of an armedexpedition. Still moreimpudently, the lettercontinues,‘ifdeathhadnotprevented him he wouldhave bequeathed to me

alone theguardianshipandbringing up of his son’.The one thing that deathhad indisputablypreventedNur-ad-Din doing was toleadanarmyintoEgypt totry conclusions with theman now claiming calmlyto have been his mosttrusted lieutenant and thenatural choice for theguardianship. But at thisstage in the devolution ofNur-ad-Din’s power the

focus was the youngsuccessor. Isolated still inEgypt by domesticuncertainties,andgenerallydistrusted by the powerfulmeninSyria,Saladincoulddo little more for themoment than write lettersand protest his loyalty tothe Zengid dynasty.Though even now he felthe could risk a few darkhints.‘Iperceivethattomyhurt you have arrogated to

yourselves the care of mymaster and the son of mymaster. Assuredly I willcome to do him homageand repay the benefits Ihave received from hisfather by service whichshall be remembered forever; and I shall dealwitheach of you according tohiswork.’Bytheendofthesummer

the rulers of Damascusrecognised that the fiery

vizir would soon becomingtoSyrianot just todemonstrate his loyalty tohis new king but with thefull authority of Nur-ad-Din. Ibnal-Muqaddamappealedratherdesperatelyto Mosul, but Saif-ad-Dinwas still pleasantlyoccupied in securing theprovinces he had recentlydetached from the Syriankingdom. So, makingvirtue of necessity, Ibnal-

Muqaddamwrote a formalinvitation to Saladin tocome to Damascus, andeven sent his agentsthrough thecityduring theprecedingweeks to stir upenthusiasm among thepopulace. This indicateshow far out of touch withpopular feeling the rulingclique had become, forSaladin’s stock stood highwiththecitizenryatlarge.Towards the end of

October Saladin set outfrom Cairo with just 700picked cavalry, his brotherTughtigin and chancelloral-Fadil. The Franks madeno attempt to harass hisrapid march through theirlands of Transjordan andhe was joined on his wayby various desert shaikhsand local garrisoncommanders.Amongthesewere his cousin Nasir-ad-Din, son of Shirkuh, and

Sadiq-ibn-Jaulah,masterofBusra,whowasastonishedat the small force thevizirhadwithhimandhowlittletreasure he had brought tobribe the city’s officials.But Saladin was travellinglight, determined to get tothetheatreofactionasfastaspossibleaftermonthsofenforced delay. The factthat he was also riding atthe direct invitation of thegovernorofthecitywasan

advantage that he couldhardly have hoped for. Inthese circumstances speedwas more important thansecurity, and in any caseSaladinwasconfidentofapopular reception. Hisarrival on 28 October wassomething of a love feast,with populardemonstrationsofwelcomebeginning while he wasstill miles from the citywalls.

Perhaps the citizens hadnot forgotten that thevizir’s father, Aiyub, hadbeen their governor.Saladin had no intentionthat they should: the firstnight he spent in hisfather’s old house. ThenextdayIbn-al-Muqaddamordered the gates of thecitadel opened. He wasremoved from his post infavourofSaladin’sbrotherTughtigin but assured of a

profitable appointment inthe future. Tughtigin wasinstalledasgovernorofthecity in the name of theyoung king as-Salih, andduringawhirlwindten-dayvisitSaladin found time towin thegoodgracesof thecity fathers with a morepractical and pointedgesture when he abolishedthe non-canonical taxes,forbidden during the reignof Nur-ad-Din but

reimposed by the régimewhich had claimed soinsistently the right to theguardianshipofhisson.Healso received an embassyfromAleppo.Saladin had sent envoys

ahead to Aleppo with aletterprotestinghis loyaltyto as-Salih. ‘I come fromEgyptinservicetoyouandtofulfilanobligationtomydead master. I beg you totake no notice of the

adviserswhosurroundyouatthemoment;theydonotshow you the respect dueyour statusandwieldyourauthority for their ownends.’ It is difficult to seewhat, if anything, Saladinhoped to gain by this.Thecourt at Aleppo includednumerous powerful andlong-standing enemies ofhis, and the young kingseemstohavechosentheirprotection willingly. He

certainly had little to gainby putting himself underSaladin’s tutelage. Themost powerful man inSyria was unlikely tosurrender the absoluteauthority when the timecame to end the minority.Aleppo rejected hisprotestations of loyaltywith calculated contempt.The embassy was led byone of the generals whohadleftEgyptyearsbefore

in protest at Saladin’sappointmentasvizir.Afterhehaddeliveredtheking’sformal rejection ofSaladin’s claim to theregency the ambassadorlaunched into a tirade ofinsults and invective.AccusingSaladinofhavingcome into Syria to usurpthe kingdom outright, hewent on: ‘The swords thatonce captured Egypt foryou are still in our hands

and the spears with whichyou seized the castles ofthe Fatimids are ready onour shoulders and themenwho once resigned yourservicewillnowforceyouto quit Syria. For yourarrogance has overreacheditself. You! – You are butone of Nur-ad-Din’s boys;whoneedspeople likeyouto protect his son?’ Theywere words to strain theconventions of diplomatic

immunity to breakingpoint, and the ambassadorhad perhaps Saladin’srenownedchivalrytothankthat he escaped with hislife.Within days of this

explosive interview theEgyptian and Damasceneforceswere on the road toAleppo. On 9 DecemberSaladin took the town ofHoms, leaving adetachment of troops to

contain the garrison of thecitadel. From there hemarchedontoHamah.Thetown’s governor hadplayedanimportantroleinsettingupthenewAleppanrégimeduringthesummer,but now he decided toaccept Saladin’s claims ofloyalty to the young kingand agreed to go and puthis case at Aleppo. If therégime there refused anaccommodation he would

surrender Hamah. He wasarrested on arrival atAleppoandhisbrother,leftin charge at Hamah,handed the place over toSaladin. By 30 DecemberSaladin was before thewalls of Aleppo, preparedfor an extended siege. Indesperation Gümüshtigincalled for help not onlyfrom the Franks but alsofrom Sinan, the leader ofthe heretical Assassin sect

based at castle Masyaf inthemountains to the southandwestofhisbeleagueredcity.Gümüshtigin’s appeal to

Sinan and the latter’sagreement are just onemore instance of howpoliticsoverrodeprinciplesand expediency cancelledtradition in twelfth-centurySyria.Saladinwas soon tomake propaganda out ofthe fact that the rulers of

Aleppo who claimed theright to advise the son ofNur-ad-Dindidnotscrupleto ally with his greatenemy. But for the timebeing Saladin’s life wasendangeredbythealliance.One day during the firstweek of January 1175 amurdergangmade itswayto the heart of his campoutside Aleppo. Theirdisguise was not pierceduntil the last moment and

oneof themwascutdownat the very entrance to thevizir’stent.Aleppo made a

surprisingly determinedresistance to Saladin. Theruling clique paraded theyoung king through thestreetstobegthesupportofthepeople;withtearsinhiseyes he implored them toprotect him from hisfather’s rebellious servantwho had come to rob him

of his inheritance.Aleppanswereproudtobeloyal to the memory andthe heir of Nur-ad-Din,whatever they might thinkof the men who hadsucceeded to government,andtheyfoughtstubbornly.However, whenGümüshtigin relaxed therestrictions on the Shi‘itesectinthecitytheirloyaltywas strained. The revisedregulations were no doubt

partofthepricethathadtobe paid for the alliancewith Sinan, and they didguarantee the support ofthe communal effort by areligiousminority,buttheydidnothing to improve thepopularity of the hereticalsect. Having appealed toheretics outside the cityandplacatedhereticsinsidethe walls GümüshtiginpreparedtoforceSaladintoraise his siege by allying

withtheinfidels.Like the Syrians, the

Christians were in thethroes of a royalminority,however the regent,Raymond of Tripoli,enjoyed general support inthe kingdom and was acompetent ruler andadministrator. Followingthe spirit of the alliancethat Amalric had agreedwith Ibn-al-Muqaddam ofDamascus, he now

marchedagainstthecityofHomsand,inalliancewiththe garrison of the citadelwhichstillheldforAleppo,openedadiversionaryfrontto relieve the pressure onAleppo. The force thatSaladin had left at Homscouldnothope toholdoutagainst the Christian armyandthegarrison,andratherthan lose the city for thesake of an uncertain siegeSaladin hurried south.

Raymond immediatelywithdrew from Homs andin mid-March Saladinforcedthecitadelaswellasthe city into submission.He then marched onBaalbek, which alsocapitulated.ByApril 1175Saladin was master ofSyria from Hamahsouthwards, and the worstfears of the Zengidministers in Aleppo wereconfirmed.

BythistimetheEgyptiansuccesseswerebeingtakenseriouslyevenatMosul.Inthe previous year, Saif-ad-Din had refused appealsfrom Aleppo andDamascus.Hedidnottrustthe régimes and wasdetermined to consolidatehis hold on the territorieshehad takenfromAleppo.But now he realised thatthe future of the wholedynasty was in jeopardy

and sent his brother, ‘Izz-ad-Din, with a large forceto join thewestern armies.At the same time hemarched with theremainder of his armyagainst Sinjar, where hisother brother, ‘Imad-ad-Din, had gone over toSaladin. The carefully laidalliance with Sinjar wasnow paying its dividendsby diverting part of theMosul war effort away

fromtheattackonSaladin.Butwhen the allied forcesofAleppoandMosulmadecontactwithhimatHamah,where he was waitinganxiously forreinforcementsfromEgypt,itwasobvious thathewasfaroutnumbered.Despite their advantage,

however, the alliedcommanders decided onnegotiations. Theconcessions he at first

offered showed just howconscious Saladin was ofhis weakness, but hisenemies also had somedifficult calculations tomake.Overthethirtyyearsof Nur-ad-Din’s reignAleppo had reversed thetraditional supremacy ofMosul and Gümüshtiginhad no intention ofcrushing Saladin only tofindhimselfonceagainthesubordinateofSaif-ad-Din.

If he could persuade theEgyptian ruler to renouncehis recent conquestswithout a fight then thearmyofMosulwouldhaveserved itspurpose,withoutwinning the initiative inSyria. At first negotiationseemed to promise a quitedazzling success forAleppo. Saladin agreed torecognise her supremacy,to restore Homs, Hamahand Baalbek, to retain

Damascusonlyasgovernorfor as-Salih, and even tomake restitution for themoney he had distributedfrom the royal treasurytheretothepopulaceofthecity. It looked likeawalk-over,alwaysassumingthatthe Egyptian vizir wouldhaveheldtothetermsoncehe felt strong enough tochallenge them. But theallies pushed theiradvantage too far when

theyinsistedononefurthercondition and demandedthe cessionofRahba.Thistown had been among theholdings of Shirkuh thatNurad-Dinhadconfiscated.Saladin had restored it toShirkuh’s son, Nasir-ad-Din, and to surrender itnow would not only be acompleteacceptanceofas-Salih’s royal prerogativesbut, more importantly,wouldundermineSaladin’s

position as theheadof theAiyubid dynasty. He hadbeen spinning out thenegotiations and usingbribery among the enemycommanders to win timeforhisownreinforcements,led by his nephewsFarrukh-ShahandTaqi-ad-Din,toarrive.Butwiththislast demand thenegotiations had to breakdown.The battlewas fought on

13 April. Occupying atwin-peaked hill knownlocally as the Horns ofHamah, Saladin had theadvantage of terrain, buteven so he was hardpressed until thereinforcements came up inthe nick of time. Theenemy were utterly routedand a massacre was onlyaverted by the orders ofSaladin,who rode into thethick of the battle to stop

thekilling.Now itwashisturn to dictate terms, andthey were surprisinglymoderate. All politicalprisonersinAleppoweretobe released and theAleppan army was tomarch under Saladinagainst the Franks onrequest,buttheyoungkingwastostayatAleppounderthe guardianship of itsrulers.Despitehisdecisivevictory in thefieldSaladin

hadneitherthetimenortheresourcesfortheprotractedsiegethatwouldhavebeenneeded toconquerAleppo.In any case events wereflowing in his favour. As-SalihmightstillbekinginAleppobuthisadvisershadbeen forced to recogniseSaladin’s independentauthority in his ownterritories. He formallyrenouncedhisallegiancetothe Zengid house and

assumed the title ofsovereigninhisnewSyrianlands–thetitlewassoontobeconfirmedbythecaliph.The first round in Syria

had been won. It was avictory for the interests ofIslamaswellasforSaladinhimself. Of course theZengid establishmentaccused him of self-interested arrivisme.Appealing to thepeopleofAleppo, as-Salih had

pilloriedhimas‘thisunjustman who aims to relieveme of my town; whorepudiates the benefitswhichmy father showereduponhim;whohasrespectfor the rights neither ofGod nor of Man’.Dispatches from the armyof Mosul before its defeatat Hamah referredcontemptuously to ‘thismad dog barking at hismaster’. In Aleppo the

rulers claimed: ‘We havelost only the bodilymanifestation of Nur-ad-Din, but his spirit is stillwith us and the All HighGod will guard hisdynasty.’ In reply SaladinpouredscornonDamascusand Aleppo, who hadboughtthefriendshipoftheFranks: ‘the treasure ofAllah,meant for his causeand the interests of Islam,has been wickedly

dissipated, to the anger ofGod and of all piousMuslims’. The wealth ofAleppo had been given tothe infidels and boughtlances to pierce Muslimbreasts,menwhoactedlikethis had ostracisedthemselves from thecommunity of the faithful.Still worse was theirbetrayaloftheprinciplesofthe Faith itself. In MosulSaif-ad-Din had repealed

Nur-ad-Din’s prohibitionon wine, while in Aleppoeven heretics found favourwith theauthorities. ‘Whatan astonishing differencethereisbetweenthosewhocarry on the struggleagainst the infidels andthose who prefer thefriendshipoftheimpioustotrue believers and whohand over to them theirmostprecioustreasures.’Saladin was able to turn

the most unlikely materialto propaganda advantage;butwhathehadtosayrangtruetomanyinAleppoandDamascus who had beendisillusioned by thecompromising policies oftheir rulers.So longas theZengids ruled inSyriaandSaladin in Egypt thechancesofacommonfrontagainst theChristianswereremote. Saladin claimedthattheonlyreasonforhis

expedition to Syria was touniteIslamand‘putanendto the calamities inflictedbyherenemies.’‘…ifthiswar against the Franks didnot necessitate unity itwould not matter to mehowmanyprinces ruled inIslam’. There were plentyto contest this claimat thetime and many who havedonesosince,buttherecanbe no question that hadSaladinnotwoncontrolof

thewhole ofNur-ad-Din’sinheritance thewar againstthe Franks would havebeencrippled.Having now won a de

facto authority in SyriaSaladin needed itconfirmed. He had writtento Baghdad to request adiploma recognising hisconquests and conferringthetitleofking,andinthelettersetouthiscredentialsasachampionofIslam.He

listedhismasteryofEgyptand its return to Sunniteallegiance, his victoriesover the Franks and therecoveryoftheYemenandNorthAfrican territories totheAbbasidallegiance.HeclaimedthathehadenteredSyria in the name of theyoung king as-Salih for‘under her presentgovernment Syria wouldneverfindorder.Sheneedsa man able to lead her to

theconquestofJerusalem.’He concluded with arequest for a diploma ofinvestiture with the landshe had conquered andpromisedthatallhisfutureconquests shouldbe in thename of the caliph ofBaghdad. This wassomething thatNur-ad-Dinhad never guaranteed, andit is interesting to seehowimportantSaladin,regardedby the Turkish

establishmentasausurper,rated the approval of thenominal head of theMuslimworld.Therespectwas, with reason,reciprocated. With such aservant as Saladin,acknowledging only thecaliphal authority andmaking no appeal to theTurkish sultanate, thecaliph’s prestige wasimmensely strengthened.Saladin phrased his

application diplomaticallyand chose as ambassadorMuhammad-al-Baalbekki,reputedly the first man tomake the SunniteinvocationinCairo.InMayanofficialdelegationcameto him in Hamah bearingthe confirmation of hisauthority in Egypt and hisconquestsinSyria,andthediplomas, the honorificrobesandtheblackbannersoftheAbbasidcourtwhich

confirmed also his royaltitle. The same year hisname was invoked in themosques of Egypt andSyriaandhehadtheCairomint issue coins with theproudinscription,‘al-Malikal-Nasir Yusuf ibn-Aiyub,alaghaya,’–‘Theking,thebringer of victory, Yusufson ofAiyub, lift high thebanner!’By the end of May

Saladin was back in

Damascus. His victorieshad secured him abreathingspacetoorganisehis new territories andensurecontrolofevents inEgypt.TheMuslimsofthenorth were licking theirwounds, and to givehimself time tomanoeuvreSaladinagreedatrucewiththe kingdom of Jerusalem.The mediator wasHumphreyIIofToron, therevered elder statesman of

the kingdom, respected bySaladin since theirfriendship of eight yearsbefore. Sporadic Christianraiding continued, butnothing serious enough todistract Saladin’sreorganisationathome.Newgovernorshad tobe

appointed and the mostimportant posts went tomembers of the family.Damascus to Taqi-ad-Din,HomstoNasir-ad-Din,and

HamahtooneofSaladin’suncles; the importantcommand at Baalbek,whereAiyubhadoncelaidthe fortunes of the family,was given to Ibn-al-Muqaddam,who had beenpromised a senior postwhen he surrendered thecitadel of Damascus toSaladin the previous year.Affairs in Egypt needed astrong and loyal hand.Saladin dispatched his

secretary al-Fadil with theEgyptian expeditionaryforce back to Cairo and‘Imad-ad-DintookoverhisdutiesatDamascus.Meanwhile, new trouble

was brewing to the north.Saif-ad-Din, furious at thedisaster of Hamah, wasnegotiating again withAleppo to reopenhostilities. The sameambassador was alsoinstructed to go on to

Damascus, after fixing anarrangement with Aleppo,to assure Saladin thatMosul would respect thearmistice between the twoSyrian capitals. Accordingto one source theambassador, in his officialaudience with Saladin,handed over not thedocument intended for thekingbutAleppo’s reply tothe proposed alliance withMosul. Saladin certainly

heardof thecomingattacksomehow,intimetocallupreservesfromEgypt.Toprepareforthecoming

campaign, GümüshtigindecidedtoensureChristiangoodwill by releasingRaynald of Chatillon andJoscelin ofCourtenaywhohad been prisoners inAleppo for the past fifteenyears. He next attended aformal reconciliation withSaif-ad-Din of Mosul. As

their armies moved south,Saladinmoved up tomeetthem.Thetwoforcesmadecontact on 21April, abouttwenty miles to the north-east of Hamah, whileSaladin’s troops werewatering their horses. Hisenemy scattered and takentotally unawares Saif-ad-Dinhadvictoryinthepalmofhishand,buthethrewitaway. With absurd over-confidence, he rejected his

staff’s advice for animmediate attack. ‘Whyshould we inconvenienceourselves over thedestruction of this upstart?Tomorrow will be soonenough.’ Saladin was lefttooccupytherisinggroundof Tall as-Sultan at hisleisure. At first the battleon the following daywentagainst him, despite theadvantage of terrain. Hisleftwingwasbeingpushed

back by the troops of Irbiluntil a counter-charge ledby Saladin himself put astoptotheretreat.Then,attheheadofhisbodyguard,hewent over to the attackinthatsegmentofthefrontand routed the enemy,unprepared for thisreversal.Saif-ad-Dinbarelygot off the field and mostof his officers werecaptured. The camp, asSaladindrilyobserved,was

more like a commontavern. His officersrecruited the singing girlsto their harems while hissoldiers drank themselvesstupidonthevaststoresofwine. Saladin took only acollection of cage birds.They were sent on to theretreatingSaif-ad-Dinwiththerecommendationthatinfutureheconfinehimselftosuchamusementsandretirefromthebusinessofwar.

Saladin pushed hisadvantage. Four days afterthe battle he was againoutside the walls ofAleppo, but this time hehad no intention ofbesiegingtheplace.Insteadhe aimed to isolate it, andmarched northeast to thecity of Manbij. Itscommander was an oldenemy but surrendered thetownwithoutafightonthesole condition that he be

given a safe conduct forhimself and his treasure toMosul. When he had lefttherewasstillanestimatedtwomillionsinbullionandtreasure left in the city.Generally Saladin keptlittle booty for himself,preferring to supplementhis soldiers’ pay with theproceeds, but on thisoccasionhisfancyseemstohave been tickled by thefact that some of the plate

borehisname,Yusuf,alsothenameofthegovernor’sfavourite son. It seemed tothe conqueror too good ajoke to miss. ‘Yusuf?’ hequeried. ‘That’sme, Iwilltake as my share of theplunder all the pieces thatappear to have beenreservedforme.’From Manbij he moved

westtoAzaz.By21Juneittoo was in his hands.Aleppo was now menaced

tonorthandwest;andnowSaladin moved against thecapital itself. It looks asthough Gümüshtigin hadexpected his enemy tocomplete the encirclementof Aleppo by attackingHarim,twenty-fivemilestothe west of it, for hehimselfhad takenover thecommand of the garrisonthere.Infactthismaywellhave been Saladin’soriginal intention, changed

only when he learnt thatGümüshtiginwasnotinhiscapital. He openednegotiations almost atonce,andwithinfourdays,on 29 July, a treaty wassigned whereby Aleppofinally acknowledgedSaladin’stitleofkinginhisconquests.Saladinhadwonall he could reasonablyhave looked for. The heirof Nur-ad-Din had beenforced to concede regal

honours to his father’slieutenant. This, with theconfirmation of thosehonours which Baghdadhadalreadygranted,meantthat of the crucialquadrilateralofpoweronlyMosul remained inopposition. Itwas thenextobjective, but for the timebeingitcouldwait.Saladin concluded his

campaign in Aleppanterritory with a

characteristically courtlygesture. When the treatynegotiations were finisheda young girl came to thecourttobegafavourofthenewkinginSyria.Shewasthe sister of as-Salih andshehadcometobegforthecastle of Azaz so recentlyconquered.On the far sideofAleppofromDamascus,it would have been aremotefortresstogarrison,andthelandsaroundithad

already been retroceded toAleppo in the treaties.Saladin granted it to hisyoung petitioner, loadedher with presents andescorted her back to thegates of Aleppo with hisfull staff. He would havebeen within his rights tohaveheldthiscitadel,eventhough the surroundinglands had been returned tothe dominion of Aleppo;the fact that he did not do

so was not an emptygesture, and the way hehonoured the princessswelled his growingreputation for chivalry.Byrelinquishing his hold onAzaz,andbynotpressingasiege of Aleppo where henowhadagoodchanceoffinal victory, Saladinshowed that his objectivewas not to annihilate hisopponents in Islam but toforcethemtoacknowledge

hisclaims.After his triumph at

Aleppo he returned toDamascus in late August.In a twelve-day stay therehe appointed his elderbrother,Turan-Shah,asthenew governor and alsocelebrated his ownmarriagetooneofthegreatladies of the city, Asimat-ad-Din. About the sameageasthekinghimself,shehad been one of thewives

of Nur-ad-Din. Themarriage put the seal onSaladin’stwo-yearmilitaryand political campaign towintheinheritanceofNur-ad-Din. On 22 September1176, to a tumultuouswelcome, he made histriumphalentrytoCairo.Five days before, Kilij

ArslanofKonyahadwonacrushing victory over theByzantine emperor,Manuel. The emperor had

aimedtomaketheroadsofAnatolia safe for Christianarmies and if he had wonon the field ofMyriocephalum he wouldhave been the greatestpower in northern Syriaand the kingdom ofJerusalem could havecontemplated a majoroffensive.Asthingsturnedout, one of the greatestarmies Constantinople hadever mustered was

destroyed and the militarymachine of the empire setback a generation. Theemperor himself comparedthe disaster to that ofManzikert 105 yearsbefore.Before we leave the

accountof thesetwoandahalf years, so critical inSaladin’s career, there isonestrangeepisodestill tobe dealt with. Chance hadremovedsomeof themost

seriousobstaclestohisrise,his own political sense ormilitary prowess haddisposedofothers,buthowthe hostility of the sinisterAssassins was alsoneutralised remainssomething of a mystery.During the siege of Azazon 22 May Saladin hadbarelyescapedwithhislifefroma second attempt.Hehadbeenresting,notinhisowntentbutthatofoneof

his staff officers,whenhisfirst assailant broke in andstruck at his head with aknife.Theblowglancedoffthe cap of mail the kingwore under his turban; asecondblowtotheneckcutthrough the collar of thethick riding tunic he waswearing but was stoppedby the mail shirtunderneath.Withinsecondsthe king’s personalattendanthadcourageously

grasped the knife by theblade so that it cut hisfingerstotheboneandthenkilled the man. But twomore attackers followed inakamikaze-styleattempttocomplete the missionbefore the guards couldcomeup. Saladin, shockedto be so vulnerable in theheartofhisowncamp,andalso terrified as he franklyadmitted later, rode at topspeed for the headquarters

compound. The enquirythat followed revealed,unnervingly enough, thatthe three had been able toenrol in the personalbodyguard of the kingwithoutquestionsasked.From this time Saladin

was to sleep in a speciallyconstructed wooden towerbunk inside his tent. HealsodeterminedtorouttheAssassins out of theirmountain stronghold at

Masyaf. He opened theoperation with systematicpillaging of thesurrounding country andthenlaidsiegetothecastle.Sinanhimselfwasawayatthe time and hurried backwhen the king’s summonsfor surrender reached him.He demanded animmediate interview withSaladinandthen,withonlytwocompanions, retired tothe top of a hill

overlooking the besiegingarmy and awaiteddevelopments.Thinkingheat last had the old man inhis power, Saladin senttroops and messengers tokill or arrest him, but theyreturned with frighteningtales of powerful magicthat made their weaponspowerless. The kinghimself now began to fearwhether his enemy wassomething more than

mortal, but took theprecaution of surroundingthe approaches to his tentwithchalkdustandcindersto record the steps of anyintruder.Afewnightslaterthe king awoke to see ashadowyfigureglideoutofhis tent. Some hot sconesbaked in a shapecharacteristic of the sect’sbread were on his pillowandbesidethem,pinnedtoit by a poisoned dagger,

wasanotewithamysticalthreattohislife.Therewasnosignoffootstepsoutsidethe tent. Saladin wasconvinced that Sinan hadvisited him that night andsent to beg him to pardonhisformererrorsandgranthim a safe conduct out ofhislands.Thiswasgrantedonly when the siege ofMasyafwasraised.Apart from the magical

element in this account,

which is based on theversion of a biographer ofSinan, it is worth noticingthat Nur-ad-Din in hisattempts to stamp out theAssassinswasthepreytoasimilar nocturnal visitcomplete with poisoneddagger and warning note.There were orthodoxMuslims who believed inthe magical powers ofSinan, and the incrediblefeats of mind over matter

still performed by similarsects today easily explainhow people came to fearand avoid their medievalpredecessors. Saladin didcall off the siege ofMasyaf, only days aftermounting it, for noidentifiablemilitaryreason,andheneveragainsufferedtheattentionsofSinan.Maybe he knewwhen to

concedeapoint.Maybe,inthetime-honouredclichéof

theofficercorps,he‘knewhow to handle men’ –opponents as well asfriends. The career of Ibnal-Muqaddam is a case inpoint. As Nur-ad-Din’sgovernor in Damascus hehad at first held the cityagainst Saladin but thenyielded the place to himand became his loyal manuntildeath,eventhoughhewasremovedfromhispostin favour of Saladin’s

nominee. It was to beexpected, of course, butclearly the transfer washandled with due concernfor thedeposedgovernor’sfeelings and he acceptedthe demotion withoutresentment. In due coursehe was given thegovernorship of Baalbek,Saladin’s childhood homecity, and a few years laterwe find him leading theDamascus Hajj as the

proud representativeof theliberator of Jerusalem. Infacthediedinaskirmishtodefend his lord’s prestigeagainst the representativeofthecaliph.Theabilitytoinspire rather than enforceloyalty is a critical qualityof leadership. Few mendefected from the serviceof Saladin once they hadmade their commitment tohim.

Chapter8

TriumphintheNorth

Saladin marched out ofEgypt once again as achampion of the jihad on18 November 1177. Hisspieshad toldhim that the

alliancebetweentheFranksand the Byzantines hadbrokendownand also thatCount Philip of Flanders,whose arrival in thesummer had seemed tothreaten the Muslims, hadno serious militaryintentions.AstheEgyptianarmymovedupthecoasttoPalestine it seemed at firsttobeaimingforGaza.TheTemplars, who garrisonedthe place, called up all

available reserves only tosee the enemy march paston the road to Ascalon.King Baldwin, with 500knights and the bishop ofBethlehem,wasabletogetinto the fortress beforeSaladin arrived. The kingsent out urgent messagesfor reinforcements but,leaving a small force tohem in the royal army,Saladin marchedconfidently on Jerusalem.

The road was wide open,the Christians had beendivided and decoyed topositions away to the rearof the fast-moving attack.The army was jubilant atthe prospect ofreconquering the HolyCity, and Saladin, pleasedat the success of hismanoeuvre, relaxed theusuallystrictdiscipline.Atan uncertain locationknown toWilliam of Tyre

as ‘Mons Gisardi’ and asthe ‘Battle of Ramla’ byArab sources, the carefreerazziawastoberouted.YoungKingBaldwin the

Leper now roused hiskingdomtoaheroiceffort.A message was smuggledthrough the Muslimblockade of Ascalon,ordering the Templars atGaza to join the royalarmy. When they arrivedBaldwin and his knights

were able to break out ofthe encirclement and thecombinedforces thunderedup the road to Ibelin andthereturnedinlandtowardsJerusalem. ‘Howling likedogs’ down the ruggedravines, they took thescattered Egyptian armycompletely by surprise.Saladin barely escapedwith his life; wholedetachments wereslaughtered where they

stood; thousands of othersfled in terror without anythought of taking up theirbattle formations. Inheadlong flightsouthwards, theyabandoned camp, booty,prisoners and even theirweapons. It was a crucialChristian victory. WithJerusalem at his mercySaladinhadheldthefateofthe kingdom in his hand,but his own over-

confidence and thelightning recovery of theChristians had transformedatriumphforthejihadintohumiliating defeat. TheEgyptianswereharassedbyBedouin as they struggledback across Sinai, andSaladin,knowing theblowhis prestige had suffered,sent messengers ahead onracing camels to Cairo toproclaim his safety andreturn.Fromthecapitalthe

news was broadcastthrough the country bypigeon post, and thepossibilityofrebellionwasaverted. The Egyptianswere back in force inPalestine the next year –but the capture ofJerusalem had been putbackadecade.Baldwin was not strong

enough to march onDamascus and so undo allSaladin’sprogressinSyria,

but he did strengthen hisown frontiers. HumphreyofToron,theconstableandoneofthekingdom’smostrevered elder statesmen,built a fortress on the Hillof Hunin that commandedtheroadfromBanyastohiscastle.Thekingbuiltanewfortification on the upperJordan overlooking animportant crossing knownas Jacob’s Ford. Itwas onsensitive territory. The

local peasantry who owedallegiance to Damascus orJerusalemdependingontheside of the river they hadtheir homes used the fordregularly to take theirflocks fromonegrazing toanother.TreatyagreementsgovernedtheplaceandtheFrankshadpromisednevertofortifyit.ForthisreasonBaldwin, despite his greatvictory, was reluctant totake action which could

onlybeprovocative.Urgedon by the Templars,however, he did go aheadwith the building. Thefortress, by militarising a‘friendly’ stretch of thefrontier,angeredBaldwin’sown subjects amongst thepeasant population as wellas those of Damascus.Soon they were appealingto Saladin to force theChristianstoabidebytheirtreatyobligations. Itwas a

badtimetoaskhishelpforhe was rearranging theadministration atDamascus.His brother Turan-Shah,

thegovernorofDamascus,had been lax in his dutiesand had also been onsuspiciously good termswith as-Salih at Aleppo.Saladin installed hisnephew Farrukh-Shah asthe new governor, and,much against his will,

pacified his brother withthe lordship of Baalbek –even though for the pastthree years it had beenloyally held by Ibn-al-Muqaddam.Withthingssounsettled in his highcommand, Saladin wasunwilling to risk acampaigntosatisfypeasantpetitioners. Instead heoffered tobuy thekingoffwith 60,000 gold pieces;when this was refused, he

uppedtheofferto100,000,and when the Christiansstill refused to dismantletheircastlehewarnedthemit would be destroyed andswore an oath to settle theaffair as soon as eventswerepropitious.In the spring of the next

year, 1179, the seasonalmovementof flocksacrossJacob’s Ford sparked offthe war that was bound tocomesooneror later.King

Baldwin, based at the newcastle, was preparing toroundup the flocks and inAprilSaladinsentFarrukh-Shahwith a small force toreconnoitre. In fact theycame on the Christiansunexpectedly and,attacking promptly, cameneartodestroyingthearmyand capturing the king.Thanks to a heroicrearguard byHumphrey ofToron, he did escape, but

Humphrey himself wasmortallywoundedanddieda few days later at thecastle of Hunin. Even hisMuslim enemies hadrespected the grand oldman, and his death was asevere blow to Christianmorale. Once againSaladin, perhaps caughtunprepared by theunexpected success, feltunable to follow up thevictory.Helaidsiegetothe

castle at Jacob’s Ford butwithdrew after only a fewdaystohisbaseatBanyas.From there he sent outdetachments of troops toplunder the harvest fromSidon to Beirut whileBaldwinmovedinforcetoToron, across the riverfrom Saladin’sheadquarters, to deal withtheraidersontheirreturn.Scouts soon brought the

Christianleadersnewsofa

plundering party movingslowly south from Sidonunder the command of theredoubtable Farrukh-Shah.Itwastheidealopportunitytopayoffanoldscore,andtheChristiansmoveduptointercept the isolatedcolumn, laden with bootyand flushed with success,sureofaneasyvictory.ThearmiesmetintheValleyofthe Springs between theLitani river and the upper

waters of the Jordan. Theking quickly scattered theMuslims while theTemplars and a force ledby Raymond of Tripolimoved on up the valley,screening the action of theroyal troops andreconnoitring the groundforanadvanceintoMuslimterritory.EvenanattackonDamascus itselfmust haveseemed a possibility. Infact at the head of the

valley the Christianadvance guard found itselfface to facewith themainMuslim army commandedbySaladin.Keepingakeenlook-out for his raidingparties, which he knewwould be vulnerable ontheirreturn,hehadseentheherds on the opposite sideof the Jordan stampedingand had guessed that theyhad been disturbed by theChristian army on the

march. Rapidly mobilisinghismenhehadgoneouttotherescue.Although the Christians

hadbeentakenbysurprise,the result of the comingbattle was by no means aforegone conclusion. TheMuslim army was fresh,but so were the Templarsand Tripolitans that facedthem. Down the valleyBaldwin’s force haddispersed Farrukh-Shah’s

men and needed only timetore-formtomeetthenewthreat. Had the Christianadvance guard stood firmthe whole army mightsystematically have beenbroughttobearonSaladin.As it was, the Templarscharged haphazard themoment the enemy wassighted. Soon they werebeingrolledbackdownthevalleyontothedisordered,thoughvictorious,troopsof

Baldwin. In the rout thatfollowed some of theChristian fugitives madetheirway tosafetyand thecoast while the king andCountRaymond ofTripoliwere able to bring part ofthe army to the crusadercastle of Beaufort on thewest bank of the Litani.Hundreds stranded on theeast bank were massacredor taken prisoner. Thedimensions of the disaster

were measured by themany noble prisonerstaken. Among them wasthe master of the Temple,who contemptuouslyrefused an offer of hisfreedom in exchange forone of Saladin’s capturedemirs, declaring that theMuslim world could notboast a man that was hisequal.HediedatDamascusthe following year. Of theother distinguished

prisonersBaldwinofIbelinwas released in exchangefor 1,000 Muslimprisoners-of-war and apromisetofindaransomof150,000goldpieces.Ithadbeenagreatvictory

yet Saladin did not feelable to push his advantagetoofar.Theroyalarmyhadbeen scattered but a reliefforce led by Raymond ofSidon, though it had beentoo late to join the battle,

was still in the field. Thetroops in Beaufort formedthe nucleus round whichthe fugitives could rally;the garrisons atHunin andJacob’s Ford were stillintactandinadditionnewsreached Saladin of thearrival of a large body ofknightsfromEuropeledbyHenry II of Champagne.But Saladin did decide tofulfiltheoathhehadtakento destroy the castle at

Jacob’s Ford. In the lastdays of August 1179 theplace was overrun, thegarrison put to the swordand the fortificationslevelledtotheground.Thechivalrous company fromFrance proved moreinterested in pilgrimagethansiegesandreturnedtoFrance. Once moreSaladin’s operations inPalestine lapsed and theonly offensive for the rest

of theyearwasadramaticraid by the Egyptian fleeton the shipping in theharbour at Acre. It was atribute to the fightingefficiencyofSaladin’snewmodel fleet and cost theChristians a good deal inmerchandise and vessels,but it had little impact onthecampaign.The year 1180 opened

with a highly successfulraid into Galilee. But

neither side was muchinterested in continuinghostilities. A droughtduringthewinterandearlyspring threatened both.King Baldwin’s offers oftruce were accepted bySaladin,andinMayatwo-year truce was signed.Hostilities with Tripolicontinuedforawhile–theEgyptian navy made asuccessful raid on the portofTortosabutSaladinwas

repulsed in a foray inlandin al-Buqai‘ah. Soon afterthishecame to termswithRaymond and turned hisattentionnorthwards.Hehadbeencalledon to

intervene in a disputebetween Nur-ad-DinMuhammad,princeofHisnKaifa, andKilijArslan theSelchük ruler of Konya.Nur-ad-Din owed histhroneatHisnKaifato thepatronage of his great

namesake. His father haddied when he was stillyoung, and the town hadbeen in danger of comingunder the domination ofMosul,thenruledbyQutb-ad-Din, brother of the lordofAleppo. The greatNur-ad-Dinhadheldhisbrotherback and protected theyoung prince, but HisnKaifa still had reason todistrustMosulandonNur-ad-Din’s death had allied

with Saladin. The youngNur-ad-Din had also takento wife one of thedaughters of Kilij Arslanbut had subsequentlytreatedhersobadlythatherfather was threatening tomarch and take reprisals.The approach of Saladin’sarmy from Syria wasenoughtopacifytheangrysultan of Konya, and heeven sent an envoy todiscuss long-term peace

withthenewkingofSyria.A conference at Samosataon the Euphrates, held weare told inOctober, settledatwo-yeartruce.This,withthe agreement he hadalready reached with theChristians, gave Saladintime to stabilise hisposition in Egypt andconfirmhisholdonSyria.ArrivinginCairoearlyin

1181, he spent the rest ofthat year engrossed in

Egyptian affairs, butimportant developmentswere soon to draw himnorth again. During thesummer the Frankish lordof al-Karak, Raynald ofChatillon, broke the truce,and in December as-SalihdiedatAleppo.Thecareerof Raynald explodeserraticallyoverthenextsixyears, with disastrouseffect for the Christiancause,andduringthattime

Saladin learnt to hate himwith a personal intensitythat he rarely showedtowards his enemies. Abrief look at the man’santecedents will help toexplain why this shouldhavebeenso.Raynald came to the

MiddleEast in the trainofLouisVIIofFrance,ontheill-fated Second Crusade.The younger son of aminorFrenchnoble,hehad

no prospects at home anddecided to stay on inPalestine in the service ofKing Baldwin III. He wasthe typical Europeannewcomer. Bigoted inreligion, insensitive todiplomacy, land hungryand brutal, he made apromisingstartasa robberbaron in the best Westerntradition. He was young,well built, and a bravesoldier, and he caught the

eye ofConstance, princessof Antioch. The marriageofthisyoungadventurertothe greatest heiress in theFrankishEast raised a feweyebrows, but Raynaldsoon proved his soldierlycompetence by extendingthe frontier of theprincipality of Antioch. Ina rapid campaign againstthe Armenian prince,Toros, he reconquered theterritory round the port of

Alexandrettaandhanded itover to the Order of theTemple. This was thebeginning of a friendshipbetweentheprinceandtheknights that was to havemomentous consequencesfortheChristianstates.Itwasalsoasnubforthe

Byzantine emperor,Manuel, who claimedsuzerainty in Antioch.Worsewassoon to follow.The emperor, a loyal and

valuablefriendoftheLatinstates,hadresignedhimselfto Raynald’s marriage andhad offered to subsidisehim if he would fight forthe empire against theArmenians. Raynaldconsidered his side of thebargain fulfilled by theAlexandretta campaign,whichhad in factcosthimlittle and had benefitednobodybuthimselfandtheTemplars,butManuelnow

refusedtopaythepromisedsubsidy until theArmenians had beenthoroughly beaten or theempire had received sometangible advantage.Raynald always founddeeply repugnant thenotion that treaties hesigned could layobligationsonhim.FuriousatwhathesawasManuel’sdouble-dealing, hepromptly teamed up with

Toros, recently his enemy,for an invasion of Cyprus.The new allies weretemporarily hampered byshortage of funds butRaynaldsolvedthissimplyenough by torturing, in aparticularlybestialmanner,thepatriarchofAntioch.Ina month of rapine andpillage Cyprus was soeffectively devastated andthepopulationsoterrorisedthat two years later the

Egyptianfleet,traditionallywary in Cypriot waters,wasabletoplunderthereatwill.Four years later, in the

late autumn of 1160,Raynald was on a raid inNur-ad-Din’s territory.Returning, loaded withbooty, he and his armywere overwhelmed in anambush. Raynald wastaken prisoner and held atAleppo for sixteen years,

being released in anexchange of prisoners latein1175.His firstwifehaddied while he was inprison, yet, now in hisfifties,hesoonwonhimselfanother rich bride, theheiress of the frontierprovince of Transjordanand the great castle of al-Karakwhichgloweredoverthe caravan and pilgrimroutes from Damascus toMecca.

From the momentBaldwin and Saladinsigned the truce of May1180 al-Karak was apotential flash-point. ToRaynald it seemedoutrageous that, thanks toappeasement politics,Muslim merchants shouldbeabletopassunmolested.The fact that thekingdom,torn by political intrigueand harassed by thedrought and famines of

early 1180, needed therespitewasquitebesidethepoint. In the summer of1181 he led a detachmentout of al-Karak south-easttotheoasistownofTaima’in Arabia on the Meccaroad where, as he learntfrom his spies, a majorcaravan, virtually withoutescort, was to halt. TheChristians took richplunder and manyprisoners. Saladin first

demanded compensationfromBaldwin,butthekingwas not able to forceRaynald to makerestitution.Intheautumnaconvoy of Christianpilgrimswasforcedbybadweather to take shelter inthe port of Damietta, notrealising the strainedinternational situation.They disembarked andwere promptly imprisonedtobeheldashostagesuntil

Raynald should disgorgehis plunder. When he stillproved adamant, thepilgrims were sold intoslavery and Saladinpreparedtotakereprisals.Thedeathoftheeighteen-

year-oldas-SalihatAleppoin December was anotherreason to move north.There were two obviouscandidates for thesuccession,bothgrandsonsofthegreatZengiandboth

cousins of as-Salih; theywere ‘Izz-ad-Din, the newruler of Mosul, and hisbrother ‘Imad-ad-Din ofSinjar.Ashelaydyingofamysterious stomach illness– which some ascribed topoison–thetalentedyoungruler had debated thequestion of his heir withthe council; itwas dividedinto two factions. TheTurkish party, anxious tosecure a strong Zengid

succession,naturallyurgedthe case for ‘Izz-ad-Din,the strongest member ofthefamily.TheArabs,andno doubt others, werealarmed that Aleppo, sorecently themistress of allSyria, shouldbe subject toher ancient rival. Theyargued for ‘Imad-ad-Din,who was also as-Salih’sbrother-in-law – ‘yourfather loved him much,treated him with affection

andconcernedhimselfwithhis education’. But as-Salih, more interested inhis dynasty’s prospectsthaninsentimentalisingthepast,arguedwiththeTurksin favour of ‘Izz-ad-Din.Hepointedout that ‘Imad-ad-Din had only theresources of Sinjar andcould do little against themight of Saladin: ‘If thisman be not stopped, therewill not remain a single

plot of land in thepossession of our family.’Leading members went toswear their fealty to ‘Izz-ad-Din while the ‘Arab’party wrote secretly to hisbrother.According to the

chronicler Kamal-ad-Din,the most influentialminister at Aleppo wasJamal-ad-Din Shadbakht,governorofthecitadel.Hegot wind of the Arabs’

dealings and ordered themto take the oath of loyaltyto ‘Izz-ad-Din; theycomplied, realising thatlittle was to be expectedfromSinjar.Onceinstalledat Aleppo, ‘Izz-ad-Dindispensed largesse to hissupporters and penalties tohis opponents and gavebountytothepopulationatlarge; he also guaranteedthecustomsofNur-ad-Dinand as-Salih and retained

Jamal-ad-Din in theadministration.Nodoubttostrengthen the legitimacyof his take-over, the newrulermarried thewidowedmother of as-Salih, andsent her under escort toMosul.He then took possession

of all the treasures in thecitadel together with armsandmachinesofwarinthearsenalandsentitalltoar-Raqqa. He soon moved

therehimself,makingithisheadquartersforthespring.It is obvious that ‘Izz-ad-Din’s primary interestwasthe security of his ownstate of Mosul and not inmobilisingitandAleppoinajointaxisagainstSaladin.He wrote to his brother‘lmad-ad-Din demandingthat he cede Sinjar to himin exchange for Aleppo.Thebargainwasstruckand‘Imad took up his new

command, bringing withhim his treasure andarmoury to replace somepart of the depletedreserves of Aleppo. Whenhe heard of the transfer ofpower, Saladin wasdelightedthatthegreatcitywasnow in thehandsof arulerwho‘hasneitherarmsnor money’ and who haduntil recently beenSaladin’sally.Hewasalsobitterlyincensedthatacity,

which he claimed by rightof a caliphal diploma,shouldhavebeen takenbyanother while Saladin’sown army was actuallydefending the city of theprophet from the infidels.In his letter to the caliphcomplaining of ‘Izz-ad-Din’s take-over andarguing against itslegitimacy, he wrote: ‘Ifthe exalted commandsshould ordain that the

prince of Mosul beinvested with thegovernment of Aleppo,thenitwerebettertoinvesthim with all Syria andEgyptaswell.’On11May1182Saladin

marched out ofCairowithan army of 5,000 troops.There were elaborateformal leave-takingsbetween the vizir and hisministers,andasoothsayerin the crowd called out a

verse propheticallyinterpretedtomeanthatthevizir would never againreturn to the city that forthirteenyearshadbeenhiscapital. He took the routeacross Sinai to al-Aqabaand thenheadednorth-easttoavoidtheChristianarmywhichhadbeenstationedatPetra to intercept hismarch. Not only did hesuccessfully evade battle,he was able to send out

pillaging raids into thedistrict around ash-Shaubak. King Baldwinhad been persuaded tomarchthemainarmyofthekingdom into Transjordanby Raynald of Chatillon.No doubt, as acontemporary alleged, hisreal motive was to protectasmuch as possible of hisown lands from thevengeance of Saladin; itwas hardly sound strategy

to take the main Christianarmy so far from thekingdom proper. Saladin’sdeputy at Damascus, hisnephewFarrukh-Shah,wasa commander of provedability and, acting underinstructions from the highcommand, seized theopportunity to raid inGalilee, plunderingDaburiya and numerousother places in theneighbourhood of

Nazareth.Hewasalsoableto recapture the importantfortofHabisJaldak,twentymileseastofJordanandanirritant long overdue forremoval.Farrukh-Shah’s activities

fulfilled precisely thewarnings that had beengiven by Raymond ofTripoli,whohadurgedthatthe army should remain toprotect the heartlands ofthe kingdom and not be

drawn away by themarching of the Egyptianarmy or the importunitiesof troublemaker Raynald.Like his supporters at thetime, modern historianshave tended to applaudRaymond for astatesmanlike sense ofstrategy and condemnRaynald.While there isnodoubt that the activities ofthe egregious Raynaldforced retaliation out of

Saladin where none hadbeen intended, and sobrought war on thekingdomat thetimeitwasleast able to cope, thestrategy ofMay 1182 wasnot so easy andstraightforward as it ismade to appear. First, tothe charge that Raynaldwasusingtheforcesofthekingdomtoprotecthisownterritories, his supporterscouldquitefairlyretortthat

since Galilee was thedomain of Raymond’swife,thecountofTripoli’smotives might not beentirely altruistic.Secondly, the customs ofthe kingdom laid on themonarch the obligation ofcoming to the aid of anyvassal under attack fromthe Infidel, and at thebeginning of the campaignthiswascertainlyRaynald.Thirdly, the lands of

Transjordan were no lessvital, though only frontierprovinces, to the ChristiancauseasawholethanwerethelandsofGalilee.The fact was that

Saladin’s superiorresources and theirstrategic positions enabledhim to strike at will alongthe frontiers of thekingdom. Although not asyet strong enough to dealthe decisive blow, he was

able to orchestrate a seriesof damaging raids inChristian territory – seveninthedecade1177to1187.Thecomparativefrequencyoftheserazziasintoinfidelterritory helped build theimage of Saladin as achampionoftheHolyWar,they also contributedsignificantly to theweakening of the Frankishstate. Land leasesoccasionally contained

clauses exempting thetenant from rent for aperiod in which the cropshad been laid waste byenemy action, andmany alord found himself forcedtosellpropertytoraisetheransoms for kinsfolk ortenants captured in theMuslimraids.After his successful

march up from al-Aqaba,Saladin joined his nephewandthetwoleftDamascus,

on 11 July, heading southround Lake Tiberias intothe kingdom. They madecontactwiththeChristians,who had called upreinforcements from thegarrisons of the castles inthe area, at theHospitallers’ castle ofBelvoir,alsocalledKaukabal-Hawa’. A running fightdeveloped in which theMuslim horse archers didtheirbesttoluretheFranks

intoanall-outattack,whiletheChristianswerecontenttoholdtheirformationandsodenytheenemyfreedomofaction.Thefightingwasspasmodicitseems,thoughoccasionally very fierce,and when the engagementwas broken off the resultwas inconclusive enoughfor both sides to claim avictory.Next month Saladin was

again on the warpath; this

time against the northernport of Beirut. He hadcalleduphisEgyptianfleetby pigeon post but theamphibious attempt failed– the garrison at Beirutheld out long enough forKing Baldwin to come toits aid, and Saladinwithdrew.Hehadorderedadiversionary raid by hisEgyptiantroopsinsouthernPalestine, but the Frankshad ignored the tactic and

thrown the whole of theirarmy against the mainenemy in the north. It hadbeen a vigorouscampaigning season andfrom Saladin’s point ofview a successful one. Infivecoordinatedattacksbyvarious divisions of hisforces he had probed thekingdom’s frontier fromsouth to north; theChristianshadbeenon thedefensive throughout the

summer and they hadsuffered considerabledamage from hisexpeditions.Itwasapatternwhichhad

been seen a number oftimes during the recentfighting. In the next fewyears there were to bethose, even among hisfriends, who criticisedSaladin’s apparentslowness in dealing withtheFranks–thesamething

had been said of Nur-ad-Din. But Saladin’s failureto follow up even decisivevictories over theChristians was, in part, tobe blamed on the fact thathe had always to keep aneye on the situation at hisback. Since as-Salih’sdeath in December 1181,events had followed thevery course which theyoung king had fearedwhenhetriedtoensurethe

succession of the powerful‘Izz-ad-Din. Whatremained of the kingdomof Nur-ad-Din wasthreatening to fall apart attheseams,thepoweroftheZengid house was beingquickly fractured and onlySaladincouldprofit.Inthelatesummerof1182,ashenursed his disappointmentover Beirut, opportunitieswere opening up innorthern Syria which

seemed likely to lead to adecisiveinitiativeforhim.Therivalrybetween‘Izz-

ad-Din and his brother‘Imad-ad-Din and theirconfused negotiations hadofferedthelesserpowersinthe area fascinatingopportunities forpoliticking at the expenseof their once all-powerfulneighbours, Mosul andAleppo. The lord ofHarran, a discontented

vassal of ‘Imad-ad-Din,drew the rulers of HisnKaifa and al-Birah into analliance against Mosul.Next the allies invitedSaladin to cross theEuphrates in the assuranceof their support. Theirmessenger reached him,encamped with his armybeforethewallsofAleppo.EarlyinOctoberhecrossedthe Euphrates and began atriumphant progress

through al-Jazirah. Edessa,Saruj and Nisibin quicklysubmitted and on 10November he was beforeMosul preparing for aprolonged siege. Theobjective was, andremained, to force ‘Izz-ad-Din to admit Saladin’ssuzerainty and to supplytroops on request for theHoly War as Mosul hadsupplied Nur-ad-Din.Although Saladin

persistently demanded acaliphal diploma to thiseffect, he never asked forthe outright lordship ofMosul.Saladin pointed out that

‘Izz-ad-Din was not onlyfinancing the Christians toattackhiminSyriabutwasalso in alliance with theSelchük ruler of PersianArmenia,oneofBaghdad’sarch enemies. The caliphwas more concerned to

take the heat out of asituation that wasuncomfortably near hisown frontiers. He sent amediatortosettlethetermson which Mosul shouldcollaborate with Saladin.The negotiations brokedown over the question ofAleppo,which ‘Izz-ad-Dinrefusedtosurrender.Itwasaswell thatSaladinhad tosever his dealings withMosul since the very fact

of the negotiations wastroubling his allies a gooddeal. They had only daredtheir independent initiativebecauseof therift thathadopened between Aleppoand Mosul – a deal overtheir heads betweenSaladin and ‘Izz-ad-Dinwas the last thing theywanted. With diplomacynowatastandstill,Saladincould have been expectedto press his offensive but

was persuaded by thecaliph’s representative toabandon the siege. Hewithdrew to Sinjar, thetown that Mosul had wonback only months beforeby trading off Aleppo.Afterasiegeofafortnightit fell, andSaladin’sarmy,possibly restless afterbeing, as they saw it,cheatedoftherichspoilsofMosul, sacked the placewith uncharacteristic

thoroughnessandbrutality.The governor was sparedand sent with anhonourable escort back toMosul,butthefallofSinjarhad been a severe blow to‘Izz-ad-Din’s prestige andheledhisforcesoutontheroadtoSinjarinashowofstrength.Theeffectfalteredwhenhesentfurtheroffersof a truce to Saladin andwhen these were turneddown because the wanted

concessions over Aleppowere still withheld, theMosul army returnedignominiouslytoitsbase.Throughouthiscampaign

Saladin had kept updiplomatic pressure onBaghdad to grant officialrecognition to his claim ofsuzerainty over Mosul. Itwas consistently refused,but he was granted thediploma for Diyar-Bakrand late in January 1183

marchedagainst it.Afterathree-weeksiegeitfellandwasgivenasafieftoNur-ad-Din ofHisnKaifa. Thecity held one of the mostfamous libraries in Islamand Saladin gave hissecretary al-Fadil carteblanche to remove thevolumeshewished.Evenacaravan of seventy camelscouldtakeonlysomeofthetreasurestoDamascus.Itisa measure not only of the

magnificence of thecollection but of the gulfthat divided the culture oftheWestfromthatofIslam–intwelfth-centuryEuropethe contents of a greatlibrary were to bemeasured in scores ratherthanhundreds.At the end of 1182,with

Saladin fully committed tohis campaign againstMosul and Aleppo,Raynald mounted an

audacious expeditionsouthwards towards theheartofSaladin’sdomains.He took al-Aqaba, whichhadbeen inMuslimhandssince Saladin captured theplace twelve years before.While he himselfblockaded the islandfortress opposite the port,he launched a fleet ofprefabricated ships whichhad been transportedoverland from al-Karak.

They mounted anexpedition down the Sinaipeninsulaand into theRedSea; it raided along theAfrican coast and sackedthe port of ‘Aidhabopposite Jedda. Themerchant shipping in theharbourwasplunderedandan overland caravan fromtheNile valleywas routedas it approached the town.Next, with considerableélan the Christian pirates

carried the attack to thecoastofArabia,raidingtheports which served MeccaandMedina and sinking apilgrim ship. For a timeeven Mecca seemed indanger.But thedangerwasmore

apparent than real. Thanksto Saladin’s naval reformsEgypt was well prepared.His brother, al-Adil, thegovernor, promptlydispatched a fleet to deal

with the marauders. Al-Aqaba was recaptured andtheChristianfleettaken;inmilitary terms the wholeexpedition, which hadoccupiedlessthanamonth,had been a fiasco. It hadalsoprovedthatEgyptwasquite able to look afteritself and that Saladin hadcomplete freedom ofmovement in his hugeempire, sure in thecompetence of his

lieutenants. Nevertheless,Raynaldhadtouchedarawnerve in Saladin’s self-esteem. His image ofhimself as the protector ofthe Holy Places and thepilgrim routes and hisreputationassuchinIslamhadbeentarnished.Itisnotsurprising that his reactionwas far stronger than themilitary danger warranted.Batches of the prisonerswere taken for ceremonial

execution at the Place ofSacrificeatMinainMecca,atCairoandatAlexandria,where they were escortedby triumphant processionsofsufisandotherreligiousenthusiastswhocarriedoutthe killings. The picture isas ugly as any Frankishatrocity,butinanagewhencivilisation and barbaritywalked comfortably handin hand the propagandavalue of such public

punishmentoftheChristiansacrilege was of courseconsiderable.Because the raid had

dared to aim at the holiestplaces of Islam, Saladin’schancellery was able tomake immense capital outof it, even though it hadfailed. He himself washavingtocampaignagainstMuslimsbecausetheywereallied with the Infidel.Everyaspectoftheepisode

was exploited in thepropaganda of the HolyWar.Raynaldandhismenwere compared to the‘companions of theelephant’, a group ofAbyssinians who,accordingtotheKoran,hadattackedMeccainthedaysbeforetheHegira.Politicalcapitalwas certainlymadeout of it, but the Red Seaexpedition did alsoprovoke a response of

genuine horror from theMuslim community. TheSpanish traveller Ibn-Jubair,whowasjourneyingin the Middle East at thetime, records theimpressions the eventmade, and the jihadliterature of the thirteenthcentury abounds witheulogies of Saladin for hispartintheprotectionofthesacred sites of pilgrimagefrom the impious designs

ofRaynald.Hoping perhaps that the

swell of public opinion inhis favourwould reinforcehis application, Saladinwrote again, after thecapture of Diyar-Bakr, tobeg Baghdad’s officialsanction for his campaignagainst Mosul. It was, hesaid,thefactthattheattackonDiyar-Bakrhadhad theauthorisationoftheheadofthe Faith that had ‘opened

the gates of the city tohim’. The same wouldassuredlyhappenatMosul,and the obstinacy of thisone city was all that nowstood between Islam andtriumph over the Franks.‘Let thecommanderof theFaithful but compare thebehaviour of his servants[i.e. Saladin and ‘Izz-ad-Din] and judge which ofthem has most faithfullyserved thecauseof Islam.’

If,thelettercontinues,itbeaskedwhySaladin,alreadyso powerful, demands thesupreme authority in al-Jazirah, the LesserMesopotamiacontrolledbyMosul, it is because ‘thislittle al-Jazirah is the leverwhichwillset thegreatal-Jazirah [i.e. the whole oftheIslamicMiddleEast]inmotion. It is the point ofdivision and the centre ofresistanceandonceitisset

in its place in the chainofallegiancethewholearmedmight of Islam will becoordinated to engage theforces of Unbelief.’ Hemight have added that thefertile region between theupper waters of the TigrisandEuphrateshadbeentherecruiting ground of thearmies of Zengi and hadprovidedvitalmanpowertoNur-ad-Din. Saladin couldnot relyexclusivelyon the

manpower of Egyptbecause its own extendedfrontiers now demanded asizeablestandingarmy.The petition was as

unsuccessful as formerones, but the victory atDiyar-Bakr brought theruler of Mardin and othercities behind Saladin.Having handed over thecitiesofal-Jazirah to loyalemirsanddemonstratedtheinability of Mosul to

defend even its owninterests, letalone thoseofits allies, he marched onAleppo, arriving before itswallson21May1183.As the siege began the

garrisonmadeanumberofhard-fought sorties, duringone of which Saladin’syoungest brother, thetwenty-two-year-old Taj-al-MulkBöri,waskilled.Itwas a serious loss forSaladin, who depended

heavilyonhisfamilyintheadministration of hisdomains;buthealsolovedtheboy. In lateryears, fullof remorse, he toldBaha’-ad-Din: ‘We did not winAleppocheaply, for it costthelifeofBöri.’IfKamal-ad-Din, the historian ofAleppo, is to be believed,therewasalsounrestinthearmy. The poor harvestsandarrearsintheirpayledto grumbling among men

and officers which camedangerously near tomutiny.Saladin,itappears,while pointing out that hispersonal resources werefew, promised them richpickings from Aleppo andits territory once the placewaswon.Thereplyhegotwas curt enough.’ Whowants to take Aleppo? Ifthe sultan would but sellthejewelsandfineryofhiswives we should have

money enough.’ And so,we are told, the sultan didas demanded and paid histroopswiththeproceedsofthesale.Kamal-ad-Din,whowrote

hishistoryofAlepposomethirtyyearsaftertheeventsdescribed, is our onlysource for this odd story.Saladin’s plea of personalpoverty rings true enough.Enemieshaveaccusedhimof buying popularity,

admirers ascribe it to hisgreat-hearted generosity ofnature, but no writer onSaladin has ever deniedthat his distribution of theplunder of war was lavishcomparedwiththepracticeof other commanders andfar in excess of what themilitary conventionsrequired. The reference tohis wives is intriguingbecause so little is knownofSaladin’s private life. If

wearereallytobelievethata sale of their personaleffects was enough tosatisfy an army’s demandforbackpayhemusthavebeen uxorious indeed. Butthe context suggests thatthestoryismerelyafictionbytheAleppanhistoriantobalance the genuinequandary facing the rulerof the city with acorresponding dilemma inthecampoftheenemy.

For ‘Imad-ad-Din’stroops certainly weredemanding theirpay–andhe had other problems.Although he had beeninstalled at Aleppo on hisbrother’s authority he waslittle liked by the Turkishpartyamongtheemirswhohad originally opposed hissuccession, nor had hisbrother greatly helped hisprospects by clearing outthe armoury and the

treasury. Discussing thesituation with Tuman, hisclose adviser who hadcomewithhimfromSinjar,he confessed himself at aloss. Before making hisproposals he asked for apromisethattheywouldbetreated in absoluteconfidence, for, he wenton, ‘if the emirs learnt asingle word of ourconversation they wouldstarta risingand theaffair

would turn against us.’ Infact he intended that theyshould use Aleppo as abargaining counter toextricate themselves fromwhatwasrapidlybecominganimpossiblesituation.Forthe plan to work the townwould have to besurrendered while it stillappeared to have somechance of survival. Secretnegotiations were openedwith Saladin. He not only

offered ‘Imad-ad-DinSinjar in exchange forAleppo, but also Nisibin,Saruj and even ar-Raqqa,where the treasures andarmaments of Aleppo hadbeenhoused.For‘Imad-ad-Din, who had onlyreluctantly surrenderedSinjar at his brother’surgings, the deal was agood one, and on themorning of 11 June thedefenders were

dumbfounded to see theyellow banners of Saladinbreak out on thebattlements.The Aleppan emirs who

had been opposed toSaladin ever since hisarrival inSyrianowfearedtheywouldlosetheirfiefs;the population at largefeared they would losetheir lives. The rais(ormayor), with a group ofcity elders,went up to the

citadel to protest againstthe surrender, but ‘Imad-ad-Din,wisely not comingout tomeet them, returnedthescornfulmessage: ‘Thething is settled.’ Thecapitulation was in factimmensely valuable toSaladin. Aleppo wasvirtually impregnable andSaladin was no master ofsiege warfare. Had ‘Imad-ad-Dinbeenasdeterminedas the citizens, Saladin

might have had to becontent with the kind ofdeal he eventually struckwithMosul,wheretherulerrecognised his suzeraintybut retained his ownposition in the city. As itwas, ‘the thing wassettled’.Thegarrisonandcitizenry

hurriedly made up a jointdeputation which metSaladin during theceremony of surrender at

the Green Hippodrome.They were astonished anddelighted at his reaction.The officers andcommanders of thedefeated garrison receivedrobes of honour for theboldnessofthedefenceandthecitywassparedasack.Secure now in the goodgracesoftheirnewmaster,thepopulationpouredtheircontempt on the outgoinggovernor.Before he left, a

fuller’sbowlwaspresentedto him with the words‘Royaltywasnotmeantforyou; this is the only tradeyouarefitfor.’(Staleurinewas one of the standardbleaches of the medievalfuller.)Of Aleppo’s

dependencies only Harimstill held out. Its governortried for help fromFrankish Antioch, but thistime the traditional

manoeuvre disgustedpublic opinion. Thegovernorwas deposed andthecitywasformallymadeovertoSaladinon22June.Hewas poised for the lastgreatdecadeofhiscareer.Exercising uncontested

authority from Egypt toSyria, including theterritoriesofDamascusandAleppoandareasofwhatisnow southern Turkey,recognised as lord in

Arabia and patron of theHoly Cities of Mecca andMedina; supported by thecaliph in Baghdad, nowthat his authority wasunchallenged by the oncemightycitystateofMosul,and his friendshipcultivated by the Selchüksultans of Konya inAnatolia, Saladin directlyruledterritoriesofimperialdimensions and exertedinfluence and authority

more extensive than thoseenjoyed by any otherMuslim ruler west of Iranin200years.Saladinhadowedhisrise

inlargeparttoloyalSyriantroopers, noted even thenfor their violence andtermed his ‘roughcompanions’ by Imad-adDin; he was himselfcapable of ruthlessnesswhen occasion demandedit,andthoughnotedforhis

magnanimity to hisenemies, was rigid in hisobservance of the dividingline between those of thetrue faith of Islam andUnbelievers. A famousanecdote relates how herestrainedtwoofhisyoungsons, barely in their teens,from participating in aslaughter or prisoners. Butthis should not beunderstood as an instanceof altruistic

humanitarianism on thepartofSaladin,orawishtocheck a burgeoning bloodlust. It was right thatwarriors should kill theInfidel – but only when,withmatureunderstanding,they knew the distinctionbetween them and thepeopleoftheFaith.Saladin was a hero

indeed, but a hero of theDaralIslam,theregionofthe religion. As such his

face was always set hardagainst the Dar al Harb,theregionofwar.Tofightthe good fight it wasnecessary for him tosubdue other rulers to hiswill. The service of theFaith required resourcesand obedience of imperialdimensions. It was thelogic of his life that madeofSaladinadynast.

AdramaticmonumenttoSaladinwaserectedinDamascusinthetwentieth

century.Non-MuslimsoftensupposethatthereisaKoranicinjunctionagainstthedepictionofthehumanformandpersonalitiesinart.Infactthisisnotso.

ThisfamousimageofSaladin,datingfromabout1180,isattributedtoanartistoftheFatimidschool.

Builtbetween685and691,the

DomeoftheRock,sometimescalledtheMosqueofOmar,istheearliestgreatarchitecturalmonumentofIslam.Notinfactamosquebutashrine,itwasbuilttosheltertheRock,sacredtothememoryofMuhammad.ItislocatedontheTempleMount,wherewastheTempleofSolomon,anditwasherethattheChristianKnightsTemplarmadetheirheadquarters.WhenSaladinrecapturedJerusalemforIslamin1189thebuildinghadtoberituallycleansed.Some18

metersindiameter,thedomeisawoodenstructure,cladoriginallyinlead,lateringoldleaf,andrestingonadrumsupportedby16columnsandpiers,surroundedbyanoctagonalarcade.

TheinterioroftheDomeoftheRockshowingtheRock

itself,honouredbyMuslimsastheplacefromwhichtheProphetMuhammadmadehismysticalascenttoparadise.Thecircleofpiersandcolumnssupportingtheactualdomeissurroundedbyanoctagonalarcadeof24piersandcolumns.ThestructureowesmuchtoRomanandByzantinearchitecture.Overthecenturiesitwasadornedwithmosaicandfaiencetilesandmarble.

TheCitadelatJerusalem,

showingfortificationsfromthetimeoftheCrusades.ThepictureshowsbothFrankishfoundationsandTurkishupperworks.

Thisnineteenth-centuryprintofJerusalemdepictstheHolyCitywithinitswallsmuchasitmusthavelookedtoSaladinpreparingtolaysiegetotheplacein1189.TheDomeoftheRockcanclearlybeseeninthecentreofthepicturewith,toitsleft,theAl-Aqsamosque.

TheinteriorofthegreatmosqueatDamascus,theMosqueoftheUmayyads.Begun(AD705)undertheUmayyadcaliphAbualAbbasalWalid,itwasbuiltonthesiteoftheformerChristianbasilicaofStJohntheBaptist.

Eighth-centurymosaicsonthewallsdepictedasceneofhousessetamonggardensandstreamsthatmayhavebeenintendedasavisionofparadisebutmayinfact,havebeenbasedonviewsofDamascus.

AviewoftheMosqueofthe

UmayyadsatDamascus,showingthecolonnadedcourtyardwiththecitylaidoutbeyond.AtthetimeofSaladin,Damascus,thoughtbysometobetheworld’soldestcontinuallyinhabitedcity,wassetamonggardensandorchards,riversandstreams‘asifbyahalo’accordingtoonecontemporary.

Anineteenth-centuryviewoftheruinedclassicaltemplesatBaalbekoverlookingtheBeka’avalley.ItwouldhavebeenafamiliarsightonthelandscapetotheyoungSaladinonridesfromthefamilyhomeinDamascus.

AwatercolourviewofTyre,seenfromitsisthmus,bythenineteenth-centurytopographicalartistDavidRoberts.Accessiblefromthemainlandonlyalongthisnarrowneckofland,thecitywassecureagainstanythingbutacloselycoordinatedland-

seaoperation.

TheruinsofthecrusadercastleofBelvoir,knowntotheMuslimsasKaukab.ItfelltoSaladin’sforcesin1188.

Themostfamousofallcrusadercastles,KrakdesChevaliers.ArebuildonthesiteofaformerMuslimstrongholdknownasthe‘CastleoftheKurds’,itwasthegreateststrongholdoftheKnightsofStJohnof

Jerusalemwhohelditfrom1141tothe1270s.

Abouttwenty-fivemilestothesouthoftheDeadSea,thecrusaders’castleofMontreal,knowntotheMuslimforcesasash-Shaubak,wasideallysitedtoplundercaravansenroutefromAqabatoDamascus.ItfinallyfelltoSaladinin1188.

ThesiteofSaladin’sgreatvictoryoftheChristianforcesat‘TheHornsofHattin’overlookingtheLakeTiberias(theSeaofGalilee)in1187.Thepicturewellcapturesthedramaticnatureoftheterrain.

Chapter9

DynastandHero

Muslims and Christiansrated the submission ofAleppo very highly. Somefervent jihad enthusiastsmight deplore this

continuingwarbetweentheMuslims, but many morewere jubilant that Islamwas once again beingunited. Events had shownthat the Zengid princeswere too envious of thepower of the Kurdish‘usurper’ to help himagainsttheChristians.Andjust as Nur-ad-Din fromAleppo had concentratedon winning Damascus andthen Egypt before risking

the final blow against thekingdom of Jerusalem, soSaladin had refused tocommit himself against itwith a hostile Aleppo onhis frontier. Baha’-ad-DintellsusthatSaladinlookedonAleppoasthebasisandkey to his power whilefrom William of Tyre welearn that the news fell inthe Christian camp like abombshell. ‘It ran throughthe land of the Christians

whoweremuchafraid, forthiswasthethingtheyhadbeen dreading. They wellknew that if Saladin couldconquerthatcitythentheircountrycouldbesweptandbesieged in every part.’Another Frank said quitesimply that the Christianswere now in a permanentstateofsiege.Saladin was the greatest

power in Islam; but hisnewlywonempirebrought

with it deep politicalcomplexities. His ownearly career had shownhowdifficultitcouldbeforthe lord of Syria tomaintainhisgriponEgypt,evenwhenitwasheldbyaloyallieutenant.NowCairodominated the NorthAfricancoastasfarwestasTripoli, thanks to raidingcampaigns by theambitious Sharaf ad-Din.Hehadsetupthisfar-flung

presenceofAiyubidpoweralmost single-handed, andmoreover, as a general inthe forces of Saladin’snephewTaqi-ad-Din,owedhis first allegiance to amember of the familywhose own ambitionsmadeitnecessarytowatchhis loyalty constantly.Taqi-ad-Din had beenposted inSyria since1175(an inscription shows himasgovernorof the townof

Hamahfrom1179)andthegovernment of Egypt hadbeenentrusted toSaladin’sbrilliantyoungerbrotheral-Adil. Another brother,Tughtigin, had been giventheprovincesofArabiatheyear before the Aleppocampaign, and from thepeace that reigned in thatpart of the empire we canassumethathisloyaltywasnever in doubt. Turan-Shah, the dynamic and

colourful conqueror of theYemen, after a chequeredpolitical career includinggovernorships ofDamascus, Baalbek andfinally Alexandria, haddied in semi-disgrace, tooaddictedtohispleasurestobe a usefulmember of thefamilyteam,in1180.Afarmore serious loss was thedeath of Saladin’s nephewFarrukh-Shah, who hadproved such a capable

soldier and commander atDamascus, in September1182.Hiscousin,Nasir-ad-Din, was governor ofHoms.Healsowasthesonof Shirkuh, the conquerorof Egypt, and his loyaltytoo could not becompletelyreliedupon.Saladin now ruled an

empire that far exceededthe state of Nur-ad-Din.His colleagues in empirewere a numerous family,

some of whom, like Taqi-ad-Din and Turan-Shah,hadshared in thefoundingofhisgreatness, andall ofwhom,given the separatistnature of twelfth-centuryIslamic politics, could besupposed to have theirindividual ambitions.Where Nur-ad-Din hadbeen free of importunaterelationsandhadbeenableto use subordinates likeAiyub and Shirkuh who

depended on him for theiradvancement, Saladinneededallhisconsiderablepolitical intuition toharness the abilities of acompetitive family, manyolder than he, and checktheir rivalry. The empirewastofallapartsoonafterhis death, just as thedomain ofNur-ad-Din haddone. To maintain it inbeing during his liferequiredforceofcharacter,

constantattentionandtime-consumingwork.Thefirstdecisionwasthe

appointment of a newgovernor of Aleppo. ForsixweeksSaladinwasbusyreorganising theadministration,andperhapssatisfyinghimselfabouttheloyaltyoftheplace.Hehadlittle to fear. Despite theirfierce traditional loyalty tothe Zengid house, thepeopleofAleppohadbeen

shabbily treated.Only twoyears back, ‘Izzad-Din ofMosulhadtradedtheproudformercapitalofSyriawithhis brother, and now thatbrother had shamefullybetrayed it to the manwhom the Aleppans hadlong regarded as the archenemy of their city andtheir dynasty. Saladin’sclemency,followingsofaston the mean, ingloriousexpedients of the Zengid

princes, dissolved thethreat of any immediateopposition. The long-termintegrationofthegreatcityinto the Aiyubid realmwould need the guidinghand of a loyal andexperienced man. Thenearest of Saladin’srelations was Taqi-ad-DinatHamah.His talents as asoldierwereprovenbuthispolitical abilities andloyalty in a sensitive post

werenot.Back in1175hehad held the governorshipof Damascus, but had hadto be removed twelvemonths later. For the timebeing things in Aleppowere peaceful enough forSaladin to install astemporary governor histhird son, the ten-year-oldaz-Zahir, with anexperienced adviser. Weare told that he was hisfather’s favourite son and,

naturally enough, that hewas virtuous and wisebeyond his years.However,at theendof theyearhewastofindhimselfreplaced by his renowneduncle al-Adil who for thepast nine years had beendirecting the Egyptianadministration with coolefficiency. Just whenSaladin decided on theswitchwedonotknow,butthere is some reason to

suppose that it was duringthesummerof1183.By 24 August he was

back inDamascus.Hehadannounced his intention ofanother campaign againstthe Franks in a well-publicised dispatch to thecaliph.Havingassembledalarge army he left the cityon 17 September andmovedsouthineasystagestoreachtheeasternbankoftheJordan,belowtheLake

ofTiberias,onthe28th.Onthemorningofthenextdayhe crossed over into thekingdom. His leisurelymarch to the frontier ford,about fifty-five miles inelevendays,hadgiventimefor all the expecteddetachments to join themain army: it had alsogiven theChristians ampletimetomuster.Theregent,GuyofLusignan,calledallthe forces of the kingdom

to his standard atSaffuriyah in the hillsaboutGalilee.Well placedfor access to the port ofAcreand thecoastalplain,andwith largeandreliablesupplies of water, theposition also enabled thedefending army to blockequally rapidly an enemyadvance from across theJordannorthorsouthofthelake.The chief men of the

kingdom were with theregent: among them thebrothers Balian of Ibelinand Baldwin of Ramlah,CountRaymondofTripoli,soon to contest theleadership of the kingdomwith Guy, and Raynald.Hurryingupfromthesouthwere furtherreinforcements, drawnfrom the garrisons ofRaynald’scastles,al-Karakand ash-Shaubak

(Montreal), and led by hisstepson, the youngHumphrey IV of Toron.Despite its great size, thearmy’sfunctionwaspurelydefensive, to remain in thefield in force so as tocramp any majormanoeuvresby theenemy,not to seek out a decisiveengagement.On29SeptemberSaladin

swept into the town ofBaisan, which had been

deserted by its populationonthenewsofhiscoming.The soldiery was left freeto pillage and burnteverything they could notcarry off. It was aninspiriting start to whatlooked like being aprofitable razzia. The nextday the army pushed onsouth-west a few miles tothe head of the valley ofJezreel which stretchedinland from Haifa to

modern Yizre’el. Saladinpitched camp overlooking‘AinJalut,apoolknowntotheChristiansastheSpringof Goliath. He had alsosent on ahead a flyingcolumn led by ‘Izz-ad-DinJurdik,formerlyoneofthemostloyalofNur-ad-Din’smamluks. He successfullyambushed Humphrey ofToron’s forces on theslopes of Mount Gilboabarely twenty miles short

of its destination, anddestroyed it. The newsreached the main army on30Septemberandraiseditspitch of euphoria a notchhigher.Inforty-eighthourstheyhadsackedaChristiantown and destroyed asignificantenemyforce.But the Christians were

now heading south tocontest the vital wateringplace of ‘Ain Jalut withSaladin.‘Becausehemeant

to pit his forces againstthem in the field’, Saladindrewuphisarmyinformalorder of battle and sent avanguard of 500 on toharass the enemy. In thewords of his biographertheseweresoon‘eyeballtoeyeball’with theChristianvan, commanded by theregent’s brother, Amalric.There was a fierce clash,but the main Christianforcesooncameupandthe

Muslimshadtodrawoff.Now began one of those

battlesonthemarchwhichhadbeenacharacteristicofcrusadingwarfarefromtheearliest years. ‘The Frankskept their ranks closed,their infantry protectingtheir knights, they neithercharged nor stopped, butcontinued their march tothe spring and there theydressed their tents.’Saladin, using traditional

Turkish tactics, sent hishorse archers down on thecompact column time andagain in a vain endeavourtomakeitbreakranks.Buta Christian army whichkeptdisciplineandwasnotoutrageously outnumberedwas almost impregnable,even on the march. Thesuperior physique of theFranks and their heavyarmour gave them theadvantage. It is largely for

this reason that many ofSaladin’s campaigns seemineffectual – so much ofthetimewasspenttryingtolure the Franks to breaktheir formation. On thisoccasion the armiesconfronted one another forfive days. Then Saladinwithdrew to Jabal Tabur(Mount Tabor) some tenmilesawayhopingtotemptthe Christians from theirposition to attack him. In

the meanwhile hismarauders had sackedmany villages round aboutthe battle zone and hadattacked a monastery onJabul Tabur itself.Althoughhardpressedandfor a time desperate forsupplies,theChristianshadheldfirm,andnow,insteadof pursuing Saladin toJabalTabur,theywithdrewback towards their base atSaffuriyah. Saladin, his

army bloated with plunderand flushed with triumph,broke off the action andwas back in Damascus by14October.If we are tempted to ask

just what had beenachieved and indeed whathad been intended, few ofhis subjects had suchdoubts.Inadashingrazziatheirarmyhadplunderedatwill, taken the fighting tothe enemy, and forced on

himthehumiliatingroleofinaction while all aroundhim his peasants andtownships were pillaged.Saladin received a hero’swelcome on his return toDamascus. The Christiancamp, by contrast, wasbitterly divided. Thecommon soldiery, plaguedby the insolent arrows ofthe enemy, had wanted tofight – the view urged inthe councils of the

leadership by the fire-eating Raynald. Theseeminglytimidadvicethatthe array must bemaintained intact, whichthe regent had followed,had come from Raymondof Tripoli and the Ibelinbrothers. Their enemiesnow charged that they hadbeenmotivatednotbywisestrategy but by an enviousdetermination todenyGuyany chance of glory. The

fact that thearmywasstillinbeingandcouldstopanymajorinvasionwasnotthekind of militaryachievement that theaverage man couldunderstand or would beinterested in. There musthavebeenmanyChristianswho cast envious eyes atthe triumphs beingcelebrated in Damascus.Among his own peopleSaladin’s reputation,

tarnishedalittleperhapsbyhis campaign againstAleppo, was once morebright.Aweeklaterhewasonce

more on the road south.Thistimetheobjectivewasal-Karak.Al-Adilhadbeensummoned up from EgyptandSaladinwas scheduledto rendezvous with himunder its walls. Baha’-ad-Din tells us that whilewaiting for news of his

brother’s progress Saladin‘set out several times ontheroadforal-Karak’.Thisis just one of the pointersthat leads to the suspicionthat the famous siege ofNovember 1183 was notthe simple militaryoperationitappearstohavebeen.The siege, which

coincided with themarriage between theyoung Humphrey IV of

Toron and Isabella ofJerusalem is a centrepiecefor the chivalric tapestrylater woven round thecrusading wars. Themarriage had beensponsored by KingBaldwin in the faint hopethat it would heal the riftbetween the house ofIbelin, Isabella’s step-parents, and the allies ofRaynald, Humphrey’sstepfather. The politics of

the kingdom had beenfragmented into two fiercefactions when, in 1180,Sibylla, the sister of theleprousKingBaldwin,hadmarried Guy de Lusignan,speciallybroughtoverfromEurope for the purpose byhis brother, Amalric, theconstable of the kingdom.With the king a leper thesuccession was a vitalquestion,andthismarriageseemed to threaten the

baronage with an untried,upstart young Frenchnobleman as their futuremonarch. The Ibelinsrepresented the baronialparty, while Raynald,himself very aware of hisEuropean allegiances, waswholeheartedly behind deLusignan.Baldwin,bravelytrying to keep harmonybetween the strongmenofa realm, which neededunity above all things, had

arranged the betrothal ofHumphrey and Isabellaalthough the princess wasat the time only eight.Now, three years later, itwas thought possible tocelebrate the marriage.Raynald was determinedthat, little as hewelcomedthe political implicationssupposed to lie behind theunion, if it was to becelebrated at all it shouldbeinhiscastlewithallthe

pomp he couldmuster.Aswellastheweddingguests,entertainers and jugglersthrongedtothecastlefromall parts of the Christianstates,andbythemiddleofNovemberthepartywasinfull swing. Meanwhile,from the south, the forcesof al-Adil were at last onthemovefromEgypt.He joined Saladin and

Taqi-ad-Din outside al-Karak on 20 November.

Saladin was able to forcean entrance into the townbelow the castle with arushed assault but wasbeatenbackattheentranceto the fortress.Henowsetup his siege engines andbegan a heavy andrelentless bombardment.Taqi-ad-Din was with theDamascusarmyandtookahand in directing theoperations. It looked likeamajor attempt to take a

castlewhichhadcausedtheMuslims so much troublefor so long. Within thewalls the festivitiesdefiantly went on. Onecontemporary accountinforms us that thebridegroom’s mother evenprepared dishes from thewedding feast and hadthem sent out to thechivalrous Saladin. Inreturn he courteouslyenquired where the young

couple’smarriagechamberwas and ordered hisartillerymen not to fire atthat section of the wall.However, if he left thebride and groom somerelative peace, Saladincontinued thebombardment on the maincircuit of the walls, whichwas as fierce as ever. IndesperationthegarrisongotamessagetoJerusalemandbeacon fires soon brought

the reply thatreinforcementswereonthemarch. It was enough todecide Saladin towithdraw. The Christianarmy pressed on and thekingwascarriedintriumphintothecastle.Saladinwasback in Damascus on 11December, and at firstglance it would seem asthough he had achievedlittle.Most historians have

regarded this expeditionagainst al-Karak and theone that followed in 1184as failed attempts to takethe place by storm andhave supposed that al-AdilcameupfromEgyptsolelyto bring reinforcements.Acynicalmodern biographerofSaladin,notingthespeedwithwhichhefellbackonnews of an approachingChristian relief force,suggeststhatthecampaigns

were mere charadesdesigned to bolsterSaladin’s reputation as anuntiring warrior in thejihad. Both interpretationsseemalittleimprobable.Itmay well be that Saladindid not plan for aprotractedsiege.Karakwasone of the strongest of themany very formidablecastles theCrusadersbuilt;when it did fall in 1188 itwas only after a stubborn

year-long siege. Saladinwas perfectly aware of themilitary problem posed bythis strongpoint. Had itscapture been the firstobjective in 1183 and ’84hewouldhavepreparedhisposition against theinevitable attempt by theenemytorelievetheplace.We deduce that thereduction of the fortresswas not the point of hiscampaign. Equally, the

object can hardly havebeentowinprestige–thereis little of that to be hadfrom failure. The clue towhat lay behind Saladin’splanning is found impliedin Baha’-ad-Din’s accountof the 1183 campaign.Baha tells us that ‘anumber of merchants andothers travelled with al-Adil’, and ends with theobservation that Karak‘caused great damage to

the Muslims for … itobliged the caravans totravel with an armedescort’. After the armieshadmade their junction atKarak they promptlyseparated again. Al-Adilmarched on northwards,wherehewastotakeupthepostofgovernorinAleppo,whileTaqi-ad-Din,abettersoldier,headedsouthwardsto take over command inEgypt.AccordingtoBaha’-

ad-Din Saladin had grownapprehensive of theChristians marchingagainst thatcountry. In theautumn of 1183 thenSaladin’s concern was notwith the captureof agreatChristian fortress but toensure the smooth transferofcommandsintwoofthemost important provincesand to protect the passageof a rich convoy. Had al-Karak fallen he would no

doubt have been as muchastonishedasdelighted,forthe campaign had beenintendedtodrawtheforcesof the kingdom to aposition where he couldhold them, and he knewthat a feint against Karakwouldbethesurestwayofdoingthis.A similar pattern can be

discerned behind the siegeof Karak inAugust/September 1184.

This time it was Taqi-ad-Din who brought up thearmy from Egypt and thistime the precious goodsunder convoy were thehousehold and treasures ofal-AdilontheirwaytojoinhiminAleppo.Thearmiesof Saladin and his nephewmade their junction on 30July,andafortnightlaterafierce bombardment ofKarak began. A monthafter, they were back to a

triumphant reception inDamascus. Saladin had anadditional cause for self-congratulation, for thisbrief campaign was thefirstinwhichhisarmyhadincluded contingents fromthe sensitive areas to thenorth which he wascontestingwithMosul.Despite his

disappointmentthereinthewinterof1182Saladinwasstilldeterminedtoforcehis

suzerainty on the city. InFebruary1184adeputationreachedDamascus lookingfortermsofcompromise.Itwas headed by Baha’-ad-Din,atthattimeoneofthesenior advisers of Mosul,and with him was theprestigious Badr-ad-Din,whoborethehonorifictitleofShaikhofShaikhsatthecaliphal court. Saladin,with his characteristicrespect for age and

wisdom, visited thevenerableambassadorfromBaghdad almost daily, buthe refused to back downfromhis claims onMosul.AsBaha’-ad-Dinwas laterto learn, part of thesediscussionswereconcernedwith him. Saladin,impressed with the leaderof the Mosul deputation,persuaded the shaikh tooffer Baha’-ad-Din atempting opportunity to

enter his service. But hewasmetwitharefusal.Theambassador feared,reasonably enough, that,with the negotiationsclearly heading for animpasse, to accept the jobwould provoke charges ofdouble-dealingagainsthim.Possibly, in fact, Saladinwas hoping that he couldundermine the authorityandprestigeof‘Izz-ad-Dinat Mosul if he could

persuade one of his chiefadviserstoquithisservice.But the fact that the offerwas to be repeated andeventually acceptedprovesthatsuchanulteriormotivewasnothisonlyone.While Baha’-ad-Din was

atDamascus theentourageof az-Zahir arrived fromAleppo. After six monthsin office the boy and hisadviserhadbeendisplacedbyal-Adil,whoreachedthe

city in the middle ofDecember.Consideringtheboy’s age the replacementwas hardly surprising, yethe seems to have resentedit. Baha’-ad-Din, watchingwith the professionaldiplomat’s eye, reportedback to Mosul that: ‘theboysubmittedtohisfatherinall thingsandconcealedhis discontent, but it didnot escape the eye ofSaladin.’ The next month

al-AdilwasatDamascustocelebrate the Feast ofSacrifice with his brother,andnodoubttoreport.With the festival over,

Saladin sent outmessengerstorecruitalliesforacampaignplannedforlater that summer againstthe Christians. Amongother things Saladin wasanxious todemonstrate thereality of his influence inal-Jazirah.Thefirstamong

the princes of the area tojoin the standardwasNur-ad-DinofHisnKaifa,whowas received by al-Adilwith high honourwhen hemarched into Aleppo onthe last day of May. Aweek later they went toDamascus together andSaladin, who had been ill,hastened out tomeet themon the road as anothergesture of honour to thisverywelcomeally.Hehad

good reason to be pleasedwhen his armywas joinedby detachments fromMardin and Sinjar. It wasanimpressiveforcethattheEgyptians found awaitingthem at the rendezvousoutside al-Karak. Anartillery train of fourteenmangonels put up a fiercebombardment – acontemporaryletter,quotedby the historian Abu-Shamah, boasted that no

defender dare show hisheadforfearoftheMuslimarchers. Saladin had mensapping the foot of thewalls under the protectionof coveredapproachways.Abu-Shamah’s anonymouscorrespondent thought thatvictorywasclose,butnewscame that the Christianarmy was on the march.Saladin interrupted thesiege and marched tointercept them, again

apparently hoping to forcea full engagement. Butagain it was denied him,and the Franks,maintaining their compactcolumn on the march,forcedtheirwaythroughtorelieve the beleagueredfortress. Denied the ratherimprobable bonus of aquick capitulation from al-Karak, Saladin tookadvantage of the fact thattheFrankswereoncemore

concentrated at the castleand sent out raidingcolumns as themain armyheadedbackforDamascus,to ravage from NablusnorthwardsintoGalilee.On15SeptemberSaladin

returned in triumph toDamascus. Greeted by hisown people as a hero, hewas careful to honour theruler of Hisn Kaifapublicly, even investinghimwith a robeofhonour

which the caliph had sentfor the victorious Saladinhimself.Fortherestof theyearSaladinwasbusywiththe administration of hislargeempire,anditappearsthat he also had to pacifycomplaints from Cairo.With the bulk of theEgyptianarmyawayinthenorth the country feltvulnerable to surpriseChristian raids. Theseprotests were to become

more plaintive thefollowing year whenSaladin took the Egyptianforceswithhimstillfurtherfrom their home in acampaignagainstMosul.Thoughhisadmirersmay

have been unhappy at yetanother conflict with aMuslimcity,Saladinknewtherewaslittletofearfromthe Christians. The tragiclife of Baldwin IV wasnearing its endandhehad

designated his eight-year-oldnephewBaldwinashissuccessor.Thusattheverytime Saladin, with Alepposubdued and the lesserprinces of al-Jazirah hiswillingallies,wasweldingMuslimSyriaintothemostconvincing unity it hadknown since Nur-ad-Din’sdeath, the Franks werefacedwith a long regency.Better still, Guy ofLusignan had been

explicitly excluded fromthe regency which hadbeen given to his rival,RaymondofTripoli,sothatsome bitter and damagingpolitics lay ahead for thekingdom. For the momentits most pressing problemwasathreatoffamine.Thewinter rainshadfailedandthepeasantryseemedfacedwith starvation; theplundering expeditions bySaladin’s troops of the

previous year had nothelped matters, while theChristiansweredesperatelyshort ofmen if the enemyshould decide on a majorinvasion. Emissaries hadbeensent toEuropetobegreinforcements,butwithoutsuccess. When the newregent met his council todecidewhatwastobedonethey agreed, with littledebate, tohisproposal thata truce should be sought

withSaladin.Not only did Saladin

readily grant the truce,willingly according to oneWestern source, he alsoordered supplies into thedisaster areas. In fact,according to the Frankishsource known as Ernoul,‘theSaracensbroughtinsomuch provender that theChristians had all theyneeded; had there been notrucetheywouldhavedied

of famine. For this thecountofTripoliwasmuchblessed and honoured bythe peasants, for the trucethat he hadmadewith theSaracens.’ For the Frenchhistorian Grousset thefactors in the situationproved that Saladin,‘satisfied with theconstitution of his Syrio-Egyptian empire, wasprepared to tolerate theFrankish presence in

coastal Palestine, despitehis jihad protestations.’ Itmust be conceded that,strictly within the contextof the Holy War, thesituationinearly1185wasgood for an attack on theChristians.ButSaladinhadcommitments to his alliesin the Islamic world andnews was already comingin that ‘Izz-ad-Din atMosul,withthehelpofthePersianSelchük,Pahlavan,

wasmountinganattackonhis ally the lord of Irbil.Determined to settle theperennial disturbances thatthreatened on his northernfrontiers, Saladin wasdelighted that his southernborder was secured by thefour-year truce the Frankshadbeggedofhim.Hecrossed theEuphrates

at al-Birah to be joinedtherebyGökböri,governorofHarran,andenvoysfrom

Irbil and other parts of al-Jazirah. Despite warningsfrom Konya he continuedhis march, judging rightlythat the sultan would notsend troops against him.HereachedHarraninmid-May and there followed abrief episode which hasremained a puzzle.Gökböri, who had longbeenoneofthemostardentadvocates of Saladin’sintervention in the area,

was almost immediatelyarrested ‘for something hehad done and for certainwordsattributed tohimbyhis ambassador whichangered Saladin, thoughcertainly he had notthoroughlyinvestigatedthematter’. It seems thatGökböri had promised50,000 dinars to theexpeditionwhichwere notavailable when Saladincalled on them; more

seriouslywegetahintthatthegovernorofHarranhadbeen accused of havingdealingswithMosul itself.Perhaps these are the‘words attributed to him’.ThefactthatBaha’-ad-Din,stillintheserviceofMosulat the time, comments thatSaladin could not haveinvestigated the matterproperly suggests that hehad inside informationandknewthatthegovernorhad

infactmadenoapproachtoMosul. It seems thatSaladin soon discoveredthat the accusations wereslanderous. Gökböri wasstrippedofallhistitles,yetwithinamatterofdays,hehad been released and hadgiven back thegovernorship of Harranwith the assurance thatEdessa too would bereturned to him in duecourse. His complete

restoration to favour wassymbolised when Saladinmagnanimously clad himwitharobeofhonour.A month later the army

wasonceagainoutsidethewalls ofMosul. And onceagain they promised to bemore than a match forSaladin’ssiegecraft.Moreseriously,signsofsicknessbegan to spread; yetwhile‘Izz-ad-Din, whose allieswere now too concerned

with their own affairs tocometohisaid,beggedforacompromise,Saladinwasadamant. It was believedthat he was toying withplanstodivertthecourseofthe Tigris and so rob thecityofitswatersupply.Butdevelopments to the northdiverted him from a fullblockade of Mosul, and afewweeksaftersettingthesiegeheledthebulkofhisarmy out on the road to

AkhlatonthecoastofLakeVan.TheSelchükprinceoftheplacehaddied,andhissuccessor, calledBaktimore, learnt withdismay that Pahlavan, thelord of Azerbaijan, wasplanning to march againsthim. Baktimore sent adesperate plea for help toSaladin.Saladin responded

promptly,andonthemarchnorth hewas accompanied

byhiscousinNasir-ad-Din,lord of Homs, and ‘Isa-al-Hakkari, a senior memberof the Egyptianadministration on thecampaign with Egypt’sarmy.SincePahlavanaloneof ‘Izz-ad-Din’s allies hadactually sent troops to theaidofMosulapointscoredat his expense wouldemphasise the wide reachof Saladin’s influence.Perhaps, too, there was an

elementofnostalgiabehindthedecision.Akhlat layonthe edge of the Kurdishhomelands from whichSaladin’sfamilyhadcome.Finally, there was troublebrewing up on this distantnorthern frontier whichcould,andinfactsoondid,impinge on the security ofnorthern Syria in generaland Aleppo in particular.At about the time ofBaktimore’s appeal,

turbulent warfare hadbroken out between a newwave of Turkomansmoving in from centralAsia and the Kurdishpopulation of the UpperJazirah. The Turkomanswonanoutrightvictoryandmassacred theiropponents.Fromthatpointonthroughto thewinter of 1186 theyravaged the Christian andMuslimlandsfromGeorgiato Cappadocia virtually

unopposed: by 1187 theywould be threatening eventhe northern frontiers ofAntiochandAleppo.If he hadwon control of

it, the fortress city ofAkhlat would haveprovidedavaluableoutpostfromwhichtokeepacheckon these threateningdevelopments. A furtherfactormusthavereinforcedSaladin’s decision tointervene and this was the

somewhat surprisingarrivalofanembassyfromConstantinople. Theprospect of having an allyon the northern boundaryof his inveterate andnaggingenemyKilijArslanat Konya was worth animmediate gesture inresponse. The situation inAkhlat gave him a chanceto show his capacity foroperationsremotefromhisown base in support of a

prospective ally aswell asoffering immediateadvantages.The diplomatic minuet

between Saladin and theByzantines which wasalternately to enrage andfascinate the Muslim andChristian Middle East foranotherfiveyearsrevolvedaround certain commoninterests. The EmperorAndronicos knew theMuslimworldatfirsthand.

When as a young man hehad been exiled from theByzantine court, he hadbeen befriended both bythe caliph at Baghdad andby Nur-ad-Din atDamascus. Andronicosalso badly needed allies.Hisaccessionwasregardedby some as mereusurpation, others wereinfuriatedbythecrueltyofhis régime: he had manyenemies and some of the

most influential were inexile. At the time of hisapproach to Saladin, KingWilliam II of Sicily wasadvancing into the Greekprovincesonbehalfofoneof them. And there weretwo other more long-termthreats. The sultanate ofKonya, which had alreadyoverrun vast tracts ofByzantineterritory,andtheisland of Cyprus,theoretically a Byzantine

dependency, was in revoltand so possibly an ally ofthe Franks in Palestine.Boththesestateswerealsopotentialor actual enemiestoSaladin.An alliance between

SaladinandtheByzantinesmadepoliticalsense,but itwas obvious that Saladin,lord of Syria and Egypt,would expect to be thesenior partner. Obvious,that is, to all but

Andronicos,whocouldnotbreak loose from the time-honoured conventions ofByzantine diplomacy,which had recognised noequal since defeatingZoroastrian Persia in 628.Saladin was asked to dohomage to the emperor,and the division of anyconquered territories wasweighted in favour ofConstantinople.Andronicos even supposed

that he was strong enoughto insist on the return ofJerusalem to the empire.But in fact he was notstrongenough to retainhisown throne. WhenSaladin’s ambassadorsarrived at the capital withtheir reply to the proposedalliance, itwastofindthatthe emperor had beendeposedbymobactionandreplacedbyanewemperor,Isaac IIAngelus. The first

movement of the minuetwasover.By this time, September

1185, Saladin had learntthatAkhlathadeludedhim.Baktimorehadbeenabletocome to terms withPahlavan and married oneof his daughters. Saladinreturned to Mosul. InNovember ‘Izz-ad-Din,hoping to appeal to hisrenownedchivalry,senthiswifeand twoprincesses to

intercede with him, butwithout success. Theoutlook forMosulwasnotgood. There was no hopeof relief from the outside,andSaladin’sarmyseemedready to press the siegethroughout the wintermonths. But at this pointSaladin’s fragile healthbroke down in the sultryhumidity of the winterrainy season. With him incommand the army would

fight beyond the demandsofconvention,withouthimitwoulddonothing,andon25 December Saladin fellbacktoHarran.Despitethecritical nature of hisconditionherefusedtorideinalitterandstayedinthesaddle for all the army tosee he was still incommand.During the next few

weeks, his life in thebalance, Saladin tried to

ensure a peacefulsuccession by forcing hisemirs to swear loyalty tohis sons. But ambitiousmen were stirring. Nasir-ad-Din of Homs, whoapparently felt that he hadbeen promised thegovernorship of Mosulwhen it fell, obviouslythought he had a strongclaim, and securedpromises of support fromgroups in Aleppo and in

Damascus, being assuredthat the capital would beheld for him if Saladindied. There was alsotrouble in Egypt whereTaqi-ad-Din, proud of hismilitary reputation, wasbeginning to chafe at hisposition as tutor andsecond string to Saladin’seldestson,al-Afdal.Duringhis illness Saladin hadurgent discussions on thesituationwithal-Adil,who

had hurried up fromAleppo with his ownphysician.During January 1186

Saladin’s health began tomend, and in February hewasabletoreceiveanotherdeputation from Mosulheaded by Baha’ad-Din.He tells us thatMosulhadseen Saladin’s illness ‘asan opportunity not to bemissed for we knew howreadily the prince lent his

ear to an appeal and howtender-heartedhewas’.ButSaladin, disturbed by theunrest thatwas brewing inthe empire, was as eagerfor a settlement aswas ‘I-ad-Din, and on 3 Marchtheir ambassadors signedatreaty. ‘Izz-ad-DinremainedlordofthecityofMosul, but the city finallyacknowledged theoverlordship of Damascus,and the lands across the

Tigris to the south ofMosul were put in thecharge of emirs appointedbySaladin.Two days later news

arrived in Harran thatNasir-ad-Dinhaddiedfroman excess of wine. ‘Likefather, like son’ wouldcover the facts, thoughsomewere later to suggestthat Saladin himself hadhad a hand in the death.There is no evidence to

support the rumour, nor isit probable. His cousin’sdeathwouldcertainlyhavesuitedSaladin’sbookafewweeks earlier. Assured ofthe security of his ownprovinces he could havedriven a harder bargainwith Mosul. As it was hehastened to confirm thetwelve-year-old heir ofNasir-ad-Din, Shirkuh II,asrulerofHoms,andearlyin April was back at

Damascus.Saladin now had the

goodwill of Baghdad, andthethreeothercitiesofthequadrilateral of powerunder his direct authority.The Franks were dividedamongst themselves bybitter political wranglingand the truce with themhad, in any case, threemoreyearstorun.ThenewByzantineemperor,IsaacIIAngelus, had been

entertained once atSaladin’s court while anexile and now confirmedthe ‘treaty arrangementsthat Saladin had proposedinresponsetotheinitiativeofAndronicus.Saladinwasfree to put the finishingtouches to thereorganisation of hisempire.The situation in Egypt

was disturbing, and duringJune al-Adil came down

fromAleppo for a numberof conferences with hisbrother.Alsoat thecapitalwere Saladin’s two youngsons, the fourteen-year-oldal-’Aziz and the thirteen-year-old az-Zahir, stilllanguishing after his briefperiodofgloryasnominalrulerofAleppothreeyearsbefore. The result was ageneral postwhich revealsa good deal about Saladinthe dynast. His sons were

approaching manhood.Nur-ad-Din’s son and heirhad been only eighteenwhenhedied,but evenbythat time he had wieldedsufficient influence atAleppo to sway thechoiceof his successor. Menexpected the sons ofprinces to be ready forresponsibility at an earlyage.Saladinwasanxioustoestablishhissonsfirmlyinthe administration of the

empire, to assure theirloyaltyandthecontinuanceofhisdynasty.Buthealsorealised the strain thatadvancing them too fastwould impose on theloyalty of his gifted andenergetic brother al-Adiland the hotheaded butequally talented Taqi-ad-Din.In the summer of 1186,

Taqi-ad-Din seemed to bethemostpressingproblem.

Saladin decided to recallhim fromCairo and at thesame time summoned hiseldestsonal-Afdal.Hewasnow sixteen andhad spentallhislifeinEgypt;hewaswellestablishedandhewasambitious–whenhisfatherlaydyingsevenyearslater,he calmly took the seat ofhonour in the banquetinghall. Saladin, who hadalready detected signs ofhis son’s ambition, was

clearlynotwillingtoleavehim at Cairo to presideover the change ofadministration that was tofollowtherecallofTaqiad-Din. Instead, the youngeral-Aziz was sent to Cairowithal-AdilashisatabegThere was mounting

criticism in Cairo ofSaladin’s policies andgrowingexasperationatthelong-drawn-out strugglewithMosul.Evenal-Fadil,

for years Saladin’s mostloyal minister in Cairo,bitterlycomplainedthatthewars against Mosul weredraining the wealth ofEgyptandtakingthousandsof her troops to remotetheatres of war. Far fromsympathising with hissovereign when he wasconvalescing from thenear-fatal illness of early1186, he had lectured himfor backsliding from the

cause of jihad ‘God hasgivenyouawarning.Takea vow that if you recoverfrom this illness, you willnever again fight againstMuslims and that youwilldevoteyourenergiestowaron the enemies of Allah.’One Arabic source seemsto hint that even he haddabbled for a time inopposition politics; othercriticsofSaladinhadbeendescantingpointedlyonthe

evils of wars betweenMuslimsforsometime.As a result of the

discontent in the upperreaches of theadministration theatmosphere at the court ofDamascus was heavy withsuspicion.The intrigues ofNasir-ad-Din had involvedimportant figures boththereandatAleppo.Whenhe accepted the post atCairo, al-Adil, although

Saladin’sbrother andmostrespected adviser, took theremarkablestepofclearinghis position with the twoyoung princes as aprecaution, after a summerof rumour-mongering,against the whisperings ofambitious rivals.He foundthe boys sitting togetherandtooktheplacebetweenthem. To al-‘Aziz he said:‘Your father, my lord, hascommanded me to enter

yourserviceandtogowithyoutoEgypt.Iknowthereare many wicked peopleand some of them willcometoyouandwillabusemeandcounselyounot totrust me. If you mean tolisten to them tellme nowso that I may not go withyou.’ Despite the boy’sassurance al-Adil nextturnedtohisbrother.‘Iamquite well aware that yourbrothermightlistentomen

who devise mischief andthat, if he did, I could notrely on any but you.’ Az-Zahir’s answer was calmandreassuring,‘Blessyou!Allwillgowell.’In August az-Zahir was

nominated the ruler ofAleppobyhis fatherwhilehis elder brother, al-Afdal,arrived at Damascus.Messengers were soon ontheir way to Egypt todemand the return also of

Taqi-ad-Din.Years before,in the council whichreceived the embassycommanding Saladin’sreturn to the capital of hissuzerain Nur-ad-Din, hehad been the one to urgethatthefamilyshoulddefytheir rightful lordanddarehimtocomeandasserthisclaim.Nowhewasequallyoutraged when his ownuncle commanded hisreturn. He vowed that he

would join his generalSharaf-ad-Dincampaigningin the maghrib and raiserebellion. But he too wasurgedbyhisadvisersnottodefy the orders ofDamascus, and inNovember there was areconciliation betweenuncle and nephew. As aconsolation Taqi-ad-Dinreceived the appanage ofHamah, where he hadalready servedasgovernor

andwherehecouldhopetofind neither the resourcesnor the obscurity to raisefurther trouble. The yearended with two marriagesdesigned to heal some ofthe ruptures among theruling family. At Aleppoaz-Zahir married adaughter of al-Adil towhom he had beenbetrothed for some time,while at Damascus theAiyubid heir, al-Afdal,

tookawifefromamongthedaughters of the deadNasir-ad-Din.The rumblings of

discontent beneath thesurfaceofthegreatempirequietened. By contrast,Christian politics shatteredin rivalry, intrigue andtreason. InAugust theboyking Baldwin V died,attended by the regentRaymond of Tripoli andthe seneschal Joscelin,

who, at Raymond’sinsistence, had held thecustody of the king’sperson. Raymond, whileaccepting the regency, hadrefusedtheguardianshipofthe weakly child for fearthat he would be accusedwhen the king died. Thewill of Baldwin IV hadprovided that in the eventof the boy’s deathRaymond shouldbe regentuntiltheemperor,thepope

and the kings of Englandand France should decidebetween the claims of thetwoprincessesoftheroyalhouse, Sibylla (wife to theunpopular Guy deLusignan)andIsabella.ButthepartisansofSibyllaandGuy, among them theseneschal and Raynald,outmanoeuvred Raymond.They held Jerusalem andtheroyalregaliaandforcedthrough the coronation of

Queen Sibylla and KingGuy.While most of his

supporters accepted thecoup, Raymond retired toTiberias, demanding thatGuyrestoretohimhiscityofBeirut.Therehemadeaseparate trucewithSaladinto cover his own countyand his wife’s principalityof Galilee. A few monthslaterhewasreported tobenegotiating forMuslimaid

inabidforthecrownitself,and according to Muslimchroniclers he definitelyreceivedtroops.Neitherhisenemies’sharppracticenorthe provocation he hadreceivedcould justify suchoutrighttreason–Christianranks were more bitterlydividedthanever.Itwasaswellforthemthatthetrucewith Saladin still had twoyearstorun.Thencamestunningnews

from the south. Raynaldhad overrun yet anotherrich caravan, slaughteredtheconvoyandinternedthemerchants with theirtreasure at al-Karak.Saladin at once dispatchedan envoy to demand thereturn of the hostages andrestitution of the treasure.He poured reproaches onthe truce-breaker andthreatened him withfearsome vengeance, but

Raynald,securebehindthewalls of al-Karak,contemptuously refused anaudience.TheenvoyswentontoputtheircasetoKingGuy. Knowing full wellwhat could now be inprospect for the kingdom,he was conciliatory andsent orders to Raynald tomake reparation. But hismessenger returned fromal-Karak with nothing toreport save a neatly

appositemisquotefromthejeering Jews who hadsurrounded Christ at thecrucifixion. ‘They trustedin Muhammad that heshould deliver them; lethimdeliverthem!’Western historians have,

ingeneral,castRaynaldofChatillonastheevilgeniuswho presided over, evenguaranteed, thecollapseofthe kingdom of Jerusalem.Some have suggested that

Saladin might have beencontent to contain theChristian threat; to renewthe truce indefinitely; andto wait for Europeanapathy and the dwindlingresourcesandmoraleoftheone-time Crusaders tosubmerge the infidelsettlements in theoverwhelming facts ofMuslim population andculture. Yet it is doubtfulwhether, increasingly

cornered by his ownostentatious jihadpropaganda and no doubtdriven on by his owngenuine religious piety,Saladin could or wouldhave left the Christians inpeace much longer. As itwas,Raynaldmadeallsuchspeculation irrelevant. Noris it entirely clear that hisview of things wasmistaken. However keenthe Franks of Outremer

may have been to seethemselves in the roleofaEuropean aristocracymerely set in a foreignlandscape, they were stillthe warriors of religion.They faced an Islamicworld up in arms againsttheir intrusion and theirraison d’être was not theadministration of landedestatesbuttheprotectionoftheHolyCityand theWaragainsttheInfidel.Perhaps

diplomacy andappeasement would havesaved them from suddendisaster,but itmust, in theend,havemeant the losingof their identity in thepolyglot world of MiddleEastern politics andsociety.Theflaring,blood-red militancy of Raynaldsuited better with theoriginsof thestateand thenature of a European-derived martial class than

pliant and subtlepoliticking.And there was some

military sense behind hishandling of his commandin Transjordan. Al-Karakand ash-Shaubak were astanding menace to thelines of communicationbetween Syria and Egypt.No caravan could riskrunning the gauntletwithout a really powerfulconvoying escort. In 1183

and 1184 Saladin had hadtomountlargediversionaryattacks to secure a safepassage for merchants andcourtiers. Bloody-mindedthough hemay have been,Raynald occupiedmore ofSaladin’s time andresources than any othersingleChristianprince.Hecouldreasonablyarguethatif the Muslims couldpillage Christian lands atwill, and so weaken their

war effort as well asreaping plunder andransoms, there was littlepoint in castles whichcommanded the richesttrade routes in Syria andoneof thegreatarteriesofMuslim pilgrimage if theywerenottobeused.Uptillthat time even the worstprovocationhadnotstirredSaladin to crushingretaliation.But now his suzerainty

over Mosul, confirmed byhis name stamped on itscoinageand invokedeveryFriday at the biddingprayer, gave him authorityto command its fightingmentohisbanners.Hewaslord of all the territoriesonce ruled by Nur-ad-Dinand,inaddition,underhimthecauseofIslamwasnowbackedby theresourcesofEgypt.Perhapsbecausetheknock-out blow had been

so long in coming, theFranksmay not have fullyappreciatedthefatethatlayaheadforthem.Now, in the spring of

1187, the tocsin of jihadwas reverberating fromCairo toMosul. Itwasnotjust one more flurry ofrazzias that was inpreparation but adetermined attempt to winat last the Holy City ofIslam. The vast forces

assembled and the well-thought-out strategy withwhich they were deployedwere going to probe theresources and militaryadaptability of theChristians to the full. Andto his vow to recaptureJerusalemSaladinhadnowadded an oath to finishonce and for all the careerof the infideloath-breaker,Raynald.

Chapter10

Oh!SweetVictory

At the beginning of 1187,‘Saladin wrote to all theprovinces to call them toarms in the Holy War’;troopswerecalledupfrom

EgyptandtheSyriancities,andthelordsofMosulandthe other cities of al-Jazirah. Among them wasGökböri of Edessa andHarran; the ill-feelingbetween him and Saladin,whatevermayhavebeenitscause, was obviously longforgotten: Gökböri hadreceivedbothhis lordshipsback.DuringthemiddleofApril the army leftDamascus, marching due

southforRa’sal-Ma’.Herethey were joined bynumerous Syriancontingents and al-Afdalwas left to continue themuster. His instructionswere to dispatch theincoming detachments onharrying raids in Christianterritories and particularlyto probe the situation inGalilee where CountRaymond of Tripoli, lordof the principality through

his wife Eschiva, was stillon terms of alliance withSaladin.It seems obvious that

Saladin was developing amajor strategical planaimedat thedestructionoftheChristianarmyand theconquest of Jerusalem.Becausethecrucialvictory,when it came in July,depended to some extenton Christian errors, someofSaladin’smoderncritics

have proposed that hissuccesswasdueasmuchtogood luck as goodjudgement. They suggestthat the massive forceswere intended for nothingmore than a large-scalerazzia. The developmentsof the spring and summergive the lie to suchtheorising.The coming campaign

posed two related strategicproblems. Saladin could

not hope to take the citiesandfortressesonwhichthekingdom of Jerusalemrested unless he firstdestroyed the army in thefield. But long experiencehad taught that theFranks,if well led and welldisciplined, were virtuallyindestructible unless takenbysurpriseoratsomeotherdisadvantage. From this itfollowed that the secondproblemwastomanoeuvre

them into a situation inwhich they were forcedinto mistakes. It willbecome quite clear thatSaladin fully understoodthe issues involved. Thesheer size of the militaryforces that were buildingupintheHauranwouldnotguarantee success, theywould have to be handledwith cunning and thepsychology of warexploitedtothefull.

Here Saladin held animportant card. Hisdealings with CountRaymond had alreadyconsiderablyweakened theChristian cause withmutual recrimination andsuspicions.NowKingGuyhad gone so far as tosummon the army of thekingdom to meet him atNazareth with a view toforcing Raymond’ssubmission before the

Muslim attacks reallybegan. Guy was hisdeclared enemy; Saladinhis only friend but theambiguity of Raymond’sposition was heightenedwhen, at the end of April,hereceivedanenvoyfromal-Afdal. He was notprepared for what was tocome. As one ally toanother, al-Afdal blandlyrequested permission tosend a force of 7,000

horsemen through Galilee.The purpose anddestination do not seem tohave been discussed; allthat was asked for was asafe conduct for whatamountedtoasmallarmy.Raymond’s dilemmawas

acute. Well-informedsources in the Muslimcamp believed that theobjective of al-Afdal’sexpedition was thehinterland of Acre itself,

and Raymond can hardlyhave failed to make asimilar deduction. ManyChristians had alreadyclassed him as a traitor, ifhe collaborated in such aproject his reputationwould be blackenedindelibly.Yethecouldnotafford to abandon theSaladin connectioncompletely until Guy’sthreat on his southernfrontier had lifted. He

proposed a compromise.The 7,000 could gothrough on condition theyharmed neither town norpeasants and that theycrossed the Jordan afterdawn and returned by thesamefordbeforenightfall.Thefactthatal-Afdalwas

content with these termsconfirms thesuspicion thatSaladin’s objective wasdiplomatic rather thanmilitary. TheAcre rumour

isreportedbyIbn-al-Athir,who was not with thenorthern army at the time,and it seems that Saladinwas wishing to probe hisally’s reliability and testhow far he would commithimself.However,al-Afdalmade full use of theopportunity for his staff tosurvey and reconnoitre thetheatre of the comingcampaign. The expeditionwas led by Gökböri,

commander of thecontingents from al-Jazirah, and thecommanders of theAleppan and Damascustroops. Thanks toRaymond’s embarrassedcooperation the Islamicforces were able to rideover the country betweenTiberias and Saffuriyah –the traditional assemblypointfortheFrankisharmywhen faced with invasion

in the north of thekingdom.Unexpectedlyitalsogave

them the chance toliquidate a force ofHospitaller and Templarknights.Toavoidabreachof the truce by his ownpeople, Raymond haddispatched messengersthroughout the principalitytowarnofthemarchbytheSaracens.What he did notknow was that King Guy

had finally agreed tomoderates’advicetoseekasettlement with him andthat an embassy wasalready in the principalityonitswayuptoTiberias.ItwasledbyBalianofIbelin,and with him was RogerdesMoulins, grandmasterof the Hospitallers, andGerard de Ridefort, grandmasteroftheTemplars.Hewas not the man to letinfidels ride unmolested

throughChristian territory.Onhearingthenewsontheevening of 30 April he atonce ordered all theTemplars in theneighbourhood to come tohis standard. With otherknights who joined thecolours they made up aforceof closeon150.Thenext day they rode out insearchoftheenemy,Rogerprotesting but shamed intotheabsurdadventurebythe

taunts of his fellow grandmaster. The Muslimhorsemen were wateringtheir horses near toSaffuriyah, when to theirastonishment they foundthemselves under attackfrom a mere handful ofChristian knights. Joyfullythey prepared themselvesfor thisbonusbattlewhichquickly became amassacre.Onlythreeoftheknights survived, among

themGrandMasterGerard.The blond head of Rogerdes Moulins was amongthose borne back intriumph on the lances oftheSaracentroopers.The main army greeted

the news with jubilation.When he heard it Saladinwas on the road south todeal another blow at theChristians.Newshadcomethrough that Raynald wasgoing to attack pilgrims

(moving up the Meccaroad)andthenreturntobarthe Egyptian army fromjoiningupwiththeSyrians.Thesituationwasalmostacarbon copy of 1183 and1184.Onceagainacaravanescorting prestigioustravellers – this timeSaladin’ssisterandherson– was obliged to run themailedgauntletofRaynald,poised between the twohalves of the Muslim

empire. Once again therewere importantmanoeuvrespending.Thenithadbeenanexchangeofpostsbyhighofficials,nowitwasamilitarycampaignwhichcouldnotbeallowedtogooffathalfcock.TheEgyptian contingent wasvital;forthemomentitwasmore important toneutralise Raynald at theleast possible cost thancrushhim.Butthistimethe

Muslim forces were verymuchlarger.ItwasenoughforSaladin tomarch southwithout even laying siegeto al-Karak to persuadeRaynald to leave thecaravanalone.Onceitwasout of the area Saladinmarched, systematicallyravaging Raynald’sterritories.At the end of May he

moved back northwardsand in June set up his

standard at al-‘Ashtara,some twenty miles nearerthe Christian frontier thanRa’s al-Ma’, where themainmusterhadnowbeencompleted.The enemy toowasclosingranks.Shockedby the disaster atSaffuriyah, Raymond hadcome to terms with thekingandwasnowwiththearmy.Itwasthebiggest inliving memory, some saidthe biggest that the Franks

had ever put in the field.But that gathering roundSaladin’s standard wasbiggerand,becauseof latearrivals, growing. In thethirdweekofJunehehelda general review and gavehis officers a detailedbriefing. The duties of thecoming campaign wereexplained and dutiesallotted; the words ofcommandwererunthroughafinaltimetoensureasfar

as possible againstmisunderstandings in thefield,amongaforcedrawnfrom widely scatteredregions and differenttraditions of service. Eachemir was given a specificpostandorderedstrictlytostick to it and the threesenior commands wereappointed. Taqi-ad-Din ontherightwing,Gökbörionthe left, and Saladinhimselfincommandofthe

centre. The reviewfinished, he next paid outthe bounties which he hadhad to promise to variouscommanders to persuadethem to come on thecampaign.At last the army was

ready and, on Friday, 26June,Saladinmovedoutofal-‘Ashtara towards thefordofSenabra, just southof Lake Tiberias. Hepitched camp at al-

Uqhuwanah. ‘The vast seaofhisarmysurroundedthelake. The ship-like tentsrode at anchor and thebattalionsfloodedin,waveupon wave. A second skyofdustspreadoutinwhichswords and iron-tippedlancesroselikestars.’Herethey rested for five dayswhile the scouts broughtback the news that theFranks were indeedmustering at their usual

base of Saffuriyah, whereonly a few weeks beforetheMuslimhighcommandhad taken the opportunityof checking the lie of theland at first hand. In 1183the Franks had not beenlured into battle onunfavourable terrain, evenby Saladin’s capture ofBaisan – clearly a biggerinducement would have tobe found. The objectivewasTiberias.

On 1 July the armycrossed the Jordan. Themain force was sent on afewmilestothenorth-westwithorderstocampatKafrSabt and from there tomonitor the Franks’movements. ‘If they triedto reach Tiberias, theMuslims were to set outimmediately to attackthem. Saladin went toTiberias with his personalguardandhismostfaithful

troops.’Thetownsoonfellbut the Countess EschivaandthegarrisonleftbehindbyRaymondwithdrewintothecitadel.From there shegot amessage to the royalarmy begging the king torelieve the siege thatSaladin was laying to thecitadel. The day wasThursday, the date 2 July.The campaign was barelyforty-eight hours old andthe bird seemed ready to

cometothelure.Tiberiasliesaboutfifteen

miles due east ofSaffuriyah, though themostlevelroad,curvingtothe north, stretched thedistance to some twentymiles–thelimitofaday’smarch.Thisroadlayacrossan arid upland plain andthen descended to the lakeaboutamiletothenorthofthe town. An alternativeroutebenttothesouth-east,

leadingtothesouthernmosttip of the lake and thencenorthwards up its coast.Again the distance wasabout twenty miles, andthis road, though not sogood, was well watered.But with Saladin’s mainforce straddled across thesouth-east route at KafrSabt, it was not even anoption to theChristians. Ifthey were to relieveTiberias they would have

to facea longday’smarchunder enemy action acrosswaterless uplands in theheat of a Syrian mid-summer.By thecaptureofTiberias, by the placing ofhisforces,andbyblockingup the few wells andsprings along the northernroad, Saladin had done allinhispowertoforceontheChristians that all-importantmistake.Nowhecould only wait on the

decision of the highcommandatSaffuriyah.Thecouncilofwar,which

was to decide the fate ofthe Christians in the HolyCity, began early in theevening of 2 July. Theargumentsagainstthereliefof Tiberias ran roughly asfollows. Saladin could notdestroy the army where itwasatSaffuriyahbutstoodagoodchanceofdoing soon the march. Thus

inaction would keep thearmy in being, and sincethe Muslim army usuallybrokeupofitsownaccordat the end of thecampaigning season theloss of Tiberias could beseen as only a short-termmatter. If, flushedwithhissuccess there, Saladinshould decide to attack,thenitwouldbehis troopsandnottheChristianswhowouldbefightingunderthe

handicapsofheatandthirstwith no safe base to fallbackon.Upontheexposedplateau thearmywouldbeinviting destruction. If itwerelostthensowouldbethewhole kingdom.Betterto lose Tiberias. Themajority of thecommanders urgedprudence, and they wereheaded by Raymond,althoughTiberiaslayinhiswife’s domain and it was

she who, as commander,had begged for support.Raymond pointed out thateven if the garrison weretaken prisoner they couldeasily be ransomed in duecourse.But theargumentson the

other side were equallycompelling, and it wasthese that Saladin musthavebeendependingupon.Heknew that the two fire-eaters, Gerard de Ridefort

andRaynald,werewiththearmy and both had beenhumiliatedbyhisactivitiesofrecentmonths.Whenthecouncil broke up justbefore midnight on the2nd, itwaswiththeking’sagreement to follow theRaymond line and stay atSaffuriyah.ButGerardandRaynald stayed behind inthe king’s tent to persuadehim to reverse thatdecision. They had some

cogent points to put. Theyreminded Guy that threeyearsbeforehehadbeenincommand of another greatarmy which had refusedbattle to Saladin at theSpringsofGoliathandthatsubsequently he had beencharged with cowardiceand deprived of hispositionasregent.Thenhehad followed similarcautious advice fromRaymond, and it had been

Raymond who hadreplaced him as regent.Furthermore, they argued,Raymond had beentreacherously allied withtheenemyuntilonlyweeksbeforeandtheresultofthatalliance had been theslaughter of more than ahundred knights. If theking, commanding thebiggestarmyyetputinthefield,refusedthechanceofdestroying the enemy on

theadviceofatraitorthen,saidGerard,thecontinuingloyaltyof theOrderof theTemple could not beguaranteed. One can onlyadmiretheskillwithwhichSaladin had combinedmilitary and diplomaticmanoeuvres during theforegoing months to openstill further the divisionswithin the enemy councilsso that the crucial error ofjudgement was virtually

forced.But there was another

point which must surelyhave influenced Guy’sdecision to attempt thereliefofTiberias.Thepartyof Raymond had arguedthat as the campaigningseason came to an end theMuslim army would meltaway. Now while it wastrue that the troops andemirs of al-Jazirah wouldcertainly return to their

distant bases, the AleppanandDamascene troopsandmuchoftheEgyptianforcewould stay. Saladinwouldhave ample forces to holdTiberias over the winter.Guy must have askedhimself what exactly thearmywasforifitcouldnotprevent one of thekingdom’s major citiesfalling to the enemy. IfTiberias could fall, whichwould be the next town to

goandhowlongcouldtheintegrity of the statesurvive suchencroachments? At dawnonFridaythe3rd,thearmyemerged from the securityof Saffuriyah to begin itsfateful last march.Saladin’s jubilant reaction,reported by Baha’-ad-Din,fully supports theassumption that the whole1187 campaign had beencarefully calculated to the

final grand objective, therecaptureof Jerusalem.Hetold his secretary that thisdevelopment ‘confirmedthat his decision, based onhis earlier judgement, hadbeen accurate’, andcontinued,’ “If they aredefeated, killed andcaptured, Tiberias and allPalestinewill have no oneleft to defend them andimpedeourconquest.”’Onceithadbeendecided

to march at all, it wascrucial that the Christiansreach the shores of LakeTiberias in a single day’smarch.ThesecondblowtoChristianhopescamewhenSaladin succeeded inforcing the army to a haltin the evening of the 3rd.The morning had begunblazing hot and dry, andwithinhoursofleavingthetrees and gardens ofSaffuriyah the Franks

‘were suffering greatlyfrom thirst’. A thick dustcloud choked the parchedthroats and caked on thesweaty skins of thelabouring troops. Soon theSaracen army moving upfrom Kafr Sabt madecontact and their horsearchers poured an almostunbroken streamof arrowsinto the enemy.Theirmenand horses gasping forwater, and under constant

attacks on flanks and rear,the Christians’ progresswas slowed to a crawl. Arunningbattlelikethiswasone of the classicmanoeuvres of crusadingwarfare – the Christiantactic was to maintain asteady march for itsobjective; the Muslim aimwas of course to force theenemy to a standstill orbreakhiscolumn.AheadofGuyandhistroopsSaladin

and the army of Tiberiasbarred theway to the lakeand made ready to checkany attempt by thevanguard to charge. But itwas theconstantattacks intheir rear that eventuallyforced the Christians tohalt. The army was indangeroflosingtouchwiththe rearguard and Guymade camp near Lubya amile or two from a lowpeaked hill known locally

astheHornsofHattin.TheFranks had covered barelytenmiles.Surroundedbythemisery

oftheirwoundedanddyingthey spent a fearful anddemoralising nightpunctuated by jubilantshoutsof thechant– ‘Godisgreat;thereisnoGodbutGod’ – from every quarteroftheenemycamp.Ibn-al-Athir tells us that theMuslims ‘had lost their

first fear of the Franks.They could smell thevictory in the air and themore they saw of theunexpectedly low moraleof the Franks the moreaggressive and daring theybecame.’Whileallthiswasgoing on Saladin orderedup reserves of arrows andchecked troop placements.By dawn the Christianswere completelysurrounded,sotightly‘that

not an ant could have gotout.’ The battle openedwith a charge led bySaladin. Althoughweakened anddemoralisedbythirst,theknightsputupa furious resistance andSaladinorderedthearchersto begin firing. TheChristian infantryabandoned all formationand attempted a wildbreakthrough towards thewaters of Lake Tiberias

which lay shimmering inthedistance.Aprairiefire,startedbyavolunteerintheMuslim army, added itsscorching smoke to theirmiseries. Most were cutdownor takenprisoner. Ina desperate attempt tobreakoutRaymond,actingapparentlyontheordersofthe king to open a waythrough the Muslim ranksfortherestofthearmy,leda charge against the wing

commanded by Taqi-ad-Din.ButSaladin’snephewwas notwilling to risk thebreakupofhisformationina mêlée with the heavilyarmed enemy, and openedhis ranks to let theknightsthunder throughineffectually.Lookingbackup thehillRaymondcouldsee that theremnantof thearmy was in a hopelessplight,healsorealisedthathe could not break back

throughthereformedranksofTaqi-ad-Din’s force.Heand his men rode away toTripoli.Hoping perhaps that the

Muslim ranks would opento any determined attack,other groups of Frankishknightsmountedaseriesofcharges which almostdislodged the Muslimsfromtheirpositionsinspiteof their numbers.But theywere steadily driven back

leaving their dead behindthem. ‘The Muslimswheeledaroundthemlikeacircle about its diameter’;inexorably that diameterwascontracting.Guyandaparty of a few hundredmade theirwayup thehillto theHornsofHattin andthere they pitched theking’s red tent for a lastgallantstand.It is apparent from the

asides in their chronicles

thatIbn-al-Athir,Baha’-ad-Dinand‘Imad-ad-Dinweremightily impressed by theFrankish knights. NowGuy, Gerard and Raynald,and theknightswith them,showedthesuperbfightingqualities that had so oftensaved the kingdom fromdisaster and which hadalways forced Saladin totreat the Christian armywith respect. The finalstages of the battle are

described for us in thewords of his son al-Afdal,fighting in his first majorengagement,asreportedbyIbnal-Athir:I was at my fatherSaladin’s side duringthebattle,thefirstthatIsawwithmyowneyes.The Frankish king hadretreatedtothehillwithhisbandandfromtherehe led a furious charge

against the Muslimsfacing him, forcingthem back upon myfather. I saw that hewas alarmed anddistraught, and hetugged at his beard ashewentforwardcrying:‘GivetheDevilthelie!’TheMuslims turned tothe counter-attack anddrove the Franks backupthehill.WhenIsawthe Franks retreating

before the Muslim Icried out for joy: ‘Wehave defeated them!’Buttheyreturnedtothecharge withundiminished ardourand drove our armyback towardmy father.His response was thesameasbefore,andtheFranks retired back tothe hill. Again I cried:‘Wehavebeatenthem!’butmyfather turned to

me and said: ‘Holdyour peace; we shallnot have beaten themuntilthattentfalls!’Ashe spoke the tent fell,and the Sultandismounted andprostrated himself inthankstoGod,weepingforjoy.The fact that these last

charges were aimed atSaladin’spositionindicates

that thiswas a tactical bidto win a last-momentvictory and not a suicidelast stand. In a council ofwarimmediatelybeforethebattleaknightcalledJohn,who had served as amercenary in Turkisharmies,hadadvisedthatthebestwaytovictoryagainstthesemotley forceswas toattack the commander-in-chief. If his section couldbe routed the whole battle

was as good as won. Theidea of a Christianmercenary in service withthe Turks, which maysound oddly in our ears,would not have surprisedFrankorMuslim. It is justone more instance of howthe high-flown passionsbehind the rhetoric ofcrusade and jihad wereoften served by men withpurely professionalinterestsinwarfare.Infact

Sir John’s sound advicenearly saved the day forGuy and his friends. Aforlorn hope it certainlywas, but from the intentandfarfromconfidentwayin which Saladin followedthe closing stages of thebattle we can sense howwell he knew the dourdeterminationofhisenemyand doubted the drive ofhisowntroops.By late afternoon, when

the last grand gesture wasmade, it is possible thatfatiguehadfinally finishedthe fighting spirit of theChristians.When their tentwasatlastoverrunthekingandhisknightswerefoundsitting and lying on theground, totally exhausted.Their resolve had beenfinally broken by the lossof the True Cross. Takenintothebattleasastandardby the bishop of Acre, it

fell to the troops of Taqi-ad-Dinand thebishopwaskilled.‘Stumbling like drunken

men’, the king and hiscompanions were ledbefore Saladin in fetters.Tounderstandwhatwastohappen it is important torememberthefeudbetweenSaladin and Raynald andalsothefactthatGuywasarecentarrivalfromEurope.Thetwowereorderedtosit

together and then SaladinbegantoberateRaynaldasanoath-breaker.Herepliedcoolly enough through theinterpreter: ‘This is howkings have alwaysbehaved; I have onlyfollowed the path ofcustom.’ The otherprisonerswerenotsocalm.The king, who after hoursof exhausting battle hadlost his kingdom and themost prized relic of

Christendom,was shaking,itappearedwithfear,moreprobably from delayedshock. He appealed for adrink and Saladin affablyorderedsnow-cooledwaterto be brought.Guy passedthe cup on to Raynaldwhenhehaddrunkhisfill.Immediately Saladinintervened. ‘Tell thecount,’ he said, ‘that yougavehimthatdrinkwithoutpermission from me. He

has not received food ordrinkatmyhandandsohecannotclaimtheprotectionofmyhouse.’Withthisheleft the pavilion tosupervise the return of thearmy to its camp stationsandthepitchingofhisowntent, and also ‘to letRaynaldroastatthefireofhisownfear’.Returning in the evening

heenteredthetenthousingthe prisoners and at once

summoned Raynald tostandbeforehim; thenandthere Saladin felled himwith a blow which caughthim on the shoulder. Aguard struck off the headandthecorpsewasdraggedout by the heels. Guy,already exhaustedphysicallyandemotionally,assumed this was thebeginning of a generalkilling. His Europeanbackground made it

impossible for him toaccept that the lord of theinfidels could be amanofhis word. Saladin tried toset his mind at rest afterthis macabre episode ofrough justice. ‘Twice haveI sworn to kill that manwhen I had him in mypower;oncewhenhe triedto attack Mecca andMedinaandagainwhenhebroke the truce to capturethe caravan.’ Guy and his

other noble companionswere spared, and were induecoursereleased–eventhe grand master of theTemple.But the lesser knights of

the order were not sofortunate. Their devotionand rigorous militarytraining made them themost feared of theChristian troops and, withuncharacteristiccoldbloodedness, Saladin

orderedtheslaughterofthehundred or so TemplarsandHospitallersamongtheprisoners.Seatedonadaisbefore the whole army hewatched as the band ofscholars, sufis andasceticswho had flockedenthusiasticallytothearmywhen jihad the wasproclaimed and who hadbeggedtobeallowedtokillone of the knights, carriedout the ceremonial killing.

ThedayafterthevictoryatHattin the CountessEschiva formallysurrendered the citadel ofTiberias and was sentunder Saladin’s safeconducttoTripoli.It was the first of many

capitulations. Hattin hadcrackedthedefencesofthekingdom wide open andcastellans and citygovernors throughout thecountryknewthistobeso.

Saladinmovedfast,topickthe fruits of victory whiletheChristianmoralewasatits lowest ebb. Acre,commanded by Joscelin ofCourtenay,seneschalofthekingdom, was the firstobjective. On 10 July theplace capitulated oncondition that the lives ofthe citizens were spared;the majority of theChristian merchantsmarched out with their

household possessionsunder the safe conduct butthey left behindwarehouses crammed withstocks of silks andmetals,jewels and arms. As thestreams of refugeesmarched through the citygates Saladin celebratedpublic prayers in themosque: the first Fridayprayers to be held in thecitysincetheinfidelFranksfirst invaded Islam.

Saladin, who loved tobeginhiscampaignsandifpossiblefighthisbattlesonthe Muslim’s Holy Day,found his victory thesweeter for being on aFriday, but the rest of thesurrenders that summercould not always be timedso conveniently – theyhappened too fast. Hiscommanderssystematicallytookthesubmissionsofthetowns and castles of

Galilee. Nazareth,Saffuriyah itself, Haifa,Caesarea fell without afight,Nablusplayedatwo-day masquerade ofresistance,andthecastleatToron held out for afortnightbeforeyieldingon26 July to a force led bySaladin. Meanwhile, theEgyptian army under al-Adil had taken Jaffa bystorm and sent its peopleinto slavery to be sold in

the markets of Aleppo.Beirut, Sidon, Jubail andmany other placesfollowed,sothatbytheendof August in the wholekingdom the Christiansheld only Tyre, Ascalon,Gaza and Jerusalem, apartfrom a few castles. To thesouth al-Karak and ash-ShaubakwerestillheldfortheCross,yetafterabitterlong siege they tooeventually fell. It seemed

that, short of a miracle ormassivehelpfromEurope,the collapse of theChristian adventure inPalestinewasonlyamatterof time, and a fairly shorttime at that. Two eventsand two men combined tofalsifythisprediction.Itwasexactlyfortyyears

since the last Europeanintervention had ended inthe disastrous SecondCrusade, and though there

had been appeals for helpfairly regularly since thattime nothing had come ofthem. In August 1187Saladinwouldhaveneededa sophisticated intelligencenetwork in Europe,combinedwiththeskillsofprophecy, to foresee theadvent of the ThirdCrusade and the militarygenius of Richard ofEngland. Nor could hehave predicted the arrival

ofConradofMontferratatthe port of Tyre in mid-July.A closer look at the

crowded days whichfollowedHattinshowshimbuilding on the victorysystematically andthoroughly.AttheFieldofBloodnearlyseventyyearsbefore, the victory hadbeen wasted; Il-Ghazi hadbeen content to feast histriumphatAleppoandsend

boastful dispatches to thecaliph and others. Bycontrast Saladin was hardat work the next day. Thebattle was fought on aSaturday. Sunday wasoccupied with CountessEschiva’s surrender of thecitadel at Tiberias. Next,officers and squadronshadto be detailed off to beginthe quicksilver conquestsalready sketched. Yet onWednesdaySaladinandthe

bulk of his army werepitching camp before thewalls ofAcre, a good twodays’marchfromTiberias.The speed with whichSeneschal de Courtenayconceded the town musthave surprised Saladin; itcertainly angered thetownspeoplewho rioted inprotest. Nevertheless,within two days the placewas handed over and theMuslim troops were soon

avidly dividing the spoils.The commanders hadreceived bounties whichlured them to the warbefore the campaign at al-Ashtara, but the commonsoldiery too expected warto be profitable. The fieldofHattinhadyieldedlittle,but the burstingwarehousesofAcrewereadifferent matter – littleserious fighting could beexpectedfromthearmyfor

some days. However,Saladin still had work todo:heopenednegotiationsforthesurrenderofTyre.Theancientcitystoodon

an island joined to themainland by a narrowsandy spit which wascrossed at the landwardside by a massive wall.Even the weakest defencecouldholditagainstassaultfrom the shore. It hadfallentotheFranksin1124

only after six months ofblockade by sea and land.Saladinknewhehadtowinthe place as soon as wasconvenient,healsohadnotime for a long-drawn-outsiege. Both for personaland political reasonsJerusalem must be higherontheagenda,butafterthesuccess at Acre, he feltconfident that Tyre wouldcapitulate quickly. Hisconfidence was well

founded. Negotiationsmoved rapidly and thecommander took deliveryof the yellow banners ofSaladin which were to beflown on the city walls atthe handing-overceremony.Yetwhen,afewdays later, Saladin and hisofficial party arrived forthat ceremony they foundthe gates closed againstthem. The near-miracleneeded to save the town

hadhappenedinthepersonofConradofMontferrat.He had arrived from

Constantinople, a fugitivefrom justice and quiteignorant of Saladin’svictory.HesailedintoAcreharbouron14Julyandwasa little puzzled that theship’s arrival was notgreeted in the usual way.Soon he learnt that theplacehad just fallen to theMuslimsandthatTyrewas

the nearest port still inChristian hands, ConradmadegoodhisescapefromAcre and headed north. InTyreheagreedtotakeoverthedefenceoftheplaceoncondition he was acceptedas absolute lord there.Thecitizens and refugeescrowded in the townagreed, the formercommander left that night,and the town’s walls weresoonmanned.

Saladin made no attemptto force the assault, nor tolayasiege,Therewaslittlereason he should. Therewerestill importantplaces,above all Jerusalem, to betaken. Tyre, strong as itsdefences were, wouldeventually be reducedwhen the army andEgyptian fleet could bejointly mobilised. Amongthe prisoners atHattin hadbeen Conrad’s father, the

aged marquis ofMontferrat. Saladinparaded him before thewalls of the town andthreatened to kill him if itwas not surrendered.Conrad refused to trade aChristian city for a singleknight, even though it behis father. Nonplussed bysuchunfilialpiety,Saladinspared the old man’s lifeandmovedon.Elsewhere his hostages

provedmore useful. Jubailsurrendered on the ordersof its lord, who was thenreleased. At Gaza theTemplar garrison, obligedbytherulesoftheordertoobeythegrandmasterinallthings, handed the citadelover to Saladin when hebroughtGerarddeRidefortbefore the walls to orderthe capitulation. Ascalon,however, refused evenwhen Gerard and the king

himself first ordered andthen begged thecommander to give in. Afortnight of brave defencecost Saladin the lives oftwo of his emirs, andinvolved al-Adil and theEgyptian army. ButAscalon too was forcedinto surrender. Despitetheir resistance the peopleand garrison were grantedhonourable terms andallowed to leave the town

in peace. It had been thesame all over theconquered land. Saladin’sclemencydidmuch towinhim the chivalrousreputation that soonsurroundedhisnameintheWest. It also encouragedthe rapid collapse of theChristian establishment.With virtually the wholekingdominhishandsaftertwo months ofcampaigning, the time had

come to redeem the greatpledge of the jihad. ThearmyturneditsjoyousfacetoJerusalem.Anintriguingsidelighton

the fallof Jerusalem is theconnection Saladinestablished early in thesiege with the OrthodoxChristians in the city. Itseems theywere preparingtoopenoneofthegatesforhis troops but wereforestalled by events. It

was natural for Saladin’ssecret service to enlist theOrthodox whose hatred ofthe Latin authorities madethem a natural fifthcolumn. His dealings withtheEmperorIsaacwereonan altogether differentplane. The two had beenfriendlysince1185whenithad been agreed thatSaladin would transferChurch government inPalestine to

Constantinople.Accordingly,soonafterthefallofJerusalemhehandedover control of Christianaffairs to the Byzantinepatriarch, though notbefore he had sent atriumphant embassy toannouncehisvictoryattheimperial capital. It carriedrich gifts, among them anelephant, jars of preciousbalsam,athousandTurkishhorsesandrarespices.The

emperorhousedtheenvoysin one of the magnificentpalacesat thecentreof thecity. When they returnedtheybroughtwith them,asreciprocal presentations,part of the vast armouryIsaachadcapturedfromtheSicilian invasion armysome months before, aswellasrobesofhonourforSaladin and his sonstogetherwithacrown.It was typical of the

shrewd diplomacy ofByzantium to mix thepracticalwiththeflattering,andalsoentirely typical tofit the present to therecipient. While in theByzantineworldthecrownwas the classic symbol ofkingship, among theprinces of Islam the mostcoveted distinction was arobe of honour from thehandsof the caliph. Itwasusually accompanied by

some honorific title oradministrativeappointment, and it waspreciselysuchanhonorificthat Isaac hoped now toconfer.Hispredecessorhaddemanded Saladin’shomage, without success;rather more subtly, Isaachoped now to bribe himinto submission with akingdom. ‘I send you this[crown],’ he wrote,‘becauseinmyopinionyou

areandshallberightfullyaking, with my assistanceandGodwilling.’NodoubtYusuf ibn-AiyubSalah-ad-Din, al-Malik al-Nasir,king of Syria, ruler ofEgypt, lord of DamascusandAleppoandsuzerainofMosul,wasamusedby thepretension of the emperorof Greece and parts ofAnatolia. But theyremained good friends andat a full court heldoutside

Acre on 6 January 1188attended by his sons,nobles and officials of hiscourt,andtheambassadorsof the Greeks, Saladinreaffirmedthetreaty.He must have looked on

this glittering assembly assomecompensationfortwodisastrousmonths that hadled up to it. After thetriumph of Jerusalem,Saladin had confidentlysenthisarmynorthtoTyre

to finish off a resistancethat was becomingirritating. In July he hadnot been ready to devotethetimeneededtotakethecity; now in November hewas to find that thesituation had changedradically. The city teemedwith the refugees –merchants and nobles –Saladinhadsenttherefromthefortressesandtownshehad taken during the

summer. This clemencyhad certainly encouragedmany of the surrendersduring those months.Perhaps Saladin had alsoassumedthatwhenthetimewasripehecouldpersuadethe refugees, convenientlynow concentrated in asingle port, to embark enmassefortheWest.Hewastobedisillusioned.ConradofMontferratproved tobe‘a devil incarnate in his

ability to govern anddefendatownandamanofextraordinarycourage’,andduring the threemonths inwhich Saladin had beenrounding off his conquestsConrad had been buildingup the already impressivedefencesofTyre,andfiringthedemoralisedpopulationtoresistance.Heknewthatwithout help from Europehewouldhavetosurrendereventually, but luck and

initiative had brought himthe lordshipofa rich townandhewasnotgoingtobedislodgedeasily.InfacthewasconfidentofEuropeanintervention – he believedthat the loss of Jerusalemwouldstirhisgenerationasdeeply asEdessa had theirforebears. The archbishopofTyrewas already in theWest preaching the causeand in the meantimeConradwouldholdout.

When, inmid-November,Saladin joined his army atTyre, his heart must havesunk. His crushingsuperiority in manpowerwas now virtually useless.Even if the wall and thenewditch that stretched infront of it from the seawere overrun, his troopswouldhavetofightstepbystep up the narrowcauseway and could easilybe held by a fraction of

their numbers. Galleyswere at station either sideof the isthmus,armedwithballistas and archers, sothat the army ‘was underconstant attack not onlyfrom the citizens in frontbutalsofromtheir flanks.’OnhissideSaladinbroughtupnofewerthanseventeenballistastoplayonthewallandthetowndayandnight,anddividedhis troops intocompanies to keep up a

twenty-four-houraction.The other commanders

with the army includedSaladin’ssonsal-Afdalandaz-Zahir, his brother al-Adil with the Egyptiancontingent,andhisnephewTaqi-ad-Din.Butthekeytothe situation was asquadron of ten Egyptiangalleys which had beencalled up from Acre.When, late in December,theFranksput theseoutof

action by a boldly pressedsurprise attack, the wholeoperation came to a halt.For Saladin to have heldthe army together as longasthiswassomethingofanachievement. BeforeHattin, Raymond hadadvised inaction preciselybecause experience hadtaught that Muslim armiesbroke up of their ownaccordwiththeadvanceofwinter. Saladin’s victories

in theMuslim world weretoo fresh in hiscommanders’memoriesforthem to risk outrightinsubordination, but now,with the possibility of awinter-long campaignahead of him, Saladin hadtocallawarcouncilifonlyin the interests of‘participation’. The feelingof themeetingwas clearlyagainst him, though thedecisionrestedwithhim.

Against continuing thesiege it was argued thatlosseshadbeenheavy,thatthe troops were exhaustedandtheywerediscontentedwith the long-drawn-outcampaign and with theshortage of supplies. ‘Letusgoawayandrestduringthecoldwinterandtakeupthe fight again in thespring.’ Behind thisspecious reasoning,according to Ibn-al-Athir,

the emirs concealed thefear that if they stayed onstationSaladinwouldforcethemtocontributefundstothe war effort. The warchest was indeed empty.With the bounties paid atthe beginning of thecampaign and booty fromsixmonths’successfulwar,which had gone straightintotheircoffers,theemirshad made good profits. Itwasnopartoftheirplanto

usethemtofinanceaHolyWar which only extendedthepowerandinfluenceofthe greatest man in Syria.Now Saladin had nothingto offer but a hard coldwinter siege with nopromise of victory ormoney. He must havesensed that to leave thebusiness unfinished wouldbe a mistake, but hiscommanders wereobviously unwilling to

continue. He hesitated.Seeing his uncertainty, theopposition emirs, againaccording to Ibn-al-Athir,deliberately sabotaged thewar effort – ignoring ormisinterpreting orders andeventuallyrefusingtofight,arguing that there was toomuch discontent in theranks. ‘So’, says thehistorian quite simply,‘Saladinwasforcedtogo.’Pro-Zengid in sympathy,

Ibn-al-Athir stresses thefailure to take Tyre andblamesSaladinexclusively.Butheishonestenoughtorecord the kind ofobstruction that sometimesfaced him when successbegantoflag.Nodoubtthefickle enthusiasm of histroopsandofficersexplainsin part why he avoidedlong-drawn-out sieges andmajorbattlesexceptonhisown terms. 1187 had been

ayearofsweetvictoryandtremendous achievements.The kingdomof Jerusalemhad been rubbed off themap and the third ofIslam’s Holy Cities wasback in the Faith. Butduring the remainingyearsof his life Saladin and hisarmies would have to putthemonthsofeasytriumphbehind them and struggletoholdwhathadbeenwon.Those Byzantine

ambassadors attending thebrilliant court of Acre inJanuary1188broughtnewsthat gave a disturbingglimpse of the clouds thatlayinthefuture.It seemed Europe was

mobilising. But Saladinhad also to face hostilityfrom Baghdad. Successorto the heretical Fatimidrulers in Cairo, his namewas even mentioned inFriday prayers in the great

mosqueofMecca:enemieshadwhispered he intendedtodisplaceCaliphal-Nasir.In February 1188 Hajj thegreat from Damascus, ledby Ibn al-Muqaddam inhonour of Saladin asthanksgiving to Allah fortheliberationofJerusalem,came to blows with theHajjfromBaghdadoutsideMecca, over a matter ofprecedence. Al-Nasircomplained bitterly. He

already resented Saladin’suse of the honorific al-Nasir,whichheclaimedashisexclusiveright;heevenchallenged the Kurd’sclaim to be the conquerorof Jerusalem, on thegrounds that it had beentaken in the name of thecaliph,andsobythecaliphhimself. Saladin reactedwithindignation,tellingtheenvoy to his face thatJerusalemhadfallen tohis

own army under his ownbanners – his officialwritten responsewasmoreemollient. As he preparedtoleadthefightagainsttheInfidel once again, Islam’schampion deferred to theleaderoftheFaithful.

Chapter11

TheThreatfromtheNorth

The Greek envoys hadwarned Saladin thatcrusading propaganda in

Europe seemed likely toproduceahighresponse.Infact thepopehad takenupthe cause, and in the verymonth that Saladin heardthe depressing news thekings of France andEngland were pledgingthemselvestotheCross.InMarch the EmperorFrederick I Barbarossafollowed suit and sentletters to Kilij Arslan inKonya and to Saladin to

warn them of hisintentions. Although hewas nearly seventy his tallfigurewaslittlebowedandhis immense charisma andauthority were undimmed;he demanded that Saladinreturn the whole ofPalestine to the Christiansand challenged him tocombatinNovember1189.Saladinsetaboutpreparinghis northern frontiersagainst the coming

invasion. The problem ofTyretooksecondplace.Because, when it finally

came, the Third Crusadewas largely a French andEnglishaffair,andbecausesome of the contingentscame by sea to Tyre,historians, forgetting thelong shadow cast by theGerman threat, havecensoriously blamedSaladin for failing to forcethecaptureofthetownasa

matterofurgency.YetuntilApril 1189, when a Pisanfleet made landfall there,this important commercialporthadnomilitaryrecordat all. In anycase,Saladinhad only the historicalprecedents to guide himandneithertheFirstnortheSecond Crusade had comebysea.Evenin1147,whenthe whole of the seaboardwas in Christian hands,LouisofFrancehadchosen

the land route through theBalkans and Anatolia, justas Barbarossa was nowproposing. Twocontingents had come bysea to the SecondCrusadebuttheynaturallymadeforAcre. Saladin had made ithis immediate businessafter Hattin to take thatgreat military port. In factno one but the historiansseems to have rated Tyrevery highly in military

terms.HenryIIofEnglandplanned to traveloverland,andwrotetotheemperorinGermany, to the king ofHungary and to theemperor in Constantinopleasking for a safe passage.He also wrote to thearchbishop of Antioch toassure him that he wouldbe marching to the city.When themajor forcesdideventually arrive at theCrusadetheyignoredTyre.

Both Philip of France andRichardofEnglandweretosail direct to their siegelinesoutsideAcre.Saladindid well to leave thequestionofTyre–themoresoperhaps,wemightthink,because the army that didkeep the Christian causetruly alight was notcommanded by Conrad ofMontferrat at all but byKing Guy, to whomConrad consistently

refused access to Tyre orreinforcements from thetroopswithhimthere.In the spring of 1188 all

this was in the future.Saladin had to prepareagainst the long-termpossibilityofinvasionfromaGermanarmythatwouldbe coming overland fromthe north through theterritories around Antioch.In the summer of 1188 hebacked up a vigorous

military campaign boththere and in the kingdom,while continuingnegotiations with theByzantineempire.ThefortificationsofAcre

needed repair, and whileSaladin held his wintercourt therehecalledinthearchitect, the emirKarakush, who haddesigned the defensiveworks at Cairo during the1170s.With theworkwell

in hand Saladin left forDamascus in the spring,and then, in the earlysummer, he headed north.The march lay pastBaalbek,upthewidevalleybetween Mount Lebanonand the Anti-Lebanonwhich led to the valley ofal-Buqai‘ah, running downto thecoast.Thefortressesof ‘Akkar and al-Arqah,which dominated thevalley, fell with little

opposition. He may havehoped to conquer Tripoli,but the town receivedhelpfrom William II of SicilyandConradfromTyre,andSaladin’s chief objectivesat this time were thefortresses inland and thenorth, which could beexpected to give aid andsuccour to the Germanswhen they eventuallyarrived. The army,reinforced by contingents

from al-Jazirah under thecommand of ‘Imad-ad-Dinof Sinjar, soon had animpressivelineofChristiancapitulationstoitscredit.The fortress of Krak des

Chevaliers was by-passed,and at Tortosa, where thetown was overrun, theTemplar garrisonmanagedto hold out in a stronglyfortified tower; the greatHospitaller castle at al-Marqabwasleftintherear

with a masking forceposted to contain thegarrison, but the ports ofJabala and Latakia werequickly taken, and on 29July the supposedlyimpregnable and trulyintimidating castle ofSahyun fell. Pushingdeeper into the territoriesof Antioch, Saladin tookthe important castles ofBurzey, Sarminiqa andBakas Shoqr. Ibn-al-Athir,

who was with the army,was considerablyimpressed by the immensestrength of the castles andby the sultan’s vigour andcourage. At Burzey hispersonal guard led one ofthe assaults and ‘Saladinarmedatallpointswent inamongstthemtospurthemon.’ At the end of Augusthecontinuednorthwardstosecure the strategic pointsof Darbsaq and Baghras,

which controlled the passthrough the hills to thenorthofAntiochknownasthe Syrian Gates. In twomonths Bohemond ofAntioch had been reducedtohiscapitalanditsportofSt Symeon; he had madeno attempt to relieve theoutlying castles, despitetheir appeals, and evenwhen Saladin attackedBaghrashestoodidlyby.Yet a determined sortie

could well have saved theplace.Beforethesiegewaslaid,Saladinhadconferredwithhisemirs,andastrongparty was opposed toattackingthetown,arguingthat it was so close toAntioch that the armycould easily come underattack from the city. ButSaladin continuedwith hisplanseventhoughthearmywas‘inspiredbyfearoftheinhabitantsofAntiochwho

they believed could easilyoverrun the army with thesupport of theneighbouring population’.As the siege dragged outthe troops becameconvinced the placewouldhold out and so increasetheir danger from the city.Despite their earliersuccesses, Saladin’s troopswerestillfrightenedbytheFranks. Saladin himselfwas prepared to attack

Bohemond’s capital, butthe troops from al-Jazirahwereanxioustogetbacktotheir homes to rest andrenew their equipment.When Bohemond offeredaneight-monthtruceitwaseagerlyagreedto.Thewholearmy returned

to Damascus with thesultan, but there hedischarged the troops fromSinjar and Mosul and theothercitiesoftheeast.His

advisers urged him torelease his own troops forthe winter, but he refusedwhile Kaukab, Safad, al-Karak and other suchfortresses were still in thehands of the Franks. ‘It isabsolutelyessentialthatwerid ourselves of theseirritants in the midst ofMuslim territory, for therecan be no guarantee thattheir inhabitants will notattack us.’ This was no

mere rhetoric, as thechroniclerconfirmsthattheinhabitants of the townswithin striking distance ofacastle likeal-Karakwerefrightened of the Franksliving there and dreadedthe possibility of attackfrom them.Accordingly inmid-November, afterbarely a month’s rest inDamascus, Saladin led hisownmentothesiegeoftheTemplar castle of Safad, a

few miles to the north ofLake Tiberias. Despitedrivingrainwhichreducedthe field of battle to aquagmire, heheldhismento the siege for a month,and in earlyDecember thegarrison surrendered. Thefoulweathercontinued,butSaladin had more work todo and pushed on to thegreater and moreinaccessible fortress ofKaukab.Amonthlaterthis

too had fallen, and thesetriumphs were soonfollowed by exciting newsfrom the south. The armyofal-Adilhadreceivedthesurrender of al-Karak.Thesiegehad lastedmore thana year, and the defendershadsoldtheirwomentotheBedouin in exchange forsupplies. Later the sameyearash-Shaubakfelltoo.ButSaladinwas listening

for news from the north.

Crusaders had traditionallydepended on the goodwillof Constantinople, andSaladin hoped to persuadeIsaac to deny a passage toFrederick Barbarossa.Early in 1188 a newembassy had beendispatched with more richpresents and, according toLatin chroniclers, largesupplies of poisoned wineandgraintobeusedontheGerman troops. The

evidence for this earlyepisode in the history ofchemical warfare isprejudiced – the Latinswere understandably keentoblackenthereputationofIsaac, so shamelesslywilling to deal with theInfidel.InexchangefortheOrthodox control of theChurchinPalestine,hehadoffered his protection toIslaminConstantinople.AthisinvitationSaladinsenta

minbar (pulpit) for theMuslim community inConstantinople. But theship carrying it wascaptured by a Genoesesquadron and the pulpittakenbacktoTyre.Conradsent letters to Europereporting the capture asproof positive of thedouble-dealing of theemperor.AtfirstSaladinhopedfor

great things from the

alliance.ItisclearfromtheMuslim historians that allIslam was terrified by thenews of the Germanadvance. Barbarossa hadput in the field the best-trained and best-equippedarmy yet known to theCrusades. They set outfromRatisboninMay1189and crossed theDanube inJune; Isaac was quitepowerless to stop theirprogress through the

Balkans. Yet at the sametimehewasentertaininganembassyfromSaladinwithevery mark of distinction.WhenaGermanenvoy,ledby the bishop of Munster,reached the capital in Julyto announce the emperor’sintended time of arrival,Isaachadthemthrownintoprison and gave theirinsignia to Saladin’sambassadors, no doubt asanearnestofhisgoodfaith.

Soon after this theyreturnedtoSaladin,findinghim in his camp in MarjUyunatthesiegeofShaqifArnun (Beaufort). Theywere able to tell him ofdevelopments in theBalkans, and also broughtaninvitationfromIsaacforSaladin to send a secondminbar along with imams,and a muezzin to theimperial capital. Later thatyear therewas an event to

shock the imagination ofthe Western Christianworld when the name ofthecaliphofBaghdadwasinvoked in a Sunniceremony held inConstantinople in thepresence of Musliminhabitants and visitingmerchants, with theconnivanceoftheEmperorIsaac. It was anachievement of whichSaladin could reasonably

be proud, but he wasbeginning to realise hecould hope for nothingmorepracticalfromIsaac.In theMarchof1190his

supposedallyprovided thetransport which carriedFrederick’sarmyacrosstheDardanelles. The Greekalliance had provided littlepositive advantage. Eventhe once formidable sultanof Konya, who hadtroubled both Saladin and

Isaac, was powerlessagainsttheGermans,andinMay Frederick enteredKilij Arslan’s capital.Saladin,nowinvolvedwiththeFrankishforcesoutsideAcre,sentadetachmentoftroops north to guard thepasses through the hillsnorth of Antioch. At thebeginning of JuneFrederickcamethroughthelast range of the Taurusmountains and led his

troops down into theCilician plain with the seaglittering in the distancebeyondtheportofSeleucia(modern Silifke). The bestapproachtothetownmeantarivercrossing,anditwashere that the emperor methis death, ‘drowned at aplacewhere thewaterwasnot even up to his waist’.Perhaps the tougholdmantook a chill, either afterbathing or from the shock

ofcoldwateronswelteringarmour.SaladinandallIslamsaw

the hand of God in thismiraculous deliverance.Such terror had beeninspiredbytheapproachofthe Germans that in thedistrict near Mosuladministered by Ibn-al-Athir’ brother the price ofcorn was affected. One ofSaladin’s emirs had avillage in the district; the

bailiffoftheestatewroteatharvest time askinginstructions for the sale ofthe crops. The emir, withthe army in Syria, orderedhis agents not to sell asinglegrainbutonlyafewdays later gave permissionfor the sale to go ahead.WhenhereturnedtoMosulhewasaskedtoexplainhischange of mind to hisfriends. ‘Well,’ he replied,‘whenwe got news of the

German king’s advance,wewereconvinced thathewoulddriveusoutofSyriaandsoItookprecautionstoensure a good reserve ofprovisions on my estatesback here. But when Goddestroyed the Germanstherewasnoneedforfoodreserves.’ForthedeathofFrederick

did effectively destroy hisarmy.TherewereGermanstoo who saw the hand of

Godinthegreatemperor’sdeath, and some of theleadersturnedback,thoughbarely a hundred milesfrom the Christian statesthey had come to help.Others left the army to goby sea from Seleucia toTyre, and Duke Frederickof Swabia, who took overafter his father’s death,found himself with aweakened anddemoralisedforce. Because he too was

ill, the remnant of theGermans, whose numbershad in any case beenreducedbyguerrillaattacksin Turkey and by disease,pushedonwithouthimandlost still more men in arunning battle withSaladin’smenguardingthenorthernpasses.WhentheyreachedAntioch inAugustthe magnificent fightingmachinewhichhadsetoutfrom Ratisbon fifteen

monthsbeforewasnowanirrelevant, indisciplinedrump. In June, when theGermanemperor laydyinginAsiaMinor,thekingsofFrance and England hadnot even set out for theHoly Land, and they didnot arrive there until someten months later. In thosemonths Saladin shouldhavebeenabletodemolishthe beach-head positionsround Tyre and Acre. We

must now attempt to seewhy,evenwiththeGermanthreatlifted,hecouldnot.The story begins back in

July 1188, when SaladinreleasedKingGuyand theknightswithhimaftertheyhad sworn to leavePalestine and never takearms against him again.ArrivingatTripoli,Guyofcourse found no difficultyin getting a prelate torelease him from this oath

–given,soitwasclaimed,under duress and to aninfidel. In additionSaladinhad allowed defeatedgarrisons safe conducts toTyre and other places stillin Christian hands; so thatwhile the kingdom ofJerusalem had lost itslands, it hadoncemore itsleaders and a growingnumber of soldiers. In theeyes of Saladin’s Muslimcritics such clemency was

suicidal. But Saladin hadnot necessarilymiscalculated.Thepoliticalinfighting around Guy’skingship had only beenthinlypaperedover for theHattincampaign.WithGuyback in the arena thecontroversy became stillmore acrid. In the autumnof 1188 hemarched downto Tyre and demanded theplace be handed over tohim. But Conrad, from

being a mere adventurer,wasnowregardedbymanyas the saviour of thekingdom;Guy,ontheotherhand, was remembered asthe man who lost Hattin.Obviously playing for thehighest stakes, Conradrefused to handoverTyre,claiming to be acting astrustee for the Europeanmonarchswhowouldsettlethedisputeontheirarrival.Guy had to retire to

Tripoli for the winter, butinApril1189hewasback,determinedtoforceConradto surrender. It looked asthough theChristiansweresettlingdowntoafull-scalecivil war. It is hardlysurprising thatSaladinwasnot much worried aboutTyre,nowbeingblockadedfor him by the Christiansthemselves. In a letter tohisbrotherintheYemenhewrote: ‘OnlyTyre remains

to them; if it were not onthe coast and so can berevictualledfromthesea,itwould have been takenlongago.But,thankstotheGrace of God, Tyre is nolonger a fortress whichprotects its inhabitants butrather a prison that hemsthemin; theyareprisonersenjoying provisionalliberty, dead men whomlife has not quiteabandoned.’

But in April 1189 therewas another developmentwhichshouldperhapshaveworried the sultan. ThePisan fleet which arrivedoutsideTyreinthatyeartohelp Conrad fell out withhimandwentovertoGuy.Seapowergavethekinganimportant new advantage.ButatthismomentSaladinencampedwithhisarmyatMarj Uyun was engrossedwith the attempt to take

Beaufort, commanded byRaynald of Sidon.Hewasone of the few Christianswith a genuine enthusiasmfor Islamicculture,hewasfluent in the language, andit was even rumoured hadpassages from the Koranread to him at meals. Henow used all his guile topersuade Saladin that ifencouraged he mightactuallybecomeaMuslim.He also claimed to be

fearful that if he handedover the castle too easilyhiswifeandfamily,atTyrewith Conrad, might be indanger. He asked to beallowed until August toprepare the ground for thesurrender. Fascinated withhis enemy’s high cultureand adroit intellectualism,thesultanspentlonghoursin debate with him whileRaynald’s agents openlybought provisions in the

markets set up forSaladin’s army. WhenAugust came and Raynaldstill failed to deliver thecastle Saladin eventuallylost patience and sent himto prison in Damascus.Beaufort was not takenuntil the followingsummer, but by that timeevents had swept on in adramatic and unexpectedway.In August 1189 Guy,

realising that Tyre wasvirtually impregnable,lifted the siege, and withthePisanssailingdownthecoast in convoy marcheddown to Acre. It was areckless gamble by a mandesperately needingsuccess to retain anypoliticalcredibility.Saladinimmediately saw theopportunity offered andmarched out in pursuit,intending to destroy the

smallChristianarmyonthemarch. But the Christianswere to be spared onceagain. ‘When Saladinconsulted his emirs, aboutwhether they should taketheenemybytheheelsandattack them on the march,or meet them face to faceby taking a different routefromtheirs, theemirssaid:“Thereisnoneedforustofollow them, for their roadisdifficult andnarrowand

we could not easily takethem as we want. It isbetter to proceed by thebroader road and attackthemfrom the rearas theyapproach Acre, where wewill disperse them.”’Saladin was totallyunconvinced.‘IftheFranksreach their destination andget a firm hold of theterritory,itwillnotbeeasyfor us to dislodge them.’But,asonotheroccasions,

his dependence on hisallies,made it possible forthem to override him.Nevertheless, he did orderskirmishers to keep intouch with the Christianmarch and harassstragglers. Their successsuggested to at least onedispassionate observer thathad Saladin’s full strategybeenadopteditwouldhavebeensuccessful.Asitwas,Guy made good his rash

expedition, and, on 27August 1189, began topitch his tents around thewallsofAcre.It must be said that the

failure of the Germancampaign pleased othersbesides the Muslims. TheByzantine emperor, IsaacAngelus, was more thancontent to see the collapseof the Western initiative,even though it meant areverse forChristian arms.

Since Gregory VII beforethe First Crusade, popeshadenvisagedtheunionofOrthodox Constantinoplewith Rome by force ofarms. The leaders of theChristian churches in AsiabothfearedandhatedtheirLatin opposite numbers inthe Crusader states. In aletter that reported thedeath of Barbarossa, thehead (catholicos) of theArmenian Church dubbed

himself Saladin’smameluke and prayed thatGod would ‘bless ourmaster’s who had reunitedthe Faithful (and here ofcourse he was referring totheMuslim Faithful). Thiswas surely beyond therequirements of diplomaticsycophancy.Incidentally,itis the catholicos whoseems to suggest that theemperor took a chill afterbathing; but a near

contemporary illustrationmost graphically depicts arider, without armour,thrown by a stumblinghorse– theLatin reads ‘influmine defunctus’s, i.e.‘dead in the river’. Anangel lifts the soul,innocentofsinasababe,tothehandofGod.In the forthcoming

struggle between SaladinandRichardofEnglandtheChristian East seems in

general to have sidedwithits orientalmasters againstitsWestern co-religionists.AfterthefallofJerusalem,Saladinhadbeenurgedbyhis more extreme advisersto demolish many of theChristianshrines,includingthe Church of the HolySepulchre, as monumentstoidolatry.WhileMuslimsrevereJesusChrist(Isa)asa true prophet in the lineleading up toMuhammad,

they deny his crucifixionanddivinity.Otheradvisersargued that the proposeddestruction, while inconformity with Islam,wouldenragetheidolaters,i.e.theChristianpopulationin Muslim territories. Theshrines in question are, ofcourse, as sacred to theEastern churches as theyare to WesternChristendom.Infact,attherequest of Emperor Isaac,

guardianship of the HolyPlaceswas assigned to theOrthodox authorities andthe celebrations of theLatin rite in those placeslargelysuperseded.If the rump kingdom of

Jerusalem,withthehelpofits European crusaderallies, could recover thecity, this settlement wouldbe overturned.Meanwhile,it lessened the danger thatthe governor of Jerusalem

andothercitiesmight facesubversion from theindigenous Christianpopulations.

Chapter12

Acre,theCityforwhichtheWorld

ContendedThemodern townofAkkastands on a hook-like

promontory jutting southinto the Bay of Haifa. Inthe middle ages theharbour, the safest on theSyriancoast,wasembracedby the curve of thispeninsula and was furtherprotected by a molerunning eastwards from itstip.Themolewasguardedat its landward end by thestrongly fortifiedTowerofFlies. The result was alarge military harbour,

virtually inaccessible toseaborne attack. Thelandward defences werestill more formidable,consisting of two massivewalls which ran due northand due east to meet in aright-angleheavilyfortifiedbytheCursedTower.Acrehad been one of thewealthiest cities of theChristian kingdom and afavoured royal residence.Now it was the chief

arsenal for Saladin’sPalestine provinces and itsgreat defences had beenrestored to war readinessbyKarakush, thearchitect,who had also beenappointed the commanderof the city. Considerationsof strategy and prestigeensured that the comingbattlewouldbehard.Itdidnot seem likely to be veryprotracted.Guy had his small army

pitch camp in a wide arcfrom north to south withAcre at the focus. For acomplete landwardblockade he had to coverthe ground from the RiverBelus in the south to thecoast northwards at morethanabowshotrangefromthe city walls. He did nothave enough men. If hewastotakethecityhehadalsotoblockadeitfromthesea, but in the autumn of

1189 the Muslims wereable to sail in and outalmostatwill.JusthowtheChristians were able tohold this perilous situationfortwoyears,inthefaceofSaladin’smassive army, isthe critical question of thelater years of his career.Regrettablythereisnooneconclusive answer. Thestarting point of anyanalysis must be Saladinhimself. Whatever was

achieved for Islam inPalestine in the 1180swasthe doing of this oneman.There was nothingautomatic or overridingabout the drive to recoverJerusalem. When Nur-ad-Din united Aleppo andDamascus way back in1154 the Christians hadbelieved, with reason, thattheir hour had come. Yettwenty years passed andthe great champion of

Islam died without havingmade any seriousmove torecover the Holy Places.The lesser lords of Syriawhowereeventuallyforcedinto alliance with Saladinhadlittlerealmotivationtojointhebutfearofhimandhope of plunder. OnceJerusalem fell it becameanother province in hismassive empire, and theenthusiasm for battle withthe infidel became still

weaker. Only the will ofSaladin kept the Muslimsatwarwhileitwasonlyhisskill and personalinspiration on the field ofbattlethatsavedthemfromdefeat. Apart from hisbrotheral-Adil,noneofhiscommanders was capableof the sustained effort andimagination that theslogging war against theFranksdemanded.Eventhedashing Taqi-ad-Din had

called up Saladin toconclude the siege ofToron–astandardenoughoperation – whilethroughout the Acrecampaignonlyhispersonalpresence could bringsuccess.But Saladin, now in his

earlyfifties,wasbeginningtoweaken under the strainof a lifetime of work andwar. His health had neverbeenstrongandarecurrent

stomachcomplaintlaidhimup more and morefrequently, causing lapsesin the fighting at oftencritical moments. For thearmy in general had littleinterest in continuing thewar. Most of the greatcitiesof thekingdomwerenow inMuslim hands andtheopportunitiesofplundercorrespondingly reduced.Nor did the comingcampaignoffermuchinthe

way of exciting action.Since itsnomadicdays theTurkisharmyhadreliedonspeed and mobility – thestatic warfare of the siegewas not its métier. AfterHattin, Saladin hadsystematically boughttowns and fortresses withthe lives of the garrisons.Strong Christian forcesremained in the field, butthepricewasworthpayingto savehis troops thekind

of action where they wereattheirweakest.OnceKingGuyhadbeguntoestablishhimselfaroundAcreinthelast days of August justsuch a campaign began toseemunavoidable.At first, however, things

must have seemedpromising. For the firstmonth there were almostdailyskirmishesandbattlesbetween garrison andFranks, Franks and the

main Muslim relievingforce. The weather waskind and an almosttournament atmospheredeveloped. Knights andemirs and the soldiery ofboth sides got to knoweachother sowell that thebattle might be halted foran hour or twowhile theyexchangednewsandviewsor even brought up themusiciansfromtherearfora session. When the

entertainmentwasover thefighting was resumed bycommon consent. On oneoccasionamockbattlewasevenarrangedbetweentwolads from the city and twofrom the besieging army.One of the Muslim boysthrew his Christianopposite number to thegroundandclaimedhimasprisoner;aChristianknightsolemnlyofferedthevictora ransom of two dinars,

which was gratefullyreceived, and the prisonerdulyreleased.A note of reality was

struck in mid-Septemberwhen Taqi-ad-Din,commanding the northernwing near the coast,succeededinforcingawaythroughtheChristianlines.Inevitably Saladin wasclosely involved. Hisconcernwith thedetailsoftheoperationwas‘likethat

of a mother, threatenedwith the lossofoneofherchildren’,forthreedaysheate virtually nothing. Butthe outcome was atriumphant entry with hisentourage into the city.While the sultan went therounds of the defences hiscourtiers enthusiasticallyshied stones down at theranks of the besiegingarmy. ‘Great had been thefearoftheFranksandthey

would have fled if theycould; but our leadersconsidered the opening ofthe road as an unexpectedsuccess and did not finishoff the job although hadthey seized the momentthey would haveexterminated the enemywho were completelydemoralised. Given thisrespite they were able toreestablish their positionand close the road.’

Ominously for the future,they began to fortify theircamp with trenches andrevetments. Itwas the firstexperiment in a system ofdefences that would soonmake the Franksimpregnable.There were to be many

times in the future whenSaladin was robbed of adecisive advantage by theunwillingness of his menand their commanders to

push home an unexpectedvictory; but on thisoccasion he himself mayhave been hesitant tocommithiswholeforce,ashisarmywasnotyetuptostrength. Reinforcementswere expected from Egyptand three sizeabledetachments of the mainarmywerestillinthenorth,blockadingthegarrisonsofAntioch, Tripoli and Tyre.The troops at Acre ranged

from the relativelyuntrained bands of Diyar-Bakr, ‘men completelyignorant of militarymatters’, as Baha’-ad-Dincalled them, to veteranswho had fought underShirkuh at the conquest ofEgypt twentyyearsbefore.They were encamped in asemi-circle round Acre,matching the arc of theFrankish besieging army.But it was more than a

camp;itwasastandinglineof battle carefully plannedbySaladintoreduce,asfaraspossible,theweaknessesofthematerialthatmadeitup. It was a generalprinciplewithhimtoorderhis line of marchmeticulously to be readyfor action at any time, andthiscampwasarrangedonthesamelines.Thenorthernanchorpoint

of the two-mile crescent

was made up of veteransunder the command ofTaqi-ad-Din, one of thebestsoldiersinthearmy.Afirmlinkbetweenthiswingandtheforcesofthecentrewas made by furtherdivisions of trustworthytroops, next came thecontingents from Nablus,Diyar-Bakr and Mosul, aright of centre blocconsisting of soldiers ofless sure loyalty or ability.

The centre itself consistedofdivisionsunderal-Afdaland az-Zahir, with theirfather nominally in overallcommand. On Saladin’simmediate left the cohortsof warlike Kurds undertheir commander al-Mashtub and further alongthelinetheforcesofSinjar,ofHarranandEdessaunderGökböri, and on theextreme leftwing the everreliable old guard of

Shirkuh.Saladin’sHQwasonalowhillamileorsointhe rear.Themorningof4October found himgallopingdowntothearmytoprepare forwhat lookedlike a major offensivebeing mounted by theenemy.SinceTaqi-ad-Din’smid-

September victory theFrankshadbeenreinforcedbyaforcefromTyreunderCount Conrad, though the

quarrelwithGuywasonlypatchedup.Hewouldfightwith the king’s army butonly if he were treated ashis equal. Also with theroyal armywere the countof Thuringia, with acontingentofGermans,andaforceofTemplars.Itwasthe biggest concentrationthe Christians could hopefor in the foreseeablefuture, and the last chancethey could expect for a

decisive engagement withthe Muslims. Both Baha’-ad-Din and Ibn-al-Athirstress that the Christianattack was quiteunexpected. That morning‘the Muslims were abouttheir usual duties, somecoming down to offerbattle, others doing choresaboutthecamporgoingtofetch the provisions fortheir group for the day.’From the vantage point of

his HQ Saladin had beenable to see the signs ofunusual preparation in theenemycamp,buttherewasnot time to do more thangivethesignalforageneralmustertoactionstationsassoon as possible. Now thepoint of that carefullyplanned camp could beseen. ‘Because the sultanhad disposed his troopsevenincamp,accordingtotheir order of battle, they

didnothavetochangetheirpositions when they heardthesignalforaction.’The first attack was a

charge by the Templarsagainst Taqi-ad-Din. Hedecided on the time-honoured tactic of thefeigned retreat, perhaps togive the rest of the linemore time tocome tobearby drawing the attack off-centre.Saladinhad left theimmediatecommandofthe

centre to Isa, the governorof Jerusalem, while he‘rode up and down thebattalions, urging them ontothebattleandcallingontheir zeal for the truereligion.’ Without histireless inspirationthroughout the battle it isprobable that the surpriseachieved by the Christianswouldhavebroughtthemanotable victory. As it wasthe need to be everywhere

at once in the openingstages, anxiously keepinganeyeon thesuccesswithwhich his emirs werebringing their forces tobear even as he rallied themorale of the troopers, ledSaladin into a serious andsurprising mistake. Bothour two chief authoritiesfor the battle agree that itwasbyhisorderthatafewcontingents were detachedfromthecentretogotothe

help of Taqi-ad-Din.Perhapsthesultanassumedthe right was asdisorganisedassomeotherpartsofthelineandwasinreal retreat. He did nothave thechance to recoverhis misjudgement. Theenemy high command atonce sized the situationupand a phalanx of foot andhorse was soon doubling‘as one man’ towards theweakened centre.

Surrounded by footsoldierstheknights’horseswere almost proof againstthe Muslim bowmen, andthen at the last momentthey opened up and thecavalry crashed through inperfect order to scatter theill-fated men from Diyar-Bakr. The rout continuedup to the shores of LakeTiberias – some of theTurks did not stop theirflightuntiltheyreachedthe

streets of Damascus itself.As for the citizens ofTiberias,theyfledtheircityimmediately, on whatsoundedlikethenewsofamassiveChristianvictory.Returning from their

invigoratingchaseoverthehillsofGalilee,theknightsmadefor thehillonwhichSaladin’s tent wasstanding, killing a fewcamp-followers andchamberlainsastheywent.

‘ItwasonlybyGod’sgracethat theydidnot cutdownSaladin’s tent for if theyhad, the whole Muslimarmy would have realisedhow far they had got andthatthecentreoftheirownarmy had fled before theenemy, and this wouldhave led to a generalflight.’ As it was, a littletired from their exertions,they looked about to findwith some surprise that

they were divided fromtheir own people by afierce battle. On the right,Taqi-ad-Din still held firmand forced the Christiantroops launched into thegap into the centre to turnaside and deal with thisoppositionfirst.Ontheleftthe Muslim ranks werealmostunbrokenand somedetachments were movingup to cut off the retreat ofthe Christians returning

from the rout. Even thecentre was reforming,inevitablyaswehavenowlearnt to expect, underpersuasion and threats ofthe ubiquitous Saladin.Anditwaswithagroupofhorse drawn from thisdemoralised section of thearmythat thesultan tippedthe scales decisivelyagainst the Franks. Underhis leadership they wereoncemorea fighting force

andwerestrainingtogetatthe small, isolated bodycomingdownfromthehill.Saladin, who hadmarshalled them in a foldin the ground, held themback until the knights hadpassed and then unleashedthe charge.The rest of theChristian army saw theirsupposedly victoriousbrothers stampeded into apanicflightandrushedpellmellbacktotheirlines.

The moment could beturned into a crashingvictory and Saladinprepared togatherhismenforthecoupdegrâce.Thewhole engagement hadshown him at his brilliantbestasacommanderinthefield.The careful planningat the outset of thecampaign had ensured thearmy was virtually on awar footing at amoment’snotice, and it was his

tireless energy at themoment of battle that hadraised the whole line intoaction. Themistake of theweakened centre, if it wasin fact his and not that ofIsa of Jerusalem,hadbeenmagnificently recovered,and the final charge,madepossible only because he,yet again, had restored theshattered morale of thecentre, had revealed hisincisive tactical sense.

Now,evenafterexhaustinghours of battle, hegraspedthe nub of the reversedtactical situation and wasgirding for the conclusiveencounter–onlytofindhisarmywouldnotfollow.Analarm was spreading allalongthelinethatthecamphadbeenpillagedandmenand officers were peelingoff in all directions tocheck the safety of theirpossessions and hard-

earned booty from earliercampaigns.The rout of the central

divisions and the pell-mellcross-country pursuit bythe Franks had been seenfrom the tents behind thebattle lines where theservants and camp-followers had deduced thetotal defeat of theMuslimarmy. Supposing theirmasters dead or in flight,they looted the rich camp

furniture and storedplunder, and, taking thepack horses, made theirbest speed eastwards.When the battlewearywarriors got back to theirtentsitwastofindthattheyhad‘escapedthedangerofdeathonlytofallintoothermisfortunes. The richfound themselves paupersand the bravest manhesitated.’ Himselfovergenerous when

dividing the spoils of warbetweenhis emirs,Saladinnowfoundhimselfobligedto leave a won battle toorganiseatreasurehuntfortheir lost possessions.There was nothing else tobedoneifheexpectedstillto have an army the nextday.Messengersandarmedposses were dispatchedacross the hills to bringback the miscreants and aproclamation read through

the camp that everythingwas to be brought beforethe specially convenedcourtofredistribution.Toadd insult to injury, it

was Saladin who had topresideover thecourt.Yethe did it with ‘a firm andgenerous heart, a smilingdemeanour and with therectitude of judgement hehad shown in trust inGodand that energy he had inthe defence of religion’.

Somewhat unnecessarilythechronicleraddsthatthewhole business was forSaladin‘agreatfatigue’.Itis a measure of the man’sstrengthofwillthathewasable to remain completelyunruffled while he dealtwith a matter supremelyindifferent to him butvitally important to theloot-hungry captains whomanned his armies. It isevidenceofhisshrewdness

as an adjudicator that wehear of no disputed claimsafterwards. Despite thedisruption all this hadcaused, Saladin called acouncil of war within theweek and urged a newattack in force before theFranks could recover theirposition completely. But‘they reached theconclusionthatitwouldbebesttowithdrawthearmyafewmilesfurtherbackand

allowthementorest’.Itmust be confessed that

the emirs may have hadothergoodreasonsontheirside. The stench from thethousands of decayingcorpses, either on thebattlefieldordumpedintheRiver Belus, chief supplyof fresh water to theChristians,was threateningto become a major healthhazard. Saladin, exhaustedby the almost ceaseless

exertionsof thepastweek,hadagainrelapsedwithhisold illness; while thesoldiery at large, havingbeen in the field for anunbroken fifty days, wasentitled to a respite. Evenso it was this week morethananyotherwhichmadepossibletheThirdCrusade.The Franks used it tostrengthen their defences.Their camp becametransformedintoastrongly

fortified town withnumerous sally ports andposterns, which made iteasyfor themin thefuturetolaunchsortieswhereandwhen they wished. ‘Everyday the spies informedSaladin of the Franks’activities and theseriousnessofthesituation.Buthe,sunkinillness,wasin no state to act.’ Hisadvisers couldnow see, asthe walls and trenches

continued to grow roundthe Frankish perimeter,whatthehesitationofafewdays previouslywas goingto cost the Muslims, andsomeurgedSaladintosendthe army back under adifferentcommandertoputa stop to these activities.Perhapsifal-AdilhadbeentheretotakechargeSaladinwould have considered theproposal but he knew therest of his staff

commanders toowell. ‘If Iam not there with themthey will achieve nothingwhatsoeverandmightwelldomoreharmthangood.’It was only a few days

after this that he receiveddefinite confirmation thattheGermanCrusadewhichhe had long been dreadingandpreparingforhadbeenon the march since May.The royal chancellery wassethardatworkandon23

October an embassy leftthe camp at Acre on theroad north to rally supportforthejihad. ItwasledbythesecretaryBaha’-ad-Din,who carried letters for therulersofSinjar,MosulandIrbil – to send yet moretroops–andforthecaliph,to lend his support toSaladin’s appeals. Hopingto shame the Islamicleaders into action hebitterly compared the

Muslims–‘lackinginzeal,notoneofthemrespondingto thecall’–with the zealoftheChristians–‘forHimthey worship, and indefence of their faith’. ‘Indefence of their religionthey consider it a smallthing to spend even theirlife, and they have kepttheir infidel brotherssupplied with arms andchampions in war.’Muslims with Saladin’s

army were genuinelyastonishedbythedegreeofEuropean support thatwasarriving. A prisoner toldIbn-al-Athir that althoughhe was his widowedmother’s only son she hadsold their house to equiphimfortheCrusade.Thereweremany similar tales tofire the indignation ofSaladin’s courtiers whentheyconsideredthegeneralindifference of Islam, for

the fact was that the onlyterritoriestosendtroopstothe Holy War were thosewhose rulers wereSaladin’s subordinates orclients. The caliph sentmerely good wishes, aconsignment of arms andincendiary chemicals usedin the making of Greekfire, and authority to raisetaxes up to 20,000 dinarsfrom some of the westernprovinces nominally under

Baghdad’sauthority.In November al-Adil

arrived with thereinforcementsfromEgypt;these replaced thecontingents from theeastern cities, most ofwhichwerereturninghomefor the winter. At the endofOctoberfiftygalleyshadbroken through into theharbour, while inDecemberalargeEgyptianfleet under the personal

command of the renownedadmiral Lulu broughtsupplies and men. Butthese were the onlysuccesses Saladin couldboast for months ahead.TorrentialrainsreducedtheplainaboutAcretoaseaofmud. However, if thisstoppedallMuslimattacksit did not prevent theChristiansfromcompletingtheir trench and walls ofcircumvallation, so that by

theendofNovemberAcrewas almost completelyblockaded by land.Moreover, the Christianstoo were getting newrecruits, men who hadbecome impatient of thepolitical saraband whichwas keeping the kings ofEngland and France inEurope, andwith the slowprogressoftheGermans.Inthe early winter months,Danes, Frisians, Flemings,

Frenchmen, Germans andHungarians were amongthose to make landfall onthe broad beaches in thebay below Acre. Then, inMarch,Conradwasabletosail up the coast to Tyreand return with more menwithout any effectiveopposition from theMuslimships.Apart from desultory

fighting at the Christianfortifications,morethansix

months passed withoutSaladin’smenmaking anyattempt to dislodge theirenemies.Duringthespringof 1190 the contingentsfrom Harran, Aleppo andthe other eastern citiesbegan to return to thecamp, but many of thesewere immediately sentnorthwards to watch thepasses where the Germanswere expected. For theirpart the Christians did not

make another attempt toforce a full-scale battle;they were content to keepwithin their massivedefences and keep up thepressureonthegarrison.AttheendofApril theywereready for a major assault.Conrad had come backfrom Tyre with a load ofspecially seasoned timberand other materials withwhich the army carpentersbuilt three siege towers,

each about ninety feet talland with five separatefloorscrowdedwithtroops.They overtopped thewallsso that the bowmen couldkeep the defenders underheavy fire while the fosseatthefootofthewallswasbeing filled up. If thiscould be done, and thesiege towers rolled up tothewalls, the futureof thecity would be black. Anoperation on this scale

would be able to putenoughtroopsonthewallsto force a massivebridgehead.Saladin ordered heavy

attacks on the Christiandefence works, and foreight days battle ragedwithout a break. TheFrankish attack on thewallswassloweddownbutby nomeans halted. Fromcontemporaryaccountsitisclear that the siege towers

were exceptionally welldesigned and wellprotected. Not evenconstant bombardmentwith Greek fire destroyedthem, and the garrisoncommander,Karakush,wasalmostfranticwithfearthatthe town was lost. At lasthewas persuaded to listento the proposals of aDamascene inventor andscientist who, apparently,hadcome to settle inAcre

after its capture. He askedand got temporarycommandof thegarrison’sballistas and directed thefire.The first salvowasofthe standard naphthacanisters which had so farproduced no results, andwhen they again failed thedefenders saw theirenemies dancing inderision on the top of thetowers. But then followedthe patent compound, and

almost at once the towersburstintoasheetofflame.Perhaps this anonymoustwelfth-century chemisthad discovered anexplosivecompoundwhichdetonatedspontaneouslyonmixing, and, lacking thetechnology of fused,compartmented shells, wasobliged to discharge theconstituents separately.Whatever it was, hisinvention was a total

success. The first towerwas destroyed with allhands; by the time theartillery had trained roundto the other towers theirsoldiers had fled back tothe lines and watched thedestruction of the doomedmilitary hardware. It wasthe end of the attack andthe city was saved. Theinventor was granted anaudiencewithSaladin,whoasked him to name his

reward. To the sultan’sastonishment,nodoubt,thereply came: ‘I want noreward but the love ofGod.’ Itmust have been arefreshingchangetomeetaman truly devoted to theidealswhichSaladinhadsooftenproclaimed.During the rest of the

season the relieving armywas involved in only twobattles, though both werehard. A fortnight after the

destruction of the siegetowers by the garrison theFrankscameunderaheavyattackfromSaladin’sarmy.But after an eight-daybattleSaladinhadnotmadeadent in thegreatdefenceworks.Hisarmywasnotatfull strength– the siegeofBeaufort still tied down alarge number of men, andothers had been sent northin preparation for thecoming of the Germans.

But nothing suggests thateven at full strength thearmy had either theimagination or thedetermination to solve theproblem of trench warfareposed by the Frankishposition. Perhaps at thisstage Saladin’s objectivewastocontainthethreatatAcre until the northerndangerhadbeendealtwith.In June a large Egyptianfleet fought its way into

Acreharbourwithsupplies,but the situation in theChristian camp was alsoimproving. In July it wasreinforced by a largeFrench force commandedby Henry of Champagne.Laterthatmonth,however,the northern divisions ofthe Muslim army won acrushing victory over abody of thousands ofFrankishfootwhoattackedagainst the advice of their

officers. Thousands werekilled, among them, to theastonishment of theMuslims, a number ofwomen who were notrecognised until theircorpseswerebeingstrippedof their valuable chainmail. Itwas the lastmajorencounterthatsummer.The city’s defenders can

hardly have been satisfiedwith the slackening off inthe army’s efforts,

especially as their hold onthe sea route wasweakening. In June anEgyptian fleet had pushedinto the harbour by sheernumerical superiority, buttheaveragesmallsquadronhad to expect a roughpassage. In September,Saladin had watchedtensely with his army asthreeshipsbattledfuriouslyagainst a Christian flotilla.At the last moment the

wind changed in theirfavour, and to wildcheeringfromthegarrison,echoedby shouts from thedistant army, they madetheir way to safety. Thesupplies theybroughtwerevital, since the Christianswere still receiving newrecruits. In October theremnants of the Germanarmyreachedthecamp.Aswe have seen, the mererumouroftheircominghad

been enough to divertimportant divisions fromSaladin’s army; theirarrivalunder thecommandofFrederickofSwabia,thedeademperor’s son, raisedthespiritsof thebesiegers.New machinery, includinga massive battering ram,was deployed in theheaviestattackmountedonthecitytodate.Afewdayslater Baldwin, archbishopof Canterbury, marched

intothecampattheheadofa well-equipped force ofEnglishmen.Like other new arrivals

before him, Baldwin wasshockedbywhathefound.The free and easy socialfraternisation betweenMuslim and Christianwhen they were notactuallyfightingwasbarelycredible to the Europeanmind.To a churchman themorals in the Christian

campwereoutrageous.Thearmy in which ‘there wasneither chastity, sobriety,faith nor charity’ was‘given up to shamefulpractices’which, ifwe areto believe the Arabhistorians, is hardly to bewondered at. For a fewmonths previously ‘therehad arrived by ship 300lovely Frankish women,young and beautiful,assembledfrombeyondthe

sea and offering theirbodiesforsin.’ArchbishopBaldwin was not alone inbeing shocked thatcrusaders should behavelike this. ‘Imad-ad-Din thechronicler was piouslyappalled by this furtherexample of Frankishdepravity. As to the girlsthemselves, they wereclearly fascinated by theset-up. They announcedthat they too were serving

the Cross by being servedby its soldiers and ‘couldmake no finer sacrifice towinthefavourofGodthanto dedicate as a holyoffering what they keptbetween their thighs’. Butwhat reallyworried‘Imad-ad-Din was that ‘a fewfoolish mamluks andwretches’ from his ownside ‘slipped away underthe fierce goad of lust andfollowed the people of

error’. These diversionsapart, conditions in theChristian camp wereslowly deteriorating. Aswith any medievalEuropean siege army, theoverriding and largelyunrecognised danger wasthe total lack of hygieneand the resultant endemiccamp fever. In October itkilled Queen Sibylla,perhapsthemostimportantsingle person in the

Christian camp. King Guyowed his throne to hismarriage with her, andwhenConrad ofTyrewonthestruggleforthehandofher half-sister, Isabella,whowasnowtheheiressofthe royal family, the oldpolitical divisions werewidened.The marriage of Conrad

and Isabella took place atTyre in late November,and, to the anger of many

Christians, Conrad hadtakenanumberofships toescort him up the coast.Because Guy refused torelinquishanyofhiskinglyrights Conrad stayedsulking at Tyre while hisco-religionists faced anatrocious winter of famineanddisease.Wheatfetched100 gold pieces the sack,andeggsweresellingatsixdinars each; knightsslaughteredtheircostlywar

horses; the foot soldieryscavenged in the middensfor the rotting entrails orfedoff thegrass;andeventhegentrywerereduced tothieving.InFebruary,whenmorale was at its lowestebb,Saladingotarelievingforceintothecity.Itwastobe his last success.As thespring came and theweathereased,supplyshipsmanaged to get through,and then, in April, King

Philip II of France arrivedwith six ships. Richard ofEngland toowas at last inEastern waters, andSaladin’shopesofwearingdown the Christians hadslipped away. The onlyway to victory now wasstraight defeat on the fieldof battle or theoverwhelming of theChristian defence workswhich had stoodunbreached for eighteen

months. The prospects ofsuch victories were slightindeed.WhenPhilip andRichard

at last arrived, the siegeentered its final phase.Philip reached the siegelineson20Aprilandforatime the Christian attackshad new heart anddetermination. Hisengineers built new siegemachineryandmanaged todriveazig-zagrampartout

fromthecamptowithinaneasybow-shotofthewalls.The dangerous andlaboriousworkoffillinginthe fosse pressedinexorably forward. Earth,debris, the bodies of deadhorses and evenmenwerethrown in – some of thedying bequeathed theircorpses to this piouspurpose.Yettheupsurgeinmorale seems tohavediedslowly away, and the

optimists among thedefenders looked back onthe happy omen of the‘white falcon’. Soon afterhisarrival,Philiphadbeenriding down the battlelines, his favourite falconon his fist, when the birdunexpectedlyflewoffoverthewallsofthecity.Itwasa magnificent white bird,bigger than the speciescommon in the MiddleEast, and the jubilant

citizenssent itasapresentto Saladin. There couldhardly have been a morebrilliantaugury.Itfadedinthe light of the bonfireswhichgreetedthearrivalofRichard of England sevenweekslater.Considering how little

interest the Muslimsgenerally showed in theEuropean background oftheir enemies, Saladinwaswell informed on the

relativestandingofthetwomonarchs whose arrivalwas to decide the fate ofAcre. He knew that thekingofFrance,whowastoassume the supremecommand, was ‘one oftheirmightiestprinces’;healso knew the king ofEngland ranked lower, butthat ‘hiswealth, reputationand valour were greater’.The Angevin empireRichardhadinheritedfrom

his father, Henry II,comprisedhalfofFranceaswell as England, so thatthough he was technicallythe feudal subordinate ofPhilip of France therealities were as Saladin’sagents reported them.Richard’sfameasasoldierhad gone before him. ‘Hewasamanofgreatcourageand spirit,’ commentedBaha’-ad-Din,‘andshoweda burning passion forwar’

– and the conquest of theByzantineislandofCyprusmadeadeepimpressiononSaladin, whose alliancewith the emperor had, atone time, been intended topreventjustsuchaunionofinterests betweenChristianstates in Cyprus andPalestine.On the night of 8 June

trumpets brayed throughtheChristiancampatAcreand fires blazed along the

beaches to welcome theking.Thecrackling flameslit up scenes of wildjubilation, and they alsoilluminatedfor theanxiouslookouts inSaladin’s armythe huge supplies ofweaponry and stores beingunloaded from the twenty-five ships of the Englishfleet. For weeks past,Frankish officers enjoyingsafe-conduct passes intotheMuslimcamphadbeen

bragging about thebrilliance and drive of theking of England and howthey‘wereonlywaitingforhisarrivaltoputintoeffecttheir plan to besiege thecity with more vigour’.Richard’s coming, we aretold, ‘put fear into thehearts of the Muslims’.Theyhadreason.Richard had struck his

firstblowin theHolyWareven before he came in

sightofAcre.Sailingdownthe Palestine coast onFriday, 7 July, he hadsighted a galley headingpast Beirut en route forAcre.Apatrolgigsentouttoinvestigatereportedbackthat the shipclaimed tobeFrench. The ruse hadworkedbefore,butnotthistime.Richardorderedupawarship in pursuit. Inaddition to armaments andstores, the ship had 650

veteran troops on board,heading to reinforce thegarrison at Acre, and theyfought fiercely. TheChristian forces fell backuntilthekingsentthewordalong that if this prizeescaped any Christian notkilled in the action woulddieonthegallows.Ateamof swimmers dived underthe enemy ship and lashedthe rudder round. But stilltheTurkishgalleythrashed

onanditstroopscontinuedto repel all boardingparties.EventuallyRichardresignedhimselftothelossof the cargo and gaveorders to prepare to ram.ButtheTurkishcaptainhadcome to the sameconclusion,andevenastheenemy galley came in forthekillhescuttledhisshipratherthanletherstrategiccargo fall into enemyhands. Of almost eight

hundred soldiers andsailors on board onlythirty-five survived thesystematic slaughter thatfollowed – they comprisedemirs who were goodransom prospects and ateamofmilitaryengineers.That night Richard

anchoredoffTyre, and thenext day made his grandentry to the camp atAcre.Within hours hewent sickwith camp fever, but from

his bed he was soondirecting the constructionand placing of yet moresiege engines. Little morethan a month later AcrewasoncemoreaChristiancity.TheMuslimsbelievedthatthelossofthesuppliesintheshipsunkbyRichardwas to blame. But thesiege, under Richard’sdirection, had becomeoverpowering. Thebombardment was

ceaseless, and a newballista built to the king’sspecification was lobbingits missiles into the veryheartofthecity–thestonecouldkill twelvemen.Thedefenders had to servicetheir artillery, man thewalls, clear the fosse, andman the ships in theharbour with reducedforces and on twenty-four-hour stand-by, while theenemyfought inshiftsand

so could maintain anoffensivefordaysonend.Late in June

reinforcements joinedSaladinbut,aswassoontobe obvious, he neededmore than numericalstrength. The walls andtrenches that the Frankshadbegunnearlytwoyearsbeforewere nowperfectedand were effectivelyimpregnable to Muslimattack. To relieve Acre

Saladin’s soldiers had tooverrun thesewalls, and itwasatlastobviousthatthisthey would never do. Thecredibility of the sultan’sarmy as a relieving armycollapsed conclusively onWednesday, 3 July. Theday before had been hardfought. The Franks’ attackhad been announced fromthe city by the agreeddrum-roll signals, and forthe rest of the daySaladin

was at the front. Hegalloped back and forthamong the battalions,urginghismenonwiththebattle cry ‘For Islam!’ hiseyes swimming with tearsandturningagainandagaintothebitterfightingonthedistant city’swalls.He atenothing all day and drankonly the medicine whichhis doctor had prescribed.The next day he led theattack oncemore, but was

called away to hear thelatest dispatch brought inbyswimmer from thecity.Its contents wereshattering.If nothing concrete was

donetorelievethepressurethatday,wroteal-Mashtuband Karaqush, they, thecommanders, would offertheFranksthecityinreturnfor their livesand thoseofthe garrison the followingday. This, after a day’s

fighting, twenty-fourhourswithout food, and asleepless night, hit Saladinso hard that his officers atfirst thought hewoulddie.The news was the morebitter as al-Mashtub theKurd and the Cairo emirKarakush were two of hisoldest friends and besttrusted officers. At thispoint he must surely haveknown thatAcrewouldbelost. Yet his valiant spirit

recovered, and after anhourofprayerhepreparedto rally the troops for yetanotherassaultonthegrimfortifications round theenemy camp. ‘But on thatday the army did notsupporthim,fortheenemyinfantry stood like anunbreakable wall withweapons, ballistas andarrows behind theirbastions.’ The news thatthe army would no longer

follow even Saladin wasenough for al-Mashtub:before nightfall he hadbegun truce talks with theenemy.Acrewassavedforafew

moredayswhentheFranksrefused to guarantee thelivesof thegarrison in theevent of a capitulation.Thatnightthreeemirstooka small boat out of theharbour and slipped pastthe end of the Christian

siege lines to reachSaladin’s camp beforedawn. Two had the goodsense to disappear whilethe thirdwas,onSaladin’sorders, thrown into prison.The next day the armyrefusedSaladin’s order fora frontal assault. Shortlyafterwards threeemissariesarrived from Richard ofEngland.Theyhadcometopropose further peacenegotiations – they also

visited thecampmarket tobuy snow and fruit. Theirreport on the low state ofthearmy’smoralecanonlyhave strengthenedRichard’s determination toyieldnothing.The city held out for

anotherweek,andthearmystill made some effectivediversions. For the wholeof one day a group ofKurdish emirs, amongthem the brother of al-

Mashtub,madeattackafterattack on the enemytrenches, and at the heightof the battle they werejoined by ‘Izz-ad-DinJurdik,onceoneofNur-ad-Din’s staunchest mamluksbut now devoted toSaladin. Nevertheless,despite such acts ofherosim, and despite thearrival of yet morereinforcements, few ofSaladin’s commanders

really believed the citycould now be saved. Thesearch was on for peaceterms to save the lives ofthe garrison. The Frankscarried on negotiationswith the city and the armysimultaneously. Thenegotiators at Saladin’scampwereofferedthecity,its armoury and stores andthe return of the TrueCross. But they insisted,probably on King

Richard’s instructions, thatall former Christian citiesbe returned as well as allFrankishprisoners.Conradof Tyre acted as mediatorin dealings with the city.Thetermsfinallyagreedbyal-Mashtub and Karakushwere sensational. Theyyielded the town and itscontents,andinadditionalltheshipsinitsharbour,600prisoners, including 100nobles listed by name by

theenemy,theTrueCross,and a ransom of 200,000dinars. Conrad received afeeof4,000goldpiecesforhispartinthetransaction.When,onFriday,12July,

aswimmergotnewsoftheterms to Saladin he wasnonplussed.Hisownoffershad proposed nothing ofsubstance. To him the‘True Cross’ was merelythegaudyfetishofapaganculture, while the military

arsenal in Acre, valuablethoughitwas,couldnotbesavedonceRichardwas inthe city. The fleet, on theother hand, could possiblyhavebeenfoughttosafety,andwouldinanycasehavetaken a heavy toll of theChristian shipping. As tothe ransom, such a sumwould beggar his alreadyovertaxedwarchest.Butitquickly became apparentthat his view of the terms

held only academicinterest. Even before hebegantodrafthisrefusalofthe terms the Christians’bannerswereseenbreakingoutonthewallsofthecityand on the minaret of thegreatmosque.The shock of losing the

great city seems to haveoverbalanced Saladin’smilitary judgement. Hepersuaded himself thateven at this stage the

Christians might be luredfrom their entrenchmentsinto an open battle, if theinducement was bigenough. The main armywas ordered to fall backwhile the sultan, with asmallforce,remainedinanopenandclearlyvulnerableposition.ButtheChristianshad no need to rise to thisbait, while Saladin’sadvisers pointed out thatunless he confirmed the

surrender the garrisonwouldcertainlybelost.Heagreed.Hearrangedtopaythe 200,000-dinar ransominthreeinstalments.On11August he delivered thefirst payment and a groupof the stipulated prisoners.ButKingRichardwas lessinterested inmoney at thispoint than militaryadvantage. The defendersofAcre,who hadwon therespect of the Christians

with their skill andcourage,were, in his eyes,too numerous to beguarded and tooprofessional to be returnedto the enemy. On 20August he had themsystematically slaughteredon the plains outside thecity, in full view ofSaladin’s army. It was abarbarity which far outdidthe ceremonial killing ofthe Templars at Saladin’s

orders years before, and itadded a new dimension tothe terrible name ofRichardtheLionheart.Inmilitary termsRichard

could argue that he waseliminatingafightingforcewhich otherwise wouldhave to be held, at hisexpense, with thepermanent possibility ofescape back into friendlyterritory. Saladin’sChristian prisoners could

be and oftenwere sent offto the slave markets.Indeed, the fact that thewar was fought on histerritory gave Saladin apermanent and pricelessadvantage,forRichardwasbound togohomeatsomepoint. The massacre alsomeant that Saladin’s menwere ever after loath togarrisonanycitythreatenedbyasiegefromRichard.Henceforward Saladin

would often retaliate inkind by slaughtering hisprisoners.Neithermonarchregardedtheotherasa‘warcriminal’, the concept hadyettobeborn.Kingslivedabovetheplaneofordinarybeings.AllChristianswereequal in the sight of God;allMuslims in the sightofAllah – but on this earththe rule of man moreusually prevailed. Thecourtesies of courtly life

between the camps wouldrecover; though Saladinnever agreed to a meetingwiththeking.

Chapter13

SaracensandCrusader

Richard’swarsinPalestinelasted another year. Forposterity this is the highromantic period of theCrusades. Arab and

Christian sources alike arefullofanecdotesabout thedealings between the twogreat champions. Agenuine and closefriendshipgrewupbetweenRichard and Saladin’sbrother al-Adil Saif-ad-Din, known to theChristiansasSaphedin;butthere was fraternisationamongthelesseremirsandknights also. Just as theking girded al-Adil’s

twelve-year-old son withthebelt of knighthood andbanqueted with his fatheron Frankish and Arabcuisine, so the Frankishnobility had grown intoeastern ways. Respectcould sometimes softencontemptonbothsides.The original armies from

Europe had been officeredby an ambitious andruffianly nobility and thetroops had been recruited

from the riff-raff of asocietywherebrutalitywascommonplace. A Germanwriter in these early daysobserved that ‘most of theknights are brigands’, andothers accused the nobilityoftakingtheCrosswithallsolemnity but abandoningtheirvowsoncetheSaladintithe had been levied ontheir tenants. A recruitingdrive in Wales for theThird Crusade was

considered a great successwhen the region’s mosthardened thieves andmurderers opted forfreedom with the army inPalestine rather thanimprisonment at home.LaterPopeGregoryXhadto instruct the Frankishclergy not to defendcrusaders who hadcommitted‘theft,homicideor rape simply becausethey had crusading

indulgences’.The more sophisticated

European visitors wereashamed of the Frankishsociety that generations ofsuch recruitshadproducedin the Holy Land. TheGerman DominicanBurkhardwrote: ‘Our ownpeople, the Latins, areworse than all the otherpeople of the land….Andthus is the place of ourredemption brought into

contempt.’ With Germanyone of the least numerousof theEuropean nations inPalestine, Burchard wouldhaveanaturalantipathyforits predominantly Latinpopulation.Yet hewas bynomeanstheonlytravellerto complain at theshameless way theChristians overseasexploited their fellowCatholics, on pilgrimagefrom Europe. Westerners

werewillingtobelieveanytaleabouttheFranksacrossthe water. In Jerusalem. itwas said, there was not aman,whether richorpoor,who thought twice aboutexposing his daughter, hissister or even his wife tothe lust of thepilgrims formoney.Yet even this did not

evoke such outrage as thefraternisation betweenChristianandMuslim.The

ideological conflict, soimportant to Europeans,was kept artificially alivein the kingdom andprincipalities by theappointment of Europeanstoalltheseniorpostsinthechurch. Throughout thecentury, WilliamArchbishop of Tyre wasthe only native-bornchurchman to reach thebenchofbishops.Nodoubtitwasnecessarytokeepthe

Faith overseas pure andfervent with regularinjections of untaintedblood; left to themselvesmen showed a disturbingwillingnesstoliveinpeaceand to accept theirdifferences. At Damascusitself there was a holyimage that healed Jews,Christians and Muslimsequally;whileMuslimandChristian togethervenerated thespringwhere

the Virgin Mary hadwashed the clothes of theinfant Christ and the palmthathadbent itsboughs togiveher food.Whereeventhe saints and the shrinescould be held in common,the cause of sectariansolidarity needed constantnurturing.Theluxuryofeasternlife

seemedaswickedasthealltoo frequent tolerance ofthe foreign religion.

Knights and nobles whocould boast the lineage ofthe greatest families ofEurope were to be seenwearing the outlandishburnous and turban, andridingintobattlewiththeirarmour covered by a longsurcoatandtheirhelmetbya flapping kefieh.Gentlemen of middlingrank and the nouveauxriche Italian merchantscovered their houses in

mosaicandmarble;carpetslay on the floors and richdamask hangings gracedthe walls. Inlaid furniture,meals served on gold andsilver, elegant cutlery andthe new-fangledconvention of eating meatwith a fork, regularlylaundered bed linen andfreshwater brought on tapthroughthegreataqueductsbuilt by the Romans,contributed tomakeaway

of life that the hardyEuropean found alien andsuspectedaseffeminate.Visitors were also

shocked by the way thatcommerce seemed togovern everything. Thewealth of the kingdomlargely depended on thetrade passing from theMuslim hinterland to theportsofthecoast.Muslimshad to be allowed freeaccess and given the

protection of the law. TheItalians – Genoese,Venetians, Pisans,Amalfitans – and Frenchmerchants from Marseille,had theirbusiness ineverycity of importance, withspecialdistrictsinAntioch,Tripoli, Beirut, Tyre andCaesarea in which theywere subject to their owncustoms and administeredtheirownlaws.Theirshipstransported the pilgrims

and the armies of thekingdom–ataprice.Theyhad little interest inreligion; it was said that aman of Venice wouldratherhelpaMuslimthanaGenoese.Venetians,PisansandGenoesewerewiththeSicilian fleet atAlexandriain 1174, but Saladin notedtheyfoughthalf-heartedly.One of Saladin’s long-

termobjectiveshadbeentolure the Italian trade from

the Syrian to the Egyptiancoast.Forthefactwasthat,despite their abominablereligious beliefs, theChristians had brought aheavy increase in the tradeof the Palestinian coastalcities and had alsoprovided a prompt andefficient merchandisingoperation to get the goodsto the new markets inEurope. Trade broughtChristian and Muslim

together as nothing elsecould; Saladin had littledifficulty in negotiatingtreaties with Genoa andVenice and oncecommented to an adviserthat there was ‘not one ofthem [the Italians] whichdoes not supply our landwithitsmaterialsofwar…and treaties of peacefulintercourse have beennegotiated with them all’.EventheKnightsTemplar,

whobythelatterpartofthetwelfth century haddeveloped their immenseassets and endowments tobecome rich and powerfulbankers, operated regularaccountsforArabclients.It was all a far cry from

thebloodthirstydaysoftheFirstCrusade.Thechaplainof King Baldwin I (d.1127) had commented inthe very early days: ‘Wehave become true

Easterners.TheRomanandthe Frank are transformedinto the Galilean orPalestinian, the native ofRheims or Chartres into acitizenofTyreorAntioch.’The rhetoric of religion,important to the fanaticsand statesmen of bothsides, made littleimpressiononmerchantsorlocalpoliticianswhocriss-crossed the lines ofideology in their single-

minded pursuit of wealthandpower.In the minority, and

representative of a morebackward civilisation, theFranksmovedmore easilytoassimilation.Thereweremany who could speakArabic and a few, likeRaynald of Sidon, whoeven took an intelligentinterestinArabicliterature.Muslimchroniclers,on theother hand, display little

interestinthehistoryoftheCrusader states and nointerest at all in theircountries of origin; thoughthey do show considerableconcern with the historiesof the high civilisations oftheNearandFarEastand,in the thirteenth century,even analysed the originsand motives of theMongols.FortheChristiannewcomers, theirprevailing mood came to

be one of contempt: ‘TheFranks (MayAllahRenderthem Helpless!) possessnoneofthevirtuesofmen,exceptcourage.’Some Muslim comments

on Christian customs andreligionwereasobtuseandignorant as Europeaninvective against Islam.The belief in the Trinitywas branded polytheismand the adulation of theTrue Cross, when it was

taken into battle, seemedthe rankest idolatry. ‘Theyset it up and then bow theknee to it and prostratethemselves…. It is coatedin red gold, and encrustedwith pearls and preciousstones.Attimesofdanger,orduringgreatfestivalsthepriests present it to thepeoplewho…praytoitasif it were a god, bowingtheir faces in the dust andsinginghymnsofpraise to

it. There are numerousotherslikeitwhichtheysetup in their houses to dohonourto.’Even the sophisticated

Usamah,princeofShaizar,whose memoirs provide afull and fascinating insightinto life in twelfth-centuryPalestine, was sometimesnonplussed by the strangedoings of the Franks. Hespent many years at thecourt ofDamascus, during

the middle years of thecentury when it wasfrequently in alliance withJerusalem,andhetravelledagooddeal,bothastouristand diplomat, in theChristianstates.Hemadeanumber of friends, but henever really understoodthem. When he came torecount the cases‘regarding the Franks’, hedisclaimed allresponsibility for the tall

stories thatwere to follow,piously commenting,‘Mysterious are the worksof the Creator, the authorofall things!’Usamahhadfriends among theTemplars who were thecustodians of the Aqsamosque; they reserved oneof the porches forMuslimworshippers who wereregularly to be seen at theappointed times of prayerbowing in the direction of

Mecca, that is southwards.One day Usamah wasbrutally interrupted in hisdevotionswhenaFrankishpilgrim, horrified by hisfirst sight of an infidelpractising his abominablecreed,rusheduptohimandswung him roughly roundtofacetheEast,cryingout:‘This is the way thoushouldst pray.’ Althoughhe was pulled off by agroup of highly

embarrassed knights, hereturned to the attack assoon as their backs wereturned, determined,apparently,thatatleastoneMuslim should learn theright way to pray. Thistimehewas thrownoutofthe church and theTemplars attempted tomollify their friend byexplainingthattheoffenderhadbutrecentlycomefromEurope. For his part

Usamah was not onlyshocked by the experiencebut also, it would seem, alittle frightened ‘at theconduct of this devil of aman, at the change in thecolour of his face and histrembling’.Such fanaticism was a

little out of place incosmopolitan Jerusalem,but the average MuslimwouldatleastrecognisetheChristian’s religious

fervour. Butwhen it cameto the sexualmores of theFranks a Muslim wascompletely at a loss forwords. Women not onlywalked openly in thestreetswiththeirhusbands,but if they happened tomeet a friend, thehusbandstood patiently by whilethey had their chat. If theconversation dragged on,the Frank thought nothingofleavinghiswifewiththe

man while he went abouthisbusiness.Frankish behaviour was

still more unconventionalin the public baths. Theythoughtitabsurdlyprudishto wear a towel round thewaist as the modestconventions of the Eastrequired. One day aboisterous younggentlemanwhippedoff thetowelbeingwornbyoneofthe attendants. Stopping in

his tracks he stared inastonishment,fortheman’spubichairhadbeenshaved.Thenarratorcontinues:‘Heshouted for me, “Salim!”AsIdrewnearhestretchedouthishandovertheplaceand said, “An excellentidea. By the truth of myreligion do the same forme.” Accordingly he hadhimself shaved after theSaracen fashion.’ Whatthen followedmight cause

afewraisedeyebrowsevenin a uni-sex sauna.Ordering his servant tobring his lady to the hotroom the knight there andthen had his wife’s skirtspulled up and personallysupervised the bathattendant as he shaved offherpubichair.Eccentricities like this

must have afforded hoursof entertainment round thedinner tables of Usamah

andhisfriends.Butononeoccasion his ears wereaffronted by words ‘thatwouldnevercomefromthelipsofasensibleman’.Hegot on to such good termswith a Frankish pilgrimthat the two called oneanother ‘brother’. Whenthe time came for theEuropean to return homehe tookUsamah aside andsolemnly urged him:‘“Send thy sonwithme to

our country, where he cansee true knights and learnwisdom and chivalry.Whenhereturns toyouhewill be awiseman.”Suchwerehiswords,yetevenifmy son were to be takencaptive,hecouldnotsufferaworsemisfortune than tolive in the land of theFranks.However, I repliedas follows: “By thy life,this has been exactly myidea. But the fact is, his

grandmother,mymother,isso fond of him that sheexacted an oath from methat I would return him toher.” Thereupon he asked:“Is thymother still alive?”“Yes,” I replied. “Well,”saidhe,“disobeyhernot.”’The obtuseness of this

well-meaning Christianwas positively enlightenedcomparedwiththeattitudesofmany churchmen to thehostile faith. The

similarities betweenChristianity and Islamconvinced some writersthatMuhammad began hiscareer as a Christianheretic, while othersbelieved hewas subject tofitsofdemonicpossession.In view of the religion’sfierce antipathy to allimages, whether of thegodheador of theprophet,itisbarelycrediblethatoneofthecommonestChristian

charges against Islam wasthatofidolatry.Thelegendgrew up that the crusadershad found a silver idol ofMuhammad in the Templeat Jerusalem, and in 1200we find the FrenchmanJacques Vitry assertingthat: ‘as often as thefollowers of Muhammadpossess the temple ofSolomon they set up hisstatue there’. Yet moreaccurateinformationwasto

be found. Burkhard, theGermanwhohadservedona mission from FrederickBarbarossa to Saladin,reported the tolerance hehad seen shown to theChristians of Egypt andcontradicted many of theprevailingEuropeanmythsabout Islam. AlthoughpolygamywaspermittedtoMuslims, he found thatmost had only one wife.Like other unprejudiced

observers he was greatlyimpressedbytheMuslim’sstrict observance of thehours of prayer, andreported that they believedin one God who hadcreated heaven and earth,as did the Christians, andthat they even reveredJesus Christ as one of theprophets. Whereas thesesimilarities indicated tosome Europeans thatMuhammad was but a

renegade Christian, toBurchard they seemedsigns of hope, and to alocal Frankish bishop theyseemed to be proof thatGodwasleadingtheInfideltohimselfinhismysteriousdivine plan for theuniverse.On their side, the

Muslims had equallymixed notions of theirenemies and some equallyadmiring views. Saladin,

who had to maintain thewhole Muslim war effortfrom his own territories,spoke admiringly of hisChristian enemies whocame from all parts ofEurope to fight for theirFaith. Whereas they drewvolunteers from Scotland,England, Italy, Germanyand from all over France,hecouldwinthesupportofthe armies of Mosul onlywhenhehadconquered its

princeand forcedhim intosubmission.Ifcouragewasthe only manly qualitywhichsomeoftheMuslimsconceded to their enemies,noonedeniedthattheyhadit to the full.Watching theheroic march of theChristian army to Arsuf,one of Saladin’s staffwrote: ‘One cannot helpadmiring the patiencedisplayed by these people,whoborethemostwearing

fatiguewithouthavinganypart in themanagement ofaffairs or deriving anypersonaladvantage.’These dogged fighting

qualities and the falteringenthusiasm for the waramonghisownemirsmadethe period of KingRichard’s campaigns inPalestine one of constanttension for Saladin. InAugust 1191 the glorioustriumph at Jerusalem was

four years in the past, andsince that moment he hadbeenfightingtodefendhisconquests. The longtermsituation was swinging inhisfavour.Duringthesiegeof Acre Guy and Conradhad continued their rivalryforthekingship.Evenafterthelossofthecity,Saladincould have stabilised thefrontiers if Richard ofEngland had returnedwiththe French king after the

Christian victory. As itwas, during the nextthirteen months Saladinwas almost constantly inthefield,andwhenatlastatreaty was settled withRichard he had less thansixmonthstolive.The halo of chivalry

which surrounds the rivalchampions is not merelythe invention of posterity.Saladinandhisemirs,bredin the tradition of the

Muslim gentleman,delighted to entertain theFranks with all the luxuryof eastern courtliness, andhad come to respect thecourage and brilliance oftheEuropeanfightingman,while their enemies wereenthralled by theburgeoning European cultof knighthood, andintensely admired thedashing style of Turkishwarfare.Theairofglamour

andexcitementgrippedtheleaders. Saladin and hisbrother al-Adil wereobviously fascinated bytheir great antagonist,while Richard was in hiselementwherechivalryandmilitary problems were sorichlycompounded.But in the weeks

immediatelyafterAcre theair of mutual admirationwas poisoned for ‘Saladinwas terribly wroth at

Richard’s massacre of theprisoners at Acre’.Frankishstragglersbroughtinto the camp wereunceremoniously killedafter interrogation, andmanyhorriblymutilated.ItisdoubtfulwhetherSaladinwould have been obeyedhad he tried to intervene.The slaughtered garrisonhadhadfamilyandfriendsin the army, and thesetroops had fought bitterly

allthatcruelAugustdaytosave their comrades. Thenthey had been beaten backby the Franks; now a fewdefenceless prisoners werethe anguished victims oftheir pent-up fury. Saladindidnotdoubtthejusticeofthe deaths: vengeance waspart of the code all menlived by, but wantoncruelty was not in hisnature.Yearsbeforehehadrefused his young sons

permission to kill aprisoner in cold bloodbecause it was not rightthey should learn thehabitof killingmen before theylearnt the ways of justice.Even in the fervid weeksafter Acre he managed tosave some of the victimsfrommutilation.The news the prisoners

broughtinwasdisquieting.SincemarchingoutofAcreon 22 August Richard’s

army had made only slowprogress on its way southalong the coast road, butthis it emerged wasbecause the king waskeeping in touch with thefleet and its supplies. Thiswasnotarashgamblelikethe march of Guy to Acrebut ameasured opening toa long-term strategy withambitious objectives. Thetarget was Jerusalem.Richard planned to march

down the coast to Jaffaand, with this port as abase,tostrikeinlandattheHoly City. But Jaffa wasmorethansixtymilesawayalong a difficult road witheight river crossings andthemarchwasintheheightof the Mediterraneansummer. It was shadowedbyamassiveMuslimforceinthenearbyhills.For two weeks the

Christians marched

doggedly southwards, thesea on their right and theMuslimsontheirleft.Theymade barely five miles aday. Richard had dividedhis force into threedivisionsparalleltothesea.In the centre was thecavalry, to protect thehorses from the Turkisharrows, the baggage andthe standard. This was awagoncarrying‘atowerashigh as a minaret from

whichfloatedthebannerofthe people’. Since thecapture of the True Crossthe Christians had beensearching for a newrallying symbol. At AcreGuy had been precededinto battle by anilluminated copy of theGospels under a canopycarried by four knights.Perhaps this had beenchanged because it wasunfortunately reminiscent

of the Muslim custom ofcarrying the Koran intobattle. Either side of theChristian centre were twocolumnsoffoot,theoneontherightbeingprotectedbythesea, theoneon the leftcarrying the weight of theMuslim attacks.Periodically the twochanged stations so thateach had a chance to restfrom the fighting. Undertheir regulationmail shirts

the troops wore heavy feltjerkins so that the hail ofarrows caused littledamage. The brunt of thebattlefellontherearguard,which had to marchbackwards,fightingasbestit could. The Christiancrossbows inflicted terriblewounds on the Muslims,but there were not enoughofthem.For the most part the

Christianshadtotrudgeon

inthedustyheat,powerlessto strike back at theMuslim archers and lightcavalry. Men died of heatstroke, of fatigue, ofchance arrows in the face.Yetdayafterscorchingdaytheykept formation, to theangry admiration ofSaladin and his staff. Aswe have noted whatimpressed them about ‘thepatiencedisplayedbythesepeople’wasthatthey‘bore

the most wearing fatiguewithout having anyparticipation in thedirection of the campaignor deriving any personaladvantage.’ Itwasa ruefulcomparison with theposition of Saladin, whohad to consult his emirsover every decision. Toooften, as we have seen,they overrode him androbbedhimofvictory.On 30 August the

Christians reachedCaesarea.Nowtheirordealintensified. Saladin hadalready reconnoitred theterrain and settled on theapproaches to the port ofArsufforamassiveassault;here the coastal plainwidened to give additionalmanoeuvrability to hishorsemen.On7Septemberthe running action reachedthe dimensions of a majorbattle. Over the blaring

trumpets and rollingkettledrums,overthesoundof rattles, gongs andcymbals, rang out thestrident battle cries ofTurks,Arabs,Bedouinandblacks. Saladin was at thecentre of the action. Witharrows flying round hishead and accompanied bypages leading two reservehorses he rode slowly upthe line between the twoarmies, urging hismen on

to break the enemyformation. Under the wildfury of the assault theChristians at last began tofalter. Knights who hadswallowed their pride andkept their stationthroughout themarch nowbegged Richard toauthoriseacharge.Stillheheld them back, waitinguntil Saladin’s skirmishersand cavalry were too farcommitted to withdraw;

nevertheless the knightsbegantobreakthroughthewall of infantry all alongthe line. ‘The knightsgathered together in themiddleoftheinfantry;theygrasped their lances,shoutedtheirwarcrieslikeone man and rushed in agreat charge, some on ourleft,someonourrightandsome on our centre.’ Thecharge was only momentsbefore he had intended it

but Richard gathered andled it with a vastmomentum that shatteredtheMuslim ranks and sentmen flying for their lives.Saladin stayed firm by hisstandard with only somesupporters; once again hehad to rally his force topreventarout.The Christian success at

Arsuf was not a crushingvictory. It enabledRichardandhisarmytomaketheir

way safely into Arsuf,certainly, but Saladin’sarmyre-formedatnearfullstrength. What the actionhaddonewastounderminefatally the whole tacticalassumption on whichSaladin’s campaign wasbased – that the way todefeat the Franks was tolure them into a battle ofmovement and break theirformation. The triumph atHattin had flowed from

careful manoeuvre,brilliantly calculated andexecuted to drive theenemy into a position ofmultiple disadvantage;Arsuf demonstrated thatwithout such preparationthe defeat of a Christianarmy – well armed, welldisciplined, andprofessionally led – wasbeyond the resources atSaladin’s disposal. Theblow to Saladin’s

reputation had been farheavier than the militaryconsequences. Seeing nowthe real possibility thatJerusalem itself might belost,hefellbacktoRamlahto block Richard’s roadfromJaffa.But at the moment

Richardhadnointentionofmovingtothenextstageofhis campaign until Jaffahadbeenproperlysecured.In any case his army was

not in a fit state to fight.Afterthehazardsofthelastfewweekshismenrelaxedinto the luxury and nightlife of Jaffa as completelyas theyhadatAcre.Not afew made their way backup thecoast road that theyhad helped to clear, torenew the acquaintance ofthose ‘lovely Frankishwomen’ we have alreadyheardabout.Afewofthesehad sailed down to Jaffa,

but obviously it wasconsidered a littleprovincial in comparisonwithAcre.Therewas littlefighting. While Richardwas strengthening his baseat Jaffa, Saladin was atAscalon. Barely crediblethough it may sound, hewas supervising thesystematic destruction ofthe defences and largeareasofthecityitself.The reverses atAcre and

Arsuf had totallydemoralised the Muslims.Now Saladin feared thatRichard,ifhecouldmakeafirmfootholdinAscalonashehaddoneinJaffa,wouldbe poised for an attack onEgypt. The nightmare thatthewholeofhislife’sworkmight be overturned didnot seem beyondpossibility. The nightbefore the decision to razeAscalon he slept fitfully

anddiscussed theprosandcons of the case with hissonal-Afdal into thesmallhours. ‘I take God towitness,’ he said, ‘that Iwould rather lose all mychildren than cast down asingle stone from thewalls.’ The recapture ofAscalon, that once greatEgyptian outpost inPalestine, had been one ofthe proudest moments ofthe 1187 campaign. To

destroy it was a bitteradmission of weakness.YetSaladinrecognisedthatafter his army’s pastperformance he could notrelyonanygarrisontoholdit. Once the decision hadbeenmade, this sternmandid not shirk the seeing itthrough. Accustomed allhis life to supervise hissubordinates in everythinghe regarded as a topmilitary priority, he was

now to be seen going upanddownthestreetsofthisprized city helpingpersonally in therecruitingof the workmen, andassigning portions of theramparts to groups oflabourers or towers to anemir and his troops.Fearing Richard wouldreach the city before thejob was completed thesultan forced himself tourge on the demolition

squads just as he hadexhorted his troops in theheatofthebattle.The destruction of

Ascalonwasafullmilitaryvindication for Richard’sbarbarous massacre of theAcre garrison. Saladinhimself was bitterlyopposed to the demolition,aswehave said, butwhenheproposeddefendingittohiscouncilofwartheemirsrejected the idea. ‘He

invitedtheMuslimstolockthemselves up at Ascalontodefendit.’SowroteIbn-al-Athir. ‘No oneresponded to this appealbut they all said: “If youwish to defend it, go inwithusorhaveoneofyoursons go in with us;otherwisenotoneofuswilllock ourselves up here forfear of what happened atAcre.”’Therecouldhardlybe more telling proof that

without Saladin theachievements of the 1180swould have beenimpossible. After Ascalon,a number of fortresses inthe southern part of theformer kingdom weredestroyed–therewerejustnot enough troops to holdall these strong points theyearround.For the moment Richard

held the initiative, but healso had problems. With

Philip of France back inEurope,Richard feared forthesecurityofhisownvastFrench domains. He wasalso beginning to havedoubtsaboutthequalityofhis army. Guy had beensentback toAcre to roundup the deserters with littlesuccess and soon Richardhimself would have to gothere to roust them out.Even the troops whoremained loyal to the

colours saw themselves aspilgrims.IftheycouldfighttheirwaytoJerusalemandvisit the Holy Places theywould be content. Theywereunlikelytostayoninthe East to hold theconquered lands. On 17October Richard openednegotiations with al-Adil.Saladinwasnotpreparedtocompromise his dignityand bargaining position byameetingwithRichard,but

agreed that his brothermight communicate withthe enemy commander.Thetwohadstruckupsucha close understanding thatRichard looked on al-Adilas a ‘brother and friend’.At Richard’s request al-Adil sent his secretary todiscusspreliminaries.The first stage was the

statement of extremebargaining positions.Pointing out that the war

was a wasting sicknessdamaging both sidesequally, the king proposedthetimehadcometoputastoptoit.Then,asthepriceof peace, he demandedJerusalem, all the landsbetween the coast and theRiver Jordan, and finallytheTrueCross, ‘which foryou is simply a piece ofwoodwithnovalue,butforus is of the highestimportance’. Since these

were the very three pointsat issue in the war it ishardly surprising thatSaladin, his army still inthe field, refused outright.What followed was acompromisesolutionwhichhorrified contemporariesonbothsidesandhasneverceased to fascinatehistorians. Itwasproposedthatamarriagebearrangedbetween Richard’s sisterJoanna,thewidowofKing

WilliamIIofSicily,andal-Adil. From her brotherJoanna was to receive allthelandsinPalestineunderhis control while al-Adilwas tobemade lordof allthe remaining territory atpresent held by Saladin.OnlytheplacesheldbytheTemplars were to beexcluded from thearrangement. The coupleshould rule jointly fromJerusalem. In addition

Saladin would hand overthe True Cross and therewas to be a completeexchangeofprisoners.Before continuing the

negotiations on thisastonishing line, al-AdilgottheexplicitapprovalofSaladin. It was willinglygiven ‘because he knewquitewell that theKingofEnglandwouldneveragreetosuchterms’.Buthewaswrong.Whatevermayhave

beenRichard’smotivesforembarkingon theCrusade,we can be fairly sure thatreligious piety was notchief among them –according to legend hisfamilywasdescendedfromthe devil. When buildingthe castle of Gaillard inNormandy, he ignoredprotests from theArchbishop of Rouen whoowned the land and isreputedtohavereplied:‘If

the angel of God himselfshould try to stop thisbuilding he would be metbyacurse.’Ifthemarriageof his sister to a Muslimwould settle the Palestinequestion and allow him togetback tohisownaffairshewaswilling to considerthe matter. However, hefullyrealisedtheimpactonpublic opinion. His sisterseems tohave raised someforcefulobjectionstoo,but

these were less influentialthan the fact that ‘TheChristian peopledisapprove of my givingmy sister in marriagewithout consulting thePope…. Accordingly Ihave sent a messenger tohim….Ifheauthorises thewedding, so much thebetter. If not, I will giveyouthehandofoneofmynieces.’ Saladin refused toconsider any bride but the

king’ssister, thoughif thatcould be arranged he washappy to go through withthe proposal. It is obviousthat he was onlyprotractingthenegotiationsto win time.Whatever themotives of King Richard,Saladin would never havepermitted the marriage ofhis own brother and aninfidel. But with winterdrawing on he may havehoped that the end of the

conventional campaigningseason would give him abreathingspace.And Saladin had another

card. Simultaneously withthe negotiations withRichardhehadreceivedanapproach from Conrad ofTyre. The emissary wasRaynald of Sidon, who,despite their encounter atBeaufort two years before,was well received bySaladin. Ever since his

intervention at Tyre,Conrad’s policy had beenentirely self-seeking – toextendhisownpowerwithlittle thought for the well-being of the Christiancauseasawhole.PhilipofFrance, his strongestpatron, had returned toEurope, and Richard wasopenlyhostiletohisclaimson the monarchy ofJerusalem.Hewas not theonlynativeFrankwhowas

worried at the way theEuropeannewcomersweretakingcontrol inPalestine,andseemstohavegatheredquite a following inaddition to Raynald. HenowofferedtohelpSaladinrecaptureAcreifthesultanwouldguaranteeSidonandBeiruttohimandhisallies,thoughherefusedastraightanswer when asked if hewouldtakeuparmsagainstRichard himself. Courted

by both sides from theChristian camp, Saladinconsulted thecouncil as towhich he should come toterms with. On balancethey favoured Richard asmarginally the moretrustworthy, but both setsof negotiations werecontinued. Al-Adil, whorevelled in the diplomaticcomplications, wouldsometimes be seen ridingwith Raynald past

Richard’s camp. Desultorytalks continued withConrad, but for the timebeing Richard saw therewas little point in hisnegotiations.At the beginning of

November, Saladin had torelease the easterncontingents. The smallwinterarmycouldnothopeto match Richard in thefield, even if the rains andmud had notmade serious

fighting virtuallyimpossible. SaladinwithdrewtoJerusalem.ButRichard led his army ontowards Jerusalem andoccupied Ramlah. For sixweeks they camped there,fending off the attacks ofSaladin’sskirmishers;then,to his consternation, theypushed on still nearer, tooccupy the fort of BeitNuba only twelve milesaway. In that firstweekof

January 1192 the hillsaround theHolyCitywerelashed with storms thatsnapped the tent poles inthe Christian camp andturned the roads intoquagmires. But with theobject of their pilgrimageso close the morale of theChristian troops was ashigh as ever it had been.ForhispartSaladinhourlyexpected an assault andbegandividing thedefence

of the walls among hisemirs.A week after the

Christians had made theircamp at Beit NubaSaladin’s scouts reportedthat they were marchingback down the roadtowards Ramlah. Thedecision to retreat hadstretched Richard’sauthority almost as muchas thedecision to stayhadSaladin’s. The European

contingents were strainingto attack, but thePalestinianlordsconfirmedthe king’s own gloomydiagnosis. Even if, despitethe appalling weather andtheEgyptianforcescampedinthehills,hesucceededintaking Jerusalem, hispilgrim troopers wouldhead for home when thecity was won. TheChristianarmywasbitterlydisappointed. Against the

odds and against theweather they had fought away to their goal. Now,through driving hail andsnow, over marshes andswamps that sucked downmen and horses, theymarched away, beatenwithout a battle. Therewere many deserters, ‘thegreater part of the Frenchwent off in anger to Jaffaandlivedatease’,otherstoAcre,where supplieswere

abundant, and some tookservice with Conrad atTyre.NowwasthetimeforSaladin to strike. Butalthough Richard haddefied the appallingweathertogettoBeitNubathe conditions did put amajor battle out of thequestion.Itwasnotmerelya matter of the terrain.Archers were Saladin’smainoffensivearmandtherain would soon have

slackened their bow-strings. In addition hisarmy was depleted by theseasonal leave to halfstrength and demoralisedby the failures of theprevious months. To haveheld them together hadbeen an achievement; nowhe could only wait for theweathertoimproveandthetroops of Mosul and itsregion to return. It is aninteresting light on

Saladin’s swellingreputation among hisenemies that someChristians attributed hisinactiontohischivalry.Eventsdidnotstandstill.

Richard led his army toAscalonwhere they ‘couldbarelystruggle through thegates over the heaps ofrubble’ left by Saladin’slabourers. The next fourmonths saw thesefortifications rebuilt. All

thatSaladinhadwonbytheagonised decision todestroy the place was alittle time. By May,AscalonwasonceagainaneffectiveChristiangarrisontown.Buttheenemycouldnot deploy his advantage.Conrad refused to joinRichard at Ascalon. TheFrench contingent led bythedukeofBurgundywasstill disaffected, the Pisanshad takenoverAcre in the

name of King Guy andheld it against thecombined forces ofConrad, Burgundy andGenoa. Once againSaladin’s enemies weredoinghisworkforhim.In March he and al-Adil

at last brought thenegotiationswithConradtoan offensive/defensivealliance, and immediatelymade a handsome offer toRichard which, shrewdly

enough, included Beirut,one of Conrad’s primeobjectives. In addition theChristians should retaintheir conquests, have backtheir cross and be allowedthe right of pilgrimage tothe Holy Places whereLatin priests were to beinstalled. Saladin had longago written off hisineffective ally atConstantinople.Al-Adilledthe delegation to the plain

outside Acre whereRichard was working torestore some unity amonghisallies.OnPalmSunday,29 March, ‘amid muchsplendour’, as a sign ofrespectforhis‘brotherandfriend’ Richard girded al-Adil’s sonwith thebelt ofknighthood.Thetermsweregoodand

shouldhavebeenactedon.Both sides wanted peace.Saladin was troubled by

reports of trouble in al-Jazirah, where one of hisnephews was stirring updiscontent. Richard washearing disquieting reportsof conflicts between hisministers in England andhis ambitious brother,Prince John. He could notaffordtostayouteastmuchlonger, and early in Aprilcalled a full council of thekingdom to settle thedispute between Conrad

andGuy.Althoughhehadfavoured Guy’s claim,when the councilunanimously voted forConrad he agreed. It waswhattheMarquishadbeenwaiting for. He agreed inturn to join the army atAscalon after hiscoronation in Acre. Then,on 28 April, Conrad wasstruck down by twoAssassins, sent by Sinan,‘The Old Man of the

Mountains’. He had aprivate grievance againstConradandmayalsohaverecognised that he alonewas able to rebuild apowerful state in theChristian lands. Butrumour told differentstories. Some said thatSaladinhadaskedSinantoarrange the deaths of bothRichard andConrad; later,rather confused Assassintradition held that the

murder was at Saladin’srequest. But since it tellshow the men killedRichard, it can bediscounted.TheChristians,remembering theantagonism betweenRichard and Conrad,favoured the view thatRichard had ordered thekilling. Since, barely aweek before, Richard hadat last settled his quarrelwithConrad and had even

got his agreement to jointhe common fight againstthe Muslims, this is, ifpossible, still moreunlikely. In any case, hemade no attempt torehabilitateGuy.Whenthepeople of Tyre acclaimedHenry of Champagne asthe successor to their deadhero, Richard againacquiesced.On5May,justone week after herhusband’s death, Queen

Isabella married Henry.Thespeedof theoperationraised a few eyebrows inthe Christian camp, whileMuslim opinion, hardenedas it thought to thebarbarous morals of theenemy, was disgusted tolearnthat themarriagehadbeen consummated eventhough the queen wasalreadypregnant.During all this time

Saladinhadbeencontentto

watch the confusion of hisenemies. The situation inthe east was too uncertainfor him to commit himselfto a campaign and he wasstill awaiting the return ofhis emirs. He no doubtthought the provisionalagreement with Richardwould hold long enoughfor them to come up. ButRichard had now heardreports of Saladin’srebellious family and he

may also have heard therumour that Guy’sassassinshadhoped tokillhim. More probably hismilitary mind saw thechance of a quick, cheapandimportantgain.Inmid-May he advanced by landand sea down fromAscalon to the importantfortress town of Darum,twentymilesfurtherontheroad to Egypt, and by the28th it was once again in

Christianhands.Stillworsefrom Saladin’s point ofview was the news thatRichard, stirred by theexhortations of hischaplain, had put off hisreturntoEuropeyetagain.The eastern contingents

were at last flooding backto join thearmy,butwhenRichard advanced onceagaintoBeitNubaSaladindid not feel strong enoughto do more than harry the

outposts of the Christianforce, which stayed in itsadvanced position for amonth.TheChristianswereas perplexed as Saladinabout thenext stageof thecampaign. The argumentsthathadpersuadedRichardto retreat in January stillheld good, and nowSaladin was stronger.However, another successsooncame.Agreatcaravanwasmakingitswayslowly

upEgypt totheHolyCity.We are told by Baha’-ad-Din that Richard himselfreconnoitred the positionbefore dawn disguised asan Arab. The result wasthat his men were able totaketheconvoycompletelyby surprise, and only abaggage train belonging tothe sultan himself wassaved from the disaster –thankstotheheroismofitscommander, Aybak-al-

Aziz. The militarysignificance of the episodewas not unimportant.Amongtheimmensebootythe Christians had takenthousands of horses andcamels, and once againSaladin’sstandingwithhisown people had sufferedheavily. Now, he wasconvinced, Richard wouldmoveinforthekill.Withaheavy heart Saladinconvened his emirs once

more to screw theircourage to the stickingpoint of resistance. Hecalledacouncilofwar.The proceedings opened

with an oration fromBaha’-ad-Din remindingthe emirs of their duty tothe Holy War andexhorting them to standfirm.Whenhehadfinishedthe company sat in silencewaiting for the sultan tospeak. Minutes passed.

Then Saladin rose slowlyto his feet. ‘Today,’ hesaid, ‘you are the supportof Islam.Only you amongthe Muslims can stand upagainst this enemy. If youfail – which God forbid–they will roll up this landlike the rolling up of ascroll, and you will beanswerable, for itwas youwhoundertooktodefendit.You have received moneyfrom the public treasury

and now the safety of theMuslims throughout thelandrestswithyou.’Inthatassembly the mention ofcashwastimely.Therewasnot a man there who hadnot received richly of thesultan’s largesse, who hadnot at some time hadvaluable warhorses givenhim in replacement for themounts lost in the HolyWar. Many of the emirshad already criticised the

plan to stay in Jerusalem.The shadow of Acre stillhungheavilyintheair,andtherewereplentyofvoicesin favour of risking apitched battle rather thanwaitingcoopedupforwhatthey regarded as theinevitable fall of the city.The argumentwas dressedin specious militaryreasoning,butSaladinwellknew that if once he leftthe place his cause would

belost.Anygarrisonlefttoholditwouldfallapart,for‘the Kurds will not obeythe Turks and the TurkswillneverobeytheKurds’.As to themainarmy,onceit was in the open field itwould melt away as theemirs lookedforsafetyforthemselves and theirpossessions behind theJordan.Whenhehadsatdownno

one attempted to open up

the debate. He wasanswered by al-Mashtubthe Kurd. ‘My lord,’ hesaid, ‘weareyourservantsandslaves.Youhavebeengracioustousandmadeusmighty and rich, we havenothing but our necks andtheyare inyourhands.ByGod,notoneamonguswillturnbackfromhelpingyouuntil we die.’ After thisSaladincalledfortheusualeveningmeal tobeserved,

and when they had eatenhiscaptainswithdrew.Thewhole episode smacks ofcareful stage management.The uplifting call to thejihad, followed by areminder of thepracticalities of thesituation, and the wholerounded off by adeclarationof loyalty fromthe leader of the Kurdishsquadronswiththehintthatdefaulterswouldhavethem

to reckon with. Yet againSaladin had held acrumbling situationtogether. And for thesecondtime,asifbydivineintervention the Muslimsweretobespared.Richard,always a soldier first andpilgrim second, saw thatthe situationwas as it hadbeen in January, with theadditional hazard thatSaladin had poisoned thewells. On Sunday, 5 July,

he ordered the retreat, andSaladin, with his emirs,rode out to watch theirenemy trudgingdisconsolatelysouthwards.Two days later, to

Saladin’s astonishment, amessage arrived fromHenry‘KingofJerusalem’,demandingthereturnofall‘his’ lands. He was curtlyinformed that as thesuccessor to Conrad thebesthecouldhopeforwas

the return of Tyre andAcre. In fact, we are told,Saladinwassooutragedbythe impudence of thedemand from an enemywho had completed hisretreat that the messengerwasluckytoescapeunhurt.Hewasfollowedbyamorediplomatic embassy fromRichard, now at Jaffa anddetermined at last to getback to Europe. He askedthe sultan to forgive the

rashnessoftheyoungkingand to consider oncemoreterms of peace that wouldbringhonourtobothsides.Saladin’s emirs were askeen as Richard to put anend to the damaging andinconclusive campaigns ofthe past year, andagreementseemedinsight.But neither Saladin norRichardwouldyieldonthematterofAscalon.Theoneinsisted that the

fortifications bedismantled, the otherrefused to surrender theone major achievementsinceAcre.Richard in fact was so

sure that agreement wouldbe reached that he hadmoved his army to Acreandwaspushing alonghispreparations for departure.Unprotected, Jaffawas toovaluableaprize toSaladinfor him to let it slipwhile

the final peace was stillawaitingsettlement.On27July he marched downfrom Jerusalem and threedays later his troops werestorming through thestreets looting and killing.The garrison in the citadelhad agreed to capitulate inreturn for their lives, butthis Saladin could notguaranteeuntil theorgyofpillage in the town hadexhausted itself. In the

meantime the news of thedisaster had been broughttoAcre,whereRichardwason thepointofembarking.The exhausted messengerhad not completed hisreport before the kingwasrallying the fleet and hisknights.On31Julyhewassighted off Jaffa with afleetofgalleys.BecauseofthechivalryofSaladinandhis officers the garrisonwerestillsafeinthecitadel

whiletheirenemiestriedtopacify the rioting soldiery.When they saw help athand they took up theirarms prepared to hold outuntil the king of Englandcametotheiraid.There were already

Muslim banners on thewallsof thecity,andforatime Richard hesitated.Then a soldier from thegarrison made his way tothe king’s ship and told

him the place was stillbeing held. Waiting nolonger, Richard, stillwearing his sailor’s deckshoes,plungedintotheseafollowed by some eightyknights and, under theastonished eyes of Baha’-ad-Din, who was stillacting as negotiatorbetween Saladin and thegarrison, cleared theharbouroftheKurdishandTurkoman soldiers. The

king was followed by aforce of Italian marines,and as Saladin sat in histent trying to clinch thefinal surrender terms theflood of panicked soldiersand refugees crowding thestreets told him all waslost. As usual, he, with asmallbandof loyal troops,tried to rally the cowardsround the standard – butthecasewashopeless.Thecourage and decision of

Richard had made JaffaonceagainaChristiancity.Nevertheless, Saladin

knewhowweakhisenemywas and he refused toconcedetheposition.Inthedawn of Wednesday, 5August, a Genoese sentryin Richard’s camp heardthesoundofhorsesandthechinkofarmourbeyondthelines. He alerted thecommander. Still draggingon their armour and

reaching for their swords,fifty-four knights, led bythemartialking,dashed totheperimeter,defendedbyalowpalisadeofsharpenedtentpegs.Theywerejoinedby some two thousandItalian crossbowmen. Theknights, shields on arms,stood in pairs, their lancespointing towards theoncoming cavalry, andbehind them the archers.Saladinhad7,000horse in

thefield,buttheycouldnotbreak down the oppositionthough their attacks cameagainandagainuntil earlyin the afternoon. Now,seeing his enemy tiring,Richard and his knightsmounted and hurledthemselves at the Muslimcavalry. The battle wasturned by their gallantry.Richard’s horse was shotunder him, and al-Adil,whowaswiththehost,sent

himareplacement.Itwasabad-tempered animal, andSaladin’s brother watchedintriguedtoseewhetherthekingwouldbeabletobreakits spirit. But Richard hadnotimeforsuchchivalrousby-play and ordered theSaracengroomback tohismasterwithawrymessagenot to set traps like that.WiththedefendersofJaffasoheavilycommittedatthecamp some of Saladin’s

menattemptedtostormtheplace, but they too weredriven back. Once againSaladin had to retire toJerusalem and once againhe prepared to stand asiege.ButthistimeRichardhad no intention ofcarrying the war to him.Seeingthat thislastsuperbvictory had exhausted theChristian champion,Saladin was soon back inforce atRamlah.The final

round of negotiationsbegan.Richardwas forcedto give up Ascalon, hissuggestion that he hold itasafieffromSaladinintheFrankish manner wasturned down. The coastfrom Acre to Jaffa was toremain in Christian handsandthetroopsinRichard’sarmyweretobeallowedtomake their pilgrimage tothe Holy Places. On 9October Richard,

desperately sick, went onboard at Acre. His lastmessage to Saladin wasthat when the three-yeartruce was over he wouldreturn to take Jerusalem.The chivalrous reply cameback that ifSaladinhad tolose his lands to any kingthere was none moreworthy to win them thanthekingofEngland.By the1190s thebalance

between theMuslimworld

and Western Christendomwas very much in theMuslims’ favour. Theywereintheascendantinthe‘crusading’wars,which,ofcourse, they won with theevictionoftheFranksfromPalestine in 1291. Theirswas also the dominantculture. Communicationsacross the linguistic dividewere in Arabic; thenegotiations betweenRichard and Saladin’s

brother al-Adil wereconducted through theyoung Humphrey IV ofToron, one of the Franksfluent in the language.Arabic sources, impressedby the dedication of theFranks to their religiouscause,criticisedSaladinforwarring againstMuslims –in fact, lordships outsidehis control showed littleinterest in the threat fromEurope.Genoesegalleysen

route to provision theChristian army besiegingAcrewereabletorevictualatNorthAfricanports; thesultan of Isfahan wasindignant when Saladinrefused him help againstlocalinsurgents.With the death of

BaldwinIVtheFrankslosttheir last notable king; theleprosy that wasted hisbody never infected hiswill, dedication or mental

powers. The days ofJerusalem as capital of aChristian kingdom werenumbered. Saladin hadforced its neighbour statesinto an encircling alliancethatwouldlastlongenoughto ensure the recovery ofthe city for Islam – asettlement not challengedforsome760years.

Chapter14

TheDeathofaHero

During theweeks betweenthe signingof thepeace atRamlah and the departureof Richard, hundreds ofEuropeans seized the

chance to visit the HolySites, as allowed by thetreaty. Some fanaticalMuslimswereangeredthatinfidels should be allowedinto the city, and Saladinordered patrols on theroads to protect theChristianpilgrimsfromtheenthusiasts. Vindictivenesswas no part of his natureand he was perfectlywillling to permit thedefeated enemy a last

gestureofpiety.PerhapsheregrettedthatKingRichardrefused to make thepilgrimagefromshamethathehadnotbeenabletowinthe city back forChristendom, but heentertained his emissary,Hubert Walter the bishopof Salisbury,magnanimously. He ‘senthimmanygiftsofpriceandeven invited him to aconference in order to see

whatkindofamanhewasin appearance. He had theHolyCross shown to him,andtheysattogetheralongtime in familiarconversation … heenquiredastothehabitsofthekingofEngland…andasked what the ChristianssaidabouthisSaracens.’Attheendoftheinterview,heinvited the bishop to askany favourhewished.Thenext day, having begged

time to think over hisrequest, Hubert Walterreturned and asked thatLatinpriestsbeallowed tocelebrate Catholic rites atthe Holy Sepulchre,BethlehemandNazareth.Saladin’s agreement to

this request was natural inhis generous nature. It isequally likely that he sawpolitical advantages fromrival Christianestablishments at the

shrines. Tension betweenthe Catholics and theSyrianchurcheshadbeenapermanent feature of theChristian kingdom. In factHubert Walter had beenprompted to make hisrequest because, in thewords of the Christianchronicler, ‘he had foundthe services only halfcelebrated after thebarbarous Syrian fashion’andwishedto‘inauguratea

fitting service to God’.Saladin was closelyinformed on theweaknesses of hisopponents andwould havebeen well aware that thearroganceoftheLatinshadlong deprived them of thecooperationofalargebodyof fellow Christians inMuslim-occupied territory.The new arrangements forthe guardianship of theChristianholyplacescould

be expected to keep illfeeling alive between thetwocommunities.EvenhisfriendlyagreementtoallowChristians from the armyup to visit the shrines hadhad an element ofcalculation. He knew thatthe bulk of the newlyarrived Europeans hadcome on Crusade only tofulfil the pilgrimage andoncetheyhadmadeittheseFranks would be eager to

depart.The Ramlah agreement

on pilgrims seems to havebeennegotiatedbyRichardas an opportunity for himto reward his own menwith the special passportswhichwere stipulated.ButSaladin ordered that allpilgrims should be letthrough,andsoonreceivedanangrymessagefromtheEnglish king; he wasparticularly irritated that

the French, who hadrefused their help at Jaffa,werebeinggiven thesametreatment as the English.But Saladin gave‘honourable entertainmentto such as he chose …receiving them at his tableandlettingthemknowthatbydoingsohewouldincurthe reproachesof theking.He ignored the prohibitionhe had received fromRichard with the excuse:

“There are men here whohave come from afar tovisit the Holy Places andourlawforbidsustohinderthem.”’Saladin remained at

Jerusalem until he hadreceived the news thatRichard had finally sailed.Hehadbeendiscussingtheadvisability of making hisown pilgrimage to Mecca.Hewasanxioustofulfilhislongoutstandingobligation

to theFaith; althoughonlyin his early fifties he wasaware of the toll that hisrelentless work scheduleshad taken on his fragilehealth. Following hisdoctor’s orders he hadoften had to break thefastingdutiesofthemonthof Ramadan and now, tothe dismay of Baha’-ad-Din, he was beginning topayoffhisdebt toreligionby fasting on uncanonical

days.Itseemsobviousthathefearedthathemightdiebefore he had completedhisreligiousduties.Yethisadvisers raised practicalobjections against makingthepilgrimageat thistime.Their chief fear was thatthe peace with theChristians was not firmenough to guarantee thenew territories and that ifSaladin were to leave atthis moment, even for the

fewmonthsneededfor thejourney to Mecca, theenemymightmountanewattack. They urged him tomakea tourof the frontierfortresses.Theirfearswereno doubt exaggerated.After a year and a half ofintensive campaigningunder the dynamicleadershipofRichardIandreinforced by Europeanarmies, the Christians hadfailed to win back

Jerusalem and had beenheld to a narrow coastalstrip.TheprinceofAntiochwasfriendlytoSaladinandthe armies of the kingdomwere in no position tolaunch a new offensive.Nevertheless, the Muslimhigh command had seentoo many instances ofemirs reluctant to fight tobe confident of theirresolution if thecommander-in-chief

withdrew.On 14 October he

marched out of Jerusalemon the road to Nablus.There he inspected thefortifications and on themorning of Saturday the16th he held court,rendering justice anddistributing largesse. Heheard many complaintsagainst the governor al-Mashtub and fixed a datefor a full hearing. It was

one of the most seriouscriticismsofSaladin’s rulethathewastooindulgenttothe faults of his officials.Perhaps with the greatgoalsofthereligiouswaratlastachievedheplannedtotake a firmer hand in thegovernment of his nowmassive empire. Hecontinued his northwardmarch toBaisan,whereheagain made a thoroughinspection of the fortress,

which was now standingempty. He concluded thatthe place should be putback into commission andthoroughly repaired, andthen went on to examinethe nearby stronghold ofKaukab, formerly Belvoir.After examining itsdefencesSaladindecideditshould be razed to theground, being too close toBaisan for the practicalpurposes of Muslim

defence and a standinginvitation to theChristiansto recapture as a counter-fortress.On the evening of

Tuesday, 19 October, hearrivedatTiberiasjustasastorm was beginning toblowup.Thatnightandthefollowing day torrentialrainsweptdownoncentralGalilee, churning up theroads and swelling therivers. But Saladin

continued his tour ofinspection with thefortressesbetweenTiberiasand Beirut, which hereached at the end of themonth. There, on 1November, heheld a greatreception for the Christianprince of Antioch,Bohemond, called theStammerer. Saladin’sconquests had isolated hissmall state from thekingdom, and the Third

Crusade had not restoredthe status quo. Bohemondwas lookingforadealandleftwithquiteafavourableone. In exchange forhomageandtherecognitionof Saladin’s overlordshiphewasinvestedwitharobeof honour and grantedlands in the plain ofAntioch to the value of15,000goldpieces.Armedwith this satisfactoryarrangementhereturned to

his capital, while SaladinproceededtoDamascus.On 4 November, after

four years of absence, heentered his capital toscenes of tumultuousenthusiasm.Itwasafittingculmination to hisexhausting, at timesdangerous, yet ultimatelytriumphant campaigning inthe cause of Islam. Thetimewas long overdue fora rest and during the

ensuing weeks he devotedhimself to hunting thegazelle in the countryround the town with hisbrother al-Adil and hissons. Between whiles herelaxed with his family inthesummerpavilionsofhispalace. One day, when hewas playing with afavourite amonghisyoungsons, a Frankish embassywas shown into hispresence. When the little

boy saw the strangefigures, with their close-shaven chins, close-cropped hair and oddclothes, he clung to hisfather and began crying.The great man, no doubtmore than a little irritatedat having his privacyencroachedon in thisway,dismissed the visitors towait until he was ready tolisten to their business.Then, turning to his

secretary, he asked him toorder something to eat.‘Speaking in his usualkindlyway,hesaid:“Itisabusy day. Bring uswhateveryouhaveready.”’Such gentle, well-

manneredconsiderationforsubordinates and servantswas, to many observersused to the arrogance andviolence of petty despots,oneofthemostremarkabletraits of a remarkable

character. Open access tothe ruler, an honouredtradition at some Muslimcourts to this day, wassomething that Saladininsisted on wheneverpossible, and during theseaudiences the cushion hewas sitting on wasunceremoniously trampledunderfoot by the jostlingpetitioners. Evenunimportantcourtierscouldexpect a civil response at

almostanytimeofday.Ashe was preparing for hissiestaoneafternoon,anoldmamluk, ‘whom he muchesteemed’, came into thetent with a petition onbehalf of religiousenthusiasts serving asvolunteers in the army.Saladin, genuinelyexhausted after a hardmorning’swork, asked theold man, who had pushedpassedtheattendants,tolet

him look into the matterlater. ‘Instead, he held itright up to the king’s eyesso that he could read it.’Finding himself sounceremoniously cornered,the greatest lord in Islamwryly agreed to thepetition,ifonlytogetridofthepetitioner,butobservedhe could not sign theauthorisationuntilafterhisrest when his secretarycamewith the ink.But the

old mamluk, who wasobviously used to theevasions of the great,pointed out that there wasan inkstand on a tablebehind Saladin’s couch.‘By God, he is right,’sighed the king, andreached for the inkstand.The fact that he did thishimself,withoutcallingouta servant, was ‘a sign ofgreat benignity’ to theadmiringBaha’-ad-Din.

Wedonothavetorelyonthe eulogies of Saladin’sadmirers. In summing uphiscareer,Ibn-al-Athir,thepro-Zengid Turkishchronicler,wrote: ‘Hewasa generous man, sweetnatured, a man of goodcharacter, humble andaccepting patiently thingswhich displeased him,though perhaps tooinclined to overlook thefaults of his lieutenants.’

Oneevening, at adrinkingbout with his mamluks, abootwasthrownduringthehorse-play and nearly hitSaladin; instead ofdisciplining the offender,he turned to the courtiernext tohimandopenedupaconversation.Onanotheroccasion, when he wasrecovering froman illness,his servants drew his bathtoo hot. Saladin called forcoldwaterandthebathboy

tripped and splashed theking; Saladin called formoreandthistimethemanstumbledanddepositedthewhole jugful on him.Despite the shock to hisweakened system Saladinmerely commented: ‘Mydear fellow, if you aim tokill me, give me duewarning.’ And that, addedIbn-al-Athir, was his onlyobservationontheincident.During the weeks of

relaxationSaladinmadehisvow to make hispilgrimage the followingyear. In February thepilgrims made their returnto Damascus, and on the20th Saladin and hisentouragewentouttomeetthemon the road: itwas amagnificent sight and thepeopleofthecitycameoutto greet the king. Thewinter rains lashing downdid little to dampen the

enthusiasmof theoccasionand Saladin repressed theshiversofhisbody,buthewasalreadycontractingthechill that was to kill him.The weather was so badthattheroadshadhadtobecleared of the floodwater,yetSaladinforgottoputonthe padded tunicwhich healways wore out riding.Baha’-ad-Din hurried aftertoremindhim.‘Heseemedlikeamanwakingoutofa

dream and asked for thegarment, but themaster ofthewardrobecouldnotfindit.’Later itwas tobe seenas an omen that the kingshould ask for somethingthat he never used to bewithout and could not getit.When theyhadreturnedto the place that Fridayeveninghecomplainedofagreatweariness and beforemidnightwasprostratedbyanattackofbiliousfever.

Thenextmorninghewasstill desperately weak andthe feverwas still on him.He complained of adisturbed night but chattedeasilywithhis son,Baha’-ad-Din and al-Fadil untilmid-day.Hewasunabletocome in to lunch and hissonal-Afdaltooktheplaceof honour at the table. Tomanythesightofthesoninthefather’splaceseemedasadomen.Onthesixthday

of the illness, his anxiouscouncillors sat him up,supporting his back withcushions and calling forwarm water for him todrink after taking hismedicine. ‘He found thewater too hot so a secondcup was brought; this hefound too cold but did notget angry or start ranting.Hesimplysaid:“DearGod,can no one produce waterat the right temperature?”

At this the qadi and I lefttheroomweepinghottears,and the qadi said to me:“What a spirit Islam isabouttolose.ByGod.Anyother man would havethrownthecupattheman’shead”.’It became clear that he

wasfailingrapidly.On theninth day he lostconsciousness and couldnot take his medicine. Bythis time the length of the

illness was beginning tocausealarminthecity.Thedeath of a potentate wastoo often followed byrioting while the palacefactions fought for thesuccession, and somemerchants began clearingtheir market stalls. Baha’-ad-Din and al-Fadil foundthat their comings andgoings from the palacewere anxiously observedbythecrowdswhotriedto

tellfromtheexpressionsontheir faces how the king’sillness was progressing.‘On the tenth day he wasable to take a little barleywaterand thenewscausedpublic rejoicing. But thefollowingmorningweweretoldthattheviolenceofhisthirst was beyond beliefandhadcausedthedoctorstoabandonhope.’Whenal-Afdalwas informed of hisfather’s condition he

hurriedly convened thechief officers andcouncillors and orderedthem to make the oath ofloyalty to himself.Hewasan ambitious young man,but the precaution wasabsolutely necessary andcontributed to the smoothtransferofpower.Hebreathedhis last after

the hour of the morningprayer on 4 March 1193.He was in his fifty-fifth

year. ‘The qadi came intohisroomjustafterdawnatthe precise moment of hisdeath,’ Baha’-ad-Dincontinues his account;‘when I arrived he hadalready passed into thebosom of divine grace.’When the divine who wasreading the Koran at thebedsidereachedthewords:‘“ThereisnootherGodbuthe,andinhimismytrust,”he smiled, his face was

illumined, and he gave uphisspirittohislord.’The death caused such

genuinedisplaysofgriefinDamascus that thephysician Abd-al-Latifcommented that it was, tohis knowledge, the onlytimeakinghadbeen trulymournedbyhis people. ‘Itwasawearyday;everyonewas so deep in his owngrief and sorrow that hecould pay attention to no

one else…. His sons wentout among the peoplecrying out for pity… andsoitwentonuntilafterthemid-day prayer. Then weoccupied ourselves withwashing his body andclothing it in the shroud;but we had to resort toborrowing – even to thestraw. After the mid-dayprayerhewascarriedoutinacoffindrapedsimplywitha length of material

procured, like the othermaterialsneeded to shroudhim, by al-Fadil. Men’sgrief overcame them anddistracted them even fromtheprayerrecitedoverhimby men clothed insackcloth. Then the bodywas carried back to thepalaceinthegardenwherehe had lain during hisillness and was buried inthe west pavilion. He waslaid in his tomb about the

hourofeveningprayer.’Saladin’spenurywhenhe

died, so extreme that hisfriends had to borrow tobury him, was attested byhostile as well as friendlycommentators, and allrecognised that it was theresult of a life ofunparalleled generosity.Ibn-al-Athir recorded thatwhenhediedheleftonlyasingle Tyrian dinar andforty pieces of silver. He

concluded his résumé ofthegreatmanwhomhehadso often criticised with awarmth which, more thananything written by hisfriends, demonstrates thedeep impression thismagnanimouschampionofIslam made on all hiscontemporaries.‘Inaword,he was the marvel of histime, a man rich in finequalitiesmarkedbyhisfineactions and by the great

campaigns he led againsttheInfidel,ashisconquestsproved.’‘God sanctify his spirit

andilluminehissepulchre.’

EpilogueIn 1976, the obviousparallel to draw betweenthe world of Saladin andthe contemporary worldwas that between thekingdom of Jerusalembrought low by Saladinaftersome90yearsandtheState of Israel, then some28(nowsome60)years in

existence. To Arabs, bothwereintruders,bothseenasagents of ‘Western’interests. For example, thefirst reaction of the baronsof the kingdom on thedeath of Baldwin IV inMarch 1185 was to referthematterofthesuccessionto the monarchs of theWest. The kingdom’schampion warriors, theKnights Templar andKnights Hospitaller, were

largely funded bybenefactors from all overWestern EuropeanChristendom.In the Muslim world,

religious reformers urgingaction were often highlycriticalofthoserulerstheyconsideredeithercorruptorirreligious or collaborativewith the Frankish enemy.In the twenty-first century,the comparison with suchmodern organisations as

the Muslim Brotherhoodand their attitude toWesternising Islamicgovernments is thought-provoking.Thecomparisonof Usama bin Laden withSinan ‘The Old Man ofMountain’andheadof theAssassins would seem, toWestern eyes, obvious:bothoperatingfromremotemountain retreats, bothcredited with immenseinfluence,andboththought

to command numbers offanatical followers. As toSaladin, an honourableman of high ambition butalso of religious principleand military achievement,generally respected by hisenemiesashewaslovedbyhis friends, no candidatespringstomindinourownday on either side of thereligious divide. But then,Saladinwasremarkable.

NotesandSources

IntroductionThe principal Arabicauthority for the Muslimworld empire fromSamarkand to Cordoba inthe timeofSaladin is Ibn-al-Athir (1160–1233) of

Mosul,authoroftheKamilat Tawarikh, i.e. ‘ThePerfect [or Complete]History’. Also sometimesknown as his WorldHistory, it was well inadvance, in scope anddetail, of his Latincontemporaries.Hewasaneyewitness of manyepisodes and is alsoadmired for the simpleelegance of his style. Thearticle by Ashtor-Strauss

on Jews at the time ofSaladin, cited in thebibliography,isstilluseful.In general, despite therestrictionsreintroducedbySaladin, Jews preferredIslamic regimes to theLatin Catholic kingdom ofJerusalem. Many left forEgypt. Alexandria had apopulation of some 3,000Jews, Cairo of 2,000,served by two synagoguesand a rabbi at the head of

thecommunity.

ChapterIJerusalemIbn-al-Athir remains ourchief companion, but wealso meet the anthologistAbu Shama of Damascus(1203–67), of the nextgeneration. His Kitab ar-Raudatain, ‘Book of theTwoGardens’ (that is, thetwo dynasties of Nur ad-DinandSaladin),drawson

earlierwriterssuchasImadad-Din of Isfahan (1125–1201) who wassuccessively secretary toNur ad-din and Saladin,and whose seven-volumehistory of Saladin’s times,al-Barqal-Shami,wasusedby severalwriters, notablyAbu Shama, though theoriginal text has notsurvived. Abu alsoexcerptedShamaofImad’sal-Fathal-qussifil-fathal-

qudsi, roughly ‘AnEloquent Account of theFall of Jerusalem’, whilegreatly simplifying theconvoluted style.He relieson Imad for informationnot to be found elsewhere.We owe the account ofSaladin’s generosity atJerusalem to the Latinsource known as ‘Ernoul’,edited as Chroniqued’Ernoul et de Bernard leTrésorier by L. de Mas-

Latrie(Paris,1971;seealsothe bibliography underMorgan).

Chapter2AcrosstheBattleLinesOver the decades,Europeans’ attitudestowardsthemselvesaswellas to the Muslim worldcouldbemixed–or in thecase of the Würzburgannalistdownrightcynical.But, even at the time, a

committed crusadehistorian like the monkFulcher of Chartres, whodied aged about 60 atJerusalem circa 1125,having settled there in theyearofitscapture,couldbereasonably objective. HisGesta FrancorumIherusalemperegrinantium(found as HistoriaHierosolymitana inR.H.Cr.Occ. III) is areliable and reasonably

objective account of theearly years of the FirstCrusade.

Chapter3TheQuadrilateralofPowerAfter his ‘Perfect History’the best-known work byIbn al-Athir was ‘TheHistory of the Atabegs ofMosul’. Often verging onthepanegyricandcertainly

less objective than hisprincipal work, for pageafter page it rings to thetriumphofZengi’s captureof Edessa. A selection inFrench translation will befoundinR.H.Cr.Or.VolIIpartii.

Chapter4Nur-ad-DinandthePropagandaoftheJihad

Thischapter is indebted toL’Islam et la Croisade byEmmanuel Sivan. It seemsthat Saladin modelledhimself to some degree onNur-ad-Din’scultivationofa public reputation forpiety, though seen fromEgypt his motivationseemedmorelikeambitionthan religion. Moreover,though the lord of Aleppomight have dealings withthe Franks, his

propagandistsinDamascusrepresented the peoplethere as yearning for hisleadershiptotheHolyWar,while the prince of theircity negotiated with theChristians. Damascus’shistorian, Ibn-al-Qalanisi(1073–1160), who heldvarious posts in the city,wasaneyewitnessofmuchhe described and wasreasonably objective.Translated extracts by

H.A.R. Gibb appeared asThe Damascus Chronicleof the Crusades (London,1932).ThebasicsourceforthehistoryofAleppoisthe‘ta’rikh Halab’ of Kamal-ad-Din ibn al-’Adim(1192–1262), a native ofthecity.

Chapter5TheFamilyofAiyubInterestingly, to theChristianwriterWilliamof

Tyre (1130–85) Shirkuhseemed ‘a hard-workingman, avid of glory’. Bornin Syria but educated inEurope, and archbishop ofTyre from 1175, William,who had good Arabic aswellasLatinandGreek,isnoted for his scholarlyHistoria rerum in partibustransmarinis gestarum,‘History of things doneoversea’. In addition toIbn-al-Athir’s ‘Atabegs’

and Abu Shama’s ‘TwoGardens’ this chapter usesthebiographyofSaladinbyhissecretary,Baha’-ad-DinIbn Shaddad (1145–1234).A lucid narrative(translated in R.H.Cr.Or.,1884) based on personalobservation, it gives thebest portrait we have ofSaladin from an admiringbut not sycophanticMuslimpointofview,anda vivid account of his

times.

Chapter6VizirofEgyptThe rivalries between theShia and SunnicommunitiesofIslamwereone reason why SunniBaghdad urged Saladin tosuppress theShiacaliphateat Cairo; the rivalries ofrace compounded thedisunity of the Islamicstates throughout the

period. Ibn-al-Athir’s‘Atabegs’ gives the detailsof Shirkuh’s expedition toEgypt and Saladin’s ownaccount of his personalreluctance to go on thesecond Egyptianexpedition. He and Baha’-ad-Din give the tellinginsights into the Aiyubidfamily discussions overtheir deportment towardsNur-ad-Din, and thedebateson the same in the

councils of hiscommandersandemirs.A decisive moment in

Saladin’s career was thesuppressionoftherebellionof the Nubian guards inJuly–August 1169.According to Imad-ad-Dinthe Fatimid caliphs’Nubian regiments hadtraditionally been a causeof trouble forvizirs: in theunrest during Saladin’stakeover of power they

were slipping out ofcontrol.Accounts differ asto the exact sequence ofevents in theuprising.Therebel forces took uppositioninthegreatsquarebetween the caliph’s Eastand West palaces.Saladin’s brother TuranShah was in command ofloyal troops there whileSaladin 192 Saladinhimselfandthemainforcewere in the Vizir’s Palace

quarter.TheNubianswereforced down the mainstreettowardsthegateBabZuwaila and abandonedtheir action on news thattheirquartersatMansuriyawere aflame. Either theywere given quarter torescue their families (asArabhistoriansreported)orthey were harried as theyfled. In the next daysthousands crossed theNilefor Giza but were hunted

downandmassacred.

Chapter7TheCriticalYearsAsinChapter4,Kamal-ad-Din’s ‘History’ isimportant for events inAleppo, Ibn al- Athir forgeneral history and eventsrelating to Mosul. Amongsecondary sourcesEmmanuel Sivan’s workwas most helpful. And asinmanypartsofthebookI

turned to AndrewEhrenkreutz’sbiographyofSaladin here, for exampleregarding the sultan’sdealings with the Aleppanregime after Nur-ad-Din’sdeath.

Chapter8TriumphintheNorthThanks to a decade ofexcavations on the site,described on the VadumJacob Research Project

website, under RonnieEllenblum, ShmulickMarco and Amotz Agnon,the dimensions of thevanished castle at Jacob’sFord and the strategicconsequences of itsdestruction by Saladin’sforces in 1179 were givennew importance in theearly2000s.Archaeologistswere able to trace theconstruction sequence ofthe site – existing barely

eleven months from theinitiation of the works inOctober1178totherazingof the structure thefollowing September.Saladin’s letters to thecaliph at the time of hisdifficultieswithMosul arefound in Abu Shama. The‘Travels’ of theAndalusian-born IbnJubayr(alsoJubair)(1145–1217),beinganaccountofhis pilgrimage to Mecca

1183–85, was translatedinto English by R.J.C.Broadhurst in 1952. Thestoryofthepresentationofafuller’sbowltoImad-ad-Din, Aleppo’s governor,comesinKamal-ad-Din.

Chapter9DynastandHeroI foundWilliam of Tyre’scomment on the Christianreaction to the fall ofAleppo and much else in

René Grousset’s Histoiredes Croisades et duroyaume franc deJérusalem of the 1930s.This magnum opus wasbasictosubsequentEnglishgeneral histories of thecrusades. The story ofSaladin’s chivalrousconduct at the siege of al-Karak comes from theLatin source known asErnoul. That of al-Adil,Saladin’s brother,

consulting with his youngnephews beforeaccompanying them toEgypt, comes fromBaha’-ad-Din,whorecordsthathehaditfromal-Adilhimself.

Chapter10Oh!SweetVictoryIn this chapter, Ibn-al-Athir’s ‘World History’along with Imad-ad-Din’sbiography of Saladin, andquotations from it in Abu

Shama, are importantsources for our knowledgeof events. Charles M.Brand’s Speculum articleof 1962 has still valuableinsights on Saladin’srelations with theByzantineempireandtheirjoint opposition to theThirdCrusadeandisdrawnonbothhereandinChapter11. J. Prawer’s CrusaderInstitutions (1980) has aninteresting account of the

BattleofHattin.Thedefeatof the Franks at Hattinsmashed the kingdom’slogistical system.Essentially, the Frankishpresence in ‘Outremer’comprised garrisonsettlements, colonies ineffect, that depended fortheir survival on relativelysmall numbers of heavilyarmoured mounted men atarms, operating fromscattered fortified bases.

Even Notes and Sources193 small units of suchtroops could be effectiveagainst large forces inlimited engagements. Ifbroughttogetherinasingleforcetheyhadtowinoratleast retire in good order;Hattin removed westerncapability from militarycalculations in the regionforayear.

Chapter11The

ThreatfromtheNorthWe know of Henry II’sletters from the chronicleof Ralph (Radulfus) deDiceto, the dean of StPaul’s(ed.WilliamStubbs,London, 1876). The Latinchroniclers’ suspicions ofByzantium are discussedby Charles Brand.Throughout thenegotiations Saladin took

care for the status andpreservation of Islam atConstantinople and themosque there. Baha’-ad-Dindescribedthearrivalofthe imam atConstantinople; he alsotells us the emperor Isaacgrumbled that the onlyresultofhisfriendshipwithSaladin seemed to havebeen to bring down thehatred of the Franks uponhis empire. I take the

account of FrederickBarbarossa’sdeathand thereaction to it of the emirfromIbn-al-Athir,whoalsorecorded Saladin’s debatewith his emirs about theChristiansinAcre.It is worth noting that

Barbarossa had appointedSt George’s Day 1189 asthe launch date of hiscrusade. In September1191, passing throughLydda,homeof thesaint’s

cultsincethesixthcentury,Saladin ordered thedestruction of the saint’schurchthere.

Chapter12Acre,theCityforwhichtheWorldContendedThe account of the battlegames before Acre comesfromBaha’-ad-Din,asdoesthe criticism of the emirs

for not pressing theadvantage before theFranks could consolidatetheirposition.Thischapterdraws heavily on him andon Ibn-al-Athir in his‘WorldHistory’.Morethanonce, they indicate thatSaladin was thwarted ofsuccess because of lack ofsupport and cooperationfrom his emirs. Thehardships of the ChristianforcesintheThirdCrusade

are detailed in theItinerarium peregrinorumetGestaRegisRicardi (ed.William Stubbs, London,1864). Meaning literally‘The travel record of thepilgrims and the deeds ofKingRichard’, its title isareminder thatcontemporaries never usedthe term ‘Crusade’. Forthemthesecampaignswerearmed pilgrimages to theHoly City; the Muslims

saw their campaigns asjihad or Holy War torecover lands onceconqueredfortheFaith.

Chapter13SaracensandCrusadersAmost vivid guide to lifein the overseas territoriesof the expatriate Franks ofthetwelfthcenturyistobefound in the

autobiographical work ofUsama ibn Mundiq, emirofShaizar,wholivedfrom1095to1188.CalledKitabal-I’tibaror‘TheBookofInstruction’, it survives inan incomplete manuscriptin the library of theEscorial, Madrid. Baha’-ad-Din, Ibn-al-Athir andAbuShamaare,ofcourse,important to the narrative,and among secondarysources the work of the

FrenchscholarsEmmanuelSivan and AlbertChampdor have beenuseful. For theAssassins IhavedrawnontheworkofBernardLewis.

Chapter14TheDeathofaHeroFor the fascinatingaudience Saladin gave toBishop Hubert Walter ofSalisbury, we have thetestimony of the author of

the Itinerarium … RegisRicardi, and for Saladin’sreception of Bohemond ofAntioch I have followedtheaccount in194SaladinGrousset. But the bulk ofthis chapter relies onBaha’-ad-Din’s account ofSaladin’slastdays.His reputation has not

passed down to posterityunchallenged.Thedeedsofanother hero of Islam,Baybars the Mamluk

Sultan of Egypt whovanquished both theChristians and Mongols,are still recited in thepopular coffee houses ofEgypt.YetitwasthenameofSaladinthatwasinvokedwhen President GamalAbdelNasserunitedEgyptandSyriaintheshort-livedUnitedArabRepublic,andbefore his overthrow in2003 Iraq’s deposeddictator Saddam Hussein

boasted that he, likeSaladin, was born in thecityofTakrit(Tikrit).

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Glossary

adab–

thefullrangeofaccomplishments,fromsomeknowledgeofmathematicsandpoetrytotheartsofconversationandgenealogy,expectedofan

Arabgentleman.

A.H.–

AnnoHegirae,thelatintermforthedatingofthelunaryearsoftheMuslimEraoftheHegira(alsoHejira).ThetermreferstotheProphet’swithdrawalfromMeccatoMedinaon16July

A.D.622.

al-Jazirah–

fromtheArabicwordfor‘island’,theregionlyingwithinupperIraqandsouth-easternTurkeybetweentheUpperEuphratesandTigrisrivers–i.e.UpperMesopotamia.arulerofacity,

atabeg–

fromtheTurkishwordfor‘atutor’,i.e.originallytheregentforaminor,thenominalruler.

Hajj–

theannualpilgrimagetoMecca,enjoinedonallpiousMuslims.aleaderofthe

imam–

Muslimcommunity,insomecontextsthecaliphhimself.IntheShiatraditiontheimamsareleadersofspecialsanctityandabsolutemoralandreligiousauthoritywhohaveappearedatsuccessiveepochsinhistory.

iqta–

apaymentinlandrevenues,tobederivedbytheholder(mukta)fromestates,villagesortownsassignedtohimforthepurpose.asermon.ForthecultivatedMuslimthekhutbawasanexerciseinhigh

khutba–

poeticliteraryart,followedavidlysothatalistenermightbeabletorepeatpassagesverbatim.Skilledpractitionersweremuchadmired.Itwasanorationthatmighthavepoliticalaswellasreligioussignificance.

mamlukormameluke–

a(usuallyTurkish)soldierofslaveorigins.SaladinfollowedconventionbyrecruitingslavecorpsinhisarmiesinEgypt.In1250aleaderofoneofthesecorps200Saladinseizedpower,establishingtheMamlukdynasty

thatwastoruleEgyptforthenext250years.

mihrab–

aprayernicheinthewallofamosquethatfacesinthedirectionofMecca,theqibla;themihrabthusindicatestheqibla.

minbar–thepulpitfromwhichthekhutba

isdelivered.

muezzin–

theofficialofamosquewhodeclaimsthecalltoprayerfromtheminaret.

mulla,mullah–

derivingfromanArabicword(mawlah)denoting‘lord’or‘master’,mullacamebeusedasatermofrespect

forareligiousteacher.

qadi–

ajudgeinthetraditionoftheshari’ahlaw;hecametobeanadministratorofpiousbequestsoraguardianofminorsandothervulnerablepeoplesuchaswidows.thedirectionto

qibla–befacedbytheFaithfulforprayer,indicatedinamosquebythemihrab.

razzia–

araidingcampaign(originalArabicghazia,meaning‘war’).

rais–theseniorofficialofatownadministration.

sultan–

originallywiththemeaningofmoralorreligiousauthorityassuch,fromtheeleventhcenturyitwasusedasthetitleofaruler.

tchogandar–

thepolomaster,animportantcourtofficial.Thewordderivesfromtchogan,

‘ball’.

ummah–

thereligiouspoliticalcommunityofIslaminwhichthepoweroftheFaithisvestedandtheconsensusofwhoseopinionsistheultimateguidetoright-doing.An

unpopularorcorruptrulerorregimemaybeconsideredaarasiticintermediaryontheummah.

zarf–

thesenseofstyle,eleganceandrefinementthatshouldunderlieagentleman’seducation.