SALADIN IN EGYPT

THE

MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN PEOPLES, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES, 400-1453

EDITORS

MICHAEL \ 'VHITBY (\'Varwick) PAUL M AGDALINO, H UGH KENNEDY (St. Andrews)

D AVID ABULAFIA (Cambridge) BENJAMIN ARBEL (Tel Aviv)

M ARK M EYERSON (Nolre Dame)

VOLUME 21

SALADIN IN EGYPT

BY

YAACOV LEV

BRlLL LEIDEN . BOSTON· KOLN

1999

This book is printed on acid-rree paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lev, Yaacov. Saladin in Egypt I by Yaacov Lev.

p. em. ( rile medieval Mediterranean, ISSN 0928- 5520 ; v. 21 )

Includes bibliographical rererences (p. ISBN 9004 112219 (alk. paper)

) and index.

I. Saladin, Sultan or Egypt and Syria, 1137-1193. 2. Egypt-- History-Saladin, 1171-1193. I. Title. II. Series. D'f 95.8. L48 1998 962'.02'092 dc21 98- 33830

e lP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Lev, Yaacov: Saladin in Egypt I by Yaacov Lev. - Leiden ; Boston; K61n : Brill, 1998

(lne medic:vaJ Mediterranean; Vol. 21 ) ISBN 9()-()+- 1 1221 ~9

ISSN 0928·5520 ISBN 90 04112219

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CONTENTS

List of Abbreva tio ns ..... . ... .. ........ . ........... . Acknowledgements ............... . ... . ... .. .... . .. . Introduction ..................................... .

a. Questions and the Sources ..................... . b. The Outlines of Political History, 1 ]69-1174 ...... .

Chapter One: The Sources .......................... . I. Selling the Stage: The Twelfth Century .......... .

a. Cultural and Religious Trends ................ . b. Political Life ............................•..

2. Saladin 's HislOrians ................ . .... . ..... . a. Qadi al-Fadil .............................. . b. ' iinad ai-Din .............................. . c. Ibn Shaddad .............. . .......... . d. Ibn a l-Athir e. Ibn Abi Tayy and Abu Sham a ................ . f. Maqrizi ................................... .

3. Textual Problems: Tendentious and Conflicting Versions ..................................... . a. The Campaign of 11 67 ..................... . b. The Killing of Shawar ................ . ..... . c. The Nomination of Saladin as Vizier ......... . d . The Battl e of the Blacks .............. . .... . . e. The Proclamatio n of Abbasid Suzerainty

VII

IX

XI

XI

XII

10 14 14 26 33 36 4 I 43

45 45 46 49 49 50

Chapter Two: Saladin in Egypt. 11 69-1 174 . . . . . . . . . .. .. 53 1. Saladin's Rise to Power ................ . ... . . ... 53

a. The Sick Man on the Ni le. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 53 b. The Killing of Shawar ....................... 61 c. The Betrayal of the Fatimid State ............. 66 d. The Battle of the Blacks ............ . .... .. .. 8 ] e. The Demise of the Fatimid State. . . . . . . . . . 84 f. The Conspiracy of I 174 ...................... . 86

2. Expansionism and the Search for Legitimacy ...... 94 a. The Rupture with Nur aI-Din . . ............... 94 b . Yemen and Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97

VI CONTENTS

c. Syria........................... . ......... IOl d. In Search of Legitimacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 105

Chapter Three: The Consolidation of Saladin's Rule. . . 108 I . The Dismemberment of the Fatimid State ........ 108

a. T he Appropriatio n of Urban Properties. . . . . .. 108 h. Investments in the Urban Economy .......... J 13 c. The Acquis ition of Agricultural Land. .. . . . . .. 11 5

2. Salad in 's Religious Policy ...................... 11 6 a. Ismai li sm in Fatimid Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. 11 6 b. The ReSLOration of Sunni Isla m ......•. . • . . .. J 24 c. Taxation and Religion. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. 132 d. The Impact of Saladin's Pol icies ....•. . ...... 136

Chapter Four: The Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 141 a. The Size and Military Composition o f the Army .. 141 b. The Ethnic Composition of the Army ........... 150 c. T he Administration of the Army. . . . . . .. . . . . . ... 158

Chapter Five: The Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16 1 a. T he Fatimid Naval Inheritance ................. 161 b. Saladin and the Egyptian Mediterranean Towns .. 163 c. The Creation of the Office of the Navy. . .. . . . . .. 166 d. Saladin's Navy in Combat. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 168 e. Saladin 's Navy and the Siege of Acre............ 172 f. The Wider Context of Saladin's Naval Activity.... 175

Chapter Six: The Non-M uslim Communities ... . . . . . . . 185 a. Fatimid Realities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 185 b. Oppression and Persecutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 187 c. The Impact of Saladin's Policies........... . .... 190

Conclusions .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .. 194

Bibliography ....•........ • .... • ............ . •.... 199

Index ................................. . ... . •.... 209

AAS Abu Shama

(Beirut) AI BED BIFAO BSOAS Crwadm and

MII.dims £,1.2. I:.gypl mid Syria

JESHO The jihad and

its Time

l}MES JAOS JARCE jNES JRAS JSM JSS Maritime Asptr.1s

of Migration Medieval Historical

Writings MAl MW REI S I War and Society

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Asian and A/neall Studies (H aira) Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatayn fi AltMar af-Dawlal(l)'II. (Heirul . o. d .), 2 vols Annahs hlam%giqllu Bulltlin des Eilides Oritmtaks Bulldin dt {'/nsli/1I1 Francais J'Archiologit GriU/lale Bulle/in of the School of Oriental (!lId A/neall S/lUlits Crusadns and Muslims in T~lflh-&lIl ury Syria, (cd) M. Shalzmiller (I..eiden, 1993) Encyclopaedia of biOll/, 2nd Edilion I:.gypl arid Syria in the Falimid, Ayyubid and Ma1llluk Ears, (cds) U. Ve rm eule n ;wc! D. De Smet (Lcuven, 1995)

jOllrrwl oj lilt Economic and Social History of lilt Orient The Jihad Gild its Time. Dedicated to And rew Stefan EhrenkrclILZ, (cds) H. D;yani-Shakeel and R. A. Messier (An n Arbor, 1991 ) International Journal of Middk f."'aJt Studies jOllnwl oJ the American Oriental Society journal of the American !usearch Center in Eg)'pt journal of Near Em/enl Studies jOllnwl of the ROJ'al Asiatic Society jenuakm Studies in Arabic and Islam journal of Semitic Studies Maritime Aspects of Migration, (cd ) K.. Friedland (Wien , 1989)

Medieval Historical Writings in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, (cd ) D. O. Morgan (London, 1982) The Mariner 's Mirror The Muslim World RevIU des Etudes /slarniques Studia Is/arnica War (md Socuty in the Eas/c7i MrditnTanean. 7th-151h Centu­M, (cd) Y. Lev (Leiden. 1997)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of my research and preparing this book I incurred debts of gratitude to many individuals and institutions. My thanks go first to Anne-Marie Edde of Paris, who read the elllire manu­script and made many helpful com ments and suggestions. John H. Pryor of Sydney read two early versions of the chapter on navy and cOnLributed much to its content. This chapter was also read by Ruthi Geru.vagen of Haifa, who made valuable suggestions and generously shared with me her vast knowledge of Acre during a tollr of the city. John France of Swansea read th e chapter on army and offered many useful comments. Finaiy. I wish to thank Julian Deahl of Brill, who read the entire text and corrected my English. Needless to say that the responsibility for the book's content is sole ly mine.

I am also pleased to acknowledge the generous assistance of the lib rarians and staff of the following institutions: the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Library of th e School of Oriental and Afri­can Studies, London; the Oriental Reading Room, the J ewish National and University Library, Jemsalem and Bar-Ilan Un iver­sity Library.

INTRODUCTION

a) Questions and the SQurces

The main aim of thi s book is to discuss the waning ofth e Fa timid sta le and to examine Saladin 's po licies in Egypt, which created a new po litical and social o rde r. At the beginning, it seemed a simple and straightforward malle r , the sources abundam and free ly avail· able. However, progress was hampe red by problems with the source ma te rial. It became clear that mos t or o ur data o n Saladin 's ad­ministrative , fiscal , military and naval policies in Egypt arc derived fro m a single source: th e lost contem po rary chro nicle by Qadi a l­Fad il. O nly Saladin 's re ligio us polic ies a rc we ll a ttested to by a va ri e ly of th e sou rces due to the rich la te medieval biographical li te ratu re. I Other sou rces contempo rary with Saladin do p rovide in formatio n o n his inte rna l policies , b ut th e data are bese t by immense contradictio ns. The d iffi culti es with the sources are nOt a new problem . A number of scholars h ave d evoted g reat effort in th e a ttempt to understand a nd cla rify these problems, and my own work relies much o n th e ir Iindings.2

The content of th e book is shaped by th e need to re~examine the sources and evenLS thalled to Saladin 's rise to power in Egypt. It must be said tha t re~examination of the sources is frustra ting and occasionally quite futil e. Saladin is po rtrayed in diametri ca lly op posed ways by his admi rers and some of his c riti cs, nOlably Ibn al~Athi r. Our ability to pene trate beyond these contradictory ac~ counLS is se rio usly hampered by o ur limi ted understanding o f the system o f po litical and moral va lues th a t guided the men of the tvre Lfth century. Therefore, our abili ty to d iscern the hidden motives behind the conflicting presenta tio ns of Saladin is restri cted. Chapter One renec LS and d eals with these diffi culti es.

But the situa tio n is no t a ltogether ho peless. T he obvio lls way out o f such dit-li culti es wi th connicting and contradictory d a ta is to employ sou rces which d o not be long to the tWO o pposing his-

I Th is aspect has been deall with in great detai l by G. Lli Vicre Leiser, see bibliography.

2 See the works or H. A. R. Gibb, P. M. Holt and D. S. Richards listed in the bibliography a nd quoted in Cha pters One and Two.

XII I NTRODUCTION

torical traditions: of Saladin's admirers and his critics. Indeed, on some occasions. such independcm fragments do exist and pro­vide an important corrective to sources biased one way or the other lO Salad in. Most surpri singly some original documents cited in fu ll in the lite rary sources remain neglected. A careful reading of them sheds much fresh light on the events under discussion. These types of sources a re utili zed in Chapter Two. H owever, it is not only a question of sources but also of perspeClive. The second chapter is written from the point of view of Fatimid history. The years 1169-1171 constitute a chapter in Fatimid history as much as they offe r a hislOI), of Saladin's rise to power. When th e events of these years are also approached from the point of view of Fatimid realities a clearer picture of Saladin 's intentions and policies emerges.

T he need to examine and re·examine the sources also looms large when Saladin's internal policies are examined (see Chapler Three). Frequently these policies are prese nted so as to accord with Salad in 's image as a pious and just ruler and devoted war­rior of the Holy War. We must always be aware of the fact that Salad in 's very real achievements-the victory at Hittin and the conquest of Jerusalem-had already been formed into a myth d uri ng his lifetime and this obli terated Saladin's personali ty and deeds . Only on rare occasi9ns is the non-mythical Saladin di s­cernable.

b ) The Outlines oj Political History, 1169-1174

The aim of this subsection is to provide a short account of the political history of the period 1169-1174 which win serve as an unifying te nn of reference for the whole book. T he main even ts that took place in those years are referred to constan tly in subse­quent chapters.

During the .1060's Egypt became a battle ground between Fatimid military leaders, who fought with the help of foreign armies for the post of the vizier. Two regional powers became involved in the internal affairs of Egypt; Nur ai-Din of Damascus and the Crusader Kingdom of J erusalem. From 11 62, Fatimid politics were overshadowed by Shawar's bid for power. In that year, Shawar, the governor of Upper Egypt, established himself in Cairo and

I NTRODUCTION X III

became the stro ng man beh ind th e throne. But his triumph was short-lived; he was driven away from the capital by another con­tender for power , Dirgham . Shawar found refuge in Damascus at the court of Nur ai-Din whom he persuaded to give military back­ing to his attempt to regain power in Egypl. In Apri l 11 64, Shawar, supported by Nu r al-Din's expeditionary force commanded by Shirkuh. moved to Egypt. Shawar's bid for power was crowned with success: with Shirkuh 's help he re-established himself as vizie r. however , he had no intention of keeping his promises to Nur al­Oin . In order to oust Shirkuh from Egypt. Shawar e nlisted the support of Amalric. the King ofJ entsalem. Shawar's gamble proved to be correct beyond all expectations: the Fran ks and Shirkuh dashed indec isively on Egyptian soi l and eventually both parties agreed to leave Egypt (October J 164). For a short period of time, Shawar could enjoy the success of his divisive po licies.

In 11 67, Amalric and Shirkuh at the head of their forces were again in Egypt. This rou nd of fi ghti ng was rich in event. On 19 March 11 67. the Franks and Sh irkuh fought a major but incon­clusive battle known as the Battle of Babayn. In its wake. Shirkuh left Salad in to defend Alexandria while he himself overran Up­per Egypt. For three months, Saladin was besieged in Alexandria by Shawar and the Franks. The siege brought great misery to tJle beleaguered town and its inhabitants, but Saladin's finn stand created a military stale mate which convinced the Franks and Shirkuh to agree to the wi thdrawal from Egypt of both the Cru­saders and Nur al-Din 's forces (Spring 11 67).

By 11 68. the weakness of Egypt also attracted the atten tion of Byzantium . The two Christians powers o f the Eastern Mediterra­nean-Byzantium and the Crusade r Kingdom of J e rusalem­negotiated to combine forces in ajoint military expedition against Egypl. It was an attractive alliance; Byzantium had an important asset to offer- her nava l forces. None theless, Amalrk lau nched his new offensive aga inst Egypt alone. In October 11 68, Shawar alone, with no help from Damascus, was confronted by the third Frankish invasion of Egypt. T he Crusaders stormed and conquered tJle town of Bilbays, and moved against the capilal which com­prised the two cities of Fustat and Cairo. On 12 November, Shawar set Fuslat on fire and alTered vast sums of money to buy off Amalric. Appeals for help from Shawar , or a1-<Adid. the Fa limid Imam himself, reached Da mascus. Nur ai-D in watched the Frankish

XIV I NTRODUCTION

invasion of Egypt with great concern and prepared, on his own initiative, a large force to be dispatched to Egypt. Shirkuh and Saladin found themselves once agai n campaigning in Egypt. Their very arrival to Egypt caused Amalric to retreat Uanuary 11 69).

Following the departure of Amalric, Shawar found himself in a precarious position; he now had to face the victorious Syrian expeditio nary force . This proved to be a task beyond his ab ili ty. On 18 J anuary, he was killed by Shirkuh 's men. The e limination ofShawar paved the way for Shirkuh 's appointment as the Fatimid vizier. However, his term of office was a vcry short onc: he died o n 23 March 11 69. Three days later, Shirkuh was succeeded in the post by his nephew, Saladin. From 26 March , 11 69 till I] September 1171 , Saladin served as Fatimid vizier. !-I e used h is post to stre ngthen his position vis-a-vis al-'Adid. The most important event in the shift of power from al-'Adid to Salad in was the de­st ruction o f the corps of black Fatimid infan try, which comprised the backbo ne of the army and served as the main buttress of the regime (August 11 69). Nonetheless, the final overth row of the Fatimid regime did no t fo llow immediately.

Wars with the Crusad ers and the d efence of the Egyptian Medi­terranean coas t absorbed much o f Saladin's time and e ne rgy. Eventually, the alliance between Byzantium and the Crusad er Kingdom of Jerusalem took concre te form and the two powers launched a combined attack on Damie ua, which was beaten off by Saladin's forces (25 October-I 3 Decembe r, 1169). In Decem­ber 1170, Saladin conducted a futile campaign in southern Pales­tine , but was more successful in Ayla (modern 'Aqaba), conquer­ing a Frankish fort o n a tiny off-shore island. In 1170, Saladin's position in Egypt greatly improved following the pacification of Upper Egypt, and his sense ofpersollal security strengthened with the arriva l from Damascus of his extended family; father and brothers. During the period that Saladin served as Fatimid vizier, he pursued a policy which a imed at undermining the Isma ' ili character of the Fatimid state. In Muharram and Sha'ban 566/ September 1170 and May I] 71, three madrasas, law colleges for teaching Sunni schools of law, were established in Fustat and Cairo, and a Sunni cadi was nominated in the capita l. At the beginning of Muharram 567/ September 1171 , the name of al-'Adid was omitted from the Friday sermons delivered at the congregational mosques in the capital. The o mission of the name of the Fatimid

INTRODUCTION xv

ruler heralded a shift in political a ll egiance in favor of the Abbasids and the offic ial return of Egypt to the Sunni fold. On 10 Muharram/ II September, aVAdid died and with him was extinguished the Fatimid state.

Until the death of Nur aI-Din in May 11 74, Saladin 's re lations with his fo rmal overlord were strained. In Octobe r 1171 , a coor­dinated attack planned by Nul' a i-Din and Saladin on the Frank­ish forts of Karak and Shawbak came to naught due to Saladin 's failure to meet Nur aI-Din. A year later, Salad in 's independent foray aga inst these strongholds failed to restore trust to the rela­tio ns between the two leaders. SUl difficulties in the relations between Salad in and Nur ai-Din did not prevent Saladin from ruling Egypt as he saw fit. His position in Egypt was firm ly secured. A plot discovered in 11 74 was of minor significance, pos ing no rea l threat to his rule. From Egypt. Saladin conducted an expansion­istic policy in three directions: Nubia, the Mediterranean coast of North Africa and Yemen. Egypt itself was successfully defended against another Christian Mediterranean power-the Normans of Sic ily. Their attack 0 11 Alexandria was repelled after much fight­ing (August 11 74).

CHAPTER ONE

THE SOURCES

I. Setting lhe Stage: The Twelfth Century

a. Cullural and Religious Trends

I. The abundance of sources for Saladin's rise to power in Egypt should not mislead us as to our ability to fathom the deeper motives and aspirations of the main players on the political scene. We must be always aware that most of our information is derived from the writings of a small and well-defined group of Saladin's associates and admirers notably Qadi al-Fadil , <Imad ai-Din al-Isfahan i and Ibn Shaddad. On the other hand stands Ibn al-Athir, who is mostly hosti le to Saladin. To make th ings worse, only pan of the original writings of Saladin's admirers has reached as directly. Therefore, we are dependem on late r historians, who were familiar with those works and incorporated them in their own writings. Furthermore, Saladin's historian-admirers wrote their works after the death of Saladin. Their outlook must have been influenced by Saladin's later achievements; the victory at Hittin and the conquest of Jemsa­lem. In retrospect, they tended to idealize the personality of the man who became a hero of the Holy War. The events of Saladin's early life were remodelled and censored to fit in with his later fame.

In order to evaluate the writings of Salad in 's historian-admir­ers and Ibn al-Athir as sources for the history of Saladin it is nec­essary 1O try to capture the mood of the time. Saladin's historians were a product of their age and their attitudes and perceptions were shaped by the political and cultural values of the twelfth century. Equally important are their personal biographies. No only writing on Saladin, <Imad ai-Din and Qadi al-FadiI also wrote about themselves. To a lesser degree this is true in respect of other his­lOrians of Saladin, too. Although Qadi al-Fadil, <Imad ai-Din and Ibn Shadd ad entered into Saladin's service at different times and circumstances they all became members of his inner circle. They have much in common in their educational and cultural back­grounds as well as in their professional careers. With the excep­tion of Qadi al-Fadi l. their world was shaped by the new institu-

2 CHAPTER ONE

lions of learning that spread throughout the Middle East from the second half of the e leventh century. The cultural and religious life of the period was marked by traditionalism combined with mysticism, and focused on three institutions: madrasa, Manqo and dar aMtadilh. In the madrasa, Sunni law and other aux ilia ry sub­jects were taught. Dar al-Hadilh was an institution of a more nar­row scope devoted to the study of the Prophetic traditions. The khanqa served the mystics (sufts) as a focal point of their social and religiolls life. The social life of the period was permeated to great extent by the zealous adherence of people. (la'assub),LO legal schools which were associated with theological schools of lhoughl.l

The culture of Arabic-speaking lands of the twelfth-century Middle East was much influenced by developments in Iran . The Seljuks, who reached Baghdad in 1055, were instrumental in spread­ing re ligiolls trends and forms of social organ ization that had evolved in the Iranian world. Parallel with the movement to ule west of the Seljuks, men of religion «ulama') ,juri sts (juqaha') and Sufis emigrated from Iran. They transplanted and disseminated Iranian Muslim culture to the Arabic-speaking Middle East and Egypt. The proliferation of madrasas in the Middle East is usually associated with the name of the Seljukid vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, the founder of the Nizamiyya madrasa at Baghdad, in 1063. How­ever, as the works of C. E. Bosworth and Richard W. Bulliet have shown, madrasas were common in Nishapur and in o ther smaller towns of Khurasan before the second h alf of the e leventh cen­tury. Also the fusion of law (jiqh), theology (kalam) and moderate forms of Sufism took place in Khurasan of the tenth and eleventh centuries. In Nishapur two important developments took place; the adaption of Sufism by the Shafi ' i jurists and the rise of the

1 For the traditionalist trend, see G. Makdisi, "The Sunni Re\ival ~, in Islamic Civitiwtioll,950-1150, (ed) D. S. Richards (Oxrord, 1973), reprinted in his His­tory and Politics in Eleventh Ctnlury Baghdad, (London, 1990). For the spread of Sufism, see G. Makdisi. "The Hanbali Sc hool and Sufism~, HtHnoniqra Isiamica, 2( 1974), 61-72. For Sufi institutions such as Ithanqa, wwiya and ribat see, D. Morray, An Ayyubid Notable (Hul His Wqrtd, (Le iden, 1994), 13940. For Ule social signifi­cance of the adhe rence to legal schools, see R. W. Bulliel, The Patricians ofNishapur, (Cambridge Mass., 1972), 28-39; I. M. Lapidus, "Muslim Cilies and Islamic So­cielies~ in Middle Eastern Cities, (cd) I. M. Lapidus (Bcrkeley, 1969),50,53-4; W. Madelung, "The Spread of MaUl rid ism and the Turks~, reprinted in his, Reti­giow Schools and Stcu i1l Meditval Islam , (London, 1985), 135. l owe the last ref­erence La the kindncS$ of O. Talman- Heller of the Hebrew University, Jerusa­lem.

TH E: SOU RCES 3

khanqa as a lypical Sufi inslitUlion. 2 The personal contribUlion of Nizam al·Mulk. himself of Iranian o rigin . must not be unde res ti· mated. He c reated a ne twork of law colleges and hltanqas which covered the most important c ities of Iran and Iraq . As an instilu· tion of learning the NizamiYY'l was different in its educational char· acter and the way it was administra ted fro m other institutions of learning in eleventh centu ry Baghdad. As for the motives of Ni7..am al·Mulk. the vizier. in the words of George Makdisi , "soug ht to control the 'u lama ' in o rder to control th e masses".3

In the earlie r periods. scholars and men of re ligion were to great ex te nt economically indepe nde nt and pursued a varie ty of differ­ent occupations. The process o f lea rning itself was not rigidly struc­tured and did not center o n a speci fic educational institution . Most of the teaching took place at the mosque which was a ffiu lti·pur. pose institution for worship, learn ing and socializing. In the longer run, the spread of the law colleges in the Middle East (in the second half o f the eleventh century and throughout the twe lfth centu ry) was instrumental for the institutio naliza tion and professionalization of scho la rship in medievallslam .'1 At the law colleges. the sllldents

l! For cultural a nd educational dcvelopmcn ts, see C. E. Boswon h, The GhlUlw­vilts. T/,rir Empire in Afghanistan GIld East"" Imn , 994-1040. 2nd. ed. (Beirut, 1973). 173. 174-5: nulliet, The Patrician.J, 39. n. 19,249-55. and Islam. Th, View from the Edge. (N. Y .• 1994), c h. 9: Madelung. 141: t.L Malamud. ~Sufi Organization a nd Structures or Authority in Medieval NishapurM, IjMES. 26( 1994). 427-9, 435, 436.

, G. Makdisi, - Muslim InSlilUtions of Learning in Ele\'cnth Century Baghdad". BSOAS. XX IV( 196 1),55, reprinted in his IUligioll, Law and Learnillg in Cla.ssiwl Isla III, (Londo n, 199 1). In poiiticalrerms, Sulli e! sees the I/Illdrasll as o ne orthe tools in the hands of th e regim e to control the patriciate. See , Tile Palricia lls, 73. Thc esse nce of th e I/Itldra.Ja is much debated among the schola rs. For a rccell! critical review of the prevailin g views, see M. Cha mbe rlain , KlIOwltdgt' and Social Practice i'l M"ditval /)(Hnascus, l19()..f350. (Ca mbridge. 1994). cll. 2. For his dis­cussion of the politica l utili ty o f the madra.sa, see 5 1-3, esp., 52.

4 For scho la r'S in the first centuries of Islam, see H.J. Cohen. ~The Econo mic Background and the Secular O ccupations of Muslim J urisprude nts and Tr.tdi· tiona1ists in the Classica l Period or Islam",JESHO, IS ( 1970), lfi..88. esp., 25, 39. For later periods. see J. E. Gilbert, Mlnsti mtionalization of Muslim Scholarship and Proressionalization of th e 'U lama' in Medie ..... 1 Damascus", SI,( 1980), 105-34, esp., 114: Bulliet . Islam. 149. For the spread or madra.sa.s. sec D. Sourdel. ~Renexions sur la diffusion dc' la madrasa c n Orient du Xli: au Xlll e siecle". REI, XLlV( 1976), 165-84. On th c base or evidence drawn from Nishapur. Bulliet states that: · h \\'as tcaching rat he r than learni ng that V.~dS thc object o r systcm· atization~ and ~Thc central co ncc rn of the systcm was ce rtification o r t cachers~. See . The l>alrician.J, 49, 50. To what ex tent these conclusions apply to the Arabic· speaking lands ofthe Middle EaSt in the eleventh·twelfth ce ntu ries is, at th is stage of the researc h, uncleOlf.

4 CHAPTER ONE

were fin ancially supported during the pe riod of the ir learning by incomes derived fro m pious e ndowmen ts se t up for the benefit o f these institutions. Needless to say that the tcaching staff of the college was paid too. Under the SeUuks the involvement o f the government in the religious life, in the form of politica l backing of legal and theological schools of thought, was greatly intensi­fied. The Turks adhered fanatically to the Hanafi legal sys tem and objected to Ash'an theology. In the la nds under the ir rule in Iran and the Middle East these re ligious prefe rences were translated into morc or less sys tematic s late po licies .5

Whe n approaching the religious and cultural li fe o f the twe lfth century il would be misleading to focus o nly o n the high culture of the jurists and law colleges or the learned Sufis in the khanqas. The Islam of the masses, urban and certainly rural , was differently o ri en ted; more toward spirituali sm and less concerned with texts. In popular Islam ho ly men were more central than learned me n of religion. But the religion of the educa ted e lite and that of the masses were not worlds entirely apa rt. Adherence to legal schools was important and central in the lives and ou tlook of the histori­ans of the period as much as it was in the li ves of their less re­nowned contempo raries. 6 Within Sunni Islatn, a wide common ground can be discerned between hig h and po pular fo rms of religion , and many religious practices were typical of bo th the Islam of the educated elite and o f that of the people. Cross influences are discerned a lso be t\vee n Sh i<ite and Sunni Islam . The celebra­tions of mawlid al-nabi, Muhammad's Nativity, exemplify this trend. This fes tival was a Falimid innovation and its beginnings go back to the first d ecades o f th e twelfth century. From Egypt it spread beyond Fatimid domains and was adopted by staunch Sunni rul­ers among the m Nur al-Oin. 7 In very much the same way the nights of mid-Sha<ban were widely celebrated in the Sunni world as well

!> SeUukid policies we re nOI withoul precedent. For instance, the Shafi'i le­gal school e njoyed the 5Upport or the Ghaznavid rulers, 5ee C. L. Klausne r, The &ljuk Vetirate, (Cambridge Mass., 1973),63-4. For Olher examples, see, Madel ung. 126-7, 129, 130-3, 146-7.

6 Madelung, 132, n.59, 140. 7 For the Fatimid origin or mawlid al-,wbi, see R. Sh inar. ~Traditional a nd

Reformist Mawlid Celebrations in the Maghrib~ , in Studies in Memory of Gaston Wid, (cd) M. Roscn-Ay.don Uerusalem, 1977) ,73; Y. Lev, Stale and &x:Uty in Fatimid EgyPt, (Leide n, 199 1), 146. For its adaptation by Nur al·Din, 5ee N. J . G. Kaptein , Muhammad's Birthday Fej/ival, ( Leidcn , 1993). 3 1-4.

T H E SOU RCES

as in Fatimid Egypt. In Baghdad in the thi rd decade of the n in th cen tu ry these ce lebra tio ns we re opposed by th e Han balis who consid ered them to be an u nlawful innovation . Bu t in the twe lfth centu ry, a Han bali rural com mun ity in Syria adopted these rites withou t reserva tion. The visita tio n of the graves of holy men and wome n was an another re ligious p ractice com mon to urban and rural societies which crossed the boundaries of Shi<ite and Sunni Islam .s

II . Histo ri ans of Salad in were rather typ ical members of the Mus­lim civi lian e li te of the tW'elfth cen tu ry, an e lite wh ich was com­posed of t\vo distinct bu t partl y overlapping groups: administra­to rs and men of re ligio n . Both <Imad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad had been educa ted at law colleges and , like many of their co lleagues, sought careers in the service of rulers and in state administration .9

' Imad ai-Din , a jurist by educatio n , an ad ministra tor by profes­sion and a man of high culture, was exposed in the fOllllative period of his live to Sufi sm and he had apparently some latent Sufi lean­ings. He chose as his b u ria l place a Sufi ceme tery.IO The conver­gence of a ttitudes be t\veen rule rs a nd men o f religion is a famil­iar phenomenon in Islam of the high mid dle ages. T he portrai t of Saladin given by contempo rary historians was much infl uenced by this trend . The biographical nOte o n Nur ai-Din (ruled 11 46-1174) given by Ibn 'Asakir ( II 05-1 176) in his biographical dic tio­nary of people connected with Damascus-Ta 'riklt Dimashq-epiLQ-

8 For Sunni a nd Shi ' ite traditions conce rn ing Sha'ban, see M. Kis ter, ~Sha'ban is My Month ~, in Studia Oirentalia Memoriae D. H. Baneth Dedieata, Uerusalem , 1979), 15-37. Fo r th e celebrations ofSha' ban, see S. Sabari , Mouvements populaires Ii Baghdad Ii [,ipoqu.e abbasside lXi-Xli siecles, (Paris, 198 1), 106; D. Talmon-Heller, ~The Shaykh and Ihe CommunilY. Popu lar Hanbalile Islam in 121h- 131 h Cen­tulj' J abal Nablus and Jabal Qaysu n ~, 51, ( 1995),116; Lev, Slate, 144-5. For fu­sion, on the one hand, and antagonism. o n the othe r hand, betwee n Mlow~ and Mhigh~ forms of Sufi sm in the lale middle ages, see T. Kha lidi, Arabic H islorieal Thought in lhe Classical Period, (Cambridge, 1994),2 11 -5.

9 For the con nections between education al Ihe madrasas and administrative careers. see Klausner. 62-3, 64-5, 66, who brings the exam ples of ' Imad ai-Din and Ibn Hubayra. For men of rel igion a nd adminiSlrJ.lors, see R. S. Humphreys, From Saladin to lhe Mongols, (Albany, 1977),377-80.

LO AI-Mundhi li, Al-Takmila li-Wafa),at al-Naqala. (ed) B. A. Marouf (Najar, 1968), 11 , 288. Separate Sufi cemeteries existed in Iwclfth-centulj' Damascus and in late medieval Cairo. See, Ibn 'Asaki r. 1'a'rikh Dimashq, (ed) Muhibb ai-Din ' Umar ibn Ghrama al-'Amrolwi (Beiru t. 1995), XV, II ; L. Fernandes. The Evolution of a Slifi Instilltlion i,l Mamluk Eg)·pt: the Khfmqah. (Ber lin, 1988).22.

6 CHAPTER ONE

mizes the prevailing political ideologies and the measure of co­operation between the civi lian e lite and rulers in the twelfth cen­tury. As Ibn 'Asakir himself Slates, hi s aim was to e numerate Nur al-Din 's virtues (manaqib). But his note is more than just a dull list of vinues. Ibn 'Asakir provides a comprehensive account of Nur a i-Din 's military exploilS and religious and social policies. Nonetheless, his account is a mixture of both virtues and policies and is dominated by the tendency LO personify Nur al-Din's poli­cies. Nur ai-Din is described as a person with an aptitude for learning and religious learning in particular. He scrupulously followed re­ligious observances such as prayers, alms-giving (sado.qa) , and fasting, and was modest and restrained in his personal manners. He fol· lowed the example of the forefathers (salaj) and of men of reli· gion and piety. II

Ibn 'Asakir's account begins with a brief history of the Zengid family mentioning Nur a l·Din 's grandfather, Ak Sungur. and Nur al·Din's father, ' lmad a l·Din, and his exploits against the Chris· tians-the Crusaders and the Byzantines. 12 The essential pan of the text begins with the establishment of Nur al·Din 's rule in Aleppo. At this point, Nur a l·Din's c redentials as a warrior ofthe Holy War are presented, and his struggle against the Shj'ites in Aleppo is described. Ibn <Asakir states that under .Nur al-Din 's rule Sunni Islam prevailed in Aleppo. In this context, Ibn <Asakir mentions the establishment of law colleges by Nur ai-Din and the setting up of pious endowments for their support. 13

In discussing NUl" al-Din's se izure of Damascus, Ibn 'Asakir em­phasizes that the town was peacefully surrendered to him by the population due to the high prices of foodstuffs and their fear of the Crusaders (li temlly infidels). This theme is e laborated else­where in Ibn 'Asakir's text, which emphasizes that Nur al-Din's wars did not result in the killing of Muslims and the cities that

II The text of Ibn 'Asakir 's biography of Nur aI-Din has been edited and translated imo French by N. ElisseefT, see his ~Un doc ume nt contcm porain de Nur ai-Din, sa notice biographique par Ibn 'Asakirft, BED, XXV( 1972), 125-40, esp., 139. I am gratefu l LO Y. Fre nkel of Haifa University who drew my allemion 10 this article. A photocopy edition of the whole manuscript of Ibn 'Asaki r's 'fa'rikh Dimashq has been published in the Arab world (n. p. , n. d. ) in 19 volumes. Nur aI-Din biogrdphy is included in volume sixteen.

12 My refe re nces are to both the published text and the manusc ript , see Ibn 'Asakir, (cd) ElisseefT, 136, para. I ':~: MS, XVI, 293, II , 4-12, 15-7.

I~ Ibn 'Asakir (ed) ElisseefT, 137, para., 1-4: MS, XVI, 293, II, 18-30.

TH E SO URCES 7

Nur al·Din conquered submiltcd thcmselves LO his rule. I" These remarks reflec t the fact that illle rnal wars between various Muslim po tentates were the no rm in the twelfth centu ry and Nur al·Din in creating his state fought as much against fellow Muslims as against the Christians.

Nur al·Din 's po licies and deeds in Damascus are described in great detai l. The walls of the town were improved and law col· leges were set up. Nur al· Din bro ught economic prospe rity LO the town and illegal taxes were abo lished. The taxatio n of wine was stopped and its consumption prohibited . Justice was administe red by the judicial system and Nur al·Din established the Palace o f Justice (dar at-cadl) personally pres id ing over the hearings. Men of religio n were well treated and ho nored. IS Ibn 'Asaki r specifies Nul' al·Din' s ac ts of generosity toward the weak ele ments in the society. He lavished alms on the orphans and poor and es tablished p io us endowments for the treatme nt of the sick, insane and blind . Also those who taught o rphans the Ko ran and writing were paid by p ious endowments .16 These deeds of Nul' ai-Din are pa n o f wha t migh t in mode rn parlance be described as his social policy. However , Ibn 'Asakir uses the word sadaqa, alms-giving/ charity, fo r bo th Nur al-Din 's social po licy and his personal religios ity. The lack of a distinction be tween public and persona l aspects in the lives and activities of rule rs is clearly and nicely illustrated here. This blurring o f boundaries is behind the juxtapositio n of Nur al­Oin 's vinues and po licies in Ibn 'Asakir's account.

The same lack of distinctio n is revealed when Ibn 'Asakir me n­tio ns vario us building proj ects of Nur ai-Din such as 1ibals (a multi­ro le institutio n; fo rtifi ed outpost, inn fo r trave llers or place fo r the Sufis and poor ), khanqas, hospita ls, bridges and khans (cara­vanserais). These po licies, says Ibn 'Asakir, were impleme nted thro ugho ut Nur ai-Dill 's te rrito ri es. 17 This account Jumps LOgether

I~ Ibn 'Asa kir (cd ) ElisscclT, 137, para., 5: 140, para., 3: MS, XVI, 293, I, 32; 296, II , 6-7.

IS Ibn 'Asakir (cd) ElisscelT, 137. para., 5, 7; 138, para., I; MS. XVI. 293, I, 33; 294, II , 3-4, 10·2.

16 Ibn 'Asakir (cd ) El isseclT. 138, para ., 1-2; MS. XVI, 294, 11 , 13,21-2. 17 Ibn 'Asaki r (cd ) Elissecff, 138, para., 1-2; MS, XVI, 294. II , 2 1-3. For the

.spread of ribat.J from Khu r.Is,,·m LO lJaghdad and the associa tion of ribat.Jwith Sufism, scc J. Chabbi, ~La fo nccion du riba l it lJagdad du Vi: sicclc au de but d u VUe sii:clc-, REI, XLI I (1972), 10 1-2 1. According to Lou is I'ouzet, wi thin the COli text of the Sufi world of th in ccnth<clltu ry Damascus, ribat was an institution more asso-

8 CHAIYfER ONE:

two quite different categories of building; those which served commercial purposes and facilitated travel and trade (ca ravansa­ries and bridges), and buildings which had religious and social functions. In the same vein justice is equated with economic pros­perity. The theme of justice appears several times in Ibn <Asakir's text which asserts that in the lands conquered by Nur ai-Din jus­lice was administrated and illegal laxalio n and fiscal oppression were stopped. Nur ai-Din listened to the complaints against his governors and ordered them to correct th eir ways. Ibn <Asakir ascribes to Nur ai-Din an aura of holiness by saying that Nur al­~in 's bamka saved people from hardship and brought prosperity to his subjects,lS

In various places throughout the whole text Nur aI-Din is de­picted as a warrior of the Holy War. His pe rsonal military prow­ess-his firmn ess in battles, a rchery and leadership-is praised. He led his me n in attacks (han-a) and covered them in retreat (larra). And his victories, achieved together with his brother, against the Crusaders , Byzantines and Armenians are specified. Ibn 'Asakir stresses the way Nur aI-Din treated the families of those who died in the Holy War; they were given finan cial support and their sons appointed to the post of governor. 19 Another essential feature of Ibn 'Asakir 's appreciation of Nur al-Din's rule is the extensive description of his policies toward the Holy Cities of Arabia. Nur ai-Din is portrayed as adopting comprehensive long-term policies to improve the si tuation of the Holy Cities and this at a consider­able cos t to himself. According to Ibn 'Asakir, Nur aI-Din showed respect to the emir of Medina and sent his troops to protect the town. He also improved the wa lls of the town and provided Medina with food. The emir of Mecca was granted fiefs (iqla's) and the taxes collected from pilgrims were abolished. The Bedouin were

c ialed with women. See, his Damas au Vlle/Xllle sieck. Vie et structures religieuses dmu une mitropole islamique. (Beirut. 1991 ). 21 1. lowe the last reference to the kindness of Anne-Marie [ddt. For ribals designated for women in pre-Fatimid and Fatimid Egypt, see ch. 3.

18 Ibn 'Asaki r (ed) Elisseeff, 137, para., 7, 140, para .• 2, 6. Ibn 'Asakir 's ref­erence to Nur ai-Din's buildings does not cover the full exte nt of his building activities. For that, see N. ElisseefT, ~Le5 monuments de Nur al·Din"', BED, XIII ( 1949-1951),5-50.

19 Ibn 'Asakir (ed) [Iisseeff, 137, para., 6, 138, para., 3-4, 140. para., 5; MS, XVI, 294, 1, 7, 296, 11 , 8-9.

THE SOURCES 9

also given iqla's in exchange for ceasing their depredations against the pilgrims.2o

Ibn 'Asakir, a scion of a leading family of learned me n in Dam­ascus, lived and wrote his huge biographical dic tionary of people connected wilh the history of Damascus under the rule of Nur al­Din (who expressed interest in his work and encouraged him to finish it). Ibn 'Asakir, on his part, lent SUppOrl to Nur al-Din's religious policies. 21 Thus Ibn 'Asakir's appraisal of Nur al-Din's rule , although not an official biography, is the product of a sym­pathizer. Ibn 'Asakir 's text bears witness to the fact that the call for a Holy War turned into a powerful political and religious force in Syria of the second haIf of the twelfth cenlllry. Nur aI-Din adopted the ideology of Lhe Holy War and manipulated it for political ends. He assumed the tiue t1lujahid, warrior of the Holy War, early in his rule (1149). By comparison, Nur al-Din's faLher did not use this title . even not after th e conquest of Edessa in 11 44. In ur al-Din 's protocol the title al-'adil-the just (meaning the just mler)-preceded even the title tltujahid. Ibn 'Asakir's text reOecl'i this presumption by stressing Nur al-Din's concern with the proper administration of justice by the cadi and the establishment of the Palace of Justice. In the Palace of Justice the hearing of grievances (nazir fi ' l-mazalim) look place. Basically, this was justice dispensed by the ruler himself: it had a long history in pre-Islamic Middle East and medieval Islam before Nur aI-Din and was also perceived as a symbol of sovereignty and power. Nur a l-Din's innovation was essentially instrumental: he set lip the Palace of Justice to mani­fest his interest in the hearing of grievances and to emphasize his authority as a sovereign.22

Ibn 'Asakir's text must have been known to ' Imad ai-Din who, about 1:\\'0 decades later, also wrote an appraisal of Nur al-Din's

2(/ Ibn 'Asakir (ed) ElisseeIT, 138, para., 1-2; MS, XVI, 294. II . lS..fi, 19. 21 For the cooperation between Nur ai-Din and Ibn 'Asakir, see Elissceff. ~Une

documcnl~ . 126; Mo rray, 144-5 ;Jean-Michel MOUlOn. Dama.s tl .sa Principallli .sOIlS It.s Saljoukich.s tt u.s Baurich.s 468-549/J076-1I54, (Cairo, 1994 ), 4.5,6-7.

22 Fo r Nur al-Din 's titles, see Y. Tabbaa. ~MonumenlS with Message: Propa­gation of Jihad under Nural-Oin (1 146- 11 74)~, in Tile Muting of Two Worlds, (ed) V. P. Coss (Michigan , 1986),224,226; N. Elisscc fT. ~ La limlature de Nur aI-Din d'apres ses inscriptions\ BED, Xrv( 1952-1954), 171-3, 18 1-2. For daral-'adl, see J. S. Nielsen, Secular Justice in tilt l.slamic Stalt, (Istanbul , 1985), 13; N. O. Rabbat. '"The Ideological Significance of Dar al-'Adl in the Medieval Islamic Oriene, IjMES, 27(1995),2()'1.

10 C HAPTER ONE

reign. The similarities between the two texts are many and funda­mental. <Imad ai-Din says that Nur ai-Din was the one who restored the glory of Islam in Syria. His achievements were multitudinous; he defeated the Crusaders and repossessed lands that Lhey had conquered from the Muslims. And he was responsible for the revival of religious sc ience and the teaching of law. ' Imad ai-Din praises Nur a i-Din for the various building projects that were can-jed out during his rule . These induded the construction of congregational mosques, law colleges and khanqas, all provided with generous pious endowments. ' Imad ai-Din mentions also the building of fortifi ­cations, khans and ribats. Elsewhere in his writings, ' Imad ai-Din discerns yet another positive aspect of Nur al-Din's rule: the abo­lition of taxes and custom duties unauthorized by the law. For instance, ' Imad ai-Din says that in 569/ 1173-1174, the only taxes that were levied in Nur al-Din's territories were those prescribed by the law such as the land tax (kharaj) and poll-tax (jiz.ya) im­posed on non-Muslims.23 The question of taxation posed a prob­lem in relations between jurists and men of religion and rulers. The extent of taxation permitted by the law was very narrow and could not satisfy the needs of the state. Nur ai-Din used to ex­plain that the levying of taxes unauthorized by the law is neces­sary to cover lhe expenses of the Holy War. 24 These two texts give us a clear picture of what leading personalities of the civilian elite of the twelfth century sought and appreciated in th eir rulers: commitment to Holy War and Sunni orthodoxy, and what services they were ready to render them-to justify the wars that their patrons waged against fellow-Muslims.

b. Political Life

While Ibn 'Asakir's text is important for unde rstanding the ideo­logical dimension of relations between rulers and civi li ans, 'Umara 's description of Fatimid politics reveals the real context in which these relations took place. 'Umara was a poet of Yemeni origin,

U AI-Bundari, Sana at.Barq al-Shami, (ed ) R. Sesen (Beirut. 1971),55-6, 143-4, 145. For ' Imad al-Din's admiration of Nur a i-Din, see D. S. Richards, ~' Imad ai-Din al-Isfahani. AdminislJ"ator, Litterateur and Historian", in Crusaders and Mwlims in Twelfth-Century Syria, (ed) M. ShalZmi lier (Leiden, 1993), 146.

24 E_ Sivan, L'lslam et la Croisade, (Paris, 1968),73.

T H E SOU RCES II

who lived in Egypt during the clos ing yea rs of the Fatimid period and the first years of Saladin 's rule. 'Umara is a well-known per­sonality. Hartwig Derenbo urg has studied his life and edited his poetry and more recenLl y PieLer Smoor discussed many of its as­pec ts . The refore I shall o nly di scuss a few poin ts d irec tly perti­ne nt to the purpose o f the present work. Maqri zi ( 1364- 1442) provides a concise but vivid account o f 'U ma ra's ea rl y life and his career at the Naj ahid court in Zabid . 'Umara arrived in Zabid in 53 1/ 11 36-11 37 at the age of sixteen in search of fu rthe r educa­tio n. Fo r abo ut seven years he stud ied Shafi ' i law in Zabid . From 538/ 11 43- 11 44 <Umara was in the service of Hurra, the Q ueen mo ther, auaining a high positio n at her court and movi ng freely amo ng the members o f the ruling establishment. His social ad­vanceme nt went hand in ha nd with a grea t improvement in his economic posi tion . He became a ve l)' wea lthy merchant with com­mercial interests in Aden. His legal career also nourished ; he taught law and issued legal o pinio ns (fatwas) , and his li te rary skills earned him recognition among members of the ruling circles. Fo r ten years 'Umara thrived in Zabid . In 548/ 11 53- 11 54 he became en­tangled in the complex poli tics of the region and, as a result, his positio n in Zabid was se rio usly undermined. A yea r la ter 'U mara found himself a fugitive in Mecca , but his reputation was great eno ugh to secure for him a diplomatic mission to Cairo o n be­half of the local ruler. 'Umara a rrived in Egypt in 550/ 11 55- 11 56 and was well received by the Fatimid ruling famil y and the vi zie r. He returned to Mecca and in 55 1/ 11 56- 11 57, was again dispatched o n a mision to Cairo choosing this time to seule in Egypt.

' Umara 's book, entitled Contemporary Obseroalions on the H istory of the Egyptians Viziers, is of an auto biographical character.25 In it he recounts the circumstances in which he composed vari ous poems. These background stories are inte rtwined with remarks and observations about the vi ziers and other people of the ruling circles whom 'Umara knew. It is true that 'Umara, in contrast to Qadi al-Fadil , <Imad aI-Din and Ibn Shaddad, was no t an adminis­trator, but his dealings with the ruling circles in the Holy Cities

25 For 'U mara's biography by Maqrizi, see his Kilab al-M uqaJJa al-Kabir, (ed) M. Yalaoui (Be irut, 1991 ), VIII , 742. 'U mara's autobiography is entitled as Ai­Nwwl a l-'Asriyya fi Akhbar al-W U%(.!ra' al-M isriJYa, (ed) H . Derenbourg (Paris, 1897). See, 93, where 'U mara explains the aim and lhe me thod whic h guided him in writing lhe book.

12 CHAPTER ONE

of Arabia, Yemen and Egypt were extensive. According to his own testimony, 'Umara served as an emissary. trader on behalf of rul­ers, keeper of deposits and above all as panegyrist 26 He describes his relations with members of the ruling circles as based on pay­ment in exchange of service (khudma) and panegyric (madh).27 But some of his relations were based on friendship (unsa), too. For example, such were <Umara's relations with the vizier Shawar.28

' Umara arrived in Egypt during the early years of the vizierale of Tala'i ' ibn Ruzzik, ca lled ai-Malik a l-Salih who. according to late medieval historians, was a Shi'ite of the Imami branch. Re­cently Seta B. Dadoyan has suggested that the family orBanu Ruzzik were Nusayris. 'U mara describes him as a fanatic, but he became a member of his circle. Out of what must have been many meet­ings with Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzik, 'Umara chose to tell how in a session (majlis) that took place in the house of the vizier he protested against defamation of two of the Rightly Guided Caliphs of early Islam, Abu Bakr and 'Umar, whom the Shi' ites abhorred. Such sessions were both a pastime and a typical form in which cultural and religious life was conducted.29 But 'Umara's choice to recount th is event is not incidental; his aim is to portray himself as a per­son possessing values and integrity.

For seven years (1154-1]61) Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik served as the vi­zier. He was assassinated by soldiers at the instigation of the aunt of the child-Imam, al-'Adid (19 Ramadan 556/ 10 September 1161 ).

26 'Umara, 41 , 42, 142. 27 Ibid, 94. References to financial rewards and gifts that ' Umara received

from people of the ruling class are frequently mentioned throughout ' Umara's book. For instance, from Shawar's brother ' Umara received a fief (iqla ' ) and he was on his payroll for three years receiving each month fifteen dinars. See, 135, and 43, 62-3, 88.

28 'Umara, 69, 94, 135. 29 Ibid, 44-5. Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik associated himself with Shi' ites. For example,

a member of his circle was the emir al-Zafari, who had served as the governor of Alexandria and Damietta. But, he became a Sufi and an expert o n Shiism whom Ibn Ruzzik much respected. See Safadi, Kilab al-Waft bi- 'i-Wafayal, (ed) S. Dedering (Beirut, 1982) , XIV, 8. In 1159, Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik established a large pious endowme nt for the benefit of fJShraf (i.e. the descendants of Hasan and Husayn, the two sons of 'Ali and Fatima) in Fustat, Cairo and Medina and its environs. For this waq[, see CI. Cahen, Y. Ragib and M. A. Taher, ~L'achat etle Waqf d'un grand domaine Egyptien par Ie vizir Fatimide Tala'i ' b. Ruzzik", AI, XIV(l978), 11 3, II, 22-3, 27, 11 4, II, 29-30, 35 , 11 5 , II, 43-4. For 'Umara's testi­mony about the Nusayri affiliation ofTala'j' ibn Ruzzik, see S. B. Dadoyan, The Fatirnid Annmians. Cultural and PolilicallnteTaclion in lhe Near EaJt, (Lejden, 1977), 158, n. 22.

THE SOURCES 13

The reason behind the plot was the marriage between Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik's daughter and the Fatimid Imam. It was a forced marriage by which the vizier attempted to gain supreme power and legiti­macy in the Fatimid state. 'Umara, a Fatimid sympathizer, says nothing about the background and the circu mstances of Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzik 's death. But he provides a summary of his ru le. Basi­cally he describes him as a civilized ru ler. Undoubtedly what ap­pealed most to 'U mara was Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzik 's love of literature and literati and the fact that the viz ier himself was a poet. 'Umara is even more enthusiastic about the short rule of Ruzzik ibn Tala 'i', the vizie r's son, who was entitled as ai-Malik ai-Nasir al-'AdiL He occupied the post of the vizier between 1161-1162. The new vi­zier abo lished unlawful taxation , ceased financial extortions and was very generous toward the Holy Cities of Arabia. Ruzzik ibn Tala'i ' was killed by Shawar, or his son Tayy, following a success­ful rebellion. 'U mara describes in vivid terms how in the viz ierial palace he was shown by the conspirators the head of the slain vizier. 'Umara was shocked and says that it was a revolting killing. Al­though he condemns it, he is very positive in his appreciation of Shawar's first period as the vizier.3o

'Umara tries to strike an objective tone when writing about Shawar whose friendship and financial support he fully acknowledges. During his second vizie rate Shawar shed much blood and 'Umara holds him responsible for the invasion of Egypt by the Crusaders and Nur ai-Din. 'Umara sums up his evaluation of the Fatimid viziers by saying that there was no one like Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzik who ad­vanced members of the ruling establishment wh ile the vizier Dirgham excelled in killing them and the Shawar family impover­ished them by financial extortions. The killings perpetrated by Dirgham were a result of factional power struggles with in the anny. Umara's remarks reveal the fear and the powerlessness of the ci­vilians in the face of the unleashed violence.3l Administrators and men of religion were politically and economically dependent on

so 'U mara, 66-7, 69. In many ways 'U mara 's poetry is highly idiosyncratic verging on the blasphemous. The same is true with his exaggera ted praises of the vizie r Tala'i ' ibn Ruzzik. See, P. Smoor, '''The Master of the Century': Fatimid Poets in Cairo~, in ElrYpt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyuhid and Mamlulc Eras, (eds), U. Verme ulen and D. De Smet (Leuven, 1995), 148-52. For 'Umara's assessment of both the vizier Tala 'i' ibn Ruzzik and his son, Ruzzi k, see Oadoyan , 164-5, 168, 171·2.

~I 'Umara, 74, 77, 87, 88.

14 CHAI'>TER ONE

rulers. The rulers held a monopoly on administrative posts and they c reated vast and luc rative pious endowments through which religious and educational institutions were maintained. In this violent politica l environment the c ivilian e lite had to struggle for survival and influence while trying to maintain 3tleasl a semblance of self.respect and integ rity.32

2. Saladin's Historians

3. Qadi al-Fa.dil

I. The personal biographies of Saladin's historians are as impor­tant as the cultural and religious milieu of the twelfth century. AJI of the three historian-admirers of Saladin entered into his service in the prime of the ir lives bringing with them experience and established sets of values. In many ways the most imponant per· sonality among this group was 'Abd al·Rah im ibn 'Ali al·Baysani known as Qadi al·Fadil who was born on 15 Jumada II 529/1 April 1135, in Ascalon. The sources at our disposal differ regarding the family origin. One versions says tha t the family origin had been from Baysan , a small and humble town in Palestine, and al·Fadil's father, who died in 544/ 1149·1150. at the age of 43. served as the cadi and Comptroller (nazir) of Ascalon. Following the fall of the town to the Crusaders ( 1153) the family moved to Egypt. 33 An· other version says that the family had its origins in Ascalon, but a l·Fadil's father was appoin ted as the cadi of Baysan and the fam·

~2 A different approach is adopted by O. E. P.Jackson, who sees the Muslim society of the twelfth century as vertically structured and cut across by profes­sional and administrative classes which "tended to be relatively unaffected by the higher political turmoil ofa given age~. See, his "Some Preliminary Reflec­tions 011 the Chancery Correspondence of th e Qadi al-FadW, in Egypt and Syria, 208.

" Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar MisT, (ed) A. F. Sayyid (Cairo, 198 1), 144; Ibn al­'Adim , Bughyat al-Talab ft Ta'rikh Halab, (ed) S. Zakkar (Damascus, 1988), II , 981; Abu Shama, Kitah al-Rawdataynft AJrhbar al-Dawlatayn, (eds) M. H. M. Ahmad and M. M. Ziyada (Cai ro, 1962) , I, pt,2, 403. The fact that Qadi al-Fadil's father senred as a cadi in Ascalon is well attested to. Abu Shama quotes a document issued in 1147 by aI-Hafiz to Qadi al-Fadil's father, who is described as respon­si ble for jurisdiction (qu da 'and hukm) in /\scalon. This document deals with the question who are authorized to give attestation (taz.Jriya) at the court, i.e. to senre as witnesses. See, Abu Shama, (ed) M. H. M. Ah mad (Cairo, 1956), I, pt. l , 128-9.

THE SOURCES 15

ily epithet reflects uli s appointment rather than the fami ly's place of origin.34 It is rather strange that such basic facts regarding an eminem pe rson like Qadi al-Fadi l are controversial. The reasons for this difference of opinion and il'i possible significance, if any, are unclear. Notwithstanding this difficulty it is possible to recon­struct Qadi al-Fadil's early career and how he emered into the service of Shirkuh and Saladin from the sources.

According to most of Qadi al-Fadi l' s biographers, he received his basic education in Ascalon. This included the memorization of Koran and some poetry. The next stage brought the young Qadi al-Fadi l to Cairo where he went in search for a patron and fur­ther education. According to Qadi al-Fadil's own memoires, the patron he found was head of the Fatimid Chancery, Ibn Khallal. There is nothing implausible in this version . It was a trad ition that people employed in the administration brought their sons to the Chancery and other adm inistrative offices to be introduced to the an of an epistolary and secretarial writing (rasa 'il), which was highly cultivated in the Fatimid state. 35 It was an informal, but possibly formalised, system of cooperation among the administrators to help the careers of their sons and to improve the chances that they could bequeath their posts to their sons. Thus the training of Qadi al-Fadil for a career in the admin istration fell within a familiar pattern. The same picture emerges from the available data concerning the education of an another Falimid administrator and a renowned master of the epistolary art, Ibn al-Sayrafi ( 1071-1147). In his youth, Ibn al-Sayrafi was instructed in the art ofwriling rasa 'it by the head of the Office of the Army. Later he was assigned to serve in the Chancery becoming, in due time, the head of the office.36 As in any other pre-modern traditional society, the ten­dency to inherit posts and occupations was powerful and common and the civi lian elite was not exceptional in this.S? For its part,

!14 AI-M undhiri , II , 2 10-1; YaquI, Mu'jam al-Udaba', ted) 1. 'Abbas (Be irut, 1993), lV, 1562-3; Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat ai-A'yan, (ed) 1. 'Abbas (BeirUl. 1968-71), III , 158, 161.

35 The source for this information is Diya ai-Din ibn al-Athir, the brother of Ibn al-Alhir, the historian. Diya ai-Din tells about a conversation he had with Qadi al-Fadil in Damascus in 1192. See, Abu Shama, I, pl ,2, 487-8; cf: C. Makdisi, Tlu Rist of H11 manum in Classical Islam and tht Christian Wtst. (Edinbu rgh, 1990). 65-6.

~ Ibn Muyassar, 138. '7 Diya a i-Din ibn al-Alhi r, 011 the authority of Qadi a l-Fadil. quoted by Abu

Sham a, I , pt,2, 488.

16 CHAPTER ONE

the Fatimid regime was not hostile to these practices. 38 The be­neficent altitude of the regime was in line with the conservatism and quest for social stability typical of the societies of thal age. It was also a calculated policy instrumental in fostering the loyalty and the dependence of the civilian e lite on the state.

Allhough Qadi al-Fadi l found a patron in Cairo, the next stages of his education are a mystery, and the title of cadi (qadi) does not necessarily imply that he received a systematic legal educa­tion. It was a honorific for high-ranking persons common in the Fatimid administration. 39 In fact, in early lweJfth-century Fatimid Cairo, there were very few opportunities to acquire a solid educa­tion in one of the Sunni legal systems. The first colleges for teaching Sunni law in Egypt were established in Alexandria not in the capital. In its religious and cultural life Alexandria was very different from the capital. The impact of Ismailism on Alexandria was weak. The town was connected by sea-routes to Muslim North Africa and Spain and open to innue nces emanating from these staunch Sunni re­gions. Many scholars and jurists who belonged to the Maliki legal school came to Alexandria and settled there. The first institution for teaching Maliki law was set up in the town toward the end of the e leventh century, and other were established during the first half of the twelfth century. The beginnings of Qadi a l-Fadil' s ca­reer are connected with Alexandria; for some time he was em­ployed in the local administration as a scribe. But it is unreason­able to assume that he attended any law college in Alexandria. AI-Mundhiri (1185-1258), in his obituary note for Qadi a l-Fadil, says only that he studied under the two most celebratedjurisLS of

!II See the somewhat vague and distorted repon of Ibn Abi TaY}' as quoted by Maqrizi in his Kilab al-Mawa'iz wa- 'l-rtibarbi Dhikr al-Khilaf wa-'l-Athar, (Bulaq , 1324), 11 ,309-3 10. Ibn Abi TaY}' credits al-Mu'izz, the first Fatimid ruler in Egypt, with the in itiative to train talented youth for governmental service. Provincial governors were ordered to se nd promising youths from the awlad al·na.s to Cairo for training. In Maqrizi's time the tenn awlad al-flas meant the sons of the Mamluks, however , his use of it for the Fatimid period is anachronistic.

~9 For instance, Qadi al-Fadil's secretary (haM), who served him in the Fatimid period, was also entitled as a cadi . In 400/ 10()9..10IO, me title cadi was bestowed on a Christian administrator. But this case can be dismissed as o ne of al-Hakim's idiosyncrasies. See Ibn al-'Adim, IV, 2302; Maqrizi, ltti'az. at-Hanafa' bi Ahhbar al­A'imma al-Fatimiyyin al-Khulafa', (ed ) M. H. M. Ahmad (Cairo, 1971-1973), 11 , 8 1; III , 254; cf: I. M. Lapidus, "Ayyubid Relig ious Policy and the Developmelll of Schools of Law in Cairo", in Colloque international sur l'hiSloire du Caire. 1969, (Leipzig, 1974), 282.

TIiE SOURCi':S 17

Alexandria of that time: a l-Sitafi and Ibn 'Awf. 4o In 556/ 11 6 1, Qadi a l-Fad il was called back to Cairo to senre in the Office of the Army. This was an initiative of Ruzzik ibn Tala 'j' taken immediately af­ter he assumed power fo llowing the assassination of his father. 41

Qadi a l-Fad il was an eyewitness to the disintegration of the Fatimid state. He was in a good position to gain insight into the even ts; he mingled with the key players on the poli tical scene. During the twilight ofthe Fatimid rule the paths of Qadi al-Fadil and 'Umara met o n several occasio ns. 42 They moved within the same circles, but their ways separated with the arrival of the Ayyubids to Egyp t.

II. How exac tly Qadi a l-Fadil gained the trust ofShi rku h and later of Saladin is difficult to asce rtain. Certa inly, the circumstances were propitious for shi fting his all iance toward the leaders of Nur a l­Oin's army in Egypt. Qadi al-Fadi l himself, like the vast majority of the civi li an e li te in the service of the Fatimids, was a Su nni Muslim. He could have little religious sympathy for the Fatimid regime. Furthermore, Qadi al-Fadil lived in a period which saw a steady decline in the position of Ismai l ism as the state religion of Fatimid Egypt. This process was most advanced in Alexandria but was felt in the capita l as wel l. During the twe lfth century, some of the vizie rs who actually ruled the Fatirnid sta te adopted policies which e roded the privileged position that Ismai li sm had enjoyed in the tenth-eleventh centu ries. This trend also continued during the vizie rate ofTala'i' ibn Ruzzik , who did not hes itate to humili­ate the Fatimid regime on public occasions by displaying the black colors of the Abbasids instead of the Fatimid whi te. 43 An insight into Qadi al-Fadil's inner world is offe red by Smoor's analysis of his poctry from th e closing days of the Fatimid dynasty. Smoor obsenres that it is evident that Qadi al-Fadil "showed no particu­lar knowledge of or interest in , Fatimid teachings". One of Qadi

40 The tec h nical term used by a l-M undhiri is a general one sami'a min. See. 11 ,2 10; Ibn Furat , To 'rikh ibn al-Furat. (cd) M. al-Shama (Basrd. 1969), IV, pt.2, 185. Fo r Alexandria and its mlllirasas. see C. Leise r, MThe Madrasa and the Is­lamization or the Midd le East. The Case or EgyptM.JARCE, XX II (1985), 37-40; Lev, State, 139-40.

41 'U mara , 53-4; Maqrizi, IlIi'al.. , III , 254. 42 'U mara . 79-80. 4:i Maqrizi, IlIi 'al.., 111 , 217, 222; Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani, Raj al-' Isr 'an Qudat

Misr, (ed ) I-I. A. Mag id (Cairo, 1961 ), II , 303-4.

18 CHAPTER ONE

al-Fadil's poems studied by Smoor "seems to be a kind of farewell to the whole Fatimid dynasty which would soon make way for the rabid orthodoxy of the Ayyuhids". 44 Whatever were Qadi al-Fadil's personal re ligious beliefs, as a person trained in the Chancery. he was well ve rsed in the intricacies of Ismai ' li doctrine and phrase­oiogy. as is exemplified by the le tlers of appointment which he wrote for Shirkuh and Saladin as Fatimid viziers. But a familiarity with a doctrine does not reflect convictions. There can be little doubt that Qadi al-Fadi l already adhered 1O Sunni Islam when he was serving the Fatimids.45

How the ties between Qadi al-Fadil and Shirkuh were established remains elusive. The most common version as quoted by the his­torian Abu Shama (1203-1268) inspires little confidence. This account says that Shirkuh, following his appointment as the vi­zier, asked for a scribe to run his Chancery. Qadi al-FadiI's supe­riors in the Fatimid Chancery sent him to Shirkuh with the hope that he would share the fate of his predecessor, who had bee n killed by Shirkuh. The reason for their dislike of Qadi al-Fadil was his lofty position under Shawar's son, al-Kamil. 46 IL is difficull to ascerta in whether Abu Shama gives this in formation on the au­thority of <1m ad ai-Din, or whether it is his own independent state­ment. In any case this is an untenable version. It is hardly con­ceivable that Shirkuh would have agreed to employ a complete stranger in such a vital task.47 On the other hand, this account testifies that Qadi al-Fadil was at that time employed in the Chan­cery. According to Qalqashandi (1335-1418) , who is well informed

44 See, his ~ Fatimid Poets and the 'Ta khallas' that Bridges the Nights of the Time LO the Imam of Time~, Der islam, 68(199 1), 25%0. A more cautious view is ex pressed by S. M. Ayyad who says that the extant poetry of Qadi al-Fadil is LOO meager to allow us LO form a view of his aUitude toward lsmailism. Ayyad writes: ~ .... much of what remai ns of his (i.e. Qadi al-Fadil's) encom iastic poetry is devoted LO the members of the Fatimid house and hi gh-ranking officers of the Fatimid state. But the texts have been corrupted in some places and purged in others, making il impossible 10 draw any concl usion as to how far or how con­sisten tly he uphe ld the !sma'i li ideology~. See his, kRegional Literature: Egypt", in The Cambn'dge History of the Arabic Literatun:. The Abbasid Belles-Leltres, (Cam­bridge. 1990).438.

4:' For Qadi al-Fadil's shift of loyallies, see A. S. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, (Al­bany, 1972),58; M. C. Lyons and D. E. P.Jackson, Saladin. The Polilics ofllu Holy War, (Cambridge, 1982), 2S-6.

46 Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 403, 420. 47 Cf: Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 88.

THE SOU RCES 19

about the histo ry of the Fatimid administration, the head of the Chancery in that period was Qadi al~Muwaffaq ibn Khallai. He served in this post from the re ign of al~Hafi z (1130~1149) until his death on 23Jumada 11 566/2 March 1171 .48 It means that during Shirkuh's campaigns in Egypt, Qadi al-Fad il was serving in the Chan­cery under the same man , who had supervised his training as an apprentice in his early boyhood. No less authority than ' Imad al­Oin asserts that Ibn Khallal was a powerful offi cial who "wrote as he wished".49 This is not an unrealistic description. Undoubtedly, during the political disintegration of the Fatimids state, especially in the 1] 60 's, Fatimid administrators took into thei r hands, and usurped [or th emselves political powers at th e expense of th e Fatimid rulers. Apparently during Qadi a l-Fadil' s se rvice in the Chancery his re lations with Shirkuh were es tablished , and his no mination by Shirkuh was an outcome of those relations. Fol­lowing Shirkuh 's death , Qadi al-Fad il entered smooth ly into the service of Salad in .5o The fi fteenth-centu ry Mamluk historian , Maqrizi , says that the a vo acted in unison and brings as an ex­ample of their cooperation the nomination of Sadr ai-Din ibn Oirhas as the chief cadi .51

III. Another vers ion of Qadi aI-Fad iI's earl y career is provided by Yaqut al-Hamawi (1 179-1229), who says that Qadi al-Fadil's father served as a cadi of Baysan and la ter was appoin ted as a cadi of Ascalon. He was also entrus ted with responsibility for the secret service (khabar) in Ascalon, or in plain words it was his duty to spy on o th er o ffi cia ls in the town. Eventually, thi s assignment brought his downfall. Qadi al~Fadil's father fa iled to info rm the authorities in Cairo about the re lease of a va luable hostage by the

4tI Qalqashandi, Subh al-A'slla, (Cairo, 19 13-19 19), 1.96-7. Ibn Khallal lived h is last days in retirement in his house which , in ' Imad ai-Din 's words, became his grave. See, Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 487.

49 ' Imad a i-Din, Kharidat al-Qasr fiJaridat Aht al-'Asr, (Egyptia n Poets), (eds) A. Amin, Sh. Dayfa nd I. 'Abbas, (n. p., n.d .), 1,235. Th is st.atcmc nt of ' 1m ad a l­Oin is much quoted by o ther aut ho rs. Sec, Ibn Khallikan , V1I , 219; Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 487.

!.O Maqrizi and Safadi say that lhe first person who was employed in Saladin 's Chancery was Fakhr al-Dawla al-Aswani of the Zubayr family who supported Saladin in Alexandria. See, Maqrizi , MuqafJa, 1,269; Safadi , (ed ) S. Dedering (Beirut, 1972), VI, 118-9.

~1 Maqrizi, Khitat, 111 , 378-9; cf: H. Dajani-Shakeel, ~ Displacemcnt oflh e Pal­estinians During the Crusades·, MW, LXVIII (1978), 175.

20 C H A PTER ONE

governor of Ascalon. He was recalled to Cairo and punished fo r thi s neglect of duties by confisca tio n of his property. He died grief­stri cke n and penniless. His d eath h ad a direct inOue nce o n the young Qadi al-Fadil , who could not continue his training in the administra tion. Yaqul 's anonymous source says that Qadi al-Fadil went on fOOL to Alexandria to seek a fresh start in the se rvice of the cadi Ibn Hadid, who e mployed him as a scribe for a salary of three dinars per mon th .52 One could live on such a salary. but Qadi a l-Fad il could barely support his siblings, a brother and a sisler, who lived in grea t difficulties in Ascalon. Only fo llowing the fall of the town to the Crusaders was the family reunited. DUling the time of Qadi a l-Fadil 's employment in the service o f Ibn Hadid his great talent in the e pistolary art was manifested . So much so that the other scribes in Ibn Hadid 's service became e nvio us and anxious for the ir positio ns. They smeared Qadi al-Fadil at the court in Cairo and th e Fatimid Imam al-Zafir ( 1149- 11 54) o rde red his governor in Alexandria to punish Qadi a l-Fadil by cutting off his hand. But he was dissuaded from sending his o rders by Ibn a l­Anbari, a scribe in the Chancery. Eventually, through the efforts of Ibn al-Anbari, Qadi al-Fadil was examined by al-Zafir and of­fered a position in Cai ro. But he could not e njoy security for a long time. He, like others, was e ngulfed by the political upheav­a ls of the late Fatimid period.

Following the ascendancy of Dirgham to viz ie rate and the es­cape o f Shawar to Damascus, Qadi a l-Fadi l found himself in an uneasy position . Dirgham was greatly annoyed by Qadi a l-Fadi l' s association with al-Kamil . Shawar' s son, who re mained in Cairo. Qadi al-Fadil, like 'Umara. was afraid of Dirgham 's wraLh and sought the intervention ofMulhim, Dirgham 's bro ther. on his behalf. But this prudent move by Qadi a l-Fadi l was not enough to forestall

!'>2 Yaqut, Udaba', IV, 1563. The combination of the posts of cadi and official respon sible for the secre t police had precede nts in the Fatimid state. For the activity of secret police, see Y. Lev, ~The Suppression of Crime, the Supervision of Markets, and Urban Society in th e Egyptian Capital duri ng the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries", Mediterranean Historical Review, 3( 1988), 77-9. Diverse in­fo rmation ahom the secret police is to he fou nd in the documents of the Cairo Ge niza. See, S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 197 1). II , 37 1, 379. The Banu Hadid were a Mali ki fami ly from Toledo which had senled in Alexandria in 1086-1087, and rose to power in the second decade of the twelfth cen tury. See, Maqrizi, Muqaffa, I, 505, 506-7. For th e family, see 'Abd al-'Aziz Salem, ~ D'A1exandria a A1meria ft

, Revue de i'Occident musuiman et de ia Medilerranee, 46(1987), 64-70, esp. , 65-6.

THE SOURCES 21

his imprisonmenlLOgether with al-Kamil. Both were released only after the defeat and death ofOirgham. Qadi al-Fadil was rewarded for his loyalty to a l-Kamil ; he enjoyed a high position in Shawar's circle and the tiL1e al-Fadil was conferred upon him. 53 The fact that Qadi al-Fadil was Shawar's propagandist is we ll estab lished. He publicly supported, through his poetry, Shawar's decision to ask the help of the Crusaders aga inst Shirkuh.54

But the changing political circumstances had once again an ad­verse effect on Qadi al-Fadi l's life and position. Following the killing ofShawar, Qadi al-Fadi l found himself without a patron. Accord­ing to Yaqut's version, al-'Adid interceded with Shirkuh for Qadi al-Fadil's safety, and he invited him LO join his service. But Qadi al-Fadil refused to give his assent to the vi lification of Shawar's name. Nonetheless, Qadi al-Fadil established friendly relations with Shirkuh and after his death he was instrumental in convincing al­'Adid to nominate Saladin as vizier. 55 These two items of infor­mation provided by Yaqut are simply untenable. Yaqut's source is at pains to portray Qadi al-Fadil in a positive light as a man of principle who did not distance himself from his benefactors-the Shawar family. At the same time, Qadi al-Fadi l is g iven credit for the promotion of Saladin. This version of Qadi al-Fadil's early life tries to explain the problematic shift of Qadi a l-Fadil's loyalties from the Fatimids to the Ayyubids by stressing Qadi al-Fadil's re­lations with a l-'Adid, which are unattested by other source.

Leaving aside the tendentio us information of Yaqut's version, his biography of Qadi al-Fad il portrays a man whose life, like that of <Imad ai-Din , was determined by forces which were beyond his control. As 'Umara's autobiography vividly shows, the rapidly changing political scene of the twelfth century forced members of the civilian elite to search for patrons. What they had to offer was their skills and loya lty. However, in order to survive in the face of changing political circumstances, they had to display flex­ibility and be able to change loyalties and patrons. Yaqut's source tries to convey the impression that when Qadi al-Fadil was faced with such a dile mma, he acted in a dignified way.

~, YaquI, Udaba', IV, 1563-4. ~ H. Oajani-Shakeel, -Egypt and the Egyptians: A foca l Point in the Policies

and Literature of ai-Qadi al-Fadil\JNES, 36(1977), 26. ~5 YaquI, Udaba', IV, 1565-6.

22 CHAPTER ONE

IV. Qadi al-Fadi l nourished in the sen,jce of Saladin. His career was tied to Egypt. Although he visited other lowns and regions of the Middle East, Qadi al-Fad il was an Egyptian in the full sense of the word. In COlllrast to ' lmad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad whose edu­catio n and careers brought them to live in many parts of the Middle East, Qadi al-Fadilleft Egypt only on trips in the sClvice ofSaJadin and for the pilgrimage to the Holy Ci ti es of Arabia. Qadi al-Fadil's exact administrative duties in Egypt are not emirdy clear. For example, ' Imad ai-Din, in his obituary note on Qadi al-Fadi l, says in appreciative but vague language that Qadi al-Fadi l was the prin­cipa l drivi ng force behind the affa irs of Salad in 's regime (dawLa).56 Beside this remark very Iiule concrete information is available. Yaqut says that Qadi a l-Fad i! was above such things as concerning himself with the title of vizier. He performed the work of the vizie r behind the scenes (l ite rally in secret, sirran).57 This piece of information ta llies with the overall aim o f the source used by Yaqut, but adds liule to our lInderstanding of the isslle. It sho uld be kept in mind that Qadi al-Fad il 's skills, which earned him the admiration of his comemporaries. were clerical and no t adminis­trative . T herefore he was n o t a natural candidate for the post o f vizier. About Qadi a l-Fadil 's actua l administrative assignments we know very little . For example, it is said that in 584/ 11 88- 11 89, Saladin renewed Qadi al-Fadil 's appoimment as the official respon­sible for th e affairs of Egyp1.58 In 586/ 1190-1191, he was involved in equipping and dispatching ships to Acre to help Saladin's mili­tary effort in the war for the town. 59

During the absence of Saladin from Egypt, the COllntl)' was ruled by other members of his family; a l-cAdil , Saladin's brother, and Taqi a i-Din, his nephew. Qadi a l-Fadil's position when al-'Adi) ruled Egypt was somehow ambiguous. He obeyed a l-'Adil's orders, but d id nOt hesitate to blame him for harmful policies which brought the finances of Egypt into disarray. However, h e brought his criti­cism of a)-'Adil to Saladin's auemion on ly after the d eparture of a l-cAdi l from Egypl.60 Qadi a l-Fadil's involvement in the internal

~ Abu Shama. AI,Rawdatayn fi Akhbar a[.J)awlotayn, (Beirut. n. d.), II , 24 1. ~7 Yaqut. Udaba', IV, 1562. !18 Abu Sham a, (Beiru t), II , 137. 59 Ibid, 165; Abu Shama, 'UJun al-RawdiJtaJ,yt,in Akhbar a[.Dawlotayn, (ed) A.

al-Baysumi (Damascus, 1992), II , 220. IiO Lyons and J ackson, 211-2.

THE SOU RCES 23

politics of Saladin' s fa mily was considerable. Following Saladin 's seizure of Aleppo Oune 11 83), a l-'Adil asked to be a llowed to relinquish Egypt in favor of the newly annexed te rritory. Qadi al­Fadil was instrume ntal in lhe appointmel1l of Taqi a i-Din , with whom he was o n fri endly terms, to Egypt and the transfer of al­'Adil to Aleppo.61 It seems that Qadi al-Fadi l was caught in a web of conflicting loyalties to Saladin, his sons and other members of the family.62 Due to unspeci fi ed reasons-sickness o r pe rhaps es­trangement fro m Salad in-Qadi al-Fad il remained in Damascus and did not accompany Salad in on the campaign which ended in the victory at the Ho rns of Hittin . Neither was Qadi al-Fadil present a t the conquest of J erusalem by Saladin . None theless, ' Imad al­Din claims that after Hittin Saladin sought Qadi a l-Fadil 's advice on military matters.63

Following the dea th of Saladin in Damascus, Qadi al-Fadil re­turned to Egypt where he was received with great honors by al­Malik al-'Aziz 'Uthman . Saladin's son who ruled the country. But the last years of Qadi al-Fadil' s life in Egypt were not particularly quiet or happy. He was affec ted by problems in the family life of his brother, 'Abd ' I-Karim, who lived in Alexandria, and he be­came involved in the quarrels betwee n Salad in 's heirs and their emirs. 64 Qadi al-Fadil died on 7 Rabi ' II 596/ 25 J anuary 1200, and was buried at the Little Cemetery on the foot of the Muqattam Hill. Ibn Khallikan testifies that he visited Qadi a l-Fadil' s mauso­leum ( lurba) several times and gives the date of his death as in­sc ribed on it. 65 In his lifetime Qadi al-Fadil reaped the material

61 Abu Shama. ( Bei nlt), 11 ,5 1-2 (q uoting ' Im ad a i-Din ). 62 Lyons and J ackson, 223; Abu Sham a, (Bcinu ), II , 70 (quoti ng Qadi al-Fadil's

lelter to Taqi a i-Din ). For Qadi a l-Fadil's strained relations, ir not open animo.5'­iry, with al-'Adil, see Ibn Taghribirdi , AI·N uj um a{·lahiraji Muluk Misrwa-'l-Qahira, (Cairo, 1932-1950), Vl , 157. ' Imad aI-Din characterizes Taqi ai-Din , in co ntrast to al-'Adil , as e ndowed wi th hidda, vigor but a lso a potelllial ror vio le nce. Thus, he needed the man agement or Qadi a l-Fadil to rectiry the conseq uences or his aClion. See, Al-Barq al-Shami, (cd) R. Sese n (Istanbul , 1979), V, 154.

M Abu Shama, (Be irut) , II , 82, 99; 'Uyun, II , 144, 158, 186. Sibt ibn a l-Jaw.t.:i (d. 1257) says that Qadi al-Fadil was absent fro m the battle fo r the conquest of

J e rusale m due 10 a sic kness which kepi him in Dam ascus. See, Mira '( ai-lammi, (Hyderbad , 195 1), VIII , pt,l, 398.

&I Maqrizi, Kitab fll-Suillk, (cd) M. M. Ziada (n. p., n. d ), I, pt, l , 143 , 156-7, 177, 198.

M Ibn Khallikan, III , 162.

24 CHA PTE R ONE

benefits of his high position and fame . He was a rich man who used his wealth to sustain his interest in learning and for phiJan. thropic purposes. Accord ing to the lale Safadi (d. 1363), Qadi al­Fad il 's ann ual remuneration was as high as 50,000 dinars. In ad­dition, as a private person, he was engaged in trade with India and Nonh Africa. Qadi ai-Fad i) set up many pious endowments for the support of students of law and the educa tion of orphans. He established a large highly profitable commercial building he had owned (rab', khan) as a pio lls e ndowme nt fo r the ransoming of prisoners-of-war.66 Of Qadi al-Fadil' s own family, wives and children, lillie is known. He had several sons and the most famous among them was ai-Qadi ai-Ashraf Ahmad Abu ' I-<Abbas who died in 643/ 1245-1246. He seTVed the Ayyubid rulers bfEgypt with many ups and downs. Ahmad had a vast library but it became dispersed following confiscation by the Sultan al-Kamil. A passion for books mn in Qadi al-Fadil's fami ly. Abu ' I-Qasim, another brother of Qadi al-Fadil , was also an avid book collector. 57

V. Qadi al-Fadil 's unusual skill in the e pisto lary art won him the admiration of his contempo raries and later gcneratio ll s. 68 Never­theless a few scattered remarks shed a somewhat diffe re nt light on the literary activities of Qadi al-Fadil. For instance, some of the books to which Qadi al-Fadil claimed au thorship were in fact written by others. And Qadi al-Fadi l' s epistolary letters were drawn from the rasa 'it of a former Fatimid scribe who died in 432/ 1040-1041 while imprisoned at the royal jail in Cairo.69

66 Safadi quotes Q;ldi aI-Fad iI's cOlHcmporary, Jamal aI-Din ibn Shiyash, who says that Qadi al-Fadil wId him about the dedication of the khan as a waqf in a comersation they had before Qad i al-Fadil set o n a pilgrimage to Mecca. See, Safadi, (ed) A, F. Sayyid , (Beiru t, 1988), XVJ II , 345, 379-80, For other pious endowmen ts set up for ranso ming prisoners in Iwelflh-ce nlUry Syria, see Mou­LOn, 87-8.

67 For Qadi al-Fildi!'s son Ahmad, see Maql'izi, Su/uk, 227, 27 1, 295; Safadi, (ed) I. ' Abbas, (Beirut, 1969), VII , 57. The name of the tutor of Qad i al-Fadil's sons is recorded by Safadi. See, (ed) S. Dedcring (Bcirut, 1972), VI, 152-3. For Abu 'I-Qasim sec, Safadi (ed ) R. al-Sayyid (Beirut, 1993) , XIX, 82.

M Bolh Ibn Khallikan (III , 15S-9) and Ibn Fur,lt (IV, pl,2, 185) quote ' Imad a l-Din's Kharidat al-Q(jsr in which Qadi al-Fadil is described as: Mlhe master of Lhe pcn , stylc and languageM. For criticism of Qadi a l-Fadil's style by aI-Wah rani (d . 11 78) , see Ayy.td, 423.

69 These remarks a re nOI included in Yaqut's biogr.tphy of Qadi al-Fadi l. The relevant information is scallered throughout the whole ofYaqut's huge biographi­cal diclionary. See, Udaba', II , 639, III , 1000. Safadi follows Yaq uI by saying thaI

THE SOURCES 25

Only part of Qadi al·Fadil's huge correspondence (rasa 'it) has survived either in a manuscript form or through quotation by later historians. The scope of this correspondence is very diversified. Qadi al·Fadil wrote on behalf of Saladin and his brother, al·'Adil, to the Caliph in Baghdad, his vizier as well as to many other Muslim rulers of the time. This correspondence includes reports on cur· rent events containing references even to minor incidents. The main purpose of these lellers was not merely to inform the reader about Saladin's deeds, but to present the deeds and the inten· Lions of Saladin in a favorable light. More than anything else, Qadi al-Fadil was Saladin's propagandist. Nonetheless, he was also a histo­rian. Qadi al·Fadil wrote a detailed chronicle in which he recorded events on a daily basis. This work, known under many titles (the most common being MUlajaddidal) , has not survived and is avai l­able only th rough citations by later autilOrities. 70 The loss of the MUlajaddidat is irreplaceable especially as a source for the history of Egypt and, to some exte11l. for the history of Saladin himself, altho ugh for the history of Saladin we have a greater variety of sources. In llsing the information cited from Mutajaddidal , it should be remembe red thatlhere is no strict dividing line between Qadi al·Fadi l the propagandist of Saladin and Qadi al·Fadil the histo· rian of Saladin.

Asad ibn Mammati composed books in the nallle of Qadi al-Fadi l. Sec, (cd) J. van us (Beirut, 1974). IX, 23. Due to the importance of the letters written by the Fatimid Chancery. gr.unmarians were employed in it as ed itors. See, Ibn al­Qifti, Anbah al-Rllwat 'ala Anbah ai-Nuhat, (ed ) M. Abu ' J-Fadl Ibrahim (Cai ro. 1952), II , 95, 96; Maqrili, Itti '(II .. 11 ,3 18. Evidently. Qadi al-Fadil needed no editor. Thejail (khiz.anat al-bullud), was located within the complex of the Fatamid roY-d.1 palaces. It "''as set up by al-Zahir (1021-1036) ll.'§ a royal wor~hop. For its subsequent history, see Maqrizi. Khital. I. 27g.9. and a$ jail. 280.

iO For a discussion of the charac ter of the MUlajoddidat, see H. Rabie, Tht f inmICial System ofl!gJpt A. H. :J64-741/A. D. 1169-1341, (London , 1972), 13-4; H. Mohring, Saladin u"d dtr On'lIt Krtuuug, (Wicsbaden, 1980).220-1. The ques­tion of the differe nt litles of this work has been examined by M. H. M. Ahmad. See. his ~Sollle NOles on Ar.lbic HistOriography During lhe Zengid and Ayyubid Periods (52 1 / 1127-648/ 1 250)~, in J-/i.Jtoria11J of tht Mi(ldlt East. (cds) B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (London , 1962).85-6. A long quotation from the Mutojaddidat concerning the history of Yemen is found in Ibn al-'Adim's BughJat, VI, 2843-5.

26 C H A PTER ONE

b. <[mad al-Din

I. ' Imad ai-Din was born in Isfahan o n 2Jumada II 5 19/ 6July 1125. In contrast with Qadi al-Fadil , ' Imad ai-Din acquired a solid edu­cation in jurisprude nce. He be lo nged to the Shafi'j school of law and studied at the Nizamiyya in Baghdad where he distinguished himself in comparative law (khilaj) and belle-Iettres (funun al-adab). AI-Mundhiri says that ' Imad ai-Din taught (haddalha) the Prophetic traditions in Baghdad, Damascus and Fustat. Like many o ther graduates or law colleges, <Imad ai-Din sought employment in the administratio n . He was accepted into the se rvice of the Abbasid vizie r Yahya ibn Hubayra ( 1105- 11 65), who appoin ted him to administrative posts in the towns of Was it and Basra in Iraq .71 ' Imad a l-Din 's patron was a towe ring figure in th e political and cultura l life of his age. In his ac tivities h e strived to strengthen th e po liti­ca l autono my of the Abbasid Calipha te, to combat Shi<ism and to promote the advance of the traditio nal movement. In 11 65, after th e d ea th of Ibn Hubayra, hi s former employees, including <Imad a i-Din , fo und themselves in prison. But for ' Imad a i-Din it was a short imprisonme nt. In Sha' ban 562/May:June 11 67, he was al­ready in Damascus searching for a new patron and employm ent.72

In many respects the religious and cullural life o f Damascus was not much different from that of Baghdad. Ibn Hubayra 's policies were emulated by Nur ai-Din, and trad itio na lism characteri zed the cullural li fe o f Nur a l-Din's Syria LOO. 73 This cultural unity of Is­lamic Middle East faci litated the movement around the regio n of people of the civilian e lite searching for career opportunities.

<Imad a i-Din made a spec tacular career in Damascus. The man

71 Ibn Khallikan, V, 147-8. AI-Mundh iri ( 11 ,288) says lha l he received from ' Imad a i-Din an ijaw (au thorizatio n LO teach / transmit a ce rtain text) issued in 595/ 11 98-1199 in Damascus. AI-M undhiri was fo urteen years old when he at­tended ' Imad al·Din·s classes. For the Isfahan backgrou nd of' lmad ai-Din '! family, his ! lUdie5, ex pertise in jurisprudence and his search for employment, see L. Richter·Bcrnburg, ~Funken aus dem kalten Flint: ' Imad a l·Din al·Katib a l- Isfahani~, Die Welt des Orients, XX/ XX I (1989/ 90), 121 -55.

n Al.Bundari, 52, 55-7. Fo r the period of ' Imad al·Din's employment in the service of Ibn Hubayra, see Richter-Bcrnburg, "Funken~ , XX/ XX I( 1989/ 90), 155-62; N. Rabbat, ~My Life with Salah a l·Din: The Memoirs of ' 1m ad al·Din a l-Kalib al-Isfahani ~, Edtbiyal, 7(1997), 273-4.

75 For Ibn Hubayra, see H. Mason, Two Statesmen ofMtdieval lslam, (The Hague, 1972). Fo r his infl uence on Nur ai-Di n, see N. Elisseeff, Nur at-Din, WI grand princt musulman dt Syrit au temps des Croisades, (Damasc us, 1967), III , 750-70; see alsoSourdcl. 171, 173, 182.

T H E SOU RCES 27

who opened the way fo r h im in Damascus was Nur al-Din 's chief administrator, the cadi al-Shahrazu ri , whom ' Imad ai-Din befriended and whose companion he became. He was appoin ted by ai­Shahrazuri to the Chancery where ' Imad al-Din 's command of Persian proved valuable. ' Imad ai-Din left a vivid account of his misgivings about the kind o f work awailing him in the Chancery.74 His previous appo intments were o f an administra tive nature while the work in the Chancery was essentially cleri ca l. However , he became fascinated by the fl ow of informatio n that reached the Chancery in the fo rm ofie uers from dine rent regions, and by the need to keep contac t with rulers in Pe rsia, Syria and Egypl. 75 He clearly found his assignmen t absorbing and he successfully ado pted himself LO the new working envi ro nme nt. ' Imad ai-Din also man­aged to establish fri end ly relations with o ther administraLOrs in Nur al-Din 's service. Notable among the m was al-Qaysa rani , who later se rved as Nur al-Din 's e nvoy to Saladin in Egypl.76

' Imad al-Din 's service in the Chancery became the key to enter into Nur al-Din's inner ci rcle and to gain h is confidence. By 568/ 1172- 11 73, ' Imad ai-Din was in cha rge of two administra ti ve of­fi ces (diwans): the Chancery and the Office of the Finance (uti/a'), which was respo nsible fo r Slate's incomes and expenses. In add i­tio n he served as a muslwrifof Nul' al-Din 's diwan (i.e. a fin ancial supervisor of the o ffice which was responsible fo r the management of Nur ai-Din 's personal esta tes and properties). Occasionally, ' Imad ai-Din went o n d iplomatic miss io ns o n be half of Nul' a l-Din .n Another fea ture of ' Imad al-Din 's career in Damascus was his in­volvement as a teacher and administrator in the world of learn­ing. In Rajab 567/ February-March 11 72, ' )mad ai-Din was nomi­nated as a p rofesso r of law (mudarris) at a law co llege es tablished

74 AI.Bundari, 68-9: Ibn Khallika n, V, 148: cf: D. S. Richa rds. MA Conside r· ation of Two Sources fo r Lhe Life of Salad in M.JSS. 25( 1980). 47-8. and M' lrnad 011· Din M

, 135-6. For the beginning of ' Imad a l-Din's career in Damascus, see Rich­tcr·8crnburg. MFun ken M

, Die Well MJ Orien/s, XX lI (1991), 105-10. 7~ AI-Bundari, 67-8. 76 Ibn al.'Adim. VI I, 3 100 (quoting ' Imad a l-Din's Kharidal a/·Q(lJr). 77 AI.Bundari. 67, 88, 94-5, 12(}. I , 13 1: Abu Shama. I. p l.2. 524: cf: Richa rds.

M' lmad a l_DinM, 136-7. Fo r iSlifa' in th e Sclj llkid pe riod, see M. F. Koprll lll, Tht: &ljuks 0/ A llalolia, ed ited and tra nsla ted into English by G. Leiser. (Salt Lake City, 1992),35. In Fatimid Egypt diwall al.islifa·se rved as lhe Inspection Omce. See, C. Khan, Arabic Legal and Admi1!ulralivtl Documerlls in Ihe Cambridge (dniwh Colkctions, (Cam bridge, 1993), 162-3,322.4 18. Fo r th e Mamll1k pefiod. see Rabie. 156-7.

28 CHAPTER ONE

by Nur ai-Din while serving at the same lime as Comptroller (nazir) of the college's finances. 78

Following the death of Nur ai-Din , ' Imad ai-Dill's position be­came precarious.79 It must have been a traumatic experience. For the second lime in his li fe. ' Imad ai-Din was forced to seek an uncenain future in a new place. He left Damascus, where he had family and property, and wen l to Aleppo. But he fell unsafe there and moved to Mosul. From Mosul ' Imad ai-Din intended to go Baghdad , where his uncle and a younger brother lived. However, he became seriously ill in Mosul and never reached Baghdad. In Syria ' lmad ai-Din found his third patron and a new benefaclor­Saladin. The meeting be tween ' Imad ai-Din and Saladin was not coincidental; it took place at 'Imad ai-Din's in itiative.so ' Imad al­Oin and Saladin were not total strangers. According to « mad al­Din's own tes timony, he had become acquain ted with Najm al­Oin Ayyub, Saladin's father, during his early career in Iraq wh ile selVing the vizier Ibn Hubayra. At that time. Ayyub with his brother, Shirkuh, served as the governors of the town ofTakrit in Iraq where ' Imad ai-Din's uncle was imprisoned on the orders of the Seljukid Sultan Malikshah.81 When ' Imad ai-Din alTived in Damascus, Ayyub and Shirkuh had already served Nur a i-Din in military capacities. In Damascus, <Imad ai-Din approached Ayyub and composed in his honor an eulogizing poem; he was a lso on friendly terms with Sh irkuh and Saladin. 82 The question is to what extent we should trust ' lmad ai-Din 's accoulll of his amicable relations with the Ayyubid famil y prior to his entry into Saladin's service? The back­ground to ' Imad al-Di n 's familiarity with Ayyub and Shirkuh is tenuous at best: it should be pointed out that ' Imad al-Din 's uncle was execliled in Takrit. Nonetheless, he exonerates both Ayyub and Shirkuh from any blame for this unfortunate event. It seems

78 AI-Bundari, 59, 119-20; Ibn Khallikan, V, 149.1l1e combination ofa leaching posi tion with administrative dUlies had a long tradition in the madrasa going back to th~ establishment of the Nizamiyya in Baghdad. See, Makdisi, ~ Muslim

Institu tions of Learning~, 16. 79 AI-Bundari , 159-60. 80 YaqUl, Udaba', VI , 2624. For ' Imad al-Din's rounger brothe r, see al-Mundhiti,

11 ,367-8; Richtcr-Bernburg, ~ Funken~, XX II ( 1991), 117-22. 81 AI.Bundari, 56-7. For ' Imad al-Din's unde, se.e Ibn Khallikan , I, 188-9. 82 Al-Bu ndari, 59, 67-8: Abu Shama, I, p l,2. 369; Ibn Khallikan , V, 148 (quoting

<Imad al·Din's al-Barq al-Shamj). For ' Imad al-Di n 's early relations with th e Ayyubid famil y, see Rabbat, ~My Life M

, 271-2.

T .. n: SOU RCES 29

that it was very imporlant for ' lmad ai-Din to establish that his relations with the Ayyubids had already been good during Nur al­Din's rule . Thus, his entry into Saladin's se rvice was an outcome of his early re lations with the Ayyubid family and not an act of opporlUnism dictated by the precarious conditions in which he found himself following Nur al-Din's death. Whether ' Imad al-Din's account is based on solid fact, or is merely a tendemious retro­spective embellishment of th e events , or even pure invention , remains hard to settle. There are some characteristic parallels between Yaqut's version of Qadi al-Fadil's en try into the service of the Ayyubids and ' Imad al-Din's version of his early relations with them. Both tried 1O explain the ir shift of loya lties in favor­ab le terms. Whi le Qadi a i-Fad iI's shift of loyalties was a radical one, ' lmad ai-Din had less ofa need 1O explain his behavior; after the death of one Sunn i ruler he entered into the se rvice of an­other Sunni ru ler both of whom he manifestly admired.

' lmad ai-Din's path into Saladin's service was not smooth ; his opponents tried 1O prevent his nomination LO Saladin's Chancery, However, ' Imad ai-Din was not a novice in struggles in the corri­dors of power; his experience and acumen LOld him to secure the goodwill of Qadi al-Fadil who, however, was not eas ily accessible. ' Imad ai-Din was fortunate in finding a person willing to inter­cede on his behalf with Qadi al-Fadil. This was Ibn Masal who was influential with both Saladin and Qadi al-Fadil. When ' Imad al­Oin and Qadi al-Fadil became acquainted they found they spoke a COlll mon language. and Qadi a i-Fad iI's advoGlcy was instrumen­tal for ' Imad al-Din's entry into Saladin's se rvice. ' Imad al-Din's merits, as pointed out by Qadi al-Fadil, wefe evident: his command of Persian and his knowledge of the internal aflairs of Nur al-Din's state, Qadi al-Fadil showed no objection 1O th e employment of ' Imad ai-Din in Salad in 's Chancery.8s

' Imad al-Din's relations with Qadi a l-Fadil remained amicable throughout the whole period of their employment in the service of Saladin. In his writings, ' Imad ai-Din refers LO Qadi al-Fadil as wahid ai-zaman (one [of his] lime ) chosen by God and the Sul­tan.84 The impress ion gained from ' Imad al-Din's writing is of

83 Abu Shama, I, pl.2, 633, 641·2 (quoling ' Im ad ai-Din). 8.f Abu Shama, (Beirut), II , 241,242. (quoting ' Imad al-Din 's Kharidal al-Qasr

and his obituary nOle on Qadi al-Fadil).

30 CHAPTER ONE

admiration and gratitude to Qadi al_Fadil.85 In 572/1171)..1177, ' Imad aI-Din accompanied Saladin on a journey to Egypt where he enjoyed the hospitality of Qadi al-Fadil, who made his stay a pleasant and memorable event.86 The geographical separation between <Imad aI-Din, who most of the time was in Damasclis . and Qadi al-Fadil in Egypt and the faclthat they were not compcliLOrs for posts and Saladin's favor smoOlhed relations between them. In contrast to Qadi al-Fadil, ' Imad ai-Din was an experienced administrator and he served Saladin in Damascus in administra­tive capaci ties. In 571 / 117~1176, he was aJsa responsible for hearing grievances at the Palace of Justice. In addition to his administra­tive duties, <Imad ai-Din accompanied Saladin on his campaigns. <Imad ai-Din died on the 1st of Ramadan 597/4 Juny 1201 , in Damascus and was buried in a Sufi cemetery.87

II. For the purpose of the present study, the most important work among <Imad ai-Din 's historical writings is al-Barq al-Shami (the Syrian Lightning), which covers the years 562-589/ 1166-1193. Only two of its volumes have survived in a manuscript form, but many other passages are known through quotations by later historians.88 This work was abridged by Fath ibn 'Ali a l-Bundari under the title Sana al-Barq ai-Sham;. The opening sections of Sana include ' Imad al­Din 's statement that he began to work on the Syrian Lightning fol­lowing Saladin's death fearing that the name of Saladin might fall into oblivion. ' Imad aI-Din explicitly states that his intention is to provide an account of his knowledge of Saladin, his relations with him and the services he rende red him. 'Imad ai-Din explains that his work will include the history of Salad in's family prior to their arrival to Syria. how he himself enLered into Saladin's service and the record of Saladin's life year by year. 89 Ibn Khallikan in his

M For example, ' Imad ai-Din mentions that Qadi al-Fadil helped him to se-cure an adeq uate financial su pport from Saladin. See, a l-Bundari . 212.

86 AI-Bundari, 236; Richter-Bernburg, K Funken~ , XXII(1991), 128-31. 87 AI.Bundari, 198-9; Sibt ibn al:Jawzi , ( I-Iyderabad, 1952), VIII, pl,2, 505. 88 For a detailed examination of these IwO volumes, see I-I .A.R. Cibb, MAI_

Barq al-Shami: T he HiSlory of Saladin by the Kalib ' Imad ai-Din al_lsfahanift, Wiener Ztitst:hrijt II;r dill KU11lill dtlS Mo~lancills. 52( 1953-1955),93-1 15. Before "mad al­Oin began to work on al-Barq al-Sharni he had already finished the writing of a chronicle dealing with the vic!Ory at "Ii u in and the subseque nt conquest of Palestine and Syria by Saladi n.

89 AI-Bundari . 52-3.

TIn: SOU RCES 31

description of lhe Syrian L ighlning faithfully recorded <Imad al-Din 's statemen t o n the o bjec tives of his work. Ibn Khallikan says that ' Imad ai-Din began work o n lhe Syrian Lighlning during his re tire­me nl fo llowing Saladin 's death . The fi rst pan of this ten-volume work consisted of a descriptio n of ' Imad a l-Din 's own career in Iraq and Syria unde r Nur ai-Din as we ll as references to the cir­cumstances which led him to withdraw into private life.9o

Mod ern scho lars who have studied lhe S)'rian L ighlning, speak of it as ' Imad al-Din 's memoirs.9] This charac te ri zatio n is not an exaggera tio n . Auto biographical re ferences a re q uite commo n in the Barq and Sana-they appear a t the beginning of the work and as a part of the narra tive. ' Imad al-Din 's sca tte red auto biographi­cal remarks reveal a high degree o f complacency. ' Imad aI-Din was pro ud of his ta len ts and accomplishme n ts and conveys this to his readers. He summarizes his positio n vis-a-vis Saladin by declaring that "my pe n was at a ll times a partner of his swo rd ".92 Elsewhere, ' Imad ai-Din says that the pe n is his a rmament, and o nly th ro ugh his pe n were Saladin 's a rmies mustered .93 These sayings re fl ect ' lmad a i-Din view of himself; he saw himself as belo nging to the cle rical c1ass-a gro up distinct fro m the military. How <lmad al­Oin views these two diffe rent segmen ts of society is best exempli­fied by his own words and deeds. In 574/ 11 78-1179, ' Imad ai-Din was asked to execute a p risoner-or-wa r, bu t he d eclined to d o so by explaining that his calling is the pen no t the sword .94 No less te lling are ' Imad ai-Dill 's words. He characte ri zes Baha' a i-Din Qaraqush , a leading member of the mil ita ry class o f Saladin 's period , the builder of Cairo 's fo rtifi catio ns and the d efender of Acre, as a Turk who had neithe r knowled ge o f books no r fam il-

90 Ibn Khallikan, V, 150, 152. 91 Fo r exam ple, L. Ricllle r-Be rn burg characterizes IIie Syriml Lightnillg as:

~' Imad ai-Dill's memoirs~ in which "long poems and episto lary exchange of a sometimes very priva te c ha r.lcter re pea ted ly interrup t the contex t of the histori­cal narra tive". Sec, his "Obse rva lions on ' Irnad al-Din 's al-Fath al-QlIssi fi ' l-Falh al-QlIdsi", in Siudia Arabica and Islarnica, FesLSchrift for Ihsan 'Abbas, (ed) W. al­Qad i (Be irlll. 198 1),376. and ~FlIn ke n M, XX II (l99 1), 135-6. See, also Richards. ~' Irnad a l_Din M, 141 , 144; Ra bba t. MMy Life~ , 267-9, esp., 283-4, n. l.

9'2 AI-Bundari, 53; cf: Richards, ~A Consideration~, 49. 93 See, At-Falli al-Qussifi 'i-Fa/h al-Qudsi, (ed) C. de Landberg (Le ide n, 1888),

483. 94 Al-Bundari, 308. For a deta iled disCLIssion of these views of ' Irnad ai-Di n

and his personali ty, sec Richter-Be rn burg, H FlInken~, XX II (199 1), 130-2; Rabbat, "My LifeM

, 282-3.

32 C HAPTER ONE

iarity with litera ture. In contrast to ' lmad a i-Din, Ibn Khallikan had a betler perspective of Qaraqush: he says that Saladin and Islam owed him much .95 The lines of distinction between the military class and the civilian e lite were many and visible. T he mi li tary class was composed of Kurds and Turks wh ile the c ivilian eli te consisted mosLly of Arabs and Iranians. Ethnic differences paralle led a linguistic d ivide and positions in th e social hie rar­chy: mlers vis-a.-vis those niled. T hese differences we re compounded and made visible by distinc tive ways of dress ing. 96

H.A. R. Gibb, who studied ' Imad ai-Din 's writings extensive ly and with emotional invo lveme nt, asserts that the "impressio n of van­ity and self-im portance o n the writer's part (i.e. ' Imad ai-Din )", is mistaken. Gibb is a lso very positive in his evaluation of ' Imad al­Din 's qualities as a histo rian and regard s his writings as the best source for Saladin 's life. Gibb 's esteem of ' Imad a i-Din as an his­torian is a lso shared by others. For example, D. S. Richards, a more dispass io nate student of ' Imad a l-Din's writings, cha rac terizes the treatment of Saladin in lhe Syrian Lightning as free from hagio­graphical tende ncies, and he finds that: "his (i.e. ' Imad a l-Din 's) egoti sm is n o t di stasteful".97 None theless it is a pa rtisan account written by an adh erent and admirer. Among the group of Saladin 's historians-admi res, ' Imad a i-Din was in a far closer contact with Salad in than Qadi a l-Fadil who stayed in Cairo, and th e period he had served Salad in was much longer than that of Ibn Shaddad.98

However, during the critical years 11 69- 11 71, ' Imad ai-Din was in Damascus serving as the head of ur a I-Din 's Chancery. The loss of the volumes of the Syrian Lightning deali ng with those years is most unfortunate. It would have been very interesting to read how the events of those years were la ter portrayed by ' Imad aI-Din, with

9!> Ibn Khallikan , IV, 92; followed by Safadi, (cds) M. 'A. Bakhil a nd M. al· H iyari, (Beirut, 1993), XX IV, 223. See, also a l-Bundari , 234; Abu Sha ma, I, pt,2, 686.

96 For inSlance, Ibn a l·'Adim says ( III , 1258) tllal Saladin's son, ai-Malik a i­Muhsin (born in 118 1), occu pied him self with re ligion and lea rnin g. This Slale­ment is emphasized by the observation that he abandoned military auire in favor of the dress of the men of religion a nd learning. Sec, also Maqrizi, Muqaffa, I, 724.

97 Richards, ''' Imad a i-Din"', 133, 144; ~A Consideration", 49; H. A. R. Gibb, ''The Arabic Sources fo r lhe Life of Saladin", Spuulum, 29( 1950),60.

98 O n o ne occasion ' Imad ai-D in secured Saladin 's permission to be abse nl from a campaign a nd on two olher cam paigns he fell sick, missing most of the action. See, Abu Shama, I, p t,2, 697; Richards. "' Imad a l_Di nft, 138-40.

THE SOU RCES 33

the help of hindsigill. and with in the declared aim of lIll! Syrian Lightning-to p reserve the fame of Saladin . The surviving fragments of ' Imad al-Din 's writings dealing with those years are no t a su b­stitUle for the o riginal tex t in its entire ty. AI-Bunclari in his abbre­viatio n of lite Syrian Lightning extrac ted fro m the o rna te narra tive of ' lmad aI-Din excerpts dealing with hist.o ri ca l even ts. A5 with any othe r recension , we are de pende nt o n the editor fo r his se lec­tio n . AI-Bundari 's tex t is lacon ic; ' Imad a l-Din's ri ch style was sac­rificed to the goal of lucidi ty and b revity, This approach has its price; ' Imad al-Din 's interpreta tion of and comments on the events he deals with a re obliterated. Thus, a l-Bundari's recensio n wh ile very useful is o f restricted value only.

c. Ibn al-Shaddad

In cOlllras t to ' Imad a i-Din , who joined Salad in when his personal c ircumstances were a t a very low ebb. Ib n Shaddad entered in to Saladin' s se rvice a t the peak of his career. Ibn Shadd ad was bo rn on 10 Ramadan 539/5 March 11 45, in Mosul , into a family ofShafi' i jurists. Following the premature dea th of the fa the r, Ib n Shaddad was raised by his maternal u ncle and educa ted in his native town specia lizing in the seven cano nical variant readings/ reci ta tio ns o f the Koran. His fi rst recorded appo intment W'ag as a 1IIu'id (a teaching assistance who repealS the lec ture given by the p rofesso r) at the Nizamiyya in Baghdad.99 In 569/ 1173- 1174, afte r four years as mu'id, Ibn Shaddad was appo inted as mudarris a t the newly es tablished law college in Mosul. lOO Ibn Shadd ad and Salad in met in 11 88. At that time Saladin 's achieveme n lS-the victory a t Hi ttin and the conques t of J erusalem- had made h im a legend in h is own life­ti me and Ibn Shaddad was his admirer . He composed fo r Saladin a book o n Ho ly War and need little pe rsuasion to accept an o ffe r to serve Salad in as a military judge and a n o ffi c ia l respo nsible fo r jurisdic tion (llll k m) in J e rusalem. The posts confe rred o n Ibn Shaddad re nect his so lid legal educatio n . Ibn Shaddad-certainly if we contrast him to Qadi al-Fadil and even if we compare him to ' Imad al-Din-was mo re a jurist than man of lette rs. In contrast

99 T he tech n ical terms pertaining to learn ing a nd ed ucation in medicmJ Is· lam are discussed in the various works of G. Mak.disi and more rece n tly by J. Bcrk.:;.;' '!'hI! 'fr(Humission of Knowudgl! in M l!dil!Vol Cairo. ( Princeton. 1992) , 4()'2.

I Ib n Kha11i kan. VII , 86-7.

34 CHAPTER ONE

to <)mad al-Din's fa mOlls anthology of pOCLS and poetry, Kharidat al-Qasr wa-Jaridat AId aPAsr, which exemplifies his interest in and penchant for belles-kitres, Ibn Shaddad's scholarly output is domi­nated by works related to the 1aw. 10 1

For our purposes, Ibn Shaddad's most important work is his biography of Saladin which is divided into t\\TO parts. It is-in the words of Richards-a hagiographical work aiming to portray an "exemplary life" .102 The first pan enumerates Saladin's virtues and the second is a chronicle of his life and deeds. For the period during which Ibn Shaddad served and accompanied Saladin on his campaigns ( 11 8S-1 193), his biography is based on a first-hand knowledge of the events. For the early career of Saladin, Ibn Shaddad's information is of secondary importance only. He must have relied on other works or on oral information. The first part seems to be an improved, extended and better o rganized version of Ibn <Asakir's biographical note on Nur al·Din. As the title of Ibn Shaddad 's work indicates-the Rare (Qualities) of the Sultan and the Merits of Yusuf-the author makes no distinction between the private and the public facets of Saladin's life . The opening sen· tence of the essential part of the text says: " I have seen the days of our Lord and Sultan, the Victorious King, the one who unified the cause of the belief and suppressed the worshippers of the crosses, the one who raised the banner of justice and kindness , Salah al·Dunya wa'I·Din , Sultan of Islam and the Muslims, Deliv· erer of Jemsalem from the hands of the polytheists, the Servant of the two Holy Shrines, Abi ' I·Muzaffar Yusuf ibn Ayyub ibn Shadhi".I0~ The man and the Sultan are identical entities. Ibn Shaddad identifies Saladin with his titles , which are not just epi· thets but a reflection of his actions and embodiment of his per· sonality. Ibn Shaddad is very systematic in his expositio n of Saladin's virtues. The section dealing with Saladin 's religiosity begins by mentioning the Five Pillars of Islam, and proceeds by giving ex­amples how Saladin fulfilled the duty of stating the formula of the creed, prayi ng, a lms·giving, fasting during Ramadan and the

101 Ibn Shaddad, AI-Nawadir al-Suftallina wa- 'l-Mahasill al-Yusufi"a, (cd) J. ai-Din a l-5hayyal (n.p., 1964).85,86-7; Ibn Khallikan, VII, 88.

102 -A Consideration-, 5 1. 1 0~ Ibn Shaddad, 3. For the appcllation -worshippers of the cross ft and its

uses. see Pouzct, 319.

THE SOU RCES 35

pilgrimage. IIH The o ther virtues of Saladin referred to are hisjustice and his personal invo lvement in hearing gl·ievances. 105 Ibn Shaddad describes Saladin's noble conduct, his courage, fortitude, mental strength , firmn ess and calm, his forbearance and his devo tio n to the Holy War. 106 Until this po int Ibn Shaddad' s text tallies with that of Ibn 'Asakir. But Ibn Shaddad d escribes Saladin as endowed also with hilm and ?nuruwwa. 107 Both terms have a long history going back lO pre.lslamic Arabia and acquired a wide range of meaning referring to personal virtues such as justice and mod· era tio n (hilm) and po litica l wisdom (munllvwa).108

Ibn Shaddad's en umeratio n ofSalad in ·s virtues must be exam· ined against a wider lite ra ry context; that of Ion 'Asakir's biogra· phy of Nur al·Din and ' (mad al·Din 's chap ter o n Saladin's virtues included in his al·fath at·Qussifi '[·/ ;alh at·Qudsi, a chronicle deal· ing with lhe battle of Hitlin , the conquest of Palestine and Syria and the Third Crusade. ' Imad al·Din begins by describing Saladin's commitme nt to and involve me nt in the Holy War. But the main cha racte risti c of ' lmad al·Din 's narrative is its personal character: Saladin is depic ted as a pe rson and individual. ' Imad al·Din dwells on Salad in 's manners and modesty, he wore simple clothes and men o f re ligion with whom he associated himself felt in his pres· ence as tho ugh they were sitting with one of their colleges (liter· ally brother) and no t with the Sultan . loo Saladin was generous with everybody: people of his immediate ci rcle, emi rs and administra· tors, people of religion as well as simple folk. ' Imad al·Din 's text is rich in examples of Saladin 's magnanimity quo ting events and describing Saladin's d ealings with certa in people." o

But perhaps the grea tes t importance of these accounts by Ibn Shadd ad and ' Imad al·Din is that they deal with Saladin's religi · osity. Ibn Shaddad says that Saladin believed in Resurrectio n , Hell and Paradise. He disliked philosophers, materiali sts (dllhriyyu71) and ?nu'attila i.e. those who deny God's attributes. And fo r the benefil of Saladin 's young sons the central tenets of religious beliefs

104 Ibn Shaddad, 7-9. 105 Ibid. 13-6. 106 Ibid, 17.8, 19,21-3. 107 Ibid, 28-30. 3 1-4; cf: i'. M. Ho h , "The Virtuous Ruler in Thirteenth-Ce n-

tury Mamluk Royal Biographies M

, Noltingham MtdinJaI Stl/diu, 24( 1980), 28-9. ]08 e h. Pellal, "Muru·a M

• £.1.2, VII , 636-8; " I-lilm~, £.1.2, 111. 39()"'2. ]09 See, Fath, 479-80. 110 Ibid, 48 1-2.

36 C HAPTER ONE

were formulated in the form of a c reed ('aqida) by QUlb a i-Din al-Nisaburi . who was a leading Shafi'i jurist in Damascus of the Zengid and Ayyubid periods.111 <Imad ai-Dill 's description is a little more elaborate. He begins by saying that Saladin was a Shafi'i in hi s legal school and he studied law fro m me n of religion and ju­ri sts. He used to attend sessions of Prophetic traditio ns, but he disliked asu-ologers, logicians and philosophers, and expe lled those who introduced inn ovatio ns (bida<) in religio us rites. He be lieved in th e unity of God (tawhid) and relied on God only (tawakkul) , I ]2

Both authors de pict Saladin's person al religios ity in accordance with what can be desc ribed as th e Sunni onhodoxy of the age. For example, the materialists a re refe rred lO by Ibn al-Qifti , author of the Ayyubid pe riod and a renowned biographe r of savants, as here tics. 113 To what exten t the references to Saladin 's religios ity a re d etermined by the inner religio us world of his historians-ad­mirers a nd their in tentio ns to portray his religiosity as confo rm­ing to orthodoxy is difficu lt to ascertai n . The differe nces between the accounts o f ' Imad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad li e more in the ir liter-try form than in their content. Ibn Shaddad's text is a learned systematic exposi tio n of an impersonal charac te r while ' Imad a l­Din 's text is more emotional , personal and e loquen t.

d. Ibn al-Alhir

I. It is commo n to regard Ibn al-Ath ir as representing the Zengid point of view which was hosti le to Saladin who, foll owing the death of ur ai-Din , had deprived them oflheir patrimo ny. Ibn a l-Athir ( 11 60-1233), a native of Mosul, spe nt most of h is time in the town and its e nviro ns moving in the Zengid ruling circles. From 1211 , Zengid ru le in Mosul was supplanted by Al.abeg Badr ai-Din Lu'lu' , a former military slave (mamluk) of the Zengids. Ibn a l-Athir as we ll as members of his fami ly enjoyed the patronage of Badr al­Oin Lu ' ltt ' who died in 1259. According to Douglas Patlon , Ibn al-Athir's re nowned universal history (al-Kamilfi 'l-T a'rikh) was com missioned by Lu tlu ' . 11 4

111 Ibn Shaddad , 7, 10. For Qu tb ai-Din , see Pouzet. index . IJi! Sec, Fa/h , 484. 11!I C. E. \'o n Gruneballm, Mtd~allslam , (Chicago, 1969),329-330. I H Sec, his Badr ai-Din Lu 'iu' A/abtg of Mosul, 1211-1259, (Seattle, 1991 ), 5-

7,67,

THE SOURCES 37

It remains e lusive whether Ibn a l-Athir had ever met Saladin or members of his inner circle such as Qadi al-Fad il , ' lmad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad. Two of Ibn al-Athir's works are pertinent to the study of Saladin: the history of the Atabegs of Mosul (ai-Ta'rikh ai-Bahir fi 'i-dawla al-AtabakiY)'a) and the unive rsal hisLOlY. The histOlY of the Atabegs of Mosul was comple ted in 12 11 or 1219, and in­cludes a long and detailed eulogy of Nur a i-Din which, as P. M. Holt has shown, was influenced by Ibn Shaddad's biography of Salad in . liS Ibn a l-Athir's universal history has a complex textual history: its first version was completed by the end of the twe lfth century and revised and up-daled between 1223 and 1231 when it abruptly ends. 116 Ibn a l-Athir's account of Saladin, in the univer­sal history, is harshly judged by Cibb who maint;lins that while relying on ' Imad al-Din's the Syrian Lightning Ibn al-Ath ir rewrote it with a malicious twist His conclusion is based upo n a compari­son of Ibn aJ-Athi r's vers ion of the events concerning Saladin in lhe universal history with the two extant manuscript volumes of the Syrian Lightning covering the years J 177-1180 and I J 82-1184. Nonetheless. only one direct quotation from the Syrian Lightning has been attested to in Ibn al-Alh ir's universal history by Cibb. For some reason, Cibb assumes that Ibn al-Athir's account of the yea rs 1169-1171 is not derived from <Imad al_Din. 117

II. In regard to Cibb 's views on the way that Salad in has been treated by Ibn a l-Athir the following points should be taken into consid­eration. I) Since both histo ri ca l works o f Ibn aJ-Alhi r (Bahir and Kamil) were written afte r the conclusion of ' Imad al-Din 's tlU'Syr­ian Light.ning, there is no val id reason to accept Cibb's assump­tion that Ibn a l-Athi r's account of the years 1169·1171 is inde pen-

Il~ See, his -Sa ladin and his Admirers: A Biogr.lphical Reasscssment~, nSOAS, XLVI(1983),236.

116 D. S. Richilrds, -Ibn al-Athir and the Later Pans of the Kamil; A Study of Aims and Mcthods R

, in Mt:dieval Hislarleal \\,rilinKJ ;11 Iht Christia" alld Islnmic Worlds. (ed) D. O. Morgan (London, 1982),80. Fo r Ibn al-Athir's ambi tious goals in writing al·Kmnil ilnd its SlrUClL!re, see Ahmad , 89.

117 Gihb, -The Arabic SourcesR

, 65-6. Gibb has dc mOll stratcd also other de­ficie ncies of Ibn al-Athir 's narrative. Ibn al-Athir 's lISC of the history of Dam· asclls by Ibn a l·Qahm isi for the first half of the twelfth ce nt ury is highly prob­lematic in terms o f accuracy, a nd Ibn al·Athir disto rts sOllie of Ibn al-Qalanisi's accou n ts. See, his "Notes on the Arabic Materials for the Il isLOry of the Earl)' Crusades~, nsOAS, 7(1933-1935), 746-53.

38 C HAIYfER ONE

dem of ' Imad al·Oin. Ibn a)·Athir could have used ' Imad ai-Din for the years 11 69· 11 71 lOO,I1 8 2) Ibn al-Athir did collect infor­ma tion and sources quite inde pendently of ' Imad a i-Din. In both

' works of Ibn al-Athir the re are many accounts based on oral in­formatio n ,I19 For example, the man who was instrumental in the proclama tion of Friday sermons in Egypt in the name of the Abbas ids was pe rsonally known to Ibn al-Alhir,1 20 And the accoun t of Nu r aI-Din 's death is re la ted on the aUlhori[y of his personal physician,I 21 Therefore , the divergence beuveen the works of ' lmad a i-Din and Ibn al-Athir is not n ecessa rily a reflection of Ibn al­Ath ir 's disloflion o f ' Imad ai-Din ; it could have been a resull of different and indepe ndent sources. l22 3) H os tility to Saladin does not discredit outright Ibn a l-Athir's commentary o n Saladin's deeds and motives. For the modern student of Salad in a non-partisan account might prove very valuable. 123 4) A comparison between Ibn a l-Athir 's accounts in the history of the Atabegs and the uni­versal history reveals that the narrative in the unive rsal history is more hostil e lO Salad in. In the universal history Saladin is always portrayed in a worse light than in the history of the Atabegs. 5) However, hosti li ty to Saladin did not permeate the whole of Ibn a l-Athir 's writings. The following example can serve as an illustra­tion for the diffe rent ways Saladin is treated by Ibn a l-Athir. In his account of Shirkuh 's third campaig n in Egyp t, Ibn a l-Athir quotes Salad in as saying: "Allah gave me a possess io n of what I had not coveted". Ibn al-Athir's informant was a person very close lO Saladin .124 The gene ral context within which th is saying ap­pears is Saladin 's reluctance, reported by Salad in himself, to take part in th e third campaign to Egypt. Saladin contrasts his re luc­ta nce willl the ultimate ou tcome of the campaign. Pe rhaps Saladin

118 According LO Richards, ' Imad ai-Din completcd the writing or the Syrian Lightning toward the end or the twelrth cen tu ry, i. e. a lo ng time berore Ibn al­Athir put the last touchcs to his univcrsal history. Sec, MA Considcration M

, 60. 119 Fo r a discussion or Ibn al-Athir·s use o r ora l inrormation , see Ahmad, 90. ]2(1 Ibn al-ALhir, AI·Ta 'nlth al·Bahir ft 'l-Dawla al-AtaMiyya, (cd) A. A. Tolaymat

(Cairo, n. d .), 156. ]2] Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 582. 122 Fo r instance, see the carerul and illuminatin g discussion or such an ex­

am ple by Lyo ns a nd J ackson, 406, nAO. 12~ Such an example is discussed by Humphrcys, see From &ladin to the Mongols,

58-9. ]24 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamilfi 'I- Tn 'rillh, (ed ) C.]. Tornbcrg, (Lciden, 1867· 187 1),

XI, 226; Bahir. HI.

THt: SOURCt:S 39

was indeed reluctant to participate in the third campaign, and certainly the results of this campaign were beyond his expecta­tions. But Saladin's saying is not only a record of his mood at tha t time, it serves a purpose. Saladin 's aim is LO portray himself as a man who is not avid for power. His fortun es were ordained by God in spite of his own reluctance and he is merely a tool of God's will. By using this account, Ibn al-Athir propagates in fact Saladin 's self-created image. hardly a hostile service.

Upon reading of this account one feels that Ibn al-Athir per­haps was not indifferent to Saladin's achievements ag-dinst the Cru­saders. which were undeniable and already brought him fame in his lifetime. He provides a balanced evaluation of Saladin 's mili­tary problems when fighting the Crusaders. For example, Ibn al­Athir describes the deliberations of Saladin's war council before the battle of Hittin . Some of the emirs suggested avoiding a large­scale battle with the ene my and advocated instead waging a war ofatlrition against the Crusaders by constantly raiding their terri­tories. In their opinion this type of warfare would be also instru­mental in si lencing those voices blaming Saladin for conducting war against Muslims instead the Crusaders. However, Saladin was in favor of an all-out battle. Ibn al-Athir is more critical of Saladin when he assesses his failure to conquer Tyre, in the wake of his victory at Hittin. He says that Saladin allowed the population of the towns conquered by him after Hittin to go to Tyre. The people there were ready to surrender the town, but the arrival of Conrad de Monlferrat and his leadership inspired the population to re­sist Saladin. Ibn al-Athir says that Saladin abandoned the siege of Tyre as a result of his policy of not getting involved in long sieges against towns which vigorously defended themselves. Saladin's emirs also demanded the cessation of the siege due to lack of provisions, money, heavy losses, weariness and the onset of the winter. After some hesitation Saladin yielded to his em irs. Basically, Ibn al-Athir criticizes Saladin for bad judgment (lack of luum) regarding Tyre. But, later in his account, he presents in sobe r terms Saladin's dilemma whether to engage or not to engage the Crusading armies which were converging on Acre. 125

However o ther fragments of Ibn al-Athir's writings are tainted

12!> Ibn al-Athi r, Kamil. XI. 35 1, 359. 368·9, XII , 21-2. I alll g .... Hefullo Anne­Marie Edde, who draw Illy atlcntioTl to these accounts o r Ibn al-Athir.

40 C HAPTER ONE

with morc overt hostility to Saladin. Toward the end of the ac­count of Saladin's no mina tio n as the Fatimid vizier, Ibn a l-Athir inserts his own observa tio ns on how dynasties rise to power. He adduces many examples from Islamic history to show that the fo unders of dynasties were unable to pass on their rule to their own sons. The beneficiaries were other members of the family who assumed powe r and transferred rule to lheir progeny. The Ayyubids fall into this pauc rn . Rule (mulk) passed from Shirkuh to Saladin who es tablished the Sla le (dawla) and expanded it, but evently power was transferred to his brother and to his progeny_ Ibn a l­Athir remarks that at the lime he was writing only Aleppo was in the hands o f Saladin's offspring. Ibn al-Athir points out that the founder of a dynasty as well as his immediate family are preoccu­pied with ga ining power. For this reason Allah de nies him and his progeny rule as an act of punishme nt. 126 On the one hand, Ibn al-Athir puts the Ayyubids o n the same footing as the Umayyids, Abbasids . Buyids and other grea t Islamic dynasties and sta tes. On the Olher hand, Saladin himself is compared to other fo unde rs of dynasties whose absorption with establishing their rule incurred the wrath of Cod. Ibn a l-Athir implies that the establishment of ntle is associated with the shedding of blood and violence and there­fore the fo unde rs cannot enjoy the fruits of their endeavors. The roots of this concept are Biblical, but it serves Ibn a l-Athir's purpose well. In contrast to Saladin 's historian-admire rs who depict him as unse lfish warrio r of the Holy War and upho lder of Sunni Is­lam, Ibn al-Athir portrays him as a man greedy for power. And he, like others. is punished for the way he had gained power.

These various accounts reflect the inconsis tency and complex­ity of Ibn a l-Athir 's narra tive. Manipulation of history was not for­e ign to Ibn al-Athir nor was he above it. In his universal h istory, Ibn a l-Athir successfull y obfuscated the fact that Badr ai-Din Lu ' iu ' usurped power from the legitimate rule rs of Mosul , the Zengids. 127

Therefore, each account o f Ibn al-Ath ir that deals with Saladin must be examined on its own merits . In many cases Ibn al-Athir's bias against Saladin is no t evident, o r-to put it more cautiously-

126 A/-Kami{, XI, 227~. This interesting passage is discussed by Tarif Khalidi (see 2 17) whose English re nderi ng of the tex t is a mixlUre of lfanslation and interpretation. Th e origi nal leXI is far more enigmatic than Khalidi's rendering shows. He also ignores the context which fo r his purposes is less important.

127 Patton. 5, 14.

T H E SOU RCt:S 4 1

is not d e tec table to us because of o ur restric ted understanding of the sys tem o f values which guided twelfth /thirteenth--centu ry his· tori ans.

e. Ibn Abi Tayy and Abu Shama

The two most importam historians in the genera tio ns immedia tely afte r Saladin a re Ibn Abi Tayy (approximately 11 79-1232) of AJeppo and 'Abd al·Rahman ibn Isma'i l Abu Shama ( 1 20~ 1 268) ofJ erusa· lem. Ibn Abi Tayy was bo rn in to a leading Shi ' ite family in Aleppo. Sunni historians p rovide scanty biograph ica l data abo ut him.1 28 Like many o f h is contempo raries. Ibn Tayy was a pro lific write r with inte rest in many subjects. His h is to rica l works dealt not only with AJeppo, but a lso with Egyp t and North Afri ca. He wrote the histo ri es of Saladin a nd his son al·Zahi r as we ll as an unive rsa l histOry. In AJeppo, as Claude Cahen noted . Ibn Abi Tayy had an o pportun ity to meet many no tables from late Fatimid and early Ayyubid Egypt and to collec t info rmation from the m. l29 Ibn Abi Tayy supplies very important in formatio n abou t Saladin , howevel· none of his works have survived . He is known only fro m cita tio ns by la te r histori ans such as Abu Shama and Ibn Fu rat ( 1334-1 405) who have transmi tted many fragmen ts o f his wrilings in their own works. 130

It is impo rtant to examine how Abu Shama ap proached and used Ibn Abi Tayy's works. Ibn Abi Tayy is extensively q uoted by

128 The dates concerning Ibn Abi Tayy a re gh·cn according to K\ltubi (d. 1363). But h is entry on Ibn Abi Tayy is d ull including a long list of his works a nd somc uncomplimcntary rcmarks on his lite rAry OUl pUt. See, his, Fmual af-WaJa),al, (cd) I. 'Abbas ( Beiru t. 1973), IV, 269-71. Ibn al-'Adim ( 1193-1262), the great Su nni historian of Aleppo, rare ly re fers 10 Ibn Abi Tayy. Sec, Morra}', 96. n.393. Thc a\'ai lable data o n Ib n Abi Tayy have bee n studied by CI. Cahcn in his La Syrie du Nord (ll 'ipoque des Croisatles, (Paris, 1940),55-7. Sunni historians, illllOng them Ibn Qalanisi, Ibn al-'Adim and especially Ibn al-Athi r, d istorted a lso the events and essence of the Shi 'ite rcbellion in Aleppo under Nur a l·p in . See, H. M. KJlayat, "The Shi'ite Rebellion in Aleppo in the 6th A. H/ 12 A.D. Cent u l)'~,

Rivista tlegli Sludi Orienlali, 46(1971), 184-5. 129 See, h is "Quelque ch roniqucs anciennes relatives a ux de rn iers Fat imides~,

BIFAO, XXXVIl (l937), 17·8. 1$0 Fragments or Ibn Abi Tayy's wri tings, as q uoted by Ibn Furat, have becn

u tilized in two studies by Ca he n. See, ~Une c hron ique chiite au tem ps des Croisades~, Comptts rendus de I'Awdemie des Inscripliolls el des Belles leI/res, 1935, 259-63; Orient et Occident au temps des Croisades, (Paris, 1983),222·3. See, also Khayal, 167-95.

42 C HAPTER ONE

Abu Shama who at least once refers to his biography of Saladin. Abu Shama has reservations ahoutlbn Abi Tayy's impaniality. Ac­cording to him, Ibn Tayy was hos tile to Nur ai-Din who subdued the Shi'itcs in Ale ppo. This notion is shared by modern scholars, lOO.131 But, as Gibb pointed out, hostility to Nur a i-Din did n o t entail hostility to Saladin,l32 It seems that Abu Shama fail ed to notice the niceties of Ibn Abi Tayy's different approach to Nur al­Oin and Saladin. For example, Abu Shama disputes Ibn Abi Tayy's account about the enmity between Nur ai-Din and Saladin which developed following Saladin's conquest of Egypl. Abu Shama says that Ibn Abi Tayy's vers ion is motivated by hostility to Nur ai-Din. However, Abu Shama's accusation of Ibn Abi Tayy on this score is groundless. The en mity betw'een Nur ai-Din and Saladin is re­ported also by Ibn al-Athir who is certainly not a hostile source to Nur ai-Din. Abu Shama. as the tille of his chronicle suggests (the Book of the Two Gm·dens. The History of the Two Dynasties that of NUT

ai-Din and Saladin), is a n admirer of both rule rs. Thus his re marks about Ibn Abi Tayy must be understood in the light of his effort to maintain the image and fame of both rulers and regimes.

Abu Shama's method for dealing with a certain event is to quote the accounts of several historians. To a large extent his handling of these accounts is uncritical. However, the assertion that Abu Shama "does not comment" o n his sources must be qualified. 1jS

Abu Shama do express his views. Sometimes he introduces such comments by the phrase: "" I say" (qultu).IS4 On other occasions, he provides an account of a certain event, or a short statement, without quoting any authority for it. Such accounts and statements should be understood as his own independent views. Therefore, when using and quoting Abu Shama, a clear distinction should be made be tween the passages cited by him on the authority of other historians and his own independent narrative. In his inde­pe ndent views. Abu Sham a is inclined to accept the accounts of

131 Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 441-2; Khayat, 180. Abu Sham a's quotation of Ibn Abi Tayy's biography of Saladin begins o n page 415 and it seems to continue up [Q pa§c 443. See, I, pt,2.

13 See, his ~The Achieveme nts of Saladin~, Bullttin of the John Rylands Li­brary. 35( 1952) reprinted in Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ( Boston, 1962), 92.

133 Ahmad, 93. 1' 4 The interruptio n of the narrative by the phrase qullu is a common tech­

nique in the writings of late medieval authors. See, Khalidi, 201.

THE SOURCES 43

Saladin 's historian-admirers. None theless, from the poinL of view of the present study, the value of Abu Sham's work is immense. Abu Shama provides long accounts taken from works which oth­e rwise have not survived. In contrast to Abu Shama, Ibn Wasil (d. 129B), another well known historian of the Ayyubid pe riod , rarely quotes his sources and for the years 11 69- 1174 he provides little new or important information.

In addition to Abu Shama's chronicle the Book of lhe Two GaT­dens, some a ttention should be given to his own abridgment of this work entitled CUyun al-Rawdata),n min Akhbar al-Dawlalayn. 135

In it no sources are c ited. Essentially, this work repeats infonna­tion found in the full chronicle, but it has its own va lue too. From the point view of the mod ern user it is easier to obtain from CUyun the gist of Abu Shama's narrative, which in the full chronicle is frequentJy obfuscated by redundancies. Free of redundancies, some of the accounts in CUyun have a quite differe nt tenor, almost a different essence, than in the Book of the Two Gardens.

f. Maqrizi

Among the historians of the Mamluk period the most important for the present study is Maqrizi (1364-1442). The value of Maqrizi 's writings for the study of the Fatimid history is well known; his various works are a mine of information on Fatimid Egypt. The most es­sential work is his three-volume chronicle IttiCaz al-Hunafa· ... which deals exclusively with Fatimid history. A. S. EhrenkreuLZ was the first to utili ze luicaz ( then available in manuscript form only) for the study of Saladin. Today with the publication of this huge work a be tter analys is of the text is possible. Unfortunately, by contrast to his practice in the early parts of laicaz, in the late parts Maqrizi does not cite his sources. Judging from his Khital , a work d ealing with the topography and history of Egypt and Fustat-Cairo in par­ticular, Maqrizi was familiar with Qadi al-Fadil's chronicle Muta­jaddidat. This work is cited many times for the events of the years 567-594/1171-1197. 136 This leaves open the question of what were the sources used by Maqrizi for the events of 11 60's. Apparently,

1'-" See n.61. I ~ A. R. Guest, ~A List or Wrilers, Books and other Authorities Mentioned

by EI-Maqrizi in his Khitat~,JRAS, (1902). 110. 125.

44 C H APTER ONE

Maqrizi was familiar with Qadi al-Fadil's le tte rs (rasa'il). For in­stance, Maqrizi 's version o f the Ba ttJe ofthe Blacks, in !ui'az. closely follows Qadi aJ-Fadil's repon of these events sent to Nur ai-Din in Damascus. Maqrizi also uses 'U mara 's au tobiography, devotes much attention to 'U mara 's connections with the ru ling ci rcles of the Fatimid period and quotes his poelry,I37

Syrian autho rs are little used by Maqrizi. ' Imad ai-Din is sparsely mentioned in Khilat, a nd the work quoted is no t the original-the Syrian Lightning-but Bundari's abridgment. Ibn Abi Tayy is a lso ra re ly quoted. 138 But, occasio na lly. some illuminating items of information provided by Maqrizi prove to be derived from quite unexpected sources. A point in case is an account of Ibn J awzi, a [WelfLh-cen tury historian of Baghdad. reproduced by Maqrizi with­out naming his source.139

Maqrizi's account of the closing yea rs of the Fatimid period is worth reading. In contrast to Abu Shama, who combined in his narrative extraclS from different historians and his own indepen­d ent statements, Maqrizi provid es an integra tive account. Its main value lies in the light it sheds on Saladin 's policy toward the Fatimid state from the day of his nomination as the vizier of al-'Adid until the death of the Fatimid rule r. No less important is Maqrizi 's account of the years 1172-1198. Maqrizi relying o n Qadi a l-Fadil 's Mutajaddidat supplies (in Khilal and Suluk a chronicle dealing with the Mamluks which a lso includes a section on the Ayyubids) the most significant informatio n o n Saladin 's inte rnal policies in Egypt. It is true that thi s information is no t full and systematic. but it touches upon a who le range of Saladin 's policies.

m For the history of 'Umara in Egypt and his poetry, see Maqrizi , Illi'az., III , 224-8,249-52,259-60. For Maqrizi's use of 'U mara's autobiography, see 225 (:: 'U mara, 32)' 226 (:: 'U mara 34, he re Maqrizi omits 'Umara's reference to a l­Hafiz as Imam ai-Hafiz), 227 (:: 35-6, but in Maqrizi 's text the payment that 'Umara received is incorrectly quoted), 228 (= 38), 249-50 (= 44), 25 1 (:: 49), 252 (:: 48),253 (:: 53), 254 (:: 54), 259 (:: 68, he re Maqrizi repeats 'Umara's saying tha t the fall of the Ru zzik fa mily bro ugh t about the fall of the Fati mids).

I~ Guest, III , 119. U9 See, ch.2. n.2.

TI·I E SOURCES 45

3. Textual Problems: Tendentious and ConJlir.lillg Versions

The aim of this sec tio n is 1O show how the diffe rent perspectives of Saladin's hislOrian-admirers and thal of Ibn al-Athir shaped their accounts . This will be do ne by examining some of the main even ts of the years 1167-1171 such as Nur al-Din's expedition to Egypt in 11 67, the killing ofShawar, the election o f Saladin as the Fatimid vizie r and th e proclamation of Abbasid suzerainty in Egypt. In Chap te r Two, using other sources, these incide nts will be re-ex­ami ned in o rder 1O provide another more independent perspec­ti ve o n the events under discussion.

a. The Campaign of 1167

The sources for the 1167 campaign are particularly problematic. At the time that Shirkuh and Saladin were campaigning in Egypt, 'Imad ai-Din had just arrived in Damascus in search of employ­menlo His knowledge o f the events unfolding in Egypt must have been quite limited , and he was preoccupied with his own personal affairs. Nonetheless, when ' Imad ai-Din wrote the Syrian Lightning he was able to command all the relevant sources. Unfortunately, for this campaign, we o nly have at our disposal extracts from his original writings as provided by later a uthors. Qadi al-Fadil , al­though well placed 1O be fami liar with the inner thoughts ofShawar and his extended family 110, is not quoted by Abu Shama or any other historian as a source for the events under review. Ibn Shaddad, the third of Saladin's histo rian-admire rs, cannot be regarded as an independe nt source for these events . His account is derived from oral informatio n and sources he obtained during the time he had served Saladin.

The most detailed and cohere nt account is provided by Ibn al­Athir. No hostile bias against Shirkuh o r Saladin is evident. Fo r example, the Battle of Babayn is viewed by Ibn al-Athir as a re­markable victory and Saladin's deeds during this campaign are recorded in sober terms without any detectable prejudice. In fact, one should note what seems to be a strange differe nce of opin­ion between <Imad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad regarding the back­ground to Nur al-Din's expedition to Egypt in 1167. ' Imad ai-Din

140 Lyons and Jackson, 11 ·2.

46 CHAPTER ONE

condemns Shawar for his alliance with the Franks and regards him as responsible for inviting the Crusaders into Egypl.!"l <Imad al­Oin leads his readers to view Nur al-Din's inte)\lenLion in Egypt as aimed to counter Shawar's shameful cooperation with, not to say betrayal of Egypt lO, the infidels and therefore as fully justi­fied. Surprisingly, Ibn Shaddad put Shirkuh's campaign of 1167 in a completely differenl context. He says that Shirkuh upon his return from the first campaign in Egypt did not conceal his de­sire to invade Egypt again. Thus he left Shawar with no choice but to seek the help of the Franks. 142 One gets the impression that Ibn Shaddad attaches no disgrace to Shawar's cooperation with the Crusaders, which he d epicts as a move dictated by consider­ations of realpolitik in view of Shirkuh's hostile intentions. The differences between these two versions can be explained as a re­sult of'lmad al-Din's admiration ofNur ai-Din. ' Imad ai-Din strives to portray Nur ai-Din as motivated by noble and not worldly con­siderations. While Ibn Shaddad detached from the milieu of Nur al-Din's Damascus in which ' Imad ai-Din lived and flourished is more impartial. He puts Nur al-Din's intervention in Egypt into a more realistic context. The preparations in Damascus for the sec­ond expedition to Egypt are attested to by other historians as well. 143

b. The Killing of Shawar

Nur al-Din's third campaign in Egypt was crowned with success. The Crusaders left Egypt and Shirkuh became the Fatimid vizier. His rise to power was expedited by the killing of Shawar. Ibn al­Athir says that Nur al-Din's force in Egypt feared Shawar knowing his extreme wickedness. This statement serves as a background for Ibn al-Athir's account of the conspiracy hatched by some of Shirkuh's emirs, led by Saladin and ' Izz al-DinJurdik, to kill Shawar. But, Shirkuh refused to authorize their actions. Nonetheless, they, without the consent of Shirkuh, took advantage of attendant cir­cumstances and killed Shawar. Ibn al-Athir recounts that on one

U1 AI-Bundari, 63. 142 Ibn Shaddad, 37-8; repeated by Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 367. 14~ Ibn al-Athir, Kamii,IX, 213; Bahir, 132; William of Tyre. History ofDttd.s

Done Beyond the Sea, translated into English and annotated by E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey (N. Y., 1943), II , 3 13-4; cf: ElisseefT, Nur ai-Din, II , 602, who says that the initiative for the campaign was that of Shirkuh.

THE SOURCES 47

of his regular visits to the Syrian camp Shawar missed Shirkuh who had left earlier. The conspirators arrested Shawar and at al-'Adid 's demand PUt him to death.'44

Although Saladin is not portrayed in this aCCOUnl in a bad light, it is hardly a convincing narrative. One gelS the impress ion that Ibn a l-Athi r' s version strives above all LO exonerate Shirkuh from any blame for the killing of Shawar. ' Imad ai-Din, in his account of these evenlS, says that Salad in spoke with Shirkuh about the need to eli minate Shawar. But Shirkuh disapproved of Saladin's in tentio ns and even sent his confidant, <Isa a l-Hakki ri, to warn Shawar who, however, chose to ignore the warn ing. One day. when Shawar was riding in a procession displaying the symbols of his post and might. Salad in and the emirs seized him. However, the actual killing of Shawar was carried out only on al-<Adid's de­mand.145

We are constrained in our understanding of the subtleties of the accounlS given by Ibn al-Athir and ' Imad ai-Din by o ur lim­ited knowledge of the contemporary twe lfth-century system of po­litical values. For instance, would contemporal), readers of e ither historian hold it against Saladin that he was involved in the con­spiracy which led to the killing of Shawar? Ibn Shaddad who cer­tainly had no intention of casting any shadows on Saladin 's per­sonality praises his role in the arrest of Shawar. He says tha t when the conspirators approached Shawar only Saladin was bold enough to se ize him .146 Thus we are incline to believe that by the stan­dards of the time Saladin's initiative and involvement were seen in a positive light and there was no moral stain a ttached to his behavior. The first immediate conclusion is that the accounts by Ibn a l-Athir and ' Imad ai-Din have a common aim: to absolve Shirkuh, who was the direct beneficiary of the killing of Shawar, from any responsibili ty for the deed. Both authors make every effort to deny that Shirkuh ' s ,-ise to the post of vizier was a result of regi­cide. We can conclude that in their view regicide WJ.S repugnant. 147

]4~ See, his Kamil, IX, 223-4; BlIhir, 139-40. ]45 Al-Bundari, 77--8: repeated by Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 398. ]46 Ibn Shaddad , 40. 147 How historians or the Abbasid period dealt with the question or regicide

is examined by T . EI-Hibri. Sec. his MThe Regicide or the Caliph a l-Amin~, Arabica, XLII ( 1995) , 334-64. The question ofrcgicide was an important issue in the Mamluk pe riod. For the ki lling or Qutuz a nd the rise or Baybar.>. see P. Thorau, The Lion

48 C HAPTER ONE

In any case the aim of the plOl was merely to neutra li ze Shawar, his death was the resull of al-'Adid's d emand . ' Imad aJ-Din and Ibn a l-Athir portray the conspirators as powerless in the face of a request made by the fo rmal ruler of the country. The impression conveyed by these accounts is that the conspirators had to play by Fatimid political norms. Contemporal1' twelfth-century historians, Muslims and Franks. have e mphasized that by Fatimid political standards ascendancy to the post of vizier by overthrowing and killing the former vizier was an accepted praclice. 148

A possible insight into the implicit po litica l values to which the historians of the period refe rred can be gained by borrowing terms common in Muslim jurisprudence and e thics. These classify hu­man actions into fi ve categories starting with duties whose fulfill­me nt by the be liever is o bligatory (jard/wajib) and descending to actions which are expressly forbidden (hamm). In the middle there are duties whose fulfillm ent by the believer is merely recommended (mandub). Other actions are viewed as neutral (mubah) while oth­ers are disapproved although not lega lly forbidden (makruh). In light of this classification, the role of Saladin in the plot against Shawar, fro m which he ga ined nothing directly, can be d escribed as ne utral (mubah) or, a.ccording to Ibn Shaddad's version, even mandub.

The congrui ty of the accounts of Ibn a l-Athir and ' Imad ai-Din regarding the killing ofShawar can be explained by their admira­tion of Nur aI-Din. Shirkuh was a high-ranking o ffi ce r in the se r­vice of Nur ai-Din; his immoral behavior thus stains the reputa­tion of his master, which was precio us to both of them a nd had therefore to be protec ted. I t seems to me that it is possible to infer from the accounts of Ibn al-Athir and ' Imad ai-Din the impres­sion that they strived to convey to their readers when they recoullled these events. The plot was justified. Shirkuh's behavior was noble and he had nothing to do with the killing of Shawar. Saladin's

of tiD'P'. translated i11l0 English by P. M. Holt ( Lo ndon, 1992), 83-4. The rel­evan! sources arc exa mined by P. M. Holi. See, his KSome O bservations o n Shafi' ibn 'Ali 's Biography of Baybarsft , jSS, XXIX(1984 ), 123-30; "Three Biographies of a l-Zahir Baybars ft

, in Medieual Historieal Writings, 20-7 . Fo r a wide r treatmen t of this topic, see U. Haarmann, ~ Regicidc and Law o f the Turksft, in bdellectual Studies on Islam, (cds) M. M. Mazzoui and V. B. Mort:cn (Salt Lake City, 1990), 127-35.

148 Ibn Shaddad .36, 40; re peated by Abu Shama, I, pl.2, 398; William orTyre, 11 ,305.

THE SOURCES 49

actions were reasonable or even laudable while the direct respon­sibili ty for Shawar 's death lies with the Fatim id Imam.

c, The Nomination oj Saladin as Vizier

' Imad al-Din 's account of the election of Salad in as Fatimid vizier is succinct and straightforward. He admits that the emirs of Nur al-Din's expeditionary force were divided over the nomination of Shirkuh's successor. Eventually, however, they unanimously de­cided to chose Saladin and they compelled al-'Adid to accepllheir se lection. Ibn Shadd ad adds nothing new to th is account. He says simply that following Sh irkuh's death Salad in was e ntrusted with authority,149

In contrast to these terse accounts, Ibn al-Athir provides a de­tailed description of the c ircumstances that led to the e lection of Saladin as Fatimid vizier. A number of emirs in the expeditionary force had ambi tions to com mand the force and to be nominated as Fatimid vizier. However, a l·'Adid appointed Saladin knowing that he was the youngest and the weakest among the emirs with no military following of his own, thus easy to contro l. The Fatimids hoped that the nomination of Saladin would create a mpture within the ranks of the expeditionary force that would play into their hands. Only through the effo rts of ' Isa a l-Hakkiri did the emirs accept the selection of Saladin as vizier. 150 Ibn al-Ath ir's hostility to Saladin is evident; he depicts Saladin as an insignificant per­son who owed his appointment to a here tic, the Fatimid ruler­an Ismai'ili Imam, These two diametrically opposed narratives give the impress ion that these events we re more complex and shad­owy. The brevity and simplic ity of the accounts given by ' Imad al· Din and Ibn Shaddad is as suspicious as Ibn a l-Athir's hostile ver­sion.

d. The Battle oj the Blacks

The single most important event in Saladin's rise to power in Egypt was the BattJe of the Blacks. There is a rare unity of opinion among our sources regarding the events that led to it. Mu ' tam in , a black

]49 AI-Bundari, 8 1; Ibn Shaddad, 10; repeated by Abu Sham a, I, pI,2, 406. 150 Ibn al-Athir, Kami{, IX , 226-7; Bahir, 141 -2.

50 C H APTER ONE

eunuch of al·'Adid , who was the strong man behind the throne, wrote to the Crusaders urging them to attack Saladin 's forces in Egypt. The plot was discovered due to the vigilance of one of Saladin 's men who became suspicious of a certain person because of an mismatch in hi s anire. When a rrested h e turned to be Mu'tamin's messenger who had carried letters to the Crusaders. The messenger led his inves tigators to a J ewish scribe who had writlen these letters. Under the pressure of interrogation and tortu re, the J ew embraced Islam and incriminated Mu ' tamin as the man behind the letters. Saladin duped him by keeping quie t about his knowledge of the plot. After a time, as Mu'tamin left Cairo for his country reside nce he was attacked and killed. His killing sparked off the Battle o f the Blacks.

Perhaps we are being unduly suspicious, but the way these events are represented by the historians of the period inspires little con· fiden ce. The combination in one account o f a despised black eunuch who holds the reins of power behind an Isma'i li heretic and uses a J ewish infidel to conspire with the Crusaders, a reli· gious enemy, is too much to swallow. The unmasking ofa suspected person due to some mismatch in his attire is a literary convention if not a topOS. 151 We can not escape feeling that the sole purpose of these accounts is to justify the war Saladin waged on the Blacks. Our sources, with th e exception of Ibn Abi Tayy, represent the Sunni point of view. And the fact that Ibn Abi Tayy was a Shi<ite does not mean tha t he is sympathetic to the Isma ' ilis. All of the historians under consideration share anti·Ima' ili bias, for them the Fatimids are he retics capable of the worst treachery. The re· fo re, the story of the plot must be approached with great caution.

e . The Proclamation of Abbasid Suzerainty

Ibn al·Athi r's hostility to Saladin is very evident in his account of the circumstances which led to the proclamation of Abbasid su· ze rain ty in Egypl. Furthermore, in this case, we can observe an

1.'>1 For example . this motive appears in the biography of Ahmad ibn Tulun , the nin th-century semi-independent ruler of Egypt. Balawi, his biographer, tells a story of how Ahmad unmasked an Abbasid spy by noting an expensive item in the attire o ra ce rtain person which did not match his supposed low social stand­ing. See, Sirat Ahmad ibn Tulun. (ed) M. K. 'Ali (Damascus, 1939), 124-5. For the Baltle of the Blacks, see Ibn a l-Alhi r, Kamil, XI, 228-9; al·Bundari , 82-3.

TH E S O U RCES 5 1

evolution in Ibn a l-Athir 's hos tili ty as re fl ected by the significant diffe rence be tween the accoun t in his earl ier work , the history o f the Atabegs, a nd h is la te r work, the u n ive rsa l h is tory. In the hi s­tory o f the Atabegs, Ibn a l-Athi r says tha t when the pos ition of al­<Adid was undermined , and the Fatimid a rmy d es troyed , Nur al­Oin ordered Saladin to change the se rmons in favo r of the Abbasids. Saladin refra ined from do ing so as he was afra id of the possible reactio n of Isma' il i sympathizers in Egypt. O nly when al-<Ad id fe ll ill , d id Saladin se ize the oppo rtuni ty to introduce a change in the se rmo ns. In any case, Ibn a l-Athir sta tes explicitly tha t Saladin was de te r mined to carry o u t the change, but h is explana tio ns for th e delay fa iled to convince Nu r a l_Din .1 52 In the universal history Ibn a l-Ath ir 's o utlook is radically diffe rent. Salad in 's de lay was an o utcome of h is bas ic re luc tance to destroy the Fa timid sta te. His motives were sin is ter; Saladin ho ped tha t the exis te nce of the Fatimid regime wi ll help h im in the even t of Nu l' a i-Din 's mili tary attempt to dislodge him fro m Egyp t. 153

Up to certa in point Ibn a l-Ath ir 's narra tive in the un iversal hi s­tory is cohe ren t. Salad in is d ep icted as a mino r offi cer in NUT a l­Din 's expeditionary fo rce who owes his no mination as vizie r to a l­'Adid in whom he sees a po tential ally against his overlo rd Nur al­Oin . But whe n examined as a whole, the narra ti ve is bese t by in­ternal contrad ic tions. For example, Ibn a l-Athir fa ithfuJly records those of Saladin 's deeds which were aimed a t the eliminatio n of Ismailism in Egypt such as the fo undatio n of law colleges and the removal of lsma' ili j udges. He a lso records Saladin 's policies against the Fa timid sta te: the Battl e of the Blacks and the undermining of a l-<Adid 's posi tio n . He leaves un reso lved the contradictio n of how the feeble a l-<Adid could have helped Saladin to withstand Nur al-Din 's possible invas io n of Egypt.

To conclude: the wri ti ngs of the historians examined in th is chap­te r canno t be trea ted as re pos ito ri es of uncomplicated d a ta fo r the histo ry o f Saladin . The contradictio ns among the sources are no t of the kind tha t close reading of the texts and a critical ap­proach can solve. The differences a re a result of diffe rent pe r­spec tives which a re basically mutually exclusive. The sources a re

L ~2 Ibn a l-Athir, Bahir, 156. L ~!I Ibn al-A lh ir, Kamil, IX, 24 1-2. Un fortunately, in the fragments of ' 1m ad

al-Din 's writings, as q uoted by late sources, no ex pla na tion is give n fo r tilt: delay in changing the sermons.

52 CHAPTER ONE

tainted as they belong to different historical traditions and present two different ponraits of Saladin. The works of Gibb and EhrenkreuLz reflecllhis division. The modern student of Saladin must be aware , a nd must make his reader aware, of these two different pictures of Saladin. Two further points ought to be made: 1) none of these two different historical traditions is entirely uniform and cohesive. Internal contradictions within each onc of these traditions do exist. 2) There a fe external data for the his­LOry of Saladin. Contemporary documents, inscriptions and infor­mation wh ich emanate neither from the writings ohhe historian­admirers of Saladin nor from Ibn al-Athir. Such information is limited but enlightening and must be systematically collected and used (see next chapter).

CHAPTER TWO

SAlADI N IN EGYPT, 1169-11 74

1. Saladin's Rise 10 Power

a. The Sick Man on the NilI'

I. Nur al-Din 's in te res t in Fatimid Egypt predates the arrival of Shawar to his coun in Damascus in 1164. It seemed in the early 1050's that the Fatimid state was o n the brink of inte rnal disinte­gration. On 6 Muharram 548/3 April 11 53, the military vizier Ibn Salar was killed by Ibn 'Abbas, his stepson. Following the killing of the vizier , a group of emirs loyal to him ned to Damascus. l As a result of the conspiracy against the vizier, Ascelon was los t to the Crusade rs. The killing of Ibn Salar p revented the dispatch of an army to relieve Asce lon which was besieged by the Crusaders from J anuary 11 53. The Fatimid navy which reached the town was unable alo ne, without the assistance of the ground fo rces, to pre­vent the fa ll of the town (August 1153). A yea r la ter (end ofMuh ar­ram 549/mid April 1154), the Fatimid Imam al-Zafir , toge ther with his bro thers, was killed by Ibn 'Abbas. Nonetheless, Fatimid rule in Egypt continued wi th the installa tion of al-Zafir 's five-year-old son as the Imam under the regal name of al-Fa' iz. At this grave moment in the Fatimid history, as o n earlie r occasions during Fatimid rule in Egypt, women of the royal fa mily were instrume n­tal in main taining the dynasty in power. Al-Zafir' sister, Silt al-Qusur, staged a coup against Ibn 'Abbas using fo r this purpose a provin­cial governor , Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik. With h is nomination as vizie r, 19 Rabi ' I 549/3 June 11 54, the Fatimid state regained a degree o f political stabi lity.

These even ts were carefu lly watched in Baghdad . With the sei­zure of Damascus by Nur ai-Din (April 1154), a new alignment of power emerged in northern Syria. The Abbasid caliph did not waste time : he issued to Nur aI-Din a diploma of inves titure proclaim­ing him as ruler o f Egypt and urging him to ac t swiftly.2 But with the consolidation of Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik 's positio n the hopes for a quick successfu l interventio n in Egypt we re dashed . Nonetheless

I Maqri zi, Wi'az., III , 205. 2 Ibn Jawzi , Al-Muntaz.am ft Ta'rikh al·Ummam wa-'l-Muluk, (Beirut, 1992),

XVIII , 98; Maqri1.i, Wi'az., III , 223.

54 CHAPTt:R TWO

Nur ai-Din's interest in Egypt did not evapora te, he approached Tala ' j' ibn Ruzzik on several occasions adopting the posture of a champion of the Holy War and trying to galvanize the Fatimid vizier into action against the Crusaders. At the time that Nur al­Oin approached Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik, the Fatimids were entangled in complex military and diplomatic relations with the Crusaders. In 549/ 11 54-1155, the town of Tinnis badly suffered from an at­tack by a Sicilian neet. In 550/ 1155-1156, Tala'j' ibn Ruzzik launched a naval raid on Christian shipping off the Palestinian coast. The background and the motives behind this Fatimid na­val aClivity are not entirely clear. It is tempting to see it as retali­ation for the raid on Tinnis; the Fatimids-unable or unwilling to auack Sicily-chose targets closer 1O the ir borders. But Ibn Qalanisi (1073-1] 60), the historian of Damascus, puts the Fatimid naval activity in a different context. He says that Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik wished 1O pay the Crusaders tribute and 1O establish a truce with them , but his emirs refused to contribute the money. Eventually, it was decided in Cairo to take military action. The naval raid that took p lace in 11 55- 1156 was a very successful one bringing much booty to the raiders. 3 Nonetheless, following this i<iid, at some unknown date , a truce between the Fatimids and the Crusaders was signed. However, in Rajab 552/ August-September 1157, this truce was abrogated by the Fatimid rulers. The abrogation of the truce seems unconnected with the arrival in Cairo of Nur al-Din's emissaries. In 552/ 1157-1158 and in 553/ 1158-1159. Fatimid na­val and land forces fought the Crusaders and parallel diplomatic exchanges betvveen Cairo and Damascus intensified. In 553/ 1 ]58-1159, the Crusaders asked for a truce while Nur aI-Din, in letters and poetry brought to Cairo by his emissaries, exhorted Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik to fight the Holy War. The Fatimid vizier responded by sending to Damascus a consignment of weapons. goods worth of 30,000 dinars and 70,000 dinars in cash to assisl Nur ai-Din in his Holy War. 4 In 554/ 1159-11 60, Nur ai-Din made an auemplto

! Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhayl 'Fa 'rilch Dimashq, (ed) H. F. Amedroz (Leiden, 1908) , 33 1-2; Ibn Muyassar, 153; Maqrizi, lIIi'a1., 111 ,207,224. Apparently, the naval raid loo k place in summer 1155.

4 Ibn al-Qalanisi reports on Fatimid land and naval activity against th e Cru­saders and on exchange of emissaries with Damasc us under the records of the years 553/ 1158-11 59 and 554/1 159-1160. See, 351, 353, 356. See, also Ibn Muyassar, 155, 156; Maqrizi, lIIi'a1., III , 230, 233-4.

SA L A DI N I N EGY I' T , 11 69- 1174 55

introduce a new dimensio n into the Syrian-Egyptian re lations: he proposed to Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzik launching a coordinated attack o n the Crusaders, The vizier's respo nse was hesitant; the Fatimid army was moving toward Gaza but d id nOl e ngage the Crusaders, Tala' i' ibn Ruzzik was in convenient position : he was approached by both sides, Nur ai-Din offe red him g ifts and the Crusade rs asked for a renewal o f the truce,5

From 11 6 1, in te rnal problems came again to domina te Fa ti mid politics. In fac t, Fatimid involveme nt in wars aga inst the Crusad­ers and diplomatic COnlacts with Damascus extended over a shon pe riod oftim e be tween 550-554/ 11 55- 11 60 only. In 11 62, the rule of the Ruzzik family as Fatimid viziers was terminated by Shawar, who was named the new vizier o n 12 Muharram 558/ 2 1 Decem­ber 11 62, Eventually, Shawar was o usted from Cairo and sough t refuge in Damascus at the court o f Nur aI-Din ( 11 64). T he a rri val of Shawar in Damascus marks the beginning of Nur al-Din 's di­rec t involvement in the affa irs o f Egyp t. Ibn 'A.5akir's depic tion of Nul' al-Din 's first campaign in Egypt as a sort o f favo r to Shawar inte nded to res tore him to his previous post is un tenable. The first campaign in Egypt was the culminatio n of Nur al-Din 's grow­ing illle res t in the affai rs of Fatim id Egypt. The people in power in Egypt, the viziers and the Fatimid Ima ms, were fully aware of this tende ncy and Nur ai-Din came to exert some influe nce on

~ Maqrizi, Wi'a1., III , 236; cf: A, F. Sayyid, Al-Dawla al-Fatimiyya fi Misr. TaJsir Jadid, (Cairo, 1992), 2 16-8, I am grateful to Paula Sanders of Rice Un ive rsity, Houston, who drew my altcmion to Sayyid's book. In his poetry Tala'i' ibn Ruzzi k a nguished over Latin rule in J erusalem and the desecration of the Muslim holy places. See. P. Smoor, -Poet's House: Fiction and Reali ty in the Works of lhe Fatim id Poets~, Quaderni di Studi Arabi, 10( 1992), 52, 53-4; Daja ni-Shakeel , MJ ihad in Twelfth-Century Arabic Poetry: A Moral and Re ligious Force to Counter the Crusades~, MW, 66(1976),110. Howeve r, Dajani-Shakeel's claim that Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik ini tiated a policy of jihad for the conquest of J erusalem is di nicul t to accept. It is tm c lhat Fati mid military activiry on land and sea was considerable and costly: between 100,000 to 200,000 dinars were spent on il. However when lhese actions are examined it is clear that no conquest ofterri tory, and certai n ly no t of J erusalem , was intended . These were merely raids. See, Ibn Mupssar, 156-7; Nuwayri, Niha)'al a{..Arab fi Funun a{"Adab, MS Lcide n, O r.2k, IT, 229B, 231 B, For Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik 's regre t at the way he misha ndled h is military effort against the Crusaders, see Maqri zi, Khital, IV, 81. For a very careful and realistic assessmen t ofTa la' i' ibn RUlZik's involvement in the Holy War against the Crusaders, see Dadoyan , 162-4.

56 CHAPTER TWO

Fatimid ruling circles.6 A case in point is Nur a l-Din's interven­tion on behalf of Usama ibn Munqidh. Usama entered Nur al­~in's service following his escape in 11 54 from Egypt. where he left his family. Tala'j' ibn Ruzzik offered Usama the governorship of Aswan. But Usama rejected the proposition due to his unwill­ingness to leave again his Syrian homeland (awlan pI. of walan) for Egypl. Eventually, through Nur ai-Din's intervention and threats Tala 'j' ibn Ruzzik allowed Usama's family (about fifty people in­cluding family members and hOllsehold) to leave for Damasclls. The ship on which they sailed was wrecked off Acre and all their belongings were looled by the Franks. However, the king ofJemsa­lem provided them with 500 dinars, a very substantial sum of money, and they reached Damascus safely,7

In contraSt to the cautious approach of Nur al·Din (prior to 11 64) LOward military intervention in Egypt, the Crusader King. dom ofJ erusaJem had no hesitation in sending its armies to Egypt. In 11 63, the CrusadCl"s were campaigning in Egypt. The direc t reason for the expedition was Shawar 's refusal to pay J erusalem the annual tribute of 33,000 dinars, which was agreed by Tala'i ' Ibn Ruzzik. 8 In Shawwal 558/ September·October 11 63, after a vicLOry over a Fatimid force, the Crusaders besieged Bilbays. Al­though the Crusaders overrun a section of the wall they failed to conquer the town. 9 Nur al·Din did not send army to Egypt to assist in fighting the Crusaders. Whether his move against the fortress of Harim in Syria was aimed to distract the Crusaders from Egypt is not c1ear.lO One must take into account the diffi culties in sending armies from Damascus to Egypt. Geography was certainly on the side of the Crusaders: it facilitated the dispatch of their armies to

6 Ibn 'Asakir (cd ), ElisseefT, 138-9, MS, XVl, 295, II , 4-5. It is interesting to nOte lhat bo th a1-'Adid and Shawar sho rtly aner assuming the ir offices sent robes of ho nor to Nul' a l-Oin. See, Maqrizi, lUi'm., III , 245, 260.

7 Usama ibn Munqidh , Kitah al-rtibar, (cd) P. K. Hiui (Princeton, 1930) , 34; English translation by P. K. Hiui, An Amb-Syriml Gentleman and Warrior in/he Period of the Crw;adm, (Prin cetO n, 1930); Abu Sham a, I, pt, l , 248.

B Maqrizi, ltti'a:., III, 259. 9 Ibid, III , 262; William of Tyre, II , 302.

]0 Ralph:Johannes Lilie sees a connec tion hctween these two evenlS; see his 8Y1.a ntillm and the Crw;oikr S/ote.s, translated intO English by J. C. Morris and Jea n E. Ridings (Oxford, 1993) , 190. It is true that in August 1164, the Crusaders suffered a defeat at the hands of Nur a i-Din . However, according to the Arabic sou rces, they left Egypt after the siege of Bilbays. Thus the connection between these two evenlS remains ambiguous.

SALA DIN I N EGYPT, I 169- I 1 7 ~1 57

Egypt whi le making th is diffi cult fo r Nur ai-Din. Judging from subsequent events. the Crusaders did not conside r the campaign of 1163 to be a failure or a warning aga inst unde rtaking future military actions in Egypt.

II. Our sources (especia lly Ibn Abi Tayy and occasio nally also Ibn al-Athi r) explain the invo lvement of Nur ai-Din and the Crusad­ers in the affa irs of Egypt in economic and strategic te rms. Both powers coveted Egypt for themselves and made every effo rt to pre­ven t the ir adve rsary from gai ning a foo thold in the country. Fo l­lowing the initial involveme nt of Damascus and Jerusale m in the affa irs of Egypt, bo th capi ta ls became aware of the po litical and military weakness of th e Fatimid state. The conquest o f Egypt see med to the Crusaders as well as to Nul' ai-Din to be a feasible unde rtak ing with in th eir reach. J I The combination of Egypt's economic po te ntial and inte rnal weakness also lured Byzan tium into showing growing in terest in the affa irs of Egypt. Greek sources bear witness to the wish of the e mpero r Manuel I to intervene in Egypt. 12 There is no reason to doubt an explanation emphasiz­ing econo mic and strategic motives as lying behind the involve­ment of foreign powers in the affairs of the Fatimid state. Egypt was a country wi th a viable economy; abu ndalll agricu lture and booming trade. Both Shawar and al-'Adid made promises to Nur ai-Din to share with him the economic resources of Egypt. For instance. when Shawar appealed for Nur ai-Din ts aid he promised him one third of the tax-revenues of Egypt; the other hvO thirds were supposed to be divided between Shawar h imself and al-'Adid. 13

Al-'Adid, in his turn. made an even better offe r: in addition to one third of the Egyptian tax-revenues he promised to N UT ai-Din to cover the full expenses of Shirkuh 's army in Egypt. 14 Undoubt­edly Nur ai-Din expeCled considerable gains from his interven­tion in Egypt. Abu Shama's candid remark thal when Shirkuh went to Egypt in 11 64 he was determined 10 conquer the country and

11 AI-Bundari, 74; Ibn a l-Athir, Bahir, 121; Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 364; Ibn F'ural, IV, pl.l, 20.

12 Niketa C honiate, 0 City of ByumtiulII , translated in to English uy I-\, J. l\1a,oulias (Detroit, 1984),9 1; William of Tyre, II , 348.

, Abu Shama, I, pI,2. 4 18, 420 (quoting Ibn Abi Taw); Ibn al-Athir. at-Ka",il, XI, 196; Nuwayri, f, 233A.

14 Ibn a l-Athi r. Bahir. 13S-9, 140; Abu Shama, I, pt.2, 39 1.

58 CHAPTER TWO

annex it to Nur al-Din 's territories can be accepted without any reservalions. 15 Conveniently from Nur aI-Dill's point of view, the conquest of Egypt tallied also with the main political and cultural trends of his age such as the Holy War, fighting Shi ' ism and tip­holding the authority of the Abbasid Caliph .

Economic consideratio ns were a powerful motive behind th e actions of J erusalem, toO. When Shawar invited the Crusaders to Egypt to counter Shirkuh, he paid them in cash. According to the Mamluk historian Nuwayri (1279-1332), the payment was as high as 400,000 dinars. I n general the Crusaders were well informed abollt Egypt's econo mical potent.ial. They gathered econom ic intelligence and possessed a list of Egyptian villages and the inM comes derived from them. 16 The intention of the Crusaders to tap the agricu ltural wealth o f Egypt caused Shirkuh great concern. In 1167, he ag reed to leave Egypt on condition that no troops of the Kingdom of J erusalem would be allowed to stay in villages in Egypt. This is a very telling piece of information which reveals the military implications of control of rural areas. The Muslim and Crusader armies were maintained by a system of allocating land, or income from land, in return for military service. Indirect conM

trol of villages (i.e . the ability to derive income from them) and certainly direct control, meant that the side which achieved it was able to expand its military base by attracting additional military manpower. It must be remembered that, according to the agreeM

ment of 11 67, a Frankish garrison was left in Cairo and an annual payment of 100,000 dinars was promised to the Crusaders. Appar­ently this aspect of the agreement between the Fatimids and CruM

saders concerned Shirkuh less. 17

The question that must be asked is why the Crusaders (who had geography on their side) failed in their efforts to control Egypt while Nur ai-Din was ultimately successful? In military terms the

15 See, his 'Uyllll, I, 261. 16 Abu Shama, I. pt .2, 421. 430 (quoting Ibn Abi Tayy): Nuwayri. r, 234A.

For the different promises or Amalric to his vassals and allies and ho ..... they in­nuenced the timetable and the courSe or King's actions, see H . E. Mayer, ~Le service militaire des vaSSikUX de Jerusalem a l' elr.lIlger et Ie financemcnt des cam­pagnes en Syrie du Nord el en Egypte au XII i! siccle~ in his Milangt5 5UT I'hisloirt du royaume latin deJiru5alem, (Paris. MCMLXXXIV). 14()...58; Lilie, 309-20.

17 Abu Shama, I, pt,2 , 366; ·Uyull. I, 282; Nuwayri, r. 235A; d: Sayyid. 226-8.

SALAD I N I N EGYI'T , 11 69- 11 74 59

Cmsaders were the equals o f the Syrians and superior to the Fatimid army. But, the Crusaders made two colossal mistakes. The first was the decision of Amail'ic to invade Ebrypt (October 11 68) without e nlisting any local help.l s It should be stressed that Amal ric's reluctance to coope rate with Byzantium , in spile of the negotia­tions thal were being conducted at that ti me between these two Christian powers of the Eastern Mediterranean, had no direct effect o n the outcome of his invasio n of Egypt. 19 As late r events were to prove. at the siege of Damieu a. Byzantine naval assistance was not of itself e nough to e nsure the conquest of the town . Christian naval superio rity alo ne was not sufficient to subdue Egypt. For example, during the 11 69 invasions o f Egypt, the ground forces o f th e Crusader Kingdom ofJ emsalem were assisted by some ships which entered Nile through the mouth o f the river at Tinnis. But the advance of this squadron was blocked by a barrier of ships hastily erec ted by the Fatimids.20 As J ohn H. Pryor has recclllly shown. in naval operations in the delta only a fl eet especially designed to sai l in shallow water is of any lIse. 21 A pre-requisite for assembling such fl eet is some awareness, which is no t self-evident, of the prob­le ms involved . There are no indications that the Crusaders or Byzantines planned the naval aspects of the ir illlc nded invasion of Egypt with much attention to this problem . Therefore, in 1169, onlya successful land campaign could have achieved the conques t of Egypt. However, without any local Ebryp ti an allies, Amalric's army was too small for this purpose.

Amalric's second mistake occurred in the course of his inva­sion . Un res trained by commitme nts to local allies and collabora­tors the Crusaders massacred the population of Bilbays during the conquest o f the town. Contemporary J ewish sources tell a grim story of the fate o f those who stllv ived the massacre . They were

18 Ibn Fura t (IV, pl .1. 2 1, quoling Ibn Khal1ikan ) and Nuwayri (f, 235B) say that some Egyptians e mirs con·csponded with Jcrusa lc m. But the rc arc no indi­cations thaI Amalric "'~dS assis ted by loc;11 allics.

t9 The shifts in the alt it udes of both IlY1.illl tium and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusale m toward military cooperation for the conquest or Egypt ha\·e been exami ned by Lilie and need no elabora tion. See. 198-200,309· 15. Fo r the Byz­antine side, see P. Magdalino. Tilt Empirt of M(illutl l Komn01s, 11 4)-1 180, (Cam. bri<!§e, 1993). 73-5.

William o f Tyrc. II , 353. 'll See . his "The Crusade of Emperor Fredcrich II , 1220-29; Thc Implications

orthe Mariti me E\'idencc~, Tilt American N1Jlunt. (1992). 113-3 1.

60 CHAPTER TWO

put by their Frankish captors on sale in the slave-markets of Pal­estine. According to Nuwayri, the retrea ting Crusaders LOok away with the m as many as 12,000 captives. 22 It is unclear whe ther this carnage was a calculated act of terror, or whether the Crusading army was simply undisciplined and its troops went on rampage on their own. Whe n towns were conquered, the interests of the military leade rs of the Crusading a rmies and those of the simple soldiers clashed. The leaders were inte res ted in an orderly con­quest and in res training their troops wh ile the soldiers hoped fo r greater gain by killing and looting the conquered populalion.2S

Whateve r the circlIlllstances were that led to the atrocities pe rpe­trated againsllhe po pulation of Bilbays. The message sent to the population of Eb'Ypt was a chill y one, and the advance of the Cru­saders was watched with horror. If Amalric ho ped to gain a foot­hold in the capital his conduct in Bilbays was counler productive to that aim.

On 12 November ] 168, Shawar set Fustat on fire . His motives remain obscure. The poet 'U mara says that what the Franks did in Bilbays necess itated the burning of Fuslat, implying perhaps that Shawar wanted to save the population of Fuslat from a Frankish bloodbath. Undoubtedly Shawar and others were haunted by the expe rience of Bilbays. But se tting Fustat on fire caused immense suffe ring; many lost their li ves and the material losses we re colos­sa l. 24 ' Umara's explanatio n is an apologetic one and cannot be accepted without resen'a tions. It seems that Shawar panicked and overreacted. He was afraid that Fustat would be used by the Cru­sade rs as a springboard for the conquest of Cairo, and his move was a desperate attemplto fores tall this possibility.25 Shawar was

n See, f. 236A. for Jewish sources, see S. D. Coitein , -Ce niza Sources for the Crusader Period: A Survef, in Ou/remer. Studies in /ht flis/rrry oJ lht CnLJading Kingdom oJJerusalem, Presented to Joshua Prawe r, (cds) B. Z. Kedar and others Ucrllsalem, 1982). 315-6.

23 William of Tyre, II , 352. 355. 24 ' Um<lra, 80, 88. Nu ...... ..tyri (ff, 235A-B, qOllting Jbn MUy"dSSar) says that Shawar

tried to dig a trench around Fustat: he adds that the refugees fro m Fustat we nt to Cai ro, J<lzira (the island o pposite Fusla t), and others sailed to Alexandria and Damietla .

2~ The issue of burning of Fusta t has bee n examined in delail by W. Kubiak (~Th e Burning of Misr al-Fustat in 1168. A Reconsideration of Historical Evi­dence~, Afritana Bulldin, 25[19761 , 51-64), who has posed two q uestions; what were the exact ci rcumstances that led to setting of FlI5lat on fire and what was the ex tent of the damage caused by th e fire? Kubiak considers Maq rizi's ac-

SA LADI N IN EGYPT, 1169. 11 74 61

unduly impressed by the ease with which the Franks conquered Bilbays. Fustat, however, was bigger and with a la rger populatio n than Bilbays. and Cairo was protected by wa lls and massive gates. In additio n , considerable military forces were sta tio ned in Cairo itself and in military quarte rs outside the wa lls. None theless, the conduct o f the Crusade rs inspired awe and brought Shawar to Lake ilTational steps. Following the burning of Fuslat. Amalric was faced with a difficult di le mma: time was not on his side and an a ll--ou t attack on Cairo beyond his military means.2U In any case, after some fighting directed against Cairo, the Fatimids were ready to buy off the Crusaders. A sum of o ne million dinars was offered of which 100,000 wcrc actually delivered. 27 However, o nly the arrival of Shirkuh 's sizeable force caused Amalric to retrea t fro m Egypt Uanuary 11 69).

b. The Killing of Shawar

1. Undo ubtedly the re treat of the Crusaders strengthened Shirkuh but Nul' al·Din's expeditio nary force in Egypt was vas tly ou tnum­bered by the Fatimid army. It is true that both the Syrians and the Crusade rs had a low estee m for the fighting abilities of the Fatimid forces. 28 The Fatimid army suffered from two major short­comings: it consis ted mostly of black in fantry and therefore its mobility and attacking capabil ity were restl;cted. Moreover, it lacked internal cohesion. The army was composed ofvario lls military corps differe nt in o rigin , e thnic composition , military specializa tio n and in the characte r of their troops: mi litary slaves or free·born troops. The fragmentation of Lhe anny ,vas an imporullll conuibllung factor in the inte rnal political destabilisation of the Fatimid sta te. Not· wilhstanding the d efi ciencies of the Fatimid army as a fighting

count in Khilal as un rel iable o n two point.'i: the supposed moth'es for seuing the town on fire and the extent of the damages. Working from a wide range ofsOll rccs Kubiak expresses doubt.'i regarding the supposcd scalc of the dest ruction caused by the firc . He point.'i OUt tha t prior to Shawar's fire man y parts of Fustat were a lready in ruins.

26 William of Tyrc attributes th e failure to conque r Cairo to Amalric's slow advance following rh e co nquesr of Hilbays. Sec. II . 35 14, esp., 353

27 Ibn a l-Athir, Kamii, XI, 222; Nuwayri , ff, 235 1~236A. 28 William of Tyre, II , 3 134. In this account William refers to a supposed

meeting betwee n Shi rku h and the Caliph in which hc made some scornrul re­marks about the fighti ng capabilities or the Fatimid army.

62 CHAPTER TWO

force, it enjoyed a massive numerical superiority over Shirkuh 's army.

The \vay to Ayyubid ascendancy in Egypt was opened by the killing of Shaw-ar, the only person who could possibly face Shirkuh . This event provides an unique opportuni ty to utilize sources not tradi­tionally used in the study of Salad in . The possible benefits of tap­ping such sources have been demonstrated on two occasions by Richards. 29 A chronicle from 11 96- 11 97, the anonymous Bustan al-Jami', published long ago by Cahen , furnishes interesting in­sighLS iOLO the conduct of the civilian e lite of Alexandria during the period when the town was besieged by Shawar and Arnalric. Another example, and a far morc significan t one, is provided by Ibn 'A.,akir's account of the killing of Shawar, ci ted by Abu Shama. This account has not the slightest resemblance to the oth er ver· sions discussed in Chapter One. In plain words Ibn 'Asakir says th a t Shirkuh, with the help of Salad in , se t a trap for Shawar who was lured to the Syrian camp to visit the su pposedly sick Shirkuh. Upon his arrival, Shawar was overpowered and killed by Jurdik and Barghash, who are described as me n in th e service of Nur al· Din (litera lly mawali, i.e. hi s clients o r freedmen). Ibn 'Asaki r reminds his readers that Shawar was known for his wickedness and cunning. The fact that Shirkuh was responsible for the killing of Shawar is mentioned also in a terse remark that Ibn <Asakir in· eluded in his short and dull, biographical note on Shirkuh.3o

A more e laborate account of these events appears in Ibn <Asakir's biographical note on Nur a l·Din. As we have seen Ibn 'Asakir says that when Shawar arrived as a fugitive at Nul' al·Din's court he was well treated and the first expeditio n to Egypt aimed to restore him to his previous pos itio n . But Shawar did not keep his prom· ises to Nul' al·Din, and enli sted the help o f the enemy (i.e . the Crusaders). Nur a l·Din sent a second expedition to Egypt, but Shawar paid vast sums of money to the enemy and the Syrian fo rces had to retreat. The third campaign in Egypt was in response to Amalric's attempt to conquer Egypt. Eventually, the Syrian army remained in Egypt, and its stay-claims Ibn 'Asakir-was received

29 See. his ~The Early History of Saladin~, The Islamic Quarterly. 17( 1973), 15 1-2.

so 185 .1 bn 'Asakir as quoted by Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 40 ) ; English translation by Richards, ~The Early History~. 154-5. For Shi rkuh's biography, see Ibn 'Asakir, MS, X, 170-1; (ed ) 'Arnrawi, (Beirut, 1996), XX III , 284.

SALADIN I N EGYPT, I 169- 1 ' 74 63

with joy a nd relief by the population. However, Shawar whi le in­toxicated revealed that he had approached the enemy. Ibn 'Asakir creates the impression that this should surprise no one. Shawar, he assures his readers, was known for his wickedness and cunn ing. Shirkuh set a trap for Shawar by feigning an illness. When Shawar came to pay him a visit, he was killed by Jurdik and Barghash, the mawali of Nur ai-Din. Saladin is not mentioned as involved in any way in these events. Ibn <Asakir contin ues by saying that the kill­ing of Shawar freed the people from his wickedness and paved the way for Shirkuh's ri se to power. Shirkuh's men LOok control of the country and he was invested with a robe of honor (Le. was nominated as the vizier). Shirkuh governed the country we ll : Sunni Islam was restored, Abbasid suzerainty was proclaimed in Egypt and civil wars were brought LO end.!!]

II. The textual histo ry of Ibn 'Asakir 's biographical dictionary has yetLO be studied. Judging from internal evidence, it seems to me that the account c ited by Abu Shama was writlen before the paragraph referring to the killing of Shawar in the biographical note on Nur ai-Din . In the account cited by Abu Shama, Ibn <Asakir does not deny that the killing of Shawar was Shirkuh's initiative and carried out by his troops. In total contrast LO later accounts there is no hint ofal-'Adid's involvement in the killing ofShaw'df. However, in the biographical note on Nul' ai-Din, Ibn 'Asakir sets Shawar's killing in context. This is an invented literary context whose aim is to conceal the real context against which the killing of Shawar must be examined. The real context is a brutal struggle for power and a settling of o ld scores between Nur a i-Din and Shirkuh and Shawar. The li terary context created by Ibn <Asakir begins by presenting Shawar as active ly conspiring with the en­emy, a motif missing altogether from the passage cited by Abu Shama. In light of Shawar's record , the attempt to depict him in a negative light is not a diflicult task at all. But Ibn 'Asakir has an aim in doing so: 1O provide ajustification for the killing. The reader is led 1O see the killing as justified against the background of Shawar's cooperation with th e Crusaders and also when judged in light of the beneficial results of Shirkuh 's rule in Egypt. The

~ l Ibn 'Asaki r (ed ) ElisseefT, 139. French translation, 13 1; MS. XVI , 295 , II , 11 -20.

64 CHA PTER TWO

differences between Ibn 'Asakir's version and the versions of later historians are essential. While Ibn cAsakir tries to justify Shirkuh 's involvement they deny it altogether. Denial necessitated the in­vention ofa villain-al-'Adid. In thal way their accounts have been further re moved from the real context.

The question is why Ibn 'Asakir 's biographical nOLe on Nur al­Oin makes no mentio n of Saladin's invo lvement in the plot? In my opinion, the possible answer is that this omission reflects Ibn 'Asakir 's awareness of Saladin's susceptibi lities. Ibn 'Asakir' s ac­count quoted by Abu Shama was written close to the events and at that time he fe ll no need lO suppress or modify information conceming the plot. From the point of view o f Nur ai-Din, Shirkuh, and Saladin the re was nothing special or shameful in the killing of Shawar, who had a dubio us record o f cooperation with the ene my, the Crusaders, and heretics, the Fatimid Imam. It is said that the most famous contemporary poet in Egypt urged Shirkuh to kill Sha\'v.::l r. It seems that later, with the rise of Saladin to power, he was not keen on mentioning his role in a regicide whose indi­rect beneficiary h e was. Whe n Ibn <Asakir wrote the entry on Nur a i-Din in his biographical dic tionary, he had to take into account Saladin's sensitivities. 32 Saladin's historian-admirers, who wrote their works only after Saladin's dea th , were not sure what stand to take on this issue. They chose to portray him as in~o lved but not responsible for the killing of Shawar for which they blamed a l-'Adid.

Quite surprisingly Ibn 'Asakir 's version of the killing of Shawar, as quoted by Abu Shama, is corroborated by Ibn Zafir ( 1171-1226) , a historian of the Ayyubid pe riod. Ibn Zafir's fath e r was born in Alexandria in 527/ 1132-11 33. He studied Maliki law and became a teacher a t the Qamhiyya law college established by Saladin in Cairo. He died in 1201 bequeathing his position to his son. But Ibn Zafir gave up his teaching career in favo r of a position in the

l2 Howeve r, apparently due LO lack of consistency, a diffic ult task taking into account the vast scale of Ibn 'Asaki r 's T a'rikh Dimashq, the note on Shirkuh rc­nects no altclllion to ;m y possible sensitivity by Saladin. Judging from the style, this passage must have been writte n arter the death of Nu r a i-Din in 1174, re­neCling the pe riod of Saladin's rise to power in Syria, Ibn 'Asakir says that Saladin with divine help reslOrecl Sunni Islam in Eb'YPl. He is referred to as a i-Malik al­Nasi r and the phrase ~ may Alla h prolong his daysft is used, See, MS, X, 170-1 ; (cd) 'Amrawi, XX III , 284. For poetry urging Shirkuh to kill Shawar, see Maq rizi, MuqaJJa, Ill , 346-7.

SALA DI N I N EGY PT, 11 69- 11 74 65

administratio n . Among h is writings there is a lso a history of the Fatimids. 33 Ibn Zafir says in plain words that o n l5 Jumada I 564/ 14 February 11 69, Shawar, while on his way to Shirkuh , was cap­lUred by a group of emirs and kill ed . His brot.her and three sons were also kill ed and the ir heads were publicly displayed.~ Ibn Zatir, as a man of the Ayyubid age, is certainly not hostile to Saladin . However, he did no t belo ng to the circle of Saladin 's historian­admirers; he was a you nger and less renowned perso ll . But his remoleness from the luminaries of his age had it advantages too.

Among la ter historians o nly Ibn Furat echoes to the same ex­te nt Ibn 'Asakir's account of the killing of Shawar. Ibn Furat says, without indica ting t his sources, that Shirkuh was determined to e liminate Shawar and he e njoyed the support of al-'Ad id . In a consultation with his officers, Shirkuh sa id that his ambitio n to possess Egypt is we ll known but the Crusad ers have the same goal knowing how weak Egypt is. Shawar takes adva ntage of this situa­tion by playing be tween the two sides. Following this meeting Shawar was caplllred by Shirkuh 's troops. It was a violent incident in which Salad in distinguished h imself. He wished to put Shawar to dea th , but Sh irkuh hes itated. Only the demand made by al-'Adid to ki ll Shawar brought Shirkuh to authorize the execUlion. 35 Ibn Furat does portray Shirkuh as involved in the plo t agains t Shawar. On this point his account is mo re in lin e with that of Ibn <Asakir than with the accounts given by Saladin 's historian-admirers. He, how­ever, li ke the m, blames a l-'Ad id for the killing.

The most interesting info rmatio n supplied by Ibn Furat is a frag­me nt of ' Imad ai-Din 's poetry cong rallilating Sh irkuh on the con­ques t of Egypt, his no mination as the vizier and the killing o f Shawar.36 This tallies very well with Ibn 'Asakir 's account as quoted by Abu Shama. Elsewh ere in his ch ronicle Ibn Furat says that lur a l-Din 's joy at the achievements of h is forces in Egypt turned to anger and apprehension following Shi rkuh's no mination as the Fatimid vizie r. The question is when could <Imad ai-Dill'S poetry

n Dates concern ing Ibn Zafir a re given accordi ng 10 Kutubi . Sec, III , 27. For Ibn Zafir, see A. Free's introduction to his edi tio n of Ibn Zlifi r's Aklihar aL-Duwa/ al-Munqati'a, (Cairo, 1972).

Sol Ibid, 116. ~ Ibn Furat, IV, pt, l . 3 1·2, he also Cjllotes other \'crsions of these eve nts. See,

30-\, 32-3. Nuwayri 's lI CCO UIll of th e killing of Simwar contains no new informa· lion. See, IT, 236B-237A, 2408.

:56 Ibn Furd t IV, Pl.!. 45.

66 C H APTER TWO

have been composed ? A simila r pro ble m o f d a ting a rises in re­spect o f a poem by a n othe r Da mascen e poet, 'Arqa la . who com­posed a poem congra tulating Skirkuh o n th e killing of Shawar and p raised Saladin 's rise to th e vizie ra le.'7 T h e poems by ' lmad a i-Din and <Arqala suggest tha t Nur a l-Din 's suspicio n of the Ayyubids in Egypt evolved with th e lime. Appare nLly these poems were composed at a Lime wh en Nur a i-Din harbored no ill feel­ings toward the Ayyubids, and regarded the ir achievemen ts in Egypt as his own . Othen vise it is diffi cult to see how these two poets, who moved in th e cou rt circles, could h ave wrinen what they wfOle.

c . The Betrayal of the Falimid State

I. The elimina tio n o f Sh awar was a very impo rta lll step lOward the consolidation or Sh irkuh 's positio n in Egypt, tho ugh the vast Fatimid mil itary establishment was liule affec ted by it. None theless according to th e le lle rs or appointment or Shirkuh and or Saladin (slightly la te r ) as Fati mid viziers, they were entrusted with absolute politi­ca l powe r. These le tters testi fy tha t the Fa timid state had been de ru nct before it actua lly was extinguished by Saladin . Th e Fa timid army had d ege ne ra ted and Fatimid civilian administra to rs had become a lie nated. In rac t, they be trayed and surrendered the Fa timid sta te into the hands or Shirkuh and Saladin .

The tex ts o r bo th lette rs o r appo intment, which were written by Qadi a l-Fadi l, a re rull y reproduced in the lite rary sources.38

S7 Ibid, 47. Ibn a l-' Adi m says th at 'Arqa la com posed an e ulogy in hono r of Saladin decla ring that Sa ladin would ta ke Egypt. Salad in on his side promised hi m a thousand (/ilUJrs if h is pred iction were rea lized . Following Salad in's rise to power in Egypt . 'Arqala visited h im and re minded hi m of the promise he had made, bu t asked 10 rece ive the payment in Damascus not in Egypt. Th e story is int.e resting but lacks precision in te rms of time. See, Bugh),ot, V, 2242. Kut ubi (I, 313) says that 'Arqala d ied in 567/ 11 7 1-1172 a t the age of e igh ty and lhe pay­ment promised by Saladin was sen! to Da mascus. It is h ighly doubtful if 'Arqala, consideri ng his age, could between 11 69- 1172 have unde rtaken the a rduous j our­ney fro m Damascus to Cairo to collect h is reward fro m Saladin.

-'8 In a short accou nt. refe rri ng to the Ayyubid rise to power in Egypt, Qalqasha nd i says tha t Shi rkuh was appointed as vizier by al-'Ad id a nd his le tle r of nomination was wri lle n by Qadi a l-Fadi l. I understand the phrase: wa-kutiba lahu (i.e . to Shirkuh a nd late r Sa lad in) ' ahd min insha' Qadi al-Fadilto mean that Qadi al-Fadil was the author of both docum e nts. See, III , 428. When Qalqashandi gives the tex t of both documents he presents them saying: ~a dOCll­ment composed by Qadi al-Fadil on behalf of the Caliph a l -'Adid~ (sijjil bi-qalam Qadi ai-Fadil sadir ' an ai-khalifa al-'Adid). The preposition 'an (with verbs like kalaba and a nshu ) indicates that letters were written by Qadi a l-Fadi l 011 be ha lf

SALAD I N IN ECYI'T, 11 69-1174 67

Both leHers are extraordinary documenlS which have not received the attention they deserve. The essence of the opening paragraphs ofShirkuh's letter of appoint me III is in line with Fatimid (Isma'ili) traditional phraseology. The common Fatimid claims regarding the attributes of their Imams are re-stated: al-'Adid is described as the servant of Allah and his Friend (wali), and as the rightly guided Imam and Commander of the Faithful. Shirkuh is requested to acknowledge these standard Fatimid assertions. 59 T he dOClt­ment restates the Fatimid pretensions that they are the possess­ors of the divine light (nUT), and proof (lmjja) of Allah on earth. The concept that the Fatimid Imam is essentia l for the preserva­tion of religion and human existence is powerfully sta ted: "there is no religion except through him and the re is no world except by an association with him".4o

Shirkuh is addressed as the most Illustrious Lord and the full list of his titles includes the following: the Victorious King, Sultan of the Armies, Friend of the Imam and Glory ofthe Dynasty. Two titles traditionally associated with Fatimid military viziers (dicta­tors) of the twelfth century-Protector of the Cadis of the Mus­lims and Guide of the Propagandists of the Believers (i.e. the Isma'i lis)-were also confCl"red o n Shirkuh. And most significantly, AI-'Adid's patronymic, al-'Adidi, was bestowed on Shirkuh as welL41

In the essential paragraphs of the document it is stated that Shirkuh was appointed as the vizier with responsibili ry for the man­agement (/mibir) of the state and the protection (hi)'ata) ofal-'Adid's throne. 42 Some of Shirkuh 's responsibilities are specified in de­tai l and what is expected of him is clearly stated. The document depicts an idealistic (but hardly realistic) picture of relations be-

of somebody else. When Qalqashandi wanL~ to indicale that the leller was com­posed by Qadi al-F'adil he adds the words he himself. See, VII . 90, in contrast to VII. 109. Qalqashandi's terminolob"Y reneclS that of ' Im ad aI-Din. See, al-Barq ai­Shami. MSOxford, Bruce II , fr, 16B. 4111, 104B; (ed) R. Sesen (Istanbul , 1979). V, 144. 172. Howe\'cr, ' Imad ai-Din avoids the awkward plm!.sc: ~he wrote on behalf of himselr . He simply omits the proposition 'fill fro m the combi nation ansha' 'an indicating Ihal he himsclfcomposed the letter in question. See, ai­Bargg (ed) Sesen, 23, 36, 54, 67 and passim.

Ibn Wasi l. Mufam) al-Kunlb fi Akhbar Bani Ayyub. (cd) J. aI-Din al-Shayyal (Cai ro, 1957), II, 444, 445.

40 Ibn Wasil, II , 444 (last line). 41 Ibid, 443 (firsl para.). 42 Ibid, 450.

68 CHAPTER TWO

tween the Fatimid ruler and the army. IL staLes that the army is dependent on the Imam and sustained through his favors. Shirkuh is instructed LO treat we ll a ll segments of the army: the white and the black corps, the army in Cairo and in the provinces (literally the close and lhe far-away), the foot soldiers and the cavalry, the archers and those who fight with a lance. Shirkuh is required LO

pay the u'oops their salaries (nafaqa) and to take care of their grants of land (iqla's). He is advised to be generous with the army in order lO ensure iL'i loyalty,43 The importance of jurisdiction and propaganda is emphasized, both institutions arc described as safe­guarding the people from opprcssion.'H A hope is expressed that Shirkuh'sjust conduct will be instrumental (wakil) in expanding the land under cultivation ('imam). Shirkuh is a lso invested with the management of the affairs of the people (ra'iya) and with re­sponsibility for conducting the Holy War.45

This document gives the illusion that Shirkuh is to act as the Fatimid vizier, within the framework of the Isma' ili state, with the sla'tus of a client of the Fatimid Imam bearing his patronymic.....,... al-'Adidi. This was quite an absurd presumption but necessary from the Fatimid point of view. In the twelfth century. Fatimid Imams had to come to terms with the rise of independent military viziers who acted as military dictators. The Fatimid Chancery created the impression that these viziers are subordinates of the Imams. The best-documented case is thal of Badl' al:Jamali, a Muslim Arme­nian and the first military dictalOr in the Fatimid state in Egypt (who held power from 1073 to 1094). The patronymic of the Fatimid ruling Imam of that time, al-Mustansir, was conferred on Badr, who was the most powerful man in the country and supported by a private army. The meaning intended was that Badr a l:Jamali was al-Mustansir 's c1ient. 46 The precedent of Badr was invoked to ac­commodate Shirkuh 's rise to the vizierate. Nonetheless, al-<Adid, in a personal plea to Shirkuh written o n the scro ll of his letter of appointment, admitted that this letter was unusual in having no parallel in Fatimid history. 47

Saladin 's letter of appointment as Fatimid vizier is an even more

43 Ibid, 45 I . 44 Ibid, 45 I (last para.). 4$ Ibid, 452. 46 Lev. Slalt, 46-8. 47 Ibn Wasil, 11 ,454.

SA LADI N I N EG YTJT, ,,69-' '74 69

ex traordinary docume nt. The letter begins in a traditional way and the most essential poin ts of the Fatimid credo are re-stated . Th e Fa timid rule r is referred to as Comma nde r o f the Believers cho­sen and guided by Allah. His pivo tal role as suppone r o f Relig ion and the o ne who helps people to reach the right pa th are re­emphasized. The Fatimid claim that the origins o f their family go back to the Prophet Muhammad and 'Ali is restated and Saladin is requested to acknowledge this. The document also re-affirms the Fatimid belief that their dynasty is divi nely suppo rted and rightly g uided. 48

But the most extrao rdina ry feature o f this docume nt is its ir­reconcilable self-contradictio n . On the o ne hand, Saladin is re­ferred to as one who merely assumes the place of Shirkuh. O n the o the r hand, a remarkable declara tion of far-reaching conse­que nces is stated : namely, that Saladin 's vizierate is heredi ta ry. The precedent invoked is the heredita ry viziera le that was estab­li shed by Bad r al:Jamali . By employing a play o n words, the docu­ment sta tes that Saladin would o utshine Badr's son and succes­sor, al-Afdal:19 However, the comparison is a false o ne. The Fatimid Imam al-Amir was fo rced to accept the transfer of the pos t o f vi­zier from Badr to his son al-Aldal while Saladin 's le tte r of appo int­ment gives a p rio ri legitimacy to such an develo pment . Othe r parts of the docume nt specify Saladin 's titl es and responsibilities in the manner se t out in Shirkuh 's le ll.er of appo intment.50

II. The uniqueness of these two letters o f appoimme lll is clearly shown whe n they are compared to othe r le tters of appo intment issued to Fatimid viziers. We shall begin our comparison by ex­amining a le tter o f appo intment from the early e leventh centu ry, which is in every way a di ffe rent document altoge ther. But it helps to trace the changes that the institution o f the vizier unden vent in the twelfth century. The tex t in ques tion is th e le tter of ap­po intment given to Abi ' I-Qasim 'Ali ibn Ahmad al:Jarjara 'i, in Dhu ' I-Hilla 4l 8/ December 1027:January 1028. It was written by the head of the Chancery. The language is ,-ich and sometimes cryptic but the essence of the document can be grasped . In

48 Ibid, 455-6. 49 Ibid, 459. II , 5-6. 50 Ibid, 460- 1.

70 CHAPTER TWO

an absolute contrast to the viziers of the tw·elfth century. al:JaIjara 'j was a civilian vizier and all of his responsibilities were administra­tive. References to neither judicial nor to military responsibilities appear in the text. A1:Jaljara ' j is addressed as the Illustrious Vi­zier, the Pure One and the Essence of lhe Commander of the Believers and the recipie nts of his favors. The vizier is authorized to use these phrases as his titles.

According to aJ:JaIjara'i's lener of appointment, he was selected by the Fatimid ruler to act as a safam/wasita, i.e. a mediator be­tween the ruler and the people. He is entrusted with fisca l and administrative responsibilities and the management of the affairs of all the classes of peop le; high.ranking and commoners.5 1 The meaning of saJara/wasila becomes clear only when the text is ex· ami ned as a whole . The document speaks of three social groups. The elite is alluded to in terms with Isma<i li overtones such as awliya' (friends, adherents), and supporters (ansar) of the Fatimid cause (da<wa). Another group is referred to as rijal al.dawla, meaning the people of the I'Uling establishment. It includes governors, scribes of the administrative offices. and those who serve the ruler. The vizier must ensure that people of this group receive what they are entitled to (huquq) in return for their services (khidma). The third group is referred to by the term ra'i)'a (subjects ), who live in the urban centers and the provinces. The vizier is charged with en· suring thal the subjects are not oppressed by governors and ad­ministrators. In addition the vizier is empowered to deal with a wide range of fisca l matters including stale incomes and expendi­tures (kharaj and inJaq).52 AI-Jarjara' i's letter of appointment demonstrates that the viz.iers in the Fatimid state were always highly regarded: wide responsibilities were concentrated in their hands and lofty titles were bestowed on them. But in the tenth-eleventh centuries, in contrast to the twelfth century. a division between military, administrative and religious responsibilities was maintained in the Fatimid state.

More close in time and circumstance to Shirkuh's letter ofap­pointment is Shawar's letter of nomination as the Fatimid vizier. It was written by Ibn Khallal, the head of the Chancery. on the

~ 1 Ibn al-Qalanisi. 80. ~1! Ibid. 8 1-2, the text says that the vizier is authorized to sign (tawqi') 011 be·

half of the nller.

SALADIN I N EGYPT, 1 169- 1 174 71

behalf of a l-<Adid. The circumstances that led to Shawar's second nomination as the vizier were not much different from those that were behind the nomination ofShirkuh. In both cases the former vizier was killed as result of a foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Fatimid state, and the new vizier was supponed by a foreign expeditionary force. However, the content and style ofthese two letters of appointment are very different.

Shawar's letter of appointment begins by stating that it was is­sued by the servant of Allah and his friend, the Commander of the Believers, 'Abd Allah Abi Muhammad al-'Adid Ii-Din Allah. The vizier is addressed as the Most Illustrious Lord, Sultan of the Armies, Protector of Islam (nasiral- Islam), the Sword of the Imam , the Pillar of Religion ('umdat al-din) .53 References to Fatimid viziers as those who Protect (nash"i) and Wield the Sword (sayfi) , and the combination of the titles Sword of Islam and Protector of the Imam are known from documentary sources of the twelfth century. But the title Sultan of the Armies is a new one, On previous occasions. in the protocol of Ridwan the vizier of ai-Hafiz. the title was Amir of the Armies, which signifies a rank and title much lower than Sultan of the Armies. The combination of the titles Sultan of the Annies and Sword of the Imam in Shawar's letter of appointment creates a powerful impression and conveys the primal"ily milital), character of Shawar 's vizierate. 54

Nonetheless the document repeatedly refers to the Fatimid mlers as Friends of Allah and Rightly Guided Imams designated to rule . responsible for jurisdiction (ahkam) and prOlectors of the religion (din) of Allah.55 The vizier is requested to bless the grandfather of the Imam, Muhammad, the Seal of Prophets. and 'Ali and his offspring, the Rightly Guided Imams. In that way the document re-states the Fatimid claim that Lhey are the descendants of 'Ali , the cousin of the Prophet who was also married to Fatima, his daughter. The theme repealed throughom the whole text is: the Commander of the Believers was selected by Allah to ru le and to protect Islam (at-milia al-I·1anaflY)'rl).56 AJthough Shawar was a mili-

~ Qalqashandi , x, 310. ~ For Ridwan 's protocol :, see Khan , Arabir /..Igal, 308. The titles Amir or the

Armies and Sword or Islam appear also in Tala ·i' ibn Ruzzik 's letter or nomina­tio n as vizier. See, Maqrizi, II/i'm, III , 21 8: Dadoyan , 155, n.IO.

!>.'! Qalqashandi , X, 3 11 , pard. 2, 3; 3 12, pard. 1.

72 C H A I"TER T W O

tary vizier o n whom unprecedented LiLI es were bestowed, the doclI­men ts claims that he was carefully se lected by the Commande r o f the Believers, who examined his most trusted men and fo und Shawar to be the mos t illustrio us amo ng them .57 Shawar's respo n­sibilities we re admin istrative ( ladbir) and po litical (si)'asa) , and he was reques ted La ac t justly ('adl, insaj) in harmo ny with established rules (kanun) and customs ('ada) in o rder to eradica te o ppres­sion (maz.alim) and infringeme nts of the law (i'tida). Shawar is described as wielding overall respo nsibility beh ind the th ro ne.58

But, in line with the a rgument that Shawar's no minatio n was the result of selectio n by the Fa timid ru le r, it is repeatedly stated tha t the Commander o f the Believers is the drivi ng fo rce behind the vizie r and tha t he will guide and suppo rt him.59

This internal contrad ictio n pennea tes the tex t. O n the one hand, the divine na ture of Fatimid rule and the d ynasty a re asserted in the most powerful te rms. O n the o ther hand, it is admitted that the sta te is run by the vizie r.GO The vizie r is de pic ted as surrender· ing his sword to the service ofl slam (tawhid, iman) p rotecting Islam fro m po lytheism (shirk) and unbelief (kufr). T he vizie r is a lso respo nsible fo r the a rmy and the people (ra'i)'a), he protects the cadis o f the Muslims and guides the Isma' ili pro pagandists. 61 The vizier is expec ted to speak in favor of the membe rs o f the ruling elite (mnara', awli)'a') whose swo rds, the d ocument declares, a re the pilla rs o f religio n .62 This statement re inforces the impressio n tha t the vizie r is in fac t the o nly channel o f communication be· tween the ru le r and his subordinates. It is the duty of the vi zie r to ac t in accordance with justi ce and to secure the proper fun ctio n· ing o fth e judicial system and prevent oppression . Th is repetition o f the duties incumben t on the vizie r is made in connection with the d eclaratio n that the vizie r is responsible for the provinces and fiscal matte rs.6!I

The diffe rences be tw"ee n Shawar 's and Shirkuh's le tters of ap-

S6 T he Fa timids are referred to by th e term dawla. which mea ns both dynasty and state. See. Qalqashandi, X, 312 para. 2; 313. para. I.

57 Ibid, 3 13, II , 7-8. 58 Ibid, 3 13,1. 13; 33 17, 11. 4-6. 59 Ibid, 3 14,11 , 10, 16. 60 Ibid, 3 15, II , 9-10; 3 16, II , 3-4 . 61 Ibid, 3 15, 11 ,12-3,3 16, 11 ,9- 10. 62 Ibid, 3 17, 11 , 9-10. 63 Ibid, 3 17, 11, 3-7.

SALADI N I N EGYPT, 11 69-1 174 73

poinunent are very substantial. In Shawar's letter the divine le­gitimization of the Fatimid rule occupies a central place in the text and is constantly referred to. The document t ri es to convey the impression that the vizier, with a ll h is titles and responsibili­ties, is a subordinate of the Imam. In Sh irkuh's letter the role of the Imam and his credentials are acknowledged, but most of the text is devoted to the vizier and his responsibilities.

Shawar's letter ofappointmelll as the Fatimid vizier was followed by a letter addressed to his son, al-Kamil. The two opening para­graphs of th is letter are of a laudatory nature in praise of God. Then the divine chamctcr of the Fatimid dynasty (al-dawl(l alralwiy)'a) and its superior qualities (a//.San al-si)'flr) are asserted.64 The as­sertio n that the vizier was chosen by the Imam is also re-stated in al-Kamil 's ieller. 65 On the who le the text is unyielding, the lan­guage I-ich and cryptic and the esse nce of the document becomes apparent on ly gradually. The text refers in an en igmatic way to

the spread of kuJJar (i.e. unbelievers-apparently meaning Cru­saders) in the provinces (di)'ar) of Egypt. The im pression conveyed is that against this background the Commander of the Believers decided to invest al-Kami l with responsibility for the adm in istra­tion of Cairo and the provinces.66 What fo llows is an unexpected and quite unusual statemelll testifying to the importance of Cairo to the Fatimids. The statement begins by referring to Cairo by the standard appe llation as the Protected, al-mahrnsa. But then the town is also described as the pillar of Ismailism and Islam ('umdat al-iman wa- 'i-i slam), and dar al-Itijm. of the Imam and the strong­ho ld of the Fatimid state (khilafa) since ancient times.67 Each o ne of the terms used in this short description is a cha rged one. The word iman, belief, refers to Ismail ism (in the same way as the word mu'71linin stands for the Isma'ilis). The term dar al-hijra (Abode of Emigration) also acquired an Isma' ili meaning. At different stages of Isma'il i history, leaders of the various branches of the move­ment established in the regions in which they propagated their beliefs places ca lled dar al-hijra as bases for their activity and fo­cal points for their supporters. The fact that Cairo is regarded as

64 Ibid, 318, II, 12-8.319,11. 1-3. 65 Ibill. 319, II, IS, 17. 66 Ibid, 323, II. 1-3. 67 Ibid. 323, ll , 4-5.

74 CHAPTER TWO

the dar al-hijra of the Fatimid Imam explains the references to it as ProteCled. The town is protected by the presence of the divinely inspired and rightly guided Imam. The appellation "Protected" when ref cITing to Cairo continued to be in use in the post-Fatimid period, but it lost iLS Isma'ili meaning. For example, the inscrip­tion commemorating the building of the Citadel of Cairo by Saladin from 579/1 183-1 184 speaks of Cairo as Protected by God. According to this inscription, the Citadel is to provide protection and com­fort. The imme nse differe nce between the meaning that the Fatimids attributed to their capita l and the Ayyubid point of view fenceLS the lack of divine pre tensions by the Ayyubid rulers. 58

Notwithstanding this important testimony to the significance of Cairo to the Fatimids, the essential part of the document deals with al~Kamil, who is to act as the deputy of his father. The docu­ment states that al-Kamil's deputyship renects the wish (ray) of both the Fatimid ruler. the Commander of the Believers. and Shawar. the Most Illustrious Lord. In this section of the text the document refers to the Fatimid ruler and his vizier as almost equals. The wording of Shawar's and al-Kamil's letters of appointment mirror the dependence of the Fatimid Imam on his vizier for the running of the state.69 AJ-Kamil's letter of appointment had its precedents. Ruzzik ibn Tala'i', the son of the vizier Tala'j' ibn Ruzzik, also received a letter of appointment during the vizierate of his father. It is a long. complex and quite obscure document. Qalqashandi who reproduces the entire text gives a succinct and accurate summary of it essence. He says that Ruzzik ibn Tala' i' was entrusted with the supervis ion ofthe mazalimjurisdiction and command of the army.70 Indeed both matters are mentioned in the text. 71 But these two points of substance are almost lost in the

68 Fo r the bma'ili meaning of the term dllr al-hijro, see F. Daftary. TM lsma'dis. Their Hi.story and Doctrines, (Cambridge, 1992), index. For the Ayyubid inscrip­lion on the citadel of Cairo, see N. O. Rabbal, The Citaikl of Cairo, (Lciden, 1995), 68-9.

69 Qalqashandi, X, 324, 11,12-3, see also, 11 , 2-3, 9. 70 Ibid, 325. 71 Ibid, 334,11, 6-7, 10. Command over the army is referred to by the phrase:

ai-nazar fi 'l-isfahlllrlyya. The Persian title isfahlllr was widely used in the Arabic­speaking Middle East for the com mander of the army. For instance, the con­temporary 'Umara uses it. See, 69. II signified a rank, or tille , higher than amir bmlower limn sultan. For a full discussion, see ElisseefT, ~La tilulature", 167-9.

SALADIN I N EGYPT, 1169-1 '74 75

long and occasionally e nigmatic text. 72 Large sections of the document are addressed to Ruzzik ibn Tala 'i'. It sa id that he is honored by God and serves as the guard ian and protector of the Commander of the Believe rs. 7s Other unspecified military and administrative responsibilities are also alluded to and a sharing of responsibilities between the vizier, the father, and the son is mentioned as well. 74

The passage dealing with the essence of the mazaLim jurisdic­tion is of interest. The importance of th is institution is stressed in powelful terms. The text states that the man responsible for mazalim is entrusted with a divine treasure (kanz min kuma. al-m/nna) , and the institution is seen as a tool for safeguarding the public inter­est (maslaha al-'mnma) . 75 This passage reflects the fact that in the Fatimid slate, like in medieval Islam in general, the sovereign had wide discretionary powe rs to mainta in the public interes t as he understood it. In line with a long Middle Eastern tradition LO which medieval Islam was a heir, the Fatimid Imam dispensed justice and had ove rall responsibility for jurisdiction. Going back to Ibn 'Asakir 's depic tion of Nur aI-Din , it is clear that the notio n of the "just king" and the impo rtance of the mazalim were neither original inve ntions of Nul' ai-Din nor of Ibn 'Asakir. These were commonly shared Islamic values whose origins go back to very ancient Middle Eastern traditions, which perceived Lhe king as a lawgiver and judge.

It can be argued that the letters of appointment given to Shirkuh and later to Saladin represent the culmination of a process. In the eleventh centUlY the Fatimid viziers were civilians and the Imams wie lded supreme political powe r in the sta te. The vizierial letters of appointment reflected this distribution of power. In the twelfth century Fatimid military viziers became more powerful than the Imams, and this change is reflected in their letters of appoint­ment. The titles of the viziers became more bombastic and the

72 The docume nts begi ns in a standard way by stating the crede ntials of the Fatimid ruler: se rvalll of Allah , his friend , Imam and Comma nde r of the Believ­ers. Th e recipient of the le tter is requested to voice the usual blessings on the Fatimid ruler, the Prophe t Muhammad, his grandfather, the pure (Fatimid ) family and rightly guided Imams. Later in the lex t, this demand is re peated. Th e di­vine naLUre of the Fatimid dynasty, which is supported by God himself, is asserted manr times. See, Qaqashandi , X, 325, 326, ll , 4-5, 9, 16-7,327, 11 , 1-9, 10-1.

7 Ibid, 330, 11 , 17, 19. 74 Ib id, 333, 11 , 6-7, 9-10, 13-4. 75 Ib id, 334, \, 15.

76 CHAPTER TWO

wording of the tellers stressed the pivotal role of the vizier in the state and behind the throne. Sons of viziers were given separate le tters of appointment reflcCling the desire of their fathers to establish a hereditary vizierale on the model of lheJamali family. However, in the three months that elapsed between the appoint­me nt of Shirkuh and Saladin the military balance of power be­tween the Fatimids and Nur ai-Dill's expeditionary force in Egypt did l)Ql change. There was nothing new that might explain the authorization given to Saladin to sct up a hereditary vizierate. Certainly the precedent did ex ist and some tried to emulate it. But the clue to underslanding why Saladin accomplished what other viziers, unde r very sim ilar circumstances, failed to achieve should be sought in the text of Saladin's letter of appointment itself. In a phrase, which comes immediately after the statement about the hereditary nature of Saladin's vizierate, it is said that the Chan­cery was ordered by al-'Adid to write this document. 76 If this was indeed the case, any justification by the Chancery would have been spurious. The Chancery was not a policy-making body: it executed the orders of the ruler. However, we have every reason to doubt the declaration that the new character of Saladin's vizierate was an initiative of al-'Adid. More probably, Qadi al-Fadil, the author of both letters of appointment, is justifying himself as merely fol­lowing al-'Adid's orders. Qadi al-Fadil as well as Ibn KhaUal, his superior in the Chancery, and other administrators cooperated with the Syrian emirs. The fact that the young and unexperienced al-'Adid, and the Fatimid ruling establishment as a whole, lost control over the Chancery is reflected by ' Imad al-Din's candid remark that Ibn Khallal had power over the correspondence and he wrote what he wished. 77 In plain terms, the Fatimid regime was betrayed by the administrators in its service.

II. The cooperation of Fatimid administrators with Shirkuh and Saladin tilted the balance in the favor of the Ayyubids. None of the Fatimids viziers of the 1050's and 1060's obtained the same

76 Ibn Wasil, II , 459, II , 6-7. 77 ' Imad ai-Din, KluJrido., al-Q4ST, I, 235, repeated by Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 487.

Ibn al-Sayr-afi (1071.1147) says in a manual dealing with the Chancery that the penon in charge must be ofthe same persuasion (madhhab) as the ruler (malilr). But his statement reflects eleventh<entury realities. See, his Al-Qanun Ji Diwan al-Rasa'il, (ed ) A. F. Sayyid (Cairo , 1990) ,9.

SALADIN IN EGYPT, 1 169-1 174 77

degree of cooperation from the civilian eli te. Tala 'i' ibn Ruzzik was a Shi'ite, Dirgham ru led by te rror and Shawar only brought calamities on the country. The Ayyubids o ffe red hope to the civi l­ian elite. They were Sunnis in the service of a powerful and re­spected Sunni ruler. Their own record, and the record of their master, was impressive. The cooperation of the civi lian e lite with the Ayyubids was not li mited to a few key persons such as Qadi al­Fadi!: it was quite widespread. The sources are not detailed enough 10 allow a filII prosopog raphir<J1.';;llIrly of lhosf' who rhangerl siclf's at that crucial moment, but some revealing information is avail­able . Some of those who made a smooth transition from their former employers to the service of Saladin were top-ranking ad­ministrators under the Fatimids. We can take as an example the case of cadi al-Athir ibn Bunan (507-596/ ] 11 3-] 199) from the Anbari family of Fatimid viziers. Unde r the Fatimids he had served as the head of the Office of the Inspection (diwan al-nazar). Fol­lowing the de mise ofthe Fatimid sta te , Ibn Bunan , on the recom­mendation of Qadi al-Fad il , was accepted into Saladin's service. He served as Inspector in Tinnis and Alexandria and was later in the service of Saladin's brother, Tughtakin.78 A recommendation from Qadi al-Fadil was always important in opening the way for former Fatimid admi nistrators to the service of Saladin. This was, for instance, the case with Qadi al-Fadil's own secretary, Abu '1-Hasan, known as the Egyptian secretary, who had also served al­'Adid. Saladin later appointed him as a secretary of his son al­Malik al-Zahir. 79 Two of the better known administrative families which spanned the Fatimid-Ayyubid period are the Makhwmis and Mammatis. In Fatimid times, Abu ' I-Hasan al-Makhzumi, the au­thor of an administrative manual on tax-collection , had served as the chief of the Office of Fustat. His son, Abu 'I-Qasim (547-615/ 1152-121 8). entered into Saladin's service and became the offi­cial in charge of religious endowments in Egypt including Cairo. Muhadhdhab ibn Mammati was, in the late Fatimid period, em­ployed in the Office of the Army. Following the arrival of Shirkuh and Saladin to Egypt, he and his sons converted to Islam. Follow­ing their convers ion members of the family advanced rapidly in

78 Mundhiri, II , 206-8; Ibn al-Qifti, III , 209-10; Maqrizi, Muqalfa, VII , 154-5. 79 Ibn al-'Adim, V, 2302.

78 CHAPTER TWO

Ayyubid service.BO lo another case, the son of a former Fatimid adm inistrator successfully establ ished himself in the service of Saladin and served in many posts including in the Office of the Army,SI For some people. entrance into Saladin 's service marked a great change in their life. For instance, Ja'far ibn Muhammad al-Ardali (543-622/1148-1225), of the Mukhlar family from Qus, was known in his earl y adult life for his literary talents. BUlunder Saladin he embarked on a military career serving as an emir. His miiit.:lI1' service did inlclfere with his poetry; he became a renowned poet in his times. 82 Another case involves a former Fatimid pro-­pagandist. Fakhr al-Dawla al-Aswan i, the stepson of the cadi Rashid ibn al-Zubayr, Saladin's supporter from Alexandria. Qadi al·Fadii much respected Fakhr al-Dawla and opened his way LO Saladin's service.B3 The most speclacular career was made by Masrur, a fonner Fatimid eunuch. He became the commander of Saladin 's body­guard (Jtalqa) and received the rank (or title) of emir.84 Saladin's most distinguished admiral was also a former Fatimid officer. Other people who staffed Saladin's administration were born in the Fatimid period but were not necessarily employed by the Fatimids. These already represent the Ayyubid age. B5

Qadi a l-Fadi l himself had much to ga in by siding with Shirkuh and Saladin. But, it must be remembered that at the time he lent his support to them both their final triumph was barely conceiv­able. The cooperation of the civi l e lite of the Fatimid state with Shirkuh and Saladin was religiously motivated. The common bonds of Sunni Islam proved to be a strong motivating force behind the cooperation given by Fatimid administrators to Shirkuh and Saladin as early as the campaign of 1167. Ibn Abi Tayy's account is very

80 For the Makhwmis, see Maqrizi , Muqaffa , III , 665-6; Ibn al-'Adim, VI, 2647. For the Mammatis, see Safad i, IX, 19-27.

81 Maqriz.i, Muqaffa, II , 11 6-7. 82 Ibid, III , 64-5. Fo r another emir-poet who served the Fatimids and Saladin,

see Ibn Sa'id a l-Maghribi, Al-Nujum al-Zahim ji Hula Hadm al-Qahim, (ed) H. Nassar (Cairo, 1970) , 228-9.

IU Maqriz, Muqaffa, I, 269. Two brothers of the Zubayr family became famous in the late Fatimid period. One is aI-Qadi a l-Muhadhdhab, he was associated with the vizier Tala'i ' lbn Ruz.zik and died in Rabi ' II 56 1/ January-February 1166. The other was ai-Qadi ai-Rashid, who supported Saladin in Alexandria and later was execUled by Shawar. See, Safadi, (ed) R. 'Abd al-Tawwab (Beirut , 1979), XII , 13 1-7; Kutubi , I, 337-41.

84 Maqrizi, Khilal , IV, 216. 85 For example, see al-Mundhiri, I, 10&-7.

SALADIN I N EGYPT, 11 69-11 74 79

revealing on this point. Befo re the Battle of Babayn was fought, Shirkuh had appealed to Alexa ndria for help. The civilian e lite of th e town respo nded positively and the e mir Ibn Masal sent his nephew, Ibn <Awf, with a shipme m of arms.86 Th e head of the Fatimid adm inistration in Alexandria, Ibn Zubayr, active ly sup­po rted Saladin .87 When Alexandria was bes ieged by Shawar and the Crusaders, Ibn Masal and his nephew, together with Ibn Zubayr and the cadi Ibn Habbab organ ized the defence of the town by recruiting nomadic tribes from the region. This group of four, rejected bribes offered by Shawar for the surrender of Saladin and his troops.88 In the agreeme nt arranging Saladin 's evacuation of Alexandria, Saladin stipulated that no retribution would be taken aga inst those who had helped him . However , Shawar b roke his promises and Saladin could d o little on their behalf. He had to ask Amalric to intervene with Shawar to hono r the agreement. For Ibn Zubayr, Saladin 's effor ts came too la te; as Shawar had already executed him.89 The most explicit explanation for the behavior of th e civilian e lite of Alexa ndria is given by the late historian Ibn Wasil who says tha t the population of Alexandria welcomed the Syrian expeditionary force because of the prevail­ing Sunni spirit in the town.90 This is not an unfounded charac­terization of the rel igious atmosphe re in the town which had al­ready been a bastion of Sunni Islam during the Fatimid period.

III. The le tters of appoin tme nt writte n by Qadi al-Fadi l provide an important insight into the in ternal disintegration of the Fatimid state. However, the selection of Saladin as Shirkuh 's successor was an outcome o f an internal power struggle within Nur a l-Din's expeditionary force. We have seen that neither the historian-ad­mirers of Saladin nor Ibn al-Athir provide a coherent picture of these events. Both types of accounts a re highly te ndentious. We

86 Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 426 (quoling Ibn Abi Tayy's a/·Sira al·Salahiyya-the Life ofSnladin. Ibn Abi Tayy relies here on o ra l in formalion supplied by an eye­wimess who was im'olved in lhese eve nts).

87 He is described as lhe head of lhe Office of Alexandria, i.e. lhe adminis­tralive office dealing with the affairs o f the {Own. Sec, Abu Shama, I, p t,2, 427 (quoling Ibn Abi Tayy).

88 Richards, ~The Early History of SaladinM, 152 (who quotes and tnlllsiates illlo English a passage from Bustan al-jami').

89 Ibn Khallika n, I, 161. 90 Ibn Wasi l, I, 15 1.

80 CHAPTER TWO

shall now re-examine these events relying mostly o n the accounts by Ibn Abi Tayy and Ibn Fural and utilizing some biographical data supplied by Ibn Khallikan. Following Shirkuh's death, al·'Adid asked the Syrian emirs who they recommended as vizier. The candidature of Shihab aI-Din, Saladin's uncle , was put fonvard. But Shihab ai-Din who was invited to the palace declined the nomination knowing that he did not enjoy the unanimous sup­port of the other emirs. In a conversation with a l-'Adid. Shihab suggested Saladin as the vizier and his choice was accepted by the Fatimid Imam, who appreciated Saladin's bravery and his role in the e limination of Shawar.91 However, al-'Adid's positive answer to Shihab's proposal was not enough to secure the post of vizier for Saladin. The sources which we follow do provide significant information for an understanding of the internal balance of power within Nur a l-Din 's expeditionary force. Shirkuh had at his dis­posal hi s own private corps, the Asad iyya, a force which at the time of his death was 500 men strong. According to the late rbn Furat, these soldiers were military slaves of Shirkuh and they supported Saladin. Ehrenkreutz has already called attention to the signifi­cance of the support given by the Asadiyya to Saladin.92 This sup­port must have been crucial to Saladin's rise to power, especially as two of Shirkuh 's confidants active ly backed him. One of them was the Kurd <Isa al-I-Iakkari of Mosul , who \vas Shirkuh's private leader of prayer (imam). He began his career as a student of law in Aleppo (he is referred to in the sources as ajurist of the Shafi<i school) where h e entered into Shirkuh's service. The other per­son who proved to be instrumental in the efforts to secure Saladin's nomination was Baha' ai-Din Qaraqush , an eunuch manumitted by Shirkuh. Both of them became the close and trusted aids of Saladin. It is said that ' Isa felt free to say to Saladin things that other people did not dare to mention,93

91 Abu Shama, I, pt.2, 438-9 (quoti ng Ibn Abi Tayy). 92 Ibn Fural, lV, pt, I, 56; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 63. He, however, failed to

notice that Qaraqush was Shirkuh's freedman and his description of him is mis­leading.

93 Ibn Khallikan , III , 497, IV, 91-2. ' Isa a l-Hakkiri died on 9 Dhu ' I-Qa'da 585/ 20 NO\'embe r 11 89. In a short obilUary nOle Abu Sham a mentions the most important facts about him ; he was a close companion of both Shirkuh and Saladi n, and he secured the support of people (i,e. emirs) for Saladin. See, (Beirut), II , 150; a l-M undh iri, 1, 2 13-5. Another important supporter of Saladi n among the officers of Nur al-Din's force in Egypt wasJardik, Nur al-Din's leading em ir. He gets the credit ror the ki ll ing of Shawar. See, Sibt ibn JawLi , VIII, pt,2, 456.

SALAD I N I N EGYPT, I 169- 1 174 81

These accounts put the nomination of Saladin in its prope r histo ri cal context. By 11 69, the militari7..ation of po litics in the Mus­lim Middle East had been lo ng establish ed and widespread. Mili­tary dictalOrs rose to power with the backing of their military faction o r triba l fo llowin g. Both va ri ants took place in twe lfth-cenlu ry Fatimid Egypt. Within the fram ework of the mili tariza tio n of politics of the Muslim polity, collaboratio n be tween the civilia n e lite and th e military class a lso had a lo ng traditio n. The coope ra tion of th e Fatimid adminis trators with the leaders of Nur a l-Din 's a rm y was a rather unusual case. The administrators sided with a for­e ign military fac tion against the dynasty they served . But in the ligh t of the dismal pe rforman ce of the Fatimid regim e and-from the point of view of the civilian elite-its unappealing religious ch arac te r their c hoice is quite understa ndable.

d . The Battle oj the Blacks

According LO Maqrizi . who echoes a n e laborate ve rsio n of Ibn Abi Tayy, Saladin, fo llowing hi s no mination as th e Fatimid vizie r , underwent a spiri tual transformation: h e abstained from wine and refrained from ente rtainme nt. He matured and became serious. It is interesting to note that Ib n Abi Tay}' portrays Nur a i-Din in a similar way. Prior to attaining power, Nur ai-Di n gave himself to vice . However, a t a n early stage of his rul e , he underwent a sp iri­tual experience a nd ch a nged his ways.94 Notwithstanding Ibn Abi Tayy's g rudge against Nur a i-Din , it seem s that in both cases the drift of his account is positive and is meant LO be a n appreciative cha racterizatio n of bo th rulers.

Whatever was Saladin's state of m ind, his immediate po licies were aimed at securing a smooth transfer o f power into his ha nds. Saladin establ ished friendly relations with al-'Adid and, a t the sam e t ime , was trying to buy the good will of hi s comrades in the Syr­ian expeditiona ry force , especia ll y fo llowing the return of some of the e mirs to Syria. In order to secure the loyalty of the remain­ing sold iers and e mirs, Saladin was in g rea t need of m o ney. For that purpose he used the ri ches amassed by his uncle Shirkuh.95

94 Maqri zi, IlIi'az. , III , 3 10; Richards, WA Con sideraLio n w, 147·8 (who quotes

and translates inlO English the account of Ibn Abi Tan '). Fo r Nur a i-Din , see Khayat, 180.

95 Maqrizi. IUi'w., Ill , 310.

82 CHAPTER TWO

An another powerful instrument which was ava ilable to Saladin was the distribution of iqta'. The allocation of these grants of land came at the expense of the Fatimid ruling estab lishment (alll al­dawla), and the people in the service of the Fatimid d ynasty (ahl Misr). In order to gain control over the distribution of the iqta', al-'Adid's freedom of action had to be curtai led. The general purport of Saladin's polic ies was clear. and the Fatimid ruling establishment did not delude itself as to Saladin 's ultimate goaI5. 96

In fact. Saladin 's friendl y relations with a l-<Adid were a masquer­ade. Saladin exacted from him money and humiliated him pub­licly by entering the palace precinct whi le riding on horseback (violating in that way the exclusive privilege of the Imam).

The Battle of the Blacks must be examined in the context of Saladin's policies which aimed at the weakening of al-<Adid 's position. The destruction and dispersal of the Blacks rendered the Fatimid dynasty defenseless; it was a necessary preparatory step towards the fall of the Fatimid state. As we have seen in Chapter One neither the accounts of Saladin's historian-admirers nor that of Ibn al-Athir can be trusted to provide a logical background for the Battle of the Blacks. Furthermore, with the exception of pass­ing remarks made by Maqrizi, contemporary and later historians say nothing about Saladin 's overall aims. However, rbn Zafir is very explicit about Shirkuh's intentions following his nomination as Fatimid vizier: he strove 1O overthrow the Fatimid dynasty and sought an opportunity to do SO.97

The clearest information on Saladin's aims is unintentionally supplied by Ibn Khallikan 's entry on Najm ai-Din Khabushani , a Shafi ' ijurist of Persian origin who lived as an ascetic in Fusta l. In unspecified circumstances he established friendly relations with Saladin and late r it was on his advice that Salad in founded a law college allocated to the Shafi ' ijunsts and adjacent to Shafi<i's tomb in the area of the cemeteries, Qarafa, near the capital. Najm al­Oin is depicted as a wholehearted advocate of a legal decision issued by the jurists of pote'ntial use to Saladin which permitted the ex­ecution of al-'Adid as an offender against religion.98 This account must be examined in conjunction with the information supplied

96 Ibid, II I. 3 1 J. 97 See, 116. 98 Ibn Khallikan , III , Ill. On Khabushani 's relalions with Saladin, see Leise r,

~The Madrasa M

, 42-3.

SALADIN I N EGY I~T, 11 6g-1174 83

by the History oj the Patriarchs oj the Egyptian Chuuh, concerning the fate of a l-'Adid. In th is work several versions are recounted. The first one is on the authority of Safi ' l-Dawla, who was an eu­nuch in the service of the wife of the Fatimid ruler al-Zafir ( 11 49-I ] 54). He says that al-'Adid committed suicide after be ing informed that Turanshah, Saladin's brmher, had come to the palace and was looking for him.99 The second version says that Turanshah killed a l-'Adid, who did not reveal to him the loca tion of the trea­sure hidden in the palace. Accord ing to the thi rd version, Saladin and Turanshah had drunk wine with a l-'Adid and then asked the jurists if it were permissible fo r the Caliph to consume alcoho l. The jurists declared that if it proved to be so he should be de­posed. But Saladin took a mo re drastic step , he sent his brother to kill a l-'Adid. T he account in the History oj the Patriarchs ends ,\lith a quotation from the official announcement published by Qadi a l-Fadi l fo llowing the dea th of al-'Ad id . T his document states that al-'Adid died a natural death and was buried in a dignified way.IOO Needless to say that Qadi a l-Fadi l's sta tement came to be th e only ve rsion quoted by historians of the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods.

We find indirect support fo r Ibn Khallikan 's account in another independent report: Ibn Jubayr 's description of his visit to Egypt in 1183. Al-Khabushani was known and fa mous in Muslim Spain , and Ibn Jubayr wished to visit him . He went to see the tomb of Shafi ' i and the law college built there by Saladin , who also met th e costs of maintain ing this complex. But a t that time a l-Kha­bush ani resided in his own mosque in Cairo, and it was there tha t

99 This work a lthough attributed to Sawirus Ibn a l-MuqaJTa' is in ract iI col­lective work written over a long period or time. The author or the sections deal­ing with the years 1166-1216 is anonymous. For textual histol)' or the History of the Patriarchs, see F. Micheau, MCroisades e t croises vus par les historiens ardbes chre.ie ns d'Egypte", in Itiniraires d'Orienl. Hommages a Claude Cahen, (eds) R. Curie l and R. Gyselen (Bures-Sur-Yvette, 1994), 169-70; ]. Den Heijer, ~Coptic

Historiography in the Falim id, Ayyubid and Early Mamluks Periods", Medieval Encounters 2( 1996),69-77. In the notes and the bibliography, this work is quoted as Ibn MuqafTa'. See, III , p1.2, edited and translated in to English by A. Khater and O. H. E. Khs-Bunnesler (Cairo, 1970), 66 (Arabic), III (English). The English translation or this account is erroneous due to a misunderstanding of two cru­cial terms: ustadh meaning an eunuc h and jiha, which is a honorific ror a wife or a ruler. Furthermo re, in the Arabic lext, arter a l-Zafir , the lette r ba' should me eme nded to iyya.

100 Ibn al-MuqafTa', III . p1.2. 66-7. 68 (Arabic), 111 -2. 114 (English).

84 C H A PTE R TWO

Ibn Jubayr eventually mel him and received his blessing. WI Ibn Jubayr does n ot explain what bro ught al-Khabushani to such an exalted position but, as we h ave seen , the missing link is supplied by Ibn Khallikan. Taking into account the data provided by Ibn Khallikan , Ibn Jubayr and Maqrizi, we can conclude that Saladin had a clear objective: to put an end to the Fa timid stale. And to that end he was preparing the necessary legal and religious justi­fica tion. The war that Saladin waged o n the Blacks was an aggres­sive act. However, Saladin himself and his historian-admirers deny any worldly motives on his part. Therefore the Battle of the Blacks had to be justified and presented as an defensive act. The com­plex story of the plot, told in Chapte r One. served that purpose and the story itself is, in my view, a literary invention.

e. The Demise of the Fatimid Stale

Saladin too k full advantage of his victory against the Blacks ; his extortion of al-'Adid continued, and he began to billet his troops in Cairo taking possession of prope rti es which had become vacant following the destruction and dispersal of the Blacks and the Armenian troops which. like the Blacks. had been expelled from Cairo. 102 AI-'Adid had in fac t been put under house arrest. Qaraqush , who helped to secure the support of Nur a l-Din 's ex­peditionary force in Egypt for Saladin 's nomination as vizier, was appointed supervisor of the Fatimid palaces. 103 During 566/1170-1171 , Saladin 's position in Egypt was greatly strengthened. His family-father and brothe rs-arrived from Syria and he bea t ofT a Christian attack on Damielta. For that purpose al-'Adid had sent Saladin a million dinars which further weakened his position.104

Maqrizi says that the successful defence of Damietta and the ar­rival of Saladin's fami ly in Egypt greatly strengthened Saladin 's dete rmination to put an end to Fatimid rule in Egypt. 105 In the same year, Saladin carried out a further assault on the remnants of the Fatimid army and its officers which lived in Fustat. In a well-

]0] Ibn Jubayr, RiMa, (ed ) W. Wright (Leiden , 1907),48-9; English transla· tion by R. J. C. Broadhurst, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, (London, 1952),40-1.

] 1)2 Maqrizi, Wi'az, Ill, 3 14. ]O~ Ibid, 322. ItH Ib id, 3 16. 105 Maqrizi , SuiuJr., 64.

SALADIN IN EGYPT, I 169- I 174 85

prepared and coordinated action Fatimid military personnel in Fustat were attacked and driven out of the town , and the prop­erty of the dispossessed Fatimid emirs was seized by Saladin. 106

The cumulative effect of Saladin's actions was th e removal from the capital, Fustat-Cairo, oftroops 10yai 1O al-'Adid. The overthrow of the Fatimid dynasty became only a question of time.

Nur ai-Din , who was himself under Abbasid pressure , demanded from Saladin the swift termination of Fatimid rule and the res to­ration of Sunni Islam. Saladin's tactic was cautious. The pace of his anti-Isma'ili policies depended on the progress made in weak­ening the power ofthe Fatimid army and court. Maqrizi 's account is helpful in fo llowing the two-pronged policy of Saladin . In the period immediately following Saladin's nomination as vizier, the Friday sermons in Egypt continued to be delive red in the name of al-'Adid. The second person to be mentioned was Nur ai-Din and Saladin was referred to only as Nur al-Din 's deputy in Egypt. 107

Moreover, in accordance with a long-established Fatimid tradition, Saladin appeared together with al-'Adid for public prayers at the main mosques during the major religious festivals such as Ramadan and the Feast of the Breaking of Ramadan. loa Only after the Battle of the Blacks, the victory at Damietta and the arrival of Saladin's family. were significant anti-Isma'ili measures taken. On Friday, 11 Dhu 'I-Hilla 565/ 25 August 1170, the Shi ' ite formula for the call to praye r was dropped and the names of the three Rightly Guided Caliphs, whom the Shi' ites abhor, were inserted into the sermon. I09 During 566/ 1170-1171 , anti-Isma'ili policy was accel­erated and intensified. Colleges for teaching Sunni law were es­tablished in Fustat, and Ismaj' ilijudges were dismissed from their pOSLS. Sessions of Ismai'ili teaching which were traditionally held at the Azhar mosque in Cairo were also cancelled. 1 10 The policy of removing Isma'il i and non-Isma ' ili judges appointed by the Fatimids was carried out by Saladin's cadi, the Kurd Ibn Dirbas. N; exemplified by the case of Ibn Barkat Abu 'I-Hasan, the purge was carried out with leniency. The people removed from their post were not necessarily persecuted. Abu 'I-Hasan was born in Bahnasa,

106 Maqri zi, Illi'at, III , 32 1. 107 Ibid, 31) . 108 Ibid, 3 10. 109 Ib id, 317-8. 110 Ibid, 3 19, 320.

86 CHAPTER TWO

a provincial town in Upper Egypt, and acquired his education in grammar and law in Fustat. In Fatimid times he was appointed as cadi of his hometown and then dismissed by Ibn Dirbas. He re­turned to Fustat and made a career as a teacher of the Koran and literature to the children of prominent people in the city. The cadis dismissed by Ibn Dirbas were replaced by Kurds and people from Syria. I I I Maqrizi says thallhe nomination of Ibn Dirbas was a result of the cooperation between Saladin and Qadi al-Fadil aiming at the ovcnhrow of the Fatimid dynasty. I 12 However, the ultimate implementation of this policy took place only after Cairo had been cleared of the remnants of the Fatimid army.

Saladin's explanation for the slow pace of his actions was his fear of the response that his policies might provoke. II!! Actually he faced a dilemma quite similar to which the Fatimids had faced at the beginning of their rule in Egypt. The Fatimids, like Saladin, were determined to impose their own brand of Islam on Egypt, but were unable to gauge the likely local reaction. In both cases the new rulers adopted cautious policies. With the benefit of hind­sight, it is obvious that their policies were over-cautious.

f. The Conspiracy oj II 74

The full consolidation of Saladin's rule in Egypt took place after the overthrow of the Fatimid dynasty and coincidently his rela­tions with Nur ai-Din became strained. One of the most intrigu­ing events in the early period of Saladin 's rule in Egypt was the conspiracy of 1174, which neither personally endangered Saladin nor threatened his rule. But the story of the conspiracy, or per­haps the alleged conspiracy, throws interesting light on Qadi al­Fadil and his relations with Saladin. On 2 Ramadan 569/5 April 11 74, Saladin put to death a group of people who were accused of plotting against him. An account contemporary with these events is Qadi al-FadiI's report sent to Damascus. It was used by Ibn Abi Tayy who is quoted by Abu Shama. According to Qadi al-Fadil, fonner Fatimid courtiers (ahl al-qasr) and military personnel (jund Misr) had corresponded with the Crusaders, and had even ap-

III Ibn al-Qifti, III , 333-4. 112 See, Khilat, III, 378-9. III Maqrizi. lui'az, III, 316.

SA L A DIN I N EGYPT, 11 69- 1174 87

p roached the Assassins. An envoy from the Kingd o m of J erusa­lem , who was o n an o ffi cial visit to Cairo, secre tly met with the conspira to rs as well as with J ewish and Christian scribes. The con­spirators claimed to enjoy the support o f Isma' il i gro ups and fo rmer Fatimid black and Armenian t roops. T he ir plan was to stage a rebellio n in Cairo which was to coincid e with an invasio n of Egypt by the Crusaders. In the talks with the envoy from J erusale m the conspirators insisted tha t th e ti me was ri pe fo r actio n ; Cairo had been em p tied of troops who had re turned to their fiefs (iqta's) fo r the harvest. However, Saladin 's agen t infi ltra ted the conspira­to r circle and kept Saladin info rmed abo lltthe plo t. The conspi ra­to rs in tended to resto re the Fa timid state , but they were divided amo ng themselves o n two crucial issues: which me mber o f the Fa tim id roya l family, ke pt in prison by Salad in , was to be se lec ted as th e new Imam, and o n who m would the post of the vizie r be confer red . Qadi al-Fadi l says tha t the execution of the conspi ra­tOrs was a j ust and legal ac t o rd ained by Cod . Othe r punitive ac­tio ns included the d ispersa l of Isma' il i supporte rs and the ban­ishment of former Fatimid black sold ie rs and courtie rs to re mote parts of Uppe r Egypt. l14

<Imad ai-Dill 's ve rsio n of these even ts tha t has come down to us diffe rs in impo rtant d e ta il s from tha t of Qad i a l-Fadi!. First of all , the re is no thi ng in it abo ut contacts between the consp ira tOrs, d escribed as Fa timid pro pagandists or suppo rters (du'at al-dawla al-Misriyya) , and the Crusade rs. Secondly, suppo rte rs of Saladin (ansar al-dawla al-Nasiriyya) took part in the conspiracy or a t leas t had knowledge of the plot. Thirdly, the plOl was be trayed by a preacher who asked as a reward fo r his se rvices the prope rty of Ibn Kamil , a forme r cadi and Fatimid propagandist, who la te r was executed . ' Imad ai-Din says that the conspi rators were executed in accordance with the accepted po litical no rms (siyasa), but no refere nce is made to divine law. 115 However, Ibn Khall ikan , who

114 Abu Shama, I, pI,2, 562-5 (q uoting Qadi al-Fadil through Ibn Abi Tayy). Not surprisingly Ibn Abi Tayys's inde pendent version of these events resembles tha t of Qadi a l-Fad il. Li ke Qadi al-Fadil, Ibn Abi Tayy says tha t the conspirators a pproached the Crusade rs, an d me n of re ligion ('ldama) issued a legal opinion authorizi ng the execution of the conspirators. Th is sta te me nt is taken fro m Qadi a l-Fadil 's report. See, Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 56 1, 565.

m A1-Bundari, 147-9, repeated by Abu Shama, I, p l,2, 560. In contrast to' lmad ai-Din , Ibn Abi Tayy say that it was Ibn Masal who informed on the conspirators 10 Saladin . See, Abu Sha ma, I, pt,2, 561.

88 CHAPTER TWO

quotes ' lmad al-Din's anthology of poets and poetry, says that the conspirators wrote to the Crusaders and hoped with their help to restore the Fatimid dynasty to power. J 16 Thus it is impossible to obtain an idea of the exac t conte nt of ' Imad ai-Dill 's version of the conspiracy of 1174. The main problem is to understand the discrepancies between al-Bundari's abridgmem of ' Imad ai-Dill's the Syrian Lighting and Qadi al-Fadil' s report of these events, which 'Imad ai-Din must have known. Al-Bundari 's account indicates that <Imad ai-Din simply did not believe Qadi al-FadiI's version. But the accounts in the anthology of poets and poetry repeat a cen­tral mOlifin Qadi aJ-Fadil's version ofthe conspiracy: contacts with the Crusaders and the attempt to restore the Fatimid dynasty. Obviously ' Imad al-Din's various writings include a number of different accounts of these events.

When Qadi al-Fadil's vers io n is examined on its own merits it appears to be highly problematic if not altogether dubious. There is a strange disparity between the alleged scope and threat of the plot and Saladin's action in the wake of its discovery. If indeed former Fatimid troops (jund Misr) were drafted into the conspiracy th e punishment meted out was very lenient and on the whole absurd. Why should be potentially rebellious elements sent to Upper Egypt, a region that had been pacified only some years earlier? Moreover only one officer was among the executed conspirators. The other point is the absence of any indication of harsher treat­ment meted out to the surviving members of the Fatimid royal family. None of them was put to death. 11 7 But the most intriguing question is the execution of the poet 'Umara.

116 See, JII, 435 (quoting ' Imad al-Din's Kharidat al-Qosr). The printed edi­tion of this work contai ns a reference sayi ng that the conspirators of 11 74 we re tryin~ to restore Fatimid rule. See, Kharidot ol·Qasr, (Egyptian Poets), 187.

II For the fate of lhe Fatimid royal famil y, see Maqrizi, Khilat, II, 394, 395-6; Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 494-5 (who tells of his meeting with one of the surviving sons ofal-'Adid, emir Abu ' I-Futuh , in 628/ 1230- 1231), see 495 (quoting ' lmad ai-Din); 506 (quoting Ibn Abi Tayy). An infanl son ofal·'Adid, nam ed Dawud, was smuggled from jail by his mother and deli\·e red to a certain Fatimid do'; who brought him up. The secret was revealed only during the reign of the Su l­tan al-Kamil, who imprisoned Dawud in the ci tadel of Cairo where he died in 1248. Sec, Safadi, (cd) B. Badtke. ( Beirut, 1979). XV, 377. But it appears that Safadi's information is of folkloristic character, o r simply incorrect in date. Maqrizi says that Dawud died in 604 / 1207- 1208, and a l·Kamii allowed the conducting of a proper burial and mournin g rites. However, he imprisoned the Fatimid sym· pathizers who showed up for the funeral and extorted money from them. See. Suiuk, 202, 203, see also III , 138, 139 and 209.

SALAD I N IN t:GYI'T, 11 69.1174 89

The sources are ambiguous and comradicLOry about <U mara's religious and politica l leanings. Ibn Khallikan describes him as a Shafi<i jurist and a zealous Sunni, who acquired his education at a law college in Zabid. 11 8 Ibn Wasil confirms that 'Umara was a Shafi'i jurist by his education, but describes him as a Fatimid zealot. 119 ' Imad al·Din is astonished by <U mara 's adherence to the Fatimid cause and his yea rning for the return of the Fatimids which brought his ruin . l 2Q Some en passant remarks in the sources refer· ring to <U mara only intensify the ambiguity surrounding him . For example, it is said that no less than al-Silafi , a leading Sunnijurist of the Maliki school in Egypt, ex tolled 'Umara, thejurist, in a poem. <U mara is also referred to as a man of lellers (adib) , who specialised in the transmission of Prophetic traditions. And prior to his elegy for the Fatimids. 'Umara composed [\\,0 elegies upon the death of Saladin's father. 121

Abu Shama was aware of the need to put fonvard some expla· nation for the execution of 'Umara. He says, in an independent statement of his own, that 'Umara was blamed for encouraging Turanshah to launch his expedition to Yemen, which weakened the st rength of Saladin's army and deprived him of the much­needed assistance of his brother. Clearl y this is the personal view of Abu Shama and is contradicted by events and some of the sources that he himself quotes. Turanshah left for Yemen at the begin· ning of Rajab 569/ February 11 74. In light of Abu Shama's account, one would expect 'Umara to havej o ined him. But 'Umar .. remained in Egypt and some weeks late r was put lO death. In contrast to what Abu Shama says, the conclusion sho uld be that 'Umara was perhaps executed because his patron was away. Ibn Abi Tayy speaks of close relations between 'U mara and Turanshah, but he says thal the expedition lO Yemen was approved by Saladin. 122 A possible

118 See, III , 432. 119 See, I, 212. Both Ibn Kha lli ka n and Ibn Wasil lise the same expression

when referring to 'Umara: shadid a/·ta'assuh, but the first means the Sunna while the second means the Fatimids.

120 Quoted by Ibn Klt al1ikan, III . 435-6. 121 Maqrizi, MuqaJJa, I, 710, II. 11 7,38 1. S. M. Stern has summarized 'U mara's

e nigma ill the fo llowing words: " ... he see ms to have managed to reconcile his Shali'i Sunnism with an arde nt allachmenl 10 Ihe Fatimids". Stern also says that 'U rnara paid in his life fo r his "continued advocacy of the Falirnid cause", See. his "The Succession to Ihe Falimid Imam ai-Ami .. ", Oriens, 4(1951), 212 , 2 13.

122 Abu Sham a, I, 1'1,2, 562 (whose independent account begins with qll/lu.).

90 CHAPTER TWO

clue is supplied by Ibn a l·Alhir, who says that the relations be­twec n Qadi al-Fadil and 'Umara were strained due to animosity which had originated in the Fatimid period. Nonetheless, according to him, Qadi al-Fadil inte rceded with Saladin o n the behalf of 'Umara. who was unduly suspicious of his advocacy. Regardless of Ibn al-Athir's tendentious remark, it is clear that 'Umara sought and hoped for Qadi al-Fadil's intervention on his behalf and when Qadi al-Fadil refused 'Umara understood that his falc was sealed. 123

It appears that Ibn al-Athir, who like Qadi al-Fadil belonged to the same cultural and occupational group. is at pains to exoner­ate Qadi al-Fadi l from any direct responsibility for 'U mara's death at the hands of Saladin. The same applies to ' Imad ai-Din who says that the jurists authorized the execution of 'Umara. 124 This statement cannot be harmonized with his other assertion namely that the conspirators were put to death according to the norms of the siyasa. Does it mean that the approval of the jurists was only needed for the execution of'Umara? Qadi al-Fadil's behavior can be contrasted to what is told of a former Fa timid cadi and propa­gandist, Qadi a l:lalis, who was executed toge ther with <Umara. Qadi al-Jalis inte rceded with Shawar on be half of a poet imprison ed by him, who had extolled Shirkuh and urged him LO kill Shawar. Qadi al:lalis' inte rve ntion came in spite of his strained relations with the poe t and, following his successful intercessio n , h e refused concilia tory gestures made by the grateful poel. 125 It seems that members of the civi lian e lite were expected to show some solidarity when oppressed by their rulers.

'Umara's e legy on the fall of the Fatimids contains a pOSSible clue to his downfall. <U rrtara laments the passing of the Fatimid dynasty and rule and reminds his liste ners not only of the glory of the Fatimids but a lso of their justice and generosity. His e legy is couched in Fatimid (Isma'i li ) terminology and explic itly refe rs to central Fatimid religious beliefs. He speaks of Fatimid Imams as "created out of light" and describes them as "the door of salva­tion in this world and the next". Furthermore, he speaks in strong lenns against Lhose who haled the Fatimids and betrayed al-<Adid. l26

123 Ibn a l-Athi r, Kamil. XI, 264. Abu Shama·s account in 'Uyun, J, !HO-I, is apparently based on Ibn al-ALhir.

124 Quoted by Abu Shama, I, pt ,2, 562. li!~ Maq rizi, Muqaffa , III , 347-8. 126 J quote Pau la Sanders's English tr.lnslation of 'Umara 's elegy included

SALADIN IN EGYI·T. I 169~ I 174 91

Also 'Umara's book of the Egyptian viziers, which IS III fac t his autobiography, offe rs insight into his inner world . The first thing that strikes the reader is the total irrelevancy of'Umara's work La

the new epoch heralded by Saladin's overthrow of the Fatimids. Writing sometime between the fall of the Fatimids and his execu~

tio n , 'Umara revives in his book the bygone world of the Fatimid viziers. He explains the reason for writing the book by a vague reference to the pedagogical aim of distinquishing the enduring from the transient and the good from the bad. But this moralistic aim is lost in a work which is, above all, about 'Umara himself. One can understand 'Umara; he thrived in the mi lieu he describes. But the most surpri sing thing is that 'U ma ra has nothing positive to say about the new maste rs of the country. They are si mply re~ ferred to as Ghuzz. The only pe rson associated with the new re­gime who is praised by 'Umara is Qadi a l ~Fadil.1 27 Thus 'Umara's panegyric to Saladin and his association with Turanshah must be seen in the context of 'Umara ' s attempt to earn a li vi ng. His old patrons and benefactors were a ll dead and he suffered heavy losses in the fire that consumed Fustat. !-I e was apparently impoverished which might explain his almost obsessive indulgence in mention~

ing the sums of money he used to earn fro m Fatimid viziers for his panegyrics. Clearly 'U mara had railed to adopt himself to the new circumstances and his abili ty to sense danger had also be~ come impaired.

The allusion to the betrayal of al-'Adid in 'U mara 's e legy o n the fall of the Fatimids must have been very unpleasant to Qadi al-Fadil and might explain his animosity to 'Umara. We have every reason to question the reliability of Qadi al-Fadil's vers io n of the conspiracy of 1174 as a whole. The list of those who paid with the ir lives for the alleged conspiracy offers a possible insight fo r unde rstanding these events. The executed people were harmless persons who were in no position to endanger Saladin's rule. Among them were a cadi, a Fatimid pro pagandist, a former Fatimid emir,

in her Ritual, Politics, mid the City in Fatimid Cairo, (N. Y., 1994), 136-7. Fo r o lher shOT! fragments of'Umara's poetry ex to lling the Fatimid Imallls and the ir sub­lime posilion as the g uides of the mankind. see H. C. Kay's introd uction to his Yamall. Its Early History. (the o riginal texts, with translation and notes). (Lon­don, 1892), IX-X.

127 'U mOlrd , 53-4, 80-1, 88, 93.

92 CHAPTER TWO

two administrators and an Armenian aSlfo loger. 128 It seems that they were , as Ibn al-Athir hints , victims of o ld I-ivalries between members of the civilian e lite. The people who were in power under Saladin put to death their old enem ies. This impression is strength­ened when the biographies of the people involved in these events are examined. Ibn I-Iajar aJ.'Asqalani (d. 1449). in his biographic dictionary of the Egyptian cadis , says that Ibn Kamil was a Shi ' itc (Imami ) jurisl. He was appointed to the posts of cadi and da'i. (i.e. Fatimid propagandiSl) by the vizier Tala ' i' ibn Ruzzik and held these posts intcrmiac nLly for several yea rs. He and others, including 'Umara, were accused of attempting to restore Fatimid rule and of collaborating with the Franks. Ibn Hajar says that this slanderous report was brought to Saladin by a certain jurist. On the one hand, Ibn Hajar's account renects Qadi al·Fadi l 's version of the plot saying that the re was an attempt to involve the Franks. But, on the other hand. he speaks of personal animosities as a lso playing a pan in these events. For example, the lsmai' li cadi, Ibn J a iis, was aJllong those executed by Saladin, who had interrogated him about hidden Fatimid treasure. He revealed some informa· tio n but not to Saladin 's full satisfaction. l29 Othen\'ise Saladin is passive along the whole affa ir which supposedly e ndangered his rule. If o ur understanding of these events is correct, Saladin 's passiveness confir;ns that he was manipulated by members of the civilian e li te who had len t him their support, ran his state and used him to settle their own private vendettas. Among the mem· bers of the civilian e li te , Saladin owed a special debt to Qadi al· Fadil. Apparently Saladin was quite aware of this. He is quoted as sayi ng: " I took Egypt not by force of arms but by the pen of Qadi a l·Fadil ". In anothe r version h e is quoted as saying that he took the countries not through the swords (of his emirs), but by the pen of Qadi al·Fadil.l ~ The first quotation can be understood as reflecting the faClthat Saladin's leller of appoinunent as the Fatimid vizier was wrinell by Qadi al·Fadil . Both versions manifest Saladin's

128 Abu Shama, I, pl,2, 56 1 (quotin g Ibn Abi Tayy). 129 Ibn Hajar, I, 189-90, II , 30S-4, 306-8. For people who left Egypt following

Saladin's rise to power, see Ibn al-' Adim , VI, 2802. L30 Fo r the fi rs t version of lhis saying, see Dajani-Shakce1 , ~Egypt and the Egyp­

tians", 25; Ayyad , 422. For the second version, see Sibt ibn J awzi, VIII , pl .2, 472: Ibn Taghribirdi, XI, 157; Safadi, XVIII, 350.

SALAD I N IN EGY I·T . I 169- I 1 74 93

profound understanding that the pen might occasionally be no less mighty than the sword.

The fact that the execution of <Umard cast a shadow on the people involved in the events and especially on Qadi al-Fad il is clearly refl ected by the complex and in itse lf quite improbable accoun t of Maqrizi. He begins his ta le of 'Umara's downfall by saying that Qadi al-Fadil used to meet a certain secretary, <Abd al-Samad, who served him with great humili ty. However, one day, <Abd al-Samad avoided Qadi al-Fad il' s company arousing his sllspicion that this reflected a change of attitude to\vard him o n the part of Saladin . Qadi al-Fadil sent Zayn ai-Din ibn Naj a to investigate the maller. Qadi al-Fadi l's messanger assll red him that it had nOlhing to do with Salad in, but that <Umara and others were involved in a plot against the Sultan. Maqrizi adds that Ibn Naja was aware of the fact that the re was an old animosity between <Umara a nd Qadi al­Fadi l which went back to Fatimid days.

Qadi al-Fad il hastened to Salad in , who was allending Friday praye rs at a mosque. According to Maqrizi, Qadi al-Fadi at once revealed to Salad in the full ex tent of the plot: the names of the conspirators (including ' Umara and 'Abd al-Samad), the involve­men t of fonner Fatimid troops and courtiers, the fact that some of Saladin 's own soldie rs were among the conspirators and above all the involvement of both the Normans of Sicily and the Cru­sader Kingdom of J erusalem in the conspiracy. Salad in wanted to be sure of the detai ls which were corraborated by Ibn Naja, who asked for his se lvices to be rewarded with the riches and property of cadi Ibn Kamil. At the time these events occurred, a delegation from Jerusalem arrived in Cairo with gifts and letters to Saladin. Maqrizi 's accou nt of these events has it a ll ; Qadi al­Fadil's vers ion of the plOl bm also surprisingly explicit remarks about Qadi al-Faidl 's own involvement in the afTa ir. On one hand, Qadi al-Fad il is portrayed as a cred ulous manipulable person and, on the o ther hand, as a vigilant protector of the safety of Salad in and his regime. It seems that Maqrizi himself was no t very con­vinced by this version and he devotes an lo ng additio nal explana· tion to the reasons beh ind 'U ma ra' s execution . He says lhal 'Umara 's continued adherence to the Fatimid cause and his pub­lic declarations mentioning the me rits and the vi ,-tues of Lh e Fatimid Imams PUl Saladin in an awkward position. Maqrizi espacially mentions 'Umara 's elegy on the fall of the Fatimids saying that

94 CHAPTER TWO

the jurists had d eclared 'Umara a here tic. Thus no one was really 1O be blamed for 'U mara 's death. His undoing was his own faull. Finally. one of the more interesting details to be found in Maqrizi 's biography of'Umara is his casual remark that Saladin was respon­sible for the killing of Shawar. 131

2. Expansionism and lhe Search fOT Legitimacy

a. The Rupture with NUT ai-Din

Relations between Nur ai-Din and Saladin were a sensitive sub­ject, especially for ' Imad ai-Din who had flourished in the service of both. ' lmad ai-Din asserts that Saladin did not disobey Nur a1-Din. 132 Abu Shama echoes <lmad ai-Din 's Slalemenl and disputes Ibn Abi Tayy's account to the contrary.133 Ibn Abi Tayy is quite clear about relations between Nur a i-Din and Saladin. He says, on the authority of his father, that Nur al-Din's hostility to Saladin ,vas common knowledge, and Saladin's nomination as Fatimid vizier infuriated Nur a i-Din. Also Saladin's mistrust of Nur al-Din's in­tentions toward him was widely known. l34

Ibn al-Athir pinpoints the exact circumstances that had led to the strained relations between the two rulers. This subject is treated in several of his accounts. In his universal history. Ibn al-Athir says that in Safar 567/0ctober 1171 Saladin had attacked the fortress of Shawbak. When Nur ai-Din was informed of this he attacked the Franks from another direction. However, Saladin 's aides ad­vised him to avoid meeting Nur ai-Din. Saladin informed him that Shi'ite (apparently meaning lsma'i li ) agitation in Egypt compelled him to leave the siege and to return to Cai ro. In the history of the Atabegs the accoum is more hostile to Saladin. Ibn al-Athir

m Maqrizi, Muqaffa, VI II , 75 1-6. m Abu Sham a, I , pt,2 . 503. m Ibid, 442. U4 Ibid, 440-1, 525, 558-9. In fact Nur al-Din's apprehension of Ayyubid suc­

cess in Egypt was evi dent already during the shon vizierate of Shirkuh. Ibn Abi Tayy, on the authority of his father. says that following Shirkuh 's nom ination as Falimid vizier Nur ai-Din null ified the iqta's held by Shirku h a nd Saladin in Syria. If Nur ai-Di n did indeed do this it reveals his frustration in the face of develop­ments which were beyond his COlllrol. See, Ibn Fural, IV, pL,! . 66 and 47. who lOO quotes Ibn Abi Tayy.

SALAD I N I N EGYPT, I 16g-1 174 95

says that Nur ai-Din had ordered Salad in to join him in a coordi­nated altack on the fortress of Karak. Saladin left Cairo on 20 Muharram 567/ 17 September 1171 , but failed to arrive at the meeting point. He wrote to Nur ai-Din excusing himself that in­temal problems in Egypt had obliged him to return, but Nur al­Oin refused to accept this explanation. Ibn al-Athir proceeds by describing a meeting of the Ayyubid fa mily in which the question ,or"'s discussed what should be done if Nur ai-Din invaded Egypt. Taqi ai-Din was militant advocating opposing Nur ai-Din if neces­sary. However, Saladin's father, Najm ai-Din (described in the hisLOry of the Atabegs as a wise and cunning person) sile nced him by saying that the Ayyubids were the servants and slaves of Nur al­Din , Egypt was his coulllry, and they would obey whatever he com­manded them to do. Later, in a private conversation, he told Saladin that his speech was for public consumption o nly, aiming at ap­peasing Nur ai-Din. He continued by saying that the Ayyubids should avoid provoking Nur ai-Din inLO action and must show no disobe­dience to him public1y.135

According to Ibn al-Athir's version of these even ts, Saladin's mistrust of Nul' al-Din's inte ntions had far-reaching consequences for Saladin's policies. The conq uests o f Nubia (568/1172-1173) and Yemen (569/ 1174- 11 75) were motivated by the des ire of the Ayyubids to secure a place of refuge in case o f military interven­tion in Egypt by Nu r al-Din. 13ti In contrast to Ibn al-Athir, ' Imad ai-Din treats the conquest of Nubia and Yemen as events unre­lated to Salad in 's relations with Nul' ai-Din. The conquest of Yemen is de picted by ' Imad ai-Din as a cam pa ign against a local ruler who was a heretic and bloody tyrant, and the aim of the Ayyubid campaign was to restore Abbas id sovereignty.137 ' Imad ai-Din confirms thalthe altack on Karak and Shawbak in 11 71 was sup­posed to be a coordinated action by Nur ai-Din and Saladin. However, Saladin faced difficulties which prevented him from carrying OUl his pan of the campaign.138 When in 568/ 1172-1173, Saladin launched an altack against Shawhak and Karak. Qadi al­Fadil was quick to praise the explo its of this campaign . In a lelte r

I:» Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, XI. 244-5; a/-Bahir, 158-9. Maqrizi follows al-Bahir. See, Su/ull, 70-1.

1!6 Ibn a l-Athir, Kamil. XI, 254. 260. 157 Abu Shama, I , pt,2, 551, 552 (quoting ' Imad al-Dill's Kharida/ al-Qasr). 158 AI-Bundari, 117-8; Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 518.

96 CHAPTER TWO

to Nur ai-Din, he claimed a great success: the area around the two fortresses was laid waste and the Bedouin were dispersed. He asserts that the expuls ion of the Bedouin deprived the Crusaders of their guides. Furthermore, Saladin asks Nur aI-Din to provide these Bedouin with a new territory (iqta<) in Syria .139

We have two diametrically opposed versions of the relations be­tween Salad in and Nur ai-Din. Ibn al-Athir describes Saladin as aware of his misconduct toward his overlord and afraid of his wrath. ' Jmad ai-Din simply denies any tension in the relations between the 1:\\10. The strength of Ibn al-Athir's account is that some of Saladin 's deeds are explained as by-products of his stra ined re la­tions with Nur ai-Din. This explanation sounds more convincing than <Imad al-Din 's claim that the driving forces behind Saladin's expedition to Yemen were moml considerations and the wish to advance the Abbasid cause. Qadi al-Fadi l's obvious exaggerations of the achievements of Saladin's independent raid against Shawbak and Karak indicate that Saladin was at pains to vindicate himself for his behavior in 1171 . It is not too difficult to grasp what really was a t stake in the relations betw'een Nur aI-Din and Saladin. Their views regarding the fortresses of Shawbak and Karak were very dif­ferent. These two fortresses constituted a formidable obsLacle to comm unications between Syria and Egypl.l40 For Nur ai-Din, re­gardless of his true intentions towards Saladin, unobstructed pas­sage between Syria and Egypt, his new possession, was a matter of importance. For Saladin, a Frankish obstacle on the route from Syria to Egypt was something he could comfortably live with. But the question of Karak and Shawbak was only a symptom of the fundamental problem that Nur ai-Din faced: how to e nsure that he would reap the full benefits of Saladin's success in Egypt? His ability to influence, let alone control, Saladin was very limited. Saladin, on his part, had no reason to increase his difficulties in Egypt by provoking Nul' ai-Din who for his part had no reason to push Saladin into open rebe llion. Nur a l-Din's attempts to influ­ence events in Egypt were unsuccessful. It is true that Nul' ai-Din a llowed to Saladin's e lder brother, Turanshah, tojoin Saladin in Egypt, but his inte ntions were si nister. Nul' ai-Din empowered Turanshah to supervise Saladin hopi ng to provoke dissention

1~9 AI-Bundari , 125-6. 140 Abu Shama, I. pt,2 , 527 (quoting Ibn Shaddad).

SALADIN IN t:CYf>T, 1 169- 1174 97

between the brothers and to undermine their position in Egypt. 141

If indeed these were Nur ai-~in's hopes he mUSt have been very disappointed. The two brothers cooperated , especially during the Ballie of the Blacks in which Turanshah's conlribution to the Ayyubid victory was invaluable . Nur ai-~in's perm ission given to Saladin 's father, Najm ai-Din, to join his sons in Egypt is explained in the same manner. Najm ai-~in was instruc ted by Nur a i-Din to ensure that Abbasid suzeraimy was proclaimed in Egypt, a move that Saladin was reluctant to undertake. 142 AlLhough Nur ai-~in fai led in his schemes to create rivalry and to provoke a rupture between members of the Ayyubid family in E~,')lpt, the extended Ayyubid family was not necessarily united behind Saladin. Geo­graphically the family was split between Egypt and Syria, and some of its members cominued 10 se rve Nur a l_O in .143

b. Yemen and IVl'ica

We lllUSt admit that we have very limited abi lity to penetrate far behind the facad e of politica l history deeper in to the motives of the main actors on the politica l scene. We are unable to judge whether Ibn al-Athir is correct in stating that the conquest of Yemen and Nubia were motivated by Saladin's fear of Nur ai-Din. What we can do is to put some of Saladin's policies into the wider con­text of Fatimid history. When examined from this perspective, the question of his motives for the conquest of Yemen, ubia and North Africa appears less important. Saladin's policies, whatever the immediate reasons may have been behind them, were in line with the traditional policies of his Fatimid predecessors.

Fatimid association with Yeme n had a long history going back to the early period of the clandestine activities of the Isma'i1i move­ment. As ru lers of Egypt the Fatimids maintained diverse connec­tions with Yemen. At the time ofTuranshah's invasion of Yemen, there were a number of local dynasties in the region with various Isma'i li affiliations; some of them were pro-Fatimid while others were hostile to Fatimid Ismai li sm. Turanshah 's conquests in Yemen were not private ventures; they were Saladin 's official policy sus-

141 Ibn Fur at, IV, pt, l , 82 a lso 66. 142 Ibid, 88.9. 1 4~ Fo r instance, in 566/ 1 I 7().. I 17 1, Shirkuh's son, Muhammad, was in Syria

in Nur a l·Oin's setvice. See, Ibn Fural, IV, pI, \, II J.

98 C H A PTER T WO

tained over a period of time. 144 AJj a resul t of these Ayyubid ef­fo rts South Yeme n , includin g Ade n , came under th e ir control. It is possible to p resent a va riety of reasons fo r the Ayyubid expedi­tions to Yemen , it is mo re difficult to establish their relative im­po rtance. T he desire to exert influence over Yemen and especially the po rt o f Ade n, through which passed the fl ow of the Indian trade to Egypt, was a strong mo tive behind Fatimid. and subse­q ue ntly Ayyubid. interest in the region. 145 Commercial consider­atio ns may have coin cided with othe r reasons. One of these may have been a clash of pe rsonalities and imerests between Saladin and Turanshah. Salad in was ve ry gene ro us in conferring wealth on Turanshah who was given lucra tive sources of income in Egypt BUlthis does no t exclude the poss ibili ty that Turanshah desired more wealth and a separate patri mony. The sources at our dis­posal are re ticent on these po in ts. The absence of information may be due to the fact that o nly a part o f conte mpo rary twelfth­century histo rical writings su tvive: more probably it refl ects a hesi­ta tion by contemporary writers to deal with this sensitive issue, which to uched on in te rnal rela tio ns within the Ayyubid family. Perhaps the most insightful accoun t of these even ts is supplied by Maqrizi who, in the fifteenth centu ry, had at his disposal a greater variety o f sources than we have today. Altho ugh we cannot judge how accurately he used his sources . In any case, Maqrizi's sta rting point is similar to that of Ibn al-Athi r: the Ayyubids fearing a possible invas ion of Egypt by Nur ai-Din wished to acquire a faraway terri­tory as a place of refuge. The conquest o f Nubia proved useless due to the poverty o f the region .146 Turanshah 's own interest in Yemen was aro used by the agitation of 'Umara and it tallied with

144 For details, see Maqrizi, Suluk, 98, 99, iO l , 113, 11 4. L4!> For a detailed examination of the sources and research literature, see G.

R. Sm ith, The Ayyubids and Early Rasuiid,s in the Yemen, (London, 1978), II , 31-47, esp., 47. A. Hamdani points out tha t a t the time of the Ayyubid invasion of Ye me n there were in the region Isma'ili com munities wit h pro- and an ti-Fatimid lean­in gs. According to h im , Ayyubid efTon was concen trated alr.t inst the Fatimid suppon ers. See, his ~The Tayyibi-Fatim id Com m unity of the Yemen at the Time of the Ayyubid Con quest of Southe rn Arabia~, Arabian Studies, VII ( 1985), 151-6, esp., 151-2. Fo r the commerce that passed through the pOrt of Aden, see G. R. Smith, ~ Have You Anythi ng to Decla re? Ma ri ti me Trade and Comme rce in Ayyubid Aden. Practices a nd Taxes\ 170ceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 25(1995). 127- 140; ~M ore on the Port Practices and Taxes of Medieval Aden~, New Arabian Studies, 3(1996), 208-10.

L46 Maqrizi, Suluk, 73.

SALA DI N I N EGY PT, I 1 69~ 1 174 99

his wish to ex te nd his personal possessions. BUl Turanshah 's pri~ va te interests were in line with those of Salad in , who autho ri zed the expeditio n to Yemen and assisted Turanshah. IH It seems to me that we can improve very little on Maqrizi's account. We can conclude by saying that the conques t of Yemen e pitomizes th e convergence o f Ayyubid interests. as the rulers of Egypt, with Ayybid interests as a fam ily in conflict with Nur a l ~ Oin . which was also beset by inte rnal difficulties.

Very similar reasons were behind the Ayyubid conques t o f Nubia . Musli m Egypt had a long histo ry of relatio ns with Nubia . In the seventh century, fo llowing the conques t of Egypt, Arab al.le mpts to conque r Nubia met with little success. In 640, the Arabs suf· fered a humiliating defeat due to superior Nubian archery. In 65 1, an Arab invas io ll of Nubia en ded in a peace treaty according to which the Nubians ag reed to supply the Arabs with slaves in ex· change for foodstuffs and other commodities. This agreement is known as a pact (baqt) and its supposed text is reproduced by Maqrizi. The existence of some kind of peace treaty between the Arabs and the Nubians is alluded to in a letter sent in 758 by lhe governo r of Egypt to the king of Nubia. This treaty. among its o the r provisio ns, guaranteed the safety of merchants travelling across lhe border between the two regions.148 Following the Fatimid conques t of Egypt, an envoy was dispatched to the king of Nubia asking him to embrace Islam and demanding the delivery of slaves accord ing to the baql agreement. Upon his return , the Fa timid e nvoy presented to Imam al·<Aziz (975·996) a book describing the territories and people he had visited. In the sources for the Fatimid period there are scattered references to the del ivery of gifts by the Nubians according to the baqt agreement. During the period of Badr al:Jamali' s milita ry dictatorship, the overriding Fatimid inte rest in Nubia was to secure freedom of trave l for Muslim merchants and the pro tec tion o f mosques. Th e re lations be tween the two countries osci llated be tween peace and war. T he last sig· nificant event in the re lations be tween Nubia and Fatimid Egypt was a large·scale Nubian incursio n into Upper Egypt in 11 6 1. 149

147 Ibid, 74. 1-48 For the Arab auempL~ to conque r Nubi a and the b(Ult agreement, see O.

Ayalon, ~The Nubian Dam~.JSAJ, 12( 1989).372·90, whe re lhe relevant sources and studies are cited.

149 For lhe Fatimid missio n to Nubia, see H. M. Khicr. MA Conll·ib ulion to;t

100 C H APTER T WO

Altho ugh Ibn a l-Athir followed by Maq l-izi states tha t the Ayyubid conquest of Nubia was motiva ted by the fear of Nur aI-Din, th e begin n ing of Ayyubid involvement in this region , as Maqrizi's own narrative proves, was different. In Ohu 'I-Hilla 567/July-August 1172, the Nubia ns ra ided villages in th e vicini ty of Aswan .150 In 568/ 1172-1173, Aswan was besieged by tabid (i .e. fo rmer black Fa ti mid so ldie rs) who came from Nubia. The governo r o f Aswan . Kanz a l­Dawla, himself a fo rmer Fa timid emir, asked for re inforceme nts, bu t those a rrived afte r the tabid h ad a lready left the area. lSI None­the less, furth e r Ayyubid forces led by Turanshah arrived in Aswan and invaded Nubia conquering the town ofibrim . Ibrim was given as an iqta' to a Kurdi sh emir ofTu ranshah who se ttl ed there with une mployed Kurdi sh troops. Fro m Ibrim they ra ided the regio n . The Nubians asked Turanshah fo r a n a rm is tice and sent him a d e lega tio n . Although Turan sh ah 's reply was militant he dispatch ed an envoy to th e king of Nu bia in Oanqla. Upon his return the envoy d escribed in gloomy te rms th e poverty o f the regio n and of Oanqla itse lf. 152 It see ms th a t th e Ayyubids were dragged into involvemen t in Nubia as a result of the need to pro tec t Aswan a nd Upper Egypt and, a t a certain stage, th ey went to explore the poss ibili ty of fu rthe r expansio n in th e a rea. But they, li ke th e Fatimids before them, were discouraged by tJl e poverty of Lhe region in which the Muslim rule rs of Egyp t never had a real interest. There was a sequel to the Ayyubid involvemen t in Nubia o f 568/ 1172-1173. In 570/ 11 74-11 75, Kanz a l-Dawla revolted against his Ayyubid maste rs with the intentio n o f restoring Fatimid rule. His main suppo rte rs a re ide ntified as Bedo uin and Blacks (sudan). but th e rebellio n e njoyed the support of a multitude of o the r people as well. Coincide nta l, o r even co-ordinated , with Kanz a l-Dawla 's re­be llio n \vas an uprising of a certain pe rson named 'Abbas ibn Shadi

Textual Problem-, AI, 21 (1985), 9-72. For the subsequen t Fatimid relations with Nubia, see B. I. Besh ir, MNew Ligh t o n Nubian Fati rnid ReiationsM

, Arabica, XXII ( 1975), 15-25; M. R. Cohen,jewish Self Government in Medieval EgyPt, (Plincelon, 1980), 65, 68, 70, 289.

1.'>0 Maqrizi, Suluk, 69. ],,] Ibid, 72. Ibn Abi Tayy does not dis tinguish betwee n these two separate

a ttacks. He combines them together by sayi ng tha t the Blacks (sudan) and 'abid laid siege LO Aswa n. Sec, Abu Shama, T, pr,2, 531.

1.'>2 Abu Sha rna, I, pt,2, 532-3 (q uo ting Ibn Abi Tayy); Maqrizi, Suluk, 72.

SALAD IN IN EGY PT. I 169-1 174 101

who overrun Qus. Both rebellions were crushed by Saladin's brother ai-Malik al-<Adi I. 15~

The beginnings of Ayyubid involvemem in North Africa a re pre­semed by Maql"izi as a predatory raid o f a lim ited scope. In 567/ 1171-1172, Salad in went to Alexandria: he was troubled by having many followers and little money. His atten tion was drawn to the Barqa region , which was described to him as a ri ch one and in­habited o nly by Bedouin. This matter was discussed at a family council in Alexandria and it was decided that Taq i ai-Din would launch an expedition with a force of 500 cavalry. A great deal of attention was given to the public aspects of the impending cam­paign. In order to justify the raid letters were sent to the Bedouin tribes in the region rebuking them for the robbel)' of travellers and requiring them to pay the a lms-tax (zahat) which , accord ing to the law, was to be co llec ted from the ir li vestock. In the foll ow­ing year, Sharf a i-Din Qaraqush , an emi r ofTaqi a i-Din , conquered the town of Tripoli in Libya with an army composed of Turks and Bedouin .'" In 57 1/ 1175- 11 76 and 583/ 11 87- 11 88. Qaraqush con­tinued his raids in North Africa wh ich culminated with the con­ques t of Qayrawan and brought the Ayyubids into connicL with the Almohades. 155

c. Syria

In 570/ 11 74- 11 75, a sho rt time after the death of Nur ai-Din, Qadi a l-Fadil sent a lette r to the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad . 156 This is

153 Ma{p·izi. Sulllk. 79-80. Ibn Shaddad, 47-8, sa)'! that Lh ey were Blacks (sudml). He is misquoted by Abu Shama who sa)'S 'ahid. Sec. I, pt,2, 601. Banu Kanz were a n Arab famil y of Ikdouin origin, the Rabi 'a tribe, from Arabia. They arri\'ed La

Egypt at the time of the Abbasid Caliph al-Muta ..... akkil (847-861) and settled in Upper Egypt. One of their chieftains captured the rebel Abu Rukwa in the early ele\'emh cem ury and ..... as handsomely re ..... arded by the Falimid Imam ai-Hakim, ..... ho besto ..... ed on him the honorific till e Kanz al-D;\ ..... la and invested him ..... ith the gm'ernorship of Upper Egypt. See. Maqrizi. /\i-BaJa1l wa- '{-fmb 'amma bi Ard Misr mi1l a/"'A'rab. (ed) A. 'Abidin (Cairo, 1961 ).44-6.

ISoi Maqrizi , SlIfult, 69: Abu Shama. I. pt.2. 547-8. m. Maqrizi . Sulillt, 82-3, 125. 156 This leltcr is summarized by Ehrcn krcutz (Sa/adi", 133-4) and Lyons and

J ackson (97-8). A morc comprehensive d iscussion is provided by H. Dajani-5hakeel, who to great ex tent misinte rprets Lhis docum e nt. The author sees thc leuer as a rc fl cction of Sal:ldin's perception of the Holy War. Out the leiter is not an expo­sition of Saladin's thoughts on the Holy War, and the Illany refe rences to it are of instrume ntal character. Dajani-Shakeel admits that Qadi al-Fadil while writing

102 CHAPTER TWO

a document of a paramount significance; in it Saladin presents his credentials and asks for the legitimization of his rule. Qadi a1-Fadi! describes Saladin as a dedicated warrior of the Holy War, whose goal is to fight the Crusaders and ultimately LO restore Jerusa­le m to Islam. The ic ller begins by setting forth Saladin 's personal and familial services to the cause of Islam. The Ayyubids are de­picted as a famil y of warriors dedicated to the Holy War whose beginnings were in Syria. 157 BUl their ach ievements there were ascribed to olhers (meaning of course Nur al-Din).158 The situa­tion in Egypt, o n the eve ofthe arrival of the Ayyubids. is described in bleak terms: the coun try was mismanaged and the regime COf­

fUpl.1 59 The Crusaders posed a very real threat and they extorted vast sums of money rrom Egypt. Sunni Islam was in a deplorable position , and harmful Shi'ite practices prevailed. 1OO

Intervention in the affairs of Egypt-a policy sponsored by Nli r ai-Dill-is presented as an exclusively Ayyubid e ndeavor. They has­tened to Egypt and brought with them a large army and vast fi ­nancial resollrces.!6! The Ayyubid errorLS paid off. The Crusaders who had subdued Egypt, iLS vi llages and provinces (a gross exag­gemtion), were expelled.!62 And the Ayyubids also overcame in­ternal elements which e ndangered Egypt such as the Blacks and Christian Armenians. Qadi al-Fad il goes into some detail in de­scribing the position of the Blacks in Fatimid Egypt. They were very prominent and had at their disposal vast Sli ms of money. But the Blacks showed little zea l ror fighting the unbelievers (i.e, the Crusaders) and regarded the Fatimid ruler (Iitemlly: the dweller or the palace) as their God. 16.5 Also the Christian Armenians en-

this letter had practical objectives in mind , g'.a ining recognition rrom the Caliph and secu ring the Caliph's investiture ror Saladin. See, -A Reassessment orSome Medieval and Modern Pe rception or tile Counter-Crusade-, in H. Dajani-Shakeel a nd R. A. Messie r (cds), The Jihatl a nd its T imt:, Dedicated to Andrew Stefan Eh renkrelllz, (Ann Arbor, 1991 ),58. 59.63.

157 Qadi a l-Fadil refe rs to Saladin in the first person plural. Literally, the text says "we (Saladi n). our rather (Ayyub) and our uncle (Shirkuh)~. See, Abu Shama. I , pt.2, 6 16, 11 , 16-7.

1!tII Ibid, 6 17, 11 . 2-3. IW Ibid. 617, I, 5. 160 Ibid, 617, 11 ,6-7,7- 11. 161 Ibid, 617. II , 12-3. 162 Ibid, 6 17, 11 , 13-22,6 18, 1,2. 16! Ibid, 618, II . 4-5, 5-6. 8.

SA LA DIN I N EG YPT, 11 69-11 74 103

joyed an exalted positio n in Fa ti mid Egypt. 164 Qadi al-Fadil exag­gerates (wildly) the numbe rs of black troops by saying that they numbered 100,000 soldiers. 165 Exaggeratio n is a promine nt fea­ture of Qadi al-Fad il's letter. Fo r exam ple, the Christian forces that a ttacked Damietta are described as 200,000 strong and the navy as made up o f 1,000 warships and me rchantme n. l66

The list of Salad in 's achieveme n lS as e numerated by Qadi al­Fadil is a long one. Saladin saved Damieua from the threa t of the Crusaders, a nd Cairo from the danger of the Blacks and Arme­nians. He also re nde red the Fatimid ruler powerless. 167 Saladin no t o nly staved off internal and exte rnal threa ts to Egypt, he ac­tive ly pursued the Holy War. A lot o f good will and a consider­able stre tch o f th e imaginatio n is needed to accept Qadi al-Fadil 's depictio n o f Saladin as a warrio r of the Holy War. By 11 74, Saladin 's achieveme n lS in the war against the Crusade rs were very modes t a t the mos t. But Qadi al-Fadil evades these difficulties by speak­ing in general terms, and by unwarranted boas ting. Every yea r, he says, Ho ly War is carried out by land and nava l raids. The stra­tegic importance o f the conques t of the strongho ld off Ayla from the Franks and its implicatio ns are g rea tly overstated . l68 Accord­ing to Qadi al-Fadil , this stro ngho ld posed a danger to the coast of Arabia, the Ho ly Cities o f Mecca and Medina as well as Yemen. In the internal Islamic context Saladin is po rtrayed as a warrio r aga inst here tics in Yemen, and as o ne who restored Abbas id sov­ere ign ty in North Africa. 169

One of the most illuminating sec tio ns of Qad i al-Fadil's lelle r is the descriptio n of Egypt's relations with the Chris tian world . Byzan tium is described as an ancient and worn-out kingdom which had subdued o ther Christian states. The empe ro r is refe rred to as Golia th a nd the greatest tyrant. Qadi al-Fadil continues by say­ing that nava l battles were fought with the Byzantines but also open and secre t nego tiatio ns were conducted with them. 170 He men­tions the failure of Byzantium and th e Crusade rs at Damie tta and

l&l Ibid, 6 18, 11 , 9- 10. 165 Ibid, 6 18, I, 7. 166 Ibid, 6 19, 11 , 1-2. 167 Ibid, 6 19, II, 1-2,6,8-9, 168 Ibid, 6 19, 11 , 12-3, 1&8. 169 Ibid, 620, II, 1-2,7-8, 15. 170 Ibid, 62 1, 11, 4-7.

104 CHAPTER TWO

the defeat of the Normans at Alexandria. 171 Very revealing is Qadi al-Fadil's characterizauon of Egypt's relations with the Ilalian cities of Venice, Pisa and Genoa. He says that sometimes the Italians launch destructive raids while on other occasions they come as merchants, who export weapons and other products to Egypl.l72

But the essential pan of the letler is that devoted to the situa­tion in Syria in the wake of Nur ai-Din's death. Qadi a l-Fadi l de­scribes the political disintegration in Syria; many petty rulers have emerged, and the Crusaders have buill strongholds which endan­ger Muslim territories. Inte rnal squabbles among the members of the ruling e lite of Nur a l-Din's former stale added to the disar­ray.173 In their internal struggles they brought in the Crusaders and allied themselves with them. In such circumstances, Qadi a l­Fadil says, the fe-conquest of J erusalem from the Crusaders is impossible ,17" and the Ayyubids who operate from Egypt are un­able to ameliorate this situation. Qadi al-Fadil describes how the distance of Egypt from Syria impedes mi li tary operations.175 It might have been difTerenL, he cOnLinues, had the Ayyubids been neigh­bors of the Crusaders in Palestine. Then they would have been able to wage war on the Crusade rs, and to put the affairs of Syria in order. 176 And Saladin would have been able 1O protect Nur al­~in's son, who is under the tute lage of persons ruling in his name. 177

Qadi al-Fadil fe-assures the Caliph that Saladin's sole purpose is to strengthen the Abbasid dynasty, the Sunni cause and the Is­lamic community.178 A promise is made to the Caliph that, as it was the case in Egypt, Yemen and North Africa, any other future Ayyubid conquests will be carried out in the name of the Abbasids. l79

Qadi al-Fadil presents Saladin a lso as the protector of J erusalem and its future conqueror. l SO Bm Qadi al-Fadil touches on another issue as well. The idea of establi shing Ayyubid hereditary rule (passed from Saladin to his son or brother) is clearly stated. lS I

171 Ibid, 621, II . 11 -7. m Ibid, 62 1, 11 , 1S.20, 622, II , 1-3. 17' Ibid, 622, 11 ,9-10, 11 -3. 174 Ibid, 622, II , 14-5. m Ibid, 622, II , 17-8. 176 Ibid. 622, II , 1S.2 1. 177 Ib id. 622, I, 21, 623, 11 , 1-2. 178 Ibid. 623, I, 3. 179 Ibid, 623, II , 5-6. 180 Ib id, 623, II , S.12. I II] Ibid. 623, I, 7.

SALA DIN I N t:CYPT, 11 69.11 74 105

d. In Search oj Legitimacy

IL is quite clear tha t upo n Nur al·Din 's death Saladin wished to establish his rule o n a legal basis. Saladin had to win acceptance a nd legitimacy for his rule fro m two distinct segme nLS of Muslim socie ty: the Kurdish·Turkish military class and the civilian socie ty a t la rge, especially the elite. Thus the questio n of legitimacy has two separate faceLS which , no ne theless, a re to some degree a lso interdependent. Cenain aspecLS of Saladin 's rule and pe rsonality that appealed to members of his famil y and the military class were no t necessarily instrumental in winning suppon fro m wider circles o f the Muslim socie ty and vice·versa. The questio n is: within the contex t of Saladin 's effo rts to win legit imacy fo r his rule, why did he write to Baghdad and what did he ho pe to achieve from the Caliph '

The Caliph was regarded as the supreme leader o f th e Muslims, who held ultimate power to inves t regio nal leade rs, like Nul' a l· Din and Saladin , with legal authori ty. However, due to the Caliph 's weak positio n ca liphal inves titure had little practi cal meaning. 182

Nonetheless, it was much sought afte r by both Nu l' al·Din and Sala· din and even by more di stant Muslim rule rs such as the A1mo ravids of the Maghreb.183 Caliphal investiture was viewed diffe re ntly by the (wo mai n segmen ts o f the SOCie ty whose su ppon and recogn i­tio n Saladin sought. For the Kurdish·Turkish military class caliphal investiture had apparently a res tri c ted sig nificance o nl y, but it ca rri ed fa r grea te r weight with th e civilian e li te, who served the rule r , and with the gene ral po pulace.

In his le tte r to Baghdad , Qadi a l-Fadil makes ex te nsive use of the mo tif o f the Ho ly War and presen ts Saladin as an champio n o f the Abbas id cause and o f Sunni Islam . T hese two themes pe r· meate the le tter. Within thi s te rm of reference Qadi a l-Fadil se ts forth Saladin 's po litical programme. A re mo te goal, the conquest of J erusale m, is used to provide justifi ca tio n for more immedia te ac tion-Saladin 's interventio n in Syria. Qadi al-Fadil is at pa ins to convince the Caliph tha t Saladin 's actio ns in Syri a will se rve

182 Thesc points are fully discussed by R. S. Humphrcys, "Legitimacy and Political Instabili ty in Islam ill the Age of thc Crusades", in TlItJih(1l1 und iu Tilll~, 6-7. For Salad in·s relations with Baghdad . Illostlyartcr 1174, sec, E. Sivan, ~Salad in

et Ie Cal if Nasir". Scripltl HierosolYlllituna, Uc rusalclll . 1972). 126-45. 183 R. A. Messie r, ~The Alllloravids a nd the Holy Wa r". in "'litJihad and its

Tim~, 23-4.

106 CHAPTf: R TWO

his interests too. Saladin 's very modest achievements in the war aga inst the Crusaders were grossly exaggerated by Qadi al-Fadil, who attempts to portray Saladin as a warrior dedicated to the Holy War. Moreover, the motive of the Holy War is used to justify im­pending wars which would inevitably bring Saladin into confron­tation with Muslims rather than the Crusaders. In faCl Qadi al­Fadi! invented and promulgated the myth of Saladin the warrior of the Holy War many yea rs before Saladin had achieved any real success in that war.

The notion that dedication to the Ho ly War is an important factor which enti tles legitimacy was consolidated only during NUT al-Din's rule . Qadi al-Fadil was hardly original in his propaganda; he merely followed the example set by Nur a i-Din and his propa­gandists. As we mentioned earlier Nur ai-Din assumed the title of mujahid, warrior of the Holy War, early on in his rule (1149). In contrast with Nur ai-Din, Zangi did not adopt the title mujahid during his reign, not even after the conquest of Edessa in 1144. As Emmanuel Sivan has pointed out, the image ofZangi as a warrior dedicated to the Holy War was created by historians of the thir­teenth century like Ibn al-Ath ir, Ibn al-'Adim and Abu Shama rather than by his twelfth-century contemporaries. However, with Nur al-Din's ascent to the throne the idea of jihad came to the fore. 184

The theme of J erusalem figured prominently in the poetry of Nur al-Din's court poets and panegyrists such as Ibn al-Qaysarani and ' Imad ai-Din and the conquest of the town became Nur al-Din's declared goal. As a manifestation of his serious intent, Nur ai-Din ordered the construction ofa special minbar (pulpit) to be installed at tile Aqsa mosque upon the conquest of J e rusalem. But the minbar was not merely a religious artefact it served as a symbol signifying the throne and political authority.185 The minbar like jihad epito-

18~ See. his L'lslam et La Croisade, 42-5; chAo 185 For Zangid court poelS, see Dajani-Shakeel, 1ihad in Twclflh-Cenrury Arabic

Poetry~, 97,108-9. For the political meani ng of minbar, see Tabbaa, 230-1, 234. The conquest of J erusalem was not among Nur al-Din's achievements, and the work on the minbar wh ich look some years might have been seen as rather pre­mature if not completely ridiculous. However, ' Imad ai-Din provides an expla­nation for Nur al-Din's deed . In a clearly apologetic vein, he says that Nur al­Din continued work on the pulpit knowing that he was no t destined to conquer J emsalem. What ' Im ad ai-Din wrole about Nur a i-Din resembles a motive which was widely employed by Falimid (Isma'ili) authors. The Fatimid Imam is por­trayed as investing efforts in something he knows thal o nly his successors would achieve. The aim is to explain in retrospective the failures of previous Im ams

SALADIN I N [GYPT, I 169~ I 174 107

mized the fusion of religion and politics in lwelrth~century Mus~ lim Middle Easl. In 1174, Saladin was desperate for recognition and Qadi al~Fadil's attempt to legitimize his rule by employing the idea of the Holy War was unconvincing. However, late r, as has been pointed out by Hannes Mohring, following the conquest of Jerusalem, Saladin came to be identified as the Mess iah (Mahdi). His ide ntification with Joseph of the Koran and Muslim popular lore began even earlier going back to his early career in Oam~

ascus and his own declaration from 1176. 186

Conclusions: Saladin was a typical Heerkonig of the Muslim high middle ages. His unprecedented achievements in the Holy War overshadowed the fact that he began his bid for power as an usurper. Although Holy War supplied the central element in the l egitim i za~

tion of Saladin 's rule it was compounded by other concepts such as the IUle of justice, Abbasid recognition, identification withJoseph and Messianic expectations. It proved to be a powerful mix el~

evating Saladin far above other rulers of his age.

especially in matters of a wide public character suc h as wars, By implicatio n il can be understood that Salo\din is Nur ai-Dill'S true heir in accomplishing what his Q\'erlord railed to ach ieve.

186 "ZwischenJoseph-Legende und Mahdi·Erwartung: Erfolge und Ziele Sul­tan Saladins im Spiegel zeitgenossicher Dichtun g and Wcissagung", in War and Sociely i71lhe Easlern MedittrTantan, 7th·15th Cellturies, (ed) Y. Lev (Leiden . 1997) , 177-225,

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALADIN'S RULE

1. The Dismemberment oj the Fatimid Stale

a. The Appropriation oj Urban Properties

I. The consolidation of Saladin's rule in Egypt involved the dis­memberment of the Fatimid state and the imposition of Sunni Islam. The expropriation of Fatimid properties assisted Saladin in the implementation of his religious policies. We must take into account the fact that Saladin took possess ion of a COUnlry which was economically disrupted and of which some regions were partly destroyed. The capital was considerably affected by the wars which ravaged Egypt during the sixth decade of the twelfth century. In 1164, during the struggle between the Fatimid viziers Dirgham and Shawar. sections of the capital were set on fire. - Following the destruction and dispersal ofthe former Fatimid black and Ar­menian troops by Saladin. residential quarters inside and outside Cairo were left vacant and avai lable for new uses. 2 The burning of Fustat by Shawar was a catastrophe on an unprecedented scale. although parts of the town remained relatively intact. Many of those who fled Fustat sought refuge in Cairo which became overpopu­lated. Shirkuh, during his short vizierate, was personally involved in attempts to encourage the refugees to return to Fustat. The immediate effects of the misfortunes that befell the capital were a decline in population and economic activity. Other Egyptian towns suffered no less. Bilbays, for example, was destroyed by the Cru­saders and its population was massacred and enslaved. In the tenth century the town was an important center for the provision of the Holy Cities of Arabia with flour and bread (ka'k), and many mills operated in it. 3 Alexandria was depopulated, too. In 1167, dur-

I Maqrizi. Khitat, III , 19. 2 In the course of the Battle of the Blacks, the House of the Armenians, which

was located near the complex of the Fatimid palaces, at the very heart of Cairo, was set o n fire by Saladin's fo rces. The quarters which were inhabited by the Blacks were Baha ' ai-Din , inside Cairo, and al-Mansuriyya, outside the walls. See, Ma~rizi, Khitat, Ill , 2, 3, 29-30.

Muqaddasi , Kitab Ahsan al-Taqasim, (ed) M.J. De Goeje (Leiden, 1967), (reprint), 195.

THE CONSO LIDATION OF SALADIN'S RU LE 109

ing the siege o f Shawar and the Crusaders , famine ravaged the town taking heavy to ll in human lives and many inhabitanls fled the beleague red town. As a result of the fighting orchards around the town were des troyed. 100."

In fact the whole Mediterranean coast of Egypt was in decline due to the wars of the Crusades. Economically it was a ve l)' im­portant region. In the tenth-eleventh centuries, th e towns of Farama. Tinnis and Damietla were prospe rous cenlers of the tex­tile industry and also played a role in Mediterranean trade. In addition, commercial fishing in the shallow waters of the lakes of Tinnis and BurulJus provided a valuable source of food and gen­erated income for the state.s Tinnis and other coastal towns of Egypt were attacked by a fleet of twenty galleys during Amalric's advance against Cairo in 1169. This fleet intended to sa il from Tinnis up the Ni le to assist the advancing Crusading land army. However, the water-ways leading from Tinnis to the in land were blocked by Muslim boaLS.6 In 545/ 1150-1511 , Farama suffered a devastating raid by the Crusaders. In 1169, the Crusaders found the town deserted by its inhabitants and the dikes which preve nted sea floods had collapsed. The littora l was covered by a shallow sea rich in fish. 7 The rural areas suffered as much as the towns. The armies that invaded Egypt lived off the land collecting taxes and seizing provisions from the villages on their way. Shirkuh did so twice; in 1164 and in 1167. The regions that suffered most were those around Bilbays and Alexandria , but Upper Egypt was rav­aged by Shirkuh's forces as well. s

II. The collapse of the Fatimid dynasty produced littJe booty in the form of cash and the torturing of the Fatimid eunuch, who formerly had been in charge of the palaces, revealed nothing. 9

<4 Lyons and Jackson, 17. ~ For the textile industries and trade in Tinnis, in the middle of the elev­

enth century, see Nasir-i Khusmu, Book ofTravtls (Safamama), translated into English by W. M. Thackston Jr. (N. Y., 1986),39-40; R. B. SerjaTlt, ~Materilll for the History of Islamic Textiles up to the Mongol Conquest~, An Isiamica, XIII-XIV(1948), 90-4. For fi shing in lake Burullus, in the 11 30's, see C. A. Khan, kA Copy of II Decree from the Archives of the Fatimid Chan cery in Egypt~, BSAOS, XLIX (l986), 441-3.

6 Maqrizi, Khitat, 1, 346; William of Tyre, II , 353-4. 7 Ibn Muyassar, 144; Maqrizi, Itti'az., III , 20 1; William of Tyre , II, 362. 8 Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 365, 366, 370; Maqrizi , Khitat, II , 142. 9 Maqrizi, Khital , II, 284.

110 CHAPTER THREE

What Saladin could divide among his supporters were urban and rural properties. Both types of properties were allocated to Saladin's emirs following the Sallie of the Blacks and this practice conLin­ued on a grand scale after the overthrow of the Fatirnid dynasty. The division of these properties was a reward for setvice and loyalty and was also instrumental in creating long-term ties between Saladin's emirs, the new ruling elite, and Egypt-a COUIllI)' in which they had quile unexpectedly acquired vested interests. In Fustal­Cai ro the re was a massive conce ntration of buildings and various commercial properties which belonged to the former Fatimid state and members of the ruling establishment including the royal family. All these properties were appropriated by the new regime and re­assigned for accommodation, commercial use and the foundation of new types of religious institutions.

The urban landscape of Cairo was dominated by the huge palace complex which included two separate buildings: the Great East­ern Palace, and the Lesser Western Palace. The Persian travelle r. Nasir-i Khusrau, who visited Cairo in 1047·1048, says that when looking at Cairo from a distance the palace complex, due to its size and height, appeared like a mountain. An empty space around the complex isolated the palaces from the adjacent bustling city. The palaces were only accessible through a small number of gates which were known by different names. The palaces were made up of different structures designated by the term qa'a. These qa'as were very large structures which combined a covered central hall, used normally for receptions , flanked by halls open at their ends (iwans). Nasir-i Khusrau was admitted into the interior of one of the Fatimid palaces, but he was too dazzled by the occasion and the splendor of the internal decoration to leave a detailed descrip­tion. A description more contemporary with the period of Saladin's takeover of Egypt is provided by the Frankish historian William of Tyre. who refers to underground passages that connected the various buildings within the palace complex. The palace complex could accommodate 12,000 people. but the overall number of the court personnel was even higher than that. tO Within the palace

10 Nasir-i Khusrau, 45-6, 56-7; William ofTyre, lJ , 3 19-20; cf: R. Hillenbrand, Islamic Architectuu. Form, Function and Meaning, (N. Y., 1994) ,435. In the context of palace archilecture qa'a meant an audience hall . But this tenn appears also in the context of residential architecture. See, H. I. Sayed, ~Th e Development of the Cairene Qa'a: Some Considerations~, Ai, 23(1987), 3 1-53; Goitein , A Mediterranean Sotiety, (Berkeley, 1983), IV, 69-70.

TH t: CONSO LIDAT ION 01-- SA LAD IN'S RULE III

com plex were a lso located the ad ministra tive organs o f the state as well as a grea t va ri ety of asso rted sto rerooms and treasu ries. O ther Fa timid palaces were b uilt o utside the wa lls of Cairo. T he p referred sites were in proximi ty to water: the Nile. lakes and canals. In Fustat-Cairo the re were a lso palaces bu ilt by some of the pow­erful Fa timid vizie rs such as Ya'qub ibn Killi s and Bad r a l:Jamali . In ad d itio n to palaces, members o f the Fatimid roya l family and people of the ru ling es tablishment owned many commercial prop­erti es in Fusta t-Cairo such as sho ps, marke ts, covered marke ts, ba thho uses and whole residen tial blocks. People of this class a lso owned many commercially valuable o rchards in the capital itse lf and its enviro ns.

Fo llowing the d emise of the Fa tim id sta te, the personnel o f the court, slaves and slave-girls, was d ispe rsed by Qaraqush , Saladin 's supervisor o f the palaces. He kep t some of them, but mos t were se t free o r sold. Some o f the treasu re fo und in the palaces was sen t as gifts o r tributes to Nur ai-Din shortly before his death and o ther items were sold over a lo ng period of time. The ho uses and residentia l blocks that were owned by members of the FaLimid royal family a nd o the r persons from the fo rmer e lite were e ithe r con­fi sca ted a nd redistributed among the new elite o r sold by the new regime. Most of the Lesser Western Palace was alloca ted to Salad in 's brother ai-Malik al-'Adi!. I I Salad in 's fa ther lived in another FaLimid royal building; the Pearl Pavilio n , which was situated o uts ide the Qantara Gate o f Cai ro overlooking the Cairo Canal (khalij) and Kafur 's Garden. Altho ugh this a rea was destroyed by fire d uring the war be l:\veen Dirgham and Sh awar , the Pea rl Pavilio n was regarded as o ne o f the mos t beauti ful of all o( the Fatimid pa l­aces.12 Saladin chose as his reside nce the fo rmer palace of the Fatimid vizie rs and his brother, T uranshah , settled in Cairo in a quarte r fo rme rl y occupied by Fa timid e mirs. 13 Sectio ns of the Easte rn Palace were given to Salad in 's e mirs and administrators for their use. One of them took as h is reside nce the palace ofth e Fatimid princess Si ll a l-Mulk (who died in the early 1020s). But la te r thi s palace became the p ro perty of the Ayyubid family. 14

II Maqrizi, Khilal, II , 215, 394. 12 Fo r the h istory of this bu ilding, see Maqrizi, Khilai. II , 348-5 1. 13 Ibid. III , 59--60. 14 Ibid, II. 184-5,247,295,394-5; IV, 259.

112 CH APT ER THREE

Other sections of the Fatirnid palace complex were turned into public buildings such as law colleges and hospitals. The hospital th at Saladin founded in Cairo (Dim 'I-Qa<da 577/March.April 1182) was loca ted in one of the ancien[ qa<as of the Fatimid palace complex which had been built in 384/994-995. The costs of run­ning this hospi tal were covered by renting out properti es that belo nged to the Slale (riba' al-sultaniyya). and grain was provided from the fayyum district. Salad in also re-opened an ancient hos­pital in Fustat. But it was a far mo re modest institutio n; its budget was financed from the revenues of the Office of the Pious Endow­ments. 15

Saladin and his nephew, Taqi ai-Din , made use of Fatimid build­ings such as the jail. covered markets and palaces for the founda­tion of law colleges. Taqi a I-Din was the owner of many proper­ties in the capital. He established his residence in o ne o f the oldest Fatimid palaces. known as Manazil al-' Izz. which commanded a pleasant view of the Nile. It was built by the mother of the Fatimid Imam al-'Aziz (975-996), and beca me a pleasure palace of the subsequent Fatimid rulers. In 11 7 1, Taqi a I-Din bought this pal­ace wi th adjacent prope rti es, which included a bathhouse and stables, from the state. He used the palace to set up a richly endowed law college. 16 In 569/ 1173-1174 , at Cairo, Saladin establish ed a khanqa for the Sufis. T he khanqa was established in a fonner Fatimid palace, known as Dar Sa'id a l-Su 'ada. The palace ofSa'id a l-Su<ada was an eleventh-century building construc ted by a eunuch and freedman of the Fatimid rule r a l-Mustansir ( 1036-1094).17 This institution was supported by a pious e ndowme nt, which included urban a nd rural prope rti es. When Saladin established his Jaw colJeges in Cairo h e did the same: th ese institu tions were loca ted within the Dar al-Wizara-the fOrln e r palace of the Fatimid vizie rs in Cairo. 18

The example set by the Ayyubid mling family was emulated by members of the ruling establi shment, which used fo rmer Fatim id

IS Ibid, 11,25 1; cf: N. D. MacKenzie, AYYllbid Cairo. A Topograph ical SII.I.(ly, (Cai ro, 1992) . 143-4. For the term rub' (pI. ribo'), see Goitein. M ed. Soc., IV, 13-4. For its Coptic equivalelll, see Jean-Claude Gardn, ~Toponymie et wpographi e urbaines Im:dicV'Ales a Fuslat et au Caire M. JESHO, XXVlI(l 984), 122,11.25. For ,;ba' .rullanryya in the Falim id period , see Sayyid , 3424; Lev, Sialt, 66.

16 Maqrizi, Khilal , II , 397. IV, 194. 17 Ibid, IV, 273. 18 Ibid, IV, 196.

THE CONSO LIDATIO N OF SALAD IN'S RULE 11 3

buildings to set up law colleges. In 570/ 1174-1175, o ne of Salad in 's Kurdish emirs established th e fi rst law college in Cairo . This in· stilUtion was loca ted in a seClio n of Dar al-Dibaj which originally h ad been buil t as a palace by the renowned Fatimid vizier Ya'qub ibn Ki llis (d. 989). Later it se rved as a worksho p for the produc­tion and sale of silk brocades. 19

b. Investments in the Urban Economy

All e lements of th e e lite, Saladi n 's family. emil-s and civi lian ad· ministra tors invested in the urban economy of th e capital. Their investmenLS invo lved the fo undation of eillire iy new businesses and the purchaser o f formerly Fatimid properties fro m the state and their conversio n to commercia l uses. Taqi al-Din 's business ac ti vities exemplify this twofo ld approach . He bo ught two large properties from th e state: the palace of Manazil a l-' Izz and the island of J azira (which lay between Fustat and the west bank of the Ni le). In addition he se t up two new funduqs (meaning he re: urban caravanserais) and a teneme11l block (rab' ).20 Another Fatimid palace, known as al-Nafi, was bought by an Ayyubid emir who at first used it as a stable, and then converted it inLO a funduq . A bathhouse, which was pan of the com plex of the Western Pal­ace, proved to be a va luable property. In 11 95 it was sold by its owner, a cadi, to an emi r at the high price of 12,000 dinars. In the context of the urban economy, bathhouses were viable busi­nesses and as such much sought for by the new ruling e li te. A military slave of Shirkuh appropriated for himself a bathhouse in one of the best locations in Cairo: in the vic ini ty o f Dar al-Wizara, the palace of the former Fatimid viziers. In the same area, another bathhouse became the properly 0 1" one 0 1" Shirkuh 's emirs.:.!)

A com mon practice in the early years of Saladin's rule was the purchase from the sta te of trac ts o f land in the capi tal. The fo r­ma! act of acqu isition of properti es from the diwan (i .e. the state office which was responsible I"or th ese properties) is frequen tly referred to in the sources. When Taqi ai-D in decided to d esig­nate Manazil a l-' Izz as a law college, he formally bought the building

19 Ibid, 11 ,3434, III , 51. 20 Ibid, IV, 194; Ibn Duqmaq, Kitnb al-Intisar. (cd ) K. Vollers (Bulaq. 1891-

1892), IV, 93-4. 109- 110. 21 Maqrizi, Khitat , III , 129-30, 135.

114 C HAPTER THREfo:

from the state. From a legal point of view, it was a necessary pre· requisite to g iving the building the status of lawfu lly acquired pro pe rty and as such fitted for its new lise. Other members of the elite bought properties e ither because similar legal considera tio ns or because they were obliged to do so by the unwillingness of the Slate to hand o ut its assets for no thing. Whe the r they paid the full market price for these properties is unknown , but this prac­tice was widespread. For example, the Hamra' district of Fuslal was sold lO an emir. He planted a garden there and built a new irrigation system, which included wells and water wheels.22 The Hamra' district was a very large area stretching along the Nile and was subdivided into three quarters. It \va5 an ancient zone of Fustat, which dated from the tim e of Fustat's foundation, a nd was characteri sed by ilS Christian po pulation, churches and monas· le ri es. It is difficult to imagine that the whole area was sold to a single person or even that the whole of Hamra' had been deserted by ilS population . However, the conversion ofa section of fo rmerly residential area to agricultural use shows the extent of the d epopu· lation of Fustat. Qadi a l·Fadil a lso acquired extensive possessions in the capital. He bought from the state for a vast sum of money a large tract of land in the Luq area, which lay outs ide the walls of Cairo. It was good agricultural land from which the Nile had re treated (after 500/ 1106-- 1107) due to a shift in the course of lhe river. Qadi al·Fadil established a huge o rchard on his land which supplied the capital with fresh fruit. It must have been a pro fitable enterprise. Qadi al·Fadil deve lo ped the area by erect· jng a mosque and o the r buildings there. After 660/ 1261·1262, the Nile reconquered large parlS of these lands and d estroyed Qadi al·Fadil's property. Another orchard was established o n the site of what had formerly been the al·Mansuriyya quarter, after the black Fatimid troops had been expelled and the ir dwellings (masakin) razed.23

:n Abu Salih (the Arme nian), The Churtw and Monasteria oJf.gypt, translated into English with notes by B. T. A. Evetts (Oxford , 1895),92. For the complex textual history of this work. see Den Heijer. 77-83.

2S Maqril.i , Kh itat, II , 154, Ill , 29, 189-90. lV, 89.

TI-IE CONSO LIDATION OF SALAD I N'S RULE 115

c, The Acquisition of AgriculturaL Land

Agricultural land was acquired by the new elite by grants of iqLa' or by se izure ( the essence of the Ayyubid iqta' sys te m is disc llssed in Chapter Four), The grants of iqLa' could include agricu ltural land as well as whole districL'i and even towns. Members of Saladin 's family enjoyed the greatest and the most profitable iqla's. Saladin 's bro ther, Turanshah , was rewarded with an immense iqU/. It in­cluded the towns of Qus and Aswan in Upper Egypt and the Red Sea port of 'Aydhab. In 568/ 11 72- 11 73, the reven ues from these regions were es timated ('ibm) at 266,000 dinars. The iqla' of Sala­din 's father included Alexandria and the Buhayra province. 24 Iqla' was conferred on both the mil ita ry and civi li ans. For example, Baha' 'Ali , a jurisl from Damascus, received the Basatin area in the capital as an iqla'. Whole regio ns were ass igned to [he military (Ghuzz and Turks) as iqla'. For instance, this happened with the prov­ince of Fayyum. But in I 180, the region was re-ass igned to Taj al­Mulk Buri , Saladin 's b ro ther. Buri was a very ri ch person who indulged himself in expansive building projects for pleasure purposes. When Buri received Fayyum the revenues were eslimated a t 100,064 dinars per year. It represented a sign ificant drop in comparison to the su m of 133,274 dinars which was d e rived from the Fayyu m when th is area had been a llocated to the military several years earlier. 25 This data p rovides a very im portant indica tion for the potential danger inherent in the iqta' system ; the d e teriora­tion of the land and a decl ine in the revenues it produced.

Although the iqta' system was the main inStrume Ol used by the new elite to tap the wealth of Egypt, there is a lso evidence for the se izure of agricultural la nd by powerful ind ividuals from the military, who succeed ed in converting this land into freely held private estates (mulk). A word of caution is necessary here. Data on the seizure of agricultural land emanates from Chrislian sources which were concerned with the plight of the monas te ries. The question is how representative this data is? Does such informa­tion provide an indica tio n of more wide-spread practices, or do it me rely reflect something that happened to the mo re vulner­able Christian religious institutions? A further point must be taken into consideration: in a ll of the cases reponed, the land taken

24 Ibid, III , 59, IV, 270. 25 Abu Salih , 3, 133, 141 ,204.

116 CHAI'Tt: R THREE

from the monasteries had been received as grants from the Fatimid rulers. Given Muslim atLilucies toward non-Muslims. these grants of land were rather unusual. Therefore, the seizure of these lands may have been seen as correcting an anomaly created by the previous regime. If this was indeed the case, these repofts are not necessarily indicative ofa Illorc widespread practice. Among those wh o acquired lands, which had belonged to Christian religiolls institutions, was Saladin 's brother, Tughtakin. He became the owner of land wh ich had belonged to Christian churches in the Adawiya district. This area was a lso renowned for its quarries afyellow clay. Tughtakin set up gardens there and built some houses. How he acquired these lands remains unclear. However, in three other cases there is explicit information that the land was seized by force. InJiza, the area on the west bank of the Nile opposite the capital, 30 feddan of land which had been presented as a gift to a local monastery by the Fatimid ruler a l-Amir (1101-1130). were taken by Saladin's troops (Ghuzz). Two other identical incide nts LOok place in the districts of Hulwan and Ashmunayn. 26

Another problem is what happened to villages in which black soldiers had lived during the Fatimid period. Ibn Abi Tayy men­tions this practice and Maqrizi elabora tes by saying that in cer­tain villages, rural estates (diya') and urban quarters (mahalla) the Blacks had special areas which were outside the jurisdiction of the governor. 27 Following the destruction and the dispersal of the black regimc nts by Saladin these lands became avai lable for new uses. But how the new regime administered this land remains unknown. There were sevcral options: these properties could have been divided as iqta' among the emirs, the emirs could have been al­lowed to seize the land and to convert it into mulk, or it could have been turned into state property.

2. Saladin's Religious Policy

a. /smailum in Falimid Egypt

I. During the whole period of Fatimid rule in Egypt, Sunni Islam remained a constant force in the life of the country. The grip of

26 Ibid, 141 , 185-4, 197-8,248,250. 2' Abu Shama, I, pl.2, 498; Lev, Slale, 94, n.6, where additional sou rces and

studies are listed.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALAD IN'S RULE 117

lsmailism on Egypt was never comprehensive and from the 1070's it was on the decline, evaporating almost entirely tOwards the end of Fatimid rule . Ismail ism, to use an expressio n coined by S. M. Stern, was merely the sta te re ligion of Fatimid Egypt. 28 It was professed by the royal family and to some extent by the ruling establishment and the state main tained the institution of Isma' il i propaganda (cia'wa) , which was responsible for the dissemination of Ismailism in and outside Egypt. For the first one hundred years of Fatimid rule in Egypt, Fatimid law enjoyed a privileged posi­tion. But its predominant position was eroded under the milita'1' dictatorship of Badr al:Jamali . Even during the period in which Fatimid law had reigned supreme, Sunni legal schools and Sunni jurists were active in Fustat and the provinces. A rare insight into the attitude of Sunni men of religion toward the Fatimid state is offered by Maqrizi's biography of Sharf ai-Din al-Buni (c.1 126-1206). A1-Buni was a Maliki jurist from the town of BUlla in Tunisia. At some unknown date he arrived to Alexandria and lived in Cairo during the reign of al-'Adid (1160-1171). A1-Buni twice went on pilgrimage to the holy cities of Arabia and visited Damascus and Baghdad. In Damascus he met Ibn 'Asaki r and when confronted by him with a question about the an ticipated demise of the Fatimids, al-Buni replied that the demise of both the Fatimids and Abbasids was certain. But al-Buni was particularly pessimistic about the fate of Egypt, only at the end of time and with the appearance of the Mahdi would the situation in Egypt improve. He was more opti­mistic about the prospects of Syria and Iraq following the fall of the Abbasids. 29

This reveals no particular hostili ty toward the Fatimids, rather one gets the strong feeling of general disillusionment with rulers present and future. A1-Buni's pessimistic attitude toward rulership can be explained as arising from deeply rooted Islamic values. Islam is a religion orienta ted towards the past with a cyclical view of his­tory. On this view, little good is to be expected from the present times and rulers and even less from the future. But al-Buni also

26 S. M. S(ern, ~Cairo as (he Cenlre of (he Isma'ili Movement~, reprin ted in his Studies in Early Ismaili.sm, Uerusalem, 1983), 236. The same expression is used by Mouton (see, 373) for describing the position of Ismailism in Damascus during the Fatimid period. But in comparison to Egypt, the period of the Fatim id rule in Damascus was shoner and the Fatimid grip on the town much weaker.

29 Maqrizi, Muqaffa, I, 750-3, esp., 752-3.

118 CHAPTER THRf: E

drew on his personal experience of Muslim North Africa and the Middle East. He enjoyed the advantage of a comparative view of regimes and politics, and to him the differences betwee n Fatimid Egypt and the rest of the Sunni world seemed very unclear if not altogether indistinct. The progressive de-lsmaJizalion of the Falimid stale during the twelflh century is undoubtedly behind al-Buni's outlook.

The fact thal a Maliki jurist from Tunisia settled in Alexandria is very te lling in itself and exemplifies a more general trend. The influence of Sunni Islam, in its Maliki form , was especially strong in Alexandria. In the first half of the twelfth century, the religious and educational life of the town was dominated by the activities of two outstanding scholars. al-Turtushi and al-Silafi. In 516/ 11 22-11 23, TUflushi submitted to the viz ie r al-Ma'mun a l-Bata ' ihi a request to cease the implementation of Fatimid law in cases of inheritance. Turtushi's demand reflected the growing seLf-confi­dence ofSunnijurists in Lheir dealings with the sta te. For example, a Malikijurist whom the Fatimid Imam ai-Hafiz ( 1130-1149) wished to appoint as a cadi stipulated that h e would judge only accord­ing to the precepts of his legal school. His request was denied and the nomination cancelled. Nonetheless, his stand was in sharp contrast to that of Sunni jurists of the second half of the tenth century and the first half of the eleventh , who when appointed to the post of cadi agreed to enforce the Fatimid law of inheritance.30

The confident and assertive stance of Sunni men of religion vis­a-vis the state would not have been possible without the co-opera­tion of the viziers. Beginning with Sadr al:Jamali none of Lhe Fatimid viziers of the twelfth century was an Isma<ili. In contrast to the civilian viziers of the e leventh century, the viziers of the twelfth century were military men who had risen through the ranks and had an independent military power base. Thus they were able to conduct independent religious policies which were at odds with the lsma' ili persuasions of the Fatimid rulers. In 525/ 1130-1131, for a short period of time. four chief cadis representing the Shaft ' i. Maliki , lmami and Isma'ili (Fatimid) schools of laws were appointed by the military vizier Kutayfat. Each of these cadis was empowered to judge inheritance cases according to his own school. 31 The pro-

W Ibid, I, 510-1. SI Ibid, VI , 146-7.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALAD I N'S RULE 1 J9

cess of undermining Ismail ism was especia lly advanced in Alex­andria where Sunni law colleges were set up. The impact of the cultural and educational t rends typ ical of the Easte rn parts of the Muslim world was strongly fe lt in the town. Turtllshi was familiar with Nizam al-Mulk's policies and in Alexandria he founded a teaching institution modelled on the Iraq i colleges oflaw.32 Cadis of the Banu Hadid family, who ruled Alexandria de/acto followed Turtushi's steps. Although their relations with Turtushi were fairly problematic, he set a trend and his example was compelling. The law colleges established by the Banu Hadid continued to func­tion well into the Ayyubid pe riod:'3

Turtushi died in 520/ 11 26. Shortly before that, a Shafi' ijurist from Isfahan, al-S ilafi , had settled in Alexandria (5 I 1/ 1 I 17-1 11 8). AI-Si lafi was born in 475/ 1082-1083 and during the period of his studies he travelled extensively in the Middle East in search of fa mous teachers. His choice of Alexand ria as the place for h is permanent residence was a consequence of his marriage to a wealthy woman. Al-Silafi became a towering figure in the educational life of Alexandria and a multilude of students and men of religion spent li me studying under him. The vizier Ibn Salar es tablished a law college for a l-Silafi and provided it with a pious endowment.34

Turtushi and al-Silafi represent foreign religious groups who settled and fl ourished in Alexandria in the twelfth centu ry. But the town had a lso an indigenous class of scholars of whom the most promine nt was Ibn <Awf al-Zuhri ( 1093- 11 85). In 532/1 137-11 38. the vizier Ridwan built for Ibn <Awf a law college. The document concerning the estab lishment of this madrasa has sur­vived. Ridwan himself was a typical Falimid military vizier of the twelfth century. The beginnings of his career were as a provincial military governor and he rose to power by leading a quasi-popu­lar uprising against the Armenian Christian vizier, Bahram. Ridwan himself was a Sunni Muslim and his brother a Shi <ite of the Imami branch. Once in power, Ridwan attempted to undermine the rule

32 G. L. Leiser. The R£storatio'l of Srl.1wism i'l Egypt, Ph . d. disserlalio n (U ni. \'crsity of Pcnnsylvania, 1976), I, 115·6, 123-5.

13 Fo r lhe cadi ai-Makin Abu Talib ibn I-I adid (462-528/ 1070-11 34), see Maqrizi, MuqaJJa , I, 505·7. For the madrasa of Banu Hadid , see Muqaffa, VII , 25; Le ise r, The R£storation, I, 119-21.

~ According (0 the conlemporary Ibn 'Niakir, al-Silafi stayed al Damascus in 509/ 111 5- 111 6 studying hadith. See, Ta'rikh Dimashq, (cd ) 'Amrawi, V, 208-9. Maqrizi, MuqaJJa, I, 706-11, esp., 708; Leiser, The /Ustoratioll, I, 151.

120 C H A PTER THREE

of aI-Hafi z. The docume nt concerning the es tablishme nt o f the law college in Alexandria by Ridwan is very inte res ting. The ac t of se lling up this institutio n was initia led by the vi zie r but a ttrib­uted to the Imam whose name the law college carried-madrasa al-Hafi ziyya. The Fa timid Chancery which was respo nsible fo r d raftin g the d ocument mainta ined the pre te nce that the Imam ran the state. The local authoriti es in Alexandria were reques ted to support the law college which reveals the fact tha t the city was ba re ly under the contro l of the cen tral government. The fo und­ing o f the madrasa must have been proble matic. The vizie r was eager to set it up, but was unable, o r unwilling, to p rovide it with a pious e ndowme nt. The document re fl ec ts thi s dil emma by a strange ph rase sta ting tha t the vizie r h ad expressed his stro ng wish tha t the Imam would fin ance and supply the law college with grain fro m his own resources (lite ra lly from his diwan). The jUI-ist ap­po inted to teach in this law college was of course Ibn 'Awf on wh om extravagant praise was lavish ed .35 The establishment of this col· lege must be seen aga inst a dual backgro und: the Sunni ch arac· te r o f Alexandria a nd the ability o f the vizie r to compel the Imam to d o so mething which was aga inst his own bes t inte rests.

II. In contras t to Alexandria, law colleges d id no t ex ist in Fusta t· Cairo un til the time o f Saladin . The mosque was the most impor· tant re ligio us institutio n in the capi tal fo r the who le of the Fatimid period . Mosques prolife rated th ro ugh o ut th e capi tal and its e nvi· roIlS, the a rea of the ceme te ri es , J abal Muqattam and the d esert. In 403/ 10 12·101 3, the re were in the capi tal 830 mosques which had no permane nt sources o f revenue . Al·H akim (991).102 1) alia. ca ted for the ir upkeep and funnin g 9,220 dirhams per month .36

However, the urban scen e and the religio us life of the capital we re dominated by the large and I;chly endowed congregational mosques built by the Fa timid rule rs and the ir vizie rs. The building of can· gregatio nal mosques symbo lized sovere ign ty and it was th e exclu· sive privilege o f rule rs.37 The fi rst mosque built in Cairo was the

'5 The tex t of the docum e nt appears in Qalqashandi (X, '158-9). and En­glish trAnsla tion is provided by Le iser. See. The Resloration, II , 435-8.

:16 Maqrizi , ilti'az, 11 ,96; Khilal , IV, 84. '7 The only known exception is the congregational mosque built on the Jazira

island by Ghayn, a n eu nuch of aI-Hakim , who for a sho rt pe ri od of ti me wielded great powe r in the st<l.le . Later he was subj ect to al-Hakim 's c rue l punishme nt

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALADIN'S RU LE 121

Azhar (built between April 970 and June 972). It was an Isma' ili mosque and an educational institution in which courses of Ismai' ili teaching look place. In its early history Azhar was also a focal point for the activity or a group or jurists supported by al.'Aziz and his vizier Ya'qllb ibn Killis.38 AJ-Hakim built three congregational mosques in the environs or Fustat-Cairo; in Maqs, in Rashida and outside the Zuwayla Gale of Cairo (this mosque was known as the Nlir mosque and later as the mosque or ai-Hakim). But the most sign ificant deed or aI-Hakim was the es tablishment of pious en­dowme nts in support or the Azhar, the three mosques built by him and Dar al-' lIm , and the institution of Isma' il i teaching that he founded in Cairo. Its pious endowment included urban estates and commercial buildings owned by ai-Haki m in Fustal. The in­come or the Azhar alone amounted to 1,067 dinars per yea r.39

Later two other mosques were built in Cairo: the first by the Fatimid Imam aI-AmiI' ( 1101-1130) and his viz ier-the Aqmar mosque in 5 19/ 11 25-and by al-Zafir in 543/ 1148-1149. Both mosques were supported by piolls e ndowments made lip of urban properties and al-Zafir's mosque served also as a place ror the teaching of law and a group or reciters of the Koran was attached to i1. 4o Other congregational mosques were built by Fatimid viziers. AI-Mdal , during th e ru le or his rather (Sha'ban 478/ Novcmber-October 1085) bui lt a cgregational mosque outside Cairo on a high ground overlooking the Lake of the Abyssinians. It was not an expensive project, the construction costs ran to 6,000 dhwrs, a very modest sum for such an enterprise.41

The vizier Tala'j' ibn RlIzzik es tablished two congregational mosques. One or them was outside the Zuwayla Gatc and origi­nally was designated to serve as the burial place for a holy relic­the head of Husayn-which was kept in a mash/tad (martyrium )

and dicd from wounds inflicted on him. Sec. Ibn DU(jlnaq.IV. 11 5: Maqrizi. Khital. IV, 87-8.

:vi Maqrizi. Khilal, II, 226 (quoling Musabbihi, an early clc\'enth<en lmy chroni­cler).

"" Maqrizi. Khilat, IV, 49, 50. 40 Ibid, IV, 75-6, 80-1. For the Aqmar mosque see, C. Williams, -The Cull of

'Alid Saints in thc Fatimid Monuments ofC.1.iro. Part I: the Mosque ofal-Aqm:u'~,

Muqamas, 1(1983) , 37-52. 41 Maqrizi, Khilal. IV, 74-5. ~ I aqrizi's datcs in this account are problcmati­

cal. In 478/ 1085, Afdal was not in power yet, and the su m of 6.000 dinars scems tOO low for the bui lding of a congregat ional mosque.

122 CHAPTfo:R THREE

at Ascalon. The fear that the town might falllo the Crusaders caused the vizier to build this mosque with the inte ntion of transferring the head to it. However, the Fatimids insisted that Husayn's head must be kept in the palace and a special mashhad was built for that purpose. Another mosque built by the vizier was in Cairo and senl'ed as a commemorative monument for the Fatimid Imam al· Zafir killed in a palace intrigue in 11 54.42 The building of mosques which served as shrines pre-datcs the Fatimid period in Egypt. For instance, Tibr, an emir of the Ikhshidid period , built a mosque in which was buried the head ofa Shi'ite rebel against the Abbasid Caliph ai-Mansur. The Fatimid ruleral-Zahir (1021-1036) frequently used to visit it blll the reasons for his interest in the mosque remain vague. '13

The cult of shrines and tombs in the great southern cemetery, Qarafa al-Kubra, had a long tradition in ule pre-Fatimid and Fatimid periods. The area saw intense building activity during the Fatimid period. The first member of the Fatimid royal family to build there was al-'Aziz's mother, al-Sayyida al-Mu'izziyya. In Ramadan 366/ April-May 977, she built the congregational mosque of the Qarafa which included also an orchard and cistern. Her other projects involved qasT (its mean ing is vague; house, or residence), a bath­house, an orchard and a wel1.44 The qasrexisted ul1liI567 / 1171-1172. In 520/1126-1127, ai-AmiI' buill on lOp of lh e qasr a pavil­ion from which he used to watch the dancing of the Sufis of whom he was patron. Female patronage of mosques and other structures in the Qarafa was very common during ule Fatimid pniod. In 522/ 1128, the wife of al-Amir built on the outskirts of the Qarafa al­Kubra a mosque overlooking the Lake of the Abyssinians. It seems that the same woman, who was renowned for her piety and char­ity, built in 526/ 11 31-11 32 a mosque and a ribat for aged widows in the Qarafa. 45 Her ribat was not an unique institution. For ex-

42 Maqrizi, Khilal, lV, 8 1, 265-6. 4!! Ibid, IV, 271, (quoting al-Quda'i, an e le\·enth<c ntury chronicler and an­

tiquary); Lev, Slatt, 250. H Maqrizi, Khilal, rv, 120 (q uoting al-Quda'i), 333, 342. Maqrizi attributes

the water reservoir (hawd) to Silt al-Mulk, al-Mu'izz's daughter a nd al-Hakim's sister. The construction work 011 the mosque and the qa$rwas carried out by the same person: the market inspector, aI-Hasan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz ai-Farsi. For a wider discussion of this topic, see J. M. Bloom. "The Mosquc of thc Qarafa in Cairo", Muqanul$, 4(1987), 7-20.

45 Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 322-3. For al-Amir and the Sufis, see Fernandes, 21.

THE CONSO LIDAT IO N OF SA LAD IN'S RULE 123

ample, Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn 'Ali a l-Madhara'i, a high-rank­ing administrator of the Ikhshidid period, set up a ribat for ashmJ women (i .e. the fema le descendants of Hasan and Husayn. the tw"O sons of 'Al i and Fatima). Women of the households of Fatimid vizie rs and Imams were frequent pa trons of religious buildings in the Qarafa. In the 1020's. a slave-girl of 'Ali ibn Ahmad al-J arj a ra'i founded a ribal, which was supported by a pious endowment. 46

In 536/ 11 4 1-11 42, Sill al-Ghazala, who was in charge ofal-Hafiz's inkwell and responsible for the upkeep and cleaning of pens, built a mosque in the Qarafa which came to be known by her name.47

Another female servant of a i-Hafiz, his waqqaJa, whose duty was to stand in fro nt of her maste r, established a mosque, too. It had an e nclosure (hawsh) which included several rooms (buyut) for women who lived in seclusion.18 Other mosques in the area were founded by a l-Afdal's servant (farrash) and two eunuchs of ai-Hafiz. One of them was Shaqiq a l-Mulk. the d irector of the treasury and the other, 'Azim al-Dawla, was the bearer of the parasol and the veil behind which the Fatimid Imam used to speak to the peopJe .49

The Qarafa was an important foca l point of religious life and social activi ty and a popula tio n of permanent inhabi tants-the Qara­fiyya-lived there. The patronage of women of the royal famil y, vizie rs a nd slaves and servan ts in the households of the Fatimid rule rs exemplifies the links that the Fatimid regime fostered with the people livi ng in the ceme te ries.50 For example, the water res­ervoi r built in 366/976-977 by al-Sayyida al-Mu' izziyya, was reno­vated in 546/ 11 5 1-11 52 and in 580/ 11 84- 11 85. In both cases the work was carri ed o ut on th e orders of high-ranking patrons; a Fatimid vizie r and a top Ayyubid administrator. The involvement of the regime in the social and re ligious li fe in the Qarafa was manifold: it regulated the riles that took place in the Qarafa.

46 Who lhe beneficiaries of lh is ribal were is nOl e llli rely dea r. Sec, Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 333-4. Ahmad al:J arjara'i was the brother of the vizie r Abu 'l-Qasim a l:J arjara'i.

47 Maqrizi, Kllilal , IV, 326. The inkwel l was o ne of the Im am 's insignia of rule. Sec, Sande rs, index.

48 Maqrizi , Khitat, IV, 326. 49 Ibid, IV, 32 1, 327, 328. For these courtiers and their roles in the court life

and ce re monies. see Sande rs, index, under sahib bay' ai·mal. sahib al-mizalla and sahib ai·silr.

50 Fo r lhe mosques of a l·Afdal. Tala'i ' ibn Ruzzik and lhe wife of the vizi e r Ibn Sala r, see Maqrizi , Khilal , IV, 324.

124 CHAPTER THREE

maintained water supplies and organized the distribution of a lms to people living there. Shaqiq al-Mulk , for instance, kept a regis­ter (ruznamaj) with the names those who lived in the mosques of the Qarafa and were entitled to support. On the nights of lights (layali I l-wuqud i.e. the first and the middle days of the months of Rajab and Sha'ban). he sent food to people in the mosques and to those living in secl usion allh e buyut in the Qarafa. In addition he used to send to these people fruit from the orchard that was part of his mosque. Shaqiq al-Mulk must have been a person of high standing with ai-Hafi z. In his mosque he gave a reception for his rule r a llcnded by the eunuchs o f the coun , dignitaries and emirs. The nights of the lights were po pular festivals which attracted many people to the Qarafa. O ne o f the places where crowds and Koran reciters ga tJl e red was the pavilion (jawsaq) built on the model of the Kaaba by Abu Bakr ibn 'Ali a l·Madhara' i.51

b. The Restoration of Sunni Islam

I. Saladin and the other Ayyubid rulers of Egypt did not compete with thei r Fatimid predecessors by founding mosques but instead they established law colleges. The foundation of law colleges in Fustat by Saladin was a carefully calculated act undel'taken from a position of strength. Saladin's deeds reveal a conscious attempt to maximize the public impact of his new policy, On the first day of the Muslim year 566/ 14 September 1170, a prison just sOUlh of the Ancient Mosque of 'Amr ibn al.'As, the religious and com· mercial heart of Fustat, was demolished and converted in to a law college. The building that represented the coercive power of the FaLimid regime, formally still in power, was turned into a institu· tion identified with Sun ni Islam. T he symbo lic value of this act was noted by Ibn a l·Athir, even though he was d istance to the even t in both time and place. 52 This co llege became to be known as the 71ladrasa al·Nasiriyya, deriving its name from Salad in 's epithet a l· Malik al·Nasir, the Victorious King, and served the jurists of the Shafi' j legal school. However, the inauguration of teaching in it took place much la ter. Two weeks later, on another side of the complex of the Ancient Mosque, work began on a second law

!iJ Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 332-3, !i2 Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, XI, 240,

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALADIN'S RULE 125

college. Saladin demolished a commercial building, a covered market which had been used for the sa le of linen, Qaysariyya al­C hazl, to make room for the building of a law college dedicated for the jurists of the Maliki legal school. Bo th institutions were supported by generous pious endowmen ts. The first to em ulate Saladin 's deeds was his ne phew, Taqi a i-Din. He established, half a year la ter, a law college 1'01" Shafi' i jurists within the palace of Manazil a l-' Izz. Like Saladin's colleges in Fustal it was provided wi th a rich pious e ndowment.5j Another institution estab lished by Saladin in 569/ 1173-11 74 in Cairo was a Sufi khanqa. It was designated for foreign Sufis whose arriva l in Egypt the regime e ncouraged. It was a large institution which provided the Sufis with accommodation and material suppo rt. 54

In 572/ 1176-1177, upon his return to Egypt from Syria, Saladin founded his third law college. This o ne was adjacent LO the mau­soleUlll ofShafi' i a nd became to be known as madrasa al-Nasi ri yya at the Qarafa cemetery. As is au ested by the founding inscription th e establishm ent of this institution was the initiative of a l­Khabushani. In the light of his special relations with Saladin , the positive response of the Sullan to al-Khabushani 's requests is not surprising. Moreover, al-Shafi'i's tomb was a much vis ited site and the new institution enjoyed wide public exposure. 55 Later, Sultan a l-Kamil extended a small mosque in the vicinity ofShafi' i's LOmb to become a large congregational mosque. The need for a bigger mosque was due to the great c rowds wh ich used to visit the place and the exis tence of Saladin's law college and its stude nt popu­latio n .56

The association between Saladin and al-Khabushan i was far from being unusual o r unique. Such relations between rulers and holy persons are well a ttested in the Fatimid and Mamluk periods. One of the best known cases is the compan ionship between Shaykh Khadir ibn Abi Bakr a l·Mihrani and the Mamluk Sultan Baybars. However, due to al-Mih rdn i's highly idiosyncratic characte r and behavior he became a liab ili ty to the sultan. A more typical case is the patronage ex tended by the vizier a l·AfdallO Shaykh Ibn Sa'd al-Atfih i. In the period that a l-Mdal fought aga inst al-Mustansir's

5! Maqrizi , Khi/al, IV, 193-4. 54 Ibid, IV, 273: cf: Fernandes, 22-5. 55 Maqrizi, Khi/al, IV, 251: Leise r, The Res/oration. I, 225-3J. 56 Maqrizi , Khi/a/. IV. 86.

126 CHAPTER THRE.E

eldest son, al·Nizar, and his allies in Alexandria (end of 1095-beginning of 1096), his mother used to go o n Fridays incognito among the people in the markets , congregational mosques and ribats. She learnt what people were saying about a l-Afdal and heard the ir opinions on curre nt events. In one of her tours she visited al-Atfi hi , who was a transmitter of the Prophetic traditions and an ascetic, at his mosque. He promised her victory to the Sultan and the safe-being of her son, who as she lOld him was fi ghting with the a rmy aga inst the rebels in Alexandria. Following al-Afda l's triumph she Lo ld h im about those who spoke evil of him and recommended him to befriend al-Atfihi. AI-Afdal carried O ll t sav­age acts o f retributio n against his enemies, but took al-Atfihi under his patronage. AI-Mdal's patronage evolved into veneration and respect for al-Atfihi with whom he spent many hours conversing about the Prophetic traditions a nd history. Al-Atfi hi 's mosque became crowded with people who realized thaL when al-Mdal was in the company of the Shaykh he was more attentive to their needs and problems. The relationship between the two was mutually beneficial. AI-Afdal's altitude was a mixture of pe rsonal admira­tion for al-Atfihi and poli tical considerations. AJ-Atfihi was instru­mental to al-Afdal for keeping in touch with the common people and gaining their support. At the same time al-Atfihi's prestige among the people was much enhanced. AJso in other ways he gained immensely from al-Afdal's patronage. AI-Afdal secured a steady water supply for the mosque, planted an orchard, built a bathhouse and for himself he constructed a loggia and qa'a. In addition , he buil t for al-Atfihi an open prayer area where the Shaykh conducted prayers over the dead brought for burial in the Qarafa.57

Saladin's policy of se tting up law colleges was emulated by his successors and the military and civilian elite of the Ayyubid pe­riod. Two religio us institutio ns established by o the r Ayyubid rul­ers of Egypt exempli fy Saladin 's influence in choosing central locations and the continued use of forme r Fatimid buildings. The Dar al-Hadith es tablished by the Sultan al-Kamil was located in the most cen tral site in Cairo. the stree t that runs between the two Fatimid palaces-the Western and Eastern.58 In 1242, a sec­tion of the Eastern palace was demolished by the Sultan Salih Ayyub

~7 Ibid, lV, 329-30. ~ Leiser, The RntQration, II , 36 1·75.

Tt-IE CONSO LIDATION OF SALAD IN'S RULE 127

to make a space for a new law college. The construction work was carried out at great speed and, in a less than a year, this co llege­the Salihiyya madrasa-was completed. Apparently the materials of the de molished palace were re·used which might explain the rapid progress of the work. AJso an old gate of the p~, l ace was incorporated into the new building serving as its e ntrance.59

Many law colleges in the capital were built by Ayyubid emirs. This trend began as early as 570/ 1174-] 175, and continued dur­ing the whole period of Ayyubid rule in Egypt. Two emirs in Saladin's service were among the founders of law colleges. One of them was Sayf ai-Din Yazkuj , originally a military slave ofShirkuh who became an emir in the Asadiyya regime nt. In view of the ro le played by the Asadiyya in Saladin's nomination as Fatimid vizie r, it is not surprising to find officers of th is regiment in eminent positions during Saladin's rule . Yazkuj set up rwo colleges, one in Fustat and one in Cairo.60 Also his wife, herself the daughte r of another Asadi emir, founded a law college. For that purpose she bought a building from a Jewish physician who served as secre· tary to Baha' aI-Din Qaraqush.61 Another college was set up ac· cording to the will of the emir Masru r, a former Fatimid eunuch, who became the commander of Saladin's body guard. He kept his assignme nt until the reign of Sultan al-Kamil when he retired from service. In his lifetime Masrur became renowned for his righteousness and charity. Upon his death, having no famil y and heirs , he disposed all of his properly. In his will Masrur ordered the building of a law college, which W'IS finan ced through the sale of rural property in Syria. The college i L~elf was supported by a piolls endowment which included a small futlduq. Masrur was buried in the Qarafa next to a mosque he had established there. 62

Masrur re presents a type of re ligiosi ty characte ristic of the eunuchs as well as o f free-born people of the military class. Saladin's distinguished commander of the navy, Husam ai-Din Lu 'lu ', was an Armenian and a forme r Fatimid officer. He died inJumada II

~ Maqrizi, Khitat, IV, 209; Qalqashandi , III . 352: Leiser, Tht: IU.'Jtoralioll, II , 352-61.

60 Maqrizi, Khital, IV, 19'1, 199; Leiser, Th, IUSlarflli(m , II , 327. 61 Maqri zi. Khila/, IV. 200; cf: Leiser, The Restamlioll, II . 33()'1. For a malirasa

or a Kurdish emir or Saladin known as QUlibiyya. see Ma(lri:ri. Khitat. IV, 196; cf: Leiser, The Restorati07l, II , 298-9.

62 Maqri zi. Khilnl, IV. 2 16.

128 CHAPTER THREE

596/June:July 1200 and was buried in a mausoleum (turba) he had built for himself in the Qarafa. H e too was known for his libera l charity and piety.53 The same mixture of military career, piety, charily and concern for personal salvation is reflected in the bi~ ography of Sultan al·Kamil's em ir. Fakhr ai-Din ibn Qizil al-Barumi (born in Aleppo in 11 66 and died in Harran in 1232). During al­Kamil's reign he became one ofthe most powerful persons in the state and is described as distributing bounteous charity including among those living in seclusio n (arbllb al-buyut). In Cairo. he built a complex composed of a law college and a mosque and another one in the Qarafa, which included a ribat and an elementary school for orphans (kultab sabil) . His building activities extended also to Mecca, there he set up a ribal.64

In 580/ 11 84-1 185, a splendid law college was established by Qadi a l-Fadi l in Cairo. It also included a ha ll (qa'a) for the slUdy of the seven different ways of reciting the Komn, and an elementary school for orphans. Qadi a l-Fadil's private residence was within this com­plex. The fame of this co llege, the Fadiliyya madrasa, was derived from its large and diverse library donated by Qadi al-Fadil, who was a renowned bibliophile. He used to buy books on a wide range of topics and his library also included rare items. Ibn a l-Qifti says that he had used this library and its cata logue. Members of Qadi a l-Fadil's family were connected with this institution. Qadi al-Fadil's SOil, Ahmad, taught in it and his grandson served as its librarian.65

Other administrators of the Ayyubid age were also involved in set­ting up law colleges.66

A law college established in Fustat in 570/1 174-11 75. and known as the Arsu fi tnadrasa, epitomizes the foundations set up by private people from outside the ruling establishment. Arsufi was a mer­cham from Palestine who used his private wealth to es tabli she a well-endowed law cOllege. fi7 A most inte resting institution is the

63 See. chA, n.89. 6-4 Maqrizi, IV, 199; d: Leiscr, The Jus/oraliof!, II , 349-52. Fo r olhe r law col­

leges buill by Aryubid emirs, scc Maqrizi, Khital, IV, 208, 216, 2325; d: Leiser, The JUsloratiotl, II , 3 11-3, 3 13-4, 332-3.

65 Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 197-9; Leiser, The IUsloration, II , 334-47; Ibn al-Qifli, III , 187; Safadi, VI I, 57, XVI II , 198. For a school established by Saladin lO leach orphans and poor children thc Koran, scc MacKenzie, 129.

66 Maqrizi, Khital, IV, 205; Ibn Duqmaq , IV. 92; Leiser, The /Ustoralion, II , 286-9,317-27.

67 Maqrizi, Khilal, IV, 194; Ibn Dlupnaq , IV, 98: Leiser. The /Usloration, II , 281-2.

TH E CONSO LlI)A Tl ON O F SA LA DIN'S R ULE 129

law college established in Fus!..'1!, in 640/ 1242-1243, by West Afri­can pi lgrims. It was a Maliki institu tion which became famous in West Africa, and was maintained by cash donations brought by West African p ilgrims who passed th rough Egypt on pilgrimage to the Holy Ci ti es of Arabia. 68

As a resu lt of the es tablishment of new rel igious ins ti tu tio ns in Fusta t-Cairo, many urban pro perties in the capital and even some agricultural lands were ti ed up in p io us e ndowments se t up fo r the mainte nance of these institutions. Fo r insta nce, the pio us e ndowment of al-NasiriYYd college fo unded by Salad in in Fusta t included the fo llowing properties: a goldsmiths market in Fustat and a vi llage. An inscription read by Maql;zi stated that the bu ilding ho using the goldsmiths market was constructed by al-'Aziz. It was o ne o f many buildings buill for commercial uscs in the capital by me mbers o f the Fa ti mid royal fam il y.fi9 O ther colleges founded by Saladin ; the Qam hiyya madrasa and the Nasiriyya madrasa in the Qarafa. we re provided with the same combination of urban and rura l pro perties. Th e pious e ndowme nt of the Qa mhiyya madrasa included a covered market fo r the sale of paper, Qaysariyya al-Warraq in , in Fustat and a ru ral esta te in Fayyum. T he Nasiriyya madmsa in the Qarafa was endowed with pro perties adjacent to it sllch as an oven , bathh ouse a nd sho ps as we ll as with the Island of Elephan ts which was situated at some dist.lI1ce from Cairo.70

AnOlher law college established by Saladin , the Suyufi yya madrasa, is no table fo r the absence of rural properties in the pio us endow­ment set up fo r its upkeep. Blit extensive properties in Cairo we re endowed in its favo r. These included 32 sho ps in the area of th e Li ttle Marke t of Ami r al:Juyush (a marke t es tablished by the vi­zie r Badr al:Jamali ), the Futuh Gate o f Cairo and the Barjawan quarter. one of the ancient parts of the town dating from the second half o f the tenth century.71 But it seems that th e Sufi khanqa es­tablished by Salad in in Cairo e nj oyed the richest pious e ndow· ment; it was com posed mostly o f rural prope rties which included

iii! Maq rizi, Khi/al. IV, 195; Ibn Duqm;lq, IV. 96; Le iser, The Reslomlion. 11 . 291).1. For th e di\'ersified relations between Eb'Ypt a nd West Africa, see N. Lcvl7.ion, " Mam1uk Egypt and T akru r (West Ar .. ica)~. in Sllldiu ir! Islamic HislQry and Civi­liwlior!, in Honour o rProressor David Aplon. (ed ) M. Sharon. (Jerusalem. Leiden . 1986), 183-209.

69 Maq rizi, Khilal, IV, 193. 7(1 Ibid, IV, 193-4, 251. 71 Ibid, IV, 196.

130 CHAPTER THREE

a commercial garden outside Cairo, extensive rural lands in the provinces and a covered market for the se ll of beverages and potions, Qaysariyya al-Sharab, in Cairo. 72 Among the other law colleges. Taqi al-Din's madras" of Manazil a l_cIzz, was especially richly endowed with urban properties; a bathhouse, funduq for the storage and trade of palm dates, and the Jazira island on its agricultural lands. 73 Also the institutions set up by other Ayyubid rulers were supported by pious endowments no less extensive than those created by Saladin and Taqi ai-Din. For example, the daughter of the Sultan a l-'Adil, ' Ismat ai-Din Mu'nisa, founded an endowed law college but no details aboUl the type of propenies aTe avail­able. 74 The Sultan al-Salih Ayyub developed an urban estate (hukr) from which subsequently land tax (hikr) was collected and endowed it for his Salihiyya law college. Earlier, similar method was adopted by the Sultan al-Kamil. He converted a section of the Fatimid palace­complex into a residential block (rub') and endowed it (i.e. the incomes from it) in favor of the Oar al-Hadith he had founded. 75

Taqi ai-Di n 's building activities were not restricted to the capital alone. but also included the foundation of two endowed law col­leges in the Fayyum. However, with the exception of the Fayyum, there is little evidence in the Ayyubid period for the setting up of law colleges outside the capital and the institutions founded were not established by the Ayyubid rulers. 76

II. There are two basic approaches for interpreting the meaning and the significance of the law colleges established by Saladin and the other Ayyubid rulers. George Makdisi strongly disputes the views of M. von Berchem and I. Goldziher who both regard the law colleges established in the Muslim world during the second half of the eleventh century as institutions supported by the state and, in the eyes of Goldziher, responsible also for the dissemina­tion of the Ash'ari theological doctrine. Makdisi maintains that the madrasa "remained essentially a privately endowed institution destined for public, but according to the wishes of the individual

7'1 Ibid, IV, 2734. 73 Ibid, IV, 194. 74 Ibid, IV, 200; cf: Leiser, The RtJtoralioll, II , 347-9. 7$ Maqrizi. Khilat, IV, 209. 2 1 I. 76 Leiser, The Rnloralion, II , 37()'96; S. Tsugitaka. State (lIId Rural Society in

MedievaL isLam, (Leiden, 1997), 75-6.

TI-tE CONSO LIDATION OF SAI.ADIN'S RU LE 131

founder who established the institution and who formulated its public character". He argues that: "the status of the founder did not in any way alter the legal status ohhe institution he founded: the institution remained a waq/. a charitable trust",77 As has been poimed out by A. L. Tibawi, Makdisi 's claim that the stalUs of the founder, be he a ruler or a private person, does not matter is diffi­cult to accept. 78 Ibn 'Asakir 's biography of Nur ai-Din as well as the writings of Saladin's historian-admirers clearly show that, in the period unde r discussion, the demarcation line between pri­vate and official aspects of the behavior of the ruler was tenuous at best if not blurred altogether. Moreover, Saladin, and mem­bers of his family which founded law co ll eges did so by exercising executive power. They acted as rule rs lIsing for that purpose the properties of the former Fatimid state which they came to con­tro l by the virtue of their military u·iumph. We must regard the establishment of law colleges by Saladin as the embodiment of a coherent Slate religious policy.

The drift of this policy was well unde rstood by late medieval historians. Maqrizi, in his evaluation of it, says that Saladin's chief cad i was a Shafi ' i jurist, the Kurd Ibn Dirbas. who appointed as his de puties only Shafi'i jurists. Maqrizi is also very explicit as to the theological teachings sllpponed by Saladin and his regime: it was the Ash'ari doctrine. Saladin imposed the Ash'ari doctrine and this was stipulated in the waqfdocuments of the institutions founded by him such as the law colleges and the Sufi khanqa, 79 The pref­erence accorded to Shafi'is did not mean the exclusion of other legal schools. Law colleges were not built for the Shafi'is exclu­sively. During Saladin's rule and the Ayyubid period in general, law colleges were built also for the Malikis , Hanafis and even Hanbalis. On the other hand, the support of Asharism was a clear state policy. Cadi Ibn Dirbas, in conjunction with Saladin, ordered the muezzins to announce the Ash'ari doctrine. known as the 'aqida murshida, during their night call to prayer. State support for ce r­tain legal schools and theological teaching was not Saladin's in­novation. Maqrizi contrasts Saladin's support for the Shafi'is with

77 See, his 'fht Rist of Colltgts. IllstituliOlIS of i.£arnillg ;'1 Islam and the Wtsl, (Edi nburgh , 1981),300,302,

78 See, his ~Origin and Chal1lcte r oral-Madrasa h M

, BSOAS, XXV (1962), 231-2.234. See a lso, Chambcl'lain , 5 1·2.

79 Maqri7.i, Khital, IV, [61.

132 C HAIYJ"ER THREE

Nur a i-Din 's backing of the Hanafis. 80 Maqrizi's reference to Nur ai-Din is a very apt one; it pULS Saladin's re ligious policies in their proper context.81 The establishmc m of law colleges in AJeppo was pan of Nur a l-Di n 's struggle against Shi'ite Islam in the town. Nur a i-Din changed the Shi ' ite fo rmula of call to prayer in Aleppo to the Sunni one and he supported the introduction of Sunni legal schools . He withdrew support from th e Sh i' ites and founded law colleges sllstained by pious endowments. For Saladin's religio us policies in AJeppo we have the contempora ry authoritative account of « mad ai-Din himself. When Saladin wrested Aleppo from the Zengids and annexed it to his te rrito ri es he gave preference to the Shafi ' j schoo l by appointing cadis and preachers from among its members. Although Saladin's preferences were dearly set out it did not mean that a battle was waged against the Hanafis. At least some leading Hanafi scho lars were approved by the new regime and maintained their positions.82 The religious policies of Nur ai-Din and Saladin followed a similar pattern: the legal school of their cho ice was given an eminent position in the state but the regime was not overtly hostile to the other schools, which were tolerated and occasionally even supported.

c. Taxation and Religion

I. Saladin's religious policy can be characte ri zed as Sunni, con­servative and pietistic. Pietism and the influence of Nur ai-Din are very evident when Saladin's fiscal policy is examined. A much publicized aspect of it was the abolition of taxes that were levied on the urban economy of Fustat-Cairo and were unauthorized by lslamic law. These taXes were known as mukus or hilali and included sales and property taxes.8~ Other taxes , known under the name of bamtil, were collected by sta te functionaries such as ma rke t supelvisors, cadis and governors (IUUla al-bllilltl) in the rural areas.&!

80 Ibid, IV, 48-9, t 61. 81 The innuence of Nur a l-Din's religious policies on Saladin has been nOled

by modern scholarship, too. See, Lapidus, 280, 284-5. Fo r the Ayyubid su pport of Asharism, see Madelung, 110, n.3, 158, 159-60.

82 Ibn 'Asa kir, (ed) Elisseeff, 137, para.,4, MS, XVI, 293, II , 29-30; ' Imad 111-Din , Barq, V, 127, 129-30. For Hanafis dism issed by Saladin, sec MorrdY, 40-1, 123.

8' Rabie, 105-6. 11-4 Maqrizi . Khilal , I. 179.

THE CONSOLIDATIO N OF SALAD I N'S RULE 133

Both kinds of taxes. 1nukllS and baralil, we re collected during the Fatimid period. In 11 71, after the death of al·'Adid , Saladin or· dered the abolition of m'l.lkus taxes in the capital and he regulated the collection and paymen t of zakal, the al ms-tax. The decree (manshur) announcing the aboli tion of the mukus states that Salad in as the official respons ible for the affa irs of the people manifests his good wi ll towards the inhabitants of the capital and the mer­chants trad ing the re by abolishing the custom duties levied at two ports which served the city. Custom duties levied on merchanlS arriving in and departing from these two ports amounted to 100,000 gold coins (min al-'ayn) a yea r. The decree says that the Sultan was ready to renounce (the riches of) th is wo rld for the sake of the hereafter. The mukus levied in two provinces were abolished , too. In all , Salad in discontinued the collection of illegal taxes to

the amoun t of o ne million dinars per year and two millions irdabs of grain in kind. 85

Very li ttle is known about the collection and distribution of the alms-tax in the Fatimid period. On 3 Rabi ' 1567/4 November J 171 , Salad in ordered the distribution of money from the alms-tax to those who were e ntitled to receive it: the poor and the needy, travellCl"s and insolvent de btors. It was said that the alms-tax was collected for those who fought the Holy War and for the free ing of slaves. Maqrizi specifies how the levying of the a lms-tax was carried out. It was collected o n merchand ise, livestock, palm dates and vegetables.86

In the same yea r, Saladi n tried to persuade the emi r o f Mecca to cease the collection of mukus from pilgrims arriving to Arabia by offering him compensation in the form of rural estates (di)'a').87 Apparently, similar efforts were undertaken by Saladin in 572/ 11 76-1177, with the ai m of obtaini ng exemption for pilgrims from paying mukus. ' Imad ai-Din says that on Salad in 's intervention the mukus levied on pilgrims in Mecca were abolished and Saladin promised to supply each year 8,000 irdabs of hard grain (hinla) to the Holy Cities through the port of Jedda. To finance th is ex pen-

85 Abu Shama, I, pl.2, 443 (q uoting Ibn Abi Tayy), 522-3, (where the full text of the document is given); 'Uy ll1l, I, 32 1.

86 Suluh, 65. Maqrizi's description of the collection of z.ahal talli cs with Lhat of Makhzurni. See, Khan , Arab I.£gal, 285: Rabie, 95-100.

87 Abu Sham a, ' UyUll, I, 32 1-2 (quoting Ibn Abi Tayy) ,

134 C H APTE R TI-IREE

diture, Saladin set up a special pious endowment. 88 Maqrizi adds some furthe r details. The lax that had been levied on the pilgrims amollnted to 7.5 Egyptian dinars and was collec ted eithe r in 'Aydhab, the Egyptian port on the Red Sea, or in Jedda. This accounts implies that the revenues from laxing the pilgrims were shared between the rulers of Egypt and Arabia. How such an arnlllgemenl could work in practice is unclear. In any case, Maqrizi . in line with earlier histo rians. says that the emir of Mecca had to be compensated for his loss of revenue by shipments of grain and allocation of iqta's in Yemen and Upper Egypl.89 Saladin backed up his policies aimed at abolishing the taxes levied o n pilgrims by institutional arrangements which reflect his seriousness and long­term commitmenl. Nonetheless, it was difficullto stamp out the practice of collecting illegal taxes from pilgrims. In 577/11 81-11 82, Saladin had 1O remain the governor of Qus, in Upper Egypt, to end the collection of unauthorized taxes from merchants arriv­ing from the Yemen and pilgrims from Arabia.90 It seems that the administrative office responsible for collecting the alms-tax (diwan al*zakal) was a powerful body. Its officials compelled Saladin's brother, Tughtakin, who came from the Yemen during the reign of al}Aziz 'Uthman (i.e. sometime between 11 93 and 11 99). to pay alms-tax on the goods he brought with him . Although derived fro m a late source, this is very interesting information open to several inte rpretations. It can be seen as indicating thaL everyone, even the rule r of the Yemen and a membe r of the Ayyubid fam­ily, had to fulfill the religious duty of paying zakat. Another way of looking at this account is to see it as a renec tio n of the strained relations within the Ayyubid family and the officials of the diwan as acting on the behest of the ir political master, al-'Aziz 'Uthman, Saladin 's son.91

gs AI-Bundari. 30~; Abu Sham a, I, pl.2. 693 (quoting ' Imad ai-Din); 'U,un, II , 31-2.

119 Maqri1.i. Suluk. 86. Thc concern and il1\'olvement of both Nur ai-Din and Saladin in the aITairs o f the Holy Cities of Arabia might explain the auempts of historians of the Mamluk period to trace thc establ ishment of the eunuch guardians at lhe Prophcllomb in Madina to onc ofthcm. For this issue and its wider context, see S. Marmo n, Eunuchs mid SaC7?d BOlmdaries ;" Islamic Society, (N. Y., 1995). esp., e h. 2.

90 Maqrizi , Suluk. 97. 91 Safadi. XVI, 450-1.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALADIN'S RULE 135

II. The sincerity of Saladin's attempt to adopt a tax-policy dictated by the precepts of religious law is beyond our abi lity to judge. In fac t it is quite irrelevant. We should consider Saladin's policies in their own right and examine their aims and context. When taken on face value, Saladin's tax policy was highly proble matic if not a priori doomed to fai lure. There is a basic tension between the restricted scope of taxation as authorized by the law and the needs of the state. This state of affairs is illustrated by a story narrated by Abu Shama on the authority of Ibn Shaddad, who in turn heard it directly from Saladin. Saladin said that Nur aI-Din always con­sulted Shirkuh about his policies. Once he informed him of his intention to abolish unlawful taxes. However, Shirkuh pointed out that the army was paid from reve nues derived from these taxes. It seems that the aim of this tale was apo logetic; to demonstrate that the need to maximize the state's reve nues always clashes with legal considerations. Furthermore, the hidden intention behind the whole account is to suggest that when the aim for which the taxes are collected is a just one there is no alternative but to continue levying unauthorizt!d taxes.92 Such a conflict of intt!r­eslS is nicely exemplified by the decree of 567/ 1171-1172, pro­hibiting the sale of vine. Howevt!r, it was not implemented in Alexandria where the sale of alcoholic beverages was widespread. Apparently, the implementation of this decree in Alexandria could have an adverse effect on the revenues that Saladin's father was deriving from the town. Only in 577/ 11 8 1-11 82, steps were taken to control the sale and consumption of alcohol in Alexandria. In that year, 120 shops in which beer was sold were destroyed in the 1Own.9" The improbable nature of a tax policy dictated by pietis­tic considerations is again demonstrated by a decree from 580/ 11 84-1 185 concerning taxation in Bahnasa. The collection of taxes unauthorized by the law (hilali) was permitted, but the farming out of taxes on the sa le of beer, vine and taverns (malahin) was prohibited.94 In this case, a distinction was drawn between taxes levied on alcohol expressly forbidden by law and other less out­rageous forms of illegal taxation.

92 Saladin' statement thilt Nur al·Din always consulted Shirkllh is of course a lendetllious saying aimed al portraying Ihe Ayyubids as the rightful heirs of Nur ai-Din. For the whole account, see Abu Sham a, I. pl .1. 37.

93 Maqri1.i. Suluk, 96; Rabie, 119. 94 Maqrizi. Suluk, 110.

136 CHAPTER T HREE

d. The hnpacl oj Saladin's Policies

On 9 Rajab 567/ 6 March 11 72. the restoration of Sunni Islam in Egypt was publicly celebrated. On that day a black robe of honor sen t by the Abbasid Caliph to Nur aI-Din was delivered to Saladin. A day laler, he worc it in ceremon y attended by members of the re ligious es tablishme nt: the chie f cadi, court witnesses, Koran reciters and preachers, and o n 8 March Saladin clad in the black robe crossed Cairo in a procession.95 Salad in's conduct set the norm for public behavior. The preachers who delivered the fri­day sermons at the mosques began to wear black attire. and the public was reminded that auenctance at Friday praye rs was obliga­tory. The mosques in Fustal and Cairo were stripped of distinc­tive Fatimid decorations and signs such as the silve r plates that were hung over the 11lihrahs and con tained the names of the Fatimid rulers. These were very valuable and heavy artifacts made of pure si lver.96 It seems that Saladin adopted a carefully calculated policy toward the main mosques in the capita l. In 568/ 11 72- 11 73, in the course ofrenoV'ation work at the Ancient Mosque in Fustat, Saladin's name was inscribed over the mihrab.97 In that way, the religious and educatio nal monuments althe heart of Fustat, which included two law colleges and the congregational mosque, became associ­a ted with the name of Saladin, the new rule r of the country, and Sunni Islam. O n the o ther hand, the Friday prayers at the Azhar mosque in Cairo were abo lished .98 The mosque closely associated with Isma'i li Islam and the Fatimid rulers was rendered useless and lost its re ligio us significance. More subtle was Saladin 's policy towards Husayn 's shrine in Cairo. Salad in established at the shrine a group of jurists who taught and studied Sun ni law there.99 What Saladin did was to associate Sunn i Islam with a religious cult that had origina lly had a Shi' ite character and was introduced by the former Isma' ili rulers of the country. 100 The veneration of Husayn became a characteristic feature of the religious make-up of late

95 Maqrizi, Khitat, 111 , 174-5 (q uoting Qadi a i-radii 's Ml4tajaddidat). 96 Maqrizi , S14114k, 65-6, 67, 68; Khitat, IV. 52. 97 Maqrizi , Kllitat, rv, 13. 98 Ibid, IV, 53. 99 Ibid, II. 284.

]00 For Ibn J ubayr's description of the rituals at the Husayn's sh rine see, C. Williams, ~Th e Qura'nic Inscripti on on the Tabul of al-Husayn-, I5lamic Art, 11 ( 1987),3- 13, esp., 9- 10; Lev, Stale, 15 1-2.

THE CONSO LIDATIO N OF SALAD IN'S RU LE 137

medieval Egypt and lost any Shi'ite meaning. More mysterious in its purpose but no less significant was the restoratio n work car­ri ed Out by Saladin at the Mosque of the Nilome ter, which was built by Badr al:lamali. The meaning of the mosque is not enti re ly clear. However, the Nilometer had a great significance for the ag­riculture of Egypt and served as an indica tor of the size of the harvest. Saladin followed the former Fatimid rulers who associated themselves with the Nile and the rituals connected with the river. 101

The full impact of Saladin·s re ligio us policies is mirrored by the account of the Maghrebi traveller Ibn Jubayr, who visited Egypt in 1183. In the record of his travels, (rihia), he vividly desuibes the unpleasant receptio n he and the o ther passengers received from the custom authorities at the port of Alexandria. The tax collec ted fro m them was :.akal and it was levied in me rchandise and cash mo ney. IbnJubayr c riti cizes the custom officials for a lso collecting zakat from pilgrims who had brought with them o nly the provisions they needed for the journey to the Ho ly Cities. He a lso no tes other irregularities in the collectio n o f z.akaL. 102 On the whole. Maghrebi travellers and pilgrims were roughly trea ted by the custom offic ials in Alexandria and Ibn Jubayr does not con­ceal his hard feelings about the ordeal he and others went through. But he does not lay the blame on Saladin. In his view, Saladin was not aware of what went on at the customs office of Alexandria . and had he bee n aware he would have ordered the collectio n of UlNa/. in th e proper way. In faCl, Ibn Jubayr was very enthusias ti c about evely thing he saw in Egypt and highly appreciative of Saladin. His account provides an o pportunity to see how Saladin's re ligious policy was viewed by the public, o r at least what im pression it left o n o ne observant visitor from abroad .

Notwithstanding the difTiculti es at the port, Alexandria much impressed Ibn Jubayr. He expresses his admiration for the law colleges and hos te ls (maharis) designated for sLudenLs and pious me n from abroad who received allowances, medica l care and had access to bathho uses. Saladin showed a pe rsonal inte rest in the welfare of the Maghrebi pilgrims (ab1la' al-sa.bil). who a rri ved in Alexandria by land after an arduous journey thro ug h the desert. All Magh rebi trave llers were entitled to a dai ly portion of bread

101 Ibn Duqmaq , IV, 115-6. For the rituals co nnected wil h the Ni le and the Nilometer in the Fatimid period, see Sa nders, eh. 5. csp .. 116-7.

102 Ibn J ubayr. 39-40 (Ardbic). 3 1 (English).

138 C HAPTER THREE

and this expenditure was financed through pious endowments set up by Saladin and by the incomes derived from the levy of zakal. Saladin's benevolence extended to religious institutions as we ll. The mosques and preachers in Alexandria were supported by Saladin and received on average five dinars per monlh.lOj

Religious institutions and people ofrcligion were also massively supponed by Saladin in Cairo. Ibn Jubayr notes that the holy shrines in the capital were well maintained , the government appointed supervisors over them and paid their salaries. The LOmb ofShafi'j and the adjacent law college wiLh its bathhouses made a greal impact on Ibn Jubayr. The costs of maintaining this complex were very high and the money was controlled by al-Khabushani. 104 Another religious institUlion which was on expensive to maintain was the Ancient Mosque in Fustat. Il enjoyed a hefty daily income of thirty dinars, derived apparently from its pious endowments, which were spent on the salaries of its large personnel of men of religion and ancillary staff. Many other religious institutions in the capital such as mosques, shrines, and law colleges, as well as professors of law and a diverse population of ascetics and destitute people were supported directly by the treasury (bayt al-mal). According to Ibn Jubayr, Saladin's monthly expenditure was in excess of 2,000 dinars. 105 People arriving from the Maghreb were treated in Cairo no less well than in Alexandria. They could stay and study at the Tulunid mosque and their sojourn was financed by the auth ori­ties. IOG Ibn Jubayr was very much impressed by Saladin's hospi­tals. The hospital in Cairo included three separate wards: for men, women and the insane, and the same is true for the hospital in Fustat. 107

IbnJubayr's testimony on the support given by Saladin's regime to people arriving to Egypt from the Maghreb tallies very well with other evidence for Saladin's re ligious policies. Saladin was inter­ested in attracting people whose skills he could use for the imple­mentation of his Sunni religious policies. The fact that they were

10! Ibid, 42-3 (Arabic), 34-5 (English). Maqrili says that in 570/ 1174- 11 75 Saladin while visiling Alexandria sct up th ere a hospital, law college and houses for Maghribi pilgrims. See, Khital , III . 380.

104 Ibn Jubayr, 46-7. 48 (Arabic). 38-9, 40 (English). ]05 Ibid, 50 (Arabic), 42 (English). 106 Ibid, 52 (Arolbic), 44 (English ). 107 Ibid, 5 1-2 (Arabic). 434 (English).

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SALAD I N'S RULE 139

foreigners, as expliciliy stated in the endowment document of the khanqa al-Salahiyya in Cairo, made them dependent on and loya l to Saladin. Such groups enlarged the socia l base on which th e regime relied. Saladin used the experience he had gained in Egypt in Jerusalem where he faced a similar problem in re-establishing Sunni Islam and creating a religious personnel loyal LO him. lOB

The extent of the support that Saladin's regime gave to people of religion can be gauged from a remark made en passant by <Imad ai-Din. He says that in 581 / 11 85-1186, the re were 600 jurists at the law colleges in Damascus who were supported by the state. 109

Conclusions: The character of religious life in Egypt was deter­mined a nd shaped by two different and, to certain extent, oppos­ing forces. On the one hand, from above, the rule rs of the coun­try imposed the ir own brand of Islam and the religious rites asso­ciated with it. They did so by exercising coercive power augmented by their ab il ity to establish and foster large-scale religious institu­tions, which also left a visual impact on the urban landscape. On the other hand, the masses cultivated their own brand of religi­osity which can be labelled as popular Islam. The Fatim ids and the Ayyubids did not strive to combat popular religion; at most they tried to regulate some forms of the public behavior typically assoc iated with its cults and riles. In fact, they were eager to cul­tivate popular religion and to be identified with it cults and holy people. The building activities of the Fatimids, and to lesser ex­tent of the Ayyubids as well , in the Qarafa are a reflection of attempts to dominate popular re ligion by extending patronage. The relations that evolved between certain rulers and holy men embody the confluence benveen the Islam of the ruling elite and that of the masses. The pa tronage given by the rulers to holy men was not only politically motivated , it reflected also the inner reli­gious world of the rulers themselves.

When seen in this context the Ayyubid period is part of an out­going process and the contribution of the Ayyubid rulers to the

108 For J e rusalem, see Y. Frenkel's twO Hebrew publications: MAn Ayyubi Pi· ous Endowment Document from Jerusalem-The Waqf ofal-Khanqa al-Salahiyya~, Catedra, 65( 1992),27-37, and MThe Establishme nt of the Waqf of the Madrasa a l­Salahiyya by Saladin inJerusalem M

, in PalLstille in the Mamluk Period, (ed ) J. Dro ri (Jerusalem, 1992) ,61-86.

109 Although on that occasion the support distributed among them was more symbolic than real. See, ' (m ad ai-Din, Fath, 482.

140 C H APTER T HREE

sha ping of the re ligious cha rac te r o f medieval Egypt is rathe r modesl. First of a ll , much of the ch a rac te r of the re lig io us life was determined from below and no t from above. Secondly. the process of d e- lsmalizatio n of re ligio us life in Egypt was quite advanced before th e a rrival of the Ayyubids in the couotry. The Ayyubids in tro d uced the law college as the central educational and rel igio lls insti tu tion in th e capi tal and to some exten t in the rest of Egypt, too. T he in stiLUlio ns built by the Ayyubid rule rs enjoyed the richest pious endowmen ts. With some exceptions, such as Qadi al-Fadil's law college, the law co ll eges established by Ayyubid emirs and administrato rs in Fusta t-Cairo were mod est and less s ig nifi c31ll. 11O No twithsta nding th e build ing ac ti vity during the Ayyubid age, the grea t prolife ration oflaw colleges and Sufi khanqas and zawiyas in Cairo took place o nly in the Mamluk period .

Saladin 's re ligio us po licies be tray great understanding of the public and po litical as pects of re ligion . He became associated wi th the o ldes t Muslim institutio n in Egyp t- the Ancient Mosque in Fusta t-and thro ugh the Mosque o f the Nilome te r wi th the life­giving Nile . He imroduced Sunni education al and re ligious insti­tutions and was instrume nta l in divesting the cult o f Husayn of its Shi<ite meaning and cha racte r .

1]0 The situation in Damascus was fa ther different, there the military class, ad ministrators a nd people of l'e1igio n a nd not the Ayyubid rulers were the most importa nt SpOll5ors of religious institutions. See, R. S. Hu mphreys, ~Politics a nd Architectural Pa tronage in Ayyubid Damascus~. in The Islamic World, ways in Honor of Bernard Lewis, (eds) C. E. Bosworth and others (New Jersey, 199 1), 15 1.74, esp., 153-4. In fact, within the Ayyubid fami ly, women constitu ted ha lf of the pa trons of religious insti tutions built in Damascus. See, R. S. Hu mphreys. ~Women as Patrons of Religious Arch itecture in Ayyubid Damascus~, Muqamas, 11(1994), 3!)'54, esp., 36.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ARMY

a. 71te Siz.e and Militwy Composition oj lite Army

I. The army of the late Fatimid period was destroyed and dispersed by Saladin, and replaced by a new milita ry force. Two socio-m ili­tary groups suffe red mostly from Saladin's policy: the Blacks and the Armenians. In the Fatimid army, the Blacks had served as infamry and Saladin found Iiltle use for them in the new army he c rea ted in Egypt. A racial bias against the Blacks may also have played a role in Saladin's treatment of them. The Armenians posed a diffcrcm proble m altogether. First of all , the Armenian troops who were in the service of the Fatimids had been Christians. On the other hand , the Armenians could serve as both cavalry and infantry. This characteristi c trait made them highly altractive as military man-power as is testifi ed by their massive employment in the Byzantine army. However , in Qadi al-Fadil's letter to Baghdad from 1174, the destruc tion of both the Blacks and Armenians is given as one of Saladin's achievements. Qadi al-Fadil describes Saladin's actions in religious terms as a war against infidels (the Armenians) and pagans (the Blacks). In the course of the Battle of the Blacks many Blacks were killed and the rest we re driven out of Cairo and dispersed. Saladin's policy toward the Blacks was resolute: he ordered his military governors (wula. al-harb) to fight and kill them wherever they found them.'

The core of Saladin's new army in Egypt was the expeditionary force dispa tched to Egypt by Nur ai-Din in 1169. The question of who took the initiative for di spatching this force to Egypt is pre­sented in different ways in the accounts of ' Imad ai-Din and Ibn al-Athir. ' Imad ai-Din says that the initiative was that of Shirkuh, who urged Nur ai-Din to begin military action following the inva­sion of Egypt by the Crusaders. Nur ai-Din responded positively and financed the expedition to the tune of 200,000 dinars, but the recruitment of troops was done by Shirkuh. ' Imad ai-Din tes­tifies that he was present at the military review held by Shirkuh,

I Anonymous, Buston ai-Jami', (ed) CI. Cahen BED, 7-8( 1937-1938), 39; Maqrizi, II/j'm., III , 3 13-4. The term wulo al-haTh, which appears in the Bustan, belongs to Fatimid military no menclature.

142 CHAPTER FOUR

who enlisted over 5,000 unemployed horsemen. These troops were augmented by a force of 2,000 cavalry assigned by Nur ai-Din for this campaign. He also dispatched with Shirkuh a group of his emirs, amongst whom were two of his military slaves (mamalik) while the others were men of his inner circle (khawwasL appar­emly. free-born peoplc.2 Ibn a l-Athir's account of these events is different. He presents the campaign of 1169 as Nur al-Din's ini­tiative asserting that Shirkuh went to Egypt with the army of Nur aJ-Din (af.'asakir al-NuriY)·a),3 But in an passing remark, in his earlier work Bahir, he admits that Shirkuh recruited Turkmen for this campaign." Ibn al-Athir describes in detail the resources a llocated by Nul' ai-Din for the 1169 campaign. Shirkuh was given 200,000 dinars as well as clothing, pack-animals, weapons and other sup­plies and equipment. Nur ai-Din chose 2,000 cavalry from his 'askar and, according to the later work Kamil, he also recruited 6,000 Turkmen, paying twenty dinars as a special bonus to each horse­men among Shirkuh's troops.S

It is not possible to decide who took the initiative for the 1169 campaign, but the socio-military terms e mployed by both authors are common and well understood within the broader context of Islamic military history. In the wake of the Seljukid invasion of the Middle East in the second half of the eleventh century, the Turkmen were widely dispersed in the region. They constituted a reservoir of military man-power ready for employment, and they were a natural choice for recruitment for the 1169 campaign against Egypt. The existence of military slaves and the dual composition ofNur aI-Din's military elite (free-born people and slaves) are typicaI and long-standing features that need no special comment. The review Card) held by Shirkuh on the eve of his campaign to Egypt was standard practice for the reviewing and inspection of troops. The only term which poses some difficulty is the word 'ashar, which refers to the 2,000 cavalry assigned by Nur aI-Din for this cam-

2 AI-Bundari, 75-6. ! Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, XI, 220; al-Bahir, 137. 4 Al-Bahir, 141. S Ibn aI-Athir, al-Kamil, XI, 222-3; al-Bahir, 139. Ibn aI-Athir 's version is adopted

by Abu Shama, who reports it as his own independent account. See, I, pl,2, 392. The differences between Ibn al-Athir's Bahir, less hostile to Saladin, and Kamil are interesting. The remark that Shirkuh himself recruited most of the troops for the campaign, the 5,000-6,000 Turkmen , was expunged from the accou nt in Kamil.

TI-IE ARMY 143

paign. Cibb understands this term as meaning a regu lar regimelll ohhe army.6 R. Stephen Humphreys says that in the Ayyubid peliod this term deno ted the standing army ofa certain principality. But it \va.5 also used in referring to the military forces of specifi c Ayyubid rule rs.' In our context 'askar refers to tJ·oops, who formed part of Nur al-Din 's own regiments i.e. the military forces maintained and recruited by Nur ai-Din himself.

It is clear from these reports that Saladin established and con­solidated his rule in Egypt with the help of a very small army. In order to deal with the many internal and external threats that Saladin faced in Egypt he had to enlarge his army. However, the build-up of Salad in 's milita ry forces remains enigmatic. That such process took place in a short period of time is indica ted by ac­counts which describe the stre ngth of Salad in 's army at the be­ginning of his independent rule in Egypt. The information at our disposal is highly aUlhoritaLive, being derived by Maqrizi from Qadi al-Fadil' s Mutajaddidat. O n 8 Muharram 567/ 11 September 1171 , Salad in held a review of the old and new armies. The army was made up of 167 tulhs of which 147 were present at the review. 7,000 Bedouin of the Judham tribe also showed up, but Saladin enrolled only 1,300 of them for service. Most of th e troops belonged to the lawashi category while the res t were qaraghulams. Qadi al-Fadil explains the terms he uses. It seems that for him as well as for the o ther Egyptian administrators the military nomenclature of the eas tern Islamic world that was introduced to Egypt with the ar­riva l of Saladin was a new one. And he clarifi es for the benefit of his readers the te rms he employs. Qadi al-Fadil says that lulh means in the Turkish (Chuzz) la nguage a military fo rmation whose strength can vary from 70 to 100 to up to 200 cavalrymen. How­ever, he says that the cavalry fo rce that paraded at the review was 14 ,000 strong. This leaves the actual size of a lulb rather vague. The commanding officer of the lulb was an emir who, as a mark of his rank, had a standard and a trumpet. Tawashi were highly paid troo ps. Their remuneration ranged from 700-1,000 up to 1,200 dinars. A lawashi soldie r had at his disposal ho rses, pack animals and a ghulmn (a slave or servant ) who carried his weapons.8 Qadi

6 See, h is "The Armies or Saladin H

, Cahiers d'histoire f.gyplimne, ( 1951); re­prin ted in Sludit!$ on t/ie Civiiiz.alion of Isiam, (Boston. 1962),74.

7 See, his ~The Emergence o f the Mamluk Army~ , SI, 45 ( 1977), 77-9. 8 Maqrizi, Khilal, I, 139; Illi'(u , III , 327; cf: O. Ayalon. ~Stud ies o n the Struc-

144 CHAPTER FOUR

a l-Fadil 's description ta llies we ll with William of Tyre 's account of Saladin 's army allhe bauJe of Mont Gisard (25 November, 1177) which e nded in a d ebacle for the Muslims. The overall strength of Saladin's army which invaded southern Palestine on that occa­sio n was 26,000 me n . But most of these troops were lightly-armed, moun ted on camels and pack-animals. Only 8,000 were tawashi. wh o are highly regarded by William of Tyre , and the rest were qaraghulams. 1,000 elite troops served as Saladin 's bodyguard; Illey. like Salad in himself, wore a distinctive yellow silk costume over their armor. William of Tyre alludes lO halqa whose existence at such an early d ate is a lso atlested to by Arabic sources.9 Quite obviously th e terms tawashi and qaraghulams refer to t roops of different qualities. The distinction between the tw·o. and superio­rity of the tawashi, ,vas based o n the quality of their arms and annor. It seems that the lawaslti possessed a fu ll se t of arms a nd armor, and therefore needed a baggage train and servants.

II. The Seljukid invas ion of the Muslim wo rld en hanced tlle po­sition of mounted arch ers, who were th e main military specialists of the Islamic armies of th e twelfth century. Nonetheless, contin­gents of heavy cavalry were a lso employed. The presence of such troops had already been noted by the Frankish ch roniclers of the first Crusade. 1O This should not surprise us too much . It is im­portant to bear in mind David Nicolle's observation made in the introduction to his monumental AnTiS and Annor of lhe Crusading Em 1050-1350. He writes: "one point which wi ll , I hope, become clear is that no single culture had a monopoly of technological

ture of the Mamluk Army~, I1S0AS, 15(1953). 465-6. The te rm lawnshi is part or the milital)' nomenclature or the Ayyubid age-not or the Fatimid. The rerer­ences or Ibn al-Ath ir and Maqrizi to a certain Fatim id officer rro m 496/ 1102-1103 as S:.'d al-D:.wla al-Tawashi is appuently mistaken. Ibn Muyassar gives his name as Sa'd al-Dawla al-Qawwasi. See, 74. For the reference LO Ibn al-Alhir, see ediLOr's note c on p. 74. For Maqrizi. see IlIi'at, III , 32.

9 William or Tyre, II. 430-1; Abu Shama, I, pt,2, 554 (q uoting Ibn Abi Tayy, who says that in 569/ 1173-1174 Saladin gave to his brother ror an expedition to Yemen 1,000 cavalry including troops rrom his halqa); cf: H. A. R. Gibb, The Life of Saladin, (Oxrord, 1973),21, n. 3; Ayalon, KStudies~, XV( 1953), 448. A rerer­ence to haLqa rrom the reign of Nur ai-Di n has been brought 10 light by An ne­Marie Edde. The sou rce is Ibn Abi Tayy quoted by Ibn Fu rat. Sec, her ~Quelques institution s militaires ayyoubides~, in Egypl alld S),ria, 163-4.

10 Lev, Slale, 98, n.20; J. France, Vielory in the Easl. A Militmy History of the First CnlSade, (Cambridge, 1994), 149,359-60.

THE A RMY 14S

innova tion or even of leadership in fas hio n". 11 We should give credence to the descriptions of the Frankish chronicle rs. William of Tyre's description of the Muslim army at the batlie of Babayn is in the same ve in . He says that Shi rkuh's army was 12,000 me n strong. but he distinguishes between 9,000 troo ps who "wore the breast plate and he lmet and the other 3,000 who used o nly bows and arrows". These two types ofu-oops constituted the core ofShir­kuh 's army. which was a lso augmented by Bedouin levies. The Bedouin fought in their traditional way e mploying only the lance. Speaking of the Crusader a rm y. Will iam of Tyre employs the same differemiation as he d oes whe n referring to the Muslim force. He distinguishes between 347 knights ( i.e. full y a rmed and armored warriors), and Turcopo les-lightly armed cavalry.12 Muslim hi s­lOrians , like William of Tyre, a re ca reful to distinguish between these two types of Christi an cavalry. ' Imad ai-Din, fo r instance, explains that the cavalry force that landed from the Norman larrada ships o n the beach es o f Alexandria in 11 74 was composed of 1,000 knights and 500 Turcopoles. 13 Usama ibn Munqidh refe rs to Turcopoles as the archers of the Franks.14 Th e Turcopoles were the offspring of marriages between Turks and Christian women and Muslim converts to Christianity. The existence of such a socio­military group reOecLS a wide r and more complex issue: the trea t­ment and absorp tion of fore ign and conquered populatio n by both the Christian and Muslim sta les o r the Eastern Mediterranean regio n in medieval times.15

William of Tyre's description of Muslim troops as clad in ar­mo r is corroborated by Arabic sources. The most illuminating ex­ample is the description of the battle fought between Dirgham

I] Published N. Y. , 1988. See, 1. x. The pictorial evidence collected and a na­lyzed by Nicolle shows that armored cavalry existed in the Euras ian Steppes, the earliest allcstiltion being rrom sixth-seventh centuries. Sce, I, 4. para. IA-E, II , 630; I. 7. para. 19A-H, II ,634; I, 7. pard. 20; II. 634; I. 16, para. 45A-F, 46 and 47, II , 639; 1, 17, para. 48, 11 , 640; 1, 170. para. 440, II , 721.

12 See, II , 33 1. I!I AI-Bundari. 174. 14 See, 50-1 (Ara hi c), 79 (Engli sh ). I" The research litcrature dcaling with the Turcopolcs is quite extensive. For

[ IVO recent contributions. sec B. Z. Kedar, Crusad, and Mission. (N. j. , [984 ). 76; A. C. C, Savvides, ~ Latc Byza rlline and Weste rn Historiographers on Turkish Mercenaries in Gree k and La lin Arm ies: the Turcopoles/ Tou rkopouloi-, in The Making of 8),umtine HUlOry. Studies dedica ted 1,0 Donald M. Nicol, (cds) R. Beaton and C. Roucchc (Aldcrshot. 1993), 122-37.

146 CHAPTER FOUR

and the combined force of Shawar and Shirkuh. At the o utset of th e ballle, the so ldiers had to lake off their armor which became unbearable warm in the heat. The soldiers stored their a rmor in a small tents under the care of their servanLS. 16 In itself, this ac­count sheds no direct light on how the tawashi was armed and fought. David Ayalan says that the tawashi of the Ayyubid period was a free-born warrior and h e equates him with the non-Mamluk horsemen who were found in great numbers in the Mamluk armies toward the end of the Mamluk period. 17 In mili tary terms (Le. armament and training) and in high socia-milita ry status the Ayyubid tawashi can be compared to the Mamluk Jaris trained in furusiyya. By his training the Mamluk fans was not merely a mounted archer. He was a many·sided warrior able to employ in addition to a bow also a lance and a sword. Indirect support fo r this state· ment is supplied by Maqrizi. He says that in 577/1 18 1·1182. the construction of the fortress (bury) of Suis was completed, and it was manned with twenty fursan (pl. of faris). Their task was to guard the road to Upper Egypt which was used in the trade in a lum with the Franks (meaning the Crusaders or Europeans in general) .18 Certainly, these fursan were knights and not mounted a rch ers. Maqrizi 's use of fursan is anachronistic, or a de liberate substiw· tion of fans for tawashi in order to be understood by his readers. How the term tawashi came to denote an eunuch in Mamluk times is unclear. Ayalon quotes Ibn Khaldun who says that tawashi in the terminology oftlle Eastern Islamic lands means eUl1uch .19 But this equation re fl ects the linguistic usage of the Mamluk times. In the Ayyubid period when a certain tawashi happened to be an eunuch the sources take the trouble to sta te this congrui ty expli. citly.20

16 Abu Sham a, I, pl,2, 4 19--20. 17 See, ~Studies~, XV(1953), 465-6. 18 Maqrizi , Sululc, 95. For the training of the Mamluk horseman, see H . Rabie,

~The Training of the Mam lllk Faris-, in War, Technology and Socuty in the Middlt East, (cds) V.J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London, 1975)' 15g.{)3. For a discussion of the mining of alum and its trade, see Rabie, 82-5; TSllgitaka, 67-8.

19 See, MOn the Eunuchs in Islam- , jSAJ, 1 ( 1979), 79. 20 For example, Ibn al-MuqafTa', says that Saladin appointed Qaraq llsh over

the Fatimid palaces and he descri bes him as a: "tawashi who was also an eunuch-. See, History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church, III , part, 2, 66 (Arabic). Fur­ther evide nce is adduced by Anne-Marie Edde who, in a private communication of 13 April 1995, drew my attention to the case of the lawashi Shams ai-Din Sawab al-'Adili quoting Ibn Wasil, V, 34 and Ibn Shaddad, AI-A ' laq al-Khalira (Dimashq),

TH E A RM Y 147

When Usama ibn Munqidh 's memoires a re examined from the po int o f view of mil ita ry histo ry o ne fac t clearly emerges. Usama and the mil itary society of Shayzar, his principali ty, fought as heavy cavalry employing the lance. They fought <IS knigh ts exac tl y as the ir Frankish op ponen ts did . Mo u11led archers a re not mentio ned . The conclusio n tha t there were military simila ri ties between the a rmed forces o f Shayzar and the Crusad ers is rei nforced, when Usama 's evaluation of his own socie ty and tha t of the enemy is conside red . Usama saw h imself and his comrades as knigh ts , and the term faris is applied by h im when referring to himself and the Fran ks a like. No t surprisingly Usama was famil ia r with the military termino l­ogy employed by the Crusaders. He says tha t the in fantry troo ps of Shayzar would be termed sergeants by the Franks.21

The fact tha t heavy cavalry, fi ghting with lances and employing shock tac tics, was to be fo u nd in the Muslim armies o f the twelfth centu ry, does not undermine the imporlance of mo unted arche rs. Both Muslims and their Ch risti an contempo raries were well aware o f this. Fo r example, William o f Tyre explains the military advan­tage of the Turks over the Christian fo rces by the swiftness of their ho rses, light equipment and mounted a rchers while the milita ry assets o f the Ch risti ans were the ir military training and armor. 22 A much quoted le tte r o f Nul' a i-Din reflects a simila r view. In a re ply to al-'Adid , Nur ai-Din wrote that the answer to the armor o f the Franks was the arrows of the Turks.23 But we must go a step beyond these we ll-known facts. William o f Tyre makes the o bser­vations no ted above in the contex t o f Conrad 's march through As ia Mino r in 11 47, and the Turks he refe rs to are Turkmen. Un­do ubtedly, mounted archers and a plen ty o f swift horses were char­acte risti c of the nomads and the ir style o f warfare. The Muslim rule rs of Asia Minor and the Middle East enlisted nomadic Turkmen warriors fo r military selvice in great numbers. However, the standing

(ed ) S. Da ha n (Da mascus, 1956).238. and 208. n.5. In the Ayyubid period . some of the emirs refe rred to in the sources as tawashi we re given large iqta's and had LO provide up to 250 horesmen as mil itary levies LO thei r Sultan. see. Tsug itaka , 50. It appears from Maqrizi's refere nces to the Maml uk pe riod that the eq ua­tion of tawashi with e unuc h was no t self-eviden t. See, Khitat, IV, 130, 13 1.

21 Usama ibn Munqidh . 40-2. 48-5 1, 57-8, 6 1-2. 67-70. 76-9 86, 90- 1. (Ara­bic), 64-5. 96 (Eng lish ).

l!2 Willia m of Tyre, 11 , 171 ; France, 147-8. 23 Abu Sha ma. 1. pt.2, 460.

148 CHAPTER FOUR

armies of these rulers were more diversified and also included heavy cavalry at least in moderate numbers.

The other point revealed by the review of 1171, is the employ­ment by Saladin of the remnants of the Fatimid army. The pres­ence, in Fustat, of organized socio-military groups of the former Fatimid army such as Blacks and Masamida-Berbers from the western Sudan-is attested to until as late as 587/119 1-1192. 24

During Fatirnid limes, both groups fought as infantry and there is no reason to think thalthis had changed.25 The continuities in employment over two decades of some elements of the former Fatimid armed forces by Saladin should not be over emphasized. The main characteristic of Saladin's army is a complete rupture with Fatimid military tradition a nd organization.

It seems that the dale of Rajab 577/ November-December 118] can be considered as a watershed in the military history of Egypt under Saladin. Maqrizi quotes two fragments from Qadi al-Fadil's Mutajaddidat; the first refers to Saladin 's examination of the iqla' system and the second refers to the strength ofthe army. The first parts makes little sense. It seems that Maqrizi distorted or abbre­viated Qadi al-Fadil's account in a way that its essence is lost. It is said that the estimated revenues ('ibm) of the iqta's were regis­tered as well as the actual incomes, above or beyond the estimated ones. It appears that Saladin increased the iqta's to those who had merited it. The second part of the account is straightforward: it says that the overall strength of the army was 8,640 cavalry, and its officer corps included 111 emirs. The army was made up of two types of troops: tawashi and qaraghulam. The strength of these two contingents was 6,976 and 1,553 respective ly (i.e. slightly below the figure of 8,640). The total expenditure on the army reached about 3,670,500 dinars. In addition there were Bedouin levies paid through the iqta' system, and other troops. Among these were "Egyptian" -i.e. former Fatimid-soldiers to whom certain spe-

2. Ibn al·Dawadari , Kan% al-Durar wa1ami' al-Churar, (ed) S. 'Abd a i-Farah 'Ashur (Cairo, 1972), VI I, 109-10. Ibn al-Muqaffa' says that Blacks (sudan) were among the troops of the garrison of Acre captured by the Crusaders following the fall of the town. In fact he says that among the prisoners taken were a lso Kurds, Ghuzz and Bedouin of the Kinaniyya tribe. See, III , pt.2, 91 (Arabic, in the text referring to the Kinaniyya the letter ta' should be amended to nun.), 155 (English ). For the military role of the Ki naniyya in the Fatimid period and during Saladi n 's time , see Lev, Stale, 103, n.34, 126-7.

2!t Nasir-i Khusrau, 49.

THE ARMY 149

cific sources of income were assigned. Apparemly, these troops were engaged as mercenaries in times o f need. 26 This accoum in­dicates that expenditure on the army took the lion 's share of the state's resources. In 569/ 11 73-11 74, Saladin explained to Nur al­Din's em issary, al-Qaysarani, who came to Egypt reques ting that Salad in present an account of income derived from Egypt, tha t the high-ranking dign itaries of the sta te became used to a high standard o f living. They took comrol of places (meaning appar­e ntly their iqla's) and it would be impossible to d islodge them. 27

We muSI bear in mind that it was in Salad in 's interest to present the revenues of Egypt as low and his military expe nditure as high.

There is a wide gap between the fi gure given as the pay of the tawashi t rooper (see the account of the review of 1171 also based o l1lhc authodty of Qadi al-Fadil's MUlajaddidat) and lhe total spent o n the army in 11 8 1. The pay of the tawashi must have been much below the sum of 700-1 ,200 dinars. In fact , the total expenditure o n the army given for 1 18 1 is excessive. In sharp contraSlto these exorbita nt fi gures stands the report that every tawash; who was dispa tched o n the expedition to Yemen (577/ 11 81-1182) received ten dinars onl y.28 This was certainly a special bonus paid in addi­tion to the regular income thallawashi troops derived from their iqla's. None theless, this modest sum speaks for itself. On the other hand , the numbers of troops quoted fo r 11 8 1 are in lin e with Maqrizi's observation that during Saladin 's period there were in Egypt only 12,000 cavalry. This number was reduced to 8,500 cavalry at the time of Saladin's son, ai-Malik al-'Aziz 'U thman. Maqrizi says that the re were horseme n who had from ten to twenty to up to one hundred alba'. Therefore, when the troops paraded o ut­side Cairo, their numbers were much higher than 8,500.29 The alba' in this account mean the servants and the slaves of the lawash; whose participatio n in parades inflated the overall number of troops. Also other figures quoted for the stre ngth of the Ayyubid armies during the rule of Saladin and his successors indicate that it was a small force made up of cavalry only.so

2'6 Maqrizi , Khitat , I, 139; cf: Gibb, Tlu Life of Saladin, 3 1, n.4. Maqrizi's ac-count has been translated into English and discussed by Tsugitaka . See, 6 1-2.

!7 Maqrizi. Sulult, 73. 211 Ibid, 99. 29 Maqrizi , Khilat, I, 152. !II Ibn al-MuqafTa' says lhe Saladi n 's army was 10,000 men strong a nd con·

150 CHAPTER FOUR

These figures can be compared to those quoted for the strength of the army in the late Fatimid period. Maqrizi quotes an account written by Ibn Mammali , who says that once he was asked by Qadi al-Fadil about the number of troops in the time of the vizier TaJaT ibn Ruzzik. Ibn Mammati was in charge of the Office of the Army and, according to his statement, the register of the department of the 'ard (review and inspection) included the names of 40,000 cavalry and 30,000 black (sudan) infantry. 31 Elsewhere Maqrizi quotes that same account but gives different figures: 40,000 cav­alry, 36,000 infantry and 10,000 marines (muqatiLa, fighters) on board ten gaJleys.32 The existence of a special Marine Corps is not attested to by other sources and the number of 1,000 marines on ten ga lleys is unrealistic. However, Maqrizi a lso quotes an another set of figures from a different source: 'Uthman ibn Ibrahim al-Nabulusi (d. 1261). the well-known author of several adminis­trative works. He says that when Shirkuh was given 1,000 cavalry to help Shawar regain power in Egypt, he complained that his force was too small to face the Fatimid army which included 10,000 cavalry and 40,000 black slave troops ('abd). Shirkuh a lso made an a llu­sion to 10,000 marines and iqta' troops. 33 The relative strengths of cavalry to infantry referred to by al-Nabulusi seems more rea­sonable than the high numbers of cavalry quoted by Maqrizi on the authority of Ibn Mammati.

b. The Ethnic Composition of lhe Army

I. Maqrizi is very explicit about the ethnic composition of the new army created by Saladin in Egypt; it was made up of Kurds and Turks (atrak).34 The army with which Saladin established his rule in Egypt was certa inly composed of these two ethnic groups. The

sisted of tawashi, qaraghulams and mamluks whi le the army of al-'Adil was made up of 10,000 tawashi. See, III , 110, 131 (Arabic ), 163,221 ( English) . l owe these references to the kindness of Anne-Marie Edde. Maqrizi says that in 590/ 1193-11 94, the Sultan al-'Aziz 'U thman left Cairo for Syria with 27 emirs and 2,000 cavalry and 1,000 troops of the ha{qa leaving be hi nd 13 emirs and 700 cavalry only. See, Suluil, 150,

'1 Maqrizi , Khilat, I, 138. '2 Ibid, I , 152. '3 Ibid, I , 138-9. '4 Ibid, I , 152.

TH E A RMY 151

numerical strength of each group is unknown . but it seems that the largest cOOlingelll consisted of Turk men (turkuman). The term lurkwnan refers to nomadic Turkmen tribes, which became wide ly dispersed throughout the Middle East and Asia Minor after the Seljukid invas io n of these regio ns in the second half of the elev­enth centu ry. The place of the Turkmen tribes within the b roade r matrix of Middle Eastern society a nd politics is not easily defined. On the one hand . they fended for themselves and posed a threat even to firmly established politica l e nti ties in the region. On the other hand, they constituted a pool of military manpower ready to take service wi th rulers and states under vario us kinds of agree­ment. For example, Turkmen were employed by Christi an Arme­nian rulers as well as by Saladin in Syria. They fo ught against the annies of Third Crusaders when these were cross ing As ia Minor. 35

The Seljukid rulers employed Turkmen on a large scale in their armies, and they even served with the BY-lan ti nes as mercenaries. 36

A systematic study of the relatio ns between various nomadic groups and states in the medieval Musli m Middle East is still needed. Sibt inJawzi's Mir 'al ai-Zaman is a treasure house of info rmatio n on this to pic. but it has not been studied yet from this point of view. Nonetheless, information is abundam in other sources as wel l. For instance, William of Tyre reCOllnLS two iOleresting episodes about the relations between Turkme n and the Crusade r Kingdom of

J erusalem. Th e first concerns a surprise but abortive attack o n J erusalem by the Turkmen and the othe r tells of the breach of an agreement with the Turkmen by the Franks. Bedouin and Turkmen were permitted by the king of Jerusalem to stay in the Banyas district to pasture their horses. Nonetheless, they were attacked and the ir herds were looted . Many of the m were killed and the rest fled the area.37

~ Abu Shama. (Beirut). II , 154, 155. 156. For the impact of Turkmen no­mads o n Asia Minor, see S. Vryonis, The Declirll! oJMediroal Hellmism in Asia Minor, (Be rkeley, 1971 ), 169-94.

~ A. Bo mbaci, "The Army of the Se ljuks of Rum ~, Annali lnstituto Oril!11tale di Nn.poli, 38( 1978),346-8, 354. The employment of merce nary troops was wide­spread and quite often did not respect co nressional boundaries. See, ]. Ric ha rd , ~An Accou nt or the Battle or Hiltin Referring to Lhe Frankish Me rce na ries in O riental Moslem Stalesft , Speculum, 27(1952), 171-5; Y. Lev, ftAr my, Regime and Society in Fatimid Eb'Ypt, 358-487/ 969-I094 ft , IjMES, 19( 1987), 338. For Muslim North Mrica. sec ]. F. P. Hopkins, Medieval Muslim Governml!11/ ill Barbary, ( Lon­don , 1958), 73.

S7 See, II , 215-7, 255-6.

152 CHAPTER FOUR

The fact that Saladin's army in Egypt consisted of Turkmen is attested to by no less an authority than Ibn Mammati. In his book on the Egyptian adm inistration during the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods, he says that the army included Turks (atrak), Kurds and Turkmen. Ibn Mammati's observation is a casual remark appear­ing in the section of his work dealing with iqla'.38 Given Ibn Mammati's position and knowledge his remark must be regarded as significant. Turks and Turkmen belong, of course, to the same ethnic group. Thus we have to ask what Ibn Mammati meant when he refers Turks and Turkmen as separate groups. One way of understanding this accoun t is to regard the term Turks to mean Turkish military slaves (mamluks) and freedmen in contrast to Turkish free-born socio-mi litary groups such as the Turkmen. A clear-cut conclusion is hampered by the habilUal use of the term atrak in a generic way meaning troops of Turkish origin in gen­eraL For example, Abu Shama, in his own independent statement, says that Qaraqush, the military slave (ghulam) of Taqi ai-Din, conquered the coast of North Africa with a group of Turks and Bedouin.39 In this account, the term turk (si ng. of atrak) is used in a loose way, and there is no reason to assume that Turkish military slaves or freedmen are being referred to. The same holds for a passing reference to a contingent of800 Turkish troops from Egypt, which appears in the annals for the year 578/ 11 82-11 83.40

On the other hand, our sources distinguish clearly between Kurds and Turks. Thus, Ibn Abi Tayy is very precise in identifying the ethn ic origin of the emir who asked for the town of Ibrim in Nubia as an iqla': he was a Kurd named Ibrahim. His request was granted and a group of unemployed Kurds was sent to join him.41 The same concern with preCise ethnic identifications is reOected by a short report from 58 1/ 11 85- 11 86, which says that Kurds were granted iqta's in territories beyond the Euphrates. 42 The Kurds in Saladin's army kept their tribal organization and names of Kurdish tribal groups occasionally are me ntioned in the sources. If our understanding of Ibn Mammati 's en passant remark is correct, then

S8 Ibn Mammal! , Kilab al-Qawanin al-Dawallin, (ed) A. S. Al!ya (Cairo, 1943), 369.

Y.I Sec, I, pl,2, 547-8. 40 Abu Shama, (Beirul), II , 38. 41 Abu Sham a, 1, pt,2 , 532-3. 42 Abu Sharna, (Beirut ), II , 62.

TH E A RMY 153

we must wo nder what was the re lative sign ificance of the each group me ntioned by him.

This ques tion has been the subjec t of studies by Ayalo n . Hum­phreys and most recently by Anne-Marie Edde. Ayalon , who has dealt with it ex tensive ly, reached the conclusion that under Saladin and the Ayyubids the Turks played a more significant role than the Kurds, and Turkish milita ry slaves occupied a central place in the armies o f all of the Ayyubid rule rs.43 In his study, Ayalo n makes an ex tensive use of Ibn a l-Athir and the info rmatio n d e rived from him is highly regarded . Ibn a l-Athir is ce rtainly a convenient source to use, but his wrilings can not be simply regarded as a reposito ry o f stra ightfon \lard , re liable and eas il y available data . Ibn a l-Athi r must be used critically and with cau tion . He has his d efi ciencies. His account of the Fatimid period reflects a n an ti-Isma< ili bias, and his account of Salad in is no less problematic. An examina­tio n of two accounts o f Ibn a l-Athir used by Ayalo n exemplifies this point. The purport of both accoun ts is thal rule in Egypt passed from the Fatimids LO the Turks. Ayalo n understands these accoun ts and o the r data as testifying to the p red om inance of the Turks in the Ayyubid pe riod .44 BUL, when Ibn a l-Athi r speaks abo ut the pass ing of the rule from the Fa timids to the T urks, he means Nur ai-Din (himself a Turk) nOt Saladin and the Ayyubids. It must be remembe red tha t Saladin conque red Egypt while serving Nur al­Oin. Certainly, Ibn al-Ath ir regards and portrays Saladin as Nur al-Din 's lieutenant in Egypt. T he second passage used by Ayalo n in suppo rt o f his view abo ut the pred ominance of the T urks in the Ayyubid pe riod is no less p roblematic. T he passage in ques­tio n is quo ted by Ab u Shama o n the au tho rity of Ibn Abi Tayy. It co ntains a slory told to Saladin 's b rothe r, Turanshah, by Qadi a l­J a li s who was a close companio n of a l-<Adid. In o ne o f his visits to a l-<Adid , Qadi al:Ja lis noticed two Turkish mmnluhs , and al-'Adid prophesied that the Fatimid rule would be brought to end by people wearing an a ttire like these two mamluhs.45 T h is accoun t cannot be taken a t face value as acknowled ging a supposed Turkish p re­d o minance. The ability of the Fa timid Imam to foresee the fu­ture is a belief deeply-roo ted in Ismailism and a typ ical motif in

o See , his MAspeclS of the Mamluk Phe nomenon ~ , DeY Islam , pt. lI , 1·2, 7·8. <H Ibid, pl.lI , paragraphs I and 11 ; 5, paragraph, IV. 4!> Ibid, pt. lI, &..7.

154 CI'IAl'TER FOUR

the wrilings of 15ma' ili authors. It was used as a literary device for a retrospective justification of policies and events. In fact , a quite similar story is to ld regarding the absorption of the first Turkish troops imo the FaLimid army in the second half of the temh century in Egypt. 46 The only thing that can be concluded from this story is thal Qadi al:Jalis entertained his new masters with tales derived from Fatimid (Isma'jli) lore.

The question of the ethnic composition of Saladin's army is a difficult one and the sources are largely reticent about it. In Usama ibn Munqidh's autobiography references to the ethnic origin of individuals and groups are common. But other criteria for express­ing collcClive identity are no less important. For example, people are referred to according to a geogrdphical criterion as Khur.lsa~ nians without any indication of their ethnic origin. Mi li tary spe~ cialization serves as a powerful criterion for group identification. Knights are referred to asfursan, and their ethnic identity, be they Kurds or Arabs, is of secondary imporlance only. In the same vein Usama speaks of a group of Armenian archers stressing, in this case, the congruity between ethnic identity and military specialization. The Khurasanians mentioned by him are a lways sappers. Humphreys, who deals with this issue in a more dispas~ sionate way than Ayalon, reaches the conclusion that the Kurds were a minority in the Ayyubid army.47 Given the present stage of our knowledge this conclusion must be accepted. Nonetheless, it is more an educated guess from the sources than a firmly docu~ mented conclusion.

II. AyaJon's opinion regarding the relative importance of military slaves under Saladin and the Ayyubids has evolved with time. In his early writings Ayalon expressed the view that mamluks were not, until the ru le of Salih Ayyub, a decisive factor in the Ayyubid period. 48 However, his later writings are permeated by a belief in the linear development of mamluk institutions from the eighth century to the time of the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria (13th·15th centuries). According to Ayalon, during these cent~· ries both the institution of military slavery and the military role

46 Y. Lev, ~Falimid Policy Toward Damascus (358/ 968-386/ 996). Mililary, Political and Social AspeclSft,jSAI, 111 (1981-1982),1 75.

47 Usama ibn Munqidh, 67, 73, 83, 84, 85, 95-6,106, 128 (Arabic), 96,102-3, 124.5, 136, 150 (English); Humphreys. MThe Emergence, 45(1977), 89.

43 See, ~Sludies", 465.

TH E A RM Y 155

of the T urks became more and more predominant in the Muslim world and the Ayyubid pe riod is no exceptio n .49 Ayalo n 's views canno t be accepted witho ut reservatio ns. First of a ll , o ur knowl­ed ge of the institu tio n o f mili tary slavery prior to the es tablish­ment of the Mamluk Sul tana te is very limi ted . The most impo r­tant tex t is by Nizam al-Mulk. In h is view, the successful training o f mili tary slaves req uires discipline, a lo ng period of t ime and slow pro motio n .5O But in reality these rules were no t a lways ob­served . Compro mises were mad e with regard to the length of the training period and its rigo r. 51 Secondly. mi litary slavery was no t a unifo rm institutio n tha t d eveloped in a simple linear manner. It had a checkered history and assumed many diffe rent forms. Thus. in some cases (Aghlabid Tunisia a nd pre-Fatimid and Fatimid Egypt) , thi s institutio n which is lIsua lly associa ted with Turks and mounted archers was used to procure and train Blacks which fought as in fantry.

Surp risingly, the o nly contemporary twe lfth-centu ry d escription of the institutio n of military slavery is p rovided by William ofTyre. Altho ugh this tex t re mains neglec ted, his o bserva tio ns are most valuable. According to William of Tyre , the instilUlion of mili tary slavery utili zed three sources of manpower: young prisoners-of­war, slaves bough t in the slave-markets and the offspring of slave­mo thers. As an o utsider, William of Tyre had no knowledge o f Ihe lives of slaves during the pe riod o f their training. He says o nly that they were t rtlined in the art of war and adult mamluks received remuner.nio n and large possessio ns, acco rding to their merits. The milita ry role of the mamluks was to pro tec t the ir maste r du ring ballie. Victo ry, says Wi ll iam o f Tyre , d epended la rgely o n the m ilita ry performance of the ?namiuks.52 Will iam ofTyres's account of Muslim military slavery be trays his interest in Arabic and knowl­ed ge of Islam and what he says is corro bo ra ted by Arabic sources. Fo r instance, the incorpora tion of yo ung prisoners-of-war in the institution of military slave ry is mentioned in relation to the Fa timid period wh ile the reference to the large possessio ns given to mili-

49 See, his ~ From Ayyubids to Mam luks". IlEl , (198 1) , 44; "The Auxi liary Forces of thc Mam lu k Sultanatc", Der Islam, 65( 1988). 37.

!IO Nizam a l·Mulk, Tlu: Book of Governmenl or Illlies for Kings, tr,lIlslatcd into English by H. Oa rke ( London, 1960), 106-8.

Sl Lev, State, 10 1·2, S2 See, II , 43 1.

156 C HAPTER FO U R

La ry slaves can be unde rstood as meaning iqla<, The compa ri son be tween the tex t of Nizam al-Mulk and William o f T yre is very revealing. Nizam al-Mulk explains the principles according to which the institu tio n of military slavery was supposed to o perate while William of Tyre d esnibes the way it ac tua lly did o pe ra te.

In many ways, the pe l-iod o f Saladin 's rule was not conducive to a OOUl-ishing of the institution o f military slavery. So me of the conditio ns necessa ry fo r iLS prope r fun ctioning Stich as re liable sourCeS fo r the supply o f slaves and economic prospe rity we re lacking. Sa ladin himself spent most of his lime o n the battlefi e ld , and his pe rsonal invo lveme nt in the supervision and breeding of his mamluks could not have been great. In fact , the locatio n in Damascus, Cairo o r e lsewhe re of the installations associated with the 11ltl11llttk institution-such as the training barracks (lntjra) ­remains unknown . Il see ms that o nly the halqa can be desc ribed with any confidence as a unit composed of Saladin 's military slaves. The halqa served as Saladin 's bodyguard and its existe nce is a t­tested to fro m a very early pe riod of Saladin 's rule ( 1174 and 1177). The compositio n of the halqa, at that time, is unknown. One of the first commande rs of the halqa was a former Fa timid e unuch , Masrur, who a ttained the rank (or title) o f e mir.53 The halqa was Saladin 's private corps. For instance, during the protracted battle fo r Acre, the halqa stayed with Saladin during the win te r mo n ths wh en o the r contingen ts h ad re turned with the ir leaders to the ir h ome te rrito ri es. Whe n th e army took up ba ttl e fo rmatio n , the halqa occupied the centre from which usually Saladin commanded the a rm y. However . o n oth er occas io ns, the halqa was treated like any o th e r military uni t. It perform ed the task of advance-guard (yazk) in rotation ,\li th o the r units of the army.54 In any case, explicit refe rences to a sizeable body (several hundreds at least) of Saladin 's milita ry slaves come fro m a very late stage in his rule; the siege of Jaffa (end o f July 11 92). Their perfo rman ce was poor and their behavio r aroused the ange r of the Kurds.55 Undo ubtedly, through-

~, Maq rizi , Khital , IV. 2 16. !'>4 Ibn Shaddad , 147, 152, 155. The halqa is rcfe n'cd to as the khawwas ai­

sultan, meanin g chosen special troops, see ' InHid ai-Din , Fa/h, 324. For the halqa of Saladin and other Ayyubid rulers, sce Eddc, ~QlIclq ue'sM, 16 1·8, esp. , 166.

~!> Lyons and J ac kso n, 356, 358. Military slaves (m(ImaliJ!) are refe rred lO sev­eral tim es in Ibn MuqafTa"s dcscri pLion of th e bailie fo r Ac re, see 86, 90-1, 94 (Arabic), 146, 154 (Engli sh). At o nc point the military slaves are referred to as al-mamalik al-Salahiyya wa- 'l-Asadi)')'a and at another as fll-lMmolih al-Asadryya. Li ttle, if anYlhing, can be deduced fro m these a ll usions.

THE ARMY 157

out his rule Saladin, in spite of the unpropitio lls conditions , cui· tiva ted a force of mili tary slaves. In 585/ 11 89-1 190, for instance, the death of a commander of his military slaves is recorded.56 These military slaves apparently constituted the corps of Nasiriyya. In 587/ 1191-11 92, a person referred to as na'lib (m eaning head/ commande r) of ai-jandariy)'a ai·Nasiriy)'a escaped from the siege of Acre together with a numbe r of veteran emirs of the Asadiyya corps. The NasiriY)'(l are referred to as milit...'lry slaves (mamalik) of Saladin.57 A rivalry between the Asadi emirs, originally the mili­tary slaves ofShirkuh, and the new emerging corps of the Nasiriyya existed and was explo ited by al-'Adil fo llowing the dea th of Saladin.58

In his discussion of the supposed predominance of Turkish lIuzmluks in Saladin 's lime and the Ayyubid peliod in general, Ayalon regards references in the sources to Turks as mea ning m(lmluks. But, as is borne out by Ibn Mammati's statement, this is nOt so. There we re Turkish mililary slaves as we ll as Turkish free-born troops-Turkmen (Chuzz) . Hlllllphreys conclusion that the mi li­tary society of Saladin's period and that of th e Ayyubids in gen­eral was composed largely of free-born socio-m ili tary groups is fu lly justified. 59 Important light is shed on the issue at question by Edde's recent study of the emirs of AJeppo be tween 11 83- 1260 based on a sample of 122 biographies. First of all , her study gives attention to the social complexities of the issue under discussion. Ethnic diffe re nces be tween Kurds and Turks with the concomitant so­cial tensions and stri fe betw·een these two groups were a perma­nenL feawre during the period discussed by Eddc. However, o n certain occasions, the behavior of the emirs was influenced by po­litical conside rations rather than by ethnic loyalties. Among the Turkish emirs we must distinguish clearly between milita ry slaves and freedmen and free-born people. Furthermore, the class of

!06 Abu Sh .ulla, ( Be irut ). II , 149. ~7 ' Imad ai-Din. Falh, 344; Abu Shama, ( Bcinll ), lI , 187. For the termjandar

in the meaning of gua rd , see CI. Cahcn, Pre-Ol/oman Turkry. (Londo n, 1968), 223, 231; Edde, ~Quclques~, 172. 174; S. Elbehcil)'. L~s illslitulio1l$ tie l'Elfjpte a u Innps de aYYllbides, vol. I . L 'o rganisation de ['annee el Its institutions miiitaires, Ph. D. dissertation , (Ull i\'CI"siIY of Paris IV, 197 1), 26-45; R:lbbal . The Ciladel. 102.

!oS Abu Shama, (Be irut), II, 229. For o ther military slaves and em irs of Shi rkuh , sec Maqrizi , Khital, III , 61, 130; an d for milital), slaves and emirs o f Salad ill, see, 111 , 15 1.

~ Hum phreys. ~Em e rgence~, 45( 1977), 89·92.

158 CHAPTER FOUR

emirs raised through the institution of military slavery was not composed exclusively of Turks. There were also Armenian emirs of slave origin.5O Eddc's conclusions are not directly applicable to Saladin's period, bUllhey do show that the issue is a complex one and should not be reduced to a dichotomy of Turks versus Kurds.

C. The Administration oj the Army

In the Fatimid period the Office of the Army and Salaries was responsible for the administration of the army. N; its title suggeslS, this office was in charge of two quite separate spheres of respon­sibilities; the army and the payment of salaries to all other em­ployees of the Slale from the vizier at the lOp down to the ser­vants of the palace. The main admi nistrative task of this office in as far as the army was concerned was to maintain and update the central military register. It included information about the over­all number of troops, their equipment and welfare .61 Mallers concern ing iqla' were the responsibility of other offices. The al­locatio n of the grants o f iqta' was the responsibility of the Office of the Chamber\Counci l while the Office of the Iqta' supervised the actual administration of the fiefs. The Office of the Chamber was the most important Fatimid office: it kept records and data on every aspect of Slate activity.62

The most important change introduced in the period of Saladin was the assignment of all agricu ltural land in Egypt as iqta' for the army. Maqrizi does not say that Salad in was the first to intro­duce military iqla' to Egypt; he only says that Salad in expanded the system. The existence of military iqta' in Fatimid Egypt is well known and allested to by a variety of sources. 63 The consequences

60 See, her '"Kurdes e l TurcsM

, in War lind SOCUI,. 225-36. 61 Ibn Tuwayr, Nm.hal al-Muqialo,n fi AJrhbar al·Dawialayn, (ed) A. F. Sayyid

(Be irut, 1992), 82-5. 62 Ibid, 74-5, 86. M Maqrizi , Khilat, I, 156. Rabie has lnmslaled Maqrizi"s statement into En­

glish but he dnlw an incorrect con clusion by saying: ~Maqrizi impli es thai it was Saladin who introduced the mi litary iqla' system to Egypt~. See, 26. The Fatimid military iqla' is discussed by Cl. Cahen in his ~L'administration financiere de l'armee falimide d'apres a l.Makh7.llmi ~, JESNO, 15 ( 1972), 163-82. Furth e r evide nce is adduced by Lev, Stale, 125-7. Some key textS have been tnlllsiated into English

Tin: ARMY 159

of this change for the life or the Egyptian rellah must not be exaggerated. It could hardly have worsened his lot and there is no connection between military iqta' and slave armies.64 The Ayyubid system of mili tary iqta' in Egypt has been studied by Cahen, Hassanien Rabie, Richard S. Cooper and more recently Michael Brett and Sato Tsugitaka, so that only a short summary of its main features is needed here. In COlllrast to the Fatimid period, in Ayyubid times the holder of the iqta' (muqtll') did not pay the tithe. The revenues of the iqta' were calculated according to the annual average income ('ibm) generated by the fief, and paid in a mo n­etary unit of account (dinar jayshi). The e mirs , according to the value or their iqta', were obliged to mainta in a number o f soldiers.55

In the Zengid iqta' system, as practiced in Nur ai-Di n 's Syria, wide-ranging administrative authority was entrusted to the iqta' holder. This characteristic feature W.:l.S preserved under the Ayyubids as well. For example, in an account from 572/1176- 11 77, ' Imad ai-Din describes Shams ai-Din ibn 'Abd ai-Malik as the man in charge (mulawaLli) or Ba' iabakk who held it as an iqta'. He was also the manager or its affairs and the 11tutahakkim of its finances.66 According to a report of Maqrizi rrom 577/ 11 81- 11 82, an em ir who received the Fayyum as iqla' al-khassa was also appointed as the governor or the region.67 The term mulawalli had also a military connota­Lion meaning a regional military commander.68 In the Ayyubid system or iqla' in Egypt, grants of iqla' al-khassa constituted a spe­cial category. The holders of this type of iqta' were mostly mem-

by M. Brett. See, his -The Origins of the Mam lu k Military System in the Fatimid Period-, in Egypl and Syria. 39-53. The Ayyubid ;qla' is discussed in great detail by Tsugitaka. See. Ch . 3.

64 K. Morimoto bclic\'cs that the supposed introduction of milital1' ;(I'a' to Egypt by Saladin reduccd the free fellah of the Fatirnid period to a se rf. See. his Th~ Fucal Admin;,slralioll of Eg)'PI i'l Ih~ Early Mamie pmod. (Kyoto. 198 1), 262. Some connection be tween mi lital1' iqlll' and milital1' slavery is im pl ied by Brett in his, ~The Origins-. Howe\'er. black and whi te military slaves and installations for training military slaves existed in Fatimid Egypt pri o r to the emergence of the military iq/a' at th e beginning of t.he elc\'e nth ce ntuiY. Nor did the spread of the miiilal1' iqla' under Saladin herald an increased use of military slaves.

65 IQbie, 33, 35, 36-7, 39; R. S. Coope r. Ibn Mmnma/is Rll/esJor Minislers: Trans­{alion wilh Commenlary oJlhe Qawanin al-Dawfwi'l, Ph. D. dissertation, (University of Cali forn ia , Be rekely, 1973), 708.

66 Abu Sham a, I , pt,2, 669; Tsugitllka. 55. 67 Maqrizi. Suluk. 95. For iqta' al-khajja, see Tsugitaka. 49, 68-9. 68 For instance, in 574/ 11 78- 1179, the term ml/lall/alii is used when refer­

ring to the commander of the army of Ham'l . see Abu Sh,una. (Beirut) , II , 5.

160 C H APT E R FOU R

be rs of Saladin 's fa mily and they were a lso e m itled to coHCel non­agricultu ra l taxes. In any case, with the full mili tari za tio n of the iqta' in Egypt, the sa lary d epartme nt was separated from the Of­fice of the Army which assumed responsibility fo r the iqta' as well as o ther aspects concerning the army.69

Saladin himself was the ho lde r of an iqta', He maillla ined his regular troops ('askar) and military slaves from reven~es derived fro m these lands. The reliance on iqla' as the chief method for paying the a rmy exemplifies the confed era te nature of Saladin 's state. It is lfue that Saladin , as the Sultan and Commande r in Chief, had full control of the t roo ps b roughl lO campaigns and wars by o the r holders o f iqla' amo ng the people of lhe mi litary d ass­me mbe rs o f th e Ayyubid famil y and e mirs. Howeve r, Saladin expe rie nced many diffi culti es in keeping his army campaigning during lhe winler. Usually al lhe end of lhe campaigning season Saladin gramed lhe emirs pennissio n lO leave (dustur).70 O nly under excep lio nal ci rcumslances, such as heavy pressure by Saladin o r the hope for subslan lia l reward, would have a llowed lhe campaign­ing season to be eXlended into the winle r.

69 Rabie, 39, 42. 70 Ibn Shaddad , 11 8, and 60. 84, 9'1, 96, 146, 15 1-2,204-5, 2 10.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NAVY

a. The Fatimid Naval Inherilance

According LO various estimates, in the second half of the twelfth century the Fatimid navy comprised between 75 or 80, or even 100 galleys, and twenty transport vessels of two types: hatnmalal and musallahal. How many of these ships were operalional is unknown. Following the conquest of Bilbays by the Crusaders, a Fatimid flotilla of twenty galleys and ten harraqal/harmriq (ships from which Creek fire was hurled) is mentioned as operating on the Nile. J However, if we take our sources at face value, then at the time that Saladin became Fatimid vizier no navy existed in Egypt. The ships of the Fatimid navy had been destroyed in November 1168, when Fustat was set on fire by Shawar. However, it is quite possible that some ships of the former Fatimid navy survived the burning of Fustat intact, and there are no indica tions that the naval workshop at the palace or the arsenal at Maqs were damaged by the fire.

Although Fustat was an inland town it served as the main base for the Fatimid navy. The capital was well connected through a network of inland waterw'ays with Alexandria and Oamietta. There­fore the navy, which was protected in Fustat from the enemy raids to which coastal LOwns were exposed, could reach the Mediterra­nean quite easily. Traditionally in Muslim Egypt, the main arse­nals had been located in Fustat and later in Cairo. In 54/673-674, the Arab conquerors of Egypt built an arsenal on Jazira , the is­land on the Nile lying between Fusta t andJiza, on the west bank of the river. Following the Fatimid conquest of Egypt, a new ar­senal was set up at Maqs, the port which served Cairo-the town built by the new rulers for themselves. 2 For most of the Fatimid period the arsenal on Jazira was used for ceremon ial purposes connected with the navy. From the second decade of the twelfth century the construction of warsh ips was moved to the arsenal in

l Lev, Slate, 115. 2 Maqrizi quoles two aCCOlllll.'i, the first one by Ibn Abi TaY)' who credil.'i a l­

Mu'izz with the building of the arsenal, and the second by Musabbihi, who says that it was established by al-'Aziz, a l-Mu' izz's successor and the second F'atimid ruler of Egypt. Sec, Kllital. III , 196,317.

162 C HAPTER .' IV E

Fustat. 3 At Maqs, in additio n to warships, the governme nt also built t\vo types o f ship inte nded fo r use on the Nile. One type was des igned fo r shipping firewood and grain fro m the grain-produc­ing regio ns in Upper and Lower Egypt to the state granaries in the capita l. The othe r type was a processional barge intended fo r the use o f the Fatimid rule r and othe r sta te dignilaries.4 Boats for use on the Nile we re also built by the private sector in other places in Egypl.5 Another important naval installation in the capital was the workshop for manufacturing equipment fo r the flee t which was adjacent to the complex of Fa tirnid palaces in Cairo. 6

We are poorly info rmed about the existence and ac tivities of a rsenals in Fa timid te rritories o utside Egypl. The Persian travel­le r, Nasir-i Khusrau , who visited Egypt and Fatimid Palestine in the late) 040 's, mentio ns Haifa as a place whe re seagoing ships of th e j udi type were buill. 7 Perhaps, at those times, Mount Cannel was still covered by forests , o the twise the timber could have been procured fro m the re latively close forests of the Lebano n . Ibn al­Tuwayr (d. 1220) and autho rs o f the Mamluk pe riod (which undo ubtedly re ly o n him ), in their overviews o f Fatimid naval histo ry, say tha t squadrons of the Fatimid navy anchored in Alex­andria and Damie tta and in both ports there were active arsenals.s

Thus it is qui te possible tha t in 11 68 some ships o f the Fatimid navy we re statio ned in both ports and thus were saved from the upheavals tha t be fe ll the capita l. During the whole pe riod of

S Ibn Muyassar, 93; Maq ri1.i, Khital, III , 320. ~ Ibn Furat, IV. pt, I, 149. The boats designated for the use o f the Fatimid

rule r a nd state dign itaries a re refe rred to as 'ushari a nd day mas (pI. dawamis). Two descrip tions of Fa tim id roya l boaLS a re availa ble; o ne by Nasir-i Kh usrau (see, 5 1) a nd a nothe r by 'Abd ai-latif a i-Baghdadi (begin n ing of the 13th cen­tu ry) in his The Ea.slern Key, facsi milc edition with Engli sh tra nsla tio n by K. H. Za nd a nd J. A. and I. E. Videan (London, 1964), 187-8.

!I Nasir-i Khusr.llI, 40. 6 Ibn a l-Tuwayr, 14 1-2; Maq ri1. i, Khilal, II , 3 11 ; cf: Rab ie, 123. 7 Nas ir-i Khusrau, 19. According to H. Kindermann , ships o f this type had

o ne deck. See, Schiffim ArabiscM1l, (Zwickau, 1934), 16. 8 Ibn al-T uwayr, 95; Ibn Mammati, 340; Qalqashandi, 11 1,5 19; Maq rizi, Khitat,

III , 3 13. M. Lombard 's statement (in his £.spaces eI ri.uaux du Haut Moyen Age, [Paris, 1972), I l l) abou lthe ex istence o f e ig hl arsena ls in medieval Egypt must be qualified . Firs t of all , one must disting uish be lwee n small sh ipyards, suc h as Sali hi)'}'a in wh ich boats for sail ing lhe Nile were b uilt , a nd lhe ma in arsena ls in the capital. Secondly, the th ree a rse na ls in th e capi ta l mc ntioned by Lo mbard we re ope ra ting in d ilTe rc nl pe rio ds and no t sim ultaneously.

THE NAVV 163

Saladin's rule in Egypt the capital continued to serve as the mai n base for the navy.9

b. Saladin and the I!.gyplian Mediterranean Towns

From the outset of Saladin 's rule in Egypt. the defence of the Medite rranean coas t posed an acute pro blem. The coast was devas tated by the wars associated with the Crusades, but Damietta and Alexandria were still viab le lawns that had to be protected. Both towns were attacked by Christian forces during the early years o f Saladin's ru le in Egypt. On 27 October 11 69, a Byzantine flee t in conjunction with land fo rces o f the Crusader Kingdom ofJerusa­lem converged on Damietta . According to William of Tyre. the Byzantine fl eet included 150 ga lleys and 60 special ships adapted for use in the amphibious landing of cavalry on beaches (Arabic: tarida pI. lara'id, tarrada; Latin: pI. imide). The war flee t was ac­companied by ten to twenty heavy transport ships, dromone5,ioaded with siege e ngin es and supplies. T he besieging forces e mployed against Damietta a va riety of siege e ngines, but the siege fa iled due to a delay in military actions against the town following the landing, and the deep mistrust between the Byzantines and the Crusade rs which came out into the o pen during the siege. Severe winter storms aggravated the situation of the besieging forces, tilting the balance of power on the battleground in favor of the Mus­lims. Qadi al-Fadi l and Ibn Shaddad have exaggerated in their accounts the strength of the Byzantine fl eet. Nonetheless, th e expedition against Damietta demonstrated the vast naval resources tha t Byzantium commanded. lo

The increasing size and capacity of ships built in the nve lfth century and the wide use of ships from which cavalry could landed

9 Maqrizi, Suluh, 118. 10 Ibn Shaddad , 4 1-2; Abu Shama, I, pl,2 , 457, 458-9 (quoting Ibn Shaddad

and ' Imad ai-Di n); Will iam o r Tyre, 11 , 361-9. For the Byzan tine perspective or these events, and a description orthe Hyzantine neet, see Choniates, 191-6. The word drom071 signi fi ed a Hyzantine war ga lley, but il acquired a wide r use mean­ing baltleship. See, Frederick M. Hocke r, ~ Late Roman, Byzantine, and Islamic Galleys and Fleets~;John H. Pryor, ~ From DronlOn LO Galea: Mediterranean Biremc Calleys AD 500-1300~, both in Th t Age offht: Galley, (cd) R. Gardine r (London , 1995),94-5; 102, 103, respectively. In the account by Chon iatcs dromo/! sta nds fo r a heavy transpOfl sh ip.

164 CHAPTER FIV .. :

on beaches posed a serious threallo the rulers of Egypt who tried LO protect their coastal towns. 1 I The obvious response was to improve the fortifications of the LOwns on the Mediterranean li t­toral. In Sha'ban 566/ April-May 1171, Saladin ordered the strength­ening of the fortifications of Alexandria.] 2 Twelfth-century Alex­andria was situated several kilometers from the Nile, and an elabo­rate system of waler channels was built to provide the town with dl'inking water. It had two ports which were located along a nar­row stretch of land defended on its seaward-side by a tower,l3 We do not know how far the works ordered in 566/1 170 had been completed at the time of the Sicilian attack on the LOwn. On 26 Ohu ' I-Hijja 569/27 July 1174, the pon of Alexandria was attacked by the Normans of Sicily. Sicilian galleys slipped imo the port under oar-power. The aim of the attack was to gain control of the pon and forestall a possible intervention by the Egyptian navy against the landing of cavalry on the beaches. The Sici lian fleet included 200 galleys and 36 tarrada ships from which 1,500 cavalry were disembarked. Supplies, siege engines and troops were carried on 46 transport ships. Arabic sources put the overall strength of the force that besieged Alexandria at 50,000 men, among whom were 30,000 soldiers, the rest being sai lors (each galley had a crew of 150), operators of siege engines and others. Although these num­bers are inflated, the Sicilian fleet was undoubtedly a large one and brought a great quantity of equipment. The besieging forces built siege engines and bombarded the town with catapults which shot blac k stones brought from Sicily especia lly for that purpose. However, the defenders in a sllccessful sally from the beleaguered town destroyed the siege engines, thus dashing the hopes of the Normans for a quick victory. Eventually, on 1 Muharram 570/2 August 1174, the siege was discontinued. 14

II The data about the coastal LOwns at the time of Saladin are derived from the works of the late Maqrizi. Unfortunately, geographers more conlempornry with the events such as YaquI and Idrisi do nOt supply information of any use for the present study. The hisLOry of trnn sponatio n of horses in the Mediterrnnean for mi lilary purposes in this period is examined by J. H. Pryor. See, ~The Trans­portation of Horses by Sea During the Era of the Crusades: Eight Century LO 1285 A. D.-, MM, 68(1982), 9-19.

12 AJ-Bundari, 109; Abu Shama, I, pl ,2, 486 (quoting ' Imad ai-Din). I' William ofTyre, II , 336. For med ieval Alexandria, see M. Rodziewicz, "Al­

exandria and District of Mareotis·, GraecfJ-Arabica, 11 ( 1983), 205-6, 208. 14 AI-Bundari. 170-1 (quoting Qadi al-Fadil"s letle r to Damascus) ; Abu Shama,

TH E NAVY 165

T he fa ilure o f the Normans in Alexandria did no t deter them from allacking o ther costa l towns in Egyp t. Their prefe rred tar· ge t was the town of Tinnis wh ich sufre red repeated attacks. In 548/ 11 53-- 11 54, the fi rs t recorded at tack o n the town took place. Tinn is was a ttacked again in 549/ 11 54- 11 55, in 57 1/ 11 75·1176, and in 573/1177· 11 78 the town was conque red by a Sicilian squadro n , composed of fo rty galleys. T he raiders set the town o n fire and took much booty and many prisoners. The p resence o f wa rsh ips in T innis was o f littl e help to the defenders of the town . At the ti me of the Norman attack, the commande r of the Oeet was away fro m his shi ps and found himself figh ting the a ttacke rs o n land . In 576/11 80-11 8 I, a navtl.1 raid on T innis W'as launched from Ascalo n indicating that it was a n initia ti ve of the Crusaders. Bu t the Cru· sader Kingd om of J e rusalem was short of naval resou rces, and the a ttacking squad ro n was composed of o nly ten sh ips fro m which Greek fi re was hurled . It ended in fai lure. 15

T he need to con tinue fortifica tion work in the coastal towns was ve ry o bvio us to Saladin . Such work was carried o ut in 572/ 11 7&- 11 77 at Alexandria and la te r in 577/ 11 8 1· I 182 a t Damie Lla and T innis.16 In Ti n nis, a ci tade l was bu ill and the wa lls were im· proved . However, in sharp con trast to the su pposed ex ten t of these works, the sum spe nl is surp ri singly low: 3,000 dinars only.17 Ap·

1,1'[,2,598.600 (q uoting ' Imad al·Din a nd Qadi at-Fad il's ahovc·mentioned lc[­ter). The information su p plied by Arabic sources is confirmed by the anonymous Old Frenc h translation of William of Tyre known as L 'estoire de Eraclu empereur et la conqlltsle de fa lerre d'Outremer. Howeve r, [he details which appear in Emcles are not derh'ed from William of T yrc. On th is subject, see J o h n H. 1'1) ·or. ~The Eracles a nd \Vittiam of T yre: An Interim Report~, in The Horns of Hallin, (cd) 8. Z. Kedar Uerllsalem, 1992),270-94, esp., 290. l owe this rcference [0 the kind ­ness of Pryor. Historians of Norma n Sicily see the attack on Alexandria in thc context of cooperation betwee n the Norma ns a nd the Crusaders in conju nction with a n al leged plot in Egypt to overthrow Saladin. This perception of these even ts is dete rmined by the tende n tious reports or Qadi al-Fadil q uoted by latter his­torians. These rragments of Arabic sources arc we ll known in their French trans­lation, which have appea red in the volume o f Orie n tal historians of RHC. Sec, D. Abulafia, ~The Norman Kingdom of Africa and the Norman Expedi lion .~ to Majorca a nd the Muslim Medi te rranean\ Anglo NOn/ian Studies, VII. reprintcd in h is. Italy, Sicily alld the Mediterralltall 1100-1400, (London, 1987),45. esp., 11. 107; D. Malthew, The Nonnall Kingdom of Sicily, (Cambridge, 1993),279.

15 Ibn al-Qalan isi, 331; Maq rizi, Khital, I, 29 1-2; I tti'm" II I, 207; cf: A. S. Ehren kreutz, "The Place or Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle AgesM,jAOS 75( 1955), 104·5.

16 Abu Shama, I, 1'[,2, 689 (q uoting ' Imad ai-Din). 17 Maqrizi, Khilli/. I, 292. The town ofTinn is was built on an island in a large

166 CHAPTER FIVE

parenLly. the town was no longer viable a nd the repeated naval attacks contributed tQwal-d i ts decline. Even the local Bedouins became a danger. They harassed ships on the Lake ofTinnis and attempts to fight them with sh ips hurling Greek fire failed. A decade later, in 588/ 11 92·1 193. Tinnis was officially abandoned. Its popu­la tion was evacuated to Damietta and it ceased to exist as a town, becoming a military outpost only. IS In contrast with Tinnis, vast sums of money were spent in 577/ 11 81-11 82 on the fortification of Damielta. It seems that th e town had recovered from the epi­demics that had swept through it in 545-546/ 11 50-11 52. 19 The walls of Damielta were improved and a garrison was stationed in two defensive lowers between which a heavy chain was installed. The towers and the chain were designed to prevent the entrance of enemy ships from the sea to the mouth of the Nile. The town was surrounded by a trench, and the orchards in its vicinity were destroyed. Apparently, the a im was to prevent a potential enemy from using th e trees as a source of timber for the construction of siege engines, as happened during the siege of Alexandria in 1167 by Shawar and the Crusaders. 20 However, the sums quoted as the total expenditure spent on these works-one million dinan-seems too high and quite improbable. 21

c. Tlte Creation of lite Office of lite Navy

In 572/1 176-11 77, Saladin went on a tour to Damietta and Alex­andria. While visiting Darnietta, h e inspected 1,000 prisoners captured on a naval raid. 22 This is the first report of any nava l activity by the Egyptian fleet dating from the time of Saladin's rul e in Egypt. The origin of the ships that were involved in this raid

lagoon, which received water from the Nile and the sea. See, Yaqut, Mu'jam al­Buidan, (Cairo, 1906), I, 4 19-22. On the other side of this lagoon, known as Buhayrat Tinnis, lay m e town of Damietta. See, G. Cornu, AIla.s du monde ambo­islamique a l'ipoque dassique, (Leiden, 1985), map X.

18 Maqrizi , Suiuk, 95, 98; Khilal, I , 347. 19 Abu Sham a, I , pt,], 207 (quOling Jbn al-Qilla nisi). W Maqrizi , Khilal , 1,347. 21 Ibid, I, 347; Suluk, 96-7, 98-9. Yaqut explains that the tOWIl of Damietta

was spread out between the Nile and the sea. Th e Ni le entered the sea south of the town, and the mouth of the river was protected by two towers with a chain bet ..... ee n the m. See, Buidan, IV, 85.

22 Al-Bundari, 241; Abu Shama, 'Uyun, II , 36.

THE NAVY 167

is obscure. Were they remnants of the fonner Fatimid navy or new ships which had already been constructed during the rule of Sala­din? According to ' Imad ai-Din , Saladin during his vis it to AJex­andria ordered the construction of warsh ips {la'mir al-ustul ).2 .... Genera lly authors such as Qadi al-Fadil and ' Imad ai-Din say very little about naval affairs. Surprisingly, Ibn Abi Tayy is a source of detailed information on Saladin's naval policy in 572/ 1176-1177. However, the evaluation of his report is problematic. He is the last historian whom one might expect to be interested in the naval history of Egypt, and his information about Fatimid naval history is particularly unreliable. Whatever the case, Ibn Abi Tayy says that the fleet in Alexandria had fallen into disrepair and that Salad in ordered the building of new warsh ips. It would seem that Salad in had a coherent naval policy and even paid attention to the de­tails of his naval program. For example, he took measures to en­sure a supply of timber and the recruitment of skilled craftsmen needed for the construction of the ships. The manpower for the navy was mobilized from rural areas , and local authorities were instructed to cooperate. One of Saladin 's oHicers was appointed as commander of the fleet and was assigned a special iqta' . Once built, the ships were armed, equipped and manned. However, Saladin adopted a very cautious policy; the ships thal became operational were ordered to remain in the port. 24 Both the progress and the full extent of Saladin 's naval program are vague. Certainly one of the major problems was the procurement of timber. The Fatimid-A)'yubid administrator, Ibn Mammati. deplores the destruc­tion of the forests of Upper Egypt which were assigned for con­struction of the sh ips. He mentions that these forests were care­fully managed but local governors and fief-holders overexploi ted them.25

In contrast to Ibn Abi Tayy, who reports on Saladin's naval policy in his record of the year 572/ 1176-1177, Maqrizi refers to this under the years 577/ 11 81-1182 and 587/ 1191-1192. According to him , the Office of the Navy was set up in 577/ 11 8 1-1182. If this was indeed so, it means that in that year Saladin adopted an overall

23 Abu Sham a, I, pt.2. 689 (quoting ' Imad ai-Din ) . 24 Abu Sham a, I, pt,2, 689·90 (quoting Ibn Abi Tayy); 'll)'un, II , 32. 25 For English translation of Ibn Mamrnati ·s text, see Cooper, 288-9; Lombard.

130-1.

168 CHAPTER FIVE

naval policy aimed at strengthening both the coastal towns and the navy. Several sources of revenue were allocated for the needs of the Office of the Navy. Among these were income derived from the region of the Fayyum and the mining of natron (which at that time amounted to 8,000 dinars), and the endowment (habs) of Juyushi. 26 This foundation was a pious endowment set up by Badr al·Jamali in favor of his descendants and included a number of rural properties. In order to divert the incomes generated by the habs al:Juyushi for the usc of the navy the approval of the jurists was sought. In fact, this step completed the dismemberment of the Fatimid Slate and the appropriation of the wealth orits former ruling class for the benefit of the new elite and the needs of the Ayyubid regime.27 In 587/ 11 9 1· 11 92, responsibility for naval af· fa irs was entrusted to al·<Adil, Saladin 's brother, and the finan· cial resources available for the navy were enlarged. A sum of 50,000 dinars was allocated to the navy from the revenues obtained from the alms·tax. It is unclear whether this was meant to be a perma· nent increase in the budget of the Office of the Navy or merely an ad hoc step. Saladin 's actions in that year could have been a response to the demands posed by the bitter battle for Acre. In lhis protracted struggle the navy played an important role and Salad in wanted to appoint a person he could trust as responsible for the office dealing with the navy. This might also explain the need to enlarge the navy's budget. Whatever Saladin 's in tentions were, a l·<Achl did not busy himself with the day·urday running of the Office of the Navy. He appointed as the head of the office Ibn Shakir, a tOJrranking administrator.28

d. Saladin's Navy in Combat

Successful naval raids are the sole aspect of maritime history rea­sonably well attested by the sources. The interest of historians in naval warfare sprang from propagandistic concerns. Successful raids by the Egyptian navy on Christian shipping in the Eastern Medi· te rranean were presented as the embodiment of the Holy War.

26 Maqrizi, Suluk, 97. '17 Ibn Mammati, 336-9, esp., 339, followed by Maqrizi , Khilat, 111 ,210,2 11 ,

315; cf: Gibb, Tht Lift of Saladin, 20; Rabie, 86. 28 Maqrizi, Suiuk, 134-5; Khilat, IV, 205-6.

THE NAVY 169

Indeed. some of these raids resulLed in great numbers of captives crea ting an impression of spectacular vic tories over the enemy. The idellliftcation of naval activity with Holy War goes back to the Fatimid period. Authors of the Fatimid-Ayyubid period. in thei r descriptio ns of the Fatimid sta te . identify th e Office of the Holy War with the Office of the Navy.29

In 572/ I 176-1177, as memioned earl ier, Saladin while in Damiella inspec ted prisoners captured by the navy. As a matter of fact , in that year the fl eets of bo th Damiella and Alexandria were e ngaged in naval raids .30 But successful nava l raids were few and sporadic. In 575/ 1 ]79-] 180, the Egyptian navy achieved an impressive success. It launched a raid on Acre. a bustling town with a busy port, described as the Constantinople of the Crusad­ers. Qadi al-Fadil claims that a number of Christian ships were seized. 3 1 In the same yea r also two other Christian ships refe rred to as balsha were captured and 1,000 prisoners were brought to Egypt. 32 The term bats/ta is usually unde rstood as mea ning a big ship with two masts. In 577/ 11 8 1-1182, a Christian batsha which had been on he r way to the Leva nt was wrecked off Damietta. According to Arabic sources, it carried 2,500 passengers of whom 1,690 were captured alive. But these ligures seems to be highly exaggerated.33 In o ther cases th e numbe r of people captured was much lowe r. In 578/ 11 82- 1183. the Eb'Yptian navy seized two Christian ships. On the lirst occasion 400 peopl e were captured on board a batsJw which was sai ling from Constantino ple. 34 The second incident involved a balslw which was on he r way to Acre carrying timbe r fo r the construction o f ga lleys and a team of shipwrights of whom 70 people we re ta ke n prlsone r.35 This re-

29 Ibn Tuwayr, 94-5, followed by Ibn FunH, IV, pt , l, 149. ~ Abu Shama. I, pt,2, 692-3 (quoting ' Imad a i-Din). SI Abu Shllma , ( Beirut). II , 14. !2 Al-I\undari. 330. In his B(lI'q while describi ng Ihese evc nts, ' Imad a i-Din

makes a n unclear all usion to a naval raid coln'ied out by the Eg)'ptian fleet against Ihe Christian population of an unspecified island. See, MS Oxrord, Bruce II , f,136 B.

:» Ibn Wasi l, II , 114; ~bqri7.i, SIIIIIIr, 101. My reservation follows a com ment made by Pryor.

54 Abu Shama , (Beirut ), II , 32 (quoting Qadi a l·Fadil's letter to Baghdad); Ibn \Vasil , II , 114.

M Ibn Wasil , 11 , 13 1 (quoting Qadi al-Fadil's leite r 10 Saladin), \Vhcn de­sc ribing these c\'e nts, ' Imad a l·Din again makes an u nclear referen ce to some unspecified islands supposedly raided by the Egyptian fleet. See, ' (m ad a i-Din , Barq, (cd) Scscn, V, 26.

170 CH APTER FI VE

pon shows, if fu rther evide nce was needed, that naval resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, in Musli m Syria and Egypt as we ll as in the Crusade r Kingdom of J erusalem. were scarce and had to be supplemented by imports. A rear later , a batsha which was sai ling from the Levant was seized and 375 people were captured . The Muslim ships were o n the high sea for nine days and returned with captives and spo ils to Damic tta. 36 How many ships took part in these raids is no t me ntioned in the sources. But Salad in could muster quite a large war fl ee t. Fo r instance, Will iam of Tyre says that in 11 82. 30 galleys joined Saladin 's ground forces for a three­day abo rtive siege o f Be iru t.37

Parallel with the naval and land ve ntures undertake n by Saladin in the bau le for Acre (see next sub-section), naval raids which were not directly connected with this war took place. In 586/ 11 90-11 9 1, Saladin 's galleys went to attack Christian ships in their po rts. In the batlles that e nsued some Christi an ga lleys were des troyed by nafla bombs (qawari r), but Muslim galleys were also l osl.~ A number o f raids were carried Oul by unidentified Christians who had allied themselves with Saladin ; they used small boats (barakis) and were quite successful. O n o ne occasio n they attacked a large warsh ip (harraqa) which was accompanied by a boat and cap cured merchan ts and goods.~9 In two o ther inciden ts three Christian boats and about seventy-five people were se ized . This group of raide rs also attacked Cyprus whe re they captured a group of people whom they sold as slaves in Latakiyya.40 Other naval raids were conducted from Beirul. T he most spectacular ended wi th the cap ture o f five Christi an laJ7mla ships including female and male passengers. goods and forty ho rses.'41

Saladin 's naval ac tivity also ex te nded to the Red Sea. Comme r­cial traffic that passed th rough the Red Sea was of immense eco-

56 Abu Shama, (Be irm ), II , 47, 48 (quoting ' )mad ai-Din and Qad i a l-Fadi l); Ibn Wasil, 11 , 139-40; Maq rizi , Suiulr , 104 .

57 William o r Tyre , 11 , 476, 477; Abu Sha ma, ( Be irut) , 11 , 29 (q uoting ' )mad a i-Din ). T he nu mbers g iven by Willia m o r Tyre are h igh; Arabic sources give lowe r figures: 15 galleys ro r the period rollowin g the victory o r Hittin a nd 3 1 gall~ and harraqat in 580/ 1184-1185. Sec, Maqrizi, Suiulr , 112-3, 11 8.

' Imad ai-Di n , Fath, 3 19. :w Ibid, 3 16. I-Ie descri bes these people as those who were granted amant sarety,

by Salad in. 40 ' Imad ai-Din, Path , 3 17-8, 328. A leading pe rson a mo ng these rdirle rs con­

ven ed to Isla m. 41 ' Imad a i -~in, J-alh, 325, 330.

T H E NAVY 171

nomic impo rtance to medieval Egypt. Qalqashandi says that the Fatimids kept a war fl eet of three to fi ve ships in the Red Sea to pro tec t the Karimi merchan ts who engaged in trade with Ind ia. 42

Even if this in fo rmatio n is taken at face value, considering the length of the Red Sea and the li mited range of the galleys, the presence of such a small squad ron had little practical meaning. Furthermore, in formatio n garnered frolll chron icles deali ng with the Fatimid period does no t support Qalqashandi 's statement. T he Fatimids did no t maintai n a navy in the Red Sea. T hey dealt with occasional nava l threats to sea·bom e trade in the regio n as they appeared by ad hoc measures. 43 Fatim id po licy was not a result o f neglect o r weakness. It epitomizes the fac t that in the period unde r discuss io n no strong link existed betw"een sea power and sea·bo rne trade. For exam ple, mid·twelfth·century ru lers of Ade n did not mainta in a navy to p rotec t the ir port town whose prosperity, if no t very existence, was so de pe nden t on sea-borne commerce.44

J ohn )-1. Pryo r poin ts out that in the twelfth centu ry even Venice, Ge noa a nd Pisa "assembled war fl ee t .. from thei r commercial shipping whe n the need arose". In his view, only three Mediter­ra nean states; the Fatimids, Byz...'l ntiulll and Norma n Sicily "did maintain anything like a profess ional, pe rmane nt war fl ee t in the twelfth centu ry". 45

Salad in 's naval policy in the Red Sea was in line with that of the Fatimids. There are no indicatio ns that he kept a permanent war fl ee t in the region . Small war fl eets were created for speci fi c tasks. For instance, in 577/ ] 18 1-11 82, five ships capable of throw­ing Greek fire and a contingent o f arche rs were dispatched to Yeme n. These ships were built a t the arsenal in Fustat and some­how transpo rted to the Red Sea. The naval raid launched by Reynald of Chatillon in 578/ 11 82-11 83 in the Red Sea was dealt with 10. cally by the hasty construction of warships o n the sho res of the Red Sea and by pursuit of the Frankish rAiders. 46

42 See, III , 520. 4:5 Lev, Slate, 105. 44 This facl is clea rly bo rn e out by th e ma terial published by S. D. Goite in .

See, his KTwo Eyewitness Reports on th e Auack of th e King of Kish (Qais) Against Ade n", BSOAS, 16( 1954), 247-57, esp., 253.

45 See h is Geography, Technology, and War. Studiu i" the Maritime HistflT] 0/ the Mediummean 649-"71, (Cambridge, 1988)' 124.

46 Maqrizi, Su/ull, 97-8, 99, \02-3. ' Imad a l-Din 's narrative of these even t in Barq consistl5 of h is own accoun t of what happe ned a nd cita tions from Qadi

172 C HAPTER FIVE

e. Saladin's Navy and the Siege of A ere

Saladin cap tured Acre fo llowing his victory at Hillin. But from September 11 89 until 12 July 11 91 the town was besieged by Christi a n land and naval forces dete rmined to retake it. This pro trac ted connicl offe rs an unusual opportunity to examine the performance of Saladin's navy over a long pe riod of time in a struggle which had far-reaching mil itary and mora l consequences for bOlh sides. Prio r to the struggle for Acre Saladin's navy was involved o nly twice in what might be ca lled combined o peratio ns. The first time was a t Beirut in 11 82, and the second in 11 87, when a squadron of te n ga lleys ass isted Saladin's army a t the siege of Tyre. However , the fleet fa iled miserably; ships were abandoned by their crews and five galleys were captured by the Christians in a night assault. 47

During the ballie fo r Acre both Saladin and the Crusaders pos­sessed important ports at a sho n distan ce from the scene of the fighting; the Crusad ers controlled Tyre, and Saladin h e ld Beirut conquered, like Acre, in the wake of his vic tory at Hillin . It should be emphasized that the main engagements in the battle for Acre were fought on land. Saladin conducted two parallel mili tary ef­forts: one a imed at d efeating the Crusad er ground forces, and the other focused on providing Acre with supplies and reinforcements by sea. Howeve r, his army was unable to break through the Ch ris­tian besieging forces in order to link up with the garrison in the be leaguered town and the ships which entered Acre found them­selves trapped in the port.

One of the most crucial naval even ts in the battle for Acre oc­curred in its early stages. On 16 Dhu ' I-Qa'da 585/ 26 Decembe r 11 89, fifty galleys (shinis) which arrived from Egypt entered Acre. According to ' lmad a i-Din , Saladi n , from the beginning of the

al-Fadirs leUers LO Baghdad describing this incident. Bo th re ports have been translated into English and discussed with the help of additiona l sources by C. LaViere Leiser in his "The Crusade r Ra id in the Red Sea 578/ 1182-r,jARCE 14(1977) ,87-99. For a wider discussio n of the Red Sea and the secu rity consid­erations of the Crusaders see, J. Prawer, Crusadn- Institutions, (Oxford, 1980), 47 1-83, esp., 480-3.

47 Ibn Shaddad, 84; ' Imad a i-Di n, Fa/h , 79-8 1; Abu Shama (Bei rul ), lI , 11 9 (q uoting ' Imad ai-Din); Ibn Wasil, II, 243-5; cf; D. Ayalon, "The Mamluks and Naval Power", in his Studies on the Mamluks oJEt;Jpt (12'().1'17), (London, 1977), 4.

THE NAVY 173

Frankish siege on Acre, had written to Egypt ordering the prepa­ration of a navy. The commander of the fl eet which e nte red Acre was Husam ai-Din Lu'Lu ', an accomplished naval officer.48 On Saladin's orders further naval preparations were carrie::d out in Egypt. These culminated in the arrival, on 8Jumada I 586/ 13 June 11 90, ora second fleet from Egypt at Ane. This fleet entered Acre following a naval battle in which each side lost a ship. ' Imad al­Oin also mentions the capture of six Christian sailing ships (butash pI. of batsha) and the e nslave men t of women and high-ranking mi litary leaders who were trave lling on Lhe m.49

Saladin also urged the governor of Beirut, ' IZl ai-Din Usama, to send supplies to Acre. On 2 1 Rajab 586/ 24 Augus t 11 90, a sailing ship from Beirut entered Acre. This particular sh ip was originally a Christian batsha that had been captured on a raid and kept unused in Beirut. She was loaded with provisions and manned by a Chris­tian and Muslim crew and had on board a fighting team composed of archers and nafta throwers. The ship was disguised as a Chris­tian vesse l by displaying crosses and pigs on the decks.50 About three weeks later ( 14 Sha'ban 586/ 16 September 11 90) three other sailing ships arrived in Acre. They had bee::n dispatched from Alexandria following Saladin's cons tant demands fo r provisions for the besieged town. 51 Supplies continued to arrive in Acre even during the winter. On 2 Dhu 'I-Hijja 586/ 11 J anuary 1191, seven sai ling ships arrived from Egypt at Acre with grain. 52 In sharp contrast to the extensive naval effort to reinforce and supply Acre by sea, which was carried out during 586/ 1190-1191 , in 587/ 11 9 1-11 92 no Muslim ships arrived at Acre. A single attempt to ship supplies to the bes ieged town took p lace on 16Jumada I 587/ 11

48 ' Imad ai-Di n, Fa/h, 224; Abu Shama, (Beirut). II , 148 (quoting ' Imad al­Oin ). Ibn Shaddad, 122-3, says that with the navy ships also arrh'ed rrolll coastal towns carrying provisions. The late Ibn Wasil says that the warships (qit'a min ClI· ustul) which entered Acre brought 10,000 mcn . See, II , 305. A figure which, as pointed out to me by Pryor, is quite reasonable. See, also Lyons and Jackson, 307-8. According to Latin sources, the term qit'a rerers to triremes (Latin: cal/us pI. catti). See, Pryor, ~From Dromon LO Galea\ 108.

49 ' Imad ai-Din, Fa/h, 257-8. Apparently this fleet was composed or warships. ' Imad ai-Din mentions in his description galleys, ships from which Greek Fire was hurled and shaumdiyya/. According to Ibn Mammati, shaiandiyyat were decked gall~s. See, .340. The Arabic term is derived rrom the Greek cheiandioll.

' Imad al.Din, Falh, 282-.3: Ibn Shaddad , 135. 51 ' Imad al·Din , Fath, 284; Ibn Shaddad, 138. ~2 ' Imad al·Din, Fa/h, 315.

174 CHAPTER FIVE

June 1191 and ended in a failure. A sailing ship from Beirut with provisions and about seven hundred fighting men (muqalila) was sunk by Christian naval fo rces off Acre.5~ From <Jmad al-Din's description of the battle for Acre it emerges that Saladin was very aware of and concerned wilh the naval aspects of the war. On the one hand, he urged his men in Egypt and Beirut to send supplies by sea to Acre. On the other hand. there were seriolls misgivings in Sal-adin's camp in rc::gard to the ability of the Muslim naval forces. The Illost telling reOeclion of this pessimistic mood is ' Imad al­~in 's reference to the Christian ships as "spreading like scorpi­ons and venomous snakes" while "our ships cling to their ports". In a lener written in 585/ 1189-1190. to Yusufibn 'Abd al-Mu'nim, the Almohad ruler, Saladin admits that the Christians controlled the sea. He remarks that the losses which the Christian forces suffered at Acre were more than replenished by the reinforcements arriving from beyond the sea (meaning Europe). Saladin expressed his wish that the Muslim naval forces would perform as well as the land army. In general, he asked for naval support and implored 'Abd al-Mu'nim to send his navy against Sicily.54

In spite of this realistic appreciation of his naval limitations, Saladin continued to dispatch his fleets to Acre. Taking into ac­count the limited speed of the galleys and their restricted ability to remain at sea a watertight naval blockade was impossible. Ac­tive patrolling of the sea off a besieged town was not the norm. In many cases the galleys were beached on the shore and sent to sea in time of need.55 These limitations inherent in operating medieval navies made it possible for Muslim fleets to reach Acre with supplies and reinforcements. The main value of the Chris­tian naval blockade of Acre, which could not have been total , was in deterring and making difficult the attempts to re-supply Acre by sea. On the other hand, the attempts of the Christian naval forces to storm the port of Acre were unsuccessful. Entry to the

~, Ibid, 337; Ibn Shaddad. 161-2. ~ For ' Imad ai-Din's remark., ~ee Abu Shama, (Beirut), II , 152; 'U,un, II ,

2 10. For Saladin's letter, see Qalqashandi , VI, 526-30. For a French translation, see M. Gaudefroy-Oemombynes, ~Une lellre de Saladin au Galife almohade-, in Milangts Reni Basset, (Paris, 1925), II , 281-89. For the wider context of Saladin's relations with the Almohad rulers, see Mohring, Saladin, 192-209. The reason behind Saladin's request for actions against Sicily is no t clear. The Norman Kin~om of Sicily was not involved in the battle for Acre.

Lev, State, 117.

THE NAVY 175

port was protected by the Tower of Flies which was situated at the end of a mole. The fighting for possession of this fortress was the key to holding Acre. In the course of this fighting the Muslim de· fenders made very successful use of Greek fire against the Chris· tian ships, and on one occasion the galleys trapped in Acre sai led out to meet the enemy ships.56

With the fa ll of Acre, Saladin lost a great number of galleys and transport ships. In fact, his navy ceased to exist. The refore , dur· ing the later stages of the Third Crusade the whole brunt of the fighting fell on Saladin 's ground forces and the problem of de· fending the coast became very acute. Saladin adopted a policy of deliberate destruction of those coastal towns which he was unable to defend, extending this policy to inland towns as well . Follow· ing the peace seulement which ended the Third Crusade, he strengthened the forts along the Mediterranean coast and manned them with fresh troops. Apparently, the aim was to create an early· warning system against sea-borne invasions which possessed some defensive capabilities as well .57

f. The Wider Context oj Saladin's Naval Activity

Most of Saladin's naval activities were conducted in conjunction with attempts to conquer or defend coastal towns. His naval ef· forts were not aimed at control of the sea or ach ieving naval supre· macy. IL is imponant to remember the illuminating remarks of John Guilmartin Jr. that neelS of galleys could not achieve con­trol of the sea in the modern sense of the word. 'The capabili ty of the galley as a warship was seriously restricted due to its limi ted

56 ' Imad a i-Din says that the Tower of the Flies was in the sea and was cru­cial to the defe nse of the port. See, Fa/h , 289; Ibn Shaddad, 138--9. For the port of Acre and its structure, see R. Gertwagen , ~The Crusader Po rt of Acre: Layout and Problems ofMaintenance~, Au/our de fa Premiire Croistuie, (ed ) M. Balard (Paris, 1996), 553-81. In the twe lflh century, the Tower of the Flies was much larger than it appears (Oday and between it and another tower, now underwater, there was a chain protecti ng the entrance to the port.

!'>7 Saladin's policy of destroying the fortifications of coastal towns is referred to by Abu Shama. See, (BeirUll, II , 157 (q uoting ' Imad aI-Din); 'Uyun, II , 212-3. For references to naval evcnu; during the laS{ months of the siege on Acre, see Abu Shama, (Beirut), 11 , 160--1, 162·3, 164, 184 (quoti ng Ibn Shaddad and ' Imad al·Din); 'Uyun, II , 249 (for the loss of the navy in Acre).

176 CHAP'n : R FIVE

abi lity Lo remain at sea, its speed and its operational range. Naval warfare in the Mediterranean was characterized by sea-borne at­tacks on major ports and coastal towns. The attacks on DamieLta and Alexandria exemplify this lype of warfare. However, even in these combined operations the role of the navy was limited. The success of combined operations against coastal towns depended ultimately on the performance of the ground forces. Naval forces fighting on their own were ineffective in attempts to conquer or defend coastal towns. For instance, a Sici lian navy composed of 60 galleys and manned by 10,000 men was unable La prevent the fall of Jabala and Latakiyya to Saladin.58 On the other hand, ef­forts to conquer Acre from the sea also failed. In line with a ob­servation made by Matthew Bennett iL can be sa id that mastery of the sea did not directly innuence fighting on land.59 In combined operations the role of the navy was t\vofold: first, to bring the ground forces and the ir equipment and suppl ies to the scene of the fighting and, secondly, to continue to supply the army engaged in a siege wh ile preventing the enemy from providing help to the besieged Lown by the sea. However, the result of the siege was decided by the abi li ty of the besieged town to defend itself and by the will and ability of central government to commit its naval and above all its ground forces to such type of warfare.

In order to evaluate Saladin 's naval policy and its ultimate fail­ure we must take a wider view of the naval situation between 1099 and the fall of Acre to the Crusaders in July 1191. In the first decade of the twelfth century, the Fatimids lost a number of towns along the Syrian-Palestine coast to the Crusaders and their Ita lian al­lies. Only in one case, the siege of Sidon in 11 08, did the success­fu l intervention of the Fatimid navy temporarily prevent the fall of a town. During the siege of Beirut in ]] 10, the Fatimid sh ips that entered the pon found themselves trapped within it. The sailors took part in th e defence of the town, bUl with the fall of the town to the Crusaders the neet was lost too. The fall of Tripoli was due to a great extent to the vind ictive Fatimid policy towards the de facto independent rulers of the town, the family of Banu 'Ammar.

But Fatimid failure was above a ll a fa ilu re of the Fatimid army

58 ' Imad ai-Din , Fa/h , 142-3; Ibn Wasil, II, 258-9 (q uoting Ibn Shaddad). 59 Atthough his observation is made in a difTerent context, it is valid ror the

period under disc ussion as wett. See. his ~Norman Naval Activity in the Medi ter­ranean c. \060-1108~ , Anglo-Nonnan Studus 15 (1993 ), 41 -58, e sp. , 54 .

THE NAVY 177

to offer effective resistance to the Crusaders. The repeated attempts to re-conquer Jaffa , during the summers of 1102, 1105 and 1123. exemplify this point. The same happened in 1153 in Ascalon. The Fatimid navy brought supplies to the town. but Fatimid ground forces which were dispatched to relieve the town remained immobilised in Egypt due to an in ternal power struggle in Cairo. On three occasions (at J afTa in 1105 and 1123, and at Ascelon in 11 53), the Fatimid navy performed better than the arm y. But the navy o n its own, wiLhom the support of ground forces, achieved nothing. The Fatimid navy was small and mostly consisted of galleys; it included on ly twenty transport ships and its capabi lity to ship supplies and reinforcements was limited. IL was vastly outnumbered by the European fleets which ope ra ted in the Eastern Mediterra­nean in support of the Crusades. For this reasons the Fatimids were very hes itant to commit their navy when coastal towns were besieged by Crusaders who were supported by large nava l forces (as happened at Acre in su mmer 1104, at Tripoli in summe r 11 09 and at Tyre in summer 11 24).60

Egypt's naval resources were restricted by comparison to those of the European Mediterranean nations. Data collected from the Geniza documents points to a lively trade in timber between Ital­ian maritime cities (Amalfi , Genoa and Venice) and Fatimid Egypt in the twelfth century.61 The re are many indications that during the eleventh century European nations became prominent in the sea-borne trade in the Mediterranean. European merchants were common callers at Muslim city ports and became important buy­ers of the goods traded there. On the other hand, the business trips made by North African and Near Easte rn merchants to European ports were few and sporadic.62 Towards the end of the

60 W. Hamblin , ~The Fatilllid Navy During the Early Crusades: 1099-1124~, The Ammcan Neplu.ne, XLVI(1986). 77-83; Lev. Slate. 108-9. For details o n the exploi15 of the naval forces of Genoa, Pisa and Venice in the decade lOO().IOIO. see M. Balard . "Communes italiennes. pouvoin et habitanLS des etaLS Francs de Syri(. ... Paiestin e au XII i! siccle~. in Cru.sadt1'.s a11d MlLSfi m.s, 45-6.

61 Goitcin, Med.Sac., I, 46; S. M. Stern, "An Original Document from the Fatimid Chancery Concerning Italian MerchanLS~, reprinted in his Coins and Documnll.s from the Meditval Middk East, (London, 1986). For attempts of the Byzantines to prevent Venice (in ea rly 970's) from supplying timber to the Muslims and the consequences it had for the internal politics of the town, see Lombard , 133-4.

62 Goitein. Med. Soc .. I, 44-5, 2 11. Goitein refen to occasional trips by ~Ara­bic-speaking tradcn", a definition which in cludes J ews and Muslims and in geo­graphical tcnns means both North Africa and the Near East. In a later publica-

178 CI-IAPTJo:R FIV,,:

e leventh century. the European nations were able to translate with relative ease their preponderance in commercial shipping into military naval superiority. The contribution of European fleets , including that of the English, to the success of the First Crusade is wide ly recognized and has been recentJy the subject of a de­tailed sLUdy by John France.63 In the first decade of the twelfth century, Italian fleets played a crucial role in the conquest of the coastal towns of Palestine and Syria. The Fatimid vizier and miH­tary-dictator, al-Afdal, retaliated against the Genoese merchants in Egypt by arresting the m.'" This act reveals his weakness and frustration. Unable LO check the Italians at sea, al-Afdal endan­gered Egyptian commercial imerests. Following the conquest of the Palestine-Syrian coast, large European fleets were engaged in bringing pilgrims to the Holy Land. In 1102, hundreds of Euro­pean ships transporting pilgrims are said to have anchored atJaffa.65

The establishment of the Crusader states in the Levant brought about further naval developments in Europe, especially in Italy, enhancing and extending the naval preponderance achieved in the e leventh century.56

The navy rebuilt by Saladin faced the same problems as that of the Fatimids: European superiority in numbers and me loss of ports along the coast of Palestine and Syria. The inherent deficiencies of galleys as warships combined with the geographical and other naval factors discussed recently by Pryor seriously restricted the raiding potemial of Saladin's navy operating from Egypt. Pryor argues that the use of amphoras (instead of barrels) for carrying water seriously reduced the operational range of Fatimid galleys. The shipping lanes used by the European fl eets on their way to the Levant were to all intents and purposes beyond the range of

tion, Goitcin says that only one leiter from the eIC\'e nlh ce ntury testifies to an "Arabic-speakingJ ewish merchant doing business in a Christian port of Europe­(meaning Amalfi). Another leiter is from the thirteenth century and refers to a business trip 10 Genoa and Marse illes. See his Lmen of MtdievaIJ~/Jish Tradns, (Princeton , 1973),8.

63 See, his Victory in tM East, 98, 209-20. For cautious remarks on Italian naval superiority al Ihe time of the FirSl Crusade, see Pryor, Gtography, 30.

64 Goitein, Mtd.Soc., I. 45. 6/1 J. Richard, - le transport outre-mer des c roises e t des pe lerins-, in Mari·

tinu Asptcts of Migration. (cd) K. Friedland (Wien, 1989), 33-4. 66 See, for example , the remarks ofM. Balard, MUS transports des occidentaux

vers les colonies du Levant au Moyen Age", in Maritimt Asptctl of Migration, 5.

THE NAVY 179

warships operating from Alexandria and Damieua. 67 Only with the conquest of Beirut, J abala and Latakiyya were new opportunities opened for raiding to Saladin's navy.

But the main question that must be asked concerns the role of the navy in the failure to conquer Beirut and Tyre and to hold Acre. In the case of Beirut, Saladin gave up the siege when he realized, afte r three days of heavy fighting, that he was unable to take the town by assau lt. The defeat of Saladin's fl eet off Tyre was particularly humiliating but it had little effect on the failure of the siege, which was abandoned because Muslim ground forces failed to make any headway and, with the onset of wi nter, Saladin had to take into account the request o f his emirs to raise the siege.68

The evaluation of the role of the navy in the battle for Acre is more complex. First of all , Saladin's naval effort was ve ry consid­erable and on the whole quite successful. The fleets, large and small , which were dispatched to Acre managed to bring in sup­plies and reinforcements, which on several occasions proved cru­cial to the ability of the defenders to continue resisting the Cru­saders.6!l The fall of Acre was due to a combination of two fac­lors: Saladin's inabi lity to defeat the Crusaders on land and his inability to match the naval resources of the European nations involved in the Third Crusade. Taking into account the limited naval resources of Egypt, Saladin built and assembled an impres­sive number of ships for dispatch to Acre. But the trapping of his ships in Acre created an impossible situation. Each ship that reached Acre safely was a ship lost and wh ich had to be replaced. This eventually exhausted Saladin's restricted naval resources.

Saladin's heavy invesunent in the fortification of the coastal towns provided them with basic defensive capabi lities. A similar approach was adopted by other Mediterranean powers, which were faced with the problem of defending their coastal regions and towns. For example, in the first half of the tenth century, Southern Italy

67 For a fu ll discussion of thc water problelll. winds and SCi! curre nlS, see his Grography, 80-6, 11 6-22.

68 Saladin's llilval defeat at Tyre was the result of an attempt to maint.ain lhe blockade on the port. Fo r this reason his ships were at sea off the port at nighL. See ' Imad ai-D in , Fa/h, 80.

6'.l This is clearly evidcnced by Ambroise's account. See Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart. Ir,lIlslaled imo English by M.J. Hube rt ;md annot,ned by J. L. LaMOille (N. Y., 1976), (reprint), esp., 156, 189 and also 147-8, 171 -2; cf R. Rogers, La/in Siege Warfare in Ihe Twelfth Crolury, (Ox fo rd, 1992),218.

180 CHAPTER FIVE

was vulnerable to Fatimid raids launched from Sicily and Tunisia. In this case the geographical realities put the Fatimids in a good position to raid the area while the Byz3mines had to invest great effort in defending the region. The Byzantines coped with this problem by keeping a small naval presence in the Adriatic sea, especia lly in Dalmatia and at Dyrrachium, and by fortification of the coastallowns of Calabria and Apulia. 70 The deSlruction of the fortifications of the coasta l towns (and occasiona lly of inland towns as well) is an another aspect of the same policy. A town that can­not be defended must be rendered useless to the enemy.71

Our sources shed little light o n the types of ships and o n naval wanare in general. The most common te rm used in Arabic sources when referring to a sailing ship is batsha. This tenn is used in two distinctive ways: with and without the adj ective huge / big. This means that there were batsha of ordinary size but some of these ships were especia lly big. Impressive three-masted sailing ships are depicted on glazed ceramic bowls from the Balearic islands in the early eleventh centu ry,72 but how big these sa iling ships really were is not entire ly clear.7~ The term batsha in Arabic sources refe rs to both Christian and Muslim sh ips. It might indica te that the out­ward appearance of Christian and Muslim ships referred to as batshas was very simi lar, or that the term referred to ships of the same type. 74 Apparen tly there was no difference in the outward appear-

70 J. Shepard , ~Aspecl.'i of Byzantine Altitudes and Policy Towards the West in the Tenth and [levelllh Celllurics~, in nyumtium and lhe West, (ed) J. D. Howard· johnston (Amstcrdam, 1988 ), 71 , 72-4,77.

71 When Acre W-dS conquered by Saladin in the aftermath of H ittin, there was a division of opinion among his emirs as t.o what to do with it. ' (mad a i-Din says that the w-dlls were badly damaged and most of the town was without walls at all. Some advised Saladin to demolish the town and to keep Acre as a fortified outpost only. Others held the opinion that Acre is the key to control of the sea and coasL Saladin decided to fortify Acre and the task was delegated to Baha a l· Din Qaraqush , who earlier had been responsible for the construction of the walls of Cairo and rustat. See, ' Imad a l·Din , Faln , 117-8; cf: Lyons and jackson , 285.

n john. H. Pryor and S. Bel labarba, "The Medieval Muslim Ships of the Pisan Bacini~ , MM 76( 1991 ), 99-113 ; D. Nicolle, ~Shipping in Islamic Art: Seventh through Sixteenth Century AD~, The American Ntplunt' 172, Iia-b, 173 pard.ll.

7S For a summary of current knowledge about the medieval Mediterranean sail ing ship, seeJohn H. Pryor, ~The Mediterranean Round Ship~, in Cogs, Carawls and Galleons, (ed) R. Gardiner (London , 1993), 59-75.

74 The most revealing account is by the contempordry Usama ibn Munqidh , who describes lhe journey of his family from Egypt to Syria. They arrived in Damicna on boa rd a special ' ushari pm al their disposal by lhe Fatimid vizier, and sailed to Syria on board a Frankish (i.e. Christian) balsha. See, 34 (Arabic).

THE NAVY lS I

ance of Muslim and Christian warships. Ibn al-Qalanis i's descrip­tion of a Fatimid raid in 550/ 11 55- 11 56 is very revealing in this respect. On that occasion the officer in charge of the raid was chosen from the naval pt!rsonnel (tnuqaddam ulI:n al-bahriyya) , and he selec ted for the mission sai lors (mjul bahr) who spoke the language of the Franks. The crews of the warships were dressed in Frankish attire. The raid was vel)' successful; ofT Tyre the raid­ers se ized and burnt a big Christian ship and o n their way back Lhey captured ships with pilgrims.75 It would have been quite futile to put such effort into disguising the crews if the Fatimid warsh ips were markedly different fro m the Christian ones.

In the sources transport sh ips are referred to by several terms. Salad in , in a letter describing the attack of the Norman fl eet on Alexandria , mentions six ships designated as su/ltn which carried siege and war engines, big ti mber logs and other supplies. Ships of the ham-maia type were apparently smalle r carrying men and supplies. 76 According to Ibn Mammati , ha1n1nala ships were used for shipping grain . Another type of transport shi p mentioned occasionally in the sources is the musatlah. Such a ship with 500 people on board was attacked by the Egyptian navy shortly after the re-capture of Acre by the Cmsaders. Ibn Mammati has vel)' little to say about this type of ship. According LO him, the term musattah should be understood literall y, meaning a flat ship.77

When confronted by galleys and ships hurling Greek fire. the sailing sh ips. especially the big balsha, could. as long as they en­joyed favorable winds, defend themselves successfully. The diffi­culties of warships in capturing large transport ships are nicely

No less instructive is Ambroise's account or the Crusade or Richard Lion-Heart. According to him , the Crusaders had difficultie s in recognizing as Muslim ves­sels the ships, which they encountered at sea. On the first occasion , a big three­masted ship ofT the Syrian coast misled them . On another occasion, they had difficulties in deciding the identity of a neet which approached Acre. See , 110-1, 148. We have here a funher indication of what Pryor and Bellabarba describe as a ~cross-cuhural fenilization in naval architec lllre in the Mediterranean M

• See, their "The Muslim Medieval Ships" , 105.

75 The lype of ships the Fatimids used on these raids is unknown. Ibn al­Qalanisi uses the expression al-morakib ai-us/llliy)'ll. whic h can be trdnslated as ships or the navy. The term US/Ill pI. asn/it refe rs to navy. meaning, apparently, galleys. See, 332.

76 Abu Sham a, I, pl.2. 599 (quoting ' Imad aI-Din ). 77 Ibn Mammati, 340. For a n English translation of Ibn Mammati's short

account dealing with t i lt: navy and arsenals, see Cooper, 285-6.

182 CHAPTER FIVE

illustrated in the accoulll given by a contemporary twelfth-cen­tury Byzantine chronicler. In the winter of II7l , a group of Ve­netians escaped in a three-masted ship of great size from Con­stantinople. The fugitive ship was too swift for the pursuing gal­leys and ships throwing Greek fire. In any case, the chronicler remarks that any 3ncmpl LO board the escaping ship would have been impossible due La its height.78 Big transport ships may have been used for military purposes as well. For example, the English Crusaders overcame a big three-masted Muslim ship which was manned by 800 warriors armed with bows and arba lests and equipped with Greek fire. 79

OUT sources supply no information about the construction of warships or other related matters. Timber was scarce in Egypt, but some trees suitable for shipbuilding were grown in Upper Egypt. The price of lumber was very high and could reach fifty dinars a plank.SO It is quite clear that ships hurling Greek fire could have been easily and quickly built and equipped. This is borne out by the accounts dealing with the Frankish raid into the Red Sea and Lhe Muslim response to it. BoLh sides made use of fire as a weapon. 81

Th erefore , it can be safely assumed that the ships which had been assembled on the shores of the Red Sea were /tarmqat . In gen­eral, the Muslims made quite extensive use of Greek fire in naval and land warfare. However how the Greek fire was hurled from Muslim ships is not always clearly stated. Both " mad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad mention qawarir indicating that Greek fire was thrown from ships by nafta th rowers in the form of bombs.82 But it does not mean that syphons for discharging Creek £ire were not used.83

Medieval observers followed by modern scholars have been dis-

711 Choniates, 97-8. 79 Ambroise, 111-4. !jC) 'Abd al·Latif aI-Baghdadi, 35. 81 Maqri zi, Khilol. III , 139: Leiser, ''The Crusader Raid~, 92 82 'Imad ai-Din, Fath, 319; Ibn Shaddad . 143. 8~ For Greek fire in naval warfare, see V. Christides, MNew Light on Naviga­

lion and Naval Warfare in the Meditcrranean, the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (6th-14th Centuries)~, Nubica, 111 (1994). 5-25: esp., 24. Syphons are clearly mention cd in the Arabic sou rccs quo ted by Christidcs. Typcs of Greek fire, including the sort used in naval warfare, are discussed in a military treatise composed for Saladin. Sce, Cl. Cahe n, ~Un lraite d'armurcrie compose pour SaladinM, BEO, 12( 1947-1948) , 123 (tex t), 146 (Frcnch tran.). In this text the type of Greck firc used in naval w;u'fare is desc ribed as spreading (literally walk­ing) o n the sea. The spread of Greek fire on watcr is also referred to in the

THE NAVY 183

appointed by the performance of Saladin's navy. <Imad ai-Din explained the naval failure during the siege on Tyre (1187) by the poor quality of the seame n. He said that the people who were in cha rge in Egypt (nuwwab Misr, a vague expression ) showed little interes t in the navy and unde rpaid nava l pe rsonne l. They drafted to the navy an ignorant bunch, and these turned out to be dis­obedient when discipline was necessary.54 <Imad al-Din's remarks on the poor quality of naval personnel reflect a long-s tanding problem not just the realities of Saladin's period. In the Fatimid period, in comparison to the military and other employees of the state, naval personnel was serio usly underpaid. It seems that the pay of the seamen deteriomted even further during the last years of Fatimid rule. Salad in tried to improve the situatio n. In 567/ 1171-1172, apparently after the overthrow of the Fatimid dynasty, he increased by 20% the value of the "naval dinar", a unit of account according to which the seamen were paid.85 However, as is born out by Ibn Abi Tayy's account and implicitly supported by <Imad ai-Din, the manpower for Saladin 's navy was recruited among the Egyptian fellahin-peasants. The o peration ofa galley, and certa inly of fl eets composed of galleys, required experienced crews. Row­ing was a highly specialized job which demanded discipline and team work.86 One wonders how, if ever, the fellahin impressed into naval service became skilled seamen.S7 The poor quality of naval personnel might explain the behavior of the fl eets trapped

poetry or Ibn al-Hani, a tenth-cenwry Fatimid poet. See V. Chrislides, The Coll~ quest o/Crele by the Arabs (ca . 824). A TUl'7lillg Point in the Struggle Between Byzmllillm and Islam, (Athe ns, (984),65. In o rder to achicvc this cfTect the Greek fire must have been discharged massh'ely rrom a throwing d evice. Naphta bombs hurled by na ph ta throwers could not have created such an effect. For the use of Greek fire by the Muslim defe nders of Acre, see Rogers, 221-2, 223.

&I ' Imad ai-Din , Fath, 81. 85 For me Fatimid period, see Le\', Stak, 120. For Saladin's policy, see Maqrizi,

Suluk, 66; cf: Ehre nkre utz, "The Place orSaladin ft

, 105, n. 5 1; Rabie, 47-8. 86 How the tcams of rowers ,,'ere organized is V"dgUely indicated by our sources.

There was a certain hierarc hy among the oarsme n. A Byza ntine text refers to ch ief oarsma n and seco nd oarsman. See, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Admillistrando Imperio text edited by G. Moravcsik, English translation by R.J. H. J enkins (Washington. D. C., 1967), I, 25 1, 253.

87 In contrast to the rellahin , people which lived from the sea were skill rul mariners. In this respect. there is a very reveali ng inciden t that took place in 11 85 when a rebel neet. composed or small swift boats manned by fi shermen expe rienced in rowing co nfronted the imperial galleys. The galleys were due to their length very slow in turning and round it difficult 10 fi ght against the rebel

184 C H APTER FIVE

in Acre. The commander of the fl eet of galleys which en tered Acre in December 1189 was Husam ai-Din Lu ' Ill '. an experienced naval officer. He commanded 111C Egyptian fl eet in the Red Sea in 578/ 11 82- 11 83. But, on that occasion his crc\'IS were composed of sai lors of North African origin .88 We do not know what kind of sailors manned his fl t!t: t in 11 89. Lu'lll himselfwas a former Fatimid officer o f Armenian ex traction. His biographers describe in detail his victory in the Red Sea, but are reticent about his role in the batue for Acre. How he survived the fall of the town is no t me ntioned, but he died in Cairo o n 13 Safar 598/ 13 November 120 1. All of his biographers e mphasize that he devoted his wealLh to charity. Maqrizi says th a l h e quit the milita ry service but when this hap­pened is not specified.89 Further information on naval officers is scarce. The two senior officers captured with five of their ships off Tyre in 11 87 were of Maghribi and Persian origin , (Abd a l­Salam al-Maghribi and Badran al-Farsi.90 It is difficult to make sense of the ir titles/ ranks; al-Maghribi is described as ra 'is and muqaddnm while a i-Farsi as mutawaUi. Another naval officer mentioned in the an nals is Ya<qub of AJeppo. He was the muqaddam of the batsha which failed to penetrate the Christian naval blockade off Acre.91

In trying to revive the navy in Egypt, Saladin was faced with a formidable task and the odds were against him. Irrespective of his ultimate naval failure, his inability to defeat the Third Cru­sade was due to a disappo inting performance by his army rather than by the failure of his naval forces.

fl eet. In addition, due to some unspecified difficulties (pe rh aps adve rse wind conditio ns). the impe ria l galleys were unable 1.0 usc their devices for discharg­ing Greek fire . See, Choniates 209. The man-power of Musli m navies is a neglected topic of study. The notable exception i .~ A. M. Fahmy's discussion of the recruit­ment of sai lors for naval selV1ce in early Muslim Egypt. See his Muslim Sea-Power in Ihe Ea.sltm MedilerTanean, (Cai ro , 1950), 9S-106.

88 Leiser, "The Crusaders Raid-, 92. There is a hint of tlle presence of Maghribi sailors in the Egyptian navy from 575/ 1179·11 80. See Abu Shama, (Beirut), II , 14 ~uoting Qadi al-Fadi l).

AI-Mundhiri, II , 332-3; Maqrizi, Khilal, III , 138-8, gives a different date for his death; cf: Leiser, "The Crusader Raid~, 92-3.

90 Abu Shama, (Beirut), II , 119 (q uoting ' Imad a i-Din ). 91 Ibid, II , 184-5 (quoti ng ' Imad ai-Din). The tenn ra 'is pl. ru 'asa', in a naval

contex t, means the captain ofa ship. The term muqaddam means officer but laciu precision whi le the tenn mulawaUi was used in the Fatimid pe riod for both heads of adm in istrative offices and provin cia l military governors.

C HA IYfER SIX

T H E NON-MUSLIM COMMUNIT IES

a. /;atitnid Realities

In comparison to the Muslim Middle East and North Africa the positio n of the non-Musl im communities in Fatimid Egypt was q uite unique. Two fac tors migh t explain this situa tio n: a) Egypt was o nly partia lly Islamized and b) the policies of the Fatimid regime. The Cop ts constitu ted a ve ry la rge segment of the popula tion and were d istribu ted th rougho u t the country while the Cop tic Churc h was a powerful and rich institutio n . In the capita l and AJexandria there were J ewish com muni ties a nd o the r small com munities and ind i­vidual J ews li ved in many o ther places. Fa ti mid policy toward no n­Muslims was to le ran t and, with the exceptio n of a l-Hakim 's rule (996- 102 1), there were ve ry few vio lent o utbursts against no n­Musli ms. Even the wars o f the Crusad es had little impac t 0 11 the positio n of the no n-M uslim commun ities in Egyp t. O n the whole, du ring the Fa timid period Ch ristians and J ews were e mployed in the administra tio n and served as ph ys ic ians at the court. It was possible fo r Ch ristians andJews to build churches and synagogues, and they were not obliged to wear the distincti ve colo rs and dresses (ghiyar) imposed o n no n-M uslims by law and cus tom .

Another un usua l aspec t of Fatimid policy towards non-Mus lims was the consent of Fatimid ru lers to the immigration and senle­men t in the country of th e Ch ristian Ar menians who were em­ployed as sold ie rs. It is true tha t the beginning of this im migra­tion took place under the rule of Badr a l:Jamali and the Fatimid Imam al-Amir could do little abou t it. But nothing had changed fo llowing the fa ll of the J amali family and an Arme nian Ch ristian mili tary lead er , Bahram, became the Fa tim id vizie r. However h is ri se provoked a vio len t local reaction wh ich brought abo ut h is d ownfa ll (11 37). Rather paradoxically, a t about the same time tha t he was to ppled, Ch ristians fro m Pales tine and Syria found refuge in Egypt escaping persecution in thei r ho melands. Eventually a la rge po pulatio n of these refugees settled permane ntly in Egypt. It is true that they were ordinary people with no mi litary associa­tio ns. 1 Nonetheless, a t the time tha t Shirkuh became Fatimid vizier,

] Lucy-Anne Hum , ~Ch ris tian-MlIslim Relations in Pai n ti ng in Egypt of the Twelfth 10 mid-Thirteelllh Celllllries". Calliers Archiologiq ul!J, 33 (1985). 113. n.30.

186 C H A PTE R S IX

Christian Armenians still served in the army. Armenian troops were sta tio ned in Cairo and o the rs li ved ou ts ide th e LOwn .2

The pos ition of no n-Muslims a l lhe Fatimid court surprised for­eign visitors to Egypt including Fatimid sympathize rs. Perhaps it is no t just a coincid e nce that Nasir-i Khusrau me n Lio ns, in the account of his visit in Egypt (1 047-1048). a Christian millio naire and a J ewish ad mi nistra to r. T he Christian was a grain deale r and possessed immense stores of gra in . Nasir-i Khusrau chose him as an example to illustrate the p rosperi ty and securi ty tha t the people of Egypt e njoyed under Fatimid rule . The J ewish administrator referred to was Abu Sa<id (in J ewish and Arabic sources Sa<d ) a l­Tustari , who was killed by lhe a rmy in October 1047. Nasir·i Khusrau te lls a tende ntious versio n of those events stress ing, o n the o ne hand, that the a rmy showed remorse for the crime it had com· mi tted (hardly likely to be true). And, o n the other hand, tha t o the r membe rs of the family continued to enjoy the pro tec tio n of the Imam a nd re ta ined their riches.s Ano ther visitor to the Fa timid court, the Fa timid propagandist in Shi raz, Mu'ayyad fi Din, met Abu Sa'd at the heigh t of h is power. Mu'ayyad vividly d escribes his meeting and re latio ns with Abu Sa'd . He is ra ther surprised to find a J ew wielding such power, and he never fa il s to mentio n the fact tha t he is a J ew. According to Mu'ayyad 's own testimo ny, Abu Sa'd was thrilled to see him and lavished on him mo ney fro m the treasu ry p romising Mu'ayyad to secure for him the patro nage (istina') of the Imam. However, Mu'ayyad deeply mistrusted Abu Sa'd 's intentio ns toward him and disapproved of the power he held. Mu 'ayyad mentio ns tha t the army kill ed Abu Sa'd and he says tha t it was a result of the machinatio ns of the vizie r , a l·Fa llahi, himself a converted J ew, who resented Abu Sa'd 's innue nce and power. 4

The leaders and soldie rs of Nul' al·Din 's a rmies dispatched to Egypt considered these Fatimid realities as odd. Policies aimed

2 Badr a l-Jamali settled Christian Armenians in the Husayniyya quarte r ou t· side the walls of Cai ro and allowed them to take over unused J acobite churches. See, Ibn al·MuqafTa', II , part 3, 225-6 (Arabic), 355..f) (English). Maqrizi says, o n the aUlho rity of Ibn 'Abd a1-Zah ir (d . 1292). tha t 7,000 Arme nian trOOps made up of infantry and cavalry seuJed there. See, Khital, III , 33 cf: Mackenzie, 4-5 . For Husayniyya in the Mamluk and later periods, see A. Raymond. Le Caire, (Paris, 1993), index.

, See, 55..f), 58. 4 See, Sira/ al-Mu'ayyadfi 'f-Din, (cd) M. K. Husayn (Cairo. 1949),8 1-4.

THE NON-MUSLIM COMMUN ITIES 187

against non-Muslims were high on Shirkuh's list of priorities. During the short pe riod of his vizierate, he enacted a number of edicts against non-Muslims. There can be little doubt that to him the position they e njoyed seemed to be an anomaly to be corrected.

b. O/Jpression and Persecutions

I. Arab-Christian sources say that in the wake of Shawar's victory over the vizier Dirgham , troops of Nur al-Din's expeditiona ry force (refe rred to as Chuzz 'and Kurds) began to maltreat Christians, Armen ians, Blacks, Turks and the local population. These inci­dents cannot be regarded as persecutions of the non-Muslims. Nur al-Din's army behaved as an occupying force mistreating every­one. But in periods of instability and indiscriminate violence non­Muslim communities were especially vulnerable. Many churches in Cairo and its environs we re destroyed , and the local po pula­tion cooperated with the Chuzz and Kurds in the des truction of churches.5 Such events lOok place in Jumada I 559/ March-April 11 64, and in 564/ 11 68-1 169.6 Four churches which belonged to the Melkite community were seized by the Chuzz and Kurds. The buildings and the walls which surrounded the compounds were pulled down, and the looters took any timber that they found in the churches. The destruction of churches was not limited to the capital. In Jiza two churches were thoroughly ransacked by the Chuzz and the local population . Churches were also destroyed in Upper Egypt at the towns of Qus and Asyu1. 7

Churches and especially monasteries lost the lands bestowed on them by the former Fatimid rulers. Several Fatimid Imams showed interest in monasteries by viSiting them and granting them tracts of agricu ltural land as gifts. In 575/ 1179-1180, a survey of such lands was conducted. Altogether Christian institutions had 9 15 feddans of land belonging to this category. This land was unevenly distributed: 906 feddans were in Upper Egypt and only 9 fed dans in Lowe r Egypt. The income derived from this land amoullled to 2,923 dinars in cash and 4,824 irdabbs of grain.s All

~ Ibn a l-Muqaffa', III , pan, 1,52 (Arabic), 87-8 (English); Abu Salih, 96,106. 6 Abu Salih, 89, 90, 91, 94-5. 7 Ibid,96-7, 174-5,234,235,249. B Ibid, 15.

188 CHAPTER SIX

of this land was seized from the Church. The Chuzz confiscated land which belonged to this category from monasteries inJiza and Hulwan. In 1174, at Ashmunayn, an emir of Saladin convened a flourishing monastery into a mosque and settled in its grounds. A monastery which had enjoyed exemption from taxes during the Fatimid period was seized in Asyul.9

Some monasteries were big and prosperolls landowners. For instance, the monastery seized at Ashmunayn owned twenty feddans of land granted to it by the former Fatimid rulers. It also oper· aled a number of production installations including an oil-press, a mill and an oven. The monastery and its production complex were surrounded by a w<lll. Such prosperolls monasteries were not exceptional. A monastery in Asyut had similar facilities; it also owned an orchard and grew vegetables. This pal-ticular monastery received money from contributions and payment of covenants. These two monasteries were not the richest ones. A monastery in the Fayyum owned land in several places; it cultivated palm-trees and was involved in the production of salt from an area of salt-marshes. A population of 130 monks lived in this monastery. \0

II. Shirkuh, during the three short months of his period as vizier, inaugurat.ed anti-dhimmi policies. He enforced the ghiyar regula­tions on non-Muslims. Arabic-Christian sources speak of a sweep­ing anti-dhimmi campaign at the beginning of Saladin's rule blaming Qadi al-Fadi l for advising Saladin to prohibit the employment of Christians in the fiscal administration of the state. I I In Rajab 567/ February-March 1172, a group of non-Muslims was dismissed from the ir posts. However, non-Muslims employed by Saladin's emirs in the administration of their rural estates were not affected by

9 Ibid, 183-6, 197-8,248,250. 10 Ibid, 208. II Ibn al-Muqaffa', III, pt.2, 634 (Anlbic), 106-7 (English). The late al-Nabulusi,

who was an anti-dhimmi bigot, says tha i Saladin prohibited the appointment of Christia ns 10 diwans and provinces. See, his Kitah Tadjrid Say! ai-Himmo, (ed) CI. Cahen in his ~ HislOire Copte d'un cadi medieval", BIFAO, LlX(1960). 146, 147. This statement can be interpreled as meaning that Christians were prevented from holding pOSIS of authoriry as heads of administrative offices and fisca l governors. Even according to this source Saladin 's policy was a se lective o ne and did not amount to a generAl purge of non-Muslims from the adm inistration. For Nabulusi and his anti-dhimmi altitudes a nd writings, see B. Callos. "To Catch a Spy: The Case of Zayn al·Din and Ibn Dukhan", Medieval encQunters, 2(1996), 99-11 3.

THE NON-MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 189

this policy. The atmosphere in the capital must have been very tense; rumors spread aboUl the possible expulsion of non-Mus­lims from the town and aboUlthe confiscation of their homes. 12

In addition to the enforcement of the ghiyar regulations, restric­tions were imposed on worship. Crosses were removed from churches and the ringing of church bells was forbidden. Religious processions were prohibited and non-Muslims were obliged La ride on asses alone. Public consumption of wine was also forbidden. 13

These policies caused a group of Christian clerks to convert to Islam. Perhaps the most famous case is that of the Mammati fam­ily of Copts whose origin was in Asyut. In the Fatimid period, members of the family served the sta te and atlained great power. The father of the family, al-Muhadhdhab, was in state service at the time that Shirkuh became vizier, either in the Office of the Army or in the Office of the Iqta '. He used La appear in public witholll the obligatory ghiyarand Shirkuh had removed him from his post. AI-Muhadhdhab and his son, Asad, converted La Islam and kept their posts under the new mastcrs. 14 It said that Saladin was instrumental in the conversion to Islam ofa Christian physician, al-Muwaffaq ibn ai-Matron, whose father had also been a physi­cian. Following his conversion, al-Muwaffaq continued to serve Saladin. 15 Other anti-dhimmi edicts were proclaimed in 577/] 181-1182. Non-Muslims were banned from practising medicine and the prohibition 011 their employment in the civi l service was re­enacted includ ing the ban on riding horses and mules. 16 But conversion to Islam was not a prerequisite for employment by Saladin. AJewish physician who had served the Fatimid rulers was employed by Saladin and was paid the high salary of 24 dinars a month. Other Jewish physicians were also employed by Salad in and members of the Ayyubid family. The most famous of the Jewish physicians of Saladin 's period was Maimonides whose son, Abraham, fo llowed him in the service of other Ayyubid rulers of Egypt. Maimonides, at the beginning of his career in Egypt, enjoyed the

12 Maqrizi , Suiuk, 68, 69. I ~ Ibn al-Muqaffa', Ill , pt.2, 97-8 (Arabic), 164-5 (English). 14 Yaqut, Udaba', V, 103-8; Ibn al-Qifti, I, 231-2. Safadi.IX, 20, 21·2. On the

Mammati family in the later Ayyubid period, see Morray, 56-7. I~ Maqrizi , Muqaffa, II , 98·9. 16 Maqrizi , Suiul!, 100.

190 CHA PTE R S I X

patronage and finan cial suppo rt of Qadi al-Fadil, who also helped othe r J ewish phys icians. 17

c. The Impact of Saladin's Policies

One can wonder what was the overall impact of these policies on the non-Muslim communities in Egypt ? We can derive some insight by comparing the beginning of the Ayyubid rule with a l-Hakim 's persecutions of non-Muslims at the beginn ing of the e leventh century. As in the early Ayyubid period , a l-Hakim's anti-dhi1n11li pol icies led to the convers io n to Islam of senio r Christian scribes and fiscal officials as well as of ordinary people. IS However, in bo th cases there are no indica tio ns that conversion of Christian admin­istrators c rea ted a general tre nd to conve rsion or played any sig­nificant role in a mo re ex te nsive Islamization. Ayyubid policies had a limited effec t even on the high echelons of the non-Mus­lim communities. Non-Muslims continued to be e mployed in the state administration and by me mbers of ule Ayyubid family. Ayyubid emirs employed non-Muslims, especially Copts. in the administra­tion of their rural estates, which they had acquired e ither through seizure or as an iqta'.19 The e mployment of non-Muslims by me m-

17 Safad i, XV, 127. For a number of Jewish physicians in lhe service of Saladin and other Ayyubids, see E. Ashtor, ~Saladin and the Jews~. flebrt:w Uni011 College Annual, XXVII(l 956), 310-3; S. D. Goitein , Palesli1le Jewry i1l Early Islamic mId Crusader Times, (Jerusalem, 1980), 26 1-2, 270, 32 1-2 (in Hebrew). For Qadi a l­Fadil's auitude to J ewish physic ians, see B. Lewis. ~Maimonides, Lionheart, and Sa ladin~ , Ereldsrael, L. A. Mayer Memorial Volume, 7( 1964), 70-6; M. Meyerhof. ~MediaevalJewi sh Physicians in the Near East, from Arabic Sources\ Isis 28( 1938), 445,447. For Abraham see, Goitein, Med. Soc., rv, 476-7. In Ayyubid Syria and especially Egypt non-M uslim physicians continued to be employed and enjoyed high status. See, Ann e-Marie Edde, "Les medecins dans la societe syrienne du VIl e/Xlll e siecJe", Ai, XXIX( 1995), 92, 93. However , the employme nt of non­Muslim physicians by the Muslim ruling class was a specia l case. It had a long history in medieval Islam and physic ians moved across political and confessional boundaries. See, for exam ple, E. Ko hlberg and B. Z. Kedar , "A Melkite Physician in FrankishJerusalem and Ayyubid Damascus: Muwaffaq a i-D in Ya'qub b. Siqlab\ AAS, Studies in Memory of Eliyahu Ash tor, 22(1988) , 113-27. But opposition to the employment of non-Muslim physicians became biuer and vocal, especially during the Mamluk period. See, M. Perlmann , "Notes on the Position of Jewish Physicia ns in Medieval Muslim COllntries~, Israel Orienlal Studies, 2( 1972),3 15-9.

18 Y. Lev, "Pe rsecutions and Conversion to Islam in Eleventh-Century Egypt", AAS, 22(1988)' 82.

19 Ibn al-MuqafTa', III , pt.2, 98-9 (Arabic), 165-6 (English); For a Christian vizie r of Sultan al-'Adil, see Safadi , IX, 22.

THE NON·MUSUM COMMUN ITIES 191

bers of the military class in the management of their properties and rural estates became an established practice that continued well into the Mamluk period. In fact the anlj·dhimmi spasm of ] 172 abated quickly. The need in 577/ 1181·1182 LO proclaim new edicts similar LO those of 564/ 11 68- 11 69 shows that. the situation returned to normal.

Following the reversion of a1-Hakim's persecutions of non­Muslims, in the late 1020's, the dhitntni communities invested great effort in recovering their religiolls establishments; synagogues, churches, monasteries and pious endowments, which had been damaged during the years of oppression. The destruction inflicted on religious institutions had wider implications for the ability of non·Muslims to conduct their li ves as communities. Synagogues, churches and monasteries were not merely houses of worship: they also served as focal points of communal life. The same happened in the 1160's and 1170's. Attempts to rebui ld damaged churches and monasteries Look place almost immediately after their destruc· tion by Nur a l-Din's expeditionary forces. For example, during a1-'Adid's rule a church that had been burnt by the Ghuzz and Kurds, in the Hamra' district of Fustat, was restored. 20 In some cases, churches that had been destroyed in 559/ 1163-1164, were already rebuilt in 560/ 1164-1165.21 Other churches were rebuilt between 1172 and 1186. including those in Qus and Asyut. 22 On the other hand, the small and feeble Melkite community was unable LO re-claim and restore its destroyed churches in the Hamra' di s­triCt. 23 But other churches in this area, destroyed either during Shawar's fire or deliberately, were re-bu ilt later.24

A very special case was the Armenian Christian community in Egypt. Following Saladin's rise to power in Egypt, the Armenian Patriarch left Cairo for Jerusalem (23 Rabi I 568/ 13 November 1172), and Armenian churches and monasteries were closed. Other churches which had been given LO the Armenians during the Fatimid period were reclaimed by their original owners, especially the Copts. However. even the Armenians tried LO rebuild their

20 Abu Salih, 106. 2 1 Ibid, 91, 96. 2'l Ibid,94-5 , 106, 121 ; 11 3, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 138 (see, also 95-6, 11 2-

3); 234, 235, 249. 23 Ibid, 96-7. N Ibid, 112-3, 119-22, 122-4, 125, 126-7.

)92 C H APTER SIX

churches. They were e ngaged in a lo ng and bitter di spute with the Copts, and both parties tri ed LO secure the goodwill of their new Ayyubid masters for their cause. 25 In Upper Egypt, an Arme­nian communi ty and its churches continued to exist unaffec ted by the tunnoilthat had befallen the Armenians in Cairo. The origin a fth e Armenian seulemem in Upper Egypt goes back to the 11 30's, the period of the Fatimid Armenian Christian vizier, Bahram. 26

However , the Christian communities did suffer some pennanent losses. For instance, the grants of land bestowed on Christia n institutio ns by former Fatimid rulers were appropriated by the new regime. The same is true of churches and monasteries that had been converted to mosques and of lands endowed to churches and monasteries that had been se ized by Saladin's troops.27 Simi­lar events took place during al-Hakim 's persecutions; houses of worship were conve rted to mosques and the land endowed to them taken and divided as iqta' among the soldiers . In such cases the cessa tio n and reversal of al-Hakim's persecutio ns had no effec t on the new status of those buildings and lands. The non-Muslims lost them for ever.

The Christian communities were also affected by Saladin's al­locatio n of iqta' to h is emirs. Land distributed as iqta' also housed churches and mo nasteries and this was the case in bo th the envi­ro ns of the capi tal and the countryside. Re la tions betw'een the recipients of iqla' and the Christian institutions on their land varied greatly. For example, a Syrian jurist who had received the Basatin area on the outskirts of the capital as an iqta' left the churches there untouched. Upon his death , the new holder of this iqta< closed two churches the re. Saladin 's bro ther who boug ht land which included a church refrain ed from inte rfe ring with i1. 28

Thus the pe rsecutions of non-Muslims in the early period of Ayyubid rule in Egypt had some permanent effects for the dhimmi communities. Nonetheless these effects were local and contained .29

25 Ibid, 3-4, 6, 8, 10-1, 13. 26 Ibid, 255; Lev, State, 126. 27 For such cases, see Abu Salih, 14 ,247-8,250. 28 Ib id, 3, 12, 141. 29 For local effecLS of the persecutions, see Abu Salih, 162-3, 165, 168,242,

256. For a systematic regional approach to Islami1.ation, see M. Martin, ~La Province d'Asmunayn: historique de sa configuration re ligieuse", Ai, 23( 1987), 1-28, esp. 23, where the stages of the process are discussed.

TtlI': NON·MUSLlM COMMUN ITI ES 193

Even the Armenian community in Egypt survived the persecutions.30

The Ayyubid rulers adhered to the basic parameters that deter· mined the position of non·Muslims in medieval Islam 31 and the implemel1l.alion of the legal restrinions imposed on non·Muslims by them was slack.~2 The persecutions by al·Hakim and the Ayyubids show that short periods of duress were not enough to bl-ing about a massive Islamization . Only pressure from below combined with the determined policies of rulers from above. as happened in the Mamluk period brought about the almost complete Islamization of Egypt. The powerfu l and extensive presence of the COplS at· tracted. th roughout the Ayyubid period. an ever more militant response from the Muslim religiolls class. But the deterioration of relations between Muslim society and the authorities and the non·Muslim communities LOok place only in the Mamluk period. first in Damascus and later in Egypt. ·n

"" For a con tinued Armenian presence in Egypt, see Abu Salih. 1·2, 13, 162· 3. 255. For the continued importance of the Armenians in the Christian an of Ayyubid Egypt, see Hunt, 142, 144.

5] This i5 the view of AshlOr. Sec, 308-9, It can be corroborated by fresh evi· dence. $ce, C. Khan "A Doc umen t of Appointment of a Jcwish Leader in Syria Issued by al·Malik al·Afdal 'Ali in 589 A. I'I. / 1193 A.D.", in Y. Ragib (cd), f)0Ct1-

1II1:1I/S dl:l'lslalll medieval, (Cairo-Pa ris, 1991 ),97-116, esp., 99, 11 , 3- 18 (text), 102 (t ran .), whe re the rcsponsibilities and powers of the head of lheJewish commu­nity arc enulI1erated.

52 E. Si\'an. "NOles sur la sit uation des chrcticns a r cpoque ay}'ubide\ RLvlJ.e de l '/,istoirll dllJ religions, CLXII(1967) , 121.

53 Thc decade 1250- 1260 and thc period thaI followed marked a change in the relations between Christians and Muslims in Damascus. See, Pouzet, 328-34. For the Islamization of the Copts in the Mamluk period. see D. P. Liltle, "Coptic COIH'crsion to Islam under the Ba hri Mamluk.s 692-755/ 1293-1354~. BSOAS, 39( 1976), 552·569.

CONCLUSIONS

I. Saladin was a man of his age: an age of constant warfare which saw the rise of ambitious military leaders to supreme power through the ranks. The very essence of civi lized society is that it creates religion, cullure and legal and political systems which curb vio­lence. Thus the quest for power by individuals had to accord with the fundamental values of society, or had at leasllo be presented as such. In other words, power and the quest for it had to be le­gitimized. unless violence is to be revolutionary violence which seeks to re-shape the values of socieLy and its institutions. But Saladin was not a revolutionary. Therefore his career must be examined within the framework of the established values ohhe Muslim society of his age. The need to see Saladin against the wider background of his period is a lso dictated by the character of our sources. Saladin's historian-admirers, especially Qadi al-Fadil and ' Imad al­Din , were towering pe rsons in the cultural life of their times and they presented Saladin through the prism of their own system of values.

The best example of how the values of the historians who wrote about Saladin determine the presentation of Saladin and his deeds is the killing of Shawar. Shawar examplifies the worst example of unrestrained behavior by any member of the military society of his age. Members of the civilian elite contemporary with Shawar­Ibn cAsakir and the poets in Egypt and Syria-saw his killing as a fully justified deed. However, later, when Qadi al-Fadil, <Imad al­Oin and Ibn Shaddad wrote their histories of Saladin, the passage of time diminished the role of Shawar's opportunism and mischief and what remained was the fact the Shirkuh had gained power by regicide. Saladin's historian-admirers re-wrote this incident and brought it into accord with their own system of values, in which there was no place for regicide.

The same entanglement of policies and their later presentations is evident in the accounts of the policies of Shirkuh and Saladin towards the Fatimid state and towards a l-cAdid himself. The Ayyubids were dispatched to Egypt to benefit their master, Nur ai-Din, by the conquest of the country or at least by gaining control of its resources. From Nur al-Din's point of view his intervention in Egypt weIlL sour because of Shawar's treachery and more significantly

CONCL US IONS 195

because the Ayyubids developed a taste for Egypt quite indepen­dent of their master. Ostensibly, the terminatio n of Fatimid rule by Saladin poses no difficulties of histo ri ca l presentation. Sunni Islam and Abbasid suzerainty prevailed over Isma' ili heresy. But the events were far more complex than that. Saladin, a man in the service of Nur ai-Din, became the Fatimid vizier, a servant of an Isma<ili heretic. Therefore his determined policies to under­mine Fatimid rule, the Battle of the Blacks, and, apparently, the killing of al-<Adid, had to be played down and even denied alto­gethe r. The manipulation of the accoun ts dealing with these policies was neccessary in order to avoid presenting Saladin as an oppor­tunist avid for power for himself and devoid of any moral restraint and scruple. What Saladin's historian-admire rs could present without any difficulty were Saladin's policies aga inst Ismailism. This aspect o f Saladin's policies is treated as standing by itself and divorced from the wider context o f his actions against the Fatimid state and dynas ty . The overthrow of the Fatimids brought Saladin inLO direc t conflic t with Nur ai-Din, an embarrassing po int which is simply denied by ' Imad ai-Din , but e mphas ized by the hostile Ibn al-Athir.

We sho uld always be aware that Qadi al-Fadil and ' Imad ai-Din who depict Saladin as blameless strive also to present themselves as people wi th integrity and scruples. ' Imad ai-Din was in the service of Nur ai-Din and later of Saladin, who deprived Nur al-Din's legitimate hei rs of their patrimony. ' Imad ai-Din feels no need to explain his shift of loyalties. He maintains that he already main­tained good rela tio ns with the Ayyubids whi le he was in the se r­vice of Nur ai-Din and he openly admires both Nur ai-Din and Saladin. Qadi al-Fadil was in a more difficult position; he had been in the selvice o f Shawar and the Fatimids, and had somehow to justify his shift in loyalties. We can regard Yaqut's account of the beginning of Qadi al-Fadil's caree r in th e service of Saladin as an version sponsored by Qadi al-Fadil himself, or at leas t as a ver­sion attmepting to portray him in a favorable light.

As a large number of scholars have already established-nota­bly Emmanuel Sivan, Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz, R. Stephen Hum­phreys, Malcom Cameron Lyons, D. E. P.J ackson and Hannes Moh­ring-the concept of Ho ly War was manipulated by rulers in the twelfth century for thei r political ends. They presented themselves as champio ns of the Holy War, a presentation supported , pro pa-

196 CONCLUSIO NS

ga ted if not invented sometimes by members o f the civilian e li te . In this context Qadi al-Fadil rendered to Salad in a tremendo us service: he presented Saladin's war against Nur al-Din's heirs as h aving a n ulterior motive-H oly War and the conquest of J erusa­lem.

II. Medieval warfare had its own rationale. For an agrarian pre­modern, pre-industrial society wa r was the main instrument for expansion and gaining wea lth. Agricultural land and the control of the peasantry constituted the main sources of wea lth. Towns with their trade and the urban econo my were a second source of weallh. Both sources of wealth could be best acquired by wars of conquest. From an economic point o f view wars agai nsllhe Cru­saders for the conquest o f land and towns made perfect sense. These wars also accorded well with the religious and political values of Muslim society in the twelfth century. Wars of defense made sense only when the core territories of the kingdom , on which its very existence depended, were threatened by an enemy. Within these parameters Saladin's battle for Acre made no sense at a ll .

Following the conquest of Acre, there was a divergence of opinion amo ng Saladin's advisors about what to do with the town. Some advocated the abandonmelll o fth e town whi le others pointed out to its strategic and economic value. Saladin chose to retain and fortify the town. Shortly aftenvards Acre came under Christian siege. From that very moment, from Salad in 's point of view. Acre instead o f being a future asset turned into a liability. The wisest thing to have done was to have given it up immedia te ly. Instead Saladin fought a lo ng, costl y and eventually disas tro us war for control of the town. It cannot be a rgued that Salad in was dragged into this struggle by the dynamics o f the war itself. DUI-ing the winte r the armies around Acre were much reduced and Saladin, had he so wished , could have evacuated the town and disengaged his forces from combat. It can be argued that Saladin fought the ballie for Acre in order to preserve his re puta tion as a warrior of the Holy War. To put it differently. Saladin fell victim to his own-or mo re accurately Qadi al-Fadil's-propaganda. But this argument has its limitations. The le ngth o f the period that Saladin chose to face the challenge of the Third Crusade and the tremendous stra in it put o n his resources make this argument look rather shallow. Saladin could have given up Acre expecting Qadi al-Fadi l. ' Imad

CONCLUS IONS 197

a i-Din and Ibn Shaddad to explain this as an necessity. Undoubt­edly, at the beginning of the battle for Acre, Saladin was confi­dent of his abi li ty to win this war. But as the batLle dragged on and the challenge of the Third Crusade intensified, Saladin's continuous war effort must be also seen as a reflection of his commitment to the ideology of Holy War.

Saladin was man of h is age, and on the who le his policies lacked any originali ty. His religiolls policy, the building of law colleges and Sufi convents, his tax decrees and his policy toward the Holy Cities of Arabia were the policies of his former master, Nur a l­Oin. T he same holds true of Salad in's military policy. The army that Salad in c reated in Egypt, with iLS tota l dependence on cav­alry and d isregard for infa ntry, was in direct line with the type of armies that emerged in the Muslim Middle East and Asia Minor, from the second half of the e leventh century o nward . It had iLS advamages as well as grave shortcom ings as is exemplified by the battle for Acre. Saladin's policies were in total accord with the re ligious and cultural va lues of his age and its political and mili­tary practices. His close aids and future historians-Qadi al-Fad il . <Imad ai-Din and Ibn Shaddad-could serve him without hesita­tion confidem L11at the deeds of their master corresponded to the ir own seLS of va lues and. al the same time, conformed to the world view of the whole o f contemporary society.

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INDEX

'abid, black milita ry slaves, 100 Abu Sha ma , hiSlOrian, ( h istorical

writings of), 18, 43, 62, 64; (usc of Ibn Abi Tayy), 4 1-2, 86, 89

Acre, 169, (besieged in 1189-11 91), 172-5; (Saladin 's navy in), 172·3, 179: (Christian Oeets in ), 174

Aden, (comme rcial importance 01), YI:I al-'Adid. Fatimid Imam . 12,2 1,50.57,

64 ,68, 7 1, 76,82,84,85. 90.91 , 133; (o rdering th e killing of Shawar), 47, 48,65: (death of), 82. 83

al.'Adil , Saladin's b ro th cr. ( rulcr o f Egypt), 22: (rule r o f Aleppo). 23; (campa igns in Egypt), 101 ; (properties in o:.ira). III

al-Afdal, Fatimid vizie r, 69; (religious policies). 125. 126. 178

al-MdalLJa'far ibn Muhanumld, c mi r, 78

Aleppo, (Shi 'i le Islam in). 6,: (Nur a l­Din 's relig io lls policy in ). 6, 132; (Saladin 'S religious policy in ), 132

Alexandria, (defended by Salad in in 11 67),108-9; (fortification of), 164: (po n s and arse nals in ), 162, 164 : (besieged in 117'1). 145. 164; (Maghrebi pil g rims in). 137·8: (taxation in), 135. 137, (Sunni Islam in), 16,20,78-9, 117, 119; (law col­leges in ), 16, 11 9- 120

alms-tax, 6, 133, scc also lakal Amalri c, Ki ng of J e rusalem , (ex pcd­

itions 1.0 Egypt). 59-60, 6 1: (relations wi th ByzaIHiulll ), 59, 60

al-Amir, Fatim id Imam , 69: (mosq ues built by), 12 1, 122

'ard, milita ry review, 141-2, 143, 148, 149. 150

Armenian(s). (i mmigration to Egypt), 68, 192, (sold iers in Fatimid Egypt), 87, 102-3, 141,185-6; (in Ayyubid Egypt), 19 1-3

arsenals, 161-2 Asadiyya, regim e nt, 80, 127 Ascalo n, (Qadi a l·Fadil's fa mily in), 14 ,

19-20, (conque n.-d by Ihe Crus.'tders), 14.53

Ash'ari, (theological doctrine). 4.130, 131

'(l.Jkar, military formalion, 142-3 Aswan, l i S; (auacked by the Nubians),

100 almh, see Turks Aytl lon. D., 146, 153. 154-5, 157 'Aydhab, 11 5, 134 Ayyubid(s), 77-8: (pe rsecutions o f non­

Muslims), 11 5-6, 186-7, 192; (101-e l, uion of non-Muslims), 192-3

Azhar, (as an Isma'i li mosque), 85. 121 , 136; (educatiollal activity in), 12 1; (pious e ndowments of), 121

a l-'Aziz, Fatimid Ima m . 99, 11 2. 122, 129

Badr al:Jamali, Fatimid \;zier, 68, 69, 99. 129, 185; (rel igious policies 01).1 18, 137

baql, agreement wit h the Nubian$, 99 h(mdil, taxes. 132. 133 batsha, a type of ship , 169, 170, 173, ISO,

18 1, 184 Bailie of Babayn, 45. 79, 145 Battle of the Bl ac ks, (\'crsions of), 49-

50,82, 110; (conseque nces of). 85. 84, 110, 141

Hatt ie of Mont Gisard, 144 Be nnett, M., 176 \ '0 11 Berche m , M .• 130 Bilbays, (besieged in 11 63), 56;

(conque red in 1167),59-60. 108 Blacks, (i n the Falimid army). 87. 100,

\02, 108, 116, 14 1, 150 Bosworth , C. E .. 2 Brett, M., 159 Bum e t, W. R. , 2 al-Bundari, Fath ibn 'Ali , historian, 30.

33, 88 Buni , Sharf ai-Din , jurist, 11 7·8 Buri , Saladin's brother, (properties of),

115 Byzantine, (naval fo rces), 59, 163, 17 1,

182

Cahen, CI. , 4 1, 62, 159

210 INDEX

Cai ro, (lsma'ili refere nces lO), 73-4; (military quarters in a nd outside of), 6 1,84, 108; (Fati mid pa laces in), il().I, 11 3; (Saladin 's hospital in ) , 112. 138; (Saladin 's khanqa in), 112, 125. 129, 138, 139; (mosques in ). 12()'2, 136, see also madraso

churches, <in Egypt), 11 5-6, 187, 191 ; (i n Fustal-Cairo), 187, 191, 192; (seized by the Ayyubids) , 120-2, 136; (destroyed), 187, 19 1; ( re-bu ild) , 19 1-2

Coope r, R. S., 159 Copts. (co nve rsio n 10 Islam). 189, 190,

193

Dadoyan. S. B., 12 Damascus, (under Nur al-Din's rule),

6-7; (unde r Saladin's rule), 139 Darnic tla , (besieged in 11 69), 84, 85,

109, 163; (fortificd bySaJadin ), 165-6

dar al-'adl. (d e finiti o n of), 7; (estab­lished by Nu r a i-Din ), 7, 9, 30

dar al-hadilh, (defini tio n of), 2; ( in Cairo), 126, 130

De ren bou rgh , H., II , Dirgham, Fatimid vizier, 13,20,21,108 diwan al-naUlr, see Office ofthc Inspec-

lion diwan al·UJkal, 134 dromon, a type of ship , 163 duslur, 160

Eddc , Anne-Mane, 153, 157, 158 Egyp t, (Sunni Islam in the Fatimid

period), 11 ~7; (economy of), 57, 58; (i nvaded by the Crusaders), 13,45-6,57-8,59; (military weakness unde r the Fatimids), 57, 6 1; (relations with Byzantium ),57, 103; (relation5 with Italian towns), 104, 177; (Medi te r­ranean coast of), 109, 163-6, 179-80; (naval resources of) , 177-8

Ehrenkre uLz, A. S., 43, 52, 195

Farama, (destroyed by the Crusaders), 109

faris/fursan, cavalry, 146, 147, 154 Fatimid , (state in Egypt), 48, 53-4, 6~

8,70,75-7,8 1,82,84, 108; (religious credentials). 67, 69, 70, 7 1, 73, 90; (ruling establishment), 82, 86; (state prope nies), 108, 109, III , 11 2, 11 3-4; (army), 61,67-8,84-5,87,88, I'll , 148, 150; (navy), 161-2, 167-8, 17~ 7, 18 1; (attitudes toward non­Muslims)' 185-7

Fayyum, (reven ues from) , 115, 168; (law colleges in), 130; (iqla' in ), 159

France, j. , 178 funduq, caravanserai, (built by Taqi al­

Din ), 113, 130: (built by Masrur), 127

Fustat, (set on fire in 1169), 50, 9 1, 108; (Saladin 's law colleges in), 124-5: (Taq i a l-Din 's law colleges in), 125; (the Hamara' district of), 114, 191 : (mosques in), 124-5, 136, 137, 138, 140; (Saladin 's hospital in), 138

ghulams, military slaves, 143 Ghuzz, 91. 157; ( maltreatment o f

Christians by), 11 5, 116, 187-8, 19 1 Gibb, H. A. R., 32, 37, 42, 52, Goldziher, I. , 130 Greek fire, (in naval warfare), 170, 171 ,

173, 175. 182; see also harraqat Gui lm artin Jr. j., 175

habs al-Juyushi, (confiscatio n of), 168 a i-Hafi z, Fatimid Imam, 19,71, 11 8 ,

11 9-20, 123 a i-Hakim , Fati mid Im am, (mosques

supported by), 120; (mosques built by), 120-1 ; ( pe rsecutio ns of non­Muslims by), 185, 190, 19 1

Hakkari , ' Isa, e mir, 49, 80 halqa, body guard, 127, 144, 156 hatnmalat, ships, 160, 18 1 harraqat, ships, 160, 170, 171 , 18 1, 182,

see also Greek firc hilali, tax, 132, 135 Holy Citics, of Arabia, ('Umara in the) ,

11 -2; (Nur ai-Din 's policy toward), 8-9; (Saladin's po li cy toward ), 103, 133-4, 197

Holl, P.M., 37 Holy War, 68; (in Nur al-Din's propa­

ganda), 54-5, 106, 195-6; (i n Sala-

INDEX 211

din's propaganda), 102-3, 104, 105, 106, 107, 196; (Sa ladin's comm it­llIent to), 19().7

H umphreys, R. S., 143, 153, 157, 195

Ibn Abi Tayy, histo ria n, (writings of), 41 ,42,50,78-9,80,86,89,94, 116, 167, 183; (ignored by other hi.'Horians), 41, 44

Ibn 'Asakir, historian, (writings of), 5, 10, 34, 62, 63; (biography of Nur a l­Oin by), 5, 6-9, 34, 35, 75, 13 1; (relations with NUl" aI-Din), 9; (on the killing of Shawar), 62-3, 64,

Ibn al-Athir, historian , (relations with 8<tdr ai-Din Lu' Lu'), 36, 40; (writings of), 36, 37-9, 46-7, 5 1, 79, 82, 94-5, 97; (hosti lity to Saladin), 37, 38, 40, 45,49,50-1,94; (reports on Saladin ), 38-9,40- 1,45,5 1, 124

Ibn 'Awf, al-Zuhri, jurist, 17; (madrasa of), 119-120

Ibn Bunan , al-Athir, jurisl. 77 Ibn Dirbas, Sadr aI-Din, cadi, (religious

policies of), 19,85-6, 131 Ibn Furat, historian , 4 1, 80; (on the

killing of Shawar), 65 Ibn Hajar, al-'Asqalani, biographer, 92 Ibn Hubayra, Yahya, Abbasid vizier, 28,

(policies of), 26 Ibn Jubayr, traveller, (description of

Alexandria by), 137-8; (description of Cairo by), 83-4, 138

Ibn Khallal , Qadi al-MuwalTaq, adm inistrator, IS, 19,70,76

Ibn Khallikan , biographer, 23, 30, 32, 80,82,83,87,89

Ibn Mammati , Muhadhdhab, admini­strator, (reports on armies), 150; (reports o n iqla'), 152; ( re ports on forests and n avy), 167, 18 1; (conversion to Islam ), 189: (family members) , 77, 89

Ibn Munqidh , Usama, (relations with Tala'i' ibn Ruzzik) , 55-6; (escape LO Syria), 56; (description of armi es), 145, 147, 154

Ibn a l-Qala nisi, historian , 18 1 Ibn a l-Qifti. biographer, 36, Ibn al-5ayrafi, admi nistrator, 15 Ibn Shaddad, historian, (education of),

5,33; (biography of Saladin by), 34-5

Ibn a l-Tuwayr, historian, 162 Ibn Wasil, hiSlorian, 43, 79,89 Ibn Zafir, hiSlOrian, (family background

of), 64; (on the killing of Shawar), 64-5, 82

Ibn al-Zubayr, Rashid , adminislr,ttor, 78,79

' ibm, 115 ' Imad aI-Din , hiSLOrian, (education of),

5, 26; (in tht: service of Ibn Hubayra), 26, 28; (in the se Eviee of Nur aI-Din), 26- 7, 32, 195; ( in the service of Saladin), 28-9, 30, 32, 195; (relations with Qadi al-Fadil), 29, 30-I ; (historical writings of), 18, 19,30, 31-2,33,35,45,87,88,14 1,172,174, 183;( poetl1' and literary writings of), 34,65-6, 88;(sel f-view), 3 1-2

iqlu'. ( ho ld by F:uimid emirs and troops), 82,150,158; (gil'en to naval officers). 167; (given to Ayyubid emirs and troops), 100, 152, 159, 190, 192; ( the Ayyubid syste m of), li S, 159-60; (th e Zengid system of) , 159; (gi"e n to emir of Mecca), 8, 134; (distributed by Saladin), 82, 148, 149, 159-60; (given to Bedouin ), 96, 148

Ismailism (in Fatimid Egypt), 116-8, 140 if/ma', patronage , 186

Jackso n, O. E. P., 195 al:Jarjara'i, 'A li ibn Ahmad, Fatimid

vizier, 123; (letter of appointment), 70-"

J erusalem, (in Nur a i-Din 's propa­gallda), 106; (i n Saladin's propa­ga nda) , 102, 104, lOS, 107

Jews/ Jewish , (physicians), 127, 128, 189, 190: (administrators), 50, 87, 186; (sources),59

jihad. see Holy War jitya, poll-tax, 10 Jurdik, ' Izz aI-Din, emir, 46, 62, 63

kala tn, 2, see also Ash'ari Kamil, son ofShawar, Fatimid vizier, 13;

(Ieue r of appointment), 73, 74 al-Kam il , Ayyubid Sul tan, 125, 126, 127,

128, 130 Khabushani, Najrn aI-Din, ascetic, (hos-

212 INDEX

tilil)' 10 Ih~ Fatimich). 82; (relations with Saladin ), 82·3. 84,125.138.139

khan, car.l\'an~r.ai, 7 It.honqa.. (definition of), 2, 3, 4, 7; (bui ll

by Saladin), 112, 125. 129, 138 Jeharaj. land tax, 10 Khusrdu, Nasir-i, traveller, 162;

(desc riplion of Falimid palaces). 110: (reports 0 11 Christians in Fatimid Egypl), 186

Kurds. 32; (i n Ayyubid armies), 150-1, 152. 157

l:1w colleges. 3; (eslabtished by Saladin), 112, 124, 126; (established by Taqi ai-Din), 112; (established by Ayyubid emirs, SlIltam and women), 113, 126-7,130; (established by NUT ai-Din), 6, 2708

Lu'lu', Badr ai-Din. "Iabeg of Mosul , 36, 40,

Lu'Lu', Husam ai-Din, admiral, (in the Red Sea), 184; (in Acre), 173; (buildings of). 127-8, 184

Lyons, M . C., 195

madrasa, (definition of), 2, 130-1; (pious endowments of), 6,129,130,131; (in Iran ), 2; (al-Nizamiyya in Baghdad), 2,26; (in Aleppo), 6; (in Damascus). 7,27-8; (al-Hafiziyya in Alexandria). 119, 120; (al-Nasiriyya in FU5tat), 124; (of Arsufi in Funat ), 12S-9; (of West Mrican pilgrims in Fustat). 129; (a l-N asiriyya in the Qarafa) , 125, 129; (al-Sali hiyya in Cairo), 12&-7; (a l-Fadi liyya ill Cairo), 128; (al­Suyuliyya in Cairo), 129; (al­Qamhiyya in Cairo), 64,I29 • .see also law college

Makdi5i. G., 3, 130, 13 1 al.Makhzumi, Abu ' I-Hasan, admini­

nrator, 77-8 mamlu.u. military 5laves, 153, 156, 157 Maqrizi, historian. (historical writings

of),43,44,82,86,93.94,116.117, 143, 148; (Ol! a source for Saladin's policies). 43. 44, 9S-9.131·2, 134, ISO, 167-8; (use of Qadi al-Fadil by), 43-4; (reports on Fatimid.Ayyubid armies), 143, 14S-9, 150

m(UIIIIa(/" martyrium. (of Husayn). 121-2, 13&-7. 140

Masrur, emir. (military career of). 78, 156; (bui ldings and charities of), 127

mawlid a/· nab" festival, 4 military da\'ery. (inSlillition of). 154-5 military sla\'es, see ghulanuand mom/uks minbar. 106 Mohring. H " 107, 195 monasterics, 115-6 mosque, (as an educational in5titution).

3. see also Azhar. Cairo and FU5tat Mu'ayyad Ii-Din. ai-Shirazi, Fatimid

propagandiu, (repo rts on Jews in Fatimid Egypt). 186

mudarriJ, law profellSor. 27. 33 mu'id, teaching assistant, 33 muhw, taxes, 132, 133 mullt. land ho ld by Ayyubid family and

emirs, 115-6 al-Mundhiri. biogr.tphcr, 16,26 I1Iwaltah, a type of ship. 160 al-MuSlansir. Fatimid Im am. 68, 112,

125

Nabulusi, 'Ulhman ibn Ibrahim, administrator, 150

nOlflOl, bombs of, 170, 182 navy, (in Fustat-Cairo), 161 -2; (in

Damielta). 162; (in Alexandria), 162, 167; (timber for the) , 167, 182; ( manpower for the) , 167, 183; (officers of the), 184; (of Saladin), 168- 75,182-3; (oflh e Italian towns). 177-8, 5ce also Fatimid

nazir fi maUllim, 9, 30, 74, 75 Nicolle, D" 144 Nishapur, 2 Nizam al·Mulk, Seljukid vizier,

(religious policy of), 2, 3; (military policy of), 155. 156

Nubia, (Fatimid re lations with), 99; (Ayyubid conquest of). 97, 98, 99, 100

Nur ai-Din, (pormlyed by Ibn 'Asaki r), 6-9,75; (portrayed by ' Imad al·Din), 10-1; (baraA:a of). 8; (religious policies), 4, 6, 10, 26. 131·2. 139; (policy toward Egypt), 45-6, 53, 54, 55, 57, 62, 141-2, 194-5 ;(rule in A1eppo),6, 132; (rule in Damascus), 6-7; (warrior or the Holy War). 6. 8,

INDEX 213

9, 10, 106; (titles of), 106; ( \'irlllcs and rtligiosity). 6,7; (buildings aI), 7,8; (policy to .... a rd the Ho ly Cilies of Arabia), 8, 197

Nuw3yri, historian, 58, 60

Office of the Army, 15, 17,77,78,150, 157, 160

Office or the Chamber, 157 O ffi ce oflhe Chancery. IS, 18, 27, ~2,

69, 76, 120 Office of the Finance, 27 Office of Fust:k1 , 77 OlTtce o f the I-Io iy War, 169 Offict of thc Ilispectio n , 77 Office of the Iqt,\', 157 Office of the Navy. 167-8, 169 Offict of thc " ious Endowment, 134

see a lso ditIJall orpha ns, educa tion or, 7, 24, 128

Pallon . D., 36 pious endowment(s), (rol' law colleges) ,

6, 10, 112, 11 9, 120, 125; (for mosques). 120-1. sce also hubs

prison trs-of-war, (ranso m of), 4; (capturt:d in naval raids), 155, 166, 169

Pryor,J. H., 59, 171 . 178

Qadi al·Fadil, (fa mily background 01), 14·5. 19.20; (educa tio n 01). 15-6; (historical writin~ of). 25, 43, 44, 83, 88. 92. 143 ; (poe try a nd rasa'if w\'itings 01) , 17-8,2 1, 24, 25, 44 ; (let­ters ofappoinl mc lll written by), 18, 6~9. 76; (relatio ns with Shawar), 20· I ; (ill lhe service o f Shirkuh ), 17, 18. 19,2 1, 78; (propagandist of Saladin ), 22-3. 102·3,10'1, 105-6, 107, 14 1, 148, 149, 196; (defende r of Saladin 's rul e), 86. 87, 9 1·2, 93; (admini­strative duties 01), 22; (C$trangement from Saladin ), 23; (later life of), 23; ( .... eal th a nd properties of), 23, 24, 114; (chari ties of). 24 , 128; (madrllStl of), 128; (alii tudes towa rd non· Muslims). 188, 189-90

Qalqasha ndi , histOrian , 18-9, 74-5, 17 1 Q-... rafa, cemetery. (buildings in ), 123-

4 , 128; (populatio n a nd religious life

in ), 123-4, 126. 139; (Shafi'i's tomb in),82, 125

qaraghulam, (d e finiti o n 01), 143; (number.; of). 143-4, 148

Qaraqush, Ba ha' ai-Din , emir, 3 1-2. 80, III

Qaraqush. Sharfa\-Din, emir, 101. 152 qatIJurir, see na fta

Rabie. 1-1 .• 159 rasa'it, (written b), Q;ldi al.Fadil ), 24·5;

(writtcn by Ibn al· Sayrolli ), 15 Red Sea, ( Mu.~ lirn naval presence in ),

170· 1. 182. 184 ribal, (dc finition aI), 7; (huilt b)' and

for women). 122·3 Ric hards, D. S., 32, 34, 62 Ridwan , Falimid vi/ier, 7 1, (religious

policies 01), 11 9-20 Ruzzik ibn Tala'i'. Fatimid vil.icr. 13. 17,

74-5

jadaqa, charity. (distributed by Nur al­Oin ), 6, 7

Saladin , (as Fatimid vizie r), 49. 69, 76. 80.8 1; (plo t ag-... inst Shawa r). 47·9, 62·3,64; (Ie lle r ofappoiuunenl ) , tiS-9; (titles of). 34, 124; (virtues 01), 35; (religiosi ty of), 34, 35-6; (warrior of the I-Io ly Wa r). 1,35,39. 102, 103, 104, 105-6, 107, 196-7; (legi timacy of rule), 40, 102, 105-6, 107; (an ti· Isma' ili policies of). 50-1, 85, 86, 124, 136, 195; (religious policies of), 50-1, 131-2,136; (tax policy of), 132·3, 135, 137-8, 197; (policy toward the Ha l)' Cities), 103, 133-4, 197; (army in 1171) , 143-4, 148, 149; (army in 11 77), 144; (army in 118 1), 148, 149; (naval policy 01). 167-8, 175·6, 182· 3; (iqla' policy of) , 82

Salih Ayyub, Ayyubid Sultan , 126, 130 Seljuks, (spread o f the ), 147·8:

(re ligious policies o f the), 4 Shawar, Fatimid vizier, (rise to po ..... e r ).

13, 71 -2; (Ieuer ofappoinunellt), 7 1· 2,73; (titles of), 72; (relations with 'Um ara), 12: (burning of FU5la t by), 60-1; (the killing of), 4~7, 48, 62·3, 64,65, 194

Shirkuh , (campaigns in Egypl) , 45, 46. 57-8, 141·2; (plo t against Shawar),

2 14 I NDEX

46-7; (letter of appoilllment), 67-9; (titles of), 17,67. 168; (persecm ions or non-M uslims by), 188-9

shini, a type or ship, 172 al-Silafi, JUI'ist, 17, 119 Sivan, E., 106, 195 Smoor, P., I I. 17, 18 Stern, S. M., 117

Tala'i',ibn Ruzzik, Fatimid vizier, (risc to power), 53; (relations with 'Ulnard), 12, 13; (religious policies 01), 12, 17, 177; (wa rs against the Crusaders), 53-4, 55; (mosques built by), 121-2; ( the ki lling 01).12-3,55

Taqi ai-Di n . Saladi n 's nephew. 10 1; (properties in FUSLOlI-Cairo). 95; (law colleges established by), 112, 130

lorida, a type of ship. 163-44, 170 tawa.shi, (defi nitio n of), 143, 136;

(numbers of), 143-4, 148. 149 lax/ taxation, (levied on pilgrims), 8,

133-4; (permitlcd by law), 8, 10, (Nur a i-Di n policy), 7, 8, 10, 135; (Saladin po licy), 132·3, 135, 137,see a lso baratil, jiz.Ja, m Ilkus

Ti bawi, A. L., 13 1 T innis, (attacked by the Nonnans), 165;

(auacked by the Crusaders), 109; (rortifications of), 165--6

Tsugitaka, S., 159 Tughtakin, Saladin's brother, 77, 134

(properties of), 11 6 tulb, military rormation, 143 Turanshah, Saladin's brother, 83, 96;

(relatio ns with 'U mara ). 89 98; (ex pedition to Ye men). 89, 97, 98-9; (in the Battle or lhe Blacks), 97; (campaigns in Nubia), 100: (iqlo's in

Egypt). 11 5; (wealth a nd prope rties in Cairo), 98, II I

Turkme n, (recruited by Nu r al·Di n ), 14 1·2; (in Saladin's army), 151 . 152, see also turkumon

Turks, 32; (i n Ayyubid <!.rmies), 152, 157-8

turkumall. 141. 147·8, 151. see also Turkmen

Turtushi,jurisl, 11 8, 119

'U mara. (ed ucatio n of). II , 89; (in Yemen and Arabia), I ().I; (i n Eb'YPI). II ; (relations wi th ru lers), I I , 12, 13, 2 1,89,98; (rela tion with Qadi al· Fadil ), 17,90,93; (writings of), II , 2 1,9 1; (poe try of), 89, 90, 93-4; (executed by Saladin), 88. 89. 93

Usama. see Ibn Munqidh

\Villiam or Tyre, Archbishop. (repora o n Muslim armies). 144, 145, 147, 155, 156; (reports on Christi a n n eels). 163. 170; (desc riptio n or Cairo by), 110

YaquI, a l.Hama ..... i, biographer, 19,21, 195

JOlA. military rormation, 156 Yazkuj. e mir. 127 Yemen, (Ismail ism in ), 97; (Ayyubid

conquest 00, 89, 96. 97-8

Zabid , ('U mara in ), 11,89 a l·Zalir, Fatimid Imam , 20, 53. 83, 122 al·Zahir, Fatim id Imam, 122 z.okol, 101 , 133, 134, 137, 138, see also

a lms-tax

THE

MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN

PEOPLES, ECONOM IES AND CULTURES, 400-1453

Editors: Michael Whitby (W'arwick), Paul Magdalino, Hugh Kennedy (SL Andrews), David Abulafia (Camblidgc), Benjamin Arbcl (l'cI Aviv),

Mark Meyerson (Notre Dame).

This selies provides a forum for the publication of scholarly work relating to lhe interactions of peoples and cultures in the Medit erranean basin and the Black Sea area and is intended fo r readers wi th int.erest in late antiquity, the Middle Ages (h aly, Spain, the Latin East), Byzantium, Islam, the Balkans and the Black Sea. Manuscripts (in English, Gennan and French) should be 60,000 to 120,000 words in length and may include illustrations. The editors would be particularly interested to receive proposals for monograph studies; studies with texts; editions witll paraJleI translalions or lexts or collections of documents; or translations provided wilh rull annotation.

I. Shatzmiller, ;,,1. (cd.), Crusaders and Muslims ill T we!flh -CtIl/ury ~n·a. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09777 5

2. T sougarakis, D., 71u Lift oj Leontios, Pa/narch oJ Jmt.raltm. Text , Translation , Commentary. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09827 5

3. Takayama, H. , TIe AdministratwlI if the Norman Kingdom if Sicily. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09865 8

4. Simon, LJ. (cd.), [berio. and tire Mediterranean World if tire Middk Ages. Studies in Honor of Robert I. Burns SJ. Vol. I. Proceedings rrom Kalamazoo. 1995. ISBN 90 04 101683

5. St6ckly, D. Le sysUme de ['[neanto des galies du marchi a Venise (fill X[lIe_ milieu XV'" ,~,k. 1995.9004100024.

6. Estow, C., Pedro tJ~ C"'" qfCastiie, 1350-/369. 1995. ISBN 90 04 100946 7. Stalls, W.C. , Possessing the Lond. Aragon's Expansion into Islam's Ebro Frontier

under Alfonso the Battler, 1104-1134. 1995. ISBN 90 04 103678 8. C hevedden, P.E., OJ. Kagay & P.G. Padilla (cds.), [herio. and the Meditmallean

World if the Middk Ages. Essays in Honor or Robert I. Burns Sj. Vol. 2. Proceedings rrom 'Spa in and the Western Mediterranean ', a Colloquium Sponsored by The emier for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Unive rsity or Calirornia, Los Angeles, October 26-27, 1992. 1996. ISBN 9004 105735

9. Lev, Y. (cd.), War and SOCU!Y ill the £aslem Meditmanean, 7th-15th Cellturin. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10032 6

10. Ciggaar, K.N. , Weslern TrfllJellers to COrlStantinopk. T he West and Byzantium, 962-1 204: Cultural and Political Relations. 1996. ISBN 90 04 106375

II. Skinner, P., Health and Medicine in Early Medieva[ Southem [taly. 1997. ISBN 90 04 103945

12. Parry, K. , Depicting the Word. Byzantine Iconophile Thought of tllC Eighth and Nintll Centuries. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10502 6

13. Crisafulli, V.S. & j.W. Nesbitt, TIle Miracles of St. Artemios. A Collection of Miracle Storics by an Anonymous Author of Scventh-CentLllJ' Byzantium. 1997. ISBN 90 04 105743

14. Antonopoulou, 1'., The Homilies of the Emperor Leo VI. 1997. ISBN 90 04 108149

15. Tougher, S., The Reign of Uo VI (886-912). Politics and People. 1997. ISBN 9004 10811 4

16. O'Callaghan, J .F., Alfonso X and the Cantigas de Santa Maria. A Poetic Bio­graphy. 1998. ISBN 90 04 110232

17. Gilmour-Bryson, A., The Trio.l of tJu Templnrs in Cyprus. A Complete English Edition. 1998. ISBN 90 04 100806

18. Reyerson, K. &J. Orendel (cds.), Urbml and Rural Communities in Medieval France. Provence and Languedoc, 1000-1500. 1998. ISBN 90 04 10850 5

19. Kagay, OJ. & T.M. Vano (eds.), On the Social Origins of MedievaL Institutions. Essays in Honor of J oseph F. O'Callaghan. 1998. ISBN 90 04 11096 8

20. ferreiro, A. (cd.), the V"z.sigoths. Studics in Cultu re and Socicty. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11206 5

21. Lev, Y., Saladin in EgyP'. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11221 9