i

TITLE PAGE

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION AND REGULATORY AGENCIES IN NIGERIA: A FOCUS ON THE ECONOMIC AND

FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION (EFCC), 2000-2010

ii

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this research work has met the requirements of the Department

of Political of Science, for the Award of a Masters of Science (M.Sc.) Degree in Political

Science of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and is approved.

BY

-------------------------- --------------------------

Prof. Jonah I. Onuoha Date

(Project Supervisor)

------------------------- -------------------------

Prof. Obasi Igwe Date

Head of Department

-------------------------- ---------------------------

Prof. Emmanuel O. Ezeani Date

Dean of Faculty

External Supervisor ---------------------------

Date

iii

DEDICATION

To the

Well Being and Good Health of my Parents,

Mr. and Mrs. Nkemegbunam Anselem Uzendu.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

To the Glory of God. I am immensely grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Jonah I.

Onuoha whose effort ensured the success of this work. Prof, your cordial relationship with

your supervisees and the students at large, speaks much of your professionalism and kind

spirit, I cannot thank you enough.

To my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Nkemegbunam Anselem Uzendu, my siblings (Henry

Chukwujike, Colombus Udochukwu, David Ifeanyi, Rosemary Ifunanya and Augustine

Chimobi), my uncles and aunt, (Boniface Uzendu, Okezie Uzendu and Marcy Ndu, nee

Uzendu and their respective families) etc, I appreciate all of you for seeing me through to

the end of the turnel, as the light shines upon me now.

To my room-mates, friends and well-wishers: Ukanwa Oghajie E., Ogbu Ejike C.,

Adibe Raymond C., Eze Ojukwu Onoh, Okoye Kingsley E., Anya Okoro Ukpai, Ukeka

Chinedu D., Dickson Agwuabia, Chris Onyekachi Omenihu, Sampson Eziekeh,

Ogochukwu Nnaekee and host of others whose influences have helped to shape my life to

better. I appreciate the communal living and mutual understanding that exist amongst us.

Your company provides me comfort and, makes me feel at home away from home. Thanks

to all of you for helping me overcome part of my greatest life challenges. I cannot still forget

my special friend, Miss. Roseline Akuabia Emoh, please thanks for everything. All the 2009

Post Graduate Students of the University of Nigeria, particularly those from the Department

of Political Science, I wish all of you the best.

I extend my gratitude to all the lecturers and staff of the political science department

as well as all the staff of Nnamdi Azikiwe Library, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for their

big assistance. Please bear with me if your name does not appear on this page, our space is

limited. Always remember that you will remain on the limitless page of my heart till

eternity.

Uzendu Anselem Chinedu.

Department of Political Science.

University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Logical Data Framework (LDF) for the Study--- --- --- --- 26

Table 2. Abacha’s Loot Profile--- --- --- --- --- --- --- 38

Table 3. Individual Loot Profile in Naira--- --- --- --- --- --- 41

Table 4. Nigeria’s Position in Transparency International Perception Index --- 78

Table 5. Twenty-One Wire Transfer by Nnamani in Foreign Banks--- --- 83

Table 6. Loot by Public Officials Discovered in Foreign Accounts --- --- 86

Table 7. EFCC’s High Profile Cases in Nigeria--- --- --- --- --- 96

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ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with the political economy of corruption and regulatory agencies in Nigeria. It focused on the critical assessment of the performance of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in its fight against political corruption in Nigeria since its creation. Thus, this study is guided by the following research questions: (1) Has the EFCC accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria between 2000 and 2010; (2) To what extent does dual legitimacy of criminality influence the performance of the EFCC in Nigeria. To achieve our objectives of this study, we relied on the observational technique and documentation as our method of data collection. This implied that data were generated from the secondary sources, which were analyzed with the use of qualitative descriptive analysis as well as table presentations and percentages. We adopted the theory of social production and reproduction as the viable framework of analysis that explained how the activities of the EFCC have been constrained by certain environmental conditions. We observed that the EFCC has remained a tool of social and economic domination of the ruling class over the rest of the society. The study concluded that political corruption will remain unabated in this current social structure of dependence of the EFCC on the ruling class and that EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of corruption in Nigeria. Unless these environmental conditions change, the EFCC will not accomplish its statutory obligation. However, we recommend that there is need to review the penal codes in our constitution, which will stipulate in clear terms the procedure and punishments for all categories of corrupt practices especially within the public sector.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- i

Approval Page--- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- ii

Dedication --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- iii

Acknowledgement --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- iv

Abstract --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- v

List of Tables --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- vi

Table of Contents --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1

1.2 Statement of Problem --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 6

1.3 Objective of Study --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 8

1.4 Significance of Study --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 8

1.5 Literature Review --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 9

1.6 Theoretical Framework --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 20

1.7 Hypotheses --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 24

1.8 Method of Data Collection --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 24

1.8.1 Method of Data Analysis --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 25

1.8.2 Logical Data Framework for the Study --- -- ---- --- --- 26

CHAPTER TWO: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND THE ORIGIN OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION (EFCC) IN NIGERIA. 2.1 Introduction --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 28

2.2 A Historical Overview of Corruption in Nigeria --- --- --- --- 28

2.3 The Origin of EFCC in Nigeria --- --- --- --- --- --- 42

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2.4 Establishment of the EFCC Act 2002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 44

2.5 The Institutional Structure of the EFCC --- --- --- --- --- 47

CHAPTER THREE: EFCC AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: THE JOURNEY SO FAR.

3.1 INTRODUCTION --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 51

3.2 EFCC and Political Corruption in Nigeria --- --- --- --- --- 52

3.3 EFCC and Obasanjo’s Anti-Corruption in Nigeria --- ---- --- --- 55

3.4 EFCC and Yar’dua War Against Corruption in Nigeria --- --- --- 60

3.5 EFCC and Plea Bargain Issue in Nigeria --- --- --- --- --- 62

CHAPTER FOUR: DUAL LEGITIMACY OF CRIMINALITY AND THE PERFORMANCES OF THE EFCC IN NIGERIA.

4.1 INTRODUCTION --- --- --- --- --- --- ---- --- 72

4.2 Dual Legitimacy and Political Corruption in Nigeria --- --- --- --- 72

4.3 The Performance of EFCC in Nigeria --- --- --- --- --- --- 76

4.4 The Ineffectiveness of EFCC in fighting Corruption in Nigeria --- --- --- 91

4.5 The EFCC’s high Profile Cases in Nigeria --- --- --- --- --- 95

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Summary --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 113

5.2 Conclusion --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---- --- 116

5.3 Recommendation --- --- ---- --- --- --- --- ------ --- 117

BIBLIOGRAPHY --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- 120

1

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is one of the most

acclaimed anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria saddled with the responsibility of fighting and

reducing the rate of political corruption (financial crimes) in Nigeria. Over the years, their

activities and performance have raised unending debate and intellectual controversies on

whether they have actually performed or not based on the accomplishment of their statutory

mandate since their creation. Hence, there is no agreement among scholars and

commentators on the performance of EFCC. Consequently, two contending intellectual

divided or schools of thought have emerged to explain the nature and character of the EFCC

and how their performance have affected the state over the years in terms of reducing the

rate of corruption or not. The first is the bourgeois school while the second is the radical

school of thought.

Essentially, the bourgeois scholars believe that the EFCC is instituted to curb the

menace of corruption in Nigeria. According to them, EFCC has succeeded in accomplishing

its statutory mandate by fighting and reducing the rate of corruption involving financial

crimes in Nigeria. One of the proponents of the bourgeois scholars, Babafemi, in Alli

(2010:1) observed that the EFCC is an enduring institution that is better equipped to deal

with all forms of economic crimes in a way that will impact and enhance positively a

sustainable national development. He further observes that since June 2008, when Mrs.

Farida Waziri assumed office, she had been doing a lot with her team to break records and

surpass past records. That in both administrative and operational angles, EFCC has placed

2

several measures and strategies to chart a new course for the anti-graft agency, but has

equally and painstakingly commenced processes of revitalization, restructuring, re-

orientation, repositioning and re-building among others to build an institution around

structures and processes rather than individuals. In line with the above, other bourgeois

scholars believe that EFCC, as an agency established to fight corruption has indeed taken up

the gauntlet in reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria. For them, generally,

EFCC has made tremendous success in accomplishing its mandate in terms of fighting and

reducing the rate of corruption in Nigeria.

On the other hand, the radical scholars are of the view that EFCC has not

accomplished its objectives in terms of curbing the menace of political corruption. For them,

EFCC has failed, it is seen as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class to fight and

dominate its oppositions whose interest is not in conformity with that of the ruling class. On

of the laudable proponent of the radical scholars, Adamu (2005:1) opined, reading “EFCC:

justice, not politically persecuted”, by one Yashau Shaib and published in the punch

newspaper of January 9, 2006, that:

I am compelled to make a comment. I wonder how one can commend government for the establishment of agencies and institutions whose creation is questionable. What is government’s ulterior motive behind the establishment of those agencies? But since we are in a democracy, we can’t do without having divers opinions.

Though the Olusigun Obasanjo administration, by some of its policies, might seem to love the values of democracy, It is quite glaring that it is afraid of its principles. For example, when the president instituted the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) many Nigerians applauded his effort. The hope of Nigerians then was that all those who had hand in the looting of the nation’s treasury, thus depriving ordinary

3

Nigerians their share of the national cake, would be brought to book, irrespective of their social, economic and political stand. While commending the acts of former police IG, Tafa Balogun, and the impeached governor of Bayelsa state, Dr. Diepreye Alamieyesiegha, in their totality, events around the EFCC have clearly shown that it is nothing more than a tool with which the government hunts and persecutes its political opponents.

Generally, the radical scholars believe that the EFCC has not accomplished its

statutory mandate; rather it is served as a tool of persecution of oppositions in the hands of

the ruling class.

For us, EFCC’s performance has not addressed the problems for which it was created. Thus,

we attribute this poor performance of the EFCC to certain environmental conditions which

influence their performance in terms of accomplishing its statutory mandate in reducing the

rate of political corruption in Nigeria. Such environmental conditions that impede EFCC’s

performance include Dual legitimacy of criminality and the irony or paradox o fighting

corruption by corrupt individuals. It is assumed that one does not make laws against his own

will. Unless these environmental conditions change, EFCC performance will not change

from what it is at present.

However, form the other side of the variables of this study, we will not fail to

understand that corruption is a necessary condition that gave birth to the establishment of the

EFCC. Corruption is not a recent phenomenon that pervades the Nigerian state. In all

ramifications, it is one fundamental problem confronting Nigeria today. Particularly,

political corruption has manifested in various means such as embezzlements,

mismanagement, nepotism, military coups, looting of public treasury, bribery, vote buying

and other abuses of office etc. Nigeria has been independent for 50 years now and recently

4

celebrated her Golden Jubilee anniversary, which in my own opinion was a celebration of

poverty in plenty and continual success in dominance of the group that captured the state

shortly after independent. Nigeria had experimented about seven military and five civilian

administrations since independence and the high incidences of corruption in about all sectors

in the country pose a serious threat to development efforts in Nigeria.

Since the creation of modern public administration in the country, there have been

cases of official misuse of resources for personal enrichment. Hence, the rise of public

administration and the discovery of oil and natural gas are two major events seen to have led

to a litany ignoble corrupt practices in the country. Over the years, the country has seen its

wealth withered with little to show in living conditions of the average human being.

Following the stupendous oil wealth, comes political corruption, mismanagement

and incompetence in government. Corruption brought about instability, insecurity, and

failure of institutions. Hence, politics in Nigeria has become a do or die affair since political

power is now a strategy for stealing public funds. For instance, it is common practice for top

government jobs to be filled with cronies who serve as conduit for siphoning public funds to

foreign accounts.

As Dudley noted, that political power provides a rare opportunity to acquire wealth

and prestige to be able to distribute jobs, contracts, gift of money, etc, to allies (Dudley,

1982: 30-31). The implication of Dudley’s argument is that the communities and relatives of

the politicians who control political power support the stealing that is prevalent in the

political system since they are directly or indirectly, the beneficiaries of such political

corruption.

5

Indeed, corruption is dangerous and inimical to the systemic existence of any polity.

It is socio-political, economic and moral malaise that may permeate and cripple, as a result

of its contagiousness and malignancy, the nerves of any polity. It is an intolerable

characteristic that should be discouraged in governance because once it sets into any part, it

automatically contaminates all the strata of the system’s multidimensional hierarchy in ways

symmetrical to the spread of a bush fire (Akindele, 1995:37).

Equally, Ifesinachi (2003:27), captured these debilitating effects of corruption in

terms of the argument on the prevalent social values, corruption appears to have overthrown

and defined commonsense and logic both in the public and private realm in some African

States like Nigeria. It is in recognition and the effort to stem these ugly trends that the

Obasano’s administration had responded by lunching a number of campaigns and strategies

against corruption. Meanwhile, despite the laudable measure and strategies by the

Obasanjo’s administration to curb corruption, the concerns of various eminent citizens and

scholars in the country and outside is that the previous regime left a horrendous stinking

legacy of covering up for current and potential looters of Nigerian treasury since it is those

who set up the regulatory institutions are still the same people that loot the public treasury.

The implication of this scenario is that the regulatory institutions will be ineffective

and weak. These facts have necessitated the background to the emergent of this research,

which we shall try to accomplish through the study of one of the mostly acclaimed anti-

corruption institutions, the Economic and financial crime commission (EFCC), and how far

their activities have hindered or helped to curb the incidence of political corruption in

Nigeria.

6

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Political corruption is the major challenge facing Nigeria today, and its debilitating

ancillaries such as graft, nepotism, embezzlement, looting, abuse of office, etc. These factors

have stunned the growth of the country in all areas of her endeavors. In order to curb the

menace cause by political corruption in Nigeria, former President of Nigeria, Chief

Olusegun Obasanjo, in 2002, instituted the Economic and Financial Crime Commission

(EFCC), after other attempts to stem corruption had been proven abortive. Abumere, quoted

in Ezeani and Elekwa (2006:339), recollected that President Obasanjo had declared in his

inaugural speech on May 29, 1999 that “corruption, the greatest bane of our society today

will be tackled head on at all levels and there will be no sacred cows; nobody, no matter who

and where, will be allowed to get away with the perpetuation of corruption”. Meanwhile in

today’s experience, the reverse seemed to be the case. Observation proves that corrupt

public personnel are usually convicted when they have a contradicting interest with the

power that be.

Furthermore, political corruption is pervasive in Nigeria and has been

institutionalized such that not only that, officials are corrupt, but corruption is official

(Clark, 1995:125). Corruption has taken different forms and shapes in Nigeria such as

endemic planned and developmental corruption (1991:47), to comment with obvious

impatience that these forms of corruption, notably; endemic, planned and developmental

corruption is a classic vicious circle capable of destroying Nigeria completely.

However, the effect of political corruption in any given society can never be over-

emphasized, especially as in the case of contemporary Nigeria where political corruption has

7

eaten deep into the fabrics of our national life and where political power is used to

expropriate loot and plunder public wealth. Public officials use their positions to extend

undue favour to their Kith and kin as well as their political loyalists. Worse still, the

Nigerian state is deeply immersed in political corruption (Okolie, 2003:338).

Despite the enormous and detailed investigations conducted into this work, there still

exist hitherto some gap, lapse and unanswered questions by scholars and commentators to

which this research hopes to address and therefore, add to the incremental body of

knowledge and debates towards finding a viably inbuilt mechanism which can effectively

checkmate the incidence of political corruption and fraudulent financial transactions within

the public sector. Thus, there are two major strands of analysis which help to explain our

problematique. The first is to assess in EFCC performance in accomplishment of their

statutory mandate in curbing corruption in Nigeria. The second is the of dual legitimacy of

criminality. In this regard, the members of the ruling class legitimize corruption on one hand

and the members of the communities encourage political corruption since they lack the

moral and legal support against corrupt officials. Political power provides the public

officials with the opportunities to extend undue favour to their communities; distribute jobs,

contracts and gift of money which they got from illegitimate means. On the other hand, the

second strand of analysis is the strong and ineffective state in Nigeria. This implies the

conditions of political instability, incompetence in government, low productive forces,

insecurity, failure of institutions, low level of transparency and accountability in the

Nigerian state.

8

These problems are the central concern of this emergent research, and can be

specifically stated in the form of those research questions below:

1. Has the EFCC accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of

political corruption in Nigeria from 2000 and 2010?

2. Does the dual legitimacy of criminality influence the performance of EFCC in

fighting political corruption in Nigeria from 2000 and 2010?

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

The central concern of this study is to assess dispassionately the achievement of the

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in their fight against political

corruption in Nigeria. Therefore, the specific objective of this study includes the following:

1. To examine if the EFCC has accomplished its statutory mandate by reducing the rate

of political corruption in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

2. To assess how the dual legitimacy of criminality has influenced the performance of

the EFCC in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The significance of this research will manifest in both theoretical and practical

levels, since it will be useful to our society where political corruption is pervasive. At the

theoretical level, the study will provide with scholars and commentators, the idea and

knowledge to understand the debilitating damage and various dimensions corruption has

taken in Nigeria society. Also, contribution from this study will not only consolidate the

existing body of knowledge in our discipline but will also serve as a veritable reference

material to students, academics and researchers who have interest on this issue. This

9

research work will equally serve as a good reading material for all the people who desire to

enrich their knowledge.

In the practicable aspect, the value of the study will at the first place, provide

Nigerians with the fundamental reliability and understanding of the unabated nature of

political corruption in Nigeria, thereby keeping them disposed to contribute their quotas

towards its reduction. Secondly, the study will facilitate the process of restoring sanity in

this society by serving as a basis for building structures that will promote an additional

checks and balances alongside other existing structures.

Finally, this study when implemented will help to restore confidence in our

government as well as the economy. This is because the cost of government will be reduced

and funds hitherto diverted for private use will be made available for our infrastructural

development which in turn will create an enabling environment for economic growth in the

different sectors of government.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

For the purpose of accommodating the two variables of the hypotheses as contained

in this research, this literature review will be divided into two themes; the first theme will

evaluate the existing literature on political corruption in Nigeria. The second theme will

review author’s works on the operation of the regulatory institutions like the EFCC in fight

against political corruption in Nigeria.

10

Political Corruption in Nigeria

An attempt has been made by Ikejiani-Clark, to trace the origin of corruption in

Nigeria to the on set colonialism, which bastardized the traditional Nigeria values.

According to her, traditional Nigeria society was fairly well organized around such values

and ideals as honour, prestige, respect for elders and constituted authorities, integrity and

public interest rather than selfishness (Clark,1995:128). In her analyses of political

corruption, she sees corruption as an inducement in cash or kind to secure services or goods

from public officials or other agencies through illegitimate, unlawful or irregular means.

Consequent upon the bastardization of these values that regulated individual and

group conduct of private and public lives, the way was paved for political corruption which

as at then simply found expression in giving to court carks and interpreters in order to revert

justice. Ikejiani-Clark further examined how previous regimes have tackled political

corruption in the past and postulated that since post-independent, Nigeria consolidated these

colonial imposed values, Nigeria needs a reform of her political structure and institutions.

Obviously, one of the laudable hallmarks of Ikejiani-Clark’s perspective to corruption in

Nigeria is its historical specificity. Meanwhile, her appraisal of how corruption has been

tackled in Nigeria was restricted to previous governments and regimes only thus, inadequate

in our explaining the basic concern of this study.

Aluko (2002:393-402), critically examined how corruption became institutionalized

and manifested mostly in the political arena. Its approach was from a sociological

perspective as he sees corruption largely as a social problem and not emanating from

individual disposition. He concluded that the nation as such has the responsibility to educate,

11

mobilize, socialize, enlighten and sensitize its citizens towards a tradition of honesty,

excellence, diligence, integrity, honour, reputation, good name and other moral virtue that

will lead to the establishment of a new social order.

Although, Aluko’s recommendations are quite commendable, it however, lacks

practicability in Nigeria as both past and present leaders had been bereft of such self-

discipline and indeed has remained the source of corruption.

Equally, as observed by Ugwu (2002:23), the nation was deeply immersed in

corruption arising from poor and weak leadership, which regarded some people as sacred

cows. The result was embezzlement and defraud “kick back and kick front”, rigging

election, selection and not election syndrome, 10% to be paid to a government official for

any contract awarded, murder cases during election to public posts, sectionalism, favoritism,

nepotism, sex scandal, incarceration of innocent but vociferous citizens etc.

These were the offspring of political corruption in Nigeria. The blazing heat of the

fire of political corruption sent so many Nigerians packing. Hence, Odey in 2001, wrote that

“politically, the turmoil, the repression and the general insecurity that pervaded the country

forced thousands of Nigerians to flout all international border laws and get out of Nigeria by

hook or by crook. As a result, Nigeria’s image suddenly slumped to infamy” (Odey,

2001:41-42), quoted in (Ugwu, 2002:23).

In the forefront of the critic against political corruption in Nigeria, Achebe (1983:1)

has this to say; “there is no problem with the Nigerian soil, climate, water or even air, the

only problem facing Nigeria is the problem of leadership”. The corrupt practices by the

12

Nigerian leaders at all levels of government have been the major reasons for the country’s

underdevelopment. Corruption is a cankerworm that has eaten deep into the fabrics of our

leaders, to the extent that when they go to bed, they go with corruption, they dream

corruption, they think corruption, they eat corruption, live with corruption and practice

corruption at every moment. Corruption has become a culture in the Nigerian society and the

people celebrate it. Any leader that wishes to uphold the dignity of transparency,

accountability and due process is seen as an uncivilized person, and sabotage (Achebe;

1983:3). Achebe actually captured the debilitating incidence of political corruption, but

failed to proffer solutions on how to revolutionalize the mentality of the people as well as

enhance mechanism for fighting corruption.

Apparently alluding to the result of a double standard approach to anti-corruption

measures, Klitgaard, (1998:55) noted that if people especially the big shots get away with

political corruption, the others would not be afraid to do it because after all, the commission

would not remove the big shots and may be, is not sincere. Constantly, Klitgaard, observes

that a double standard approach is an incentive to corruption and this fact cannot be denied.

Be that as it may, Klitgaard’s approach is contradistinction to the basic concerns of this

study, which aims at determining if the EFCC fight against corruption actually reduced the

rate of corruption in Nigeria since its creation. Daniel Kaufmann, argues that despite myriad

contributions on this topic by various authors, serious unresolved questions and debates still

exist not only about the importance of governance and corruption but also about the

unwillingness and ability of the international community including the private sectors to

help countries improve in these areas. He equally presented eight myths, which are very

helpful in resolving some misunderstood issues concerning governance and corruption. His

13

work therefore, focused on the intervention in the area of transparency reform complimented

by improvement in freedom of the press and gender equality and when implemented such

reforms could have a major impact on improving governance and anti-corruption.

(Kaufmann, 2002:9-24).

The 2001 transparency international (TI) corruption perception index lists Nigeria as

the second most corrupt country in the world behind Bangladesh. Nigeria alone is reported

to be responsible for over 30% of the incidence of corruption in Africa. The same report

notes that corruption in Nigeria has accelerated since the civilian government of Obasanjo

came to power from 1999-2007. Staggering $36 billion in public money is report to have

disappeared with a few traces. (Business in Africa, December 2002/January 2003:6).

Robert Payne in 1975 raise doubts as to their effectiveness in checkmating the

incidence of corruption society and pointed out that in both cases, of the “corruption and

decay sets in first at the top” this is the head in the case of the corpse and the leadership in

the case of the society. According to Payne (1975:4), the brain cells are only alive for four

(4) minutes after the head had stopped beating… and even though the heart beat may be

revived, the infinitely complex machinery of the brain begin to be dismantled within four

minutes and exists no medicine is capable of reviving the dead man. But unlike the corpse,

Payne (1975:4) observed that “societies afflicted with it (corruption) sometimes yield to

treatment but the cure involves a radical re-orientation of the society away from the sources

of corruption”.

Deriving from this, Payne (1975:5), admonished that “there is only one battle cry

against corruption and that is, resist to the uttermost as you would resist death itself”. But

14

this, according to Payne “is only possible when we help one another with all our strength

because, the intensity of life is the intensity of helpfulness and the ceasing of help is what

we call corruption” (Payne 1975:5).

Still on political corruption, Shah (2006:14), provides one of the most elaborated and

extensive research, dealing with a wide range of issues on the causes and possible solutions

to corruption. A critical examination of his work reveals that “localization of power helps to

break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decision making closer to the

people” (Shah, 2006:14). Also he noted that this measure strengthens government

accountability, since the citizens can then monitor the performance of government officials

and equally demand corrective actions. He however, pointed out that in such areas where

feudal and industrial interest dominate and institution of participation and accountability are

weak and political interference in local affairs rampant, localization may increase

opportunities for corruption. He maintained that rule of law and citizen’s empowerment

should be the priority in any reform effort.

Nonetheless, Achebe (1983:38), wrote that the corrupt nature of the Nigerian society is such

that keeping an average Nigerian from being corrupt is like keeping a goat from eating yam.

Corruption in Nigeria has passed the alarming and entered the fatal state; Nigeria will die if

we keep pretending that she is slightly indisposed.

The above statement seems to suggest that corruption is inherent and quite inevitable

in the nature of Nigerians. But is it really correct? Perhaps, if we were fatalists or were to be

compelled to believe in predestination, that line of argument could have been seen to be

sound, but since it is not an established case that corruption is naturally inherent on inborn in

15

human beings, Nigerians cannot be exceptional since they are not naturally or fundamentally

different from other human beings.

Equally, following Momoh (1991:115), a corrupt practice can sometimes be a sole

undertaking as in some cases of embezzlement of public funds where an official uses his or

her position to swindle the nation or his employers. But we will take an ideal corrupt

practice to be one which at least involves two individuals. The first individual involved in

the corrupt practice is the one who accepts something in the form of cash, presents, gifts or

bodily pleasures in order to perform an act.

Momoh (1991), further maintained that in so far as the business of corruption is

concerned, the stronger party, mentioned above, is always referred to as the one who

occupies the strategic position to perform or cause an act in question to be performed,

whereas the second individual, usually referred to as the weaker party is the one in need for

favour, who is on the other hand gives something in the form of cash, presents, gifts or

bodily pleasures in order to induce the performance of an act. In essence, both parties are

guilty of corruption and ought to be punished by the law of the land. But for the fact that

corruption has been taken to be part of life in Nigeria, the perpetrators of the act are

indirectly permitted to celebrate with impunity and thereby propagate the erroneous

impression that corruption is a value to be cultivated and appreciated in Nigeria.

Corruption triumphs in Nigeria because of the desire to get rich quick that has been

prevalent among Nigerians. It is no news any longer to hear that policeman, directors,

teachers and even traditional rulers can openly and unashamedly demand for and accept

gratifications of different kinds before doing the whatever they are supposed, or in some

16

cases, genuinely employed to do for the development and progress of their country.

Moreover, there is no doubt that a number of factors are instrumental to the lingering crises

of corruption among the Nigerian populace. However, the basic and most central to the

causes of this phenomenon are due to lack of exemplary leadership, greed and inordinate

ambition for material wealth, power and glory. There is also a great deal of support by the

government authorities. Therefore, it is true to say that one of the most agonizing aspects of

Nigeria’s problems that has actually given license to corruption is the problem of ineffective

leadership. For some decades, Nigeria has not been opportune to enjoy the dividends of

good and exemplary leadership, be it military or civilian, who have the interest of the people

at hearth and also ready to sacrifice personal gains for the greater number of citizens.

Meanwhile, on critical evaluation of his argument, it is obvious that his position were

valid but he, however, failed to advance any particular method through which measures he

outlined can be achieved and sustained. This becomes necessary based on the fact that those

principles are usually accepted by every government but are hardly put into practice. To this

extent, his view has failed to address the problem in this research.

Regulatory Institutions on Corruption in Nigeria

Iheanacho, (2005:14) made a critical examination of the speech by Justice Akanbi

and lamented on the abysmal performance of the anti-corruption commission, The

Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC), blaming it

on poor funding, limited jurisdiction power, corrupt and opaque judicial system. Iheanacho,

therefore, wonders how it has all these landmines buried along its way an administration that

says one thing to the International Community and does another thing at home. As a

17

solution, he advocated for an anti-corruption seats in the executive council meeting and

broadening the scope of those that should be investigated by the commission regardless of

their position.

The major flaw in his work had been his belief that such government that is deeply

involved in corrupt practices will be willing to constitute any genuine institution that will

have the power to subject for investigation. Hence, his stand is logical inadequate for this

work.

Invariably, Umez (2000:36-38), began by arguing against the assumption that

corrupt leaders cannot address the fundamental problem of why Nigerian politicians and

administrators are corrupt. Hence, it is already obvious that most of those leaders were

corrupt before they assume public office. For him, a better and more comprehensive focus

should be on what are the sources of corruption and ways of eradicating them. In some, he

argued that “the prevalent people’s value system is mostly responsible for the leadership

corruption, which in turn produces problem of development in Nigeria” (Umez, 2003:38).

Although, his analysis is both correct and useful but it is however, difficult to clearly

explain, following his argument why, despite all the publicity and mass orientation, political

corruption still persist. Therefore, in the context of this work, his views are equally

considered inadequate.

In order to evaluate the anti-corruption records of Obasanjo’s administration, Olori

and Adams (2005:7), listed a number of ministers that have been relieved of their positions

following certain allegations of political corruption. In any case, their general assessment on

the performance of the regime in combating political corruption was that it has been highly

18

ineffective and in their own words, “a mere effort by Obasanjo to boast his waning

popularity” (Olori and Adams, 2005:7). Having provided these insights, they failed to

categorically state any policy that can make an impact towards a sustainable fight on

corruption.

Ribadu N. in 2004, outlined some of the difficulties facing the Economic and

Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), which began with a brief discussion on the state of

political corruption in Nigeria and thereafter focused entirely on legal and prosecution

difficulties hampering on the activities of the commission. The basic problem with the

analysis is its limitations in tracing the actual cause of political cause and its impact in the

country. Besides, this points a critical examination of the Act Establishing the Commission,

which reveals whole lot of contradictions.

In effect, his focus is on prosecution rather than providing a preventive solutions or

addressing the causes of the problem. Thus, at best, his work can only provide a penal code

for corrupt practices which is basically outside the immediate concern of this study.

USAID, (2003) examines the impact of political corruption on development

challenges both in political and economic spheres, the outlined various anti-corruption

programmes which fall into a number of categories and their applications depending largely

on the types of corruption within a local environment. Furthermore, it views decentralization

of authority and responsibility as useful tool for achieving transparency and accountability.

However, this article failed to explain why these measures hardly bring any positive result in

most of the developing countries just like Nigeria. This entails that the analysis is

ineffective.

19

On the 16th commonwealth law conference 2009 held between 5th-9th April, 2009 at

the Hong-Kong convention, it is noted, by the present chairman of the EFCC, Mrs Farida

WAziri, that the constraints of law enforcement within the rule of law are drawn mostly

from the work of the Economic Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria. She further stated

that in fighting corruption, it is necessary to recognize that in the long run, what matters is

the institution and not the individual. It is therefore necessary to build institutions that will

last and sustain the fight. Where the institution is built around individuals, results tend to be

short lived in nature. Recognizing this fact, the EFCC has commenced the process of

building structures and process that will sustain the institution and outlive individuals. It is

important that the legal environment is sufficiently populated with requisite laws that will

facilitate that fight against corruption. The absence of specialized courts and legislation on

assets forfeiture tends to hamper the fight against corruption. Where an agency faces these

difficulties, it has to be at the forefront of championing the enactment of the requisite

legislations and the EFCC has been championing the enactment of key legislations like the

establishment of special Economic Crimes Courts and an Assets Forfeiture Act.

Having gone so far, we wish to summarize by stating that a number of scholars have

carried out investigations into the activities of the anti-corruption agencies including the

EFCC and other institutions on the mechanisms for reducing the rate of political corruption

in Nigeria, but none of these scholars has substantially analyzed why this measures had

failed and at the same time provide an alternative measure that can bring about positive

change. In other words, most scholars whose works were reviewed presented only

superficial views on the impact of the anti-corruption (EFCC) profile in Nigeria and those

that identified these weaknesses failed to proffer viable alternatives.

20

Having rigorously and systematically x-rayed what scholars have examined and what

they have not adequately addressed in the existing literature as concerned with the

relationship between the EFCC and Political corruption in Nigeria, it is evidence to note that

scholars are yet to address in concrete terms the effects of political corruption on the EFCC.

The hallmark and the logic of the above is that there still exist hitherto gaps in the

existing literature with regards to Political corruption in Nigeria. From the foregoing, the

existing literature has failed to explain how the paradox of dual legitimacy of criminalizing

financial crimes and communally legitimatizing it affect the regulatory institution like the

EFCC and how the strong but ineffective state in Nigeria contribute to the increase in

political corruption. The imperative demand for filling these gaps forms the logical point of

departure for this study.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In studying how the activities of the government officials, who criminalize financial

crimes (political corruption) but also steal from the government coffers weaken the

regulatory agency like the EFCC and how the strong but ineffective state in Nigeria has led

to increase in political corruption, we will have recourse to the Marxist theory of social

production and reproduction.

Marx and Engels (1884:456), argued that ‘according to the materialist conception,

the determining factor in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of

immediate life. But this in itself is of a twofold character. On one hand, the production of the

means of subsistence, of food, clothing and shelter and the tools requisite therefore; on the

21

other hand, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The

social institutions under which men of a definite historical epoch and of a definite country

live are conditioned by both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labour, on

the one hand, and of the family, on the other. The less the development of labour, and the

more limited its volume of production and, therefore, the wealth of society, the more

preponderantly does the social order appear to be dominated by ties of sex (Marx and Engels

1884:456-457).

The choice of this approach stems from the fact, as Ogban (2005:16) noted, that what

can be produced and reproduced at each point in time depends on a combination of the

quality of labour power (physical strength, knowledge and skills), non-human physical

resources for production (tools and objects for applying the tools and interpersonal relations

of production (who decide what is to be produced, exchanged, distributed and consumed, as

well as who does what and gets what is produced. In every social production and

reproduction system, there must be someone or people to make binding decisions on what is

produced, distributed, exchange and consumed by who and for who. Those who decide what

to produce also control the social production process and in their favour. They generally

have the most of what is produced and they are often satisfied than the other group within

the production process and tend to protect their position in the production process (Ogban,

2005:16).

The implication of the above is that a student of social phenomenon like political

corruption and its effects must pay particular attention to the totality of the relations of

production, which constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation upon

22

which arises the legal and political superstructures like the EFCC and (financial crime)

political corruption.

Thus, the productive system in Nigeria is largely based on rentierism. As a result, the

ruling class that control political power see the apparatus as instrument of primitive

accumulation. Hence, class relations both within the ruling class and between the ruling and

dominated classes in a peripheral economy like Nigeria is highly fractious and antagonistic.

The relation within the ruling class is factious because access to political power is not seen

to arise from the actual control of the social relations of production but a matter of

opportunity or sheer luck.

In this light, the social institutions of the state becomes a repressive instrument of the

advantage fraction of the ruling class in subjugating the rest of the society and fostering

primitive accumulation of the advantaged ruling class as well as protecting their relations in

the production process. EFCC, as an institution of the state, saddled with the responsibility

of fighting corruption has become notorious for double standard practices is its fight against

corruption. On the one hand, it has prosecuted many corrupt officials “whose interests or

activities have been perceived to threaten the interest (primitive accumulation) of the

dominant class. And on the other hand, it has conspicuously ignored or failed to prosecute

other corrupt officials whose interests are in harmony with that of the dominant class.

In this regard, the state apparatus (EFCC) and laws were manipulated in favour of

the ruling class’ interest and at the expense of the other classes within the state. Basically,

the logic of the foregoing is that the EFCC shall be conceived as the instrument of

domination in the hands of the ruling class who are the controller of the means of

23

production. By implication, the regulatory institutions would be weak and ineffective. In

order to maintain the domineering influence of the ruling class, over the dominated class,

there would be a continuous primitive accumulation to strengthen the power. This implies

also that there would be increase in political corruption.

Thus, the inevitable tendency of one class to struggle for maintenance of domination

over another, accounts for the of dual legitimacy of financial crimes; first it is legitimized

within the ruling class and secondly, within the communities where the individual politician

comes from. This is in exemplified in reported cases in Nigeria where the EFCC fails to

prosecute the members of the ruling class whose interests are in conformity with the power

that be. Also, the community of such individual politician seems to encourage and protect

their member in phase of corrupt practices as in the case of Alamieyesiegha and Ibori.

Obviously, dual legitimacy of criminality and the irony of fighting corruption by those who

are assumed to involved in corrupt practices are does environmental conditions that has

greatly influenced the performance of the EFCC in accomplishing its statutory mandate.

Unless these environmental condition changes, EFCC will not make wave in achieving its

pursuit in terms of reducing the rate of financial crimes in Nigeria. Thus, the prerequisite for

the maintenance of domination is solely based on their position in relations of production

and the state power. Hence, the political corruption and the attendant regulatory institution

like the EFCC can be best appraised in the context of Marxist theory of social production

and reproduction.

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1.7 HYPOTHESES

This research is predicated on the following hypotheses:

1. The EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate

of political corruption in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

2. The dual legitimacy of political corruption has greatly influenced the performance

of the EFCC in its fight against corruption in Nigeria from 2000-2010.

1.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHOD OF DATA

COLLECTION

The reliability and validity of our data for this study lie in the use of observational

techniques and documentations as our major method of data collection. This implies that, in

the course of this research, data shall be gathered through secondary sources like materials

from the internet, relevant textbooks, magazines, newspapers, conference papers, seminar

papers, and statements of commentators as concerns the issue at hand. Equally, government

documents, white papers, a report of panels of enquire will also be of importance to this

research.

This method of data collection as adopted in this research will enable us to

understand the comparative opinions of scholars and commentators concerning the

operations of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the incidence of

political corruption in Nigeria. However, in view of limited reliability of this method,

serious efforts will be made to ensure that scientific objectivity overrides the research

process.

25

The use of documentaries forms our empirical source of data. This is because the use

of documents allows the researcher on areas where he cannot have access to the respondents

and this cannot study what is concerned with decisions and dispositions among government

officials. This goes on to rule out the possibilities of using survey methods like questionnaire

and interview methods. Irrespective of the above argument, interview and questionnaire

would have been conducted, but the actors may decline to respond. Reliable and expressible

documents are capable of bringing the significant information which cannot be gotten

through other methods. The issue is that where reliable documents exist, generations appear

more reliable than those emanating from limited data from the primary source.

Finally, another justification is that this method will assist to collect data stored in

files, government archives, libraries, bookshops and other international documents.

1.8.1 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The nature of this study makes the use of qualitative descriptive analysis quite

imperative. This method of Analysis according to Asika (1991:118) essentially has to do

with summarizing the information generated in the research verbally. This method of

analysis is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in

which the data are created or presented since other method of analysis like table presentation

is equally adopted. Thus, analysis of materials collected from secondary sources such as

textbooks, journal, article, magazine, newspapers, and overall documentaries etc, will

subscribe strictly to the use of qualitative descriptive analysis and tables.

26

The use of these methods of analysis as stated above is to read meaning into the

information gathered from materials and other secondary sources as well as to categorize

data in their scale of measurement where necessary.

27

1.8.2 LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK (LDF) FOR THE STUDY

S/n Hypothesis Variables Empirical indicators Theoretical framework

Method of data collection

Method of Analysis

Sources of Data

1. EFCC has not accomplished its statutory mandate in terms of reducing the rate of political corruption in Nigeria.

(1) EFCC’s statutory mandate.

Reduction of the rate of corruption in Nigeria

Prosecution of offenders.

Thorough investigation of corrupt cases.

Arresting the suspects. Recovery of looted

assets.

Theory of social production and reproduction.

Observation Documentaries

Qualitative Descriptive analysis

Tables presentation

Secondary source

Library Internet

materials Journals Newspapers/

magazines

(2) Reduction in the rate of political corruption in Nigeria.

More accountability. Increase in infrastructural development. Low level of corruption cases Low possibility level of

looting.

Theory of social production and reproduction.

Observation Documentaries.

Qualitative Descriptive analysis

Table presentation

Secondary Library Internet

materials Journals Newspapers/Magazines.

28

S/n Hypothesis Variables Main indicators of the variables Data/sources Method of data collection

Method of data analysis

2. The dual legitimacy of political corruption has greatly influenced the performance of the EFCC in its fight against political corruption in Nigeria.

(1) Dual legitimacy of political corruption in Nigeria.

Corruption is legitimized within the ruling class and within the communities.

Lack of transparency and accountability

Political officials are corrupt but criminalize financial crimes.

Absence of moral and legal support against political corruption

General criminalization of corruption but communities embrace corrupt officials.

Secondary sources:

Library

Textbooks

Internet materials

Magazine

Journal

Documentaries

Observations

Tables

Quantitative Approach

Qualitative Descriptive Analysis.

(1) Influence of dual legitimacy of criminality on the performance of EFCC

Fear of prosecution of public officials

Favour in exercising duties Lack of autonomy of the regulatory

institution Dependency of the regulatory

institution Non-prosecuted cases of corruption Selective justice Preferential treatment to alleged

corrupt officials

Secondary sources

Library

Textbooks

Internet materials

Magazines

Journals

Documentaries

Observations

Tables

Qualitative descriptive analysis.

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CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND THE ORIGIN OF THE

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION (EFCC) IN NIGERIA.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we shall evaluate the historical overview of the incidence of corruption

in Nigeria and the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the anti-graft agency like the

Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), as well as the institutional structure of

the commission.

Thus, the story of corruption in Nigeria is nearly apocryphal; it is indeed stranger than

fiction. Perhaps this account for why “some Nigerians are tempted to say that corruption

should be legalized so that its proceeds could be taxed. Some also believes that every Nigerian

is a corrupt individual while others say corruption is now adored rather than abhorred”.

Granted that corruption is a universal problem which was not invented in Nigeria but the

Nigerian environment has become a fertile ground where it is nurtured to the extent that the

few who are not corrupt are seen as odd people who are not “true” Nigerians.

2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PHENOMENON OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA.

In Nigeria, corruption has grown alarmingly over the past two decades, though its

growth has been traced earlier through the court messages and native authority court members.

It was also during the colonial period that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was charged for

mismanagement and corrupt practices in the African Continental Bank (ACB). However,

following the report of the commission which investigated the charges, it was revealed that the

30

colonial office only wanted to embarrass Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his supporters by the

trumped up charges of misconduct, hence no established case of corruption against him.

First Republic

During the first republic, chief Awolowo and some leading members of his party was

equally charged for corruption and diversion of funds into the party funds and also into private

use. The Cooker commission of enquiry investigating this allegation stated that the movement

of this money was effected through the marketing board and national investment and

Properties Company, which were government controlled. The commission condemned Chief

Awolowo’s direction of the use of funds, but exonerated him.

According to Ikejiani,(2001)

It is interested to note that in these cases, as in the case of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, charges of corruption could not stick. The two foremost nationalists proved that they could use their positions to advance the interest of their people.

The change in orientation in leadership perhaps came with the stiff competition for

political power, which characterized the post-independence Nigeria, especially after 1963. It is

possible that the keen competition led to pervasion of rules to gain advantage and to the

damaging mobilization of ethnic primordial ties to ensure victory. Obviously, this

development necessitated the emergence of corruption in Nigeria public service.

Aguiyi Ironsi’s Regime (January – July 1966)

The first coup d’etat in Nigeria in January 1966, led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna

Nzeogwu was therefore, to rid Nigeria of a group of lawless and corrupt politicians who as it

31

seemed then had misappropriated a lot of public funds. At this time, it was still unethical to

enrich oneself by illegal means. The actions of the government of Prime Minister, Sir Alhaju

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa confirms Fanon’s argument that;

In the African State, once independence has been won, government becomes no more than holding company of the national bourgeoisie intent only on sharing out the national booty.

The military regime led by Major General Aguiyi Ironsi was too brief to rid Nigeria of

the infectious national disease known as corruption. It was too brief for one to assess its

involvement in corrupt practices.

General Yakubu Gowon’s Regime (July 1966 – July 1975)

Against the expectations that the essence of Gowon’s regime would be to correct the

ills of the first republic, for which military had to intervene in the first instance, ironically,

Gowon’s tenure witnessed an unprecedented rise on corruption in the country’s body polity,

nurturing a coterie of powerful Nigerian millionaires- the veritable fat cats. For instance the

cement armada of 1974 is a ready example of corruption during the Gowon’s regime. The

federal government had ordered through the Nigerian national supply company two million

metric tones of cement from various countries. The Minister of defense also ordered for 16.23

million metric tones when it only needed 2.9 million metric tones for its project.

Although, the total cost per tone was only $40, Nigerians were paying $115 per tone.

This means that through this singular cement business, someone or some people were being

enriched by $75 per tone for 16.23 million metric tones. “This is hard to believe at a time when

32

despite the oil boom workers takes home pay was nothing to write home about”. This example

is one out of the several cases of corruption during the Gowon’s regime.

Fortunately and unfortunately, the period of Gowon’s regime was the beginning and

probably the climax of ‘oil boom’ in Nigeria. A Central Bank of Nigeria annual report has it

that the value of Nigeria oil produce rose from N 262 million in 1969 to N 5356.7 million in

1974, the year just before the overthrow of Gowon. The masses of course never benefited from

this increase in revenue rather than continued to languish in poverty and deprivation in the

midst of plenty. According to Dudley, “the effect of the ‘oil boom’ was to convert the military

political decision makers and their bureaucratic aids into a new property owing, rentier class

working in close and direct collaboration with the sole aim of expropriating the surplus derived

from oil for their private and personal benefits”.

There are many examples of unfathomed greed among the officials of the Gowon

regime Mr. Ukpabi Asika as reported by New Nigerian of December 3, 1975, during his tenure

in office had acquired the following property illegally (a) Bladi Court, Warri valued at

N120,000; (b) Plot K, in the GRA, GRA Onitsha, valued at N 76, 000 (c) an apartment, 1229

Latorre on Spain (d) another property, in Spain, 9 Torremeloes Spain (e) a house, 6 Mayhaung

Road, GRA Kano. These in addition to several others landed property(s) scattered across

strategic locations in different cities with the country. The point here is that at that time, no

Nigerian could earn such a huge salary that could afford him all these, Asika was not alone,

some others had even more than this.

General Gowon, himself was corrupt and inefficient and so could not influence or

address the serious cased of corruption and indiscipline, Gowon only would say “if there be

33

any of you who has abused in any way the confidence I and the nation response in him to

enhance some unworthy ends, I leave such person to his conscience and to God and to

posterity”.

General Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime (July 1975 – September

1979).

General Murtala Mohammed terminated the inefficiency of Gowon’s regime in July

1975. His was a corrective attempt and clean-up exercise involving the examination of the

assets of dismissed military governors and other public officers. Over 10, 000 persons (judges,

civil servants, university dons, military etc) were retired/dismissed from public services, for

reasons ranging from old age, health reasons, inefficiency, incompetence and corruption. And

in contrast to Gowon, he said that commissioners and public officers who were found to own

assets over and above what could reasonably be computed to represent their legitimate

earnings would forfeit all such excess assets by certification.

Some analysts believe that Obasanjo was not as firm as Murtala Mohammed and that if

he had maintained the spirit and tempo of his predecessor’s crusade, the story would have been

different today. Falana accusing Obasanjo of corrupt practices explained that as soon as

Murtala died the succeeding regime institutionalized corruption in Nigeria by promulgating

decree No 11 of 1976, public officer’s protection against Accusation. From all indication, the

regime of Obasanjo saw a rise in corruption too. Records showed that it was his tenure that N

2.8 billion oil money got missing from the NNPC account. Thanks to Justice Ayo Iriefe probe

panel, which believe in “let the sleeping dog lie”, thereby, covering the misdeeds of that

34

regime. It could be because corruption lingered during the Obasanjo’s regime that the Shehu

Shagari’s regime picked and enlarged it.

Shehu Shagari regime (second republic).

According to Prof. Ikejiani, “the accounts of corruption during Shagari’s regime would

fill the archives if recorded”.

Corruption indeed held sway at all levels of government during his regime, large

mobilization fees were paid before any real work began and in most cases those projects are

never completed. There were alleged fraud in the account of the federal capital development

authority and disappearance of millions of naira worth building materials from the Nigerian

national supply company. The mysterious and epidemic fires in government buildings were

equally alleged to be deliberate plots to cover up corruption and fraud. Some of those building

included; ministry of external affairs, the thirty seven stories Lagos headquarters of Nigerian

external telecommunications and federal capital development authority Abuja. These fire

incidences happened when these establishments were under investigation of corruption and

financial fraud.

Furthermore, contracts amounting to N795 million for the Ajaokuta steel projects were

awarded in 1980 to Fougeroue (N329 million), DUMEZ (N179 million) and Julius Berger

(N297 million). These contracts were awarded with the understanding that Kickbacks and

commissions would be paid to the national party of Nigeria (NPN). The kickbacks paid

amounted to N59.625 million. The state governments were equally not left out in this looting

spray, notable among them was ‘JMB affairs’ and Anambra State government was ripped off

35

by cross oceans limited London and some Nigerians. This amount was for the building of fiber

filament and carpet manufacturing complex in Ihiala a contract signed by the then Governor

Chief Jim Nwobodo in 1982.

The Gross Oceans limited never executed the contract despite the fact that it drew from Samuel Montaqu Bank the 7.36 million pounds from the loan provision made from the contract.

Mr. Audu Ogbeh, the then federal minister of communication revealed that the federal

government was loosing N50 million every month as salaries to workers that did not exist in

the post and telegraph department”. Also under the guise of state security Governors gulped

millions of taxpayer’s money by enriching themselves.

General Muhammed Buhari – December 1983 – August 1985

The generality of the masses had become fed up with the moribund second republic of

Shagari that had become rotten with corruption, hence he had learnt nothing from the past

mistakes of the first republic General “Buhari’s Maiden speech to the nation read in part as

thus”… the corrupt, inept and insensitive leadership of the past four years have been the source

of immorality and impropriety in our society since what happens in any society is largely a

reflection of the society. We deplore corruption in all its facets. Indeed corruption becomes a

deity, which was worshipped by the Shagari’s administration.

“The problems of Nigeria were too numerous that the Buhari’s regime was fully

engaged with things to do to put the nation on course”. His institution of the War Against

Indiscipline (WAI) was therefore, an ethical revolution aimed at inculcating in every Nigerian

citizen abhorrence for corruption and economic sabotage. The task was not easy and before the

36

regime could grapple with the situation, surprisingly the General Ibrahim Babangida coup had

taken place. The Buhari regime could not be said to be visibly corrupt.

General Ibrahim Babangida (August 1985 – August 1993)

When General Babangida took over government accusing General Buhari of slow

‘pace action’ and high-handedness to the people of Nigeria thought that Babangida and his

men would tackle the hydra-headed problems of Nigeria particularly that of corruption with

speed and accuracy. On the contrary, Babangida provide himself in every thing he did as a

dribbler who turned the political and socio-economic clock of Nigeria backward by many

years. According to Nwala:

Under Babangida’s regime corruption became Nigeria’s nickname and young men carried their banner to the international scene through cocaine pushing, Advance fee fraud (called 419) and other sophisticated corrupt practices.

Babangida sins with regards to corruption are many and may outnumber those of

Abacha but because he is still alive, most of those atrocities are covered. Babangida,

capitalized on the Lukewarmness of Nigerians and brazenly spent public funds. He was the

first leader in Nigeria to maintain what he called “dedicated account” into which he channeled

the proceeds from the sale of 105,000 barrels of crude oil per day. It was not until his exit from

office that Nigerians were made to know that the ‘dedicated account’ were in actual sense

dedicated to Babangida.

It was Pius Okigbo the chairman of a panel of enquiry set up by General Sani Abacha

in 1995 to review the activities of the CBN that let the cat out of the bag. Babangida never

swindled in small units. According to Okigbo while submitting the report of the panel “… of

37

the $12.4 billion that went into the report of the dedicated account when Babangida was in

charge, $12.2 billion much of which was a windfall from the Gulf war, was spent on what

could never be adjustment genuine high priority nor truly regenerative investment…

Babangida and Abdul Kadir Ahmed, the Governor of Central Bank, accounted to none of these

massive extra-budgetary expenditures”.

Babangida started the sabotage in the oil sector in Nigeria. In order to make smooth

business, which brings huge amount of money without tears, the refineries across the country

must not be in operation continuously. The NNPC was continuously manipulated so that it

continues to play the big fool. Any managing director who did not compromise was thrown out

of job. A good example was that of Aret Adams “he was relieved of his duty, because he

refused to be manipulated by Babangida”.

In the area of foreign debt, Nigeria was plunged into the heaviest debt during his

regime. An available record reveals that, the debt stock increased from $17.765 million in

1983 to $32.584 billion in 1995. The truth about these loans is that they were not used for

anything meaningful to the nation. IMF managing director Micheal Camdeseaus confirmed

this when he publicly declared that… much of the money borrowed by Nigeria from foreign

creditors went directly or indirectly into the foreign accounts of some Nigerians, others to

military spending, and some invested on unproductive projects.

It is no use enumerating the different choice properties illegally acquired by

Babangida, since the fact remains that in terms of physical cash he may be richer than the

country itself. Babangida’s regime marked in a certain tragic sense, the most outstanding point

38

of decline of Nigeria’s value system. The height of corruption that saw him out office in 1993

was the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election.

His wife Mirian Babangida added more sophistication to the life-style of the Victoria

Gowon as a first lady. Through her self carved office of “Better life for rural women” she

siphoned the national treasury as much as possible because she was not accountable to anyone.

General Sani Abacha (November 1993 – June 1998)

According to Jibrim Ibrahim, “The Abacha regime was not just a continuation of

Babangida regime, it signaled a qualitative transformation of the Nigerian state into a fully

criminalized and indeed, rogue-state”.

The regime of Abacha built an empire for corruption while he and his cronies were

growing fatter and fatter from ill-gotten wealth the masses were growing leaner and leaner

from poverty and deprivation. General Abacha in addition to other avenues of looting has a

field day with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Billions of dollars and pounds were carted

away from the Central Bank since he was going for ‘money run’. Tell magazine reveals the

number of times Abacha directly took cash from the CBN as represented in the table below:

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ABACHA’S LOOT PROFILES

Date Amount ($)(000,000)

Feb,15, 1995 $ 4million and 2million

Feb, 17 1994 $ 4million and 2million

Dec, 29, 1995 $5 million

March 26,1996 $5million and £3million

May 29, 1996 £12.57 million

Sept.24, 1996 £50 million

April 22, 1997 £60 million

July 18,1997 $60 million and £30 million

Nov.29,1997 $120 million and £30 million

Dec.11, 1996 $50 million and £30 million

Feb.18,1997 $6 million

Feb.18, 1997 $3 million

March 3, 1997 $3.27 million

March 6,1997 $1.21 million

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April 29, 1997 £147 million

June 30, 1997 £4.9 million

August 8, 1997 $ 10 million

October 18, 1997 £12.3 million

October 21, 1997 £5.88 million

October 23, 1997 £14.76 million

October 29, 1997 £11.76 million

Nov.14,1997 $10 million

Nov.26, 1997 $24 million

Dec.10,1997 $24 million

Dec. 18, 1997 £6.15 million

This was how the treasury of the nation was looted and Nigeria then ranking very low

among the countries at the bottom of world’s poorest nations.

It is on record that Abacha and his family own 57 companies including the Chaouris, a

notorious oil bunkering company. Abacha perfected on what IBB started with the oil industry.

Things actually went off-hand that investigators preferred to refer to the then number one

Nigerian family as “the Abacha’s criminal organization”. Abacha’s wife Maryan took after

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Mirian Babangida and looted without sympathy the national treasury when some of her fellow

women could hardly afford one meal a day.

In terms of external debt and its management, external creditors put debt owned by

Nigeria at $34.7 billion. Like his predecessor Babangida, “the loans were either diverted or

utilized for projects which were unable to generate funds for servicing the debt. The magnitude

of the swindling in Nigeria became clearer when we examine critically the federal ministry of

finance appraisal of the 145 projects in the then 30 states for which the sum of 513. 150 billion

was borrowed from the Paris Club and London club. It reveals that out of the 145 projects, 18

projects were described as failed projects; engulfing $836.17 millions were not executed. 44

projects, categorized as distressed and financed with $4.811 million were implemented up to

the commissioning stage.

Shortly after Abacha’s death, officials were reported to have identified $1.8 billion

placed by the late dictator in Brazil, Lebanon, Britain and Switzerland. On 9th Nov. 1998,

Mohammed Haruna, press secretary to the head of the state announced that $675.2 million,

£75.3 million and N 22 million of funds had been recovered from the family of Abacha.

Indeed Abacha’s corrupt practices cannot be exhaustively discussed in a small chapter

as this. Meanwhile the table below shows why Nigeria is poor as a nation while some

individuals in it are richer than some countries of the world including Nigeria itself.

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INDIVIDUALS LOOT PROFILE IN NAIRA

NAME AMOUNT LOOTED

IBB N2462.35 billion

Abubakar N493.85 billion

Mike Akhigbe N549.645 billion

Jerry Useni N805.9 billion

Ismalia Gwazo N517.0 billion

Umaro Dikko N894.65 billion

Paul Oguwma N53.00 billion

Sani Abacha N1218.137 billion

Mohammed Abacha N210.7 billion

Abdulkadir Abacha N338.42 billion

Wada Nas N237.4 billion

Tom Ikimi N252.553 billion

Dan Etete N327.43 billion

Dan Etiebet N567.47 billion

Al-Mustapha N199.793 billion

Anthony Ani N688.95 billion

Bashio Dachatu N555.49 billion

Gen. Wushishi N228.695 billion

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Hassan Adamu N130.5 billion

T.Y Danjuma N342.7 billion

Ishayi Bamayi N94.0 billion

Total N1.130657 trillion

SOURCE CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, EDITED BY DR. C.O UGWU (2002) P-125.

The table above shows that apart from Umaru Dikko others are military made

billionaires, the offshoot of bad leadership. The military has indeed done the nation much

disservice for roughly 30 years. Fundamentally, Nigeria needs ethical revolution to check this

ugly trend and to the extent other subsequent regimes aims to achieve this, we shall be

examining in subsequent chapters.

2.3 THE ORIGIN OF EFCC IN NIGERIA

The enthronement of a democratic government in 1999 after more than two decades of

military rule in Nigeria has posed a formidable challenge particularly along the direction of

combating national development. The Obasanjo’s administration appeared to have a full

awareness of the disturbing nature of the enigma. The first bill proposed to the national

assembly within a few months of its assumption of office was the corruption practices and

other related offence bill 1999, which later was passed and became the corrupt practice and

other related offence (ICPC) Act 2000. However, despite the ICPC Act and other legislation to

regulate the conduct of both public officers and the private sectors for corrupt practices, the

vices were still very much within the system. Bank fraud were in the upsurge, forex abuse and

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manipulation were still the stock in trade of many banks, 419 still bloomed large, money

laundering from corrupt proceeds were still visible and apparent. It was in these circumstances

that Nigeria was pressurized especially by the international community to update her laws and

steps to check the perpetration of economic and financial crimes. Acknowledging that all these

have contributed in keeping investors away, it is for this reasons and the international

dimension which these crimes had assumed that the promulgation of the Economic and

Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2000 became inevitable (Ribadu, 2004:2-3).

WHAT IS EFCC?

EFCC is an acronym for Economic Financial Crimes Commissions. The commission is

charged with the responsibility of investigating and the enforcement of all laws against

economic and financial crimes in all its ramifications. The commission is also the designated

financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Nigeria, which is charged with the responsibility of

coordinating the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and

enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes in Nigeria.

The EFCC Act, which was re-enacted in 2004 is revolutionary in three (3) basic aspects:

1. Power of co-ordination and enforcement of varied but related economic and financial

crimes laws are vested in one body.

2. Because the nature of the crimes handled by the commission is at the heart of the

economy, all critical stakeholders including security, law enforcement agencies and

apex financial regulations are made members of the commission.

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3. Apart from the offences created by the responsibility to specially enforce the provisions

of other principal laws bordering on economic and financial crimes including:

a. The money laundering Act, 2004.

b. The advance fee fraud (and other related offence) Act, 2005.

c. The failed banks (recovery of debts and financial malpractices in banks) Act, 1991.

d. The banks and other financial institution Act, 1996.

e. The miscellaneous offence Act, 1985.

f. Any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes including the

penal code and criminal code. (see section 7 EFCC Act).

2.4 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EFCC ACT OF 2002 IN NIGERIA

The EFCC was established by the National Assembly in 2002 under the EFCC Act of

2002; while there was an amendment of the Act in 2004. Section 5 of the EFCC Act 2002,

stipulates the following as the functions of the EFCC:

(i) The investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering

an counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, market fraud, fraudulent encashment of

negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam etc.

(ii) The coordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes laws and

enforcement functions conferred on any other person or other authority.

(iii) The adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate, or seize proceeds derived

from terrorist activities, economic and financial crimes related offences or the

properties, the value of which corresponds to such proceeds.

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(iv) The adoption of measures to eradicate the Commission of Economic and Financial

Crimes.

Section 6 of the EFCC’s Act confers the EFCC such special powers as to enforce:

(a) The money laundering Act 1995.

(b) The Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud related offences act 1995.

(c) The Failed Bank (recovery of debts) and financial malpractises in banks Act 1994 as

amended.

(d) The banks and other financial institution Act 1991 as amended.

(e) Miscellaneous offences act.

(f) Any other law or regulations relating to economic and financial crimes.

(g) Cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person has committed offence

under this act.

(h) With a view to ascertaining whether it has been in offences under this act, or in the

proceeds of any such offences, cause investigation to be