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35th Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Helsinki, Mai 7-12, 2007,
Paper to be presented at the Workshop No. 18,
Referendums and Initiatives: Supplementing or Undermining Representative Democracy?
Three Dimensions of Democracy?
Lijphart’s Typology and Direct Democracy
A Cross-National Analysis of Forms of Government
in 23 Advanced Democracies between 1997 and 2006
Adrian VatterUniversity of Konstanz
Department of Politics and ManagementD – 75347 Konstanz
Abstract
By expanding Lijphart’s concept of majoritarian and consensus democracy for the most recent period(1997-2006), this paper examines the relationship between direct democracy and Lijphart’s institutionalvariables in 23 modern democracies. Based on a factor analysis, our main finding is that there are not justtwo, but three dimensions of democracy. The first or “horizontal” dimension comprises thedisproportionality of the electoral system, the number of parties, the executive-legislative relationship, theinterest groups and the degree of central bank independence. In the second or “vertical” dimension ofdemocracy, we find federalism, decentralization, bicameralism, the rigidity of constitutional provisionsand the strength of judicial review. The third or “orthogonal” dimension of democracy comprises the typeof government cabinet and the strength of direct democracy. Thus, in contrast to previous research, ourempirical analysis furnish the hypothesis that direct democracy is not a variable that is independent fromall other political institutions, but that rather it is closely connected to one important feature of Lijphart’sfirst dimension of democracy. Advanced direct democracy goes hand in hand with broadly-supportedmulti-party governments, while conversely, purely representative constitutions frequently appear inconjunction with minimal winning cabinets.
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Introduction1
Modern liberal democracies are based on two competing visions of the democratic ideal. On theone hand, the majoritarian principle emphasises that democracy means government by themajority of the people and is based on a concentration of power. On the other hand, theconsensus principle promotes the idea that democracy should represent as many citizens aspossible and that there are multiple checks and balances, thus limiting the power of the centralgovernment while providing for the representation of a broader array of interests. Today,Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) ground-breaking distinction between consensus and majoritariandemocracy based on his 10 features of democracy undoubtedly represent the most influential andprominent typology of modern democracies (Mainwaring 2001),2 although his democratic typeshas been criticised by many scholars on conceptual, empirical and normative grounds(Armingeon 2002, Boogards 2000, Kaiser 1997, Schmidt 2000, Taagepera 2003, Tsebelis2002). This article follows on from Lijphart’s fundamental distinction between majoritarian andconsensus democracy while at the same time aiming for a further development in three respects:
- In conceptual terms, our study encompasses a broader range of democratic institutions.Besides the executive-parties and federal-unitary dimensions of democracy, we alsoinclude direct democracy, thus taking into account the power relation – hithertoneglected, but becoming progressively more important – between the governing elite andthe population.
- In methodical terms, we aim for a higher validity and reliability of the features ofdemocracy as defined by Lijphart (1999). Both for reasons of comparability and due tothe strong significance of Lijphart’s types of democracy, our study focuses on achievinga more valid and more reliable measurement of those variables which have beenparticularly strongly criticised in Liphart (1999).
- Empirically, we perform an up-to-date examination of the dimensions of democracyidentified by Lijphart on the basis of the individual political institutions. We examine themost recent period, which was no longer taken into account by Lijphart (1999) – i.e. the10 years from 1997 until 2006 – using a most similar cases design. Our empirical analysisconcentrates on the 23 strongly-developed OECD democracies which display acomparable degree of economic wealth and of societal modernity.
Ideally, the two types of democracy according to Lijphart (1984, 1999) are diametricallyopposed with regard to the basic aspect of power distribution. Majoritarian democracy, with itsbare-majority cabinet, two-party system, disproportional system of elections, unitary andcentralised government as well as additional elements, centres on the concentration of power asa basic principle. Consensus democracy, on the other hand, stresses power sharing on the basisof a broad coalition cabinet, a proportional electoral system, a multi-party system, federal anddecentralised government, strong bicameralism and other institutions. Although Lijphart’s
1 I would like to thank Jens Clasen and Ralph Wenzl for their support and suggestions.2 See for example Grofman (2000: 45): Lijphart’s “work on mechanisms for power sharing has world-widevisibility and an influence that has extended far beyond academic circles”.
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(1999) choice and measurement of individual features of democracy have recently beencontroversially disputed, Taagepera (2003: 14) – one of Lijphart’s most severe critics – rightlystates that Lijphart’s (1999) prominent typology of democracy and his empirical analysis ofmodern democracies “sets a standard for work to come”. Hence, in accordance with Lijphart’sterminology of comparative institutional analysis (1999: 3) and following recent theoreticalthought on new institutionalism (Grofman 2000, Hall/Taylor 1996, Kaiser 1997, Rothstein1998), the “institutional rules and practices” of the advanced democracies lie at the heart of ourresearch interest.3 However, we extend these rules and practices by a pivotal element which hasoften been neglected in empirical democracy research, although it forms the most democratic ofdecision mechanism and has increasingly gained in importance at the beginning of the 21st
century: direct democracy. Today, more and more important questions are being decided byreferendum (e.g. recent constitutional changes in Australia, Denmark, Ireland and Italy, as wellas ratifications of international treaties in the European Union), while institutional provisions forreferendums are increasingly being added to constitutions in many countries (Hug 2004, LeDuc2003, Qvortrup 2005, Scarrow 2001).
When Lijphart (1999) performs his factor analysis on the constitutional features and electoraloutcomes of 36 different democracies, two dimensions emerge. The first of these Lijphart callsthe executive-parties (or joint-power) dimension, and is loaded by the degree of electoraldisproportionality, the effective number of parties, the frequency of single-party government, theaverage cabinet length and the interest group system. The second dimension, which Lijphartcalls the federal-unitary (or divided-power) dimension, is loaded by bicameralism, federalism,judicial review, constitutional rigidity and central bank independence. However, in fact, it isgenerally agreed that there is a third dimension of democracy, namely direct democracy.Lijphart’s (1984, 1999) finding that the concept of direct democracy cannot be linkedsystematically with his two dimensions of democracy has been recently confirmed by Grofman(2000: 53). He concluded “(that) the remaining variable, the use of direct elections, does not fiteither of the first two dimensions. What we find is that this last variable defines a direct versusindirect democracy dimension that is essentially orthogonal to the first two”. Thus empirically,there are really three fundamental questions of institutional choice for consolidated democracies(Grofman 2000: 53):
1. How much consensualism?2. How much federalism?3. How much direct democracy?
However, to date, there have been only few conceptual attempts to connect Lijphart’s twomodels of democracy with direct democracy (see Jung 1996, Vatter 2000). Even recent researchon direct democracy (Bowler/Donovan 2001, Budge 1996, Butler/Ranney 1994,Freitag/Wagschal 2007; Gallagher/Uleri 1996, Hug/Tsebelis 2002, LeDuc 2003, Qvortrup 2005,
3 In other words, our study centres not only on the legal “rules-in-form” (formal institutions), but equally on the“rules-in-use” (informal institutions) which have crystallised over time (Sproule-Jones 1993, Weaver/Rockman1993).
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Setälä 2006, Suksi 1993) has only helped to confirm the conclusions drawn by Arend Lijphart(1984: 31) in his pioneering study, “that the concept of direct democracy cannot be regarded aseither typically majoritarian or typically consensual”. To date there has been no success inconnecting the basic concept of direct democracy both theoretically and empirically withLijphart’s two important models of democracy in an international comparison. The aim of thispaper is to fill this gap and to provide a convincing answer to the question raised by Lijphart(1999: 217) as to whether referendums should “be seen mainly as majoritarian instruments orrather as incentives for seeking consensus?”
The paper is organised in six sections. The next section develops a theoretical connectionbetween the most important features of Lijphart’s models of consensus and majoritariandemocracy on the one hand, and the main instruments of direct democracy on the other. Insection 3, the paper will go on to propose our main hypothesis concerning the relationshipbetween Lijphart’s institutional variables and direct democracy. Section 4 presents the researchdesign and the measurement of the variables. Section 5 focuses on the empirical analysis of 23OECD democracies, and section 6 summarises our theoretical arguments and empirical findings.
Theoretical Connections between Majoritarian,Consensus and Direct Democracy
It must be noted at the outset that there can be no general answer to the question of possibleconnections between direct democracy and the two basic dimensions of democracy. This isbecause the numerous forms of direct democracy are too manifold and too oppositional withregard to their functions and effects. Thus, it is necessary to first disaggregate referendumsbecause these have both majoritarian and consensual characteristics. A convincing answer canonly be given if we attempt to classify the direct democratic institutions in theoretical terms,subsequently connecting them to Lijphart’s two basic principles of power sharing and powerconcentration (Jung 1996, Vatter 2000). Although a number of classifications have recently beenproposed (e.g. Butler and Ranney 1994, Hamon 1995, Hug 2004, Qvortrup 2000, Setälä 1999,2006, Suksi 1993, Uleri 1996), most of these attempts come close to Smith’s (1976) basicclassification. In light of this fact, it seems reasonable to apply Smith’s first criterion (1976),albeit in a slightly more specific form: i.e. to ask the question as to who has the right to launch areferendum. Using this criterion, we can derive two basic types of referendums (cf. also Jung1996, Vatter 2000):- Type 1: Controlled (passive) referendums : The government or a parliamentary majority isentitled to launch a referendum.- Type 2: “Uncontrolled (active) referendums : Non-governmental actors, a minority of votersor a parliamentary minority is entitled to initiate a referendum.
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While plebiscites4 and in some cases mandatory referendums5 can be assigned to the first type ofdirect democratic form which Hug (2004: 323) calls “passive referendums”, optionalreferendums6 and popular initiatives7 correspond to Type 2. The latter can be also designated“active referendums” because non-governmental actors, for example a number of citizens playan active role in launching them (Hug 2004: 323). Given this basic distinction, it is now possibleat least in theoretical terms to establish an initial connection with Lijphart’s two concepts ofdemocracy: since the ruling majority has an exclusive right to trigger plebiscites, these can bethought of as having the typical features of majoritarian democracy. In contrast to this, we havepopular initiatives and optional referendums: these can be launched from the bottom by a smallminority of voters or parliamentarians, either to overturn decisions made by the parliamentarymajority (optional referendums), or to refer to voters’ propositions for laws or constitutionalreforms (popular initiatives), thus avoiding the parliamentary and government majority. Themandatory referendum which is constitutionally required on a particular type of decision islocated between these two types of direct democracy: on the one hand, the government cancontrol the agenda of the mandatory referendum and give them considerable leeway ininterpretation if the terms of the proposal are suitably vague, on the other hand, the governmentdo not have much control over the initiation of a referendum if the constitution automaticallyprovides for a popular vote on a range of specified issues.8 Thus, in line with Setälä (2006: 711)we can place the different forms of direct democracy on a continuum from high (plebiscites), tomedium (mandatory referendums) to low (optional referendums and popular initiatives)“governmental control”.
This basic classification comes close to – but is not identical to – Uleri’s (1996: 9) importantdistinction between decision-promoting and decision-controlling referendums based on therelationship between the agenda-setter and the initiator of a referendum, which is useful forunderstanding the relationship between the popular vote and parliamentary decision-making(Setälä 2006: 704). In controlled referendums (i.e. plebiscites), the agenda-setter and theinitiator are the same political actors and want to strengthen the government position with apositive referendum outcome, whereas in uncontrolled referendums the initiator of the vote andthe author of the act put to the vote may be different political actors and, in particular, havedifferent political goals concerning the issue at stake (i.e. optional referendums and popularinitiatives).
4 The use of the term “plebiscite” in the literature varies. The following explanations are based on the definitionby Suksi (1993: 10): “(A plebiscite) (...) may be an ‘ad hoc referendum’ for which there exist no permanentprovisions in the constitution or in ordinary legislation (...)”.5 Mandatory (or compulsory) referendums are those acts which have to be referred to the voters by the majority ingovernment and parliament because this is required by the constitution or otherwise legally prescribed norms.6 Optional (or facultative) referendum refers to a popular vote on a government proposal (e.g. a law) which isheld because a number of citizen or agents in the representative government (e.g. parliamentary minorities) havedemanded it (Gallagher/Uleri 1996: 7, Setälä 2006: 705).7 “Popular initiatives mean that a certain number of citizens can demand a referendum by signing a petition for areferendum on a legislative change promoted by the sponsors of the initiative” (Setälä 2006: 706). Onlyinitiatives provide citizens with the opportunity to raise their own issues on the political agenda.8 „The level of governmental control over mandatory referendums depends on the extent to which governmentshave the authority to interpret the constitution“ (Setälä 2006: 715).
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In order to achieve a more accurate typology of the numerous forms of direct democracy, weneed to ask not only who initiates popular rights, but also who makes the decision in the ensuingvotes. So far, we have considered the potential influence of governmental majority and non-governmental minorities only in terms of the initial stages of the decision-making process. Wetherefore need to continue by considering the rights of majorities and minorities during the finaldecision phase. In concrete terms, this raises the question of whether the consent of specificquorums is required for the acceptance of a referendum proposal. In this respect, Jung (1996:633) and Vatter (2000: 174) emphasise that there is a substantial difference between referendumdecisions requiring qualified majorities and those which can proceed on the basis of a simplemajority.
Following on from here, we can usefully develop an analytical classification of popular rights onthe majority-consensus dimensions. Often, provisions for required referendums stipulate not onlysimple majorities, but also the consent of qualified majorities. For instance, in the federal systemof Switzerland, constitutional changes require a majority not only among voters, but also amongthe cantons which make up the Federation. As a result of this “double majority requirement” forconstitutional referendums, a citizen’s vote in the smallest canton Appenzell Inner Rhodescarries approximately forty times more weight than a citizen’s vote in the canton of Zurich. Ineffect, therefore, the federalist protection of minorities means that small cantons “can organise aveto to block democratic majorities” (Linder 1998: 159). In Australia, too, there is a “doublemajority” rule where a national majority of voters and a majority of voters in a majority of theStates (more than half the voters in more than half the States) must vote in favour of theacceptance of a constitutional (mandatory) referendum proposal. In Italy, however, areferendum outcome is only valid if turnout exceeds 50 percent. In Denmark, a rejection of a billtransferring some aspects of national sovereignty to an international organisation is only valid ifat least 30 per cent of the voters who participated in the last election reject the bill. If less thanthis minimum percentage of voters votes against a proposal, the proposal is deemed to havebeen accepted (Hug/Tsebelis 2002: 479).
Thus, by considering majority-minority dimensions in terms of both the initiation and decisionphase of a referendum proposal, we are able to trace connections between the most importantforms of direct democracy and Lijphart’s two models of democracy, and to develop a“majoritarian-consensus” classification of different forms of direct democracy (see Table 1).Whereas plebiscites with simple majority rules belong to the majoritarian type of democracy,optional referendums and popular initiatives which require supermajorities display distinctconsensus characteristics. The latter are effective instruments which enable non-governmentalactors to enforce popular votes which may go against the will of the governmental majority, andwhich may be considered as typical power sharing instruments of consensus democracies.Initiatives and optional referendums, for which a simple majority rule applies, meanwhile, areintermediate forms9: at the crucial stage of initiation, these instruments display typical consensus
9 As mentioned before, mandatory referendums are also intermediate forms.
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features, whilst final decisions are made according to a simple majority principle.
Table 1: A “Majoritarian-Consensus” Classification of Different Forms of DirectDemocracy with Concrete Examples
Governmental controlGovernment-
initiated(high control)
Constitutionallyrequired
(medium control)
Initiated by a minorityof voters or MP
(low control)
Simplemajority
Plebiscite(e.g. UK, France)
Mandatory referendum(e.g. Spain, Austria)
Optional referendum(e.g. Denmark, NewZealand)
Simplemajority andquorum of
participation
Plebiscite(e.g. Nether-lands)
Mandatory referendum(e.g. Ireland, Denmark)
Optional (e.g. Sweden)and abrogativereferendum (e.g. Italy)D
ecis
ion
rule
Qualifiedmajority
no exampleMandatory referendum(e.g. Australia, Switzer-land)
Optional referendumand popular initiative(e.g. Switzerland)
Main Hypothesis
Following a veto player perspective (Hug 2004, Hug/Tsebelis 2002, Tsebelis 2002) we canargue that the possibility of referendums introduces an additional veto player which makessignificant changes in the status quo for the government more difficult. In particular as barriersfor the restraint of the executive, optional referendums and popular initiatives take on thefunction of powerful veto players who can delay or prevent governmental decisions – thusdetermining, to a considerable degree, the executive’s context of action in a significant way.Generally speaking, “uncontrolled” forms of direct democracy introduce a new veto player, themedian voter of the population, into the political game and thus block the choices of the rulinggovernment (optional referendum) or upset their priorities (popular initiative). Consequently, wecan assume that the government will do their best to reduce the uncertainty caused byuncontrolled referendums. A rational strategy in order to lessen risks arising from the optionalreferendum and popular initiative is to widen the executive formula in order to encompass allparties likely to make efficient use of the referendum if not co-opted as partners in the governingcoalition (Neidhart 1970, Papadopoulos 2001). Thus, we suppose that the threat of directdemocracy from below led to a boosting of executive power sharing. In sum, we hypothesize astrong relationship between the type of the government cabinet and the consensual strength ofdirect democracy: the more institutional provisions of uncontrolled referendums in a country, themore inclusive is a government coalition in terms of party composition which leads to moreoversized cabinets. In other words, contrary to Lijpharts (1984, 1999) and Grofman’s (2000)assumptions, we postulate the hypothesis that direct democracy – alongside the first and seconddimensions – does not form a third, absolutely independent dimension of democracy, but that
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rather, the individual forms of direct democracy, in accordance with their majority-consensuscharacteristics, stand in a systematic relationship with the type of cabinet, which was onevariable of Lijphart’s first dimension of democracy (executive-parties). On the other hand, we donot assume any connections between direct democracy and Lijphart’s second dimension ofdemocracy (federal-unitary). In the following sections, we will examine this hypothesis.
Research Design and Measurements of Variables
Our empirical research is based on a cross-sectional analysis of the relationships between themain political institutions in 23 advanced industrial democracies between 1997 and 2006. In afirst step, we use a factor analysis to enquire into the most important dimensions underlyingpolitical institutions in the 23 most established democracies. In a second step, a graphicrepresentation of a multi-dimensional matrix (“conceptual map of democracy”) of the 23democracies further depicts the OECD countries’ politico-institutional characteristics.
In reference to Armingeon’s (2002: 88) and Schmidt’s (2000: 348) criticism of Lijphart’s (1999)selection of countries – in particular the latter’s study of thirty-six democracies with verydifferent levels of socio-economic development – we concentrate our analysis on economicallysimilar countries, namely the 23 most highly-developed OECD countries. This systematiccomparison of the most advanced and wealthiest democracies not only has the advantage that itmeets the requirements of the most-similar systems research design (Lijphart 1971,Przeworski/Teune 1970) and therefore avoids “mixing up most similar and most dissimilar casedesigns” (Armingeon 2002: 88); it also enables us to ensure that our empirical findings are basedon reliable data, which is often not available for less developed countries (Lijphart 2002: 109).
Table 2 lists the institutional variables which we will consider in depth. Taking Lijphart’s (1999)ten attributes of majoritarian and consensus democracies as a point of departure, we will nowbriefly introduce the variables which we use for our empirical analysis. In view of our theoreticalconsiderations, we pay special attention to the measurement of direct democracy.
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Table 2: Variables, Measurement and Data Sources Variable Measurement Data Sources
1 Party system: Two party systems vs.multi-party systems
Effective number of legislativeparties (Laakso Taagepera index)
Armingeon et al. 2006; owncalculations based on EJPRPolitical Data Yearbooks
2 Cabinets: Concentration vs. Sharing ofExecutive Power
Percentage of minimal winning andsingle-party majority cabinets
Lundell/Karvonen 2003, owncalculations based on EJPRPolitical Data Yearbooks
3 Executive-Legislative Relationship:Dominant Executive vs. Executive-Legislative Power Balance
Combined index of theconstitutional strength of thelegislative and effectiveparliamentary control capacities
Siaroff 2003 andSchnapp/Harfst 2005
4 Electoral Systems: Majority and PluralityMethods vs. Proportional Representation
Gallagher index ofdisproportionality
Armingeon et al. 2006, owncalculations based on EJPRPolitical Data Yearbooks
5 Interest Groups: Pluralism vs.Corporatism
Index of corporatism: sum ofcentralisation and coordination ofwage-setting arrangements, tradeunion density, collective bargainingcoverage rate (standardised scores)
Driffill 2006, OECD 2005
6 Constitutional Division of Power:Unitary vs. Federal Government
Degree of constitutional federalism(scale of 1 to 5)
Armingeon et al. 2006,Lundell/Karvonen 2003
7 Fiscal Division of Power: Centralisationvs. Decentralisation
Share of state and local taxes intotal tax revenue (in %)
OECD Revenue Statistics
8 Parliaments and Congresses:Concentration vs. Division of LegislativePower
Scale of concentration of legislativepower (scale of 1 (unicameralism)to 4 (strong bicameralism)
Vatter 2005, Flinders 2005
9 Constitutional Amendments: Flexible vs.Rigid Constitutions
Scale of the majority required forconstitutional amendmentconstitution (scale of 1 to 10)
Lorenz 2005
10 Legislative supremacy: Absence ofJudicial Review vs. Strong JudicialReview
Scale of the degree to which lawscan be reviewed by a constitutionalcourt (scale of 1 to 4)
Lundell/Karvonen 2003
11 Central Banks: Dependence vs.Independence
Scale of central bank independence(incl. ECB) (scale of 1 to 9)
Sousa 2003
12 Direct Democracy: Controlled Referen-dums vs. Uncontrolled Referendums
Scale of the forms and use of directdemocracy (scale of 1 to 12)
see below
- Party SystemLike Lijphart (1999), we use the Laakso-Taagepera index (1979) to measure the effectivenumber of political parties in the respective parliaments. The Laakso-Taagepera index takes intoaccount the number as well as the strength of the legislative parties and is one of the mostwidely-used indicators for this purpose (Armingeon 2004). The smaller the number of legislativeparties is, the more majoritarian is the party system.- CabinetsLijphart (1999) measures the concentration of executive power in terms of the proportion ofgovernments during the period in question that were either minimal winning or single-partycabinets. The greater the proportion of minimal winning or single-party cabinets is, the higher isthe concentration of executive power and therefore the more majoritarian is a political system. Itmust be noted that Lijphart’s category of single-party cabinets includes both single party
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minority cabinets and single party majority cabinets. “However these are very different types ofcabinets in terms of the consensus-majoritarian logic. A minority government must share powerwith parliament, as the opposition controls a majority of seats and can unseat the government atany time. In order to pass legislation, a majority of MPs must vote in favour of the government’slegislative proposals. A single party majority cabinet can largely neglect parliament, as long asthe parliamentary party is disciplined and MPs support their leaders in cabinet unconditionally”(De Winter 2005: 10). Thus, putting cabinets that work according to a consensual pattern withthose that work according to a majoritarian logic together in one variable is devoid of meaning.Starting out from this criticism, we slightly modify the measure of the concentration of executivepower. In the case at hand, we aim to achieve a more valid operationalisation for majoritariandemocracy in order to take into account only the duration of minimal winning cabinets andsingle-party majority cabinets during the entire research period, while oversized multi-partycoalitions, minority coalitions and single-party minority cabinets are regarded as characteristicsof consensus democracy.10
- Executive-Legislative RelationshipLijphart (1999) measures this variable in terms of the average cabinet duration in days for theperiod in question. The more durable the cabinet is, the more dominant is the executive vis-à-visthe legislature, and therefore the more majoritarian the characteristic. However, it is obviousthat the relationship between executive and legislative power is theoretically not logically relatedto Lijphart’s indicator. An executive can be very stable but a loyal delegate of the parliamentarymajority, while short-lived governments do in fact probably indicate weak governments, but notnecessarily strong parliaments (De Winter 2005: 11). Their instability may be due to many otherfactors (see Müller/Strom 2000). Furthermore, there are many formal and informal rules thatcontribute to the power relations between executives and legislatures (agenda-setting power, therights of the parliamentary committees etc.) and that tend to work as appropriate indicators forthe executive-legislative relationship (Siaroff 2003). Thus, it is not surprising that Lijphart(2003: 20) comes to the conclusion that of his 10 institutional variables, “the variable that gaveme the most trouble (…) was executive dominance” and frankly admits: “I am not at all surethat the operational indicator I develop in Patterns of Democracy is satisfactory” (Lijphart 2002:110).11
Due to the strong criticism of Lijphart’s operationalisation, in the following we carry out a newmeasurement of the power relationship between the executive and the legislative. However, indoing so we intend to cover more than just the purely formal legal relationship between thesetwo institutions, as constitutional rules do not necessarily allow us to draw any conclusionsregarding the actual power relationship between the executive and the legislative in practice. Onthe contrary: only a parliament that additionally disposes of sufficient staff and organisational
10 See also Kaiser et al (2002: 319): „(...) minority cabinets have to be treated according to their actualfunctioning. This means that – parallel to their higher inclusiveness – the chance of alternation they offer issmaller than it appears at first glance“.11 In particular, Lijphart (2003: 21) has in the meantime become convinced that Cabinet Life 1 is “simply not avalid indicator of executive dominance in presidential democracies”.
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resources is able to control the government effectively. For instance, in purely constitutionalterms, in an international comparison the Swiss parliament disposes of a very strong position vis-à-vis the government, with very extensive formal rights of legislative participation. At the sametime, however, the Swiss legislative is characterised by extremely weak resources in terms ofstaff, financing and infrastructure, which is in turn reflected in its weak control of thegovernment (Linder 1998).12 A quite similar situation can be found in the Scandinavian states. Avalid measurement of the relationship between the executive and the legislative must thereforetake into account both the constitutional position of the legislative vis-à-vis the executive, andthe legislative’s actual possibilities of control. The variable chosen here in order to determine therelationship between the executive and the legislative is based on a combined indexincorporating both the formal legal features of Siaroff’s (2003) “executive dominance” index andSchnapp/Harfst’s (2005) effective parliamentary control capacities. Siaroff’s (2003) index pools11 indicators which Siaroff defines as the factor “executive dominance over the legislature” onthe basis of a factor analysis. These indicators include, for instance, the degree of governmentcontrol of plenary agendas, the initiation of legislation, the ability of committees to rewritelegislation, and the power of the prime minister.13 The index of Schnapp/Harfst (2005) is basedon an extensive examination of the effective control possibilities and information resources ofthe parliaments in two dozen industrial democracies.14 The two authors combine the informationand control capacities measured for each parliament to form an additive index, taking intoaccount factors such as the number of staff at the disposal of members of parliament, the size ofthe parliamentary scientific service departments, and the number of permanent parliamentarycommittees. Our combined index for the determination of the power relation betweengovernment and parliament is formed by the standardised scores of the sum of Siaroff’s (2003)and Schnapp/Harfst’s (2005) indexes.
- Electoral SystemLike Lijphart, we use the Gallagher index of disproportionality to measure the degree to whichthe electoral systems skew the relationship between votes and seats in parliament. The greaterthe disproportionality is, the more majoritarian the electoral system.15
- Interest GroupsLijphart (1999) uses an index of interest group pluralism developed by Siaroff (1999) which isbased on eight indicators and which generates a comprehensive score for 24 countries rangingfrom 1 (highly pluralist) to 5 (highly corporatist). Higher degrees of corporatism are associated
12 For this reason, in the case of Switzerland, Schwarz et al. (2005: 24) speak of a “formally strong andinformally weak parliament”.13 Siaroff’s index comes close to the (older) executive dominance measure developed by Shugart/Carey (1992).14 In the missing case of Iceland, the parliamentary control capacities were estimated based on Kristjansson(2004) and other sources.15 We follow here Lijphart’s replay (2003: 21) to Taagepera’s criticism on his measurement of electoraldisproportionality: “(…) the most appropriate measure is simply the actual degree to which elections yieldproportional results – regardless of the reasons behind these results (such as the effective threshold and otherfeatures of the formal electoral rules, the numbers and relative sizes of the political parties, and various countryspecific factors). (…) Taagepera and I are in agreement on the suitability of the Gallagher index”.
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with greater co-ordination and compromise among societal interests as well as between thesesocio-economic interests and governments, which according to Lijphart is a consensus feature.Whereas some of Siaroff’s indicators (1999: 195ff.) refer to formal and informal rules – such asthe recognition of peak organisations as social partners at trilateral negotiations and as partieswhich are integrated into policy-making – others are clearly outcomes of such rules, in particularthe number of days lost by strikes; moreover, the latter are used as such by Lijphart (1999:266ff.) in his analysis of the consequences of institutional arrangements for economic outputs.As such, causes and consequences are based to some extent on identical indicators, whichobviously creates a problem of endogenity (De Winter 2005: 11). It thus seems expedient to usean indicator of corporatism which does not rely on economic outputs indicators. However, todate, corporatism researchers have been unable to agree on a broadly-accepted quantitativemeasurement concept. Rather, there exists a multitude of very different quantitative indicators ofcorporatism “which have grown so numerous as to perhaps overwhelm even seasonedresearchers in the field” (Kenworthy 2003: 11). In fact, a recently compiled inventory shows thatthere exist more than 40 different concepts for the quantitative measurement of corporatism.Nevertheless, a systematic comparison of 42 indicators of corporatism shows at least that allthese indicators can be grouped into four categories according to their main focus: (1) interestgroup organisation; (2) wage-setting arrangements; (3) interest group participation in policy-making, and (4) political economic consensus (Kenworthy 2003). To avoid the endogenityproblem, we take a narrowly-defined measure of corporatism which includes the three firstcategories but excludes the fourth dimension (political economic consensus), which is usuallyoperationalised by strike rates (Kenworthy 2003: 16). Our corporatism index consists of the sumof four standardised indicators: trade union density (percentage of labour force consisting ofmembers of trade unions), the collective bargaining coverage rate (percentage of labour forcecovered by collective agreement), and the centralisation and coordination16 of the wageformation process.17
- Constitutional Division of Territorial PowerWith reference to the recent debate on how to measure the territorial division of power (Castles1999, Elazar 1997, Keman 2000, Rodden 2004, Watts 1998) and in order to avoid mixing updifferent concepts of vertical power sharing, we depart from Lijphart’s (1999) one-dimensionalmeasurement of federalism and decentralisation. Instead, we use two different scales to tap thisdimension, namely: the federal-unitary scale, representing the constitutional indicators for the“right to decide”, and the central-decentral scale, which indicates the extent to which non-central agencies in fact have the “right to act” (Keman 2000: 199).18 The federal-unitaryindicator measures the territorial distribution of power between different levels of governmentforms embraced by the constitution, ranging from 1.0 (unitary) to 5.0 (federal), and also takes
16 Soskice (1990) has argued in an influential article that researchers interested in the effects of wage-setting andbargaining arrangements should focus not only on coordination, but also on centralisation.17 Unfortunately, very few corporatism indicators have been measured since the late 1990s.18 See Keman (2000: 222): “(...) federalism and decentralization are two distinct cross-national variables, whichenable the researcher to categorize the cases under investigation in a more meaningful way than is often the casein the literature”.
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into consideration the recent institutional changes of territorial power in our sample of countries(see Armingeon 2004, Lundell/Karvonen 2003). The higher the degree of federalism is, the moreconsensual the regime.
- Fiscal Division of Territorial PowerWe measure the degree of decentralisation by means of an indicator of fiscal decentralisationdeveloped in analogy to Lijphart (1984: 178) and also used by Armingeon (2004), Castles(1999), Lane/Errson (1997), Keman (2000), Schmidt (2000), Vatter/Freitag (2007) and manyothers. “This measure (…) is the simplest and most unambiguous measure of the territorialdecentralisation of the fisc” (Castles 1999: 33). Fiscal decentralisation is equivalent to theproportion of state and local taxes in total tax revenue. The tax-share measure is based on thereasonable assumption that the scope of the activities of the central state and non-centralgovernment can be measured in terms of their revenues.
- Parliaments and CongressesFor his measurement of the distribution of power within the legislature, Lijphart (1999) usesthree features (bicameral vs. unicameral, symmetrical vs. asymmetrical, congruent vs.incongruent) in order to derive an index of bicameralism. Lijphart’s scale ranges from 1.0(unicameral), a majoritarian characteristic, to 4.0 (strong bicameralism), a consensus attribute.Here, we use an updated version of Lijphart’s bicameralism index based on Vatter (2005).19
- Constitutional AmendmentsAccording to Lijphart (1999: 219), the great variety of constitutional provisions can be reducedto four basic types: approval of a constitutional reform by an ordinary majority (1.0), approvalby more than an ordinary but less than a two-thirds majority or ordinary majority plusreferendum (2.0), approval by a two-thirds majority or equivalent (3.0), and approval by morethan a two-thirds majority or a two-thirds majority combined with other requirements. Themajor problem with Lijphart’s index is the unsystematic consideration of referendums (seeLorenz 2005: 342ff.).20 Lijphart assigns a score of 2.0 to the approval of an amendment by morethan an ordinary and less than a two-thirds legislative majority if a referendum is necessary.However, clearly referendums are very high barriers to constitutional changes. There are manyrecent examples where a referendum took place and constitutional reforms subsequently failed(Christin/Hug 2002). In her index of constitutional rigidity, Lorenz (2005) combines Lijphart’sscale with the systematic consideration of different voting arenas, implying that non-parliamentary actors must be considered in a systematic way when they explicitly have toconsent to an amendment. Thus, for the following analysis we use Lorenz’s sophisticated index
19 For UK, we also take the new bicameralism index score of 1.75 by Flinders (2005: 79) into consideration.20 There are also other problems, for example that Lijphart (1999) in each case considers the least restrictive legalmethod for making amendments (see Lorenz 2005: 342). However, many constitutions provide for very rigorousprocedures for the amendment of core sections, or indeed make such amendments completely impossible (e.g.Germany).
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of amendment procedures (ranging from 1.0 to 9.5), which takes into consideration the differentmajority requirements as well the different voting arenas.
- Judicial ReviewIn order to measure the strength of judicial review, Lijphart (1999: 225) uses a fourfoldclassification based, first, on the distinction between the presence and absence of judicial reviewand, second, on three degrees of activism in the assertion of this power by the courts. In the caseat hand, we use an updated version of Lijphart’s four-point scale ranging from 1.0 (no judicialreview), a majoritarian trait, to 4.0 (strong judicial review), a consensual characteristic, based onLundell/Karvonen (2003).
- Central BankIn order to measure the independence of central banks, Lijphart (1999: 235) uses the meanfigure of the Cukierman-Webb-Neyapti, the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini and Central BankGovernors’ turnover rate indexes, all of which are coded from zero to one, i.e. from the lowestto the highest independence. However, Lijphart’s overall index for the measurement of centralbank independence displays a number of weaknesses. For instance, it is partially based on out-of-date data, does not include the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini index for half of the countriesexamined, and does not take into account recent developments, particularly the formation andstrong influence of the European Central Bank (ECB). The following analysis is therefore basedon an up-to-date analysis of central bank independence for all OECD states which also recordsthe degree of independence of the ECB. Sousa (2003), in his new study, takes into account thestaff-related, political, economic and financial dimensions of central bank independence andpools the total of nine indicators in an overall index of the independence of each of the centralbanks examined. For those countries which have joined the European Monetary Union andwhere the national central banks have accordingly decreased in importance, the value of theindependence of the European Central Bank is taken into account as from the time of thecountries’ accession.21
- Direct DemocracyOn the basis of our theoretical considerations, it is possible to compile an index of directdemocracy corresponding to the majority-consensus logic. In doing so, the following applies:the higher the number of points awarded, the more consensual the direct democracy in acountry. Three criteria are decisive for the determination of the direct democracy index:- Governmental control: What instruments of direct democracy are provided for by theconstitution? To answer this first question, we award one point for each basic form of“uncontrolled referendums” (optional referendums, initiatives) provided for in the constitution.No point, on the other hand, is awarded for the plebiscite – the most majoritarian popular right –which is by definition an ad hoc referendum, can be initiated at the discretion of the head of
21 The following countries have been members of the European Monetary Union since 1999: Belgium, Germany,Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Spain. Greece has been amember since 2001.
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government, is often not binding, and which is not stipulated in the constitution. Theintermediate form, the mandatory referendum, is valued at 0.5 points according his medium levelof governmental control. All in all, a maximum of 2.5 points is possible here if a countrydisposes of the mandatory referendum (0.5) and the optional referendum (1.0) as well as thepopular initiative (1.0). An attenuated form of the popular initiative in practice is what is knownas the popular petition (valued at 0.5 points), a petition which must be processed by parliamentbut which does not lead to a referendum. This form of citizen participation exists in Austria22
and Spain23. A further specific direct democratic feature is the Italian abrogative referendum,which can be initiated by 500’000 citizens or five regional councils. “There are no time limitsbetween passing the decision and submitting it to a referendum, Italian voters may veto otherthan recent parliamentary decisions. The Italian abrogative referendum has in fact manycharacteristics similar to popular initiatives as it allows the electors to influence the politicalagenda” (Setälä 2006: 707, see also Uleri 1996, 2002). For this reason, in the case at hand wetreat the Italian abrogative referendum as a popular initiative. Finally, special forms of optionalreferendum exist in Iceland and Greece, where it can be initiated by the President if she or herefuses to ratify a project of bill (Uleri 1996: 228). Due to this majoritaran feature, the optionalreferendum in Iceland and Greece is not valued in our index.- Decision rule: how are decisions reached regarding the acceptance or rejection of areferendum? This question involves distinguishing whether a simple popular majority issufficient for the acceptance of a referendum, or whether qualified majorities or the fulfilment ofadditional criteria are required. Here, one point is awarded for each form of direct democracy ifa qualified majority (“quorum of consent”) is required. The intermediate form of voter turnoutrequirement (“quorum of participation”) is valued at 0.5 points.- Practical use: which instruments of direct democracy were effectively used in practice in thecourse of the last 10 years? In line with Lijphart’s “institutional rules and practices” approach,we will enquire not only as to the constitutional provisions, but also as to the practicalsignificance of direct democracy. Clearly it makes a difference whether a popular right isprescribed in the constitution but is never used, for example on account of overly high barriers(numbers of signatures required, collection deadlines), or whether referendums are actually heldand the population is regularly able to directly influence governmental constitutional andlegislative decisions. In our index, we award one point for the effective use, in the period from1997 until 2006, of each basic direct democratic form which is stipulated in the constitution(criterion: at least one referendum issue). Here, a maximum of three points is possible ifdecisions in a country were made via mandatory and optional referendums as well as via popularinitiatives.
22 100’000 signatures are required for a popular petition (Volksbegehren) in Austria to be forwarded forprocessing to the National Council (First Chamber of Parliament).23 The (so-called) Spanish People’s Legislative Initiative has the following characteristics: a) It does not lead to areferendum call. Rather, it is merely designed to permit the people to submit, under some circumstances, non-governmental bills to Parliament on a limited set of issues. b) Section 87.3 of the Spanish Constitution banspopular legislative initiatives for Organic Acts.
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Table 3 provides an overview of the allocation of points for the 23 democracies examined on thebasis of the index of direct democracy presented above.
Table 3: Index of direct democracy for 23 advanced democracies, 1997-2006Country Plebiscite Mandatory
ReferendumOptionalReferendum
PopularInitiative
Points
USA - - - - 0Germany - - - - 0Belgium - - - - 0UK X/SM - - - 0Canada X/SM - - - 0Greece X/SM - (X/SM) - 0Norway X/SM - - - 0Luxembourg 1/SM - - - 0Japan - X/SM - - 0.5Iceland X/SM X/SM (X/SM) - 0.5Portugal 3/PQ - - - 0.5Netherlands 1/PQ - - - 0.5France 2/SM - X/SM - 1Finland X/SM - X/SM - 1Sweden 1/SM - X/PQ - 1.5Spain 1/SM X/SM X/SM (X/SM) 2Austria X/SM X/SM X/SM (13/SM) 2Ireland X/SM 10/PQ - - 2Australia X/SM 2/QM - - 2.5New Zealand 1/SM X/SM 2/SM - 2.5Denmark X/SM 2/PQ X/SM - 3.5Italy X/SM - 2/SM 21/PQ 4.5Switzerland - 21/QM 30/SM 43/QM 7.5Legend: X: exists; -: does not exist; Numbers: number of corresponding referendum (plebiscite; initiative) issues;SM: simple majority required; PQ: quorum of participation required; QM: qualified majority (quorum of consent)required.Note: For further information, see text.Sources: Hug/Tsebelis (2002); Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy, University of Geneva,2007.
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Empirical Results
The main question now presents itself whether relationships can be observed between the mostimportant political institutions in the advanced democracies. The appropriate method forunderlaying a set of variables with an ordering structure is a factor analysis, which allowsindividual variables, by virtue of their correlations, to be classified into independent groups. Thisstatistical procedure allows us to tease out one or several dimensions underlying the differentvariables (Lijphart 1999: 245).
Table 4 presents the results of the factor analysis with our twelve variables.24 The researchperiod is the years 1997 to 2006; the units examined are the 23 most advanced democracies. Thevalues specified for each variable indicate the factor loadings, which can be interpreted ascorrelation coefficients between the variable and the first, the second and the third factor.
Table 4: Varimax orthogonal rotated factor matrix of the twelve institutional variables in23 advanced democracies, 1997 - 2006Variable Factor I Factor II Factor III
Effective number of legislative partiesElectoral proportionalityExecutive-legislative relationshipInterest group corporatismCentral bank independence
0.62 0.83 0.70 0.81 0.56
0.06 0.08 0.38- 0.26- 0.36
0.39 0.01 0.06- 0.03 0.19
FederalismDecentralizationBicameralismConstitutional rigidityJudicial review
- 0.07 0.08- 0.27 0.26- 0.05
0.89 0.74 0.80 0.72 0.65
- 0.03 0.14 0.17- 0.11- 0.10
Oversized cabinetsDirect democracy
0.12 0.04
- 0.12 0.12
0.84 0.82
Note: The factor analysis is a principal component analysis with eigenvalues over 1.0 extracted.
The central outcome of the factor analysis is the emergence of three unrelated factors, each ofwhich encompasses a group of variables. The three groups of variables exhibit high factorloadings within, as well as low loadings outside their own group. The strongest variable in the
24 The factor analysis chosen here is a principal component analysis with orthogonal, rotated factor loadings in accordancewith the Varimax Criterion. Principal component analysis is the commonest-used technique for the determination of factors.In principal component analysis, the coordinate system with the factorising characteristics is rotated so that new axes emerge,successively explaining maximum variance. The orthogonal (right-angled) rotation technique ensures that the factors areindependent of each other (reciprocally uncorrelated). Rotation using the Varimax Criterion causes the factors to be rotated insuch a fashion that the variance of the squared loadings per factor is maximised. This process aims to create the best possiblestructure for the significant factors.
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first factor dimension is the (dis)proportionality of the electoral system, which correlates veryhighly with the first factor, followed by interest group corporatism and the executive-legislativerelationship. The number of parties and the degree of central bank independence stand in asomewhat less, but still comparatively strong relation to the first factor. All in all, this factorexplains more than 20 per cent of the total variance. In the second dimension, the federalism andthe bicameralism variables prove to be the strongest features, followed by the decentralizationindicator, the rigidity of constitutional provisions and the strength of judicial review. In general,the factor loadings in the second cluster are even a bit stronger than in the first cluster.25 Thecontribution of this factor to the explanation of the total variance is almost 30 per cent.26 Thethird and smallest factor encompasses two variables, namely the percentage of oversized multi-party cabinets and the consensual strength of direct democracy. With 0.84 and 0.82 respectively,both variables correlate strongly with the third cluster. The contribution of the third factor to theexplanation of the total variance is 15 per cent. Finally, it is worth mentioning that these resultshardly change when Switzerland is dropped from the factor analysis, despite the fact thatSwitzerland is obviously a “direct democratic outlier”.27 In fact, the results proved to be verystable.
What interpretations do these findings allow? The most obvious result is the fact that if we takeinto account direct democracy, there emerge no longer only two, but a total of three dimensionsin established democracies. Nevertheless, in contrast to the findings of previous research(Grofman 2000, Lijphart 1984, 1989), the empirical results seem to confirm our hypothesis thatdirect democracy is not a variable that is independent from all other political institutions, but thatrather it is closely connected to the type of the government cabinet: the more developed theinstitutions and the use of direct democracy, the most likely there are to be broadly supportedmulti-party coalitions in the countries examined.
In the case of the first dimension of democracy, two results must be noted. First, it transpiresthat even a completely different (and hopefully more valid) measurement of the powerrelationship between the executive and the legislative leads to a similar result as in Lijphart(1999). A balanced relationship between the executive and the legislative goes hand in hand witha proportional electoral system and a high number of parties in parliament, and is obviously animportant component of a horizontal consensual structure in a country. The second notableresult is the unambiguous positioning of central bank independence in the first dimension ofdemocracy, whereas in Lijphart’s (1999) factor analysis it was allocated to the federal-unitarydimension. As such, the present result is also more consistent with Lijphart’s original conceptionof the two democratic dimensions: “My own initial view of the differences between the twodimensions, reflected in the labels that I attached to them, was that the first is a horizontal
25 All variables reach the level determined by Pennings et al. (2003) as the critical threshold value 0.35, and can therefore bedescribed as reliable components of their factor dimensions.26 In fact, this is the first (and strongest) factor dimension. However, to avoid misunderstandings and to be in line withLijphart (1999) we call the federal-unitary factor as the second dimension of democracy.27 Without Switzerland, the factor loadings between type of cabinets, respectively direct democracy, and the third factor are0.80, respectively 0.77.
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dimension of institutions operating at the central level, and that the second is a verticaldimension having to do with central-regional-local government relations. Because central banksoperate at the central level and appear to have little to do with the vertical dimension, myexpectation was that central banks would belong to the executives-parties. But the empiricalanalysis showed a strong relationship with the cluster of four federal-unitary characteristicsinstead (Lijphart 2003: 23).” The present analysis makes clear that Lijphart’s initial theoreticalconsiderations in this respect can be empirically confirmed for the most recent times, albeit withan important amendment: besides a horizontal institutional structure on the central-state level(including the central bank) and a vertical, i.e. federal dimension, modern democracies alsoinclude a third, orthogonal dimension which consists of the top-to-bottom power relation, i.e. ofthe relationship between the government and the population.
The factor analysis which we have carried out affords us profounder insights into the differentdimensions of advanced democracies and conveys much information concerning the latter’s mostimportant characteristics. However, it does not yet enlighten us as to the exact location of eachcountry in relation to the other countries on the three mutually independent dimensions ofdemocracy. A suitable procedure in order precisely to answer these as yet open questions is tographically represent the three dimensions on a conceptual map of democracy, as Lijphart (1999:248) has already done. However, this requires us to z-transform the factor values of thevariables in order to make them comparable with each other.
Figure 1 – in the form of a so-called bubble plot – represents the countries’ locations on aconceptual map formed by the twelve variables along with the three mutually independentdimensions. A bubble plot allows us to chart three variables in two dimensions by varying thesize of each data point in a scatter plot based on the third variable (Jacoby 1998). Thus, thecharacteristics of the five variables of the first and the second dimension can be used to placeeach of the 23 democracies on the conceptual map of democracy shown in Figure 1. The firstdimension of horizontal power (“parties-interest groups dimension”) is located on the abscissa,the vertical power dimension (“federal-unitary dimension”) on the ordinate. Both axes varybetween strongly majoritarian (positive values) and strongly consensual (negative values).28 Thethird dimension of orthogonal power (the “cabinets-direct democracy” dimension) is presentedby the size of each bubble, which shows the data point’s relative importance. Thus, a largebubble size means high values in the third dimension and corresponds to an active directdemocracy and oversized multi-party cabinets, whereas a small bubble size corresponds to apurely representative democracy and minimal winning cabinets in the period under scrutiny. Theexact (z-transformed) scores of each of the 23 countries on the three dimensions can be found inappendix 1.
28 In order to enable us to apply the factors to three dimensions, it was necessary to adjust the signs of the individual variables(cf. also Lijphart 1999: 247).
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Figure 1: The three-dimensional conceptual map of democracy
What new insights does figure 1 afford us compared to Ljphart’s (1999) two-dimensional mapof democracy? First and foremost, it transpires that for the most recent times, too, and despitethe devolutionary processes which have taken place there, the United Kingdom continues to be apure example of the Westminster model, while New Zealand (although the only country to beeven more unitary than the UK) has, due to the introduction of the proportional electoral systemin 1996, progressively become a mixed-type in the first dimension which comprises bothmajoritarian and consensus elements (Nagel 2000). In terms of the first two dimensions, theprime example of a consensus democracy within Lijphart’s (1999) concept is Belgium, whichhas in recent years further developed its already exceptional position as a strongly federal state.However, in contrast to Lijphart (1999), Switzerland no longer corresponds to the prototype ofa consensual-federal democracy in the first two dimensions. Thus, in the first dimension, eight(of 23) countries achieve higher consensus values than Switzerland, while in the federaldimension, five countries achieve higher values. An important reason for this result is that thepresent study – taking into account, as it does, direct democracy – includes a very importantinstitutional arrangement of Swiss democracy which, together with the type of cabinet, forms athird dimension. While Switzerland in the first two dimensions is an average case of a consensusdemocracy, it also constitutes – with the very high significance of optional referendums andpopular initiatives as well as the very broadly-supported multiparty coalition which it displays –a prime example of a direct democratic power sharing democracy. The relevant antipodes in the
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third dimension are purely representative democracies (at the national level) with minimalwinning cabinets such as Germany, the USA and the UK.
In conclusion, based on the results on hand, it is possible to compile a typology of advanceddemocracies on the basis of the democracies’ most important political institutions using the threedimensions, positioning the two “old” dimensions opposite the new, third dimension. We groupthe countries into the different categories based on the signs of the factor scores.
Table 5: A Typology of Advanced Democratic Regimes
Dimension III
Dimensions 1 and II
Majoritarian-unitarian
Majoritarian-federal
Consensual-unitarian
Consensual-federal
Representative democracy United Kingdom, Canada, USA, Finland, Iceland, Belgium,and minimal winning cabinets Greece France, Japan Norway Netherlands, Germany
Luxemburg, Portugal
Weak direct democracy Ireland, Australia Sweden Spain, Austriaand different types of cabinets New Zealand
Some elements of directdemocracy and oversized Denmark Italycabinets
Strong direct democracy Switzerlandand oversized cabinets
Note: Representative democracies which had minority or oversized cabinets are italicised. Representativedemocracy: 0 or 1 points in our index of direct democracy; weak: 1.5-3 points; some elements: 3.5-5 points:strong direct democracy: more than 5 points.
This concluding typology now makes clear that the previous two-dimensional differentiationbetween majoritarian and consensus democracies as well as between unitary and federal statesneeds to be expanded by the third, “cabinets-direct democracy” dimension in order to takesufficiently into account the importance of direct popular co-determination in domestic andforeign political affairs. In particular, it shows that the recording, to date, of consensusdemocracies has been too undifferentiated, having insufficiently accounted for the differingpower sharing techniques in plural and ethnically mixed societies. The two different prototypesof consensus democracy can best be explained using the examples of Belgium and Switzerland.Thus, Belgium most closely corresponds to the “parliamentary-representative” prototype of aconsensus democracy within the original meaning of Arend Lijphart’s concept of consociationaldemocracy (1977). The heads of the Belgian political elite, as the leaders of the numerous andstrongly segmented parties, play an important part in the quest for consensus in theparliamentary arena, and make it possible to find balanced compromises which encompass thedifferent ethnic groups.29 Another form of consensus democracy is to be found in Switzerland,which may be described as the prototype of a “cabinet-direct democracy”. In Switzerland, thedevelopment of popular rights has admittedly led to the continuous integration of the mainpolitical parties into a government coalition and weakened the parliament. In the quest to
29 “The Belgian elites – i.e. the party leaders of the governing parties – have used a variety of techniques to avoidgridlock: agreeing to disagree, log-rolling, splitting the difference, waffle-iron policy, asymmetricalconstructions. The result of these agreements is the thoroughly reformed state (…)” (Deschouver 2006: 906).
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minimise the risks harboured by direct democracy, the informal search for a broadly-supportedcompromise has required the formation of broadly-supported multi-party governments whichmake the important decisions. Extensive power sharing in the government is intended toproduce solutions acceptable to a sufficiently large majority in parliament for the risk of optionalreferendums and initiatives to be reduced (Linder 1998, Steiner 2002).
Unsurprisingly, we have not been able to identify any empirical example of a Westminsterdemocracy with a strongly-developed direct democracy from below. The UK, USA, Canada andGreece are all representative democratic systems, while the remaining advanced majoritariandemocracies typically display only the most majoritarian popular rights such as plebiscites andmandatory referendums, with no optional referendums or popular initiatives.
Conclusions
Four conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of the most important political institutions inadvanced democracies:First and foremost, our empirical results suggest that in consolidated democracies there existmore than the two well-known dimensions of Lijphart’s model of democracy. Strikingly, thecentral outcome of our factor analysis is the emergence of three largely unrelated factors. Thefirst dimension of democracy comes close, but is not identical to Lijphart’s executive-partiesdimension. Besides electoral disproportionality, the effective number of parties and interestgroup corporatism, this dimension also includes an entirely new measurement of the executive-legislative relationship as well as central bank independence, but not the type of the governmentcabinet. Because central banks operate at the national level, this result is more consistent withLijphart’s initial distinction of a horizontal-vertical contrast (Lijphart 2000: 236). Thus, the firstfactor can also be designated the horizontal dimension of democracy which operates at thecentral level. The second factor is almost identical to Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension andincludes federalism, decentralization, bicameralism, constitutional rigidity and judicial review(but not central bank independence). Hence, we can label the second factor the verticaldimension of democracy, having to do – as it does – with central-regional government relations.Finally, the most interesting result is the existence of a third factor which we call the orthogonaldimension of democracy, as it is independent of the two other dimensions. This third dimensioncomprises two political institutions, the type of government cabinet and the strength of directdemocracy. Thus, advanced direct democracy goes hand in hand with broadly-supported multi-party governments, while conversely, purely representative constitutions frequently appear inconjunction with minimal winning cabinets. In contrast to the findings of other studies to date(Grofman 2000, Lijphart 1984, 1999), it results that direct democracy is not a politicalinstitution which is independent of all other features of democracy, but rather that it stands in areciprocally relationship with the format of the government cabinet, which for its part no longer– as in Lijphart (1984, 1999) – correlates with the first dimension of democracy.
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Second, the question arises as to a theoretical explanation for the relationship which we haveidentified between the strength of direct democratic institutions and the increasing integration ofdifferent political forces into government. In line with the neo-institutional approach, it seemsthat with the increased veto potential they harbour and the ensuing unpredictability for therespective government, the increased institutional provisions for referendums in advanceddemocracies and their growing use by non-governmental actors in recent years have createdinstitutional pressures towards more power sharing in the executive. This structure-buildingfunction of direct democratic instruments and the interplay of executive power sharing anddirect democracy can thereby be demonstrated most fruitfully on the basis of the uniqueexperiences in Switzerland, the prime example of a referendum democracy. Neidhart’s (1970)pioneering analysis of the optional referendum in Switzerland showed that popular rights havehad a lasting effect on the structure of the Swiss system of governance. Immediately after itsintroduction, the optional referendum became an extremely effective instrument used by theopposition to thwart the policies of the Radical Party who held a majority in parliament andgovernment. Consequently, oppositional forces favouring the launch of referendums werecontinuously integrated into the government in the course of the 20th century, something whichfinally led to the establishment of differentiated consensual structures. The co-optation strategiesadopted over the years by the political elite in order to minimise the risks harboured by directdemocracy gradually transformed the Swiss referendum democracy into a consensus democracywith broadly supported multi-party government coalitions. Until today, this fundamental findingis generally regarded as the most important, although not the only explanation for the formationof strong consensual decision-making structures in Switzerland (Kriesi 1998; Linder 1998; 2005,Steiner 1974, 2002). Even if direct democracy in the other advanced democracies is far fromhaving the great importance which it has in Switzerland, at least its growing relevance in the pastyears seems to have exerted a certain pressure on the formation of government cabinets. Forexample in Denmark, during the 1988 election campaign the Radical Liberals made the demandfor an increased use of referendums. After the 1988 election, the Radical Liberals wereintegrated into the new government coalition and the idea for a more active use of directdemocracy was not developed further (Svensson 1996: 49). Accordingly, Setälä (2006: 715)comes to the conclusion that “the institution of rejective referendum has had indirect effects onDanish parliamentary politics as it has encourages consensus between parliamentary parties” InItaly, the largest number of abrogative initiatives was promoted by the Radical Party (PR), thereferendum party par excellence. Consequently, the Radical Party “attempted to carve a nichefor itself in Italian politics – to win, through referendum campaigns, the potential for coalition orblackmail potential that it was unsuccessful in gaining through elections” (Uleri 2002: 872).Third, how can the present results be integrated into the current findings of empirical democracyresearch? Initially, our results underline, for the most recent period, the continuing theoreticaland empirical relevance of the horizontal and vertical power sharing dimensions in establisheddemocracies as described by Arend Lijphart (1984, 1999). At the same time, our results makeclear that the inclusion of direct democracy can lead to an extension and differentiation ofLijphart’s concept of representative majoritarian and consensus democracy. Such an extension
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and differentiation takes into account not only new developments such as the increasedsignificance of referendums in modern democracies, but also counters certain researchers’criticism of Lijphart’s concept to the effect that consensus democracies are de facto oligarchicalelitist democracies without any direct influence of the people. Evidently, in reality there exist twodifferent prototypes of consensus democracies with different power sharing strategies: on theone hand the parliamentary-representative type, which is decisively influenced by the search forcompromises by the elected party leaders in the parliamentary arena (e.g. Belgium). On the otherhand, there is the direct democratic type, which is characterised by the broad integration ofpolitical forces into the government due to the pressure exercised by instruments of directdemocracy (e.g. Switzerland). Thus, in contrast to Belgium, Switzerland’s consensus democracyis not the result of negotiations between the governing parties, but is largely a product of itsstrong direct democracy from below.Finally, our empirical results can best be reconciled with Kaiser’s (1997, 1998) concept of multi-dimensional veto point democracy and his conceptual framework of democratic regimes (Kaiseret al. 2002). Kaiser distinguishes different dimensions of veto points and refers to thecompensatory function and functional equivalent of political institutions. In this sense, we agreewith Kaiser’s (1998) critique of Huber et al. (1993) and Schmidt’s (2000) one-dimensionalframeworks of counter-majoritarian institutions, or McGann/Latner’s (2006) critique ofTsebelis’ (2002) one-dimensional veto points approach. In the present case, it seems similarlyunwise simply to count up the institutional veto points, since this would cause the differentdimensions of power sharing and the specific interaction of institutions in the advanceddemocracies practically to disappear. Rather, theoretically as well as empirically, it seems moreuseful to allow for the variety of institutional arrangements in the advanced OECD countries bydifferentiating between at least three different dimensions of democracy. Taking into accountthese different dimensions provides us with a more complex, but also altogether more realisticpicture of the diversity of modern democracies.
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Appendix 1: Twelve Institutional Variables of 23 Advanced Democracies, 1997-2006
Country
Effectivenumber oflegislativeparties
Oversized andminoritycabinets (%)
Index ofexecutive-legislativerelationship
Gallagher Indexof disproportio-nality (%)
Index ofinterest groupcorporatism
Index ofconstitutionalfederalism
Australia 2.47 11 -2.38 10.04 -1.59 5.0Austria 3.19 0 1.05 1.76 1.92 4.5Belgium 8.16 44 0.4 3.63 2.99 5.0Canada 2.80 22 -2.05 12.57 -4.84 5.0Denmark 4.58 78 1.33 0.65 2.54 2.0Finland 5.01 100 1.08 3.15 5.64 2.0France 2.92 100 -1.81 19.98 -1.90 1.3Germany 3.35 0 1.74 3.00 1.21 5.0Greece 2.25 0 -1.4 7.76 0.69 1.0Iceland 3.65 0 1.78 1.44 2.84 1.0Ireland 3.18 33 -2.2 6.45 2.65 1.0Italy 5.73 78 1.43 6.67 0.43 1.5Japan 2.94 100 1.36 9.68 -3.38 2.0Luxembourg 4.12 0 -1.89 3.38 0.52 1.0Netherlands 4.98 44 0.45 1.01 0.75 3.0New Zealand 3.65 89 -1.85 2.61 -5.32 1.0Norway 4.85 89 0.49 3.25 3.47 2.0Portugal 2.58 22 -0.25 5.22 1.66 1.0Spain 2.56 56 0.83 5.68 -0.39 3.0Sweden 4.18 100 1.32 1.00 2.84 2.0Switzerland 5.22 100 0.32 2.93 -1.79 5.0UK 2.15 0 -1.92 17.1 -4.78 2.5USA 2.01 0 2.17 2.52 -6.17 5.0
Country
State and localtaxes in total taxrevenue (%)
Index ofbicameralism
Index ofconstitutionalrigidity
Index ofjudicial review
Index of centralbank indepen-dence
Index of directdemocracy
Australia 22.4 4 8 2 2.66 2.5Austria 20.9 2 3 2 6.86 2Belgium 14.1 3 9.5 2 6.29 0Canada 44.1 3 7 2 2.33 0Denmark 31.2 1 8 1 4.99 3.5Finland 23.0 1 4 1 7.16 1France 9.9 3 4 2 6.83 1Germany 29.1 4 6 2 6.83 0Greece 1.2 1 5 1 6.68 0Iceland 20.8 1 8 1 5.08 0.5Ireland 2.3 2 4 1 6.72 2Italy 5.4 3 4 2 6.97 4.5Japan 24.9 3 8 1 4.41 0.5Luxembourg 7.6 1 5 0 6.77 0Netherlands 2.6 3 8.5 0 6.81 0.5New Zealand 5.7 1 1 0 4.99 2.5Norway 19.6 1.5 3.5 1 3.41 0Portugal 5.6 1 3 1 6.83 0.5Spain 13.8 3 6 2 6.66 2Sweden 31.8 1 4 1 6.91 1.5Switzerland 36.1 4 7 0.67 6.52 7.5UK 4.1 1.75 1 0.33 3.66 0USA 32.1 4 9 2 3.83 0
Country
First dimension(parties-interestgroups)
Second dim.(federal-unitary)
Third dim.(cabinets-directdemocracy) Country
First dimension(parties-interestgroups)
Second dim.(federal-unitary)
Third dim.(cabinets-directdemocracy)
Australia -1.58 1.40 -0.14 Japan -0.64 0.39 0.55Austria 0.67 0.31 -0.44 Luxembourg 0.10 -1.26 -1.15Belgium 1.40 1.16 -0.53 Netherlands 0.84 -0.23 -0.24Canada -1.93 1.52 -0.84 N. Zealand -0.77 -1.72 0.97Denmark 0.77 0.07 1.38 Norway 0.33 -0.53 0.11Finland 1.33 -0.52 0.55 Portugal 0.11 -1.15 -0.56France -1.21 -0.10 0.55 Spain 0.06 0.47 0.35Germany 0.69 1.33 -1.15 Sweden 1.04 -0.34 0.84Greece -0.41 -1.03 -1.15 Switzerland 0.48 1.10 2.55Iceland 0.67 -0.31 -0.87 UK -2.04 -1.22 -1.15Ireland -0.13 -0.89 0.17 USA -0.63 1.70 -1.15Italy 0.85 -0.16 1.38