third way report - the still vital center

8/4/2019 Third Way Report - The Still Vital Center

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The Domestic Policy Progra

Report

MODERATE POLI TICS | FEBRUARY 2011

The Still-Vital Center: Moderates, Democrats, and the

Renewal o American PoliticsBy William A. Galston and Elaine C. Kamarck

In 2006, 2008, and 2010, America experienced a series owave elections that resulted in shits o political control. Atthe same time, the country continues to grapple with serious,

potentially existential threats: a weak economy, massive structural

decits and growing global competition. Both problemspolitical polarization and the ailure o governancesharethe same root cause: the ailure to give moderates adequatevoice in the nations electoral and policy processes. This reportargues or a new moderate politics that can solve these twinchallenges. For Democrats, a politics o the center presents acritical opportunityto both rebuild a lasting governing coalitionand to champion a new reorm agenda that can heal a politicalprocess now ractured by polarization. For America, a politics o

the center presents an opportunity to solve some o the biggestchallenges it has ever aced.

T H E C H A L L E N G E

A crisis o confdence in politics and in governance

In the atermath o the November 2010 elections, the tone o Americanpolitics has shited.

The lame-duck session o the 111th Congress was surprisingly productive,in part because Democrats and Republicans compromised to reach agreement,and in part because some Republicans abandoned their monolithic oppositionto the Obama Administrations initiatives. Since the Tucson tragedy, both partieshave worked to reduce the incivility that has disgured our politics, and Presi-dent Obama delivered a State o the Union address widely regarded as an eortto take the edge o the oten-harsh confict that dominated his rst two years inoce. As a result, the political parties and the President have all seen their ap-


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February 2011 The Still-Vital Center: Moderates, Democrats, and the Renewal o American Politics - 2

The Domestic Policy Program www.ThirdWay.o

proval jumpevidence o the publics yearning or a style o politics less gearedtowards point-scoring and more toward problem-solving.1 But despite the mod-est improvements o recent months, America enters the second decade o the21st century with a public whose mood remains sour. Only a third o Americansthink the country is on the right track, condence in government stands near

an all-time low, and partisan polarization has reached levels not seen since the1890s, resulting in public disapproval o both political parties. And despite thegenerally positive reaction to Obamas speech, only 34% think that it signals amajor change in the types o policies he will pursue.2

It is not hard to nd reasons or these sentiments: an economy mired in slowgrowth and high unemployment in the wake o the deepest recession sincethe Great Depression; two costly and seemingly interminable oreign wars;and record budget decits as ar as the eye can see. While America is stuck inneutral, nations such as China, India, and Brazil are surging ahead, generating

widespread ears that our best days are behind us and that urther decline isinevitable. The modest goodwill o the immediate post-election period is threat-ened by an impending series o high-decibel budget battles that will do little toaddress our unsustainable scal course.

This is more than a list o policy challenges; it represents a ailure ogovernancea system that heaps up problems without ever solving them. Inresponse, the people have repeatedly resorted to the ballot-box, but withoutgetting what they want. Remarkably, three consecutive elections have producedlarge shits in the political balance without enhancing public satisaction. In eight

o the past ten years, the share o Americans saying that the country was headedin the right direction has declined (See Appendix #1).

We argue that this crisis o governance and the diculty Democrats havehad in sustaining a governing majority have the same rootnamely, the ailureto give appropriate weight to political moderates in our electoral and policyprocesses. But these problems also have the same cureadopting the kinds ostructural changes that will ampliy moderates voices.

While the greater inclusion o moderates on both sides o the political dividewould benet the nation as a whole, we ocus our case in this paper on why

moderates have particular signicance or Democrats. To fesh out this thesis, wepresent evidence and arguments or three basic propositions:

Moderates are an essential ingredient or building a lasting Demo-

cratic majority. Democrats cannot build sustainable state-wide ornational majorities without winning a super-majority among voters whoidentiy themselves as moderates. At the national level, sel-identied


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liberals constitute barely one-th o the electorate; in most states, theyare nowhere near a pluralitylet alone a majority.

Moderates are not liberals in disguise. Moderates as a group havedistinct viewpoints and policy preerences. They are neither liberals in

disguise nor conservatives with a more conciliatory style. Nor are theyIndependents with a dierent label. Only 47% o moderates are Indepen-dents; only 43% o Independents are moderates.3 Their political orienta-tions and attitudes dier signicantly.

The current political process disavors moderates. The basic structureso American politicsranging rom closed primaries to Congressionalredistricting proceduressystematically tip the scales against moderatesand reward candidates closer to the political extremes.

It is in the long-term interests o the Democratic Party to champion reorms

that will level the playing eld or the moderate voters and candidates thatcomprise such a critical segment o the Democratic coalition. But not only willDemocrats benet rom giving moderates increased attention and weight, sowill the political system as a whole. Polarization will diminish, and policy-makingwill be more likely to yield sustainable outcomes that large majorities o theelectorate can endorse.

These reorms will address a central source o public dissatisaction with mod-ern politics: it will ensure that the system airly and ully refects the sentiments omoderate citizens whose voices are muted by current political arrangements.


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P O L I T I C S

Why moderates matter or a sustainable majority

While liberals are the ideological base o Democrats, theyrepresent a small minority o the overall electorate. DemocraticCongressional victories and President Obamas election werenot triumphs o liberal mobilization but the result o a basicaxiom o contemporary political arithmetic: Democrats cannotwin national majorities without winning a super-majorityamong Americans who regard themselves as neither liberal norconservative. A base strategy may be barely viable or theRepublican Party; it is an electoral and governing dead end or

the Democrats.

As the dust settles on the rubble o the Democratic majority in the House,and eyes turn toward the 2012 general election, Democratic strategists are o-ering their party and the White House a amiliar mix o competing advice. Someargue that without an agenda that re-energizes the base, both President Obamaand the 23 Senate Democrats up or reelection will ace tough sledding. Otherspoint to the huge shit among Independents as the key problem.

The debate between a base strategy and a ocus on Independents representsnot only a alse choice but also a fawed analysis. The Democratic base is denedand should be understoodin ideological terms. Core Democrats are liberals, asthat label has come to be viewed over the past our decades. But liberals constitutea small share o the electorate that has not increased in our decades.

Liberalsa small and static share o the electorate

Over the past three decades, the ideological composition o the electorate inpresidential election years has remained remarkably stable, as shown in Table #1:

TABLE #1

The Composition of the Electorate in Presidential Election Years4

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Avg

Liberal 18 17 18 21 19 22 21 22 20

Moderate 51 44 45 48 48 49 45 44 47

Conservative 31 35 33 31 34 30 34 34 33


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Midterm elections, in which turnout is about one-third lower, are muchmore variable. For example, compare 2006 and 2010. In 2006, the nationalelectorate (the total o all votes cast in House races) was 32% conservative, 47%moderate, and 20% liberal. In 2010, the liberal share remained the same whileconservatives surged to 42% (10 percentage points over 2006) and moderates

dropped by 9 percentage points, rom 47% to 38%. Despite doing a bit betteramong liberals in 2010 than in 2006, Democrats suered a huge reverse, largelybecause the composition o the electorate shited so dramatically. This is not tosay that the composition o the electorate is the only thing that matters in mid-term elections. For example, i Democrats had done as well among moderatesin 2010 as they did in 2006, theirshare o the total vote would haveincreased by about 2 percent-age points, reducing the overallRepublican margin by more thanhal. And i, in addition, they haddone as well among conservativesin 2010 as in 2006, they wouldhave held their majority, notwithstanding the electorates compositional shit.

It is possible that the decades o stability in the presidential electorate maybe coming to an end. Since Barack Obamas election, when moderates andconservatives were about equally balanced in the adult population, conserva-tives have opened up a ve-point edge (40% to 35%) over moderates in theGallup tracking survey.5 (The liberal share has remained constant.) I so, the hill

the president must climb in 2012 may be a little steeper.

Should this shit come to pass, it will be even more important or Obama todo well among moderates. In 2008, Obama carried 60% o the moderate vote,providing ully hal his total vote. (By contrast, liberals constituted about 37%.)I the electorate in 2012 looks anything like the electorate in 2010, as it could ithe Gallup numbers hold up, he would have to be even more dominant amongmoderates than he was during his rst presidential campaign.

Moderatesthe true presidential kingmakers

Moderates tend to vote Democratic. Since 1980, Democrats share o themoderates two-party vote has ranged between 46% in 1980 and 62% in 1996.60% o moderates supported Obama in 2008, while the rest chose McCain.Obama did much better among moderates than either Gore or Kerry, but roughlythe same as Bill Clinton did in 1992 and a bit worse than Clinton did in 1996.

Since 1980, no Democrathas been elected presidentwithout winning at least 60%

of the moderate vote castfor the two major parties.


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TABLE #2

Democratic share of the major party moderate vote6

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

46 47 51 61 62 53 54 60

President Obamas 2008 victory is widely misunderstood as a triumph o liberalmobilization. The truth is more complicated. He received 52.9% o the popularvote, versus John Kerrys 48.3% our years earliera gain o 4.6% o the elector-ate. Table #3 shows the ideological composition o that gain.

TABLE #3

Ideological composition of the Democratic Presidential Vote7

2008 2004

Liberal share o the electorate 22 21

Democratic share o liberals 89 85

Moderate share o the electorate 44 45

Democratic share o moderates 60 54

Conservative share o the electorate 34 34

Democratic share o conservatives 20 15

The largest increase in the Democratic vote share came rom moderates, whowere also the largest grouping in the electorate. Gains among moderates thus

contributed more to Obamas improvement over Kerry than did gains amongliberals. In act, gains among conservatives were as signicant as those amongliberals. Overall, liberal mobilizationcontributed only one-third o Democraticgains between 2004 and 2008signicant,to be sure, but hardly the whole story.Indeed, gains among liberals would nothave suced to put Obama over the top.He prevailed by persuading substantialnumbers o moderates and conservatives

that he could be trusted to govern as president o all the people and not justas a liberal champion. I Obama had received only 54% o the moderate vote,as John Kerry did in 2004, his popular vote would have shrunk to 50.3% o thetotal, and he might well have lost in the Electoral College.

President Obamas2008 victory is widelymisunderstood asa triumph of liberalmobilization.


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Base-ic maththe necessity o a Democratic liberal-moderate coalition

There is no possibility o purely liberal or purely conservative governancethat can sustain itsel over time, or the simple reason that neither liberals norconservatives constitute majorities o the electorate. To win, each party needs to

orm a coalition with moderate voters. But the structure o those coalitions is verydierent. Because conservatives command roughly twice as large a share o theelectorate as do liberals, they can make do with less than a majority o moderates.

Table #4 illustrates the dierence between the two parties winning coali-tions. When Democrats win the presidency, their electoral coalition alwaysconsists o more moderates than liberals. When Republicans win the presidency,their electoral coalition typically consists o more conservatives than moder-ateswith the sole exception o the 1980 Reagan landslide where moderateswere slightly more numerous than conservatives.

TABLE #4The Composition of Democratic versus Republican Governing Coalitions8

Moderates Liberals ConservativesImportance o

Moderates

Jimmy Carter (1976) 51.9% 21.6% +31.3%

Ronald Reagan (1980) 44.0% 40.0% + 4.0%

Ronald Reagan (1984) 38.4% 45.8% - 7.4%

George H.W Bush (1988) 41.6% 50.4% - 8.8%

Bill Clinton (1992) 54.7% 33.2% +21.5%Bill Clinton (1996) 54.6% 31.4% +23.2%

George W. Bush (2000) 46.8% 49.5% -2.7%

George W. Bush (2004) 39.7% 56.0% -16.3%

Barack Obama (2008) 49.8% 36.9% +12.9%

(Plus sign (+) indicates more of a dependence on moderates than on the base of the party. Minus sign (-)

indicates more of a dependence on the base than on moderates)

Democrats begin with a structural advantage among moderates, but theycannot aord to take it or granted. Conversely, while conservatives are lessdependent on moderates to achieve electoral majorities, the Republican Partycannot aord to write them o either. In the long run, a hard-edged, uncom-promising conservatism will alienate the substantial minority o moderates thatRepublicans need to govern eectively.


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I D E O L O G Y

Moderate voters and what they believe9

Moderates as a group etch a distinctive prole. They are center-let on social issues, middle o the road on economics, andcenter-right on oreign policy. They are not liberals in disguise,nor are they a mushy middle o let-right compromise.

Because o the longstanding edge that Democrats have enjoyed amongmoderate voters, many analysts and party activists have concluded that moder-ates are basically liberals in disguisethat is, voters whose thoughts and senti-ments correspond to those o the Democratic Party base but who preer not tocall themselves liberals because modern politics has given the term a bad name.Our research does not support this proposition.

On many measures, to be sure, moderates are somewhat closer to liberalsthan to conservatives. Still, the dierences between moderates and liberalsare very signicant. Nor is it the case, as others believe, that moderates orm amushy middlean ad hoc series o compromises between two coherent ide-ologies. In act, moderates as a group constitute a complex but distinct politicalorientation.

In the rst place, moderates have mixed opinions about the overall stances

o the two parties. When asked which party comes closer to their views on thethree major baskets o issueseconomic, social, and oreign policy/nationalsecuritymoderates responded as ollows:

Moderate Voters on Which Party Comes Closer to their Views on Issues

Democrats Republicans Both Equally Neither

Economic 40 35 4 13

Foreign/security 33 40 5 12

Social 50 27 2 11

Moderates most resemble the Democratic base in their social attitudes,although even there (as well see) there are some important dierences. Bycontrast, voters who identiy themselves as liberal or very liberal see themselvesas closer to Democrats by overwhelming margins in all three areas.


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Moderates versus liberals: Government, business and the economy

Compared to liberals, moderates are more skeptical o government, moresupportive o business and much more likely to worry about decits.

Moderates are more inclined than liberals to be skeptical o government,

which makes them more avorable toward private sector-led growth strategiesand decit reduction than are liberals. Consider their responses to amiliar surveyquestions:

Which statement comes closer to your view: (1) government is almost always wasteul and

inecient; or (2) government oten does a better job than people give it credit or?

Moderate Liberal Very Liberal

Statement 1 55 43 41

Statement 2 41 52 56

I you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing ewer services

or a bigger government providing more services?


Smaller/ewer 47 33 22

Bigger/more 45 58 71

50% o moderates, versus 29% o liberals, believe that the ederal govern-ment has too much power. 52% o moderates, versus only 32% o liberals, saythat government is trying to do too many things that should be let to individu-

als and businesses.

Given that moderates are more skeptical o government than are liberals, it isnot surprising that they strike a dierent balance between the public and privatesectors. For example, a Third Way survey conducted in mid-2010 asked:

Which o the ollowing statements do you agree with more: (1) Large companies have too

much power, hurt the middle class, and government needs to keep them in check; or (2)

American companies are the backbone o the U.S. economy and we need to help them grow,

whether they are large or small?

Moderate Liberal

Statement 1 40 59

Statement 2 51 36

Only 31% o moderates, versus 47% o liberals, believe that there is too littlegovernment regulation o business. Indeed, ully hal o all moderates believethat government regulation o business usually does more harm than good.TheThird Way survey also asked:


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Which approach to strengthening the economy do you preer: Making new government

investments to help jumpstart private sector job creation and economic growth; or Cutting

taxes or businesses to help jumpstart private sector job creation and economic growth?

Moderate Liberal

New public investments 30 60

Lower taxes 53 32

Not surprisingly, moderates lower regard or public investments goes alongwith a greater appetite or decit reduction:

Which would you rather see Congress do to help the U.S. economy: Invest in U.S. research,

innovation, and new technologies like clean energy; or Cut government spending and reduce

the decit?

Moderate Liberal

Invest in innovation 49 67

Cut spending/reduce defcit 44 30

Which would you rather see Congress do to help the U.S. economy: Invest in new roads,

bridges, and other inrastructure; or Cut government spending and reduce the decit?

Moderate Liberal

Invest in inrastructure 42 56

Cut spending/reduce defcit 54 38

Note that the contrast between moderates and liberals concerning public

investment is not black and white: substantial percentages o moderates avoran investment strategy as well. The point is rather that while public investment isthe deault position or liberals, moderates need to be persuaded.

Given moderates skepticism about the role o government in the economy, it isnot surprising that they have been less enthusiastic than liberals in their view o theeconomic policies President Obama pursued during his rst two years in oce.

Since taking oce, have President Obamas economic policies made economic conditions

better, worse, or not had an efect so ar?

Moderate Liberal Very LiberalBetter 29 43 53

Worse 22 15 10

No Eect 43 37 33


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Nor is it surprising that moderatesunlike voters to their letare ambivalentabout health care legislation, which stirred more controversy about the role ogovernment than did any other issue during President Obamas rst two years.

Do you approve or disapprove o the health care legislation passed by Barack Obama and

Congress in March?


Approve 48 66 76

Disapprove 39 24 21

A post-election survey conrmed this nding: moderates avored the legisla-tion by a narrow 7-point margin, compared to 48 points or liberals.10

Liberals, moderates, and conservatives agree that the cost o Social Securityand Medicare will create major problems or the U.S. economy i no changes

are made. But while liberals endorse raising taxes to nance these programsby a margin o 65% to 35%, moderates are split down the middle, 49% to 49%.(Solid majorities o liberals, moderates, and conservatives disapprove o cuttingbenets in these programs.)

Other evidence conrms the gap between moderates and liberals on a widerange o economic and scal issues:

61% o moderates think that labor unions have too much power, com-pared to 48% o liberals.

When presented with the proposition that protecting the environmentshould be given priority, even i that causes slower economic growth andsome job losses, moderates split down the middle, 47%/49%. By con-trast, about 70% o let-leaning groups agreed.

Only 46% o moderates endorse the proposition that Governmentshould help more needy people, even i it means going deeper in debt,compared to 63% o those who consider themselves liberal or very liberal.

Moderates versus liberals: guns, gays and God

The one place where moderates come closest to being liberals in disguise

is on social and cultural issues such as abortion, gay equality and guns. Forexample, 56% o moderates think that abortion should be legal in most or allcases. Only 42% think it is more important to protect the right to own gunsthan it is to control gun ownership. 72% agree with Obamas decision to permitederal unding or most embryonic stem cell research. Only 24% believe thatschool boards should have the right to re gay teachers. On the raught ques-tion o whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to marry legally, a plurality


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o moderates (48%) answers in the armative. Like liberals, moderates do notbelieve that immigrants threaten traditional American customs and values. Onthe contrary, ully hal believe that todays immigrants strengthen our countrybecause o their hard work and talents.

Despite these sentiments, moderates are signifcantly more socially conser-vative than are liberals. To illustrate: Moderates are more likely than are thoseto their let to think that poor people have become too dependent on thegovernment, that too many people want to get ahead without working hard andmaking sacrices, and that we have already made the changes needed to giveArican-Americans equal rights. Only 37% o moderates, but ully 59% o liberals,believe that the ederal government is responsible or reducing income dier-ences between rich and poor.

The dierences between moderates and those to their let extends to reli-gion and traditional values as well. They are more likely to believe in God and ina Day o Judgment, to say that prayer is important in their daily lives, to espouseold-ashioned values about marriage and amily, and to endorse clear guide-lines o good and evil that are binding on everyone.

Positions on religion by ideology11

Moderate Liberal

Never doubt Gods existence 83 70

Judgment Day 79 56

Prayer important in daily lie 77 58Old-ashioned amily values 67 50

Clear guidelines o good and evil 73 59

Religious dierences between moderates and liberals extend beyond belieto behavior. By a margin o 12 percentage points, moderates are more likelythan liberals to report regular church attendance, a key indicator o religiosity.

Moderates versus liberals: Hawks and doves

When it comes to oreign and deense policy, moderates slightly preer the

Republican Party. It is no surprise, then, to nd that they are less likely than areliberals to see diplomacy rather than military orce as the key to peace and morelikely to believe that we should ght or our country whether it is right or wrong.By a margin o 52% to 40%, moderates believe that the United States was rightto use orce in Aghanistan; by the same margin, those who consider themselvesliberal or very liberal disagree. (When it comes to Iraq, however, moderates lineup with the let against conservative and very conservative voters.) And unlike


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liberals, moderates embrace American exceptionalism: ully 54% endorse theproposition that God has granted America a special role in human history,compared to only 34% o liberals.

Moderates and liberals: Partial convergence

We are not suggesting that moderates disagree with liberals on every issue.Indeed, the areas o convergence are signicant, and not just in the area ovalues-laden social policy. Moderates are strong environmentalists; they believethat the ederal government is totally responsible or protecting consumersagainst unsae products; they want government to provide jobs, a minimumstandard o living, and health care or all. And they are ar closer to liberals thanto conservatives on the bitterly contested issue o immigration reorm. Roughlyhal o both moderates and liberals endorse an immigration compromise thatwould combine better enorcement and border security with a path to citizen-ship or illegal immigrants who are willing to comply with the appropriate

requirements. By contrast, hal o all conservatives give priority to enorcementand border security.

To sum up: moderates as a group etch a distinctive prole. Although (unlikeIndependents), they tilt towards the Democratic Party, they are not liberals in dis-guise, and they are open to certain conservative appeals that ew liberals wouldconsider. A sustainable center-let majority will require a broad-based agendathat liberal activists are likely to regard as excessively compromised. Similarly, aviable center-right majority would require Republicans to embrace a big-tent ap-proach to social issues, to put orward economic policies that refect pragmatism

and balance, and to acknowledge that military power is but one o the tools thata great power can deploy to advance its national interest.

P R O C E S S

The challenges o governance and the muting o moderate voices

Given the arguments made above, the ollowing question arises:I moderates are a potent and coherent political orce, why ismodern American politics so polarized?

The answer lies in systemic structural problems that silence thevoice o moderate voters. The most signicant o these structuralproblems are: (1) the current system or primaries; (2) redistrictingand (3) the leadership system in Congress.


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Since Bill Clintons election in 1992, moderates share o the electorate hasallen by eight percentage points, rom 43% to 35% o the electorate, whileconservatives and liberals have each increased their share by our percentconservatives rom 36% to 40%, liberals rom 17% to 21%.12 During the pastdecade, moreover, the bases o both parties have increased their share o their

respective parties, in part because the ideological poles are stronger than theywere, and in part because the parties have sorted themselves out ideologically.Many moderates have fed the Republican Party, while many conservatives havedeserted the Democrats.

And as the ideological bases o both parties have become more dominant,they have become less willing to entertain the kinds o big-tent strategies andlegislative compromises needed to orge stable majority coalitions. Voters out-side the parties bases have become more rustrated, and their voting behaviormore volatile.

But changes in the composition o the electorate and the parties take usonly part o the way toward an explanation o both parties ailure to seek stablecoalitions with moderate voters. Why do Democratic Presidents and DemocraticCongresses especially seem to lose their way (and subsequently their majorities)so quickly? The answer lies in some basic structural eatures o American politicsranging rom Congressional redistricting procedures to closed primaries. Thesesystematically tip the scales against moderates and reward candidates closer tothe political extremes. These structural eatures have the same consequences orRepublicans as they do or Democrats. But because the Republican conservative

base is twice as big as the Democratic liberal base, the results or Republicansare not as consequential.

Base-ic instincts: Primaries and polarization

The primary electorate is dierent, and more extreme, than thegeneral election electorate. This explains why, every electioncycle, so many Americans are so unhappy with their choices. Italso explains why it is so dicult or moderates to gain infuencein American politics. All politicians, regardless o their expresseddesire or moderate, bipartisan governance, have to cater to theirprimary constituency. As a result, the primary process exercisesa tyranny over American politics that exacerbates polarization.

Unlike nearly all other democratic governments in the world, the Americandemocracy is the only democracy that nominates candidates or major national


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oces using a primary system. In most o the worlds other, parliamentary,democracies, political parties assemble in annual or bi-annual conerences toconduct party business. Candidates or Parliament are slated in party conerenc-es and assigned to districts. The most important criteria or selection to the ticketare loyalty to the party and the ability to contribute to government. Connection

with the electoral district is not a very important consideration.

In contrast, the opportunity to stand or political oce as a Democrat or aRepublican is open to anyone in that district who wishes to so identiy.

One o the reasons that the American primary system is so porous andthereore unpredictable is that only a very small portion o voters participatesin primaries. Two actors are key. First, in hal the states, voting in primaries isrestricted to those who are registered to one o the major political parties ( SeeAppendix #4). The eligible universe or primary voters omits larger portionso voters who consider themselves Independents or who simply dont wantto declare a party preerence. Second, primary contests oten attract littleattention. By denition, primaries precede the high-energy biennial nationalelections and are thereore easy to miss. Dates or primaries vary rom stateto state, with the result that they do not attract the national media attentionthat general elections do. In addition, political parties oten schedule primaryelections at timesthe summer, or instancewhen the American public isntespecially interested in politics. As Appendix #5 indicates, the 2010 primariesell on 19 dierent days and were heavily concentrated in the summer monthswhen people are on vacation and attention to politics is low. This contributes to

the propensity or these contests to be very low turnout elections.Table #5 illustrates the low levels o turnout in primaries or Presidentinclud-

ing those years in which an incumbent President had little or no opposition.Overall average turnout in presidential primaries is exceptionally low because asthe season wears on results rom the early states winnow out the eld o candi-dates. Because o its long history as the rst in the nation primary (a position itscitizens greatly value), New Hampshire regularly enjoys by ar the highest turnout.In many years, however, the race is all but over ater the New Hampshire primary,reducing incentives or citizens o states coming later in the cycle to participate.

The choice o presidential nominees is made by a substantially smallernumber o voters than those who turn out in November. Not only is total turnoutin presidential primaries low but turnout in each o the major political partiesprimaries is a raction o those who participate the general election. As thepolitical scientist Curtis Gans points out, with the exception o 2008, turnout inpresidential primaries has been steadily alling since the early 1970s, and turnoutin statewide primaries has been alling as well. (The 2008 presidential primaries


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were unusual in that the race between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama was soclose that it went on to the end, boosting turnout in states towards the end othe season.) Even in the record high turnout year o 2008, statewide primariesthat were held on a dierent dayrom the presidential primary had minisculeturnout levelsslightly less than 15%!13

TABLE #5

Turnout in Presidential Primaries, 1976-200814

OverallTurnout

DemocraticTurnout

RepublicanTurnout

General ElectionTurnout VAP

1976 29.6% 17.9% 11.6% 53.6%

1980 26.0% 14.0% 11.5% 52.6%

1984 23.9% 16.2% 6.7% 53.1%

1988 25.5% 16.0% 9.1% 50.1%

1992 21.7% 12.6% 8.6% 55.1%

1996 17.5% N.A. 9.1% 49.1%

2000 19.0% 8.8% 10.8% 50%

2004 17.2% 9.7% 6.4% 55.4%

2008 30.3% 19.4% 10.8% 56.9%

Low turnout is an enduring characteristic o Congressional as well as presi-dential primaries. The ollowing chart, taken rom an article by David W. Brady,

Hahrie Han and Jeremy C. Pope, compares turnout in contested primaries andgeneral election turnout rom 1956 to 1998 by Congressional district.15 As ex-pected, turnout in the general election varies greatly rom presidential electionyears to o years. Primary turnout, however, remains airly stable and low, re-gardless o the year. And general election turnout is approximately three timesas large as primary election turnout.


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FIGURE 2

A Comparison of Primary and General Election Turnout, 1956-199816

1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

0

General-Election Turnout Primary-Election Turnout

Year

Turnout

As Table #6 illustrates, turnout in Congressional primaries in the rst decadeo the 21st century has been no dierentcontinuing a trend o consistently lowturnout in primary elections. I general election turnout in Congressional elec-tions is poor, turnout in primary elections is woeul. This is somewhat surprisingor the 2010 election cycle, given the attention paid to those primaries becauseo the emergence o the Tea Party as a new and exciting political orce. And yetturnout in those primaries is only about 20% o turnout in the general election

even lower than the averages Brady et. al. ound or the previous decades.

TABLE #6

Congressional Primary Turnout Compared to General Election Turnout17

Average numbero voters perCongressional

district in contestedprimaries

Number ocontested

Congressionalprimaries

Turnout incontestedprimaries

Turnout in o-year generalelections**

2002 46,894 250 5.4% 36.3%

2006 41,822 249 4.6% 37.1%2010 43,302 409 7.5% 37.8%

** Turnout or 2002 and 2006 is somewhat higher in Census reporting, however, the absence oCensus data or 2010 caused us to use data rom the United States Elections Project in order tomaintain consistency.


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O course, the above gures are calculated by adding turnout in primaries orboth political parties. In 2010 Democrats were unenthusiastic about their partywhile Republicans elt they had the wind at their backs. Thereore average turn-out in the primaries should be greater or Republicans than or Democrats. Whilethis is indeed the case, the dierences in turnout between the two parties are

not as large as the dierences in publicity between the two would leave one tobelieve. As Table #7 illustrates, Republican turnoutcalculated both as a meanand as a medianis greater than Democratic turnout.

TABLE #7

Turnout in the 2010 primaries by Political Party18

Average Primary Turnout byContested Congressional District

Median Primary Turnout byContested Congressional District

Democrats 41,218 38,782

Republicans 44,352 39,709

While energy and enthusiasm helped make Republican turnout higher thanDemocratic turnout in 2010, a bigger actor is whether or not the primary isopen or closed. Closed primaries restrict participation in the primary to someorm o stated aliation with one political party or the other. Open primariesallow the voter to choose which primary to vote in. As expected there is asignicant turnout dierence between open and closed primaries as Table #8illustrates.

TABLE #8

Differences in turnout in contested primary elections 2010 Open versus Closed primary systems.19

Average Turnout in ContestedPrimary Elections

Median Turnout in ContestedPrimary Elections

Open Primaries 47,170 45,177

Closed Primaries 39,672 33,426

So what does the act that a very small portion o the population votes inprimaries mean? Simply this: candidates who are most acceptable to the leto the Democratic Party and the right wing o the Republican Party tend to dobetter than moderates. Thereore, even candidates who are committed to work-ing across the aisle nd themselves having to constantly watch their let (or right)fank. Congressmen in sae districts need to be vigilant lest they ace a contestedprimary and lose the race to a challenger who has managed to mobilize a largeenough portion o the vote to prevail. The large uptick in the total number ocontested primaries in 2010 and the surprise results in some o those primaries


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will reinorce the already powerul incentives that members o Congress have towatch their base careully.

Although there is a wealth o data rom exit polls illustrating the dominanceo party bases in presidential primaries, exit polls or Congressional primaries

dont exist. Nonetheless, political scientists have gured out ways to test theideological slant o primary voters. Using newspaper and journalistic accounts oprimary losses rom 1982 to 2000, Brady et. al. conclude that:

As expected, Democrats who are conservative and Republicans who are liberal

relative to their districts are signicantly more likely to draw primary opposition

Incumbents who veer rom their primary constituency are much more likely to draw

challengers and thus are more vulnerable to primary deeat.20

Thus Members o Congress learn to pay attention to their primary voters.Never mind that the victorious primary election action is not ever large enough

to carry a general election. The primary system creates a tyranny o the wingsthat haunts even the most determinedly bipartisan legislator.

This dynamic is even more intense in those states that do not use primariesto nominate their candidates. In those states the unanticipated presence o onlya ew hundred heretoore un-mobilized activists can deny seasoned politiciansthe nomination. This is very common in presidential primaries where the rst-in-the-nation Iowa Caucus has long been known as a place where the Republicanright and the Democratic let rule, and underdogs rom Jimmy Carter to PatBuchanan to Barack Obama have upset the party establishment. But it happens

in Congressional races as well; witness the ate o Republican Senator Bob Ben-nett, who lost the nomination in the Utah state convention, where the outcomewas controlled by 3,500 party activists.

Gerrymandering

The process o electoral gerrymandering (drawing Congressionaldistrict boundaries in such a way that they create a districtwhich is almost impossible or one party to winor lose)exacerbates the tendency towards the extremes in the primarysystem. Considered in tandem with low turnout primaries,gerrymandering urther diminishes the impact o moderatevoters in the American system.

At any given time in modern American history, no matter how upset thepublic may be at their politicians, the vast majority o members o Congress can


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expect to be re-elected. The recent 2010 midterms, where 63 seats changedparty, is indeed historic. And yet 63 seats constitute only 14% o Congress!

The number o competitive House seats has declined dramatically overmore than 100 years o American historyrom 187 seats at the turn o the 20th

century to an average o 58 seats at the turn o the 21st century. Table #9 showsthat the number o very sae seats (dened as seats in which incumbents winwith more than 60% o the vote) has increased in nearly every decade o thelast hal o the twentieth century. The most recent midterm election eaturedthe second-highest number o House members deeated in a general electionsince the end o World War Two54 in 2010, compared to 68 in 1948. But thisis a rarity indeed. The median number o house seats lost in midterm electionsbetween 1946 and 2010 the number is 225% o the House o Representatives.

TABLE # 9

Average % of House Incumbents Winningwith At Least 60% of the Major Party Vote21

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

47% 46% 51% 61% 62%

Members o Congress in sae districts can still be deeated in a primary elec-tion. For many members o Congress, then, the election they ear most is theprimary. Thus they pay particular attention to the policy desires o their primaryelectorates. And, as Brady et.al. have shown, they pay a price when they veertoo ar rom the preerences o primary voters.

Gerrymandering o Congressional districts to create sae seats is the secondstructural actor that mutes moderates voices and increases political polarization.To be sure, other actors have also contributed to the creation o sae seats. InThe Big Sort: Why the Clustering o Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart,Bill Bishop shows how Americans have been moving, voluntarily, into geographiccommunities where they nd others who are like themeconomically, culturallyand politically.22 Given these trends, there is clearly a limit to the number o com-petitive Congressional districts that could be created i redistricting were removedrom the sel-interested political process in state legislatures and gerrymandering

reduced. Similarly, Brookings Thomas Mann cautions that there is little data tosupport a link between independent redistricting and changes in Congress. None-theless, scholars like Mann agree that partisan redistricting has an eect and areinvolved in projects to increase the transparency o the redistricting process.

In the broader public, the same dissatisaction with partisan gridlock thatled Caliornia voters to do away with party primaries recently, has also beenelt in states that have decided to put the redistricting process in the hands o


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non-partisan bodies. The number o independent redistricting commissions hasgrown over time, albeit slowly. The rst our were established in Hawaii, Iowa,Washington and Montana in the 1980s. They were ollowed by Idaho, NewJersey and Arizona in the 1990s, and then by Caliornias passage o Proposition11 in June 2008 establishing the Caliornia Redistricting Commission that will

work on redistricting ollowing the 2010 census.

While the experience with independent redistricting commissions is toosmall and too recent to enable us to draw any rm conclusions, there is someintriguing evidence rom Caliornia, which has been at the center o redistrictingbattles or the past orty years. In 1971, and again in 1991, Republican gover-nors blocked gerrymandering eorts on the part o the states Democrats. Theissue ended up in the Courts and resulted in the creation o three-judge panelsserving as Special Masters in charge o redistricting. Because o this, the RoseInstitute in Caliornia was able to study a sort o controlled experiment. Accord-

ing to the authors,The dark bars with white numbers represent the HighlyCompetitive districts that elected a Democrat one year and a Republican inanother year during the same decade (zero in the 2000s). The light bars withblack numbers represent additional districts that were competitive in each plan,meaning either the average margin between the rst and second place candi-dates in each election was under ten percent, or more than hal o the electionsin that district during the decade were decided by less than ten percent. The *appearing next to 1980s denotes that this columns gures include the ewcompetitive districts o both the 1982 Democratic partisan gerrymander withthose o the 1984 bipartisan incumbent protection gerrymander.23Sure enough,in those decades where judges drew the districts, there was an increase in thenumber o competitive districts. In those decades where the legislature drew thedistricts, the number o competitive districts remained small.


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GRAPH #1

Competitive Districts in the California Legislature24

1970s(Retired Judges)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1980s*(Legislature)

1990s(Retired Judges)

2000s(Legislature)

Decade

#ofDistricts

10

30 4

15

18

30

5

While scholars tend to study either Congressional primaries orCongressionalredistricting in isolation, it is the combination o the two that heightens theimpact o ideology. Over time we can see the eects o polarization in legisla-tive behavior. Scholars who have studied Congressional voting behavior ndthat in the middle o the 20th century there was substantial overlap among thetwo political parties.25 In mid-century, American Congressional politics includedSouthern conservative Democrats and Northern, liberal Republicans. Eachpolitical party in this era was indeed a big tent, home to some number o Housemembers and Senators whose ideological predispositions were closer to mem-bers o the opposite party than to their own. Reinorcing these broad coalitionswas the act that in this era all members o Congress shared a common under-standing o the threats to America.

The collapse o the postwar consensuson containing communism as thecenterpiece o international policy, on government as the Keynesian manager othe economy, on culture as a sphere o contestation that should remain outsideo politicsentailed the loss o shared assumptions. By the beginning o themillennium, Congressional voting returned to a pattern seen prior to the Great

Depression and World War II. In our era, as in that earlier era, there are very ewmembers o Congress who could constitute a moderate middle.26


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Congressional Leadership

In the very rst vote o every new Congress, those seekingleadership positions are required only to win votes rom their

caucus. They are not required to reach across the aisle. Theresult is that House and Senate leaders refect a majority o themajority, which is almost always a minorityo the entire legislativebody. Rather than promoting comity and compromise, themethod o selecting Congressional leadership reinorces theinfuence o each partys base.

As we have seen, current Congresses are pulled apart by orces that are increas-ing partisanship by magniying the clout o each partys base. Opening up theprimary process to more voters and reorming Congressional redistricting are twoways o increasing the clout o moderate voters in the governing processa goalthat is, as we have shown, important or the American political process but moreconsequential or Democrats than or Republicans. There is, in addition, a changein Congressional procedures that could move the system arther down that road.

Currently the Speaker o the House and the Majority Leader o the Senateare elected by a majority vote o the body. In practice this means that no matterhow thin a partys majority may be, that party will elect the leaders in the portiono Congress it controls. In turn, the House and Senate leadership is nominated

in each partys caucus. In those caucuses, the dominant action with the mostseniority tends to be made up not o representatives rom competitive Con-gressional districts and states, but rather members who can count on winninggeneral elections rom districts and states where their party enjoys a superma-

jority. When the Democrats win, the leadership is determined by saethat is,let-leaningjurisdictions; when Republicans win, the leadership is determinedby those that lean right.

M O V I N G F O R W A R D

Three ideas or a reorm agenda

The procedures we have discussed all have the eect o muting moderatesvoices, and denying them political infuence commensurate with their share othe electorate. We oer three reorm ideas that can help remedy this situation.These reorms will appeal to an electorate that has always been suspicious opolitical parties and supportive o more open electoral systems and, while it isin the long-term interests o all Americans to become champions o reorms that


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will level the playing eld or the moderate voters and candidates, the conse-quences o these reorms are particularly important to the Democratic coalition.

IDEA #1: Open primaries

All Americans, but especially Democrats, have an interest in exploring ways to

broaden participation in the primary process. There are two ways to do this. Therst is to simply get rid o closed primaries. Given the greater interest and intensityo party activists in both parties, they would still dominate most primaries mosto the time. But the possibility o expanding the primary electorate would causecandidates to look at primaries dierently. It would open up the possibility thatmoderation and compromise might be rewarded rather than punished.

A more dramatic option would be to do what Caliornia did in its June 8,2010 election. Proposition 14, called the Top Two Primaries Act passed with53.8% o the vote. It overturned the closed primary process by creating, in

essence, one political primary or both parties. Voters will be allowed to vote orany candidate, regardless o the voters party aliation. The top two candidateswill then ace o in the general election. Prop 14 applies to all elections, with theexception o presidential primaries and elections or party oce. Proponents othe Proposition argued that it might cause more moderates to be elected to theCaliornia state legislature. Passage o Prop 14 is evidence o the act that manyCaliornians elt that their government had become dysunctional as a result oextreme partisanship stemming, at least in part, rom the closed primary process.

It remains to be seen whether Prop 14 will result in more moderate gover-nance. The United States has very little experience with so called blanketprimaries. To the extent that they have been used, it has mostly been in oneparty states and or local elections. The exception is Washington State, wherethe blanket primary was approved in the courts in 2007. In the 2010 primaries,turnout over Washingtons nine Congressional districts averaged 155, 327 perdistrictnearly three and a hal times greater than the average turnout in con-tested primaries. Some districts, such as the liberal 7 th Congressional District,re-elected the incumbent Jim McDermott with 80% o the vote. But in general,the August 17th primary drew many candidates and resulted in high turnout. Itmakes sense that as, over time, the primary electorate expands to look more

like the general election electorate, the impact o moderates will increase andmembers o Congress will be somewhat liberated rom the tyranny o smallprimary electorates, potentially enabling them to engage in more productivegovernance without risking their political careers.

IDEA #2: Real redistricting reorm

As we have seen, it is easy to overestimate the impact o gerrymandering onour politics. Polarization has been increasing at all levels o governmentinclud-


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ing thosesuch as states and countieswhere lines are not periodically redrawnor partisan advantage. But or those who would like to decrease political po-larization by enhancing the infuence o moderate voters, reorming the processo drawing legislative districts by taking redistricting out o the hands o statelegislatures and placing it in the hands o non-partisan commissions is an obvious

place to start.

IDEA #3: Super-majority selection o Congressional leadership

Finally, what i it took 60% o each body to elect the Speaker o the Houseand the Majority Leader o the Senate? Unless one party commands a super-majority, the very rst vote would then test the ability o aspiring leaders toconstruct the bipartisan coalitions that are so integral to eective governance.The 60% rule would require the leadership o the majority party to establish arelationship with at least some action o the minority party. The consequencesor legislation are obvious. In the Senate, the magic number needed to break

a libuster would be achieved rst in the leadership elections; presumably thiswould make it easier to obtain 60 votes or legislation. In the House, the leader-ship election would establish a majority large enough to overcome the inevitablelapses in party disciplineassuming, that is, that the legislative agenda theSpeaker supports is consistent with the thinking o the supermajority needed toattain that position o leadership.

This proposal goes somewhat against the grain o current thinking. Somehave called or eliminating the libuster rule in the Senate so that legislationcould be passed with simple majorities. However, there are good reasons why

we should want major legislation in the United States to be passed by largemajorities. First super-majorities guarantee ownership by both political parties.In such circumstances, it is more likely that the legislative process can addressdicult problemsor instance, our long-term structural budget decitwithoutproposed solutions being manipulated by either party or political gain. Second,signicant pieces o legislation require years o careul implementation. Duringthis period, party control o government is likely to shit. Leaders o a politicalparty that has no stake in a program are not likely to work hard to make surethat the program is well implemented. In act, just the reverse might occurwithailure leading the ormer opposition party to say, in eect, We told you so.

C O N C L U S I O N

We should heed the calls or greater comity that multiplied ater the recenttragedies in Tucson. But the orces that push us apart are entrenched in dys-unctional institutions. Unless we adopt a reorm agenda, civility will be at bestcosmetic, hyper-polarization will persist, and the American political system will


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remain unable to address the problems that beset us. I that happens, we willbegin the descent that our adversaries anticipate and our allies ear.

Although much o this paper ocuses on the challenges the DemocraticParty now aces, we have ended with proposals or broad institutional change.

The reason is straightorward: the Democratic Partys problems are embedded inthe pathologies o the contemporary American political system. Trying to solve theormer without acing up to the latter would be little more than a cosmetic exercise.

Our guiding premise is that todays polarization is pathological. Not everyoneagrees. And to be sure, the sorting-out o our party system has presented theAmerican people with clearer, more intelligible choices that strengthen the tiebetween elections and governance. Citizens who vote or a Republican majoritytoday can be condent that theyll get an anti-tax, socially conservative agenda.As recently as the mid-1970s, they could have enjoyed no such condence.

We believe, however, that the losses rom ever-growing polarization greatlyoutweigh the gains. The analytical basis or our conclusion is well-established,and we need not repeat it here. Suce it to say that polarization makes itar more dicult to conduct the essential tasks o governance, rom stangan administration to addressing complex problems whose solutions requirebipartisan support. Polarization makes it easier or elected ocials to cross theline separating robust democratic discourse rom deliberate misrepresentationand personal calumny. It contributes to diminished trust and condence in ourpublic institutions. And it leads to a view o politics as warare in which con-tested issues are never resolved but rather are endlessly relitigated. A nation

that cannot adopt and then hew to a steady course is by denition incapableo solving problems that require sustained and widely supported purpose. Thesystemic reorms we have proposed will not by themselves solve the crisis ogovernance we ace, but they will signal a willingness to get past the structuresthat serve to divide rather than unite.

The political logic is inescapable: Democrats cannot sustain a majority coali-tion without winning the lions share o the moderate vote; a Republican partythat loses touch with moderates will have diculty avoiding a hard-right turnthat undermines the possibility o compromise. Without compromise, it will be

hard to institute and maintain the policies we need to surmount our problems.Without compromise, the people will continue to regard both our governmentand our politics with disdain.

There are structural reasons why each party caters to its base. Party primariesare designed to be low turnout aairs catering mostly to activists. The draw-ing o Congressional district lines to create sae districts only increases theimportance o each partys base in primary elections. And the rules or selecting


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leaders in Congress do not include any test o a leaders potential to work acrossparty lines. The institutional reorms we suggest cannot by themselves overcomedecades o polarization and create the more consensual politics that the major-ity o our citizens crave. But by making each partys base more responsive tomoderate voters, they would begin to move us away rom the pathologies that

disgure our system.

We are not suggesting that either party should slavishly ollow public opin-ion. The parties exist or a reason, their core commitments matter, and soundpolicy does not always emanate rom the center. At the same time, it is goodneither or the parties nor or the country that their core supporters are so disin-clined to accommodate the views o moderates.

Too many Americans are losing condence in the uture. Restoring that con-dence will take more than optimistic speeches and a gradual decline in unemploy-ment. It will require, as well, the kinds o systemic changes that can begin to moveus rom the politics o point-scoring to a new politics o problem-solving.

This paper is intended as a contribution to that new politics. While we areDemocrats, we do not present our proposals in a narrowly partisan spirit. Re-orms that oer moderates political voice commensurate with their numbersasituation that does not now exist would be good not only or our party, but alsoour democracy and our country.


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* * *

THE AUTHORS

William A. Galston is Ezra Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the

Brookings Institution. A ormer policy advisor to President Clinton and presidential candidates,Mr. Galston is an expert on domestic policy, political campaigns, and elections. His current re-search ocuses on designing a new social contract and the implications o political polarization.

Elaine C. Kamarck is a Lecturer in Public Policy in the Kennedy School o Governmentat Harvard University. In the 1980s, she was one o the ounders o the New Democratmovement that helped elect Bill Clinton president. Ms. Kamarck served in the White Houserom 1993 to 1997, where she created and managed the Clinton Administrations NationalPerormance Review, also known as reinventing government. She is also the author oPrimary Politics: How Presidential Candidates have Shaped the Modern Nominating System(Washington, Brookings, 2009).

ABOUT THIRD WAY

Third Way is an innovative and infuential think-tank that creates and advances moderatepolicy and political ideas. We advocate or private-sector economic growth, a tough and smartsecurity strategy, a clean energy revolution, bold education and anti-poverty reorms, and prog-ress on divisive culture issues. Anne Kim is the Director o Third Ways Domestic Policy Program.

For more inormation about Third Way please visit www.thirdway.org.


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A P P E N D I X # 1

Americans views on the direction o the country

Average number o Americans saying the country was headed in the rightdirection by year.27

All in all, do you think things in the nation are generally headed in the right direction or do

you eel that things are of on a wrong track?

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

46% 47% 54% 48% 46% 39% 33% 28% 23% 16% 29% 32%


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A P P E N D I X # 2

Demographics o moderate voters

In the ollowing paragraphs, the gures or moderates are ollowed by thecorresponding gures or the electorate as a whole in parentheses.28

Gender: 48% o moderates are male (48%), while 52% are emale (52%).Among groups to the right (conservatives and very conservative), the split is51%/49%; to the let (liberal and very liberal), its 45%/55%.

Age: Moderates are somewhat younger than the total electorate. 26% are 18to 29 (22%), while only 13% are 65 or older (16%). By contrast, 15% o conserva-tives/very conservatives are 18 to 29, while 20% are 65+. The age prole omoderates more closely resembles the cohorts to their let than to their right.

Education: In terms o educational attainment, moderates break down as

ollows: High school or less 32% (34%); some college 26% (24%); 4-year collegegraduate 18% (17%); post-graduate training 12% (11%). Compared with con-servative and very conservative respondents, moderates are signicantly morelikely to have a B.A. or more, and signicantly less likely to have gone no artherthan high school. (Dierences in educational attainment between moderates andthose to their let are not statistically signicant.)

Race/Ethnicity: The racial makeup o moderates is as ollows: white 71%(73%); Arican-American 15% (14%); Asian-American 2% (2%); other 8% (8%).Only 10% o moderates are o Hispanic origin, versus 13% o the total.

Marital Status: As or marital status, moderates break down as ollows:married 51% (51%); divorced or separated 14% (13%); never-married 25% (22%).In general, ideology and marital status are closely linked: the more conservative,the more likely to be married. More than 60% o conservatives/very conserva-tives are married, while only 42% o liberals/very liberals are married.

Religion: 47% o moderates are Protestant (49%), 24% are Catholic (24%),and 17% are unaliated. Only 37% o Protestant moderates describe them-selves as born-again or evangelical, versus 48% or conservatives and 57% orthe very conservative cohort. 36% o moderates attend religious services at least

once a week (37%), while 28% seldom or never do so (28%). Although a smallershare o liberal/very liberals than moderates attend regularly, here again thesharper contrast is between moderates and conservatives (46%) and especiallythose who are very conservative (69%).

Income: There are no signicant dierences between moderates and theelectorate as a whole. Indeed, there is virtually no correlation between incomeand ideology. For example, 13% o moderates report amily income in excess


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o $100,000, as do liberals/very liberals and conservatives/very conservatives.In the middle o the income spectrum, 14% o moderates report amily incomebetween $50,000 and $75,000; or right-o-center groups, the correspondinggure is also 14%; or let-o-center groups, 12%. Even at the bottom, dier-ences are modest: 29% o moderates report amily incomes o $30,000 or less,

but so do 30% o conservative/very conservative identiers and 32% o liberals/very liberals.

Occupation/Economic status: Moderates are less likely to describe them-selves as proessionals or business people (27%) than are those to their let(32%). Only 19% o moderates say they are sel-employed or operate smallbusinesses, the lowest percentage o any ideological group, and hal the shareo the very conservative cohort (38%). Moderates are 10 percentage points morelikely than the ar right, and 8 points less likely than the ar let, to see the UnitedStates as divided into haves and have-nots. Surprisingly, only 45% o moderates

see themselves as haves, the lowest o any ideological group and 10 pointsless than liberals.


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A P P E N D I X # 3

How Moderates and Independents Dier29

As political scientists have long argued, the majority o Independents in actlean toward one party or the other, and these leaners tend to think and act

much like explicit partisans do. For example, the 2010 Pew survey ound that othe total 37% pool o Independents, 17% leaned Republican and 13% Demo-cratic, leaving only 7% as pure Independents.

This survey is hardly an outlier. The others we examined showed much thesame thing. Overall, three quarters o Independents turn out to be leaners (40%o them toward the Republicans, 35% toward the Democrats) whose views andbehavior resemble those o the party to which they lean (and rom which manyo them have recently come). 79% o ormer Republicans lean Republican; 76%o ex-Democrats lean Democratic. That is not to say that leaners are identical

to the parties they have let. Former Republicans are more critical o GeorgeW. Bush and the Iraq war and less hard-edged on social issues such as gaymarriage. For their part, ormer Democrats are more critical o Obamas peror-mance on health care reorm than are Democrats. They trust government lessand are more sympathetic to a smaller government oering ewer services thanare their erstwhile colleagues. To a rst approximation, nonetheless, partisansand leaners can be seen as a single group.

Since Obamas election, there is evidence o a conservative shit amongIndependents. In 2008, 46% o Independents regarded themselves as moderate,

30% as conservative, and 19% liberal. By 2010, the moderate share had declinedby ve points, to 41%, while conservatives rose rom 30% to 36% and liberals heldsteady.

Over the past decade, Republican leaners have become much more con-servative and less moderate than they were a decade ago: as a share o Repub-lican-leaning Independents, conservatives have increased rom 44% to 57%,while moderates have declined rom 43% to 34%. By contrast, the ideologicalcomposition o Democratic-leaning Independents has barely budged and standsat 52% moderate, 29% liberal, and 15% conservative. So the political center ogravity among Independent leaners has shited noticeably to the right.

The ideological composition o non-leaning Independents, which consti-tute 25% o the Independent pool and roughly 10% o the electorate, hasntchanged much in the past decade. But these Independents, too, are much moreavorable to Republicansand less to Democratsthan are moderates. 43%o non-leaners identiy as conservatives, versus only 13% as liberal. In short,


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non-leaners are much closer to Republican leaners than to Democratic leaners,reinorcing the conservative tilt o Independents as a group.

The non-leaners are not a powerul political orce, however. Compared tomoderates (and to most other groups), they are very downscale in both income

and education, are less likely to be registered or to vote, even i registered, payless attention to politics, and tend to be disconnected rom even the largest policydisputes. They are disaected rom both political parties and never thought othemselves as members o either. They trust neither government nor their ellowcitizens. (Not surprisingly, they are very anti-immigrant as well.) And they aredeeply pessimistic, not only about Americas ability to solve its problems collec-tively, but also about individuals abilities to solve problems on their own.

On closer inspection, then, Independents tend to dissolve into two groups:those who are hard to distinguish rom partisans, and those who are so discon-nected and disaected as to have virtually no impact on political outcomes. As wewill show, the same cannot be said o moderates, whose outlook and attitudes ona wide range o issues distinguish them rom both liberals and conservatives.

Notwithstanding these core realities, many journalists and pundits persist inlumping moderates and Independents together. In this context, it is useul topoint out some signicant dierences between them. Consider attitudes towardthe two political parties: while moderates and Independents have statisticallyindistinguishable evaluations o the Republican Party (37% approval by moder-ates, 36% by Independents), moderates are ar more avorable toward theDemocratic Party (55%) than are Independents (36%). When asked to rank-order

the parties, moderates systematically rate Democrats higher than Republicans,while Independents do the reverse, as revealed in a number o Gallup questions.

Table A

Which political party do you think can do a better job of

handling the problem you think is most important?

Moderates Independents

Republican 29 35

Democrat 47 29

Same/no dierence 13 17


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Table B

Which political party do you think will do a better job

of keeping the country prosperous?


Republican 37 46

Democrat 49 33


Table C

Which political party do you think will do a better job of protecting the country

from international terrorism and military threats?


Republican 40 51

Democrat 46 32


Given these attitudes, it is hardly surprising that moderates approve o theway Barack Obama is handling his job as president by a margin o 54% to 42%,while Independents disapprove by a similar margin, 54% to 40%.

Moderates and Independents also dier in their stance toward governmentand its major institutions. While neither group is satised with the way the na-

tion is being governed, moderates are less dissatised (34% satised, 65% not)than are Independents (24% satised, 75% not). Majorities o both groups lacktrust in the ederal government to do what is right, but moderates are morelikely to express trust (26%) than are Independents (18%), a gap that spills overinto specic policy areas and institutions. By a margin o 13 percentage points,moderates are more likely to express trust and condence in the ederal gov-ernments handling o international problems; the margin is a smaller but stillsignicant 7 points when it comes to domestic problems. Similar trust gaps existor the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the mass media.

Given the attitudinal dierences described above, it is not surprising to ndthat, in contrast to Independents, moderates tend to look and to behave morelike Democrats, a act that is oten overlooked. For instance, only 17% o moder-ates identiy as Republicans, 33% as Democrats, and 47% as Independents.When Independents who lean in one direction or another are actored in, 56%o moderates are Democrats or lean in that direction, versus 31% Republican.65% o moderate Independents report than they have thought o themselves


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as Democrats during the past ve years, while 46% report having thought othemselves as Republicans. (Remarkably, 11% o moderate Independents havethought o themselves as both at one time or another.)

Our ocus on moderates is not meant to suggest that Independents are an

insignicant electoral orce. On the contrary, shits among Independents havealso shaped recent elections, presidential as well as midterm.

Table D 30

2008 2004

Democratic share o the electorate 39 37

Democratic share o Democrats 89 89

Republican share o the electorate 32 37

Democratic share o Republicans 9 6

Independent share o the electorate 29 26

Democratic share o Independents 52 49

Although Democrats share o moderate voters rose by twice their increaseamong Independents (6% points versus 3 points), the Independent contribution toDemocratic gains between 2004 and 2008 is about equal to that o moderate voters.

Now lets look at the states that Obama won and Kerry lost.

Table E 31

2008 2004

Dem share oModerates

Dem share oIndependents

Dem shares oModerates

Dem share oIndependents

CO 63 54 54 52

FL 57 52 56 57

IN 60 54 50 46

IA 63 56 59 53

NV 64 54 55 54

NM 62 56 60 52

NC 63 39 50 41

OH 61 52 59 59VA 58 49 57 44

In many o these states, Obamas share o the moderate vote soared aboveKerrysby 9 points in Colorado and Nevada, 10 points in Indiana, and a stun-ning 13 points in North Carolina. (Indiana and North Carolina may have been themost surprising Democratic victories in 2008, and Obamas perormance among


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moderates was the principal reason why.) In addition, two critical Democraticvictoriesin Florida and Ohiooccurred despite the act that Obamas share othe Independent vote actually declined relative to Kerrys. In both these cases,Republicans share o the electorate declined signicantlyrom 41 to 34% inFlorida and rom 40 to 31% in Ohio.

It appears that many disaected Republicans relabeled themselves as Inde-pendents but could not bring themselves to vote or Obama. Still, in both thesestates, Independents who supported Obama constituted a larger share o theelectorate than had Independents or Kerry our years earlier.

The victory threshold or Democratic presidential candidates among Inde-pendents is signicantly lower than or moderates. Clinton prevailed in 1992 and1996, as did Obama in 2008, with 54% o the two-party Independent vote. Gorereceived only 49%, Kerry 50%.

As Table F illustrates, or the past 40 years, moderates have been more likelyto vote or Democrats or president than have Independents, by an average o8.2 percentage points. In act, in the last 9 presidential elections Independentsdelivered more than hal their votes to the Democrat in only one electionthe2008 landslide that elected Obama. In contrast, moderate voters have deliveredmore than hal their votes to the Democratic candidate in six out o nine o thepast presidential elections.

Table F

Percentage of Moderates and Independents who voted Democratic32

Moderates Independents DierenceCarter 1976 51 43 +8

Midterms 1978

Carter 1980 42 30 +12

Midterm 1982

Mondale 1984 47 36 +11

Midterm 1986

Dukakis 1988 50 43 +7

Midterm 1990

Clinton 1992 47 38 +9Midterm 1994

Clinton 1996 57 43 +7

Midterm 1998

Gore 2000 52 45 +7

Midterm 2002 No data

Kerry 2004 54 49 +5


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Midterm 2006 60 57 +3

Obama 2008 60 52 +8

Midterm 2010 55 37 +18

Average orpresidential years 51.1 42.1 +8.2


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A P P E N D I X # 4

Presidential Primaries across the United States33

Closed Partially closed Open Partially Open Alternative

Delaware Arizona Alabama Illinois Alaska

Florida Caliornia Arkansas Indiana Louisiana

Kansas Colorado Georgia Iowa Nebraska

Kentucky Connecticut Hawaii Mississippi Washington

Maine Maryland Idaho Ohio

Nevada Massachusetts Michigan South Carolina

New Jersey New Hampshire Minnesota Tennessee

New Mexico North Carolina Missouri Texas

New York Oklahoma Montana Virginia

Pennsylvania Oregon North Dakota

Wyoming Rhode Island Vermont

DC South Dakota Wisconsin

Utah

West Virginia


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A P P E N D I X # 5

Dates or 2010 Primaries

Date Primary or Federal Ofce

February 2, 2010 Illinois

March 2, 2010 Texas

May 4, 2010 Indiana, Ohio,

MAY 11, 2010 West Virginia

MAY 18, 2010 Arkansas, Kentucky, Oregon, Pennsylvania

May 25, 2010 Idaho

June 1, 2010 Mississippi

June 8, 2010 Caliornia, Iowa, Maine, Montana, South Carolina,South Dakota, Virginia

June 22, 2010 Utah

July 20, 2010 Georgia

July 27, 2010 Oklahoma

August 3, 2010 Kansas, Michigan, Missouri

August 5, 2010 Tennessee

August 10, 2012 Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota

August 17, 2010 Washington, Wyoming

August 24, 2010 Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Vermont

August 28, 2010 Louisiana

September 14, 2010 Delaware, D.C., Maryland, Massachusetts,Rhode Island, Wisconsin

September 18, 2010 Hawaii


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E N D N O T E S

1 GOP Image Net-Positive or First Time Since 2005, Democratic Partys avorableRating is Improved rom last year, Gallup, January 27, 2011, Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/145805/gop-image-net-positive-rst-time-2005.aspx. See also: President ObamaJob Approval, Real Clear Politics, Available at: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/

president_obama_job_approval-1044.html.

2 Jerey M. Jones, Americans Divided on Obama, Republican Spending Proposals,Gallup, January 28, 2011. Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/145826/americans-divided-obama-republican-spending-proposals.aspx.

3 Independents Oppose Party in Power . . . Again, Pew Research Center, September23, 2010. Available at: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1739/independent-voters-typology-2010-midtersm-avor-republicans-conservative.

4 CNN National Exit Polls, 1980 2008. Available at: www.cnn.com.

5 Lydia Saad, Conservatives Continue to Outnumber Moderates in 2010, Gallup,December 16, 2010. Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/145271/conservatives-continue-outnumber-moderates-2010.aspx.

6 Authors calculation based on CNN National Exit Polls. Available at: www.cnn.com.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Unless otherwise noted, all public opinion data cited in this paper are drawn romour major surveys: (1) Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-2009, PewResearch Center, May 2009. Available at: http://people-press.org/reports/pd/517.pd; (2)Independents Oppose Party in Power . . . Again, Pew Research Center, September 23, 2010.Available at: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1739/independent-voters-typology-2010-midtersm-avor-republicans-conservative; (3) Gallup Poll Social Series: Governance, October 2010; (4)Robert P. Jones, Ph.D. and Daniel Cox, Old Alignments, Emerging Fault Lines: Religion in

the 2010 Election and Beyond, Public Religion Research Institute, November 2010. Availableat: http://www.publicreligion.org/objects/uploads/ck/le/AVS%202010%20Post-election%20report%20FINAL.pd. The authors are grateful to these organizations for their willingness toprovide the detailed cross-tabulations on which our analysis is based.

10 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, December 17-19, 2010, Q2

11 Frank Newport, Americans Church Attendance Inches Up in 2010, Gallup, June

25, 2010. Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/141044/americans-church-attendance-

inches-2010.aspx.

12 Lydia Saad.

13 Curtis Gans, The Primary Turnout Story: Presidential Races Miss Record High; Senateand Governor Contests Hit Record Low, October 1, 2008. See summary charts: http://www.american.edu/spa/cdem/upload/csae081001.pd.

14 Curtis Gans. See also source or general election turnout: National Voter Turnout inFederal Elections, Available at: http://www.inoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html.

15 David W. Brady, Hahrie Han and Jeremy C. Pope, Primary Elections and CandidateIdeology: Out o Step with the Primary Electorate Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXXII, February1. 2007, p. 80, Print.


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16 David W. Brady, Hahrie Han and Jeremy C. Pope.

17 Many thanks to Proessor Hahrie Han o Wellesley College or data rom 2002 and 2

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