third volume

JournalofComparativeTheology

atHarvardDivinitySchool

Issue1Volume3APRIL2012

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ThethirdvolumeoftheJournalofComparativeTheologypresentsarticlesconcerningboththetheoryand thepracticeof comparative theology.Thisexpanding inquiry into the field, represented byboththenumberandvarioussubjectmatterofthesubmissionswereceived,demonstratesthatthefieldcontinues to grow, especially among undergraduate and graduate students. Here, at Harvard DivinitySchoolinparticular,andinBoston‐areauniversitiesingeneral,theinterestincomparativetheologyhasbeen highlighted by a yearlong series of well‐attended lectures hosted by the Center for the Study ofWorldReligions.Furthermore,BostonCollegeheldtheir10thannualEngagingParticularitiesconference,whichhostedgraduatestudentsfrommanydifferentuniversities,fromtheWesttoEastcoast.Asthefieldgrows,somusttheJournal;wearealwayslookingtowardlong‐termvisionsandgoals.Theseinclude expanding the Journal by adding issues that are reviewed by other professors and recentlygraduateddoctoralstudents.Inadditiontobeingagraduatestudentjournal,then,wewouldalsobeanacademic journal forprofessors,providingpeer‐reviewedarticles to thebroaderacademiccommunity.Wehopetoaddalsoacolumninwhichexperiencedandveteranprofessorsofthefieldcanopineaboutinterreligiousandcomparativetheology.Thegrowinginterestincomparativetheologyindicatesthattheologiansarebeginningtotakeseriouslythegrowingreligiousdiversityofworld; it isbeingrecognizedthatatsome level,all theologymustbeinterreligious.Furthermore,italsoindicatesthatthereligiousstudiesfieldisbeginningtotaketheologyseriouslyonceagain.This re‐connection between the academic study of religion and comparative theology is the subject ofOludamini Ogunnaike’s article, entitlted “Myth and the Secret of Destiny: Mircea Eliade’s CreativeHermeneutics and the Yorùbá Concept of Orí.” Ogunnaike looks to the great Romanian historian ofreligion, Mircea Eliade, in order to address the methodological problems found within the field ofreligiousstudiestoday.Eliade’smethodologyandhermeneutics,asOgunnaikedemonstrates,aresimilartothemethodologyandhermeneuticsofcomparativetheology,andtogetherareamuchneededremedy

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for the agnosia of the academic study of religion, which is “prey to the ‘sudden, strange fixations’ ofacademicfads,withamarkedweakness,inability,orrefusaltorecognizetheirreducible,holisticnatureofreligiousphenomenaandexplainwhattheymean.”Our second article also takes on method in comparative theology. Bennett Comerford, in his articleentitled,“ThePresentSituationandtheComparativeImperative:ParallelsintheTheologicalResponsesto Religious Pluralism of David Tracy and Francis X. Clooney,” clearly illustrates the similarities thatDavidTracy’sinterreligioustheologyhastoClooney’scomparativetheology.ComerfordelucidateswhyTracy’sbroadunderstandingof“interreligiousdialogue”ismuchakintoClooney’scomparativetheology,thusshowingthatdialoguecanoccurbeyondtheroundtable,manifesting itself in the formofworksofcomparativetheology.Thethirdandfortharticlesareactualworksofcomparativetheologyinpractice.HansHarmakaputra’sarticle, “Comparing Husayn’s Martyrdom and Jesus’ Crucifixion: An Excursion on Finding CommonConcern,”isanexerciseininterreligioustheologythat“comparesHusayn’smartyrdomwithinShiʽiIslamwith the crucifixion of Jesus in Christianity to see if there are parallel themes that can be used fordialogue between the two religious traditions.” It is works such as these that demonstrate howcomparativetheologycanbeatextualmethodforinterreligiousdialoguethatdoesindeedoccurbeyondtheroundtable,butiscertainlyintendedtobeused,later,attheroundtableofinterreligiousdialogue.Our final article, by Carlo Perez, entitled “Understanding Happiness as Vision of God: A ComparativeReadingofAquinasandAl‐Ghazzālī,” isanexcellentexampleofclassicalcomparativetheology.That is,Pereztakestwothinkersfromtwodifferenttraditions,closelyandinterreligiouslyreadstheirtexts,andthusobtainsrefreshing,newinsightsforthehometradition.AsPerezwrites,“Theaimofthispaperistolookatal‐Ghazali’sunderstandingof theVisionofGod insuchawaythat itwillserveasacatalyst forCatholicstobetterunderstandwhatSt.ThomasAquinasisteachingusabouttheBeatificVision.”TheeditorsattheJournalwouldliketoexpresstheirthanksandgratitudeforthehelpofBradBannon(ThD candidate, HDS), Chen Zhang (second‐year MTS student, HDS), and Mike VanZandt Collins (MAstudent, Harvard) in getting this issue published. Furthermore, we are continuously grateful for andhonored by the advisement of Francis X. Clooney, S.J., Parkman Professor ofDivinity andProfessor ofComparative Theology at Harvard Divinity School and director of the Center for the Study of WorldReligions..

TheEditorialBoardJoshDaneshforoozErikReslyPaulNicholasAxelTakács

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AbouttheContributorsOludaminiOgunnaikeisa4th‐yearPhDstudentinAfricanandAfricanAmericanStudiesandReligionatHarvardUniversity. Hiswork focuses on issues of knowledge inWestAfrican Sufism and the Yorubatradition of Ifa in Nigeria. Holding an A.B. in Cognitive Psychology and African Studies fromHarvardUniversityandanM.A.inReligionfromthesameinstitution,hisinterestsalsoincludeIslamicphilosophy,thethoughtandschoolofIbn'Arabi,ComparativeTheology,Epistemology,andPhilosophyofReligion.BennettComerford isasecond‐yearMDivstudentatBostonCollege.HereceivedhisB.A.fromBostonCollege inphilosophyand Italian.His research interests includeHindu‐Christian comparative theologyand questions pertaining to religious identity and interreligious dialogue in West Bengal, India, andBangladesh. He will be traveling to Dhaka in June for his second summer of Bengali language studythrough the Critical Language Scholarship program. Outside of the classroomhe enjoys hiking, cross‐countryskiing,andspendingtimeinthePacificNorthwest.HansHarmakaputracompletedhisundergraduatestudiesatJakartaTheologicalSeminaryfrom2005‐2010with a thesis in theologyof religions.He then came toHartford Seminary last fall semester as astudent in the International Peacemaker Program andwill finish at the end of this semester. Hewillcontinue as anM.A. student at the same institution in IslamicStudies and Christian‐Muslim Relationsbeginningnextsemester.CarloPerezwasborninManila,Philippines.HecompletedaBachelorofArtsinPhilosophyatSanCarlosSeminaryinManilaandaMasterofDivinityatSt.Patrick'sSeminaryandUniversityinMenloPark,CA.He iscurrentlyenrolled in theLicentiate inSacredTheologyprogramat the JesuitSchoolofTheology‐SantaClaraUniversityinBerkeley,California.

JournalofComparativeTheologyVol.3Issue1April2012

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MythandtheSecretofDestiny:MirceaEliade’sCreativeHermeneuticsandtheYorùbáConceptofOríBYOLUDAMINIOGUNNAIKE

DestinyisthesecretofGod.

‐Hadīth(tradition)oftheProphetMuhammad

Orílodámi Ori(head/destiny)createdmeEniyankòó ItisnotmanOlórunni ItisGodOrílodámi OricreatedmeOríníídáni OricreatedusEnikanòíd’Órí NobodycreatedOri

‐YorùbásayingsThere’sadivinitythatshapesourends,rough‐hewthemhowwewill.

WilliamShakespeare’sHamletV.iiThefault,dearBrutus,isnotinourstars,butinourselves.

‐WilliamShakespeare’sJuliusCaesarI.iiAndweshouldconsiderthatGodgavethesovereignpartofthehumansoulto be the divinity (daimon) of each one, being that partwhich, aswe say,


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dwellsatthetopofthebody,inasmuchasweareaplantnotofanearthlybutofaheavenlygrowth,raisesusfromearthtoourkindredwhoareinheaven.Andinthiswesaytruly;forthedivinepowersuspendedtheheadandrootofus from that place where the generation of the soul first began, and thusmadethewholebodyupright.

Plato,Timaeus90a…There is alwaysakernel that remains refractory toexplanation, and thisindefinable,irreducibleelementperhapsrevealstherealsituationofmaninthecosmos…

‐MirceaEliade,Shamanism:ArchaicTechniquesofEcstasyWeholdthat…thecardinalproblemsofmetaphysicscouldberenewedthroughaknowledgeofarchaicontology.

‐MirceaEliade,CosmosandHistory:TheMythoftheEternalReturn

IntroductionNearlyeverytimeIputdownthereligiousmyths,poems,andbookswhichhavecaptivatedmesinceearlychildhoodtoreadaworkfromtheacademicstudyofreligion,Iamstruckwithasubtledis‐ease,anelusiveanduncannyfeelingwhosearticulationIfinallydiscoveredinOliverSacks’descriptionofhisencounterwithDr.P.,theeponymouspatientinTheManWhoMistookHisWifeforaHat:Yettherewassomethingabitodd.Hefacedmeashespoke,wasorientedtowardsme,andyettherewassomethingthematter—itwasdifficulttoformulate.Hefacedmewith hisears, I came to think,butnotwithhiseyes. These insteadof looking,gazing,atme,‘takingmein,’inthenormalway,madesuddenstrangefixations—onmynose,onmyrightear,down tomychin, up tomyrighteye,as if noting (evenstudying) these individual features, but not seeing my whole face, its changingexpressions, ‘me’asawhole. I amnot sure that I fully realized thisat the time—therewas just a teasing strangeness, some failure in the normal interplay of gazeandexpression.Hesawme,hescannedme,andyet….Ihadstoppedatafloristonmy way to his apartment and bought myself an extravagant red rose for mybuttonhole.NowIremoveditandhandedittohim.Helookedatitlikeabotanistor morphologist given a specimen, not like a person given a flower. “About sixinches in length,” he commented. “A convoluted red form with a linear greenattachment.”1

1OliverSacks,TheManWhoMistookHisWifeforaHatandOtherClinicalTales(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,2006),12‐14.


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PoorDr.Pwasfinallydiagnosedwithvisualagnosia,theinabilityofthebraintomakesenseofotherwisenormalvisualstimuli,typifiedbytheinabilitytorecognizefamiliarobjectsorfaces. Fromareligiousperspective,likeSacks’patient,muchoftheacademicstudyofreligionseemsafflictedwithitsownformof visual agnosia, prey to the “sudden, strange fixations” of academicfads, with a marked weakness, inability, or refusal to recognize theirreducible, holistic nature of religious phenomena and explain what theymean.Inandofitself,thisscientificoracademicgaze,whichturnsaroseinto“aconvolutedredformwithalineargreenattachment,”isharmlessenough,andcanevenbequiteuseful,butitgetsintotroublewhenitignoresitsownlimits,makespronouncementsaboutreligiousphenomenaonthebasisofitsagnosticvision,andtriestosubsumeotherperspectivesunderitself.Dr. P was able to recognize abstract shapes such as cubes, pyramids, andeven icosahedrons, andcould sometimes identify simple images bypickingoutakeyfeature(suchasEinstein’shairandmustache,Churchill’scigar,orhisbrother’sbuckteeth),butwhenconfrontedwithunrecognizableimages,Dr.P,likeanygoodacademic,wouldmakeinformedhypothesisbasedontheavailable data. Sometimes hewould be right, butmore often than not hewouldmistakeapictureofthedesertforapicnicscene,hisfootforhisshoe,andmostfamously,andhiswifeforahat.Given that the fully‐enlightened sagesworking in the study of religion arefewinnumber,itissafetosaythatmostofus,inonewayoranother,sharethe plight of Dr. P: when confrontedwith religious rites,myths, and otherphenomena,wejustdon’t“getit.”Andsowemustinterpretthephenomenaaccording to our own conceptual frameworks and severely limitedperceptual insights, more often than not producing descriptions andinterpretations that sound as strange to an initiate as a “a convoluted redformwithalineargreenattachment”doestous. Somescholarsacceptthatthisissimplythebestwecando,othersassertthatthe“convolutedredform”is just as good as or better than the “rose,” but still others do not. It isprobably abundantly clear by now that I belong to this third group,whichholdsthatreligiousphenomenaexpressandtransformrealityanditshumanperceptionsinauniqueandirreplaceableway.InmyresearchontraditionalYorùbáreligionandWestAfricanSufism,Ihaveseen far too many roses reduced to color and shape, distorted bymethodologieswhosephilosophicalpresuppositionsruncountertothoseoftheir subjectmaterial, andwitnessed theproblemsandevendangers theseacademic confusions pose for communities of practitioners. Theseexperienceshaveledmetocontemplatehow(shortofquittingtheacademytotakeupacareerasatraditionalscholarinTimbuktuorIfe)Icouldconveythepower,beauty,andaboveall,thelife‐affirmingandtransformingtruthsofthereligioustraditionsandphenomenaIstudyinanacademicsetting.That


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is,howcould I analyzeanddescribe, rigorouslyandacademically, religiousrites,doctrines,texts,andmythsontheirownterms?Onemethodologicalprecedent foraddressingsuchconcerns is found intheworkofMirceaEliade, thegreatRomanianhistorianofreligion, litterateur,and keeper of extensive journals. Eliade writes, “a religious phenomenonwillonlyberecognizedassuchifitisgraspedatitsownlevel,thatistosay,ifit is studiedas something religious. To try to grasp the essence of such aphenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics,linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one unique andirreducible element in it—the element of the sacred.”2 However, he holdsthatthereis“nopurelyreligiousphenomena;”religionalwaystakesplaceinaparticularhistorical, linguistic, sociocultural, economic,etc. context. “Butthefactthatamythorritualisalwayshistoricallyconditioneddoesnottellus what a religious experience ultimately is. We know we can grasp thesacred only through manifestations which are always historicallyconditioned.Butthestudyofthesehistoricallyconditionedexpressionsdoesnotgiveus the answer to the questions:What is the sacred? Whatdoes areligiousexperienceactuallymean?”3Inthesamechapter,Eliadeconcludes,He[thehistorianofreligions]knowsthatheiscondemnedtoworkexclusivelywithhistorical documents, but at the same timehe feels that these documents tell himsomethingmorethanthesimplefactthattheyrevealtohimimportanttruthsaboutmanandman’srelationstothesacred.Buthowtograspthesetruths?... Butmoreimportant than any singleanswer is the fact that historiansof religions askedthisquestion. As so often in the past, a correct question may infuse new life into awornoutscience4Thisarticleisintendedasamethodologicalexerciseandexperimentinspiredby the above concerns. In the first part of this article, I will outline myinterpretationofEliade’shermeneuticalmethod,andapplythismethodologyinthesecondhalfofthearticletothemythico‐ritualcomplexoftheYorùbáconceptoforí(head/destiny).Finally,Iwillconcludebyevaluatingthecostsand benefits of this method, and compare it to similar methods used inComparative Theology, with a view towards further methodologicaldevelopments.PartI:Eliade’s“CreativeHermeneutics”Oneofthemostimportantandprolificfiguresinthehistoryofthestudyofreligion, Mircea Eliade left behind a legacy whose profound and wide‐reaching influence is perhapsmatchedonly by its controversy. One of the 2MirceaEliade,PatternsinComparativeReligion(NewYork:MeridianBooks,1968),xiii3MirceaEliade,TheQuest,HistoryandMeaninginReligion(Chicago:TheUniversityOf

ChicagoPress,1969),52.4ibid.


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mostsignificantaspectsofthislegacywasEliade’sefforttocreateandwritea study of religious phenomena as religious phenomena (not as historical,ethnological, sociological, or philosophical data), in order to refocusacademicinquiryondiscoveringwhatagivenreligiousphenomenareallyis,whatitmeans.Thisturnawayfromandagainstreductionismtowardsanew,“creative hermeneutics” of religious phenomena characterizes nearly all ofEliade’s academic work, and occupies a significant place in his extensivejournals and literary works.5 Nevertheless, Eliade’s methodology isnotoriouslydifficult touncoverandeventrickier topindown. Herarely, ifever,gaveafullaccountofhisuniquehermeneuticmethodology,notinginajournalentry,“inmywork,Ihavetriedtoelaboratethishermeneutics;butIhave illustrated it in a practical way on the basis of documents. It nowremains formeor foranothertosystematize thishermeneutics.”6 DouglasAllen writes, “But during the last year of his life, after noting that‘methodological’ criticisms brought against his conception of history ofreligions had increased, Eliade wrote the following: ‘The fault is, in part,mine;I’veneverrepliedtosuchcriticisms,althoughIoughttohavedoneso.Itoldmyselfthatsomeday,‘whenI’mfreefromworksinprogress,’I’llwriteashort theoretical monograph and explain the ‘confusions and errors’ forwhichIamreproached.I’mafraidI’llneverhavetimetowriteit.’”7AlthoughEliadeneverdidwritethismonograph,heleftbehindthousandsofpagesofscholarshipillustratinghismethods,andseveralscholarshavetakenupthetaskofexplaininghiselusivemethodology.My own understanding of Eliade’s method of “creative hermeneutics” islargelydrawnfromhisownworks,particularlyfromPatternsinComparativeReligion(andJ.Z.Smith’spairofarticlesonthiswork8),MythandReality,theforeword to Shamanism, and selections from his journals. The works ofDouglasAllenandBrianRenniehavealsobeeninfluentialinthisregard.9Eliadedefinedhisdisciplineasthe“historyofreligions”andoftenreferredtohimself as “the historian of religions” in his works. This terminology

5DouglasAllen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade(TheoristsofMyth),firstedition(NewYork:Routledge,2002)MirceaEliade(1907‐1986),NoSouvenirs:journal,19571969/MirceaEliade;translatedfromtheFrenchbyFredH.Johnson,Jr.(NewYork:Harper&Row,1977);MirceaEliade,Myths,Rites,Symbols:AMirceaEliadeReader(NewYork:Harper&Row,1976)6Eliade,NoSouvenirs,313.7Allen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade(TheoristsofMyth),xii.8SeeSmith,J.Z.“Acknowledgments:MorphologyandHistoryinMirceaEliade's"PatternsinComparativeReligion"(1949‐1999),Part1:TheWorkandItsContexts&Part2:TheTextureoftheWork.”HistoryofReligions,Vol.39,No.4(May,2000),pp.315‐331(Part1)andpp.332‐351(Part2)9seeAllen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade(TheoristsofMyth)(2002);DouglasAllen,Structure&CreativityinReligion(ReligionReasonSer.:No14).FirstEdition(Berlin:MoutonDeGruyter,1978);BryanS.Rennie,ReconstructingEliade(Albany,NewYork:StateUniversityOfNewYorkPress,1996).


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indicates that there are two concepts at work: “History” and “Religion.”“Religion” or “religious” for Eliade is simply a designation for “the Sacred”which is simply the opposite of “the profane.” In his “archaic ontology,”which is the ontology Eliade attributes to the traditional, pre‐modern,religiousman(homoreligiosus),thesacredistranscendent,irreducible,andthe source of “Being”—what makes things real. It stands above and inoppositiontothemundaneworldoftheprofane:This “other world” represents a superhuman, “transcendent” plane, the plane ofabsolute realities. It is the experience of the sacred–that is and encounterwith atranshuman reality –which give birth to the idea that something really exists, thathence there are absolute values capable of guiding man and giving a meaning tohumanexistence. It is then,through theexperienceofthesacred that theideasofreality,truth,andsignificancefirstdawn,tobelaterelaboratedandsystematizedbymetaphysicalspeculation.10Thus“thesacred”isnothermeticallysealedfromtheprofane,butirruptsormanifests itself in the profane. Every instance of such a manifestation istermed a hierophany, and it is here that “History” enters, as everyhierophany is a “paradoxical coming‐together of being and non‐being,absolute and relative, the eternal and the becoming.”11 Thus, “Everyhierophanywe lookat isalsoanhistorical fact. Everymanifestationof thesacred takes place in some historical situation.”12 Anything in the worldcould potentially become a hierophany, in fact, Eliade writes, “in allprobability there is nothing that has not, somewhere, some time, beeninvested with a sacred value.”13 Just as Eliade’s “archaicontology”/methodology begins with a dialectic of the sacred (sacred vs.profane), there is a related dialectic on the plane of hierophanies: noteverythingisahierophanyallatonce,so“ineveryreligiousframeworktherehavealwaysbeenprofanebeingsandthingsbesidethesacred…Thedialecticof hierophany implies a more or less clear choice, a singling‐out. A thingbecomes sacred in so far as it embodies (that is, reveals) something otherthanitself.”14These hierophanies are the raw material for Eliade’s method, “For themoment we shall consider each separate thing—rite, symbol, myth,cosmogonyorgod—asahierophany;inotherwords,weshallseeeachasamanifestationofthesacredinthementalworldofthosewhobelievedinit.”15Furthermore, “each is valuable for two things it tells us: because it is a

10MirciaEliade,MythandReality(WorldPerspectiveSeries),1sted.(NewYork:Harper&Row,1963),139.11Eliade,Patterns,29.12ibid.,2.13ibid.,12.14ibid.,12‐13.15ibid.,10(italicsmine).


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hierophany,itrevealssomemodalityofthesacred;becauseitisahistoricalincident,itrevealssomeattitudemanhashadtowardsthesacred.”16Eliadeprivilegestheformer,andindoingsoplacestheemphasisonreligionin“thehistoryof religion:”17 “the religioushistorianmust tracenotonly thegivenhistory of a hierophany, but must first of all understand and explain themodality of the sacred the hierophany discloses.”18 Elsewhere, Eliadeexplains this priority of purpose as hermeneutics over history:19 “In otherwords,thehistorianofreligionsmakesuseofallthehistoricalmanifestationsof a religious phenomenon in order to discoverwhat such a phenomenon‘hastosay;’ontheonehand,heholdstothehistoricallyconcrete,butontheother, he attempts todecipherwhatever transhistorical content a religiousdatumrevealsthroughhistory.”20So far,Eliade’smethod issimplyto identifyhierophanies,manifestationsofthe sacred, and to attempt first, to understand the modalities of thetranshistoricalsacredtheyexpressinhistory,andthentotracethecourseofagivenhierophanythroughhistory.21Elsewherethesetwopartsaretermed“a morphology” and “a history.”22 The reason for this privileging ofmorphologyoverhistoryissimple:youcannotfollowathingthroughhistoryifyoudonotalreadyknowwhatitis;andmoreover,thismethodissupposedto ultimately help answer the questions, “What is the sacred?” and “Whatdoes a religious experience actually mean?”—questions more directlyaddressedbyEliade’smorphology.Buthowisthismorphologyconstructed?Howdoweinterpretthemeaningof a hierophany? Andwhat kindof hierophanies dowe look at: buildings,texts,rituals,myths?Eliadeconcludesthat“thesafestmethod,clearly,istomake use of all these kinds of evidence, omitting no important type, andalways asking ourselves what meaning is revealed by each of thesehierophanies.Inthiswayweshallgetacoherentcollectionofcommontraitswhich, aswe shall see later, willmake it possible to formulate a coherentsystemoutof thevariousmodalities….”23As J.Z.Smithhas illustrated inhis

16ibid.,2.17cf.MirceaEliade,Images&Symbols:StudiesinReligiousSymbolism(SanFrancisco:SearchBook,1969),29:“inthetitleof‘thehistoryofreligions,’theaccentoughtnottobeplacedonthewordhistory,butonthewordreligions.Foralthoughtherearenumerouswaysofapproachinghistory…thereisonlyonewayofapproachingreligion.”18ibid.,5.19cf.MirceaEliade,OrdealbyLabyrinth:ConversationsWithClaudeHenriRocquet(Chicago:UniversityOfChicagoPress,1984),142:“Ahistorianofreligions,whateverhisopinions…thinksthathisfirstduty,inpractice,istograsptheoriginalmeaningofasacredphenomenonandtheninterpretitshistory.”20Eliade,Shamanism,xv21seeEliade,Patterns,xiv:“TheaimIintend—thatofseeingjustwhatthingarereligiousinnatureandwhatthosethingsreveal.”22Eliade,Shamanism,xiii23Eliade,Patterns,8


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pair of articles “Acknowledgments: Morphology and History in MirceaEliade's ‘Patterns in Comparative Religion Parts 1 & 2,’” the term“morphology”(whichEliadeborrowsfromGoethe) iskeytounderstandingthisprocess.24SmithquotesEliadeaspraising“this[morphological]methodof delineating structures by reducing phenomena to archetypes.”25 Thismorphologystands inoppositiontoevolutionaryordevelopmentalmodels,whichareoftenteleologicalandprivilegethehistoricalconnectionsbetweenand amongst data; inmorphology, however, the formal relationship is theorganizingprinciple.Such historical inquiries are not off the table, but must come after themorphological work, as Eliade notes, “We shall therefore, only be able toconsidertheproblemofthehistoryofreligiousformsafterhavingexaminedacertainnumberofthem.”26SmithnotesthatEliadepromiseda“companionvolume” to Patterns, which would complement the latter’s morphologicalproject with a historical one, and argues that the foreword to Shamanismservesasanoutline to thisnever‐completedwork.27 Eliadeenvisionedhistotalworkas“avastsynthesisofmorphologyandhistoryofreligion.”28 Onthemorphologicalside,hedistinguishedhisworkfromtheevolutionaryanddevelopmental model en vogue at the time,29 and on the historical side,Eliade distinguished his method from phenomenology, “criticiz[ing] theahistorical approach of phenomenology, deploying technicalmorphologicalvocabulary to charge that a phenomenological account ignores the‘modifications’ and ‘degradations’ of the sacred brought about by culturalandhistorical‘conditions.’”30IntheforewordtoShamanism,Eliadeexplainsthisdistinctionfurther,"[Thephenomenologist]inprinciplerejectsanyworkof comparison, confronted with one religious phenomenon or another, heconfines himself to 'approaching' it and divining itsmeaning.Whereas the 24(ibid.):Part1andportionsofPart2illustratetheoriginsofEliade’smorphologyinGoethe’smorphologicalstudies,especiallythe1790work,TheMetamorphosisofPlants,inwhichGoethesoughttoshowhowallthepartsofaplantwhichdevelopedinsuccessionwereintrinsicallyidentical(allbeingleaf)despitetheirdifferencesinoutwardform,andtodescribethearchetypeoftheplant(fromwhichallplantsarelogicallygenerated),whichhehad“intellected”throughcontemplatingthevarietyofplantsinagardeninPalermo.25ibid.,Part1,p.322.26Eliade,Patterns,xvii.27Themulti‐volumework,HistoryofReligiousIdeas,couldbeseenassuchawork,butSmitharguesthatitisnot.Onp.339,Smithalsoperspicaciouslynotesthat“thatthethreeworksbyEliadethatIassociatedwithhishistorical‘companionvolume’inPart1‐Shamanism,Yoga,andTheForgeandtheCrucible‐haveincommonthattheyreverse,byavarietyofhumanactivities,thedownwardpath.Eachtechniquehasadirectionalitytowardtranscendence.ShamanismandYogaannihilatethehumancondition,alchemyaltersnaturalconditions.Ifthisbecorrect,thenthemorphologicalvolumeportraysamovementofthetranscendentaltowardthehuman;thepossiblepartialcontentsofthehistoricalvolumewouldseemtoillustrateamovementofthehumantowardthetranscendental.”28QuotedinSmith,Part2,332.29seetheforewordtoEliade,Patterns.30ibid.,333.


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historian of religions does not reach a comprehension of the phenomenonuntil after he has compared it with thousands of similar or dissimilarphenomena, until he has situated it among them; and these thousands ofphenomenaareseparatednotonlyintimebutinspace.”31The variety of phenomena is key to both themorphological and historicalprojects,andgivesusgreatinsightintoEliade’smethod.“Whateverpracticaldifficulties it causes, this very variety is what makes it possible for us todiscover all the different modalities of the sacred.”32 Of the historian ofreligion, Eliade writes, “Familiar with a considerable number ofhierophanies, his eye will have learned to decipher the properly religiousmeaningofoneoranotherfact.”33Simplyput,Eliadereadeverything,forgotnothing, and brought it all to bear on every thing. His morphology andinterpretive method consists of discovering the meaning of new religiousdata(hierophanies)bysituatingthemamongst thesystemsofrelationshipsbetweenpreviously studied hierophanies. These systems are archetypes34revealingthesamemodalityofthesacred. Eliadeexplainstheunionofthismorphologywithhistorythusly:Theverydialecticofthesacredtendsindefinitelytorepeataseriesofarchetypes,sothataheirophanyrealizedatacertain“historicalmoment”isstructurallyequivalenttoahierophanyathousandyearsearlieror later.Thistendencyonthepartofthehierophanic process to repeat the same paradoxical sacralization of reality as ininfinitum is what, after all, enables us to understand something of a religiousphenomenon and to write its ‘history.’ In other words, it is precisely becausehierophaniesrepeatthemselvesthatwecandistinguishreligiousfactsandsucceedinunderstandingthem.35As this passage indicates, “history” has unique and multiple meanings forEliade,andalthoughadetaileddiscussionofthisconceptisoutsidethescopeofthispaper(andwouldprobablyrequireamulti‐volumework),IwilltrytomentionafewaspectsofEliade’sconceptofhistorythataregermanetohis“creative hermeneutics.” In the foreword to Shamanism, he distinguisheshistory from historiography in that the former is the “specific plane ofmanifestation” of religious facts, whereas the latter is a chronologicalperspective. Moreover, given the irreducible nature of the religious, thehistory of religions is different from any other kind of history. “Though ahistory of religions exists, it is not, like all other kinds of history,irreversible.”36 This reversibility of history can only be understood if we 31Eliade,Shamanism,xv.32Eliade,Patterns,9.33Eliade,Shamanism,xvii.34AlthoughEliadecorrespondedwithJung,heusedthetermarchetypeinaverydifferentway,andeventuallydroppedtheterminordertoavoidJungianmisinterpretationsofhiswork.SeeMythandReligioninMirceaEliade,16335Eliade,Shamanism,xxiii36ibid.,xvii‐xvii


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recognize that for Eliade and/or homo religious,37 “all history is in somemeasureafallfromthesacred,alimitationanddiminution.”38However,thisfall is reversed by the process of the sacralization of the profane: thehierophany,the“eternalreturn”totheeternalsacred. “Yetinthehumblesthierophany there is an ‘eternal new beginning,’ an eternal return to anatemporal moment, a desire to abolish history, to blot out the past, torecreatetheworld.Allthisis‘shown’inreligiousfacts;itisnottheinventionofthehistorianofreligion.”39In this respect,we can see howone aspect of Eliade’s concept of “history”functions similarly to sacred history ormyth. In his “archaic ontology,” toknowathingmeanstoknowitsmythoforigin,theexemplaryhistoryofhowit came to be in illo tempore,because “facts showus that, for archaicman,reality is a functionof the imitationof a celestial archetype.”40 InPatterns,Eliadewrites, “Thusthough itmayseemparadoxical,whatwemaycall the‘history’ of primitive societies consists solely of themythical eventswhichtookplaceinillotemporeandhavebeenunceasinglyrepeatedfromthatdayto this.”41 However, the historian of religions must also deal with theserepetitions in profane time. While myth explains what things are byexplaining how they came to be in illo tempore, the historian of religionexplains what a thing is by discovering its archetype through itsmanifestations,its“becoming”inprofanetime.HereinliesthemagicofEliade’smethod.Ashewrites,“Toknowthemythsistolearntheoriginofthings…Forknowingtheoriginofanobject,ananimal,aplant, and so on is equivalent to acquiring amagical power over them bywhichtheycanbecontrolled,multiplied,orreproducedatwill.”42Similarly,byknowingthemyth,thesacredoriginorarchetype,thehistorianofreligionmakes a given religious phenomenon tractable, workable, systematic, andaboveall,meaningful.Thisprocessofuncoveringthearchetype,themodalityof the sacred, expressed through a hierophany, is likened to Platonicanamnesis(supra‐rationalrecollection),43albeitinahistoriographicmode:

37ThisslippagebetweenEliade’sownscholarlyperspectiveandthatofthetraditional,archaic,orreligiousmanheisattemptingtouncoverandexplainhasbeenthesourceofmuchcriticism,andisapointwewillreturntolaterinthispaper.38ibid.,xix.39ibid.,xvii.40MirceaEliade,Cosmos&HistorytheMythoftheEternalReturn(NewYork:Harper&Bros,1959),541Eliade,Patterns,397.42MirceaEliade,MythandReality(WorldPerspectiveSeries),firstedition(NewYork:Harper&Row,1963),13,15.43“Philosophicalanamnesisdoesnotrecoverthememoryoftheeventsbelongingtoformerlives,butoftruths,thatis,ofthestructuresofthereal.Thisphilosophicalpositioncanbecomparedwiththatofthetraditionalsocieties:themythsrepresentparadigmaticmodelsestablishedbysupernaturalbeings,nottheseriesofpersonalexperiencesofoneindividualoranother.”(Eliade,MythandReality,124)And,“Thepastthusrevealedismuchmorethan


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Through this historiographic anamnesis man enters deep into himself. If wesucceedinunderstandingacontemporaryAustralianorhishomologue,aPaleolithichunter,wehavesucceededin“awakening”inthedepthsofourbeingtheexistentialsituation and the resultant behaviour of a prehistoric humanity…A truehistoriographic anamnesis finds expression in the discovery of our solidaritywiththesevanishedorperipheralpeoples.Wehaveagenuinerecoveryofthepast,evenofthe ‘primordial’pastrevealedbyuncoveringprehistoricsitesorbyethnologicalinvestigations.44This, modern, academic, historiographic anamnesis is distinct fromtraditionalmythicalanamnesis,Butthereis thiscommonelement: theimportanceofpreciseandtotalrecollectionof the past. In the traditional societies it is recollection of mythical events; in themodernWestitisrecollectionofallthattookplaceinhistoricalTime.Thedifferenceistooobvioustorequiredefinition.Butbothtypesofanamnesisprojectmanoutofhis "historical moment." And true historiographic anamnesis opens, too, on aprimordial Time, the Time in which men established their cultural behaviorpatterns, even though believing that theywere revealed to them by SupernaturalBeings.45This reveals what I argue is the Platonic structure underlying Eliade’sontology, and ultimately hismethodology. Eliadewrites, “it could be saidthatthis ‘primitive’ontologyhasaPlatonicstructure;andinthatcasePlatocould be regarded as the outstanding philosopher of ‘primitive mentality,’thatis,thethinkerwhosucceededingivingphilosophiccurrencyandvaliditytothemodesandlifeandbehaviourofarchaichumanity…[His]greattitletoour admiration remainshis effort to justify this vision of archaic humanitytheoretically, through the dialecticmeans which the spirituality of his agemadeavailabletohim.”46 IsnotEliadeengagedinasimilar,ifnotidenticaltask?47 In his Journal he writes, “Our duty—as writers, scholars, andphilosophers—consists of reinterpreting, for the modern Westernconsciousness, theothermythological traditions, and firstof all thearchaic

theantecedentofthepresent;itisitssource.Ingoingbacktoit,recollectiondoesnotseektosituateeventsinatemporalframebuttoreachthedepthsofbeing,todiscovertheoriginal,theprimordialrealityfromwhichthecosmosissuedandwhichmakesitpossibletounderstandbecomingasawhole."(J.P.Vernant,"AspectsmythiquesdelamémoireenGrece,"JournaldePsychologie,(1959):1‐29—page7quotedinElicade,MythandReality,120).44ibid.,136.45ibid.,138.46Eliade,MythoftheEternalReturn,34‐35.47However,Eliadewritesonthesamepage,“RecognizingthePlatonicstructureofthat[archaic]ontologywouldnottakeusveryfar.”Idisagree,andinthelastsectionofthispaperwillarguethatthisrecognitionisverysignificantforunderstandingEliade’smethodologyandconclusions.However,thepurposeofthissectionismerelytosummarizeEliade’smethodologyashepresentsit.


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traditions…It’s not a matter of letting oneself be inspired by these exoticmyths and legends, but of creating poetically in a perspective inwhich thesignificanceandbeautyofthePolynesianmyths,forexample,arerevealedtothe readerwith a force equal toRilke revealing tohim themeaningof themythofOrpheus.”48But how does all of this practically work? I will present a few examplesbefore turning to “logic of symbols” which is Eliade’s expression for thestructure of the sacred revealed by hierophanies. On page 25 ofPatterns,Eliadeexplainshowthebasichierophanyofastonerevealsamodalityofthesacred, “A sacred stone will manifest one modality of the sacred at onemomentofhistory:thisstoneshowsthatthesacredissomethingotherthanthe cosmic surroundings, and like stone, the sacred is absolutelyinvulnerable, steadfast, and beyond change.” Due to its particularcircumstances, a hierophanymay become a symbol; for example, the blackstoneoftheKa’bawhich“infallingfromthesky,madeaholeinit,anditwasthroughthishole thatacommunication…couldbeeffectedbetweenheavenand earth. Though it passed theAxisMundi.”49 In thisway, a hierophanybecomesapartofasystem,andevery hierophany in fact supposes such a system…For instance, what I shoulddescribe as a cryptic, or insufficiently clear, local hierophany is the custom ofcarrying a green branch in solemn procession at the beginning of the spring;whereaswhatIwouldcalla‘clear’hierophanyisthesymboloftheCosmicTree.Yetbothreveal the samemodalityof the sacredembodied in plant life: the rhythmofrebirth, the never‐ending life that vegetation contains, reality manifested inrecurring creation, and so on. Whatmust be emphasized at once is thatall thesehierophanies point to a system of coherent statements, to a theory of the sacredsignificanceofvegetation[.]50Hereweseehowahierophany,withoutlettinggoofitshistoricalgrounding,isrelatedbacktoitsarchetpyeandintegratedintoasystemofhierophaniesthat reveal the same modality of the sacred. This is the morphologicalprocessunderlyingPatternsinComparativeReligion,andthemeansbywhichEliadedetermineswhatagivenhierophanysignifies. Thehistoricalprocessconsistsofexamininghistory for thesamehierophanyorhierophaniesthatreveal the same modality of the sacred, and are thus part of the samesymbolic system. “Thus firstly symbolism carries further the dialectic ofhierophanies by transforming things into something other than what theyappeartoprofaneexperiencetobe:astonebecomesasymbolforthecenteroftheworld,andsoon;andthenbybecomingsymbols,signsoftranscendent

48Eliade,NoSouvenirs,230.49Eliade,Patterns,227.50ibid.,8‐9.


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reality,thosethingsabolishtheirmateriallimitsandinsteadofbeingisolatedfragmentsbecomepartofawholesystem.”51Thissymbolicsystemor“logicofsymbolism”hasaspecialplace inEliade’smethodology and ontology, roughly analogous to Plato’s World of Forms.Thesesymbolicsystemsarenotconstructedbythehistorianofreligion,butrather uncovered or revealed by him. They exist “trans‐consciously” andautonomously, consciously in the mind of homo religious,52 andsubconsciously in his (and possibly modern man’s) dreams and instincts.“Whatwemay call symbolic thought allowsman tomove freely fromonelevelof reality toanother…[Symbols], aswehave seen, identify, assimilate,and unify diverse levels and realities that are to all appearancesincompatible.”53Symbols,likehierophaniesingeneral,paradoxicallybecomemore thanwhat theyarewhile remainingexactly the same. Theyuniteorbridge levels of reality in objects without negating any of them. 54 Thehistorianofreligionshasonlytointegratethehierophaniesinquestionintothis logic of symbolism to discover their relationship to the sacred andeverything else, and therefore their various levels of meaning. “In such aperspective this is not a closed Universe, no object exists for itself inisolation; everything is held together by a compact system ofcorrespondencesandlikenesses.”55This,insummary,isEliade’sontology,methodology,andhermeneutics.Thetranscendentsacredmanifestsitselfindifferentmodalitiesintotheplaneofprofane history creating hierophanies, historical events which reveal ormanifestagivenmodalityof thesacredor transhistoricalarchetype. Thesemodalities,andtheirmanifestationinhistory,areorganizedaccordingtothe“logicofsymbolism”whichgovernsthestructureof theUniverse(fromthesacredondowntotheprofane),connectingeverythingtoeverythingelseoneverylevelofreality.Thehomoreligiosusparticipatesinthesacredthroughreligiousrites,symbols,andmyths,andinhisworld,allorder,meaning,and

51ibid.,452;A“symbol”forEliadeistechnicallythatwhichmakesahierophanymorethanwhatitisinitself,orconstitutesa“revelation”whichcouldnotbeexpressedbyanyotherhierophany.Butinreality,itcouldbeanything,providedthatitembodiesorsymbolizesthewholesysteminquestion.SeeEliade,Patterns,448‐453.52seeEliade,NoSouvenirs,313:“FirstArgument:‘Thesacred’isanelementinthestructureofconsciousness,andnotamomentinthehistoryofconsciousness.Next:theexperienceofthesacredisindissolublylinkedtotheeffortmadebymantoconstructameaningfulworld.Iemphasizedthis:hierophaniesandreligioussymbolsconstitutealanguage,suigeneris,itnecessitatesproperhermeneutics.Inmywork,Ihavetriedtoelaboratethishermeneutics;butIhaveillustrateditinapracticalwayonthebasisofdocuments.Itnowremainsformeorforanothertosystematizethishermeneutics.”53ibid.,455.54Eliadearguesthatreligiousexperienceenablesmanhimselftobecomesuchasymbol,abridgeconnectingalllevelsofreality,andamicrocosminwhichallcosmicrealitiesarealsorealitiesofhisownbeing.SeeEliade,Patterns,455‐6.55Eliade,Images&Symbols,178.


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reality is derived through participation in the structureof the sacred. Thehistorian of religion attempts to distinguish hierophanies from profanethings(thedialecticofthesacred),discovertheirmeaningbylookingatwhatmodality of the sacred they manifest and/thus situating them within asymbolicsystemofrelatedhierophanies. Thelogicofthissystemwillallowhimtoidentifythesameandsimilarhierophaniesatvariousotherpointsinhistory and understand how they have been historically conditioned. Thisentire process will allow the scholar to answer the question:what does agivenreligiousphenomenonactuallymean?Beforemovingontothesecondsectionofthepaper,Iwanttopresentthreejournal entries of Eliade’s that help clarify his self‐identified purpose,precedent,andprocess,aswellasrevealthemagicofhismethodofcreativehermeneutics. Hedescribesanaspectof themotivation forhisscholarshipthus, “I want to show the cathartic function of a correct understanding ofmyth. It liberates (modern)man fromcertain inhibitionswhichmadehimincapableoflovinghisownprehistory(andhistory…).”56Helaterpresentsadiscoveryofaprecedentorpretextforhisworkandmethodasfollows:Inatextby[Henry]Corbin,Ihavefoundthesequotations:“RecitetheKoranasifithadbeenrevealedonlyforyourcase” (Sohrawardi). “If themeaningoftheKoranwere limited to the circumstances andpersonalities towhom itwas revealed, theKoranwouldhavediedlongago(BāgitIman,eighthcentury).Thesetwotextsalonecouldjustifythehistorico‐religioushermeneuticwhichcertainofusaretryingtodo(Corbin, myself, Ricoeur—and who else for the moment?). Point of departure: arevelation, although brought about in awell‐defined historicalmoment, is alwaystranshistorical, “universal,”and open to personal interpretations. In fact the term“interpretations” is not precise enough: it is a matter of a transmutation by thepersonwhoreceives, interprets,andassimilates therevelation. Formypart, I amgoing even further: the creative hermeneutic ofwhich I have been speaking in somanyofmyrecent studiesprovokesequivalent transmutationsevenwhenweareconfronted not with a “revelation” of the type of that of the Koran, but also withexotic(India,etc.)orarchaic(“primitive”)religiousforms.57And perhaps most illuminatingly, Eliade elaborates on this process oftransmutation:The meaning of my ‘learning’: I grasp the true meaning only after having gonethroughallthematerial(enormous,inert,somberdocumentation);Iwouldcomparemy immersion in the documents to a fusionwith thematerial—to the limit ofmyphysicalresistance:whenIfeelI’msuffocating,thatIambeingasphyxiated,Icomeback up to the surface. A descent to the center of dead matter, comparable to adescensus ad infernos. Indirectly, the experience of death. Drowned in the

56Eliade,NoSouvenirs,288.57ibid.,305‐6.


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documents, what is personal, original, living, inmedisappears, dies. When I findmyselfagain,whenIreturntolife—Iseethingsdifferently—Iunderstandthem.58This is precisely what I have tried to accomplish in the previous section,burying and fusing my own voice (and you, gentle reader) in Eliade’sdocuments andwords before coming up for air. I hope it has resulted inunderstanding. In thespiritof followingthemethodologyoutlinedabove, IattemptedtodothesameinconductingmyresearchontheYorùbáconceptof orí. However, in sitting down to write this next section, I was stillconfrontedbythe“magical”or“noetic”aspectofEliade’shermeneutics: theleapfromhistoricalhierophanytotranshistoricalarchetype.Thequestionofhow exactly this process occurs, how Eliade identified the archetype of agiven hierophany, is not clear from his scholarly work. Despite the self‐proclaimed empiricism of Eliade’s method, this initial leap, if empirical,seems based on the experience of something other than mere historicaldata.59Once,however,weacceptanumberofthese“leaps,”wecanbegintosee the consistency of Eliade’s logic of symbols and use these symbols asguideposts or exemplars that allow for and direct the interpolation andintegrationofnewhierophaniesamongstthem.ThisiswhatIattemptedtodointhefollowingEliadiananalysisoforí.Nevertheless,Eliade’sassertionthatthissystemofsymbols(andthesacredwhichitreveals)isautonomous,thatitisnotconstructedbythescholarorhomoreligiosus,seemsimpossibletoacceptwithoutembracingEliade’s/thearchaicontology.60 Wewill return to this issue later in the final sectionof

58ibid.,92;Thisprocessisstrikinglysimilar(althoughdescribedinslightlymoredramaticterms)totheprocessofComparativeReligiousReadingDescribedbyProf.FrancisClooneyatthebeginningofthefourthchapterofhisComparativeTheology:DeepLearningacrossReligiousBoundaries(Oxford:WileyandSons,2010).59Eliadehimselfwasinconsistentonthispoint:insomeplacesheseemedtoarguethatthehistorianofreligionneednotbelieveinthearchaicontologyofhomoreligiosus,butonlyneedacceptthatitwasrealfor,andletitguidehisstudyoftraditionalman.Inotherplaces,particularlyinhisjournals,Eliadeseemstoarguethatonlyscholarswhoaretruebelieversarecapableandqualifiedtointerpretreligiousphenomena.AllenquotessomeofhisearlyRomanianworksinwhichEliadewrites,“‘Onemustbelieveintheexistenceofthereligiousandmetaphysicalplanes…Youcannotjudgeaspiritualrealitywithoutknowingit,andyoudonotknowitwithoutcontemplatingitonitsownplaneofexistence.’Onlyby“lovingsupra‐sensiblerealities(i.e.,believingintheirexistenceandautonomy)canyoujudgeandacceptorrejectametaphysics,adogma,oramysticalexperience.”(Allen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade,11).MyhypothesisisthatEliadedidinfactembracetherealityofthesereligiousandmetaphysicalplanesandconductedhisresearchaccordingly,andthathebelievedthatwhiletheidealhistorianofreligionwouldbelikehiminthisregard,experiencetaughthimthatitwaspossibleforpeoplewhowere“wrong”intheirontologytoprovide“correct”descriptionsofreligiousphenomena.60Aspreviouslymentioned,Eliadeisinconsistentonthispoint,insomeplaceshepresentsthisontologyasbelongingonlytoarchaicman,inotherplacesitseemsthisontologyappliestobothhimselfandarchaicman,andinyetotherinstancesitseemsasifthisontologyispresentedasthetruth,notjustforthehistorianofreligion,Eliade,orarchaicman,butforall


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this paper, but for the purposes of this exercise, I simply assume that thisontological assertionwas true for the traditionalYorùbáperson (which,byallaccountsseemsaccurate)andtrytobracketmyownontology.AlthoughIthinkIwasnomoresuccessfulthanEliadewasinhisownscholarship,Ileaveit to the reader to determine if the following application of hismethod isfruitfulornot.PartII:TheSecretofDestiny:TheYorùbáConceptofOríThedestinyofmanisinhisownsoul.

HerodotusDue to the limitations of space and my erudition,61 I will not be able toprovide anything but a poor preview ofwhat a full application of Eliade’smethodologytothistopicwouldlooklike.Furthermore,thestructureofthissection will be uncharacteristic of his method, because while most of hisessays focus on a single set of symbolic structures or archetypal realities(such as “The Sky and Sky Gods,” or “Mythologies of Memory andForgetting”) initsvariousmanifestations, thisessaywillstartwithasingle,butmulti‐facetedhierophany,theYorùbámythico‐ritualcomplexoforí,andrelateitbacktothesesymbolicstructures.TheHeadThe head appears to have near universal symbolic significance acrossgeographyandhistory.FromMoaistatuesofEasterIsland,tohead‐huntingrites of Melanesia, the widespread ritual of coronation, the classical busttraditionofsculpture,andthedecorationofmanyformsofofficialcurrency(coins and now bills), the image of the head has been used to representpersonal essence, authority, and dominion. And this is no wonder: werecognizeoneanotherbyour faces,notourhands, so thehead is themostobvious sign of individuality; and in most anthropologies, ancient andmodern, theheadplaysa significant role ingoverning therestof thebody.The head is the part of the body closest to heaven, and is also a source ofknowledge, because other than the sense of touch, and the subtle sensesattested tobyarchaic traditions, thehead is the sourceof all sensorydata.The head is not only the source of knowledge, but also reveals the idea ofsourceororiginintheabstract.InlanguagefamiliesasdiverseastheIndo‐

humanity.SeethefirstchapterofPatterns,theconclusionsof“SymbolismoftheCentre”and“SymbolismandHistory”inImagesandSymbols,andTheMythoftheEternalReturn.61MostofmyreadinginthefieldofthestudyofreligioncouldandprobablydidfitinjustoneortwoofEliade’sbookshelves


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European,Semitic,andNiger‐Congo,thewordsforheadalsosignifysource,essence,origin,andleader.62But it is among theYorùbáof southwesternNigeria that thehierophanyoftheheadhasperhapsrealizeditsfullestexpressioninsculpture,song,poetry,prayer,ritual,andmyth. Thehead,ororí inYoruba, isatoncethephysicalhead(oríodè, literally, “outerhead”), the innerrealityofapersonality(oríinú, literally, inner‐head), the seat of consciousness, a guardian spirit orpersonal divinity, destiny/fate, the creator, and the all‐powerful immanentaspectofthetranscendentdeity(Olodumare). Althoughonemaybelongtothecultofoneorafewofthe40163orishas(deities)oftheYorùbápantheon,oríseems tobe theonlydivinityworshippedbyeachandevery traditionalYorùbá person.64 In the face of such a dizzying array of attributes, one isreminded of Eliade’s statement: “Hierophanies have the peculiarity ofseekingtorevealthesacredinitstotality,evenifthehumanbeingsinwhoseconsciousness the sacred shows itself fasten upon only one aspect or onesmallpartofit.Inthemostelementaryhierophany,everythingisdeclared.”65Similarly, the Yorùbá conception of orí seems like a dazzling gem ofuncountablefacets,anyoneofwhichcouldserveasthesubjectforanentirearticleorbook,butinthisshortspacewewilltrytoexamineafewoftheseaspectswithaviewtothewhole.TheMythofOríAccording to Yorùbá mythology, each person is created in heaven beforebeingbornintothehumanworld. ThebodyiscraftedbythegodOrishanla(Obatala) from primordial clay by the command of the Supreme God,Olodumare,whogiveslifetothenewpersonbybreathingapartofhimself,calledèmí, into the body. This èmí is the soul or vital force of the person,whichremainswiththebodyuntildeath,whenitreturnstoOlodumare(whomay then put it into another earth‐bound body). But before this newly

62r’as/roshinArabic/Hebrew,Sar/sirainPersian/Hindi,kichwainSwahili,olu/oriinYorùbá.TheYorùbáwordforsource/origin(orísun)isdirectlyderivedfromthewordforhead(orí).63Asymbolicnumberindicatingcompletionortotality(400)anditstranscendence(+1)cf.W.Abimbola,Ifá:AnExpositionofIfáLiteraryCorpus(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1977)64Ademuleyaquotesthefollowingtradition:

Orilababo ItisOríthatneedstobeworshippedTiabafiorishasile AndnotthedeitiesNitorioogunloniojoiponju ForcharmsareforthetroubleddaysOrienil’oniojogbogbo Onlyone’sorístandsbymaneveryday.

in“TheConceptofOriintheTraditionalYorùbáVisualRepresentationofHumanFigures.”NordicJournalofAfricanStudies16(2)(2007):212–220,p.216,cf.R.Abiodun,“VerbalandVisualMetaphors—MythicalAllusionsinYorùbáRitualisticArtofOri.”Word&Image3(3):252‐270JUL‐SEP1987.65Eliade,Shamanism,xvii.


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animatedperson leavesheaven,hegoes to thehouseofAjala, “thepotter,”whoischargedwithmakingoríinú(innerheadsordestinies).Ajalaisoftendescribedasan irresponsiblerascalwho,duetohiscarelessness,makesallkindsoforí:good,bad,andotherwise.Eachpersonmustchooseanorífromthe potter’s storehouse, and this head determines (or is) a person’s fate inlife. This choice of destiny is witnessed only by Orunmila, the god of Ifádivination, and thiswitnessing is of the utmost importance, because in thedescent to earth, a person forgets everything about his “pre‐existence” inheaven. On earth, the only way he or she can learn anything about thischoiceoforí,hisdestiny,isbyconsultingOrunmila,knownaseléríìpín(thewitnessoffate/one’slot),throughIfádivination.66Ifá isadivinationsystemsomewhatsimilar to theChineseIChing,throughwhichbabalawos(priestsofOrunmila)selectandreciteasetofversesfromone of the 256 Odus (divinatory signatures roughly corresponding to“chapters”) thatcomprise itsoralcorpus. Theseversesusuallyconsistof amythological narrative inwhich a deity ormythological character consultsthe Ifá oracle about a particular problem, the oracle prescribes a specificsacrifice,andthedeityorcharacterperformsthesacrifice,resolvingtheissuewhichledhimtoconsultIfáinthefirstplace.67Forexample,OduIreteOfunsays:“Atefun‐tefun”PerformedIfádivinationforthe401divinitiesWhentheyweregoingtoApere(astateofperfection)“Atefun‐tefun”ThebabalawoofOriwhoperformedIfádivinationforOríWhenOríwasgoingtoApereTheywerealladvisedtooffersacrificeOnlyOrírespondedbyofferingthesacrificeThesacrificeofOríwasabundantlyrewardedOríishigherthenallOrisha(deities)ItisonlyOríwhichreachesApereNootherOrishacanhelpApartfromone'sOrí68NumerousotherversesofIfáattesttothesupremacyoforí,prescriberitualsand sacrifices to honor and propitiate it, assert its role in determining the

66cf.Abimbola(1977);W.Abimbola,"TheYorùbáConceptofHumanPersonality,"inLaNotiondePersonneenAfriqueNoire(Paris:ColloquesInternationauxduCentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique,no.544.1971);Abiodun(1987).67EliadewouldhavefoundinIfáanidealexampleofhistheoryofmythandritual,“Mythassuredmanthatwhatheisabouttodohasalreadybeendone,inotherwords,ithelpshimtoovercomedoubtsatotheresultofhisundertaking.”Eliade,MythandReality,141.68Ifalola,personalcommunication‐seealsohttp://ifalola.blogspot.com/2008_02_01_archive.html


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fate of gods andmen alike, and even seem to identify itwith the SupremeDeity(Olodumare).69Interestingly, we find a structurally similar myth amongst the Igbo ofSoutheasternNigeria, theAkanofGhana, and furtherafield, in thePlatonicandneo‐Platonictraditionsofearlytolateantiquity. ChinuaAchebewrites,"The Igbo believe that a man receives his gifts or talents, his character—indeedhisportioninlifegenerally—beforehecomesintotheworld.Itseemsthere isanelementofchoiceavailable tohimat thatpoint,andthathischipresidesoverthebargaining.HencethesayingObuetunyanachiesikwu,"70meaning,“that'stheagreementhereachedwithhischi.”Thechifunctionsasa kind of guardian angel or spirit double,which determines the fate of thepersoninitscare,andservesasoneof,ifnotthecentralobjectofworshipinthetraditionalIgboworld.Indeedone’schimaybemorepowerfulthanallofthe other divinities. Thus it is said, “No matter how many divinities sittogethertoplotaman’sruin, itwillcometonothingunlesshischi is thereamongthem.”71However,apersonignoresoropposeshischiwithdisastrousconsequences,asAcheberelatesinthemythofthegreatwrestlerwhothrewallopponentsonearthandinthespiritworld,butwasdefeatedwhenhischiappearedandsmashed him to death with its little finger. When an Igbo man failsrepeatedly at an endeavor for no apparent reason, his fellows say “Chiekwero,”—His chi does not agree. The Yorùbá have virtually identicalexpressionsaboutorí(whenastrokeofluck,goodorbad,befallsus,wesay“it’s my head,” and Ifá attests that “No orisha blesses a man without theconsentofhisorí72).Furthermore,oneofitspraise‐names,oríoorò“headatdawn,”73mirrorstheetymologyofchi,whichliterallymeans“daylight.”ThustheIgboSupremeDeity,whoisassociatedwiththesun,isknownasChukwu(Chiukwu, literally “great chi”)orChineke (Chinaeke, “Chiwhocreates”).AmongstcertainIgbogroups,anindividualconsecrateshisshrinetohischiatdaybreak,whenapriestbringsthechi“downfromthefaceofthesun.”74AmongsttheAkan,thevitalforce,orkra,isalsosaidtobearaycastfromthesunintothesoulduringitsheavenlypre‐existence.Thekraisalsoregardedas a guardian spiritordivine double, and the source of aperson’s destiny.

69SeeAbimbola(1971),Abiodun(1987),B.Lawal,“Ori:TheSignificanceoftheHeadinYorùbáSculpture”JournalofAnthropologicalResearch,41:1(Spring,1985):91‐103;B.Lawal,“Orilonise:TheHermeneuticsoftheHeadandHairstylesamongtheYorùbá.”TribalArtsII:2(Winter2001/Spring2002)70ChinuaAchebe,“ChiinIgboCosmology.”MorningYetonCreationDay(London:HeinemannEduc.,1975),165.71ibid.72Abimbola(1971),81.73Abiodun(1987),257.74SeeAchebe(1975).


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Justbeforeachildleavesheaven,itdeclaresthemannerinwhichitwantstolive and the plans it will achieve in life. This declaration is known as thenkrabeaor“destiny”(literally,thatwhichyoustipulatewhenleaving). Fateisdeterminedbyone’skra,givenbyNyameorchosenbyone’sself.75Thus,aclosebrushwithdangerelicitsthesaying,“butforhiskrathatfollowedhim,hewouldhavedied.”76Likeoríandchi,thekraisworshippedasaseparatedeity, even as an immanent, personal aspect of the Supreme, Lunar GodNyame. During life, “thehonhom[divinebreathor soul] is always coupledwiththekra;butwhereasafterdeaththekralaboursupasteephillinordertoreachheaven, theretosubmit to the judgementofNyankopon[theSolardemiurge], thehonhom fliesback toNyame in the shapeof abird.”77.Afterjudgment by the solar deity Nyakopon, the kra is condemned to bereincarnated in its familial line “until one of [its] descendants achieve[s] apurekra, that is,hasbecomeasaman‐pa,agoodspiritualbeing,whichcanthenbecomeoneagainwithNyame'seternalkra.”78In his essay, “The One and Only Transmigrant,” Ananda Coomaraswamyidentifies the eponymous being with the “the solar self,” the Hindu deityPrajapati, who according to the Vedas “‘moves in the womb and ismultifariouslyborn;’‘ThePersonexpiresandsuspiresinthewomb,andthenheisbornagain,whenthou,OBreath,givestlife;‘Thoualone,OSun,artbornaboutthewholeworld,’whoasthesacrificialPerson‘waspouredoutuponthe earth from East to West.’”79 Coomaraswamy comments “by thisPrajapati,thisbodyofoursissetupinpossessionofconsciousness,heasitsdriverpassingonfrombodytobody,overcomebythebrightordarkfruitofhis acts, or rather thoseactsofwhichhe, asour InnerMan, is theactuatorandspectatorratherthanthedoer.”80 Hereweseeaverydifferentculturalcoloring, but the near‐supremedivinity and description of Prajapati as theactuatorandspectatorofallindividualactionisalsoappliedtothekra,chi,andorí.81Infact,apossibleetymologyfororíisorí,literally“itsees/finds.”Nevertheless, the structure of the West African cluster of myths isrecapitulatedevenmore closely in theMythofEr fromPlato’sRepublic.AttheendofBookX, Socrates relates the taleofaGreekwarriorwhodied inbattleandwastakenhometobepreparedforburial,butwasrevivedtwelvedayslateronhisfuneralpileandrelatedhisvisionoftheotherworld.Inhis

75Meyerowitz,27:Onyanenkrabeannikwatibea—“WhatGodhasdestinedcannotbeavoided.”76ibid.,24.77ibis.78ibid.79Commaraswamy,MajorEssays,72‐73.80ibid.81SeeAbimbola’s(1971)discussionoftheconceptofese“leg”(meaninghumaneffortandactivity).“Evenifoneispredestinedtosuccessbythechoiceofagoodorí,onecannotactuallyachievesuccesswithouttheseuseofone’sese”(85‐6).


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“death,” Erwitnessed souls traveling betweenHeaven andEarth, the threeFates, Lachesis (the past), Clotho (the present), and Atropos (the future),workingthespindleofNecessityandweavingthedestiniesofmen:Hear theword of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity.Mortal souls, behold a newcycleof lifeandmortality.Yourdaimonwillnotbeallotted toyou,butyouchooseyourdaimon;andlethimwhodrawsthefirst lothavethefirstchoice,andthe lifewhich he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honors ordishonors her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with thechooser—Godisjustified.'[…]Allthesoulshadnowchosentheirlives,andtheywentintheorderoftheirchoicetoLachesis,whosentwiththemthedaimonwhomtheyhadseverallychosen,tobetheguardianoftheirlivesandthefulfillerofthechoice:thisdaimonledthesoulsfirsttoClotho, anddrew themwithin the revolutionof the spindle impelled by her hand,thusratifyingthedestinyofeach;andthen,whentheywerefastenedtothis,carriedthemtoAtropos,whospunthethreadsandmadethemirreversible,whencewithoutturninground theypassedbeneath the throneofNecessity;andwhen theyhadallpassed,theymarchedoninascorchingheattotheplainofForgetfulness,whichwasa barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening theyencampedby the river of Unmindfulness, whosewater no vessel canhold; of thistheywereallobligedtodrinkacertainquantity,andthosewhowerenotsavedbywisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot allthings.82Here we clearly see, thousands of years and miles apart, the very samemythical structure, theparadoxical choiceofdestiny, thedivinenatureandguardianfunctionofthischosendestiny,andthemankind’sforgetfulnessofallthisduringhisentryintotheworld.Furtherlikenessesarerevealedwhenwe consider that another one of orí’s praise names is àyànmó, which inordinaryYorùbámeansfateordestiny,butwhichliterallymeans“thatwhichis affixed to one.”83 The orí, like the daimon, is chosen and irrevocablyattached to one. One of themyths of Ifá testifies to this aspect of orí, andlinksittotheconceptofreincarnationseenintheAkanandVedicaccounts:“OnedayOrunmilagatheredallof thegodstogetherandaskedthem, ‘Whocan accompany his devotee on a distant journey over the seas withoutturningback?’Eachdeity,includingOrunmila,boastsofbeingabletodoso,butuponfurtherexamination,alloftheirclaimsproveempty.ThegodsarealldumbfoundedsotheyconsultIfá,whichtellsthemthatitisonlyoríthatcan ‘accompany his devotee on a distant journey over the seas without

82FromPlato’sTheRepublic,<http://www.davidson.edu/academic/classics/neumann/CLA350/ErMyth.html>83Abiodun(1987),263.EventheshapeofthespindleandthroneofNecessitycloselyresemblethatoftheìborí,thealtarfortheoríanditscontainertheiléoríwhichinturnserveasmodelsfortheYorùbároyalcrowns.Cf.B.Lawal,“Àwòrán:RepresentingtheSelfandItsMetaphysicalOtherinYorùbáArt.”TheArtBulletin,83:3(Sep.,2001):498‐526;H.Drewal,J.Pemberton,andR.Abiodun,“Yorùbá:NineCenturiesofAfricanArtandThought.”AfricanArts23:1(Nov.,1989):68‐77,104.


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turning back,’ becausewhenever a person dies, his personal shrines of theother gods are cast away, but his head accompanies him even into thegrave.”84Similarly, in the fourth chapter of the thirdEnnead,Plotinus describes thedaimonparedos,theguardianspirit that is theguideof thesoul throughoutlifeandindeath.85Porphyry,oneofPlotinus'disciples,recordedthat,FrombirthPlotinushadsomethingmore thandidothers. AnEgyptianpriestwhohadcome toRomeandmadehisacquaintance througha friendwanted togiveanexhibitionofhiswisdomandaskedPlotinustocomeseehisownattendingdaimonevoked.Plotinushavingreadilyconsented,theevocationtookplaceinthetempleofIsis, for the Egyptian said that this was the only pure place in Rome. When thedaimonwassummonedbeforetheirveryeyes,agodcamewhowasnotoftheorderofdaimonsandtheEgyptiansaid:'Blessedareyouwhohaveagodforadaimonandnot a companion of a lower order!' Plotinus thus had as a companion one of themoredivinedaimons, andhekepthis divine eyecontinuously raised towards thiscompanion.86SocratesspokeofhisowndaimonintheApology,“Forpreviouslythefamiliardivinatory voice of the daimon always spoke to me quite frequently andopposedmeeveninverysmallthingsifIwasabouttodosomethingIshouldnotrightlydo.”87Similarly,Galenwrotethat,“Thecauseofthepassions,thatis, of inconsistency and the unhappy life, is not to follow in everything thedivinity(daimon)withinoneselfwho isof thesamestockandhasa similarnature to the one who governs the whole cosmos.”88 In the same vein,Abimbolawrites:Broadlyspeaking,therefore,onecansaythatwhenapersongoestoconsultIfáallhe is doing is finding out the wishes of his orí. Ifá is merely the mouthpiece, anintermediarybetween the inquirer andhis orí. Ifá carries themessageofOrí andthegodstothesupplicantandcarriesthesacrificesmadebythelattertoOríandthegods…Thegodsthemselveshavetheirownorídirectingtheirdailylife.Likehumanbeings,thegodsknowthewishesoftheiroríbyconsultingIfá.89

84Abimbola(1977),133‐42.85seeHenryCorbin,TheManofLightinIranianSufism(GreenOaks,IL:OmegaPublications,1994);pp.13‐37foramorethoroughexpositionofthissymbolofthe“HeavenlyTwin.”86Porphyry,LifeofPlotinus10.14‐30.Translation2005byRobertK.Clark.From<http://www.prometheustrust.co.uk/Meadow_2/Greek_Philosophical_Terms/greek_philosophical_terms.html>.IntheFourthEnnead,Plotinusdescribedapartofthesoul,itshead,thatremainsintheheavenlyrealmsandneverfallsintothesufferinganddispersionofthematerialandtemporalworld.87Plato,Apology31‐32Translation2005byRobertK.Clark88quotedinChristopherGill,TheStructuredSelfinHellenisticandRomanThought(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),280.89Abimbola(1977),115.


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Lawal identifies this divine orí (belonging to both gods and men) withOlodumare, the Supreme Deity and “head” of the Yorùbá pantheon on thebasisofanumberofsayings,prayers,andversesofIfáthatdescribetheminthesameterms,arguingthatoríis“anaspectoftheSupremeBeing.”90InthefirstoftwoparallelnarrativesfromdifferentOduoftheIfácorpus,Orí,inthehumbleformofthelittleconeofhisaltar,rollsinandsplitsthesacredkolanut of àshe (spiritual power/energy) with ease after all the other orisha(deities)hadtriedandfailedtoaccomplishthis.HeisenthronedinHeaven,whichinfuriatestheotherorishawhoattackandtrytodethronehimintheirjealousy,butOrísubdueseachoneofthemandsetsthemtotheirparticularcosmictasks.91Lawalpointsoutthattheverbfor“subdue”usedinthisversedá,canalsomean“tocreate.”Soorícanbeseenascreatingalloftheorishaandassigningthemtheirroles,somethingnormallyattributedtoOlodumare.In the secondnarrative, the orisha plot againstOlodumare and ask him toabdicatethethrone.Heagreesontheconditionthattheyruletheworldontheirownforsixteendays. Olodumare,whoisthesourceofashé,theforcethat animates the entire cosmos, cuts off its flow, and the world stopsworking. The orisha, ashamed, return toOlodumare (referred to asOlórí ,theLord,literally“theownerofthehead”)andpayhomagetohim.92DuringtheRomanEmpire,as in theYorùbáandAkancivilizations,subjectspaidhomagenotonlytotheirownpersonaldivinity(geniusinLatin)butalsotothatoftheEmperororKing.93TheRomangeniuswasalsoatutelaryandguardian deity who controlled man’s fortune, and like orí, had a“generative/creative” aspect (from which the modern English term isderived)asitwasetymologicallyderivedformtheIndo‐Europeanrootgen,meaning“tocreate.”94InTheMan of Light in Iranian Sufism,Henry Corbin conducts an extensiveanalysisofclosely‐relatedsymbolsandguardianspirits,demonstratinghowthey had been identified with the angels of the Abrahamic religions andZoroastrianism, the Active Intellect of Peripatetic Philosophy, and the“PerfectNature”ofHermeticismdescribedas“‘thephilosopher’sAngel’—thephilosopher’s initiator and tutor, and finally as the object and secret of allphilosophy, the dominant figure in the Sage’s personal religion. Again andagain,thesedescriptionsstrikethefundamentalnote:thePerfectNaturecanonlyrevealitself ‘inperson’toonewhosenatureisperfect…eachofthetwosimultaneouslyassumesthepositionoftheIandtheself—imageandmirror:myimagelooksatmewithmylook;Ilookatitwithitsownlook.”95 90Lawal(1985),92‐4.91ibid.,cf.Abiodun(1987),261‐392Lawal(1985),opcit.93SeeAbiodun(1987),Meyerowitzopcit,andJ.C.Nitzsche,TheGeniusFigureinAntiquityandtheMiddleAges(Columbia:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1975).94cf.Nitzscheopcit.95H.Corbin,ManofLight,17.


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The 17th Century Shīcite philosopher Qāzī Sacīd Qommī, similarly assertedthat“the facethatGodshowstoman is the facethatmanshowstoGod,”96andhiscontemporaryandfellowphilosopherMullaSadraheldthateachsoulcomes froma specifiedpointoforiginamongst thespirits’pointsoforigin,and the location of this point is specified by its connection to or beinggovernedbyoneof theNamesorAttributesofGod. Thispointoforigin isalso the soul’s point of return of to God. This Divine locus or origin andreturn isunique to every individual soul and thus thepath traversed fromthesouloutintotheworldandbacktoGodisalsounique(thereareasmanypathstoGodastherearesouls),andisdetermined,obviously,bythelocationofthispoint.Infact,onecouldsaythatthispathiswhatthesoul“becomes”as it goes through life headed back towards God. Therefore, the uniquenatureofeachsoul,andwhatitbecomes,i.e.,thepathittakes,isdeterminedbythisuniquelocus,whatitis,was,andwillbeindivinis:When humans ask God to guide them along the straight path in verse six of theQur’an’s first chapter, they therefore ask for nothingbut guidanceupon theirownpath,whichwill lead to their felicity. This iswhy Sadra goes on tomake a subtledistinction between the different paths available to a person and the pathappropriatetohimorher:‘ItisjustasGodsays,Anddonotfollowthepaths,fortheywill divert you from God’s path [6:153], that is, the pathwhich is for you containsfelicity and salvation,’…What Sadra seems to have inmindhere is that since eachindividual has a path to God specific to him or her, the other paths which areavailabletohimorherarenotactualoptionsintermsofhisorherreturntoGod.Apersonhastheoptiontotreaduponthem,butthetruthis,inaccordancewithhisorherinnatedisposition,thereisonlyonepaththatisopentohisorhersoul,anditisthatpath thatmustbefollowed.Sadra thensaysthatnoteveryonewhoreturnstoGodwillattainfelicity.This isbecause, inaccordancewith thedivinedecree,therearesomewhomustendupinmiseryandwretchedness,andsomewhomustendupin felicity. Thus, while all souls return to God, some meet what classical IslamictheologyreferstoasGod’sattributesofbeauty,whicharemanifestedthroughsuchdivinenamesas“thegentle,”“thekind,”and“theloving;”whereasothersmeetGod’sattributes of majesty, which are manifested through such divine names as “theoverpowering,”“thevengeful”,and“thewrathful.”97Hereagain, thedivineoriginofdestinyand itssimultaneousunitywiththesoul are emphasized, along with the resulting paradox of the unity offreedomandfate.Inallofthesediversemanifestationsofmythanddoctrinewecanseethesamemodalityofthesacred,thesamearchetypalrealitythatshinesthroughthemythoforí.

96SeeH.Corbin,EnIslamIranien:Aspectsspirituelsetphilosophiques,TomeIII:Lesfidelesd’amouretShi’ismeetsufisme.LivreIII:RuzbehanBaqliShiraziandtheSufismoftheFidelesd’Amour.(Paris:Gallimard,Bib.desIdees,1972).97Dr.MohammedRustom,personalcommunicationand“FromPhilosophicLanguagetoMythicDiscourse:MullaSadra’sAnthropologyoftheAfterlife,”paperdeliveredatAmericanAcademyofReligionConferenceinMontreal,2009.


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TheMeaningoftheMyth:Character,Destiny,Divinity

Characterisdestiny.Heraclitus

BíOríbafe’ìwàIfOrimarriesIwa(character)BíÌwàbafeoríAndIwamarriesOriAiyeagúnrégéTheworldwillbewell

‐Yorùbásong

Olodumare,Olori,Olorun,Eleda,OluÌwàSupremeBeing,LordofHeaven,Creator,LordofExistence

‐PraisenamesforOlodumareOríeni,l'ElédáeniOne'shead/destinyisone'screator

‐Yorùbásaying

Hewhoknowshimself,knowshisLord‐HadīthoftheProphetMuhammad

Now we must emerge from this process of immersion in the varioushierophanies and systems of symbols described above to answer thequestion: what does it all mean? Eliade himself gives us a key tounderstandingthisparticularmodalityofthesacred:ForPlato,philosophyhelpsyouremember the Ideas;moreprecisely to rememberthe situation of the soul in post‐existence and pre‐existence when the soulcontemplatedtheIdeas.FortheAustralians,initiationrevealstoyouthatyouwerealreadyhere,intheseplaces,inthedawnoftime,inillotempore,youweresuch‐and‐suchcivilizinghero. Thismythicalpersonageservesasamodel: theinitiatesmustrepeatwhathe did in thebeginning. But through the initiation,youdiscover thatthis mythical personage is you yourself—as you appeared for the first time.Ultimately, you are a repetition of yourself—as you were in the beginning,exemplary.98Thismythicalthemecanbeanalyzedaccordingtothefollowingelements:1)forhomoreligiosus,character,reality,andhappinessareattainedbyaligningoneself with, or participating in, one’s own unique archetype, 2) thisarchetype is atonceone’sdestiny, ideal self, andguardian spirit,whatonewasinillotempore,3)homoreligiosus“wants”tobewhathe(hisarchetype)

98Eliade,NoSouvenirs,182;Eliade,Myths,RitesandSymbols,55.


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“is”,and“is”whathe“wantstobe”(hisdestiny);thatis,manishisarchetype,andhisarchetypalselfchooses/manifests/createshisdestinyinaccordancewithitsownnature,4)Thisarchetypalselfisdivineandopensupontothetranscendent sacred. Eliade’s creative hermeneutic reveals this samesymbolic logic, or modality of the sacred, manifesting itself in themythologies of orí, kra, chi, daimon, guardian angel, “solar self,” “PerfectNature,”and“divinelocusoforigin/return,”inspiteoftheirvastlydifferentculturalandhistoricalcontexts.IntheYorùbácase,apersonlearnsanddevelopsgoodcharacter(ìwà,whichalso means existence; things exist only insofar as they have character) byconsulting the Ifá oracle about a significant event or decision in his life.Through a mythical narrative from the Ifá corpus, a person’s orícommunicatesitswishesandwhatitwoulddo(orhasdoneinillotempore)inthisevent,revealingtheway(thenecessaryrituals,taboos,andsacrifices)forthepersontore‐integratehimselfwithhisarchetype,realizinghisdestinyandbecomingimmortal(astheprayercontainedinIfásays,orímídamidaIye,Nòkúmó, Iregbogboni t’emi, Ìmólèni tiÀmàkìsì—Myorígiveme life,empowermetoovercomemortality/Ishallnotdie,Letallgoodthingsbelongtome,Aslightbelongstothegodofsunrise99).Butwhataboutthepersonwithabadorí(olóríbúrúkú)?Ifhisarchetypeordestinyistonothavecharacter/existence,ishestillfulfillinghisdestinyandmanifestinghis archetype? Theanswerdependsonperspective. Fromthehumanside, looking“up,”wehave forgottenthenatureofourorí,andso itwouldseemthateitherone’sbadactionsspoiledone’sgooddestiny,orthatone’sbaddestinythwartedone’sgoodefforts(hencethesayingenil’oríreretikòníìwà,ìwàl’omab’oríreje—thepersonwithgooddestinybutwithoutcharacter,itischaracterthatwillruinhisgooddestiny).Butfromthedivineside,looking“down,”allofaperson’sdecisionsarereallyjustrepetitionsofhisprimordialchoiceoforí, in fact, theperson is justamanifestationofhisorí, an unfolding in time of all of its potentiality, hence the saying ori enil’Eledaeni—“one’soríisone’sCreator.”100Sofromthehumanside,destinyischaracter(characterseemstodetermineone’s destiny), but from the divine side, character is destiny (destinymanifestsitselfascharacter). Bothperspectivesareright,butthedivineorarchetypalperspectiveismoresobecauseitisontologicallypriororsuperiortothehumanone.Sotheunfortunatesoulwitha“bad”oríisstillfulfillinghisdestinyandmanifestinghisarchetype,buthisoríorarchetypalself,althoughmorereal thanhiminandof itself, is lessreal thanagoodorí. As Ifásays,

99quotedinAbiodun(1987),263.100Wecanimaginetheconeoforíwithitspointataparticularlocationonthe“faceofthesun,”thefaceofdivinity.Thispointismanifested,expandedoutwardanddownward,toformthecircleofaperson’slife.


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“Orikanoburun’ileIfe;t’iwanikanlosoro”101—“ThereisnotonebadoríinIle‐Ife (the sacredcity,here symbolizingheaven), it is cultivating characterthat is difficult.” Because orí occupy a higher ontological place than theirhumancounterparts,relativetopeople,theyarenotbad,butsomearebetterthanothers, that is, some lead to livesofbetter character thanothers. Butwhatofhumanwillandresponsibility?This question has been taken up bymany anthropologists and scholars ofAfrican Philosophy who have argued that the Yorùbá concept of orí isfatalist,102soft‐determinist,103orvoluntarist,104orthattheoríislikeFreud’sunconscious.105 Theirextensivedebateshaveformedthebasisofdozensofarticles and fascinating studies, but from theEliadean perspective, they allcommit the classic error of approaching a religious phenomenon asphilosophy. FromhismentorNaeIonescu,Eliade inheritedthenotionthatthere are three planes of knowledge and reality: the religious, thephilosophical,andthescientific,eachwithanappropriatemethodofinquiry.Theworstsinascholarcancommitistoconfusetheselevelsintryingtousea “lower” method to understand a “higher” level (i.e., trying to study thephilosophical as empirical science, or the religious as philosophy).106 Byseeking to reduce it to philosophy or psychology, these scholarsfundamentallymisunderstandwhat the orímyth actually is, and thereforemisinterpretwhatitsays.107However,thisdoesnotmeanthatphilosophicalor systematic exegesis of a myth is impossible, as Eliade writes, “mythexpresses in action and drama what metaphysics and theology define 101QuotedinFayemi,“HumanPersonalityandtheYorùbáWorldview:AnEthico‐SociologicalInterpretation”TheJournalofPanAfricanStudies,2:9(March2009),170102SeeBarryHallen,TheGood,theBad,andtheBeautiful:DiscourseAboutValuesinYorùbáCulture(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2001);E.B.Idowu,Olodumare,GodinYorùbáBelief(London:Longmans,1970);E.O.Oduwole,“TheYorùbáConceptsof‘Ori’andHumanDestiny:AFatalisticInterpretation.”JournalofPhilosophyandDevelopment2(1&2):40–52;S.Oladipo,“PredestinationinYorùbáThought:Philosopher’sInterpretation.”Orita:JournalofReligion.XXIV(1&2):34–51.103SeeO.A.Balogun,“TheConceptsofOriandHumanDestinyinTraditionalYorùbáThought:ASoft‐DeterministicInterpretation.”NordicJournalofAfricanStudies16:1(2007):116–130;S.Gbadegesin,'Ènìyàn,TheYorùbáConceptofaPerson',”inP.H.CoetzeeandA.P.J.Roux(eds)TheAfricanPhilosophyReader(2nded.):175‐191;M.A.Makinde,“APhilosophicalanalysisoftheYorùbáConceptofOriandHumanDestiny.”InternationalStudiesinPhilosophy,17:1:54‐69;S.A.Ali,“TheYorùbáConceptionofDestiny:ACriticalAnalysis.”JournalofPhilosophyandDevelopment1&2(1):100–106.104KolaAbimbola,YorùbáCulture:APhilosophicalAccount(YorùbáCultureinContext)(Turnhout:IrokoAcademicPublishers,2005).105RobinHorton,“SocialPsychologies:AfricanandWestern.”AnessayaccompanyingMeyerFortes’OedipusandJobinWestAfricanReligion(Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress),41‐82.106Allen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade,9.107SeeEliade,MythandReality,148,“everyattempttointerpretGreekmyth,atleastwithinacultureoftheWesterntype,isinsomesortconditionedbytheresponseoftheGreekrationalists.”Eliade’sdiscussionofthemisinterpretationofGreekmythscouldapplyequallywelltothecaseofYorùbámythologyinWesternacademicinstitutions.


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dialectically.108”Infact,theexperienceofthesacredistheoriginofallsuchdiscourse, as the mythology engendered by such experience is “laterelaboratedandsystematizedbymetaphysicalspeculation.”109However,anysuch attempt at systemization must maintain the “opening to theTranscendent” inherent in themythandnotconfusethe levelsofexistenceunifiedinthesymbol.Fromthismethodologicalstandpoint, Iarguethat theacademicaccountsoforías fatalism, soft‐determinism,orvoluntarismareallcorrect,butalsoallwrong because they are all premised on the absolute difference between apersonandherorí.Thefatalistsassertthatapersondoesnothaveanyfreewillorchoicebecauseitisone’soríandnotone’sselfthatdeterminesone’sfate.Thesoft‐deterministsholdthatone’sorícanbealteredorinfluencedbyone’shard‐work,sacrifices,andcharacter,while thevoluntaristsarguethatone’s orí is simply what one makes of oneself given the uncontrollablecircumstancesoflife.Alloftheseaccountsfindbothsupportandoppositionin the religious rites, myths, and orature of the Yorùbá. This union ofopposing attributes and perspectives (coincidentia oppositorum in Eliade’slanguage) characterizes not only orí, but myths in general. Eliade writes,“mythrevealsmoreprofoundlythananyrationalexperienceevercould,theactualstructureofthedivinity,whichtranscendsallattributesandreconcilesall contraries…[this] coincidentia oppositorum is one of the most primitivewaysofexpressingtheparadoxofdivinereality.”110In the case of orí, thecoincidentia oppositorum of fate and freewill can beunderstoodby considering thatorí is also thenexusof thehumanand thedivine. In orí, humanwill (choice) is not separate from divinewill (fate),hence the paradox of the heavenly “choice of fate.” A person always haschoice,but shehasalreadymade this choice indivinis, in illo tempore. Butthis illudtempus isnot thehistoricalpast,but rathertheeternalpresentofmythandritual;so,conversely,aperson’sfateissealed,buthehimselfsealsit every time hemakes a decision. In thewords of one Yorùbá priest, “it(emi)chooseswhatitwillcometodo…Soalsoitistheactoftheselfwhenitiswith the supremedeity (Olorun).” 111 The choice oforí inheaven is thearchetypeandsourceofall thechoicesapersonwillevermake in life, andthishumanchoiceisnototherthanthedivinechoice.Weareultimatelynotother thanourorí, and throughourorí,wearenotother thanOlodumare,and so our choices, all of our exercise of free will, is not other than ourdestiny.Itisonlywhenweleavetheunityofeternityandthesacredandareplunged in profane time and multiplicity that these aspects seemcontradictoryandparadoxical,asintheYorùbásaying“akúnlè,ayanèdá,A

108Eliade,Patterns,418.109Eliade,MythandReality,139.110Eliade,Patterns,419.111Hallen,TheGoodtheBadandtheUgly,52.


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dáyá tán, ojú nkán ni—We knelt (in heaven) and chose our destinies, butwhenwearrivedonearth,webecameimpatient/troubled.”112Inconclusion,oríisourdivineself,morepowerfulthananyorisha,andbeingidentifiedwithOlodumare,istheindividual,personalaspectoftheSupremeBeing,“thefaceGodturnstowardsus.”113Justastheouterorphysicalhead(oríodè) is thevesselof the innerhead(oríinú)anddeterminesthe fateofthe rest of the body, humans are the chosen vessel of Olodumare anddeterminethefateoftheworld,asIfásays:…awagegebieniyan, Weashumanbeings,awaniOlodumareyan WearetheGod’select,latilotunileayese, designatedtorenewtheworld,Eniayanniwa... Wearethechosenones.114But our destinies do not absolve us from effort and struggle, in fact theydecreeitforus/wehavechosenitforourselves.AsIfásays:IfádivinationwasperformedforStruggleWhowascomingfromheaventoearthWeareonlystrugglingAllofusThosewhochosegooddestiniesarenotmanyWeareonlystrugglingAllofusWeareonlystruggling115In thisparticular struggle todescribeanaspectofYorùbámythology, as inanyexegesisofmyth,wefindthatnoexplanationcouldeverbecomplete.InEliade’s words, “…There is always a kernel that remains refractory toexplanation, and this indefinable, irreducible element perhaps reveals therealsituationofman inthecosmos…”116 Andyet in theYorùbácase,orí isboththeimpossiblekernelthatencapsulates“therealsituationofmaninthecosmos”andthesolutionwhichbreaksitopen.NoonebutthelittleconeoforícouldcrackthesacredkolanutofOlodumareandsetthecosmosinorder. 112Abimbola(1977),113;cf.Boethius’ConsolationofPhilosophyinwhich“theangelofPhilosophy”(hisgenius)comestohimandresolvestheparadoxofGod’sforeknowledgeandGod’sjudgmentbyshowinghimthatGodisoutsideoftime,andthatfree‐willandforeknowledgeareunitedintheatemporal.113Olodumarehasnoshrines,cult,orimagesintraditionalYorùbáreligion.114B.A.Ademuleya,“TheConceptofOriintheTraditionalYorùbáVisualRepresentationofHumanFigures”NordicJournalofAfricanStudies16:2(2007):214.TheYorùbáwordforperson,ènìyàn,ishereetymologicallyandmythicallyderivedfromthephraseeniayan“onewhoischosen.”115Abimbola(1977),147;cf.Ibnal‐cArabī’sdiscussionof“thestrugglers”inhisexegesisoftheQr’anicverse,“youdidnotthrow,whenyouthrew,butGodthrew.”InW.C.Chittick,TheSufiPathofKnowledge(Albany,NewYork:StateUniversityOfNewYorkPress,1989),211.116Eliade,Shamanism,xiv.


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PartIII:ConclusionandCriticismHavingattemptedtooutlineanddemonstrateEliade’screativehermeneutic,Iwillnowtrytoevaluatethebenefits and limitationsof thisapproach,andcompareittoComparativeTheologicalapproaches.J.Z.Smithwrote,“Ihaveoften observed to students that amethodological or theoretical position isnot some magic wand that makes problems disappear. Each positionassumedentailscostsandconsequences.Thequestionisnotoneofdecidingon solutions, but of choosingwhat set of costs one iswilling to bear.”117 Iagree wholeheartedly with Smith’s assessment. Every methodology is alimitationofinquiryandexposition(oneaskssomequestionsandnotothers,and writes down some things, passing over others in silence), so scholarsmust assess their own goals, the nature ofmaterial, and the nature of thedifferentmethodologicalapproachesavailabletothemwhendecidinghowtoapproachatopic.Eliade’s creative hermeneutic hasmany strengths: it attempts to approachreligion as religion, without reducing a religious phenomenon to its givenpsychological,historical,orpoliticaldimensions,whileatthesametimenotignoringtheseotherdimensions. Thismethodologyrequiresthescholar totaketheworldviewpresentedinthesubjectofinquiryseriouslyandallowitto “transform” himorher. However, this personal dimension, the need tovirtuallyadopt theperspectiveof theobjectof inquiry, isboth thegreateststrengthandweaknessofthismethod. Suchataskisincrediblydemanding(perhapsevenimpossible)fortheseriousscholar,andwhilethisHerculeanlabormayallowthescholartoproducecreativeandcoherentinterpretationsofmythsandsymbolsthatarecongruouswiththetraditions inwhichtheyreside,itraisesmanymoreissuesaboutthevalidityofsuchefforts.Withoutdelving into the messy politics of representation, suffice it to say that thepossibility, desirability, and accuracy of sucha project depends uponone’sepistemology and ontology. The emerging field of Comparative Theologyoffers some importantways of responsibly and rigorously addressing this“personalandtransformative”aspectofthiskindofwork,butIwillreturntothisshortly.I believe this is themain reason thatEliade’sworkhas fallenoutof vogue;leaving aside the largely ad hominem political critiques, most criticism ofEliadehas focusedon the slippagebetweenhisownpersonalontologyandviewsandthoseofthe“archaicman”hesoughttorepresent.118Inalmostallof his works, it is difficult to distinguish Eliade the man from Eliade the

117Smith(2000)“Part2”,351.118T.Masuzawa,InSearchofDreamtime:TheQuestfortheOriginofReligion(ReligionandPostmodernismSeries)(Chicago:UniversityOfChicagoPress,1993).


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scholar from Eliade’s “archaic man,” indeed passages from his journalsfrequently find their way into his books without significant alteration.Moreover, Eliade was clearly profoundly and personally shaped by thematerial he studied, to the extent that the line between “this is how theprimitive sees the world” and “this is how the world is” vanishes andreappearslikeaghostinEliade’swritings.This isnotnecessarilyaproblem,but it isapositionthatmeritsexpositionanddefense. One cannotdescribehowa religiouspersonviews theworld,without (even if only implicitly) adopting some kind of rudimentaryunderstandingof how theworld is; i.e.,whether or not things exist, or thelawsofnatureareregular,ortimeandspaceexistinacertainway,etc. Allkindsofcoherent,mutuallyexclusivepositionsarepossible,andeachhasitsown methodological consequences. If we take Eliade’s ontology to beidentical or at least very similar to the “archaic ontology” outlined in hisworks(andIbelievewehavegoodreasontodoso), thenI thinkwewouldfind that it has a strong resonance with our understanding of theperspectivesof so‐called“archaicpeoples.” In fact,Eliade looksto“archaicman”inmuchthesamewayashis“archaicman”lookedtomythicalfigures:asdistantexemplarsthatcanbeusedtocreateorder,meaning,andrealityinthe world. This “creative” or even “performative” aspect of Eliade’shermeneutichas,unfortunately,beenlostonmostofhiscritics.Nevertheless, the ontological foundations of Eliade’s methodology areparticular, and being particular, are not universally held. It would bedifficult, and perhaps very interesting, to try to apply Eliade’s method totraditionswhichrejectthisontology,suchaspost‐modernorpsychoanalyticcircles,orevenearlyMadhyamikaBuddhistphilosophy.119 However,Eliadeclaims that his “archaic ontology” is not a priori, but is rather empiricallyderived from his sources, indicating that perhaps his methodologicalontology could be transformed by new sources of data. This potential forreflexivityisagreatstrengthofthemethod.Intheexerciseofthispaper,IfoundthatEliade’smethodallowedmetoseeconnectionsthatIhadneverpreviouslyimaginedbetweentheYorùbámythswithwhichIwasraisedandothermythsandconcepts,butthewayinwhichImade these connectionswas certainly intuitiveandnot systematic. Afterfollowingup a given intuition about the relationship between, say, orí andgenius,Iwouldsystematicallylookforsimilaritiesanddifferences,butwhileEliade’smethodwasveryhelpfulinderivingmetaphysicalmeaningabout“agivenmodalityofthesacred”fromthesesimilarities,andhistoricalmeaningfrom their differences, it limited my examination of the aspects of thetranscendent sacred (assuming Eliade’s ontology) revealed by theirdifferences. 119SeeEliade,AHistoryofReligiousIdeas,forsuchefforts.


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Moreover,aspreviouslydiscussed,Eliadedoesnotprovideajustificationfortheleapfromareligiousphenomenontoitsarchetypethatmakesthewholecomparative project possible. I hold to the Hermetic principle that“everythingisineverything,”andthusanythingcanbereadintoanything.Givenaparticularmyth, Imayseeasymbolof theunionof thedivinewiththe human,while another scholarmay see a symbol of patriarchy, and yetanother may see it as an expression of repressed libido or class conflict.Whichoneofusisright,andinwhatway,andhowdowetell?IfEliadehadbeen more consistent and transparent in his presentation of his ownphilosophicalpositions,Ithinkhecouldhaveansweredthesequestionsandmadehismethodologythatmuchstronger.However,itisalsoprobablethatEliadewasengaginginakindofupaya,orintentionalruse.Byconcealinghisphilosophical presuppositions, he may have made his work and theconclusionshederivedfromitmorepalatabletohiscolleagues.In the end, I deemedmy exegesis of themyth of orí according to Eliade’screativehermeneuticstobealimitedsuccess, inthatitprovidedananswerto thequestionofwhat themythmeanswithout reducing themyth to thisinterpretation,closingthedooronotherinterpretations,orcuttingthemythoff from the sacred. However, I found that this method limited theexplorationofdifferenceamongstthesourcematerial,anddidnotallowforadiscussionofwhy Iheldmy interpretation tobe “more correct” thanothervalid interpretations, i.e., my own philosophical presuppositions. In onesense,Eliade’smethodologyallowedmetobehonestinthatitpermittedmetotakethemythseriouslyandasapplicabletomylife,hereandnow;anditfurther allowed me to demonstrate the kind of intuitive, associativeprocesses that are at work whenever I try to understand or explainsomething. However,IthinkitmademedishonestinthatIwasnotabletopresentasufficientlyclearboundarybetweenmyinterpretationofthemythandthemythitself.I think it would have been better to take an approach more similar to atraditionalcommentary;thatis,topresentthereaderwithafulleraccountoftheYorùbásourcesbeforebeginningthecomparativeprocess,asthiswouldallowhimorhertodevelopamorecompleteresponsetotheparticularmythbefore moving on to examine others. But this was not Eliade’s style ormethod. Moreover,hismethodmakes it all tooeasy to readwhateveronewants intoanygivenreligiousphenomenon,andthis isdangerousnotonlyfor the scholar seeking to accurately portray a religious phenomenon, butalso for the scholar who, like Eliade, is looking for new ways ofunderstanding the world. There is not much new about one’s oldpresuppositionswrappedindifferentmythologicalclothing.ThisisperhapsComparativeTheology’sgreatestadvantagewhencomparedto Eliade’smethodof doing a comparative study orhistory of religion. By


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emphasizing and even foregrounding his commitments, the comparativetheologian is paradoxicallymore open to revising them and distinguishingthemfromthoseinherentintheobjectofstudy. WhereEliadestrives forakindoftranscendentscholarlyobjectivity,ComparativeTheologythrivesonthe transformation of a particular scholarly subject. This, I believe, is thefundamental difference that separates these otherwise strikingly similarmethods.Comparative Theology and the comparative study of religion (what EliadecalledtheHistoryofReligions)haveagreatdealincommon.Asmentionedearlier, Eliade’s method of research through transformative reading bearsstriking similarities to Clooney’s description of the analogous process inComparativeTheology in the fourth chapterofDeepLearning; both seek totaketexts,rites,andauthorsfromdifferenttraditionsseriously,ontheirownterms, and discoverwhat they can say to us today; both view this task ashavingbeennecessitatedby theexplosionofdiverse religiousperspectivesinto public and academic spheres (compare the first pages of Eliade’sTheQuest to those of Clooney’sDeep Learning); and both try to achieve thesegoalswhile holding themselves to the highest standards of academic rigor.This simultaneous commitment to deep religious or metaphysical insightsand a critical evaluation of academic facts is perhaps the most importantelement shared by the Eliadean tradition of the Comparative Study ofReligionandthatofComparativeTheology.Infact,Eliade’stwodimensionsof “History” and “Religion,” as defined above, are closely mirrored byClooney’sdimensionsof“Comparative”and“Theology.”120However, as noted above, Comparative Theology differs from theComparativeStudyofReligioninthat,intheformer,theparticularreligiouscommitments of the scholar are the explicit starting point of investigation,whereasthebracketingof thesecommitments isoneof the first thingsonemustdointhelatter.AsClooneywrites,Comparativetheologymustnotbeconfusedwithcomparativereligion,sincefaithisanecessaryandexplicitfactorintheformerandnotinthelatter,whereitsinfluencemight even be ruled out. But the fields need not be separated entirely, sincecomparative theology still has to measure up to expected disciplinary standardsregardingthereligionsbeingcompared.121Transparencyandvulnerabilityarekeytothismethod,tothetransformativeencounter with ideas and texts from a different religious tradition. Theexplicit acknowledgement of one’s convictions not only makes themtransparent to the reader,butalso tooneself; and in coming to termswithone’s convictions as convictions, as “deeply held truths,” the comparative

120Clooney,DeepLearning,10‐11.121Clooney,DeepLearning,12.


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theologiancanbecomemoreawareofthefactthattheseconvictionsarenotuniversally apparent or held, making him or her more open to differentperspectives. Ironically,comparativetheology’semphasisontheparticularand the personal opens it up to a broader universe of traditions andperspectives. The vulnerability engendered by this openness is the key toallowing the study of different religious traditions to transform thecomparative theologian’s own understanding not only of the subjectmaterial,butofhisorherownconvictions.While Eliade seems to have taken a similar approach to his material, thisaspect of “vulnerability” and “transformation” was not explicit in hisacademic works, and seems markedly absent from the works of otherscholarsofComparativeReligion,suchasEliade’sstudentJ.Z.Smith.Eliade’sevocationof thedictum“read theKoranas if ithadbeen revealedonly foryourcase”revealstheimportant,althoughofteninvisible,rolethatthiskindof reading plays in his methodology. Comparative theology takes up thisexistentialconcerninparticularlyproductiveways,andbyexplicitlyfocusingonthismethodofengagingwithreligiousobjectsofstudy,providesaflexibleframework in which both methodology and epistemology underlying theprocess of comparison can be explicitly justified and simultaneouslytransformedbytheworkitself.One of the greatest weaknesses of Eliade’s method lies in the fact that hedoesnotexplicitlydefinehisunderlyingepistemologyandontology,leavinghimopentocritiquesofhisseemingly“magical”methodofintuitingmeaningfrom hierophanies, and accusations of trying to pass of his own beliefs asthose of archaic man. The methodology of Comparative Theology allowsscholarsofmultiple religious traditions, to firstof allnameandclaim theirownpositions,however complicated theymaybe, vis‐à‐vis thematerialonquestion and lift the curtain separating the reader from the scholar’sepistemologyandpersonalperspective.Thissecondtransparencyallowsthescholar to explain, defend, and perhaps even revise the intuitive processesthat are so often an integral part of this kind of work. I believe Eliade’sPlatonic ontology and epistemology is what allowed him to make theintuitive leaps fromparticular hierophanies to universal “modalities of thesacred,”but Ibelievepartof the reasonhenevergotaround towritinganexplicit expositionofhismethodwas that theacademic climateofhis timewas becoming hostile to seemingly “mystical” ideas such as the Platonicrecollectionheespoused.Thisfactiseventruertoday,andalthoughClooneydoesnotexplicitlyoutlinea particular epistemology or metaphysics underlying the process of doingcomparativetheology,hismethodallowsindividualscholarstodoso,andforthe experience of encountering different epistemologies and ontologies tochangeone’sown. Thisdouble transparency, of commitmentsandof theirrelationtoone’smethodology,canbeaneffectiveantidotetotheproblemsof


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“puppeteering,” wherein scholars use their objects of study as a thindisguisesfortheirownviews,andofthereductionofareligioustraditionorphenomenontoascholar’slimitedgraspofit.Clooney’s account strikesme as simply amore honest description ofwhatgoesonwhenIreadandwritepapers. InemployingEliade’smethod, Ihidmy own commitments from the reader, and my relationships with thevarioustextsIread,bothofwhichIbelievewerekeyinallowingmetogaintheinsightsandintuitionswhichconnectedGreek,Akan,andYorubamythstooneanotherandtomorecontemporaryphilosophicalconcerns.If I were to have conducted this methodological exercise according to themethods outlined by Clooney, I could have described howdelving into thesourcematerial from theGreek and Islamic traditions (whichhave shapedme as much, if not more than the Yoruba traditions of my forefathers),particularly certainpassageswhichdidn’tmake it into thearticle, radicallychangedthewayIunderstoodthemythsoforí,andconversely,howstudyingthe myths of orí profoundly changed the way I understood aspects of theGreekandIslamictraditions.Perhapsmosttelling,however,wasthewayinwhichthisprojectcreatedanewcrystallizationofmyunderstandingoffateandfreewill,anissuethathastroubledmesincechildhood.But comparative theology, in its current forms, has a particularly Christiancoloring, and the expositions of its approach seem disproportionatelyinfluencedbyChristianandHindutraditions. The languageofvulnerabilityand emphasis on personal experience strikes me as particularly ChristianandCatholic,however, thisneednotbeaproblem. ToClooney’s credit,hehasleftaccountsofthemethodologyofComparativeTheologyopenenoughtobetakenupandmodifiedbyscholarsfromdifferentreligioustraditions.Itwillbeinterestingtoseeiffieldisflexibleenoughtoaccommodatedifferent(i.e.Islamic,African,andother“indigenous”)traditionsofstudyingmultiplereligionswhichmayresultinmarkedlydifferentapproaches.Themainpointis, in Clooney’swords, “Noone needs to put aside faith and itshopewhenworking as a scholar, although we do need to be able to learn vulnerablywithoutlettingevendeeplyheldtruthsbecomeanobstacletolearning.”122OliverSacksoncecomparedDr.P,hispatientwithvisualagnosia,toasimilarcase, “But the saddestdifference between themwas thatZazetsky asLuriasaid, ‘fought toregainhis lost facultieswiththe indomitable tenacityof thedamned,’whereasDr.P.wasnotfighting,didnotknowwhatwaslost,didnotindeed know that anything was lost. But who was more tragic, or moredamned—themanwho knew it, or themanwho did not?”123 Despite theflawsofEliade’smethod,onesimilarlywonderswhetherhe,inhisquestfor 122Clooney,DeepLearning,13.123Sacks,TheMan,16.


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transcendentreligiousmeaning,orhispost‐moderncritics,intheirrejectionoftheveryidea,aremorelost.Onafinal,personalnote,althoughIfoundEliade’screativehermeneuticstobepowerful tools forcomparativeanalysisof thekindIhopetoconduct inthefuture,Iworrythatitcantooeasilyturnthehierophanies,thewindowsonto the transcendent that it studies, intomirrors, reflecting theprior‐heldbeliefs of the scholar. Thus, if I were to be completely honest, my mainmethodologicalinspirationcomesnotfromthe20thcenturystudyofreligion,norfromthepredominantlyChristiantraditionofComparativeTheology,butrather from the 12th‐13th century Andalusian Muslimmystic Ibn al‐cArabī,whowrote,Ingeneralmostmenhave,perforce,anindividualconceptoftheirLord,whichtheyascribetoHimandinwhichtheyseekHim. So longas theReality ispresentedtothemaccordingtoittheyrecognizeHimandaffirmHim,whereasifpresentedinanyother form, theydenyHim, flee fromHim, and treatHim improperly,while at thesame time imagining that they are acting towardHim fittingly. Onewhobelieves,believes only in a deity he has created in himself, since a deity in “beliefs” is aconstruction. They see only themselves and their own constructions withinthemselves…. So beware lest you restrict yourself to a particular tenet, for youwouldforfeitthetrueknowledgeofwhatis[theReality].Therefore,becompletelyandutterlyreceptivetoalldoctrinalforms,forGod,MostHigh,istooAll‐embracingandGreattobeconfinedwithinonecreedoranother.124Orashesaidmorepoetically,Myheartcantakeonanyform:Ameadowforgazelles,Amonasteryformonks,AtempleforidolsTheKa'baforthecirclingpilgrim,ThetablesoftheTorah,ThescrollsoftheQuran.MyReligionisLove;Whicheverwayitscaravanturns,ThatismyreligionandmyfaithBibliographyAbimbola,Kola.YorùbáCulture:APhilosophicalAccount(YorùbáCultureinContext).Turnhout:IrokoAcademicPublishers,2005.

124IbnAl‐cArabī,TheBezelsofWisdom(trans.R.W.JAustinClassicsofWesternSpiritualitySeries),Newedition(NewYork:PaulistPress,1980),137.


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Abimbola,Wande."TheYorùbáConceptofHumanPersonality,"inLaNotiondePersonneenAfriqueNoire.Paris:ColloquesInternationauxduCentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique,no.544.1971.Abimbola,Wande.Ifá:AnExpositionofIfáLiteraryCorpus.London:OxfordUniversityPress,1977.Abiodun,Rowland."VerbalandVisualMetaphorsinYorùbáRitualisticArtoftheOri,"Word&Image3(3):252‐270JUL‐SEP,1987.Ademuleya,B.A.“TheConceptofOriintheTraditionalYorùbáVisualRepresentationofHumanFigures.”NordicJournalofAfricanStudies16(2):212–220(2007)Allen,Douglas.MythandReligioninMirceaEliade(TheoristsofMyth).1ed.NewYork:Routledge,2002.Allen,Douglas.Structure&CreativityinReligion(ReligionReasonSer.:No14).FirstEditioned.Berlin:MoutonDeGruyter,1978.Chittick,WilliamC.TheSufiPathofKnowledge.Albany,NewYork:StateUniversityOfNewYorkPress,1989.Clooney,F.ComparativeTheology:DeepLearningAcrossReligiousBorders.Oxford:WileyandSons,2010Corbin,H.EnIslamIranien:Aspectsspirituelsetphilosophiques,TomeIII:Lesfidelesd’amouretShi’ismeetsufisme.LivreIII:RuzbehanBaqliShiraziandtheSufismoftheFidelesd’Amour.Paris:Gallimard,Bib.desIdees,1972.Corbin,Henry.TheManofLightinIranianSufism.GreenOaks,IL:OmegaPublications(Ny),1994.Drewal,H.,Pemberton,J.,andAbiodun,R.“Yorùbá:NineCenturiesofAfricanArtandThought.”AfricanArts,Vol.23,No.1(Nov.,1989),pp.68‐77+104Eliade,Mircea(1907‐1986).Nosouvenirs:journal,19571969/MirceaEliade;translatedfromtheFrenchbyFredH.Johnson,Jr.NewYork:NewYork:Harper&Row,1977.Eliade,Mircea.Cosmos&History:TheMythoftheEternalReturn.NewYork:Harper&Bros,1959.Eliade,Mircea.Images&Symbols:StudiesinReligiousSymbolism.1stpaper‐boundeditioned.SanFrancisco:SearchBook,1969.Eliade,Mircea.JournalII,19571969(v.2).Chicago:UniversityOfChicagoPress,1989.


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Eliade,Mircea.MythandReality(WorldPerspectiveSeries).1sted.NewYork:Harper&Row,1963.Eliade,Mircea.Myths,rites,symbols:AMirceaEliadereader(Harpercolophonbooks).NewYork:Harper&Row,1976.Eliade,Mircea.OrdealbyLabyrinth:ConversationsWithClaudeHenriRocquet.Chicago:UnivOfChicagoPr(T),1984.Eliade,Mircea.PatternsinComparativeReligion.Toronto,Canada:BisonBooks,1996.Eliade,Mircea.Shamanism:ArchaicTechniquesofEcstasy(BollingenSeries(General)).NewEded.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004.Eliade,Mircea.TheMythoftheEternalReturn:CosmosandHistory(PrincetonClassicEditions).Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005.Eliade,Mircea.TheQuest,HistoryandMeaninginReligion.Chicago:TheUniversityOfChicagoPress,1969.Eliade,Mircea.TheSacredandTheProfane:TheNatureofReligion.NewYork:HarvestBooks,1968.Fayemi,“HumanPersonalityandtheYorùbáWorldview:AnEthico‐SociologicalInterpretation”TheJournalofPanAfricanStudies,vol.2,no.9,March2009p.170Gbadegesin,Segun,2003.'”Ènìyàn,TheYorùbáConceptofaPerson',”inP.H.CoetzeeandA.P.J.Roux(eds)TheAfricanPhilosophyReader(2nded.),pp.175‐191.Hallen,Barry.TheGood,theBad,andtheBeautiful:DiscourseAboutValuesinYorùbáCulture.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2001.IbnAl‐‘Arabi.TheBezelsofWisdom(trans.R.W.JAustinClassicsofWesternSpiritualitySeries).Newed.NewYork:PaulistPress,1980Idowu,E.Bolaji.Olodumare‐GodinYorùbáBelief.Turnhout:FrederickA.Preager,1963.Lawal,B.“Àwòrán:RepresentingtheSelfandItsMetaphysicalOtherinYorùbáArt”TheArtBulletin,Vol.83,No.3(Sep.,2001),pp.498‐526Lawal,B.“Ori:TheSignificanceoftheHeadinYorùbáSculpture”JournalofAnthropologicalResearch,Vol.41,No.1(Spring,1985),pp.91‐103Lawal,B.“Orilonise:TheHermeneuticsoftheHeadandHairstylesamongtheYorùbá.”TribalArtsVII:2/Winter2001/Spring2002Accessedon12/09/09from<http://www.tribalarts.com/feature/lawal/>


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Masuzawa,T.InSearchofDreamtime:TheQuestfortheOriginofReligion(ReligionandPostmodernismSeries).Chicago:UniversityOfChicagoPress,1993.Meyerowitz,E.“ConceptsoftheSoulAmongtheAkanoftheGoldCoast.”Africa:JournaloftheInternationalAfricanInstitute,Vol.21,No.1(Jan.,1951),pp.24‐31Opokuwaa,NanaAkuaKyerewaa.TheQuestForSpiritualTransformation:IntroductiontoTraditionalAkanReligion,RitualsandPractices.NewYork:iUniverse,Inc.,2005.Rennie,BryanS..ReconstructingEliade.Albany,NewYork:StateUniversityOfNewYorkPress,1996.Sacks,Oliver.TheManWhoMistookHisWifeforaHatandOtherClinicalTales.NewYork,NY:Simon&Schuster,2006.Smith,J.Z.“Acknowledgments:MorphologyandHistoryinMirceaEliade's"PatternsinComparativeReligion"(1949‐1999),Part1:TheWorkandItsContexts&Part2:TheTextureoftheWork.”HistoryofReligions,Vol.39,No.4(May,2000),pp.315‐331(Part1)andpp.332‐351(Part2)


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ThePresentSituationandtheComparativeImperative:ParallelsintheTheologicalResponsestoReligiousPluralismofDavidTracyandFrancisX.ClooneyBYBENNETTCOMERFORD

IntroductionDavid Tracy’s Analogical Imagination provides a theoretical basis forinterreligious dialogue as an imperative for theological work. Tracy,however,haswrittenrelativelylittleontheburgeoningfieldofcomparativetheologyoutsideofhis1987essay“ComparativeTheology”whichappearedin the Encyclopedia of Religion. Stated plainly, Tracy is not a comparativetheologian. Instead, his interest in pluralism, coupledwith an emphasis onhermeneutics characterized by the interplay between the analogical anddialectical imaginations, has led to substantial contributions to the field ofinterreligious dialogue. Although his voice within the field of comparativetheology has largely remained at the level of a whisper, comparativetheologianFrancisX.Clooneyhasrecognizedhisinfluenceonthefield.ThispaperseekstohighlighttheaspectsofTracy’sthoughtthatmayshedfurtherlightontheimportanceandpracticeofcomparativetheology,particularlyasClooneydefinesit.This paper explores the relevance, for the comparative theologicalenterprise, of three central themes found within Tracy’s thought. Afterintroducing Tracy and Clooney’s respective approaches to comparativetheology,IwillproceedtooutlinethesethreethemesfromTracy’sAnalogicalImagination. Iwill firstconsiderTracy’s insistenceon“namingthepresent”(namely,therealityofreligiouspluralismincontemporarysociety),andwillarguethatsucha“naming”makestheundertakingofcomparativetheology


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an imperative. I will then look at Tracy’s understanding of the classic, andconsiderhowsuchanunderstandingmight informcomparative theology, adiscipline which is grounded in textual reading, interpretation, andcomparison. Finally, Iwill consider Tracy’s discussion of the three publics,and the church in particular as the primary public to which comparativetheology,asystematic,constructivetheology,isaddressed.Consideringthesethree themes in Tracy’s work may shed further light on the comparativetheological enterprise. Furthermore, such an undertaking may elucidatesimilaritiesbetweenTracy’snotionof interreligiousdialogueandClooney’sunderstandingofcomparativetheology.Tracy,Clooney,andComparativeTheologyIn an article included in the 1987 edition of the Encyclopedia of Religion,1Tracy offers a comprehensive definition and analysis of comparativetheology as heunderstands it. He begins bymentioning that the term “hasbeenused inavarietyofways”as includedwithin the fieldof comparativereligion, the “science of religion” and also within the history of religions.Tracy suggests that typically comparative theology, in contrast tocomparativereligionorthesecularstudyofhistoryofreligions,“referstoamore strictly theological enterprise…which ordinarily studies not onetraditionalonebuttwoormorecomparedontheologicalgrounds.”2Tracy draws on his understanding of the pluralism of the present as anexplanationfortheimperativeofcomparativetheologicalwork.Hesuggeststhat all contemporary theology is comparative theology inhow “on strictlytheological grounds, the fact of religious pluralism should enter alltheological assessment and self‐analysis in any tradition at the verybeginningofitstask.”3Furthermore,Tracyaversthatanytheologythatgiveseither positive or negative significance to the fact of religious diversity insomesensefunctionsasacomparativetheology.4Tracy generally understands comparative theology to be “any explicitlyintellectualinterpretationofareligioustraditionthataffordsacentralplacetothefactofreligiouspluralisminthetradition’sself‐interpretation.”5Inthissense,wemightcorrectlyunderstanditmorebroadlyassimplyatheologicalresponsetoreligiouspluralism.Inaddition,andcomplementarytoitbeingatheological discipline, Tracy further suggests that it is a hermeneutical one

1Thearticlewasalsorepublishedinthe2005edition.2DavidTracy,“ComparativeTheology,”inEncyclopediaofReligion,2ndEdition,ed.LindsayJones,(Detroit:McMillanReferenceUSA,2005),Vol.13,9126.3DavidTracy,“ComparativeTheology,”9126.4ibid.,9126.5ibid.,9126.


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which critically engages the religious questions of contemporary pluralismandaparticularreligioustraditionortraditionswithinthepluralisticmilieu.Heemphasizes thenecessity that all contemporary theologyengage in twoparticulartypesofinterpretation,amongothers:ahermeneuticsofsuspicionand a hermeneutics of retrieval, two models he also presents in theAnalogicalImagination.6Tracy’s understanding of comparative theology is grounded in hisunderstanding of theology in general as a hermeneutical discipline thatcontinuouslyinterpretsagiventraditionwithinaparticularsituation.7Tracysuggests that comparative theology is a distinct discipline precisely in itstheologicallygroundedinsistencethatreligiouspluralismmustseriouslybereckoned with. Tracy concludes and summarizes comparative theology as“an academic discipline that establishes mutually critical correlationsbetween the claims tomeaningfulnessand truth in the interpretationsof areligiouslypluralisticsituationandtheclaimstomeaningfulnessandtruthinnewinterpretationsofareligioustradition.”8Suchanunderstanding,wewillsee, is complementary to, though perhaps not fully expressive of,comparativetheologyasFrancisX.Clooneyenvisionsit.Tracy’sEncyclopediaentrywasanearlycontemporaryefforttodescribetherelativelynew(oratleastrecentlyrenovated)fieldofcomparativetheology.FrancisX.Clooney,inComparativeTheology:DeepLearningAcrossReligiousBorders, citesTracyasan influentialcontributorto the field.NotingTracy’semphasis on either the “comparative” or the “theological” aspect of thediscipline, Clooney suggests a third aspect. He asserts that comparativetheologycanbeunderstoodasaconstructivetheologybyitself.Constructivetheology, then,must not always arise apart from comparison, but rather itcan actually arise from comparison, insofar as such comparison is firmlyrooted in a particular tradition and entails the deep study of one ormoreothertradition(s).9Clooney emphasizes the commitment to deep and serious study acrossreligious borders, not merely theological insights gleaned from the fact ofreligiouspluralismincontemporarysociety.Clooneystates:Thiscomparativelearningdoesnotsimplynuancealreadyfamiliarthemesorrepeatmethodsalready settledprior to thecomparative practice,and itdoesnot remainsimplyamatterofobservinganotherreligioustraditionfromadistance.Itisratheratheologydeeplychangedbyits seriousengagementintheparticularitiesofmore

6ibid.,9131.7DavidTracy,“ComparativeTheology,”9132.8ibid.,9133.9FrancisX.Clooney,ComparativeTheology:DeepLearningAcrossReligiousBorders,(Oxford:WileyBlackwell,2010),43.


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than one religious and theological tradition; it occurs only after comparison, in acomplexlearningthatcannotbeleftbehindoncethecomparativeworkisdone.10Clooney concludes that Tracy is correct in his assessment of comparativetheology. However, Clooney emphasizes that comparative theology is alsomorethanTracyindicatesittobe.Clooneyreferstothedisciplineas“Tracy‐plus”givenitsemphasisonadeeperlearningoftheparticularitiesofanothertradition to the point that both the theology and the theologian maypotentiallybetransformed.11ToclarifyClooney’sapproach,heexplicitlydefinescomparativetheologyasadisciplinethatisbothComparative and theological beginning to end [and] marks acts of faith seekingunderstandingwhicharerootedinaparticularfaithtraditionbutwhich, fromthatfoundation, venture into learning from one or more other faith traditions. Thislearningissoughtforthesakeoffreshtheologicalinsightsthatareindebtedtothenewlyencounteredtradition/saswellasthehometradition.12Furthermore,itisimportanttonotecertaindistinctionsClooneymakesinhisdescription of comparative theology that are slightly more nuanced thanTracy’sdescriptionofthefield.Clooneyiscarefultodistinguishcomparativetheologyfromthesimilarbutrelatedfieldsofcomparativereligion(whichhegroups with history of religions and sociology of religion), theology ofreligions,interreligiousdialogue,andotherrelatedsub‐disciplines.Tracy,ontheotherhand,whiletakingpainstodistinguishcomparativetheologyfromcomparativereligion(althoughhedoesnotdrawquiteassharpofacontrastas does Clooney), maintains a fairly broad definition that might arguablyencompass theology of religions.13 Clooney, however, suggests that inaddition to comparative theology, theology of religions, interreligiousdialogue, and dialogical/interreligious theology are all fields that takeseriously religious pluralism from a theological standpoint. Clooneyemphasizes his approach to comparative theology as a distinct andconcentrated way of engaging in the comparative theology that Tracypresents.

10ibid.,43.11ibid.,43.12ibid.,10.13Clooneydefinestheologyofreligionsas“atheologicaldisciplinethatdiscernsandevaluatesthereligioussignificanceofotherreligioustraditionsinaccordwiththetruthsandgoalsdefiningone’sownreligion.Itmaybegreatlydetailedwithrespecttothenuancesofthehometradition,butmostoftenremainsbroadlygeneralregardingthetraditionsthatarebeingtalkedabout”(ComparativeTheology:DeepLearningAcrossReligiousBorders,10).Hedistinguishestheologyofreligionsfromcomparativetheologicalemphasisondeeplearningofothertraditionsintheirownparticularities.


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Although Tracy’s definition is broad enough to include other comparativefields that Clooney prefers to keep distinct fromhis comparative theology,thebuildingblocksofTracy’scomparativetheology,whicharearticulatedindetail inTheAnalogical Imagination, are particularlywell‐suited to informand complement Clooney’s understanding of the field.14 Clooney’scomparativetheologyembracesthreeofthemajorthemesTracydescribesintheAnalogicalImagination:itisaresponsetothecontemporarysituationofreligious pluralism; it is a practice particularly concerned with classicreligious texts; and it is a constructive, systematic theology that addressesthethreepublics,butprimarilythepublicofthechurch.Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, and Foundations of ComparativeTheologyDavid Tracy, as an American Roman Catholic priest and theologian, haswritten widely on the reality of religious pluralism in our increasinglyglobalizedandinterconnectedworld.Ofhistenpublishedbooks,halfcontainvariationsoftheterms“pluralism”or“inter‐religiousdialogue”intheirtitles.CentraltohisscholarshipisatranscendentalThomismthatattemptstomakesenseofThomasAquinas in thewakeofKant.Hismajor influences includePaul Ricœur, JacqueDerrida, HansGeorgGadamer, and process theologianSchubert Ogden. The focus of his work has been on theological method,pluralism, and an attempt at building bridgesbetweenpostmodern humanexperiencesandhumanexperiencesrelayedinclassictexts,especiallythoseoftheologyandphilosophy.Tracy’sAnalogical Imagination takes a step forward fromhis evaluationoftheChristian theologicalpluralismonwhichhe focuses inBlessedRage forOrder:theNewPluralisminTheology,toinclude(thoughtouchedonbrieflyinBlessedRage forOrder) critical insights on the contemporary “situation”ofreligiouspluralism,namely, therealityof theexistenceofotherreligions inadditiontoChristianity.Whilestillnotcompletely immersinghimself in thequestions of religious pluralism, which he addresses at length in hissubsequent works on inter‐religious dialogue, Tracy develops a solidtheoretical foundation from which arises his inchoate arguments for theimperative of taking religious diversity, and the close study of “the other,”seriously. It is from this foundation, grounded in his understanding of theroleof theology in thethreepublicspheres, the importanceofclassic texts,andthehermeneuticalinterplayoftheanalogicalanddialecticalimagination,that we may trace his later contributions to the fields of comparativetheologyandinter‐religiousdialogue. 14Iwouldargue,evenmoresoanddistinctfromthewaysitmightinformtheotherrelatedcomparativefields.


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In The Analogical Imagination Tracy first addresses the role of the threepublics, then discusses the classic (a particular term Tracy uses that willhereafternotbeitalicized),andfinally,towardtheendofthebook,considersthecontemporarysituationofreligiouspluralism.HereIwilldealwiththesetopics in reverse order. I maintain that it is easiest to understand theimperative of comparative theology using Tracy’s model(s) first byacknowledging the contemporary situation of religious pluralism, next byconsidering the practical and scholarly way of engaging that situation(namely,byreadingclassictextsinter‐religiously)asadvocatedbyClooney’sapproach to comparative theology, and finally by considering towhom thework of comparative theology is primarily addressed (the question of thethree publics). Such an approach, I believe, presents the contributions ofTracy in a similar progression to how comparative theological work itselfdevelops.15Tracy’sPluralismIn theopeningsentenceof theeighthchapterof theAnalogical Imaginationentitled “The Situation: The Emergence of theUncanny,” Tracy reminds usthat “[e]very theology lives in its own situation.”16 Tracy draws on PaulTillichasafurtherreminderthat“theinterpretationofthesituationis…oneoftwomajortasksforthetheologian.”17Tracycontinues,“aninterpretationof the Christ event in dialectical correlation to an interpretation of thesituationremains,aswehaveseen, theprimarytaskofeverytheologian.”18Here,wemightnotethehermeneuticalemphasisofTracy’sdescriptionofthetaskofthetheologian.SuchataskisoneofinterpretationofboththeChristeventandthetheologian’scontemporarysituation.

15However,itwouldbeincorrecttoassumethatcomparativetheology(aswellasTracy’spresentationoftheseconceptsinTheAnalogicalImagination)isconductedinsuchalinearfashionwithoutanyoverlaporcrosspollinationamongthesethreecategories.Certainlythecomparativetheologianmayconsidertheaudiencetowhomherworkisaddressedatthesametimethatsheengagesaclassictextorponderstherealityofreligiouspluralism.However,thebasicoutlineofthisorderingisinsomewaysunavoidable,eveninpractice.Beforeengaginginthepracticeofinterreligiousreading,anindividualmustfirstbeawareoftherealityofreligiouspluralismandtheimportanceofconductingscholarshipacrossreligiousborders.Furthermore,anactualworkofcomparativetheologymustbeproducedbeforeonecanbesureofthepublic(orpublics)towhichitisaddressedandbeforethatpublicmayreceiveandrespondtoit.16DavidTracy,TheAnalogicalImagination:ChristianTheologyandtheCultureofPluralism,(NewYork:Crossroad,1981),339.17ibid.,340.18ibid.,340.


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Tracy goes on to introduce his own general understanding of thecontemporarysituationasfollows:A distinguishing mark of the contemporary situation is the conflictual pluralismexistingonwhatworthwhilefundamentalquestionsarenowtobeasked.Adistinctdilemmaofourtimeseemstobeasensedinabilitytoaskthosequestionsatall, tobeabletowatchandlistenamidstaBabelofvoicesforanysavingword,anygiftofhope, any worthwhile question. Theologians, as intellectuals, live culturally in apost‐Christianandpostmodernintellectualsituation.19Tracy points to the reality of religious pluralism as a positive challenge toprevious conceptions of the theological enterprise. He does not view suchpluralism negatively, despite his admission that it is indeed “conflictual.”Rather, the reality of religious pluralism forces theologians to identify andformulate new fundamental questions that contribute to new and evolvingunderstandingsofwhattheologyisandmeans.Tracy expands upon “the contemporary situation” in a later collection ofessaysentitledOnNamingthePresent.Inhisopeningessay,whichsharesthetitle of the collection, he sums up the postmodern predicament in hisexaminationofthecurrentage“thatcannotnameitself.”20Hepointstothreedistinct “namings” of the present situation that are in conflict with oneanother:For some, we are still in the age of modernity and the triumph of the bourgeoissubject. For otherswe are in a time of the leveling of all traditions and await thereturnoftherepressedtraditionandcommunalsubject.Foryetothers,weareinapostmodern moment where the death of the subject is now upon us as the lastrecedingwaveofthedeathofGod.21Much of the contemporary theological enterprise is concerned withbalancingorrefutingtheseparticular“namings.”Tracy,however,callsustotake a step back from even these. Later, Tracy points to the reality ofreligiouspluralismas“anewecumenism”inwhichengagingotherreligioustraditions is vital for genuine Christian self‐understanding.22 It is throughconsiderationof theparticularitiesof these “other” religious traditions thatwemightbestproceed, foraccordingtoTracy, “thenewecumenismagreeswiththeheartofalltheclassicreligiousjourneys:theuniverseistobefoundby embracing the particular.”23 It is through this embrace of the particular

19ibid.,342.20DavidTracy,OnNamingthePresent:ReflectionsonGod,Hermeneutics,andChurch,(Maryknoll,NY:OrbisBooks,1994),3.21ibid.,3.22DavidTracy,OnNamingthePresent,136.23ibid.,137.


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that Tracy’s understanding of the present situation is closely allied withcomparativetheology.Tracy’s“Classic”As I will introduce shortly, Tracy understands theology to be primarily apublic practice, one that interprets a theological tradition for the widersociety, the academy, and the church. Tracy points to the classics as texts,events, or persons that express an excess of meaning. These classics, forTracy,resistdefinitiveandexhaustiveinterpretationandareconstantlyheldin balance between historicity and normativity. Tracy suggests “when thetext is a classic, I am also recognizing that its ‘excess of meaning’ bothdemandsconstantinterpretationandbearsacertainkindoftimelessness—namely the timelessness of a classic expression radically rooted in its ownhistoricaltimeandcallingtomyownhistoricity.”24Tracyregardscarefulconsiderationofclassicsasameansthroughwhichthepluralismofthecontemporarysituationmaybetranslatedandelucidatedforthethreepublics.Tracyinsiststhatclassics,takingtheformoftexts,images,persons, and symbols, exist in every culture and that they stand as anormativeelement inculturalexperience.25Furthermore, it is inrelationtotheclassictextsofourrespectiveculturesthatwerecognizethedisclosureofa reality akin to “truth.”26 These classics, however, are constantly beingappropriated anew and reinterpreted in light of the present situation. Andtheycanandshouldhaveamultiplicityofinterpretations.Tracygoessofarastosay“if,evenonce,apersonhasexperiencedatext,agesture,animage,anevent,apersonwitha forceofrecognition: ‘This is important!Thisdoesmake and will demand a difference.’”27 Our continuous interactions withclassics sparkevernewandongoing interpretations, the slightestofwhichstill contains significant value, both for the interpreter and for the classicitself.Inadditiontotherealityofreligiouspluralism,Tracypointstothe“pluralismwithineachtradition”toindicatetheexistenceofapluralityamongandevenwithin texts as well as a plurality of readers. Tracy’s emphasis on theimportanceof the interpretationofclassic textsplaceshermeneuticsas thelinchpinfortheologicalunderstanding.ItisviathehermeneuticalenterprisethatwemaybestnavigatethepluralityofpluralismstowhichTracypoints.Indeed,itmaybetheonlyway. 24Tracy,AnalogicalImagination,102.25ibid.,108.26ibid.,108.27ibid.,115‐116.


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Tracy’sThreePublicsTracy understands theology to be primarily an engagement of publicdiscourse. Inanattempt todemonstrate the social realityof the theologianand thepublic statusof theology,Tracydrawsonhisunderstandingof thefact of religious pluralism in contemporary society to propose theimportanceofrecognizingapluralityofpublics,threeinparticular,towhichtheology is addressed. These three publics are the wider society, theacademy,andthechurch.Tracyassertsthatineverytheologicalwork,oneofthesethreepublicswillbetheprimaryaddressee.Tracypreferstheterm“society”totheterm“culture”forthedesignationofhisfirstpublicbecause“’society’isawordcoinedbysocialscientistsasthebroadest term available to encompass three realms: the technoeconomicrealm, the realmof the polity and the realmof culture.”28 In light of thesethree realms and the inherent complexity of society, Tracy insists “anymemberof the society (including the theologian)needs to reflect explicitlyonthatcomplexity.”29All theology,but theologyaddressedtothispublic inparticular,shouldincitesuchreflection.Tracyaffirms that theology shouldbe recognizedasanacademicdisciplineby both secular and non‐secular institutions alike, and thereby continue toexplicitlyaddressthepublicoftheacademy.Giventhenatureoftheologyasadisciplineengagedinclaimsofboth“meaning”and“truth”(asdistinctfromreligious studies which confines its interests to “meaning”), Tracy stillbelievesthat thesecularuniversity isanappropriatevenuefor theologysolong as theologians are able to “render those claims explicit by renderingdisciplinary criteria as explicit as possible.”30 Hence Tracy’s second public,theacademy.According toTracy, the theologian is also responsible toa thirdpublic, thechurch. He sees all Christian theology as implicitly church theology. Tracyunderstands the public of the church to be a “’community of moral andreligious discourse which the theologian addresses.”31 As a community inwhichoneparticipatesvoluntarilyandtowhichoneisexplicitlycommitted,the church,bothagreaterChristian communityand likelyalsoaparticulardenomination,istheostensiblepublicofeverytheology:thetheologian, likeallothersinapluralistanddenominationalsociety,isinvolved,consciously or unconsciously, in an ongoing process of reflection upon one’s

28ibid.,6.29ibid.,7‐8.30Tracy,TheAnalogicalImagination,19.31ibid.,21.


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voluntarycommitmentandloyalty totheChristianchurchand,ordinarily, to someparticularchurchtradition.32Theprocessofsuchreflectionthroughwhichtheologyismediatedisalwaysaddressed,atleastinpart,tothechurch.Clooney’sComparativeTheologyvisàvisTracyClooney’sPluralismAudible reverberations of Tracy’s musings on religious pluralism in TheAnalogical Imagination (regardless ofwhether or not the influence can betracedtoTracyormerelytothesituationitself)maybeheardintheopeninglinesofClooney’sComparativeTheology:We live inaworldwherereligiousdiversity is increasinglyaffectingandchangingeverythingaroundus,andourselvesaswell.Noreligiouscommunityisexemptfromthe pressures of diversity, or incapable of profiting from drawing on this newreligioustemplate.Nocommunity,whereveritisandhoweveritisconfigured,willcasuallyabandonitstraditionalcommitmentsandpractices inthefaceofreligiousdiversity. If we are trying to make sense of our situation amidst diversity andlikewise keep our faith, some version of comparative theological reflection isrequired.33We find thatTracyandClooney take the “present situation” (aphrase thatshowsupintheworksofboth)ofreligiouspluralismwithgreatseriousness.Clooney, like Tracy, acknowledges the potential challenges inherent innavigating a pluralistic society, particularly while maintaining one’s ownreligiouscommitments.Clooneyrecognizesthepossibilityandpotential forthe celebration of religious diversity, however he is also aware of thechallenges such diversity presents for those with particular religiouscommitments.Inhighlightingthesechallengeshementionshow[i]ndividual religious traditions are under internal and external stress as they arechallengedtoengageanarrayofreligiousothers.Somefindthemselvesundersiege,threatened by a bewildering range of religious possibilities; some withdraw anddemonize their others; some, perhaps too accommodating, begin to forget theiridentities.Someofusarerelativelyuntouchedby thephenomenon,butnoneofusavoidschanginginsideandout.34Inlightofthevarietyoftheseresponses,andtheunavoidabilityofourbeingaffected by the phenomenon of religious diversity, Clooney highlights the

32ibid.,22.33Clooney,ComparativeTheology,334ibid.,3.


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imperativeof learning to learn fromour religiousothers in intentional andconstructiveways.Inundertakingthenavigationofapluralisticsociety,bothTracyandClooneycallforatheologicalresponse.Clooneyemphasizescomparativetheology,ashe envisions it, as an adequate response to religious diversity.He believesthatcomparativetheologyisaparticularlyhelpfultoolfortakingthepresentsituation of religious diversity and religious commitment seriously.35 Heemphasizesboththeincreasingdiversityaroundusaswellastheimpactofsuchdiversitywithinus, and the fact thatweareallpersonallyaffectedbythe religious choices we must make in response to the present situation.Clooney suggests keeping two distinct but complementary points in mindwhenponderingthecontemporarypredicamentofreligiousdiversity:Becausediversity is anobjective featureof theworld aroundus,weneed tokeeplookingoutward,learningtobeasintellectuallyengagedaspossibleinstudyingitinthe small and manageable ways that are possible for us. Because diversity alsotouchesuponour faith experience and affects our identitiesas religious people inour own traditions, it is changing us from the inside out. We need therefore toattend with special care and a fresh eye to the well‐being of our faith in ourcommunity, and to the quest to understand it. This spiritual and intellectualresponse todiversity,withitsoutwardandinwarddimensions, isthecomparativetheologicalventure.36AsClooneyproceedstodetailtheparticularitiesofsuchaventurehepointsto close and careful reading as a probable vehicle for crossing religiousborders.Clooney’sEmphasisonClassicTextsTracy’s emphasis on continual interpretationof classic texts in light of thecontemporarysituation isnotunlikeFrancisClooney’semphasisontextualanalysis and comparison as the primary practice of comparative theology.Taking a similar stance as Tracy, Clooney concedes that, of texts and ofreligious traditions in general, “we cannot ever say all that needs to besaid.”37 Furthermore, noting the ever increasing andwidespread access toclassic theological textsofmanytraditions,Clooneypoints tohoweasy it isforustoread.Furthermore,heinsistsitisincreasinglydifficulttojustifynotreadingoutsideofone’sowntradition.38

35Clooney,ComparativeTheology,3.36ibid.,7‐8.37Clooney,ComparativeTheology,6.38ibid.,5.


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Though open to the use of other media for comparative theologicalexploration, Clooney suggests the reading of texts is the best approach.Clooneystates:Inmyview,theforemostprospectforafruitfulcomparativetheologyisthereadingoftexts,preferablyscripturalandtheologicaltextsthathaveenduredovercenturiesandmillennia[thesewouldbeclassicsinTracy’sestimation],andthathaveguidedcommunitiesintheirunderstandingsofGod,self,andother.39Clooney’semphasisontextsdemandsthatreadingbe“patientandpersistent,careful and committed, privileging insights strictly indebted to thereading.”40Suchreadingrequiresin‐depthattentiontoprimarysources,butalso includes careful consideration of commentaries that allow us to readwithothers.Clooneyseesreadingasaspiritualpracticethathasthepotentialto change us deeply. Religious reading “complexifies and deepens howweimagineandseeGod.”41Furthermore,“wearewhatweread,andifwereadin complex ways we become persons with complex religious identities.”42Surelyitisonlybydevelopingsuchcomplexidentitiesthatwemaybeabletofullyandmosteffectivelyfacetherealityofacomplex,pluralisticworld.ThePublic(s)ofClooney’sComparativeTheologyAccording to Clooney “comparative theology needs to remain in livingconnectionwiththetraditionandfaithexperienceofparticularcommunities,which must be convinced that a comparativist’s work is actuallytheological.”43 He emphasizes the importance of using “tradition‐specifictheological language” in comparativework in order to theologize in awaythatourrespectivereligiouscommunitiescanunderstand.44Clooney’s emphasis on the importance that comparative theology begrounded in a particular faith tradition speaks to his understanding of theChurch as the primary public, at least for the Catholic Christiancomparativist. He sees comparative theology as ideally combining theexplorationofanothertraditionwithfirmrootednessinone’sowntradition.Furthermore,while the comparative theologian is responsible for choosingwhich traditions and texts to study and compare, it is ultimately one’sreligiouscommunitythatjudgesthevalueofsuchwork.InClooney’swords:Iwouldliketothink,forexample,thatIwriteaCatholiccomparativetheologyanddotheworkofaCatholictheologian,regardlessofhowdeeplyIamengagedinthe 39ibid.,58.40ibid.,60.41Clooney,ComparativeTheology,147.42ibid.,147.43ibid.,114.44ibid.,114.


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studyofHinduism.ButIcannotdecideonmyown,orjustwithmyfriends,thatIamactually a successful Catholic theologian. It is something the Church has to thinkabout and decide, in the complex ways the Church does such things. Othercommunitieswillhaveotherwaysofdecidingifthecomparativetheologianistobewelcomedhomeornot[.]”45If the comparative theologian is to understand her work as principallytheological, but also as demonstrative to her home community of thenecessity of learning from religious others, it is to her own religiouscommunity that her work must primarily be addressed. Thus we mayunderstandthechurchasinstitutionandasgreaterChristiancommunity,orits equivalent for comparative theologians from other traditions, as theprimarypublicforcomparativetheology.Tracy, Clooney, and the Negotiation of a Contemporary ComparativeTheologyThisstudyofhowtheworkofDavidTracyinformsandspeakstothefieldofcomparativetheologyasFrancisX.Clooneyenvisionsitmightberegardedasacomparativeprojectinitself.ConsideringTracy’sconceptionsofpluralism,classic texts, and the three publics in relation to Clooney’s thoughts oncomparative theology allows us to appreciate more fully a powerfultheologicalapproachtothecomplexityofreligiouspluralism.Infocusingonsuch similarities and complementarities between Tracy and Clooney, wemight alsowonder about some of the differences and aboutwhat is to begainedfromlookingatthesetwothinkerstogether.BothTracyandClooneyimploreustotaketherealityofreligiouspluralismseriously.AsCatholictheologiansdeeplyconcernedwiththefactofreligiouspluralism,bothunderstandtheimperativeoflearningaboutreligiousothers.Tracy even states that all contemporary theology, in some sense, iscomparative theology. Both understand “pluralism” to be a complex termthat describes multiple realities. Tracy emphasizes an intra‐Christianpluralismthatisimplicit,inadditiontothemultiplicityofwaysofpracticingone’s faith, in the three primary subfields within theology: practical,fundamental,andsystematic.Hefurtherusesthetermpluralismtodescribethe infinite possibilities of interpreting religious classics. Furthermore,classic texts employ a plurality of interpreters as well as a plurality ofinterpretations.Clooney,likeTracy,discussestheimperativeofengagingthepluralismofthecontemporarysituation,orthe“diversityaroundus.”Hefurtherpointstothepowerful way that engaging the diversity around us through comparative

45ibid.,157‐158.


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readinghasthepotentialtochangeusinternally,creatinga“diversitywithinus.”Finally,Clooneyalsounderstandsthatwithtextualreading,wecanneversayallthatneedstobesaid.Thistooissuggestive,likeTracy,oftheinfinitepluralityof interpretationsof texts that, thoughneverconclusive, ifstudiedcloselyandwithcare,mayguidecomparativeendeavors.In response to the reality of religious pluralism, both Tracy and Clooneyemphasize encountering classics, and the reading of classic texts inparticular,astheavenuedownwhichthecomparativetheologicalenterprise,andall theology for thatmatter, isprimarilybound.Yetbothoffernuancedperspectives with regard to how wemight read, and that reading, thoughcentral,maynotbetheonlyapproach.Tracy’shermeneuticsmayserveasacomplementaryenterpriseforthedeepreadingacrossreligiousbordersthatClooney advocates. Tracy suggests that hermeneutics might best beunderstood as akin to authentic conversation. Drawing upon Gadamer’sreflections on the experienced reality of conversation, Tracy points toauthentic conversation as the primary mode by which we may gainunderstanding of ourselves, others, and the present situationwe all share.AccordingtoTracy:[r]eal conversation occurs only when the participants allow the question, thesubjectmatter, to assumeprimacy. It occurs onlywhenour usual fears about ourown self‐image die: whether that fear is expressed in either arrogance orscrupulositymatters little.Thatfeardiesonlybecausewearecarriedaway,bythesubject matter itself into the rare event or happening named “thinking” and“understanding.” For understanding happens; it occurs not as the pure result ofpersonalachievementbutintheback‐and‐forthmovementofconversationitself.46Tracyconcludesthatgenuineunderstandingoccursonlyinresponsetosuchauthenticconversation.Noting Tracy’s emphasis on “conversation” as implicit within hishermeneuticalunderstanding,itisnotsurprisingthatmuchofhislaterworkmoves in the direction of the hermeneutics and theory of interreligiousdialogue. Interestingly, however, Tracy’s discussion of “conversation” and“understanding” cited above seem particularly relevant to the practice ofcomparative theology (allowing subject matter to assume primacy, lettingthe subjectmatter speak for itselfwithout the interference of our fears orself‐image,andemphasizingconversationassubjectiveyet inter‐subjective,shareable,andpublic).AlthoughClooneydrawsasharpdistinctionbetweencomparative theology and interreligious dialogue, Tracy’s conception ofinterreligiousdialogueappearstobemuchbroaderthanClooney’sdefinition.Tracy’s understanding of “conversation” as central to his hermeneutics isfoundationaltohisunderstandingofinterreligiousdialogue.Inasimilarway,

46ibid.,101.


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we might understand “conversation” in this sense to be deeplycomplementary, and perhaps in a certain sense synonymous to Clooney’scomparativetheology.AlthoughinterreligiousdialogueasTracyunderstandsitmaybemorecloselyrelated to comparative theology than Clooney suggests,47 we might stillunderstandClooney’scomparativetheologyas“Tracy‐plus”incertainways.Clooneyenvisionscomparativetheologyasadeeplearningprocessinwhichthetheologianseekstounderstandanothertraditionorothertraditionsfromwithinandbecomepersonally transformed throughsuch study.Thismightideallybefacilitatedthroughlearningthelanguagesandcloselystudyingthereligioustextsoftheothertradition(s)overanextendedperiodoftime.Wemight understand comparative theology as distinct from interreligiousdialogueprimarilyinitsemphasisonthedeepstudyofreligiousothersandawillingness toenter into theperspectiveof thoseothers. In this sense,onemightargue that comparative theology fallswithin thebroader categoryofinterreligious dialogue. It is a more particular and focused form of theinterreligiousdialoguethatTracyposits. However,Tracy’shermeneuticsemphasizesthepotentialfortransformationofboththereaderandthetextinmuchthesamewaythatClooneyseescloseand careful reading over a prolonged period of time as resulting in thetransformation of both the theologian and the theology. To say that Tracydoes not advocate close and careful study of other religions in theirparticularity may, in fact, be an unfair reading of Tracy. Indeed, Tracy’semphasisontheconcentrationofthe“subjectmatter”throughconversationmaynotbedissimilarfromtheclose,carefulandprolongedreadingClooneyadvocates. In this sense, it may be argued that Tracy’s hermeneuticalapproachdoesnotlacktheemphasisondepthofstudyoftheparticularitiesof another tradition that Clooney emphasizes. Clooney’s comparativetheology, rather, may in fact embody the fullest expression of Tracy’sinterreligiousdialoguethatisgroundedinahermeneuticsofconversation.IntheEpilogueoftheAnalogicalImagination,Tracypointstotheimperativeofconversationswithreligiousothersthataretransformativeandentailin‐depth study of the particularities of other religions.He concedes, however,“where that conversation will lead no one yet knows.” A key differencebetweenTracyandClooneyisthatClooneyseemstohaveaclearersenseofhowthatconversationcanproceedandwhereitmightlead.Asexemplifiedin his own comparative theological work and his contributions to the

47Clooneydiscussesinterreligiousdialogueasactualliveconversationsandinteractionsbetweenadherentstodifferenttraditions.WefindinTracy,however,anunderstandingof“conversation”thatismuchbroaderandincludesinterreligiousreading,groundedinhermeneutics,withthegoalofattaining“understanding”ofparticulartextsandtherebyotherreligioustraditionsintheirparticularities.


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reformulation of the field of comparative theology, Clooney proposes aparticular strategy for conversation. That strategy is comparative theologyitselfashehimselfpracticesanddefinesit.Finally,itisalsonoteworthythatbothTracyandClooneyseemtoagreethatthe church is theprimarypublic towhichCatholic comparative theologicalwork is addressed. Iwas somewhat hesitant to argue this parallel, for it iscleartomethatcomparativetheologyisverymuchalsoconcernedwiththeacademy, (and certainly also, though somewhat less explicitly, with thepublic of society). However, both Tracy and Clooney emphasize theimportanceofremaininggroundedinone’sfaithcommitmentswhileseekingto venture across religious borders in response to the reality of religiouspluralism.Furthermore,Clooney,inhisconcessionthatthefinaljudgmentofthevalueofcomparativetheologyrestsultimatelywiththechurch,confirmsthe church, or its equivalent in other religions, as comparative theology’sprimarypublic.ConclusionsReadingDavidTracyinlightofFrancisX.Clooney’sapproachtocomparativetheology better enables us to understand the imperative of engaging thereality of religious pluralism, namely of learning deeply across religiousborders fromreligious others. BothTracy andClooney cause us to rethinkthegoalsandpotentialof theologicalwork,particularlywithregardtohowwe read classic religious texts. And both thinkers challenge us to reflectseriouslyonourprimaryreligiouscommitments, thereligiouscommunitiestowhichwebelongandtowhichwemustpresentourtheologicalwork.In looking at Tracy and Clooney together, we find that their respectiveunderstandings of the imperative of confronting the questions of religiouspluralism share complementary and interrelated foundations. Indeed, wefind that throughclose considerationof these two theologians the fieldsofinterreligiousdialogueandcomparativetheologymaynotbeasdisparateasthey often appear. Tracy’s emphasis on interreligious dialogue calls forserious and prolonged “conversation” with the religious other. Clooney’scomparativetheologyanswersthat call inhis articulationofstrategies,andhisactualimplementationofthosestrategies,bywhichwemightproceedinour encounters with religiously other interlocutors. The reflections thatTracy and Clooney provoke, and the engagement with others that thesereflections demand, speak to the increasing centrality of interreligious andcomparative work for theology. Such reflections challenge both new andseasoned Catholic theologians, and non‐Catholic theologians alike, to be“catholic”inadeeper,fullersenseoftheterm.


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BibliographyFrancisX.Clooney,ComparativeTheology:DeepLearningAcrossReligiousBorders,(Oxford:Wiley‐Blackwell,2010).DavidTracy,TheAnalogicalImagination:ChristianTheologyandtheCultureofPluralism,NewYork:Crossroad,1981).‐‐‐.BlessedRageforOrder:TheNewPluralisminTheology,(NewYork:TheSeaburyPress,1975).‐‐‐.“ComparativeTheology,”inEncyclopediaofReligion,2ndEdition,ed.LindsayJones,(Detroit:McMillanReferenceUSA,2005),Vol.13,pp.9125‐9134.‐‐‐.OnNamingthePresent:ReflectionsonGod,Hermeneutics,andChurch,(Maryknoll,NY:OrbisBooks,1994).


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ComparingH usayn’s

MartyrdomandJesus’Crucifixion:

AnExcursiononFindingCommon

Concern

BYHANSHARMAKAPUTRA

IntroductionHusayn’smartyrdom at Karbala is one of themain events in Shiʽi history.ThisarticledescribestheShiʽiviewofHusayn’smartyrdom,andexploresitstheologicalmeaning.Furthermore, itcomparesHusayn’smartyrdomwithinShiʽi Islam with the crucifixion of Jesus in Christianity to see if there areparallel themes that can be used for dialogue between the two religioustraditions.Suchacomparison–settinguptheeventofHusayn’smartyrdomandJesus’crucifixiontogether– isanuneasytask.Thecrossof Jesushasbeenaclashpoint between Christians and Muslims for centuries. Smail Balić says thatmanyMuslimsrejectanyChristiantheologyabouttheChristandlabelitun‐Islamic.1 The reason for this rejection is that the Qurʽan never mentionedJesusascrucified.2Particularly,Shiʽitheologianslikeal‐Tusi(d.1067)andal‐Tabataba’i(d.1982)affirmthisview.3However,manyChristiantheologianshavetriedtofindawaytobridgethisdifference.4Oneoftherecentstudies 1SmailBalic,“TheImageofJesusinContemporaryIslamicTheology,”inWeBelieveinOneGod:TheExperienceofGodinChristianityandIslam,ed.AnnemarieSchimmelandAbdoldjavadFalaturi(NewYork:SeaburyPress,1979),2‐3.2ForthisdenialofJesus’crucifixion,seeA.H.MathiasZahniser,TheMissionandDeathofJesusinIslamandChristianity(Maryknoll,NewYork:OrbisBooks,2008),32‐44.3Ibid.,44.4Ibid.,15‐31.


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on this topic is by Todd Lawson, who concluded that “the Qur’an itself isneutralonthesubjectofthehistoricityofthecrucifixionandmayindeedbereadtoaffirmit.”5Still,Jesus’crucifixionisoneofthemostdisputablethemesin Christian‐Muslim discourses and presents one of the widest gaps to bebridged.Thisisthefirstofdifficultiesforthistopic.The second difficulty is the fact that there is a plurality of groups withChristianityandShiʽismthatrepresenttheirowndivergentviews.Toreachadeeper level of comparison, this study thus will use only one particularperspectivefromeach.TheShiʽiperspectiveprovidedisanelaborationofthemeaningofHusayn’smartyrdomfromtheTwelverShiʽi(Ithnāʽasharī).Then,fortheChristianviewofthecross,theblacktheologyperspectiveisthefocus,especiallyfromtheworkofJamesH.Cone.The comparison between Husayn and Jesus has been covered widely and,indeed, has become a valuable starting point of dialogue between the twotraditions.MahmoudAyoub,awell‐respectedShiʽischolarr,comparesthesetwocentralfiguresinoneofhisworks.6HestressesthattheTwelverShiʽi’saccount of Husayn has many similarities with the Christian view of JesusChrist. For example, both figures have a miraculous birth story and sharesimilarities in their passion narratives.7 But Ayoub notes key differencesbetweenthetwo;hedemonstrateshowinShiʽitraditionJesusisseenaspartofHusayn’sevent,notasthecenterofhisown,likeinChristianity.Inmorerecent studies, Khalid Sindawi also compares the Twelver Shiʽi view onHusaynandJesusChristinChristianity.HedetailshowJesus’depictionintheNew Testament has many similarities to the potrayal of Husayn in theTwelver Shiʽi tradition, such as “miraculous birth, superiormoral qualities,supernaturalabilities,abilitytoworkmiraclesandtoseethefuture,andselfsacrifice andmartyrdom.”8 In thiswork, Sindawi did better than Ayoub inarrangingthesimilaritiesanddifferences,andhasarrangedthemintoamoresystematicpattern.Whereas,AyoubisfocusismoreontheTwelvertraditionofHusayn.The followinganalysiswillcomparetheapproachesofthosetwowriters intwoways. Firstly, the scopewith respect to the theology of Jesus Christ isnarrowed to James Cone’s account. In contrast, Ayoub and Sindawi lookedmore at the New Testament where common Christian belief on Christ isrooted in redemptive power. By using a specific Christian theology, theperspective offered here arrives at different conclusions. Secondly, while 5ToddLawson,TheCrucifixionandtheQur’an:AStudyintheHistoryofMuslimThought(Oxford:Oneworld,2009),143.6MahmoudAyoub,RedemptiveSufferinginIslam:AStudyoftheDevotionalAspectsofAshurainTwelverShiism(TheHague:Mouton,1978).7Ibid.,71‐72,121,195.8KhalidSindawi,“JesusandHusaynIbnAliIbnAbuTalib:AComparativeStudy,”AncientNearEasternStudies44(2007):50‐65.


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Ayoub’sandSindawi’sworkswereconcernedonlywithshowingsimilaritiesand differences, this study goes a step further to find a common concernbetweenTwelverShiʽismandChristianity,onewhich canbecomecommonground for mutual praxis. Finally, through this process of respectfulcomparisonandcommonality,onapersonallevelofbelief,Iamlookingforwhat James L. Fredericks called “transformation” and “enrichment” ofChristianfaith,anintegralpartofmyidentity.9The use of comparative theology to frame this article can solve the twoproblems mentioned above. The first difficulty is answered by comparingtheologies, instead of historical accounts. Engaging the historicalperspectiveson these twoeventswouldonlyperpetuate the firstdifficulty.Puttingthefocusontheparticularityofeachfaithaffordsanopportunitytoengage each other in dialogue and praxis, and opens to finding commonconcernsasastartingpoint.Addressingtheseconddifficulty,theparticulartheological lensusedherepermitsexpansive engagementbetween the twodifferent traditions. It also open more encourages Christians to use adifferentlensintheirowntheologysotheycanseeTwelverShiʽi–orothertraditional Islamic– theologybetterratherthanbestuck inoneconclusion.From this author’s perspective, very little effort was needed to compareHusayn and Jesus within a comparative theology paradigm, using Jesus’account from theblack theologypointof view.Thisarticle isoffered asanexample to inviteothers toenrich comparisonsbetween Husaynand Jesus.Thus, we know that interfaith engagement can bear many positivepossibilitiesforthetransformationofallparticipants.TheTwelverShiʽiViewofHusayn’sMartyrdomHusayn’smartyrdomatKarbalaisoneofthemostsignificanteventstoshapeShiʽi identity, world‐view, and piety. As part of commemorating themartyrdom,the followersofShiʽicelebratethedayof ʽAshura’onthetenthMuharram every year Hijra. This section explores Shiʽi thoughts on thatevent.Firstly, thenarrativesof Husayn’smartyrdom, including thepoliticaland religious background behind it, are described. Next comes anexplanationofthetheologyofImamandMahdi,whichrelatestotheplaceofHusayninShiʽithinking.Finally,thispartdetailsthetheologicalmeaningofHusayn’smartyrdom.TheEventsatKarbalaMahmoudAyoubstates thatpeoplecannot fullyunderstandthemeaningofHusayn’s martyrdom without first knowing the Shi’a perspective on the 9JamesL.Fredericks,BuddhistandChristians:ThroughComparativeTheologytoSolidarity(Maryknoll,NewYork:OrbisBooks,2004),97.


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eventsdirectlyafterthedeathoftheProphet.10FortheShi’a,therightleaderandsuccessortotheProphetMuhammadwasAliIbnAbiTalib,notAbuBakr,norʽUmar,norʽUthmanIbnʽAffan,allofwhomwerecaliphsbeforeAli.Thus,totheShiathedayofSaqifahisasymbolofthebeginningoftheoppression,becauseitwasthenthatAli’srighttothecaliphatewasusurped.11Butatthattime, Ali did not protest or rebel, for the sake of the unity of the Muslimcommunity (umma). Instead he waited in patience until the communityappointedhim the fourth caliph.TheShiʽi always regardedhimas the trueleader and successor to Muhammad, who had chosen him at GhadirKhumm.12 Unfortunately, Ali’s caliphate did not last long because ofopposition,especiallyfromMuʽawiyah,thegovernorofSyriaandmemberoftheUmayyadclan.Aliwasacaliphforfouryearsbeforehewasassassinatedandsobecameamartyr.After the death of the first Imam, Aliʽ Ibn Abi Talib, Malawian had nochallengerandwasable toestablishhis reign freely.Hasan IbnAli IbnAbiTalib,whowasthesecondImam,andhisyoungerbrother,HusaynIbnAliIbnAbiTalib,thethirdImam,wereunabletochallengeMalawianopenly,sotheychosetoretreatfrompoliticallife.Muʽawiya’sreign,fromaShiʽiperspective,wascertainlynotidealsincehelackedauthorityfromGod,whohadchosentheProphet’sfamily(ahlalbayt).Tostrengthenhispositionandhisdynasty,MalawianconsistentlytriedtogetridoftheProphet’sfamily.Heoppressedthem,alongwiththeirsupporters(theShia).MalawiankilledImamHasanbypoisoninghim,andHusayn“hadtoendurethesedays[ofMaria’sreign]andtotolerateeverykindofmentalandspiritualagonyandafflictionfromMariaandhisaides–untilinthemiddleoftheyear60A.H.MalawiandiedandhissonYazidtookhisplace.”13Soon after Yazid became caliph, he had also perceived Imam Husayn as athreat.YazidtriedtoobtainHusayn’sallegiance,sinceHusaynwasoneofthemainobstaclestohisfuturereign.14KnowingthatImamHusaynwaslivinginMedina,Yazidwrotea letter to al‐Walid Ibn ʽUtbah, governorofMedinaatthetime,toasktheallegianceofthepeopleofMedina,includingHusaynIbn 10Ayoub,93.11ThedayofSaqifahwaswhenthefirstcaliphAbūBakrwaselected,andisalsothesamedayoftheProphet’sdeath.SofromtheShīʽīperspective,therightofAlīwastakenoverfromhim.Toreadmoreaboutthisevent,seechaptertwoofMahmoudAyoub,TheCrisisofMuslimHistory:ReligionandPoliticsinEarlyIslam(Oxford:Oneworld,2009),7‐25.12GhadīrKhummistheplacewheretheProphetMuhammadannouncedtothepeoplethatAlīhadbeenchosenashissuccessor.Hesaid,“ForwhomeverIamtheauthorityandguideAliisalsohisguideandauthority.OhGod!BefriendlywiththefriendsofAliandtheenemyofhisenemies.Whoeverhelpshim,helphim,andwhoeverleaveshim,leavehim.”Muh�ammadH�usaynT�abat�abai,ShiiteIslam(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1975),179‐180.13Ibid.,196.14AllegianceisatraditionalpracticeinArabsociety;itinvolvespledgingloyaltytoarespectedleader.Thisallegiancebindsthemlikeanoath.


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Ali, by force if necessary. Upon receiving the letter, Walid consulted withMarwan Ibn al‐Hakam, who had suggested to Walid that he should killHusaynifHusaynrefusedtogivehisallegiance.ThenWalidcalledonHusaynto ask for allegiance to Yazid.15 However, Husayn declined Walid’ssuggestion, telling him that allegiance should be declared before people’seyes, not in a secret meeting. So the next morning, Husayn took theopportunitytofleefromMedinatoMecca.HehappenedtomeetMarwanontheway, andthe latterpersuadedHusayntogivehis allegiancetoYazidsothere would be no disunity within the Muslim community. Again, HusaynrejectedYazidforhiswickedness,whichHusaynthoughtwouldcauseIslamtocollapse.16Thereafter,HusaynandhisfamilyarrivedinMecca,whichwasasanctuaryatthattime,asitisevenuntiltoday.HestayedinMeccaforfourmonths.Duringhis stay there,many people from all over the Islamicworld sent letters oftheir support to him. Many were tired of Maria’s rule, and became moredisappointedwhenYazid becamehis successor. Those letters,mostly fromIraq,askedHusayntoleadtheinhabitantsinacampaignagainstYazid.17Atthesametime,YazidtriedtokillHusayn,sendingassassinswhoblendedinwith thepilgrims,because itwas the time for theannualpilgrimage (hajj).Realizing this, Husayn shorten his pilgrimage ritual in order to preventspillingbloodintheholycityofMecca.Beforeheleft,hegaveashortspeechto the people at Mecca, stating that he would directly resist Yazid and bekilledasamartyr.HealsoaskedtheMuslims to joinhiminthestruggle todefend justice. 18 After that, accompanied by his family and somecompanions, Husayn journeyed toKufa,where he hadmany supporters. Itwas said that his group consisted of only about fiftymen who could bearweapons,andtherestwerewomenandchildren.19While Husaynwas still onhisway toKufa, he received news that the newgovernorofKufa, ʽUbaydallahIbnZiyad,hadkilledHusayn’srepresentativethere.20 Ibn Ziyad also had surrounded the city of Kufa with an army ofthousands to prevent Husayn’s party from reaching Kufa. When Husaynlearnedof this situation,he insistedoncontinuing;heprepared to facehisdeath,becausetherewasnopossibilityofdefeatingsuchalargeenemyforce.Apparently, Imam Husayn and his party arrived on the second day ofMuharram in 680 C.E. at Karbala where they were surrounded by Yazid’sarmy.According toShiʽi tradition, theywerekept in thatposition foreight

15Ayoub,Redemptive,95.16Ibid.,96‐97.17T�abat�abai,197.18Ibid.,197‐198.19L.VecciaVaglieri,“Husaynb.Alib.AbiTalib,”inTheEncyclopaediaofIslamvolumeIII,eds.B.Lewis,et.al.(Leiden:E.J.Brill,1971),608.20Ayoub,Redemptive,99‐100.


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days by a large armynumbering thirty thousand soldiers.21 The army alsoprevented Husayn’s party from using the river, in order to force them tosubmittoYazid.Atthistime,Husaynofferedhiscompanionsthechancetoleavehispartyandsavetheirownlives,becauseitwasclearthatonlydeathawaitedthem.Afterhereviewedhisarmytwotimesbytests,Husaynwasaccompaniedonlybyfewerthanninetypeople:hiscompanions,afewoftheenemysoldierswhohad switched allegiance to him during thewar, and his family of children,brothers,sisters,nephews,nieces,andcousins.22Ontheninthday,theenemygaveHusaynachancetochoosebetween“allegianceandwar.”Hedeferredthedecisionforonenightinordertoprayovernight.ThenextmorningwasthetenthdayofMuharramandiscelebratedasthedayofʽAshura’:thatdayImam Husayn, accompanied by a very small group of people, fought thethousandsofYazid’s army.On thatday, Imam Husaynwasmartyred, alongwithhiscompanions,includingallhisfamilymembers.23Theenemytookoff theheadsof themartyrsanddidnotburytheirbodies.TheyalsoransackedHusayn’stent, fromwhichtheykidnappedwomenandalsoseizedallofthepropertyastheirbounty.Inaddition,theyalsostrippedalltheclothesfromthecorpsesofthemartyrsandlefttheirnakedbodiesinthedesert.24OnlythreemalemembersofHusayn’spartyevensurvived.FirstofthesewasHusayn’stwenty‐two‐year‐oldson,whohadnotjoinedthewarbecauseofseriousillness;hewastobeAliIbnHusayn,thefourthImam.ThesecondwasAliIbnHusayn’sownson,onlyfouryearsold,whowouldbethefifth Imam later.The thirdwas the sonofHasan IbnAli, Husayn’sbrother,namedHasanMuthanna,whowaswoundedandfaintedamongthedead;hewasalmostkilledbutwashelpedbyoneofthegenerals.25Afterbeingtakenas captives, Husayn’s family passed through many towns before reachingDamascus. Thus, many people saw how the family of the Prophet weretortured by the Umayyad. Finally, Yazid’s army took all the prisoners, thebounty, and theheadof ImamHusayn to Ibn Ziyad, governorofKufa,whodesecrated the head of Husayn and sent all these prisoners, along withHusayn’s head, to Yazid.26 Yazid, according to some traditions, acteddifferentlyfromIbnZiyad.Hereleasedalltheprisonersandsentthembackto Medina.27 The tradition of this bitter event has been passed down byZeynab,Husayn’ssisterandoneofthoseamongthecaptives.28 21T�abat�abai,198.22Ibid.,198‐199.23Ibid.,199.24Ibid.;Ayoub,Redemptive,118‐120;Vaglieri,611.25T�abat�abai,199‐200.26Ibid.,200;Ayoub,Redemptive,120.27Vaglieri,611‐612.28Ayoub,Redemptive,120.


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Finally, the head of Husaynwas sent back to his family to be buried, eventhough the exact burial location remains in dispute. In present day CairothereisashrinetocommemorateHusayn,whichisalsosaidtobehistomb.ButthereareothertraditionsthatholdImamHusaynwasburiedinMedina,Kufa, or Karbala.29 All these shrines have become important places ofpilgrimageandritualfortheShiaeversince.TheShiʽiDoctrineofImamandMahdiTo understand fully the importance of Husayn’s martyrdom, we cannotseparatethisparticulareventfromtheShiʽitheologyofImamandMahdi,inthe Twelver Shiʽi perspective. Ayoub states that what makes Husayn’smartyrdoma special event isnotonlyhis statusas apiousman,but,mostimportantly, his position as Imam. The Imamate status came to him as adivinedeterminationthroughhislineagetotheProphetMuhammad.30The Imamate is a central concept inShiʽismandalso imparts toShiʽism itsuniquenessincomparisontoSunniIslam.31Tabat�aba’isaysinthisregard:Imamorleaderisthetitlegiventoapersonwhotakestheleadinacommunityinaparticular social movement or political ideology or scientific or religious form ofthought....Shiism believes that since Islamic society is in dire need of guidance ineachthesethreeaspects,[i.e.,Islamicgovernment,Islamicsciencesandinjunctions,and guidance in the spiritual life] the person who occupies the function of givingthatguidanceandistheleaderofthecommunity....mustbeappointedbyGodandtheProphet [italicsmine].Naturally, theProphethimselfwasalsoappointedbyDivineCommand.32According to Shiʽi traditions, the Imam possesses pre‐existence as light,which God created before the world. God then used the light as God’sinstrument for creation.33 The Imam also is known for three necessaryattributes:asthedesignated(mansūs);assinlessorinfallible(maʽsūm);andthe best among people (afdal annās).34 The Imam holds authority fromdivinedesignation,viathechoiceofthepreviousImamandnotfromelectionbytheMuslims.ThefunctionoftheImamistobearightfulguideforMuslimsand to strengthen adherence to theDivine Law. Shiʽi belief holds that Godalways put an Imamon earth, even beforeMuhammad’s time, because theearthcannotexistwithoutanImam.ThatisthereasonwhytheImamalsois

29HeinzHalm,Shi'ism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004),14‐15;Vaglieri,612.30Ayoub,Redemptive,54.31MoojanMomen,AnIntroductiontoShi’iIslam:TheHistoryandDoctrinesofTwelverShiism(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1985),177.32T�abat�abai,173.33Momen,148.34Ibid.,153.


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called the Guide (Hādī) and Proof (Hujja) of God.35 The first attribute ofDivinedesignationrequires,asalogicalnecessity,thatGodwillalwaysguidehimandpreventhimfromcommitingerror.Thus,itfollowsthathissecondattribute consists of infallibility and sinlessness. Furthermore, because hecannoterr,theImamisnecessarilythebestamongpeopleintheearth.36In addition to these three attributes, the Imam also has other importantqualities, includingknowledgeandspiritual guidance (Walaya). Knowledgemeansbothgeneralandreligiousknowledge.Religiousknowledgeisfurtherseparatedintoexternalknowledge,liketheQuran,hadith,andjurisprudence,aswell as esoteric knowledge,which includes the capability to discern theallegorical meanings of the Quran and mystical knowledge. Moreover, theImam acts as the spiritual guide who mediates between God andhumankind.37IntheTwelverShiʽismperspective,therearetwelveImams.FirstofallisAliIbnAbiTalib,towhomtheProphetMuhammadgrantedhisDivineauthorityuponGod’scommandment.ThenAlitransferredtheImamatetoHasan,andfromHasanitpassedtoHusayn.SotheImamateisseenasDivineauthority,which can be transferred only froma previous Imam to the next ImambyGod’sprovidence.FromtheTwelverperspective,exceptHasanandHusayn,therestoftheImamswerechosenfromthelineoffathertoson.ThetwelfthImam, whose name is al‐Mahdi, plays a significant role. The Twelver Shiacommunity believes that theMahdi is still alive to this day, but exists in astateofoccultation(ghayba).ThisprocesshasoccurredbyGod’sprovidence;God appointed him as the Lord of the Age (Sāh ib azZamān)who controlshumanaffairs.38TheMahdiwillreturnbeforetheFinalDayofJudgment,andleadtherighteouspeopleagainsttheenemywhomheisdestinedtodefeat.39TheologicalMeaningsofHusayn’sMartyrdomThis section elaborates on the meaning of Husayn’s martyrdom from theTwelver Shiʽi perspective. These meanings are intertwined but they aretreatedseparatelyhere.PrevailingJusticeSome condemn Husayn’s martyrdom as foolish and illegitimate, since herevolted against the leader and destroyed the unity of the Muslim

35Ibid.,147.36Ibid.,153‐155.37Momen,155‐157.38Ibid.,165.39Ibid.,166.


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community.40 But the Shiʽi perspective is different. This view starts withMuʽawiya’sdecisiontogivethecaliphatepositiontoYazid.Thatdecision inturn ignited Husayn’s uprising because the decision violated the Islamictradition of collecting allegiance from the people, and hence reduced theIslamicgovernmenttothemonarch’scontrolthroughdynasticsuccession.41In addition, Yazidwas generally known for his lack of leadership qualitiesandforhiswickedness.Thesearethemainreasonsthat HusaynrefusedtopayallegiancetoYazid.Muʽawiya’sreignhadnotbeenanidealgovernment,either,butHusayndidnothingbecausehewasboundbyaprioragreementwithMuʽawiya.42 This restraint demonstrates Husayn’s integrity. But, if hehad supported Yazid, then Islamwould have fallenprey to injustice.ManyMuslims at that time felt as Husayn did, and he received many letters ofsupport.Unfortunately,Yazidwasalreadyinapositionofpowerandwealth,andtriedtosecurehispositionbyusingmoneyandviolence.Husaynwasleftwithtwooptions:eitherhecouldpayallegiancetoYazid,ordie.Thefirstoptionwouldsave his life, but would desecrate both his integrity and Islam as acommunity.Therefore,Husaynchosethesecondoption:tofightuntildeath.ChoosingopenrevoltsothatallMuslimscouldhearandseehisconcernforjustice,heknewhewoulddieinsufferingandsorrow.43Shi’itheologians,andeven some non‐Shi’i, give credit to Husayn’s struggle, because it wassuccessfulinopeningtheeyesofMuslimstothewickednessofYazidandtheUmayyadregime.Tabataba’isaysHusayn’srevoltdidnotfail:itssuccesswasonly postponed, since ultimately the Umayyad regime fell anyway.44Moreover,Husayn’smartyrdomisastrongsymbolforMuslimtoimitate,tofightinjusticebravely.The event also inspired within the Shi’i tradition the rise of lamentationpoetry,whichusuallypraisesImamHusaynandthemartyrsofKarbalaandthereby condemns the oppressors for their wickedness. The sorrow andsufferingenduredbytheHolyFamilyoftheProphetbecauseoftheregime’swickedness is another important theme.45 In many periods, this kind ofpoetry is seen as a political threat toward the government, because itreminds theShi’i to prevail in justice and to fight an immoral government.Shams al‐Din notes that the Umayyad and Abbasid governments havepersecutedsuchpoets,andasaresultmuchpoetrycirculated insecret.He

40Forexample,WellhausenjudgesthatHusaynwasmotivatedbypoliticalpower.Vaglieri,614.41Ayoub,Redemptive,94.42Forexample,Muawiyaseizedthefayandgiveitintothehandsofthepowerfulandrich,andkilledthebestpeopleandallowedtheworsttolive.Vaglieri,608.43Ayoub,Redemptive,103.44T�abat�abai,200.45Muh�ammadMahdiShamsal‐Din,TheRisingofAlH�usayn:ItsImpactontheConsciousnessofMuslimSociety(London:MuhammadiTrust,1985),84‐85.


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also stresses that these poets had a large impact on many politicalrevolutions,suchastheonesduringtheearlyAbbasidperiod.46Shi’i theologyplacedthestruggleagainst injustice in theeschatologicalandmessianichopeoftheMahdi.Realizingthatjusticecannotbefullygainedintheworldlysense,theybelievethattruejusticewillcomeinthefuture,whentheMahdi returns before theDay of Judgment. TheMahdiwill bringGod’spowertodefeatallenemieswhodesecratedtheworldwiththeirwickedness.InShi’ithought,thisconceptcannotbeseparatedfromtheeventofKarbala,because the Mahdi will avenge Imam Husayn and all the other wrongedmartyrs. On that day, peoplemust to choose either to stand alongside theMahdiortoopposehim.47ParticipationintheRedemptiveSufferingofHusaynAyoub has called Husayn’s martyrdom event one of redemptive suffering,becauseittransformedtheevilofsufferingexperiencedbytheShiathroughhistoryintoredemption.48InShi’ipiety,peopleareinvitedtoparticipatewithweeping, fasting, and the beating of chests in order to commemorate thesuffering of Husayn and to gain redemption. Recitation of theaforementionedlamentationpoetryaboveisalsopartofthecommemorationofHusayn’smartyrdom.49Husaynisthecentralsubject,butalsoincludedareother stories of the sufferings of the House of the Prophet, with theassassinationsofallImamsandFatima’ssuffering;itisanaccumulationthatsymbolizesthesufferingofalltheShiaoppressedacrosshistory.TheeventofKarbala is treated as the zenith of all suffering. That is the reason Husaynbears the title of “Prince of Martyrs” (Sayyid alShuhadā). Hence, theremembrancemeansnothingwithoutparticipationinthesuffering.50Thecommemorationandparticipation inredemptivesufferingthatexist intheShi’iconsciousnessarethenembodied intheShi’iritualof ‘Ashura’andalsointhepilgrimagetothetombofmartyrs(ziyara).Bothritualsconsistofacts of weeping and lamenting, which express their participation in thesufferingofHusayn.TheShi’i celebrate ‘Ashura’on10Muharram,which isthesamedayonwhichHusaynwasmartyredatKarbala.Shi’ipeopleweepand beat their own bodies on that day, fast, and incorporate other ritualsymbols. These all repeat the Karbala event. Those acts also assume apromise of reward, i.e., Paradise and forgiveness of sin.51 Moreover, thepilgrimagetothetombofthemartyrs,includingtheImamsandtheHouseof 46Ibid.,86‐88.47ForadeepexplorationofthetraditionsoftheMahdi,seeAyoub,Redemptive,216‐229.Seealso,Shamsal‐Din,107‐113.48Ayoub,Redemptive,15‐16.49Shamsal‐Din,79‐81.50Ayoub,Redemptive,27.51Ibid.,142‐143,151,159;Shamsal‐Din,150‐151.


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theProphet, is another importantritual for theShia. It isbetter if they canperformthepilgrimageonthedayof‘Ashura’,butiftheycannotmakeit,theycangathertoweeptogetherintheirhouses.52Those ritualshave their roots in theevents afterHusayn’sdeath,whenhiscaptivefamilywashumiliatedinprocessionthroughcitiesuntiltheyarrivedatDamascus.ManypeopleinvolvedintheritualsenvisionthewickednessofUmayyad toward the House of the Prophet and consequently cryspontaneously.53 This enactment celebrates the redemptive suffering ofHusayn’smartyrdomandthepromiseofGod’sactionagainstinjustice.Thus,these ritualshaveagreat impactalsooneverypolitical rulerwhodisplayshostility towards the Shi’i. From the ruler’s perspective, the rituals areembeddedwithdangerouspoliticalthreatsagainsttheirregime.Thus,somepolitical authorities have prohibited the Shi’i from conducting the rituals.Shamsal‐Dinstatesthat,throughoutIslamichistory,therearetwostrategiesa ruler has used to prevent the Shi’i from partaking in those rituals. First,they stop them by threatening them with punishment. Second, the rulersremovetheobjectofpilgrimage(e.g.,bydestroyingthetomb),astheAbbasidcaliph,al‐Mutawwakil,haddone.54CosmicUnityAccording toShi’i traditions,Husayn’smartyrdom symbolizes cosmicunitywith the past, present, and future, along with transformation of theirsuffering.Thusitbringstogetherallhistory,asAyoubconcludes:Inaverydirectandspecialway,Husayn is connectedwith thehistoryof creationandofmankind.Heisalsolinkedtothedivineplanoftheuniverseandthroughhismartyrdomthedestinyofmenisdetermined.Humanhistoryrevolvesaroundhim:firstastheImamandfatherofthe imams,andsecondlythroughthemissionoftheMahdiwhowillavengeH usayn’sbloodandfulfillhismission.55Thus,Shi’itraditionrelatestheeventofKarbalatotheprophets.Notonlyhadthe Prophet Muhammad and his family known of the event, so did otherprophetsbeforehim.ItissaidthatAdam,Noah,Abraham,andJesusallknewwhatwouldhappenatKarbalaandhadvisitedtheplace.56Forexample,onetraditionsaysthatJesustraveledtoKarbalawithhisdisciplesandmetalionthathadblockedtheirway.ThelionthenspokeclearlyaboutthedeathofthedescendantofMuhammadandaskedJesustocursethemurderer.AfterJesuscursedYazid(thelatternamewasrevealedbythelion),heandhisdisciples

52Shamsal‐Din,150.53Ayoub,Redemptive,152;Shamsal‐Dinelaboratesonthisissuefromahistoricalperspective.Ibid.,140‐148.54Shamsal‐Din,41‐43.55Ayoub,Redemptive,29.56Ibid.,27‐36.


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could pass throughKarbala.57 The lion here symbolizes a complete cosmicunity,sincenotonlyhumansbutalsoothercreaturesareparticipatinginthecosmicdramaofHusayn’smartyrdom.There are further traditions that connect Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbalawithothercreatures. It isreportedthatsoonafter theevent,birds stoppedsinginghappymusicandfasted forseveraldays. 58SometraditionsrecountthatfishesandwildbeastsweptforHusayn’sdeath.Moreover,inadditiontothesufferingofhumansandanimals,djinnandangelswerealsoaffectedbythis event.59 Another tradition mentions that even non‐Muslims joined inweeping for Husayn. For example, there is the story of a Jewish man’sdaughter, whowas blind and crippled. She met with a bird smeared withHusayn’s blood, and after touching the blood, she was healed.60 In thistradition,Husayn’ssufferingisamediumforhealing.Beyond the concurrent participation of creatures in Husayn’s event,whichsymbolizes cosmic unity that is centered aroundHusayn’smartyrdom, thefutureMahdiisevokedastheonewhowillfulfillGod’sschemefortheworld.The Mahdi will not only bring divine justice, but also complete God’ssalvationplanforallcreaturesandcreatecosmicunity.Ayoubconcludes:Thus the cycle [of God’s plan]will be completed.Webeganwith a pure andholycreation,acreationwhichhasbeenconfrontedwithachoicebetweenjudgmentorsalvation. History is the stage on which this choice is painfully and dramaticallyworked out. When the process is completed, creation will return to its originalpurity....AlldominionwillbelongtoGod.61Tocompletethispart,thesethreemeaningsofHusayn’smartyrdomhavetobe treated integrally, linking together God’s divine plan for human historyfrom the creation until the last day. Justice is a core element of Islam; bycommemorating and participating inHusayn’smartyrdom,which occurredinhisbattleagainstinjustice,theShi’icommunitybecomesanintegralpartofGod’splan. TheBlackTheologyAccountofJesus’CrucifixionThis section describes Jesus’ crucifixion from the perspective of blacktheologywithafocusontheworkofonetheologian,JamesH.Cone.Heisanacknowledged prominent black theologian who discusses the black Christandtheimportanceofthecross.Coneisnotedastheleadingfigureinblack 57Ibid.,35.58Ibid.,131.59Vaglieri,613.60Ayoub,Redemptive,132.61Ibid.,229.


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theology,bothbecauseofhisinfluentialandnumerouspublications,andalsothroughhisprofoundimpactonthesecondgenerationofblacktheologians,includingthosewhostudiedunderhimatUnionTheologicalSeminary.62Hewrote the firstbookonblack theologydiscourse,BlackTheologyandBlackPower,in1969attheendofcivilrightsmovement,whichhadinfluencedhimverymuch.63 Alistair Kee argued that before Cone therewere peoplewhobrought black perspective to Christian faith, but none had received therecognitionConegarnered.64Nevertheless,Cone’sworkwasgroundbreakingfor the evolution of black theology, giving impetus to that particulartheologicalmovement. JulianKunniestressed thatCone’s importancearosefromthefactthathewroteoveraverywiderangeoftopicsinadditiontohisuseofsocialanalysis.65Anothersignificantcontribution fromCone’searlierworks was the realignment of African‐American Christians back to thechurch, as previously many black Americans thought that the church wasincompatible with black consciousness and black power. Cone’s writingassertedthatJesusChristisinabsoluteharmonywiththeblackstruggleforfreedom.66ThefollowingisabriefdescriptionofCone’sviewofJesusandthecross.ThissummaryofCone’stheologicalviewofJesus’crucifixioncomesfromhislaterbook,ABlackTheologyofLiberation, inwhichhe formulatedhisaccountoftheblackJesus.Kelly Brown Douglas stresses that Cone’s foundational understanding ofblack Christ encompasses the central symbol for black Christians, sinceChristgivesthemstrengthforthestruggleintheirexperienceofoppression.In addition, black theology refuses to see Jesus only within a “highChristology,”whichfocusespredominantlyonhisdivinity.Rather,Jesusmustbeseenprimarilyasahistorical figure,whowaswillingto fightagainsttheoppressionofhistime,tothepointthathewascrucifiedforhisresistance.67WiththeseuniqueemphasesinhistheologicalframeworkoftheblackChrist,as his main concern Cone asks: “What does Jesus Christ mean for theoppressed blacks of the land?”68 If Jesus is not on the side of oppressedpeople, then black people accordingly would not need Jesus. This vision 62EdwardAntonio,“BlackTheology”inTheCambridgeCompaniontoLiberationTheology,ed.ChristopherRowland(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),80.63DwightN.Hopkins,HeartandHead:BlackTheologyPast,Present,andFuture(NewYork:Palgrave,2002),14;M.ShawnCopeland,“Race”inTheBlackwellCompaniontoModernTheology,ed.GarethJones(Malden:BlackwellPublishing,2004),507.64AlistairKee,TheRiseandDemiseofBlackTheology(Aldershot:Ashgate,2006),45‐46.65JulianKunnie,ModelsofBlackTheology:IssuesinClass,Culture,andGender(ValleyForge:TrinityPressInternational,1994),3.66Hopkins,HeartandHead,15.67KellyBrownDouglas,“Christologies:AfricanAmerican”inTheSCMDictionaryofThirdWorldTheologies,eds.VirginiaFabellaandR.S.Sugirtharajah(London:SCMPress,2003),43.68JamesH.Cone,ABlackTheologyofLiberation(Maryknoll,NewYork:OrbisBooks,1986),111.


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stands in contrast to Jesus has long been portrayed as a white Jesus whoteachesmeeknessand love.Conealsoobservesthat thiswhite Jesuswasatthesametimeusedinordertolegitimizetheoppressionofblackpeoplebywhites–a theology tomaintain the statusquo.TheblackChrist is the realJesuswhotakessideswithoppressedblackpeople.69ConeshowsthroughhishistoricalcriticalpointofviewthatJesuswasalwayson the side of the oppressed and the poor.70 The kingdom of God that hetaught is an embodiment ofGod’s solidaritywith the poor, and Jesus trulyliveshislifetomakeitreal.Inthisaccount,Conecriticizeswhitetheologianswho often have interpreted the kingdom of God to be only a spiritualdimension, or restricted to the afterlife. This mainstream interpretationblurredtherealmessageofJesusandhiscompassionfortheoppressed.So,in Cone’s view, the KingdomofGodreallymeans salvation not only in thehereafter,but in this lifealso: it is salvation foroppressedpeopleto liveasfreemenandwomen.71Thenarrativesof theGospeldemonstratethisgoal,from his birth, baptism, ministry, through his death and into hisresurrection.72Inthistheme,Jesus’crucifixioncannotbeseparatedfromhisresurrection,because“[in]hisdeath[Jesus]istherevelationofthefreedomof God, taking upon himself the totality of human oppression; hisresurrection is the disclosure that God is not defeated by oppression buttransforms it into the possibility of freedom.”73 The crucifixion of Jesussymbolizeshisstandwiththeoppressedandthepoor,andhisresurrectionisproof that God has justified Jesus’ struggle for justice and freedom. Thiswhole theology shows how God in Christ must support black people whohave been oppressed bywhites, and so Christ stands beside them andnotwith the oppressor. Thus, Cone establishes a black Christ is black and thatjustifiesthatblackpeopledonotneedthewhiteJesusbutthereal,blackone.Cone admits that his exclusive black Christ results in insensitivity to theproblem of other oppressed groups, specifically women and ignores theproblem of sexism. Thus, the exclusive concern for oppression of blackpeopleistoonarrow.Additionally,thisviewdoesnotconfronttheproblemsoftheThirdWorld,sinceitlacksaclearanalysisofthoseeconomicandsocialissues. Moreover, it relies toomuch on the neo‐orthodox theology of KarlBarth.74Insum,Conegivestoomuchemphasistoracismandneglectsseveralimportantaspects.However, Cone takes his thought further in an article published morerecently, in which he discusses the relation of the cross and the lynching 69Ibid.,111.70Ibid.,111‐113.71Ibid.,124‐128.72Ibid.,114‐117.73Ibid.,118.74Ibid.,xvii‐xx.


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tree.75Inthisarticlehestillfocusesontheblackexperiencebutalsoaddsawiderperspectiveontheideaofoppression.Thus,hereinforcesthecrossasthecentralsymbolforChristianity.ConearguesthatthefullmeaningofthecrossofChrist cannot be fullyunderstoodwithout the lynching tree.76Thelynchingtreeisahistoricalrealityandsymbolofthesufferingofblackpeoplethatcomesfromtheirlivedpast,whenmanyofthemwerelynchedontreesjustbecauseoftheirskincolor.Thecomparisonprovidesapowerfulsymbolof thecrucifixionofblackpeople.77 In thepresentdayUnitedStates,wherethis formofviolenceanddiscriminationhasdisappeared, the lynching treehasbeengraduallyforgotten,especiallybecauseitbearsahorriblememory.But, as Cone argues, it should not be forgotten because in reality even thecrucifixion of Jesus often was interpreted as superficial pietism. By thatmodel,GodhadforgiventhesinsofChristianswithoutrealizingthecoreofthe Gospel message.78 “The Gospel,” says Cone, “is God’s message ofliberation in an unredeemed and tortured world.” It contains both themystery of salvation in the hereafter and the liberation of any peoplesufferingfromanykindofoppressionrightnow.79ItisthelynchingtreethatdiscernsthetruemeaningofJesus’crucifixion:ChristwhowascrucifiedisasignthatGodisonthesideofoppressedpeople,whoeverandwherevertheyare,bothblackandnotblack.Identifyinghimselfwiththeoppressed,theblackChristasksallChristianstofight against oppression so that the cross becomes a source of power foreveryliberationmovement.Thisinterpretativeapproachtothecrosscannotbeachievedwithoutrememberingthelynchingtree,thebitterexperienceofblackpeople.AsConeconcludes:[T]he civil rights movement did not end lynching. It struck a mighty blow to themostobviousbrutalities....Butwheneversociety treatsapeopleas if theyhavenorightsordignityorworth,asthegovernmentdidtoblacksduringtheKatrinastorm,they are being lynched covertly. Whenever people are denied jobs, health care,housing,andthebasicnecessitiesof life, theyarebeing lynched.Therearea lotofways to lynch a people. Whenever a people cry out to be recognized as humanbeings and society ignores them, they are being lynched....When I heard and readabout the physical and mental abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and atGuantanamoBay inCuba, I thoughtabout lynching.TheRomanEmpire thatkilledJesus at Calvary was similar to the American empire that lynched blacks in theUnitedStatesandalsocreatedtheatrocitiesinIraq.80

75JamesH.Cone,“StrangeFruits:TheCrossandtheLynchingTree,”inHarvardDivinityBulletin35.1(2007).76Ibid.,48.77Ibid.,55.78Ibid.,48.79Ibid.,51.80Ibid.,55.


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ItisclearfromthispassagethatConehaswidenedhisfocuspointtoaccountforallthevictimsofoppressionandforallstrugglesforliberationasapartofthe black theology of the cross. Wherever oppression still occurs in theworld, in any form, it is imperative for Christians who understand themeaningofthecrosstointerveneinordertoendit.Allsuffering,intheend,shouldremindusbothoftheblackbodieshangingonthelynchingtreeandofthecrossofJesus.ComparingHusayn’sMartyrdomandJesus’CrucifixionWithanaccountofHusayn’smartyrdomandofJesus’crucifixionfromtheirrespective traditions, it is time to compare their particular theologicalmeanings. An entrance point for further dialogues between Shia andChristians on shared concerns may appear through reference to thedominantthemes.Also,itisimportanttonotethatabetterunderstandingofanother faith could more fully enrich and transform Christian self‐understanding.To begin, Husayn and Jesus are similar in their pursuit of justice andliberation fromall kindsofoppression.Husayn’smissionwas to reveal theUmayyadwickednessto theMuslimcommunity,while Jesusstoodwiththepoorandonthemarginsofsociety.Sharingthiscommonconcernforjusticeand liberation, each used a different method. Husayn utilized an openuprisingthatwascertaintoendinhisowndeath,whereasJesususedpassiveresistanceornon‐violence,whichalso ledtohisowndeath.AyoubstressesthatifHusaynhadnotresistedtheUmayyadregime,hewouldnothavebeenable to spread his message of justice. When Husayn refused to give hisallegiance,theonlyoptionleftwasdeath.Hepreferredtodieinanopenwarrather than being killed in secret: the latter option would not haveempowered the Muslim community. On the other side, if Jesus had usedrevoltas themediumforhisstruggle,hisdeathwouldhavemeantnothing,becausehewouldhavebeennotanydifferentfromearliermessianicleaderswho had led an uprising against the Roman government at that time.However,sinceJesustookthepassiveresistancemethodasGod’splan,thenGodrevivedhimonthethirdday.Thus,afterwardhispurposeof installingjusticeandliberationwasstronglyheard.Ofequalimportance,remembranceandparticipationarethesecondparallelthemes shared by these two events. Shi’i thought, including its piety, putsgreat emphasis on the commemoration of and participation in Husayn’ssuffering.Theseareembodiedinmanyways,suchasthe‘Ashura’ritual,thepilgrimagetothetomb,therecitationoflamentationpoetry,weeping,fasting,and thebeatingofone’sownbody. Inadeeper sense, theeventofKarbalahas strongly influenced the Shi’i consciousness in their life and history inordertocontinuethefightagainstanyformofwickedness,includingthekind


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that affects them in bitter times of persecution and discrimination. Forinstance, from a personal anecdote,when a Shiamosque in Indonesiawasburnt down on 29 December 2011, one of my Shia friends on Facebookrelated theevent toHusayn’s sufferingand, accordingly, theperpetratorofthisfirewasreferredtoasoneofYazid’sminion.81Jesus’crucifixionalsoplaysanimportantroleinblacktheology’simaginationwithitsconnectiontotheblackexperienceofoppressionanddiscrimination.Inhismorerecentarticles,Coneemphasizesevenfurthertheimportanceofcommemorating Jesus’ cross by placing it alongside the lynching tree thatrepresents black people’s suffering. He clearly tries to convince somewomanist theologianswho have rejected the cross of Jesus because it hasbeen used as a tool to justify women’s oppression.82 Indeed, the cross’sidentification with suffering has been extended as the means to justify allkindsofoppression.From thisviewpoint, it functionsasan symbol for theoppressor,ratherthanoneofliberation.Ontheotherhand,thelynchingtreehas become a symbol of black suffering, even until today, and tends to beforgotten because it contains a horrible experience for black people. Here,Cone insists that if the crossor the lynching treeare seenapart fromeachother,thentheirtruejointmeaningwillbereduced,andevencorrupted.Thecrossthenisasymbolofoppression,andthelynchingtreeasaresultcarriesnoimpactforChristians,exceptasabadomenandtraumaticmemory.Coneconcluded that the true meaning of the cross is revealed only when it isplacedinjuxtapositionwiththelynchingtree,andtherebyittransformsthelynching tree: Jesus’ crucifixionmeansopposition toeverykindof injusticeandoppression.Furthermore,ConeinterpretsthecrossasanimperativeforChristians to fight every form of oppression and not only what has beenhappeningtoblackpeople.Byparticipatinginoppositiontowardanykindofinjustice in theworld, theChristianssubsequentlyarealsocommemoratingand participating in God’s plan of liberation, through the core example ofJesusinhislife,death,andresurrection.Thisideaisadeparturethatdiffersfrom Cone’s earlier stance of the cross alone. Now he puts the cross andlynching tree together. If Cone required some years to combine those two,TwelverShi’ialreadywerecombiningtheeventofHusaynmartyrdomwiththeir experience of suffering and oppression, so that it becamenot ameresymbol,butastrongmotivationtofighttherealityofsufferingandinjustice.ThereisanelementintheTwelverShi’iaccountofHusayn’smartyrdomnotfound in James Cone’s potrayal of Jesus’ crucifixion. As elaborated in theprevious section, the third theological meaning of Husayn’s martyrdom iscosmic unity. In this state, all creatures, including animals and people ofother faiths,participatedvariously in theevent,andcontinuetogetheruntil

81“Indonesia:MosqueandHousesburntdownbyMuslims,”TheMuslimNews,accessedJanuary1,2012,http://muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=2140282Cone,“StrangeFruit,”51fn.4.


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itsculminationwiththecomingoftheMahdi.Inmyopinion,Cone’stheologyofJesus’crucifixionhasnotexploredthiselement.Therefore,theblackJesusismoreofananthropocentricmodel.HeisJesusChristasliberator,andtheliberated subjects are also human, a categorywhich Cone has expanded inscope to include not only black but all oppressed people in any formimaginable. Despite his developing ideas about Jesus’ crucifixion and thelynching tree that enabled a broader vision of liberation, nowadays ourworld faces wider‐than‐human injustice. Now, when all of creation is inecologicaldanger, sucha crisisdemandstheological answers. In this sense,Cone’sviewonJesus’crucifixionas liberation couldalsobeelaborated inaway thataddressesourecological challenge.ThisChristianperspective canlearn from the cosmic reach of Husayn’s martyrdom in a way that doesincludeecologicaljustice.ConclusionWe have seen how each respective religious tradition treats the events ofHusayn’s martyrdom and Jesus’ crucifixion. Further, a comparison of thetheologyofthetwoeventsrevealsbothsimilaritiesanddissimilarities.Thisbriefstudyhasfocusedononlysimilaritiesbetweenthetwo,asitspurposeistofindcommonconcernasanentrancepointforfurtherdialogueandpraxis.FrommyChristian vantage‐point,Husayn’smartyrdomand his struggle tofighttheinjusticearestronglyreminiscentofJesus,whoendedhislifeatthecrossbecauseofhisdecisiontoembracepoorpeoplemarginalizedinsociety.Botheventsshowthatsymbolsareanimportantpartofreligiousbelief:theycan move people deeply to face their reality and problems. Otherwise,symbolswouldbeemptyandwithoutcorrelationtohumanlife.Ifthatwerethecase,theseeventswouldadduptoemptysymbolsifthepeopledidonlytheritualpartwithoutcombiningitwiththeactualpracticeoffightingunjustcircumstances and standing alongside the oppressed. Remembering theseeventsandusingtheirsimilaritiestosharetheeffortofspreadingjusticeintheworldcouldbethemeetingpointbetweenMuslims,particularlytheShia,andChristians.Moreover,bothtraditionscouldexploretheissueofecology,whichalreadyisasharedproblemallovertheworld.WhilethetheologyofHusayn’s martyrdom has already been mentioned more emphasis is needhere.Asaresult,Cone’stheologyofJesus’crucifixionwouldbenefitfromthischallenge. Dialogue can build from a discussion of similarities anddissimilarities between the two religions, but working together requirescommonconcerns.Withoutanydoubt,Husayn’smartyrdomatKarbalaandthe cross of Jesus can play a substantial part in building a mutualconsciousnessofjusticeandliberationbetweenMuslimsandChristians,thatincludes the urgent ecological challenge and other crises of justice thatconfrontoursharedworld.


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BibliographyAntonio,Edward.“BlackTheology”inTheCambridgeCompaniontoLiberationTheology,ed.ChristopherRowland.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007.Ayoub,Mahmoud.RedemptiveSufferinginIslam:AStudyoftheDevotionalAspectsof‘Ashura’inTwelverShi’ism.TheHague:Mouton,1978._______.TheCrisisofMuslimHistory:ReligionandPoliticsinEarlyIslam.Oxford:Oneworld,2003.Balic,Smail.“TheImageofJesusinContemporaryIslamicTheology.”InWeBelieveinOneGod:TheExperienceofGodinChristianityandIslam,editedbyAnnemarieSchimmelandAbdoldjavadFalaturi,1‐8.NewYork:SeaburyPress,1979.Cone,JamesH.ABlackTheologyofLiberation.Maryknoll,NewYork:OrbisBooks,1986._______.“StrangeFruit:TheCrossandtheLynchingTree.”InHarvardDivinityBulletin35.1(2007):47‐55.Copeland,M.Shawn.“Race”inTheBlackwellCompaniontoModernTheology,editedbyGarethJones.Malden,MA:BlackwellPublishing,2004.Daftary,Farhad.AShortHistoryoftheIsmailis:TraditionsofaMuslimCommunity.Princeton,NJ:M.Wiener,1998.Douglas,KellyBrown.“Christologies:AfricanAmerican.”InTheSCMDictionaryofThirdWorldTheologies,editedbyVirginiaFabellaandR.S.Sugirtharajah,43‐45.London:SCMPress,2003.Fredericks,JamesL.BuddhistandChristians:ThroughComparativeTheologytoSolidarity.Maryknoll,NewYork:OrbisBooks,2004.TheMuslimNews.“Indonesia:MosqueandHousesburntdownbyMuslims.”AccessedJanuary1,2012.<http://muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=21402>Halm,Heinz.Shi'ism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004.Hopkins,DwightN.HeartandHead:BlackTheologyPast,Present,andFuture.NewYork:Palgrave,2002.Kee,Alistair.TheRiseandDemiseofBlackTheology.Aldershot:Ashgate,2006.Kunnie,Julian.ModelsofBlackTheology:IssuesinClass,Culture,andGender.ValleyForge:TrinityPressInternational,1994.


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Lawson,Todd.TheCrucifixionandtheQur’an:AStudyintheHistoryofMuslimThought.Oxford:Oneworld,2009.Momen,Moojan.AnIntroductiontoShi’iIslam:TheHistoryandDoctrinesofTwelverShi’ism.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1985.Shamsal‐Din,Muh�ammadMahdi.TheRisingofAlH�usayn:ItsImpactontheConsciousnessofMuslimSociety.London:MuhammadiTrust,1985.Sindawi,Khalid.JesusandHusaynIbn‘AliIbn‘AbuTalib:AComparativeStudyinAncientNearEasternStudies44(2007):50‐65.Tabatabai,MuhammadHusayn.Shi’iteIslam.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1977.Vaglieri,L.Veccia.“Husaynb.‘Alib.AbiTalib”inTheEncyclopaediaofIslam,VolumeIII,editedbyB.Lewis,V.L.Ménage,C.PellatandJ.SchachtLeiden:E.J.Brill,1971.Zahniser,A.H.Mathias.TheMissionandDeathofJesusinIslamandChristianity.Maryknoll,NewYork:OrbisBooks,2008.


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UnderstandingHappiness

asVisionofGod:AComparative

ReadingofAquinasandAlGhazzālī

BYCARLOPEREZ

IntroductionThroughoutthecenturies,philosophersandtheologianshavebeenexploringthe ultimate end of the human person – happiness. What does happinessconsist in?Aristotlediscussedhisnotionofeudaimonia inhisNicomacheanEthicsas“anactivityof thesoul inaccordancewithvirtue[orexcellence]”1andidentifiedcontemplationastheactivityinwhichitconsists.St.ThomasAquinas likewise identified man’s ultimate end as happiness, and explainsthat this happiness consists in nothing else than the vision of the DivineEssence. InoneofhisarticlesintheSummaTheologica,2hediscussedthatthere canonlybeone final end,notonly foroneperson,but forallhumanbeings. This brings into mind the question of whether thinkers of othertraditions agree. Thus, this comparative study plunges into the Islamictradition and focuses on the writings of one of the most revered Muslimtheologians, Abu Hāmed Mohammad ibn Mohammad al‐Ghazzālī. In hiswork, The Alchemy of Happiness, al‐Ghazzālī explained that “the Vision ofAllahisthesummitofhumanfelicity.”Theaimofthispaperistolookatal‐Ghazzālī’sunderstandingoftheVisionofGodinsuchawaythatitwillserve

1Cf.Aristotle,TheNicomacheanEthics,trans.byH.Rackham,(NewYork:Putnam,1926),1097b22–1098a20.2ThomasAquinas,TheSummaTheologicaofSt.ThomasAquinas,trans.byFathersoftheEnglishDominicanProvince,onlineed.(2008),I‐II,q.1,a.7,accessedNovember26,2011,http://www.newadvent.org/summa/.CitedhenceforthasST.


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asacatalyst forCatholics tobetterunderstandwhatSt.ThomasAquinas isteachingusabouttheBeatificVision.TheLifeofalGhazzālīImam al‐Ghazzālī is probably the most influential scholar, philosopher,theologian,legalexpert,religiousreformerandmysticinthehistoryofIslam.HewasborninTusinKhurasan,nearthemodernIraniancityofMeshhed,in1058 CE.3 In writing about the life of al‐Ghazzālī, Hamid Reza Alavi, aprofessorat theShahidBahonarUniversity inKerman, Iran, categorizesal‐Ghazzālī’s life into four stages.4 The first stage in Alavi’s article is al‐Ghazzālī’s life as a student, from his birth up to the age of 28. His nativelanguagewasPersian, andhe studiedArabic fromanearlyage. His fatherhad died when he was young, but before his father died al‐Ghazzālī wastaughtanenduringinterestinSufism,orIslamicmysticism.Afterhisfather’sdeath he studied inmadrasa schools in Tus, Jurjan and Nishapur under anumberof famousscholars,amongthemthe famousImamal‐Juwayni. Al‐Ghazzālī developed his expertise in tafsīr (Qur’anic exegesis), fiqh (Islamicjurisprudence) and kalām (scholastic theology). Also during this period hehadalreadybegunhiscareerinteachingandwriting.Hisgreatteacher,Imamal‐Juwayni,diedin1085CE.At this second stage of his life, al‐Ghazzālī became more involved in thepoliticalandintellectualdisputesoftheage. Alavinarratedthatal‐Ghazzālībecame engaged in debates between religion and philosophy (or betweenIslamicandGreekthought,respectively),inwhichhesidedwithreligion,andbetweentheSunnitesandtheShi’ites, inwhichhesidedwiththeorthodoxcAbbasid caliphate against the Isma’ilis and those who believed in theinfallibilityofthe Imam(thespiritualleaderof theShi’ites).Hewentto thecamp(al‐mucaskar)oftheSeljukministerNizamal‐Mulk(thefounderoftheNizamiyyaschools)andstayedthere forsixyearsasacourt jurist.Thenal‐GhazzālīwasappointedasaprofessorintheNizamiyyamadrasainBaghdad,whichwasprobably themostprestigious institutionofhighereducation intheeasternIslamicworld.Therehewrotesomeofhismostfamousworks,includingTahāfut alfalāsifa, orThe Incoherence of the Philosophers, whichpermanentlyunderminedtheinfluenceofGreekphilosophicalthinkingintheMuslimworld.AlaviidentifiedthethirdstageofthelifeofImamal‐Ghazzālīatthemomentwhen he had a dramatic experience as if having a spiritual crisis and anervous breakdown. Al‐Ghazzālīwas unable to speak, and so he could not

3HamidRezaAlavi,“Al‐Ghazalionmoraleducation,”JournalofMoralEducation36,no.3(September2007):310.4ibid.,310‐311.


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teach. He also became convinced that the pursuit of fame and materialsuccesswasmeaningless. He left his teaching post in Baghdad, renouncedwealth, fame and influence and committed himselfmuchmore fully to thepathofSufism.Al‐GhazzālītravelledbetweenDamascus, Jerusalem,Hebron,MedinaandMeccafortwoyearsbeforereturningtoBaghdadandlatertohishometownofTuswherehe lived in solitudeasapoorSufi.He spentmuchtime in meditation and other spiritual exercises, and came to believe thatanythinghedidthatwasnotdoneforthesakeofGodwasahindrancetohisspiritualprogress. Itwasduringthisperiodthathecompletedhismagnumopus, Ihyā’ culūm aldīn, or The Revival of the Religious Sciences, which isarguablythemostimportantIslamictextaftertheQur’ānandthehadīth,thetraditionsandsayingsofthelifeoftheProphetandhiscompanions.Alaviconcludeswiththefinalstageofal‐Ghazzālī’slife,from1104CEwhenhewent back to teach again at theNizamiyyamadrasa inNishapur, at therequest of the Seljuk rulers and on to his death. As he went back to histeaching career,he continued to liveasaSufi and topromote theneed forspiritualdevelopmentandthecultivationoftheinnerself.Shortlybeforehisdeath he wrote alMunqidh min aldalal, or The Deliverance from Error, aspiritual autobiography that is arranged thematically rather thanchronologically.Hediedinhishometownin1111CE.TheAlchemyofHappinessAnotheroneofhisnotableworksistheKīmīya’alSacāda,orTheAlchemyofHappiness.Thebookwasoriginallywrittenbyal‐GhazzālīinPersian,aroundthe year 1105CE, towards the end of his life. It is a compendiumof somechapters of his main work Ihyā’ culūm aldīn. If one consults thecorrespondingchaptersinTheRevival,onewouldfindthatmanypointsandarguments presented in The Alchemy are also discussed in The Revival indetail.IntheIntroductionofTheAlchemy,al‐Ghazzālīpresentsastructurebywhichwecanunderstandhisepistemology:NowthetreasuriesofAllah,inwhichthisalchemyistobesought,aretheheartsoftheprophets,andhewhoseeksitelsewherewillbedisappointedandbankruptonthedayofjudgmentwhenhehearstheword,“Wehaveliftedtheveilfromoffthee,and thy sight today is keen.” Allah has sent on earth a hundred and twenty‐fourthousandprophetstoteachmentheprescriptionofthisalchemy,andhowtopurifytheirheartsfrombaserqualitiesinthecrucibleofabstinence.Thisalchemymaybebrieflydescribedas turningawayfromtheworld toAllah,anditsconstituentsarefour:theknowledgeofself,theknowledgeofAllah,theknowledgeofthisworldasitreallyis,theknowledgeofthenextworldasitreallyis.5

5AbuHamidAl‐Ghazali,TheAlchemyofHappiness,trans.ClaudField.(Lahore:Sh.MuhammadAshraf,1954),accessedNovember27,2011,http://www.sunnah.org/tasawwuf/alchemy.htm.


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Kīmīya’,oralchemy,isanappliedandmysticalsciencethathasbeenstudiedfor centuries, and it is an important religious discipline formany religiousphilosophers. Due to its spiritual dimensions, kīmīya’ is considered thenoblest of all occult sciences. Al‐Ghazzālī was himself a believer thateverything on Earth is a manifestation of God’s spirit, thus everythingbelongstokīmīya’.Initsessence,kīmīya’representsacompleteconceptionoftheuniverseandrelationsbetweenearthlybeingsandthecosmos.Al‐Ghazzālīdistinguishesbetween “theworld”and “thehereafter.”Death istheelementthatstandsinbetweenthesetwostates;“theworld”comprisingthatwhichisbeforeone’sdeathand“thehereafter”referringto thatwhichcomesafterone’sdeath.6 Thepurposeoftheworldis“provisioningforthehereafter.”Knowledgeoftheworldisthekeytoknowledgeofthehereafter.Al‐Ghazzālīwrites:Know that no one recognizes the real nature of the Hereafter until he firstrecognizesthetruenatureofdeath.Hedoesnotknowthetruenatureofdeathuntilheknowsthetruenatureof life.Hedoesnotrecognizethetruenatureoflifeuntilherecognizes the truenatureofthespirit;andthegnosisofthetruenatureofthespiritisthegnosisofthetruenatureofhisownself….7Oneneedstoutilizeone’ssensesandcometoaknowledgeofcreation,God’shandiwork. God’swork is themanifestation of God and his goodness, andunderstanding knowledge of the world builds up understanding ofknowledgeofthehereafter.While in theworld,we learn to see thegood things thatGodhasprovided,butwealsowatchoutagainsttheevilsthattendtoturnusawayfromHim.Wecancometoknowledgeofthenextworldbyunderstandingthisworldasitreallyis.Al‐Ghazzālīexplains:As long as a personpossesses these senses and they spy out things for him, he issaidtobe‘intheworld.’Whenhesaysfarewelltothesesenses,whileheenduresasdo these thingswhich are theessenceof his attributes, then it is said that ‘hehasgone to the Hereafter.’ As a consequence, this is the reason for his being in theworld.8

6MuhammadNurAbdusSalam,trans.AlGhazzaliOnKnowingThisWorldandtheHereafter(Chicago:GreatBooksoftheIslamicWorld,Inc.,2002),13.7ibid.,26.8“Aslongasapersonpossessesthesesensesandtheyspyoutthingsforhim,heissaidtobe‘intheworld.’Whenhesaysfarewelltothesesenses,whileheenduresasdothesethingswhicharetheessenceofhisattributes,thenitissaidthat‘hehasgonetotheHereafter.’Asaconsequence,thisisthereasonforhisbeingintheworld.”Ibid.,14.


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Godcreatedtheworldwithacertainorderandmanifestedthisinhislawandrevelation,especially in theQur’ān. Thehumanbeingneedstobesensitiveto this manifestation of God, and use his or her senses to perceive thismanifestation while on this world, in order that he or she may come torecognizeitinthehereafter.Sacāda, or happiness is a central concept in Islamic philosophy used todescribethehighestaimofhumanstriving.Sacādaisconsideredtobepartofthe “ultimate happiness,” namely, that of the hereafter. According to al‐Ghazzālī, it is only when a human being has liberated his or her soulcompletely from its corporal existence that he or she arrives at an activeintellect. Al‐GhazzālībelievedthatbyexercisinghisGod‐givencapacityforreason, the human person must be drawn to the spiritual alchemy thattransforms the soul from worldliness to complete devotion to God. Thisalone,hebelievedcouldproduceultimatehappiness.Al‐Ghazzālī'steachingswere to helpman to live a life in accordancewith the sacred law, and bydoingsogainadeeperunderstandingofitsmeaningonthedayofJudgment.IntheeighthchapteroftheAlchemy,hewrotethathumanperfectioncomeswhentheloveofGodconquerstheheartoftheperson. “Humanperfectionresides in this: that the love of Allah should conquer a man's heart andpossess it wholly, and even if it does not possess it wholly it shouldpredominateintheheartovertheloveofallotherthings.”9Itisinthisthatthehumanpersonwillachievethehappinessheseeks.Thehumanbeinghasbeen created by God with an inclination to seek him, ultimately findingfulfillment in him. Thisworldwill prepare him to encounter Godwithout“theveil.”10Al‐GhazzālīunderstandsthisinthatthelevelofhappinessinGodinthenext life isproportional to the loveonehas forGod inthis life. “IfhehadnodelightinAllahbefore,hewillnotdelightinHimthen,andifhisjoyinAllah was but slight before it will be but slight then. In brief, our futurehappinesswillbeinstrictproportiontothedegreeinwhichwehavelovedAllahhere.”11Thus,itisimportanttogrowintheloveofGodwhileweareliving, so that when the day comes that we pass to the next life, theknowledgeandlovethatwehave forGodwillbetransformedintothebestvisionofGodthatbringsusdelightandtruehappiness. 9Humanperfectionresidesinthis:thattheloveofAllahshouldconqueraman'sheartandpossessitwholly,andevenifitdoesnotpossessitwhollyitshouldpredominateintheheartovertheloveofallotherthings.”ClaudField,trans.TheAlchemyofHappiness(Lahore:Sh.MuhammadAshraf,1954),chapter8.CitedhenceforthasAlchemy.10Cf.ibid.11“IfhehadnodelightinAllahbefore,hewillnotdelightinHimthen,andifhisjoyinAllahwasbutslightbeforeitwillbebutslightthen.Inbrief,ourfuturehappinesswillbeinstrictproportiontothedegreeinwhichwehavelovedAllahhere.”(ibid).


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KnowledgeofGodAnyonewhowill look into thematterwill see thathappiness isnecessarily linkedwith theknowledgeofAllah.Each facultyofours delights in that forwhich itwascreated:lustdelightsinaccomplishingdesire,angerintakingvengeance,theeyeinseeing beautiful objects, and the ear in hearing harmonious sounds. The highestfunctionofthesoulofmanistheperceptionoftruth;inthisaccordinglyitfindsitsspecialdelight.Evenintriflingmatters,suchas learningchess,thisholdsgood,andthehigher thesubjectmatterof theknowledgeobtained thegreater thedelight.Amanwouldbepleasedatbeingadmittedintotheconfidenceofaprimeminister,buthowmuchmoreifthekingmakesanintimateofhimanddisclosesstatesecretstohim!An astronomerwho, by his knowledge, canmap the stars anddescribe theircourses,derivesmorepleasurefromhisknowledgethanthechessplayerfromhis.Seeing,then,thatnothingishigherthanAllah,howgreatmustbethedelightwhichspringsfromthetrueknowledgeofHim!12First and foremost, we must understand that al‐Ghazzālī recognizes theunknowability of God. David Burrell sees this unknowing as that whichdistinguishesanauthentic search forGod fromamere lustingafter idols.13Thequestionthencomesup:HowdowecometoknowledgeofGod,ifHeisunknowable? Burrellsuggests thatonecharacteristicwayofrespondingtothis divinity is to propose a schemewhichwill allow it to be accessible.14Such a scheme will be instrumental in giving us access to achieve even aminimal level of understanding. Al‐Ghazzālī leads us to the starting point:knowledgeof self. This self‐awareness consistsof twoparts:knowledgeofthebodyandknowledgeofthesoul.Hewrote:An important part of our knowledge of Allah arises from the study andcontemplationofourownbodies,whichrevealtousthepower,wisdom,andloveofthe Creator…. But, when all is said, the knowledge of the soul plays a moreimportantpartinleadingtotheknowledgeofAllahthantheknowledgeofourbodyandthefunctions.Thebodymaybecomparedtoasteedandthesoultoitsrider;thebodywas created for the soul, the soul for the body. If aman knows not his ownsoul, which is the nearest thing to him, what is the use of his claiming to knowothers?15WecancometotheknowledgeofGodbyattainingknowledgeofself, fromunderstanding one’s body andmore so through understanding one’s soul.Godcreatedthehumanperson inhis likenessandsowecangetan ideaofGod’sattributesbyknowingaboutthehumanpersonHehascreated:

12Alchemy,Chapter113DavidBurrell,FaithandFreedom:AnInterfaithPerspective,(Malden,MA:BlackwellPublishing,2004)20.14Cf.ibid,21.15Alchemy,Chapter1


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Not only are man's attributes a reflection of Allah's attributes, but the mode ofexistenceofman's soulaffordssomeinsight intoAllah'smodeofexistence.That isto say, both Allah and the soul are invisible, indivisible, unconfined by space andtime,andoutsidethecategoriesofquantityandquality;norcantheideasofshape,color, or size attach to them. People find it hard to form a conception of suchrealitiesasaredevoidofqualityandquantity,etc.,butasimilardifficultyattachestotheconceptionofoureverydayfeelings,suchasanger,pain,pleasure,orlove.Theyare thought‐concepts, and cannot be cognized by the senses; whereas quality,quantity,etc.,aresense‐concepts.Justastheearcannottakecognizanceofcolor,northe eye of sound, so, inconceivingof theultimate realities,Allah and the soul,wefind ourselves in a region in which sense‐concepts can bear no part. So much,however, we can see, that, as Allah is Ruler of the universe, and, being Himselfbeyondspaceandtime,quantityandquality,governsthingsthataresoconditioned,so that soul rules the body and itsmembers, being itself invisible, indivisible, andunlocatedinanyspecialpart.Forhowcantheindivisiblebelocatedinthatwhichisdivisible?FromallthisweseehowtrueisthesayingoftheProphet,"AllahcreatedmaninHisownlikeness.”16Godcreatedhumanbeingstobe likehimself toallowustohavean ideaofwho He is. “No one can understand a king but a king; therefore Allah hasmadeeachofusakinginminiature,sotospeak,overakingdomwhichisaninfinitelyreducedcopyofHisown.17Throughthis,wecometoacertainlevelofunderstanding, as if ahintofGod’s attribute. Wehave tokeep inmind,however,thatthisideathatwepickupisaverylimitedidea.To present an example, let us try to understand the greatness of God.Proclaiming that “God is great” means that His greatness far exceeds allpowers of human understanding and comprehension.18 God's greatnessimmeasurablytranscendsourcognitivefaculties,andthatwecanonlyformaverydimandimperfectideaofit.Al‐Ghazzālīusestheillustrationofachildasking someone to explain to him the pleasure that exists in havingsovereignty. One may address the question by saying that it is like thepleasureonefeelswhenoneisplayingbatandball.Thiswouldmakesensetothechild;althoughinrealityhavingsovereigntyandplayinghavenothingincommonexceptthattheybothcomeunderthecategoryofpleasure.19According to al‐Ghazzālī, the delight of knowledge still falls short of thedelightofvision.Thisworldisastageormarket‐placepassedbypilgrimsontheirwaytothenext. Manacquireshereonearth,bytheuseofhisbodilysenses, some knowledge of the works of God, and, through them, of GodHimself,thesightofwhomwillconstitutehisfuturebeatitude.20 16Alchemy,Chapter217ibid.18Cf.Alchemy,Chapter219Cf.ibid..20Cf.ibid.,Chapter3


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TheVisionofGodIn Chapter 8 of The Alchemy of Happiness, al‐Ghazzālī wrote specificallyaboutwhatconstituteshappiness.Accordingtohim,theVisionofGodisthesummitofhumanfelicityandallMuslimsprofesstobelievethat.Al‐Ghazzālīexplained that first and foremost, every single one of a human person'sfacultieshasitsappropriatefunctionthatitdelightstofulfill.Thisholdsgoodofthemall,fromthelowestbodilyappetitetothehighestformofintellectualapprehension.Butevenacomparativelylowformofmentalexertionaffordsgreaterpleasure than the satisfactionofbodilyappetites.To illustrate this,al‐Ghazzālīgavetheexampleofamanwho is absorbed inagameofchess.Because he is engaged in his game, he will not come to his meal, thoughrepeatedly called. Secondly, al‐Ghazzālī pointed out that the higher thesubject‐matterofourknowledge,thegreaterisourdelightinit;forexample,itismoredelightfultoknowthesecretsofakingthanthesecretsofavizier.Seeing,then,thatAllahisthehighestpossibleobjectofknowledge,theknowledgeofHim must afford more delight than any other. He who knows Allah, even in thisworld,dwells,asitwere,inaparadise,“thebreadthofwhichisasthebreadthoftheHeavens and the Earth,” a paradise the fruits of which no envy can prevent himplucking, and the extent ofwhich is not narrowedby themultitude of thosewhooccupyit.21Aswehavementionedearlier,forImamal‐Ghazzālī,thedelightofknowledgestillfallsshortofthedelightofvision.Heexplainedthatjustasourpleasurein thinking of those we love is much less than the pleasure we have byactuallyseeingthem.Our imprisonment in bodies of clay andwater, and entanglement in the things ofsenseconstituteaveilwhichhidestheVisionofAllahfromus,althoughitdoesnotpreventourattainingtosomeknowledgeofHim.ForthisreasonAllahsaidtoMosesonMountSinai,“ThoushaltnotseeMe.”22Al‐Ghazzālīusedthatimageofaveilasananalogyofhowourphysicalbodyactsassomethingthatpreventsusfromactuallyseeingwhatistheretosee.Another image that he used is that of a mirror. Through this image heexplainedwhytheVisionofGodwillbedifferentforeachandeveryperson.The truth of thematter is this that, just as the seedofmanbecomesaman, andaburieddate‐stonebecomesapalm‐tree,sotheknowledgeofAllahacquiredonEarthwillintheNextWorldchangeintotheVisionofAllah,andhewhohasnever learnttheknowledgewillneverhavetheVision.ThisVisionwillnotbesharedalikebyallwhoknow,buttheirdiscernmentofitwillvaryexactlyastheirknowledge.Allahis

21Alchemy,Chapter822ibid.


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one, butHewill be seen inmanydifferentways, just as one object is reflected indifferentways by differentmirrors, some showing it straight, and somedistorted,some clearly and some dimly. A mirror may be so crooked as to make even abeautifulformappearmisshapen,andamanmaycarryintothenextworldaheartsodarkanddistortedthatthesightwhichwillbeasourceofpeaceandjoytootherswillbetohimasourceofmisery.He,inwhosehearttheloveofAllahhasprevailedoverallelse,willderivemorejoyfromthisvisionthanheinwhoseheartithasnotsoprevailed;justasinthecaseoftwomenwithequallypowerfuleyesight,gazingon a beautiful face, hewho already loves the possessor of that facewill rejoice inbeholdingitmorethanhewhodoesnot.23AtthispointitisimportanttonoteoneveryimportantaspectoftheVisionofGod:love.Al‐Ghazzālīwrotethatone’shappiness,andVisionofGod,inthehereafter is commensurate to one’s love for Godwhile here on earth. Hewrote:Forperfecthappinessmereknowledgeisnotenough,unaccompaniedbylove,andtheloveofAllahcannottakepossessionofaman'shearttillitbepurifiedfromloveof theworld, which purification can only be effected by abstinence and austerity.Whileheisinthisworldaman'sconditionwithregardtotheVisionofAllahislikethatofaloverwhoshouldseehisbeloved'sfaceinthetwilight,whilehisclothesareinfestedwithhornetsandscorpions,whichcontinually,tormenthim.Butshouldthesunariseandrevealhisbeloved'sfaceinallitsbeauty,andthenoxiousverminleaveoff molesting him, then the lover’s joy will be like that of Allah's servant, who,released from the twilight and the tormenting trials of this world, beholds Himwithoutaveil.24Andinthelaterpartofthesamechapter,al‐Ghazzālīconcludeswith:HewhosupposesthatitispossibletoenjoytheloveofAllahisfargoneinerror,fortheveryessenceofthefuturelifeistoarriveatAllahasatanobjectofdesirelongaimed at and attained through countless obstacles. This enjoyment of Allah ishappiness.But ifhehadnodelight inAllahbefore,hewillnotdelight inHimthen,and if his joy inAllahwas but slight before itwill be but slight then. In brief, ourfuturehappinesswillbeinstrictproportionto thedegreeinwhichwehavelovedAllahhere.Tosumup,therearetwofactorsthataffectone’sattainmentoftheVisionofGod: knowledge and love. For al‐Ghazzālī, every person should strive tolearnaboutGodthroughhismanifestation increation,andeachoneshouldprepare one’s heart to love God by forming and shaping oneself andacquiring virtue. “For the nextworld is aworldof Spirit and of themani‐festation of the Beauty of Allah; happy is thatmanwho has aimed at andacquiredaffinitywithit.”25

23Alchemy,Chapter824ibid..25ibid.


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St.ThomasAquinasandBeatificVisionNowwegobacktoCatholicTheology,andseehowwecanunderstandwhatthe Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas wrote about the ultimate end ofhumanbeings.AquinaswroteinhisSummathat“Finalandperfecthappinesscan consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence.”26 Heemphasizes two points that he wants to focus on: “First, thatman is notperfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek:secondly,thattheperfectionofanypowerisdeterminedbythenatureofitsobject.”27WalterFarrell,OP,explainsthat,Theobjectofhispursuitofhappiness is notoutsidemanand in theuniverse; it isnotwithinman,bodyorsoul…Itisstillreal,stilldecidedlyobjective,thisbeatifyingobject–butitisabovemanandtheuniverse.Itistheanswertothehumancapacityto desire all goods and be satisfied with none; it is the final good that can leavenothing to be desired; it is the absolutely universal good, outside and aboveman,outsideand above theworld,outsideand aboveany good thatbears the brandoflimitation,ofparticularity.28Aquinas further states that, “For perfect happiness the intellect needs toreachtheveryEssenceof theFirstCause.”29 Thisaffirmswhathewrote inthe firstpartofhisSumma,whereAquinasdiscussedhowwecanpossiblyknowGod. To beginwith, he acknowledges the greatness of God, and thelimitationofhumancomprehension:Sinceeverythingisknowableaccordingasitisactual,God,Whoispureactwithoutany admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what issupremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, onaccount of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example,thesun,whichissupremelyvisible,cannotbeseenbythebatbyreasonofitsexcessoflight.30Aquinas continues to affirm the possibility of knowing God and God’sessence:Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see theessenceofGod.Thisopinion,however,isnottenable.Forastheultimatebeatitudeof man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of hisintellect;ifwesupposethatthecreatedintellectcouldneverseeGod,itwouldeither

26STI‐II,q.3,a.827ibid.28WalterFarrell,ACompaniontotheSumma:ThePurtsuitofHappinessVol.2,(NewYork:Sheed&Ward,1939),13.29STI‐II,q.3,a.830ibid.


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never attain to beatitude, or its beatitudewould consist in something else besideGod;whichisopposedtofaith.Fortheultimateperfectionoftherationalcreatureistobefoundinthatwhichistheprincipleofitsbeing;sinceathingisperfectsofarasitattainstoitsprinciple.Furtherthesameopinionisalsoagainstreason.Forthereresidesineverymananaturaldesiretoknowthecauseofanyeffectwhichhesees;and thenceariseswonderinmen.But if theintellectoftherational creaturecouldnotreachsofarastothefirstcauseofthings,thenaturaldesirewouldremainvoid.HenceitmustbeabsolutelygrantedthattheblessedseetheessenceofGod.31How is this possible for the limited human person to have a grasp of a“vision”of the invisible “DivineEssence?” PaulA.Macdonald, Jr., associateprofessor of Christianity at Bucknell University, in Lewisburg, PA, explainsthat for Aquinas, the power to “see” the divine essence is a supernaturalcognitivecapacitygiventotheintellectbyGod,therebymakingtheintellectlikeGod inorderthat itspossessorsmayparticipateorshare inGod’sownself‐knowledge (without, of course, possessing that knowledgethemselves).32AnnaWilliams,a lecturer inPatristicandMedievalTheologyat theUniversityofCambridge,pointsout thatwhilebeatificknowledgeofGod and God’s self‐knowledge share the same object, that is, the divineessence,thereisstillaverybigdifferenceinhowthehumanpersonandGodwillperceivethecommonobjectofknowledge.Shewrites:The creature possesses knowledge according to its own nature; it may be liftedbeyonditsowncapacities,butsuchgraceperfectsnatureratherthandestroyingit.Godalsoknowshimself according to his ownnature,andsincedivineandhumannature are essentially distinct, the mode of this knowledge differs from thecreature’sknowledge,eventhough theobjectofknowing,God, is thesameineachcase.33And yet, this capacity to “see” the Divine Essence does not operateindependently of our already developed natural intellectual capacities, andneitherdoesitsupersedeorreplacethosecapacities.34Thiscapacityisagift 31ibid.32Cf.PaulMacdonald,Jr.,“TheEschatologicalCharacterofourKnowledgeofGod.”ModernTheology22:2(April2006),259.AnnaWilliams,whomMacdonaldcitedfrom,arguesthatwhilebeatificknowledgeofGodandGod’sself‐knowledgesharethesameobject—namely,thedivineessence—theystilldifferradicallyinthemodeinwhichtheyareappropriated.Shewrites:“Thecreaturepossessesknowledgeaccordingtoitsownnature;itmaybeliftedbeyonditsowncapacities,butsuchgraceperfectsnatureratherthandestroyingit.Godalsoknowshimselfaccordingtohisownnature,andsincedivineandhumannatureareessentiallydistinct,themodeofthisknowledgediffersfromthecreature’sknowledge,eventhoughtheobjectofknowing,God,isthesameineachcase.”Cf.AnnaWilliams,TheGroundofUnion(NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),97.33AnnaWilliams,TheGroundofUnion(NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999),97.34Cf.ibid.GraceinAquinas’stheologyneverreplacesordoesviolencetonature;rather,italwayselevatesnature:“Grace...doesnotaddtothehumanpersonbycreatingnewfacultiesandthuschangingessentiallythestructureofthehumanbeingbutbyextendingtherangeofpossibilityofthosefacultiesthepersonalreadypossesses.Graceisbothforeignto


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from God himself. It is a special grace that he bestows upon the blessed.Grace never replaces nature; rather, it elevates nature. Williams explainsthis:Grace… does not add to the human person by creating new faculties and thuschangingessentiallythestructureofthehumanbeingbutbyextendingtherangeofpossibilityof thosefacultiesthepersonalreadypossesses.Graceisbothforeign tous,inthesensethatitseffectsliebeyondtheattainmentofournatureitself,andyetnatural to us in that it does not violate or alter the composition of our nature,workinginsteadthroughthatnature.35Macdonald points out that according to Aquinas, the blessed “see” God bymeans of a “supernatural disposition,” or a “supernatural increase orextension of their natural intellective powers of cognition afforded by thelight of glory that specifically strengthens and perfects the mind.”36 AsAquinasexplains,“ThislightisnecessarytoseetheessenceofGod,notasalikeness in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect,strengthening it toseeGod.Therefore itmaybesaidthat this light isnotamedium in which God is seen, but one by which He is seen; and such amediumdoesnottakeawaytheimmediatevisionofGod.”37AnotherinterestingpointaboutAquinas’notionofthebeatificvisionisthathebelievesthattheDivineEssenceisoneandthesame,butpeoplewillnothave the same perception of the Divine Essence. This difference inparticipation in the beatific vision is explained in his treatiseOn Love andCharity,apartofhisCommentaryontheSentencesofPeterLombard.Aquinaswrote:Now,theobjectoftheactivityinwhichbeatitudeconsistsisaltogetheroneandthesame,namely,theDivineEssence,fromthevisionofwhichallwillbeblessed;henceon its side therewill not be any level in beatitude. But on the side of the actingsubject,theactivityofbeatitudewillnotbeperfectinthesameway,sinceinsofarasthe habit thatbrings toperfection theaforesaidactivity, namely the light ofglory,willbemoreperfectinonethaninanother,tothatextentthisactivitywillbemoreperfectandthedelightgreater;andfromthisvantage,alltheblessedwillnotbeinthesamelevelofbeatitude.38

us,inthesensethatitseffectsliebeyondtheattainmentofournatureitself,andyetnaturaltousinthatitdoesnotviolateoralterthecompositionofournature,workinginsteadthroughthatnature.”Williams,37.35Williams,37.36ibid.37STI.12.5ad2.38ThomasAquinas,OnLoveandCharity:Readingsfromthe“CommentaryontheSentencesofPeterLombard.”TranslatedbyPeterAKwasniewski,ThomasBolinandJosephBolin.Washington,D.C.:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,2008),382.InIVSententiarum,d.49,q.1,a.4,qa.2


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Whyisthereadifference?Aquinasanswersthisquestioninanothersectionof the samework, explaining that one’s perception of the beatific vision isproportionaltoone’sloveforGod:ThemorejoinedsomeonewillbetoGod,themorehewillbeblessed.ButthemodeofunionwithGodfollowsthemodeofcharity.Therewillthereforebedifferencesinbeatitude according to differences in charity. Further, as one thing taken simplyfollowsupon another taken simply, so a greater degree of the one followsupon agreater degree of the other. But having beatitude follows upon having charity.Thereforehavingmorebeatitudefollowsafterhavingmorecharity.39AnAttemptataComparativeMomentHowdoweapproachSt.ThomasAquinas’ teachingabout theVisionof theDivineEssence,inthelightofourreadingofthewritingsofImamal‐GhazzālīonhisnotionoftheVisionofGod?Imam al‐Ghazzālī helps us to understand how it is possible to know theunknowable God. In his writings, al‐Ghazzālī reflected on the question:“What is thepleasureof seeing something thathasnodimension, shapeorcolor?”40Heexplains,inhisconfidentteachingstyle,Knowthatthis isbaseduponfourprinciples:First, thatyouknowthatseeingGodMostHighismorepleasant. Second,thatyouknowthatthegnosis[orknowledge]of GodMostHigh ismore pleasant than all things other than He. Third, that youknow that the ease andpleasurewhich is reserved to the heart ismorepowerfulandstrongerthananypleasureoftheeye,ear,ortheothersenses.Ifyouknowallthese,itwillnecessarilybecomeclearthatitisnotpossibleforanythingtobemorepleasurablethanseeingGodMostHigh.41Aquinas’ explanation of the degrees of beatitude can also be betterunderstood through al‐Ghazzālī’s explanation that one’s Vision of God iscommensuratetoone’sloveforGod.Howdoesitwork?Al‐GhazzālīteachesthatonecangrowinvirtuealsobydevelopingadesiretoexperiencetheloveofGodandturningawayfromtheevilsoftheworld.Itisimportanttogrowinthe loveofGodwhileweare living,sothatwhenthedaycomesthatwepass to the next life, the knowledge and love thatwe have for Godwill betransformed into the best vision of God that brings us delight and truehappiness. Al‐Ghazzālī describes love for God in his writings on Love,Longing,andContentmentas“themostexaltedofthestations”andthatitisthe “objective of all the stations,” when he writes, “The ultimate rule of

39ibid.,386.InIVSententiarum,d.49,q.1,a.4,qa.4.40MuhammadNurAbdusSalam,trans.AlGhazalionLove,LongingandContentment(Chicago:GreatBooksoftheIslamicWorld,2002),30.41ibid.


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perfectionoftheservantofGodisthattheloveofGodMostHightriumphinhisheart,sothathistotalityisengulfed(bythat).”42AllMuslimsagreethatthe loveofGod isareligiousobligation. “ApersondoesnothavecompletefaithuntilhelovesGodMostHighandtheMessengermorethanallelse.”43Al‐Ghazzālīfurtherwrites:“Theyasked:‘Whatisfaith?’Hereplied:‘ThatoneloveGodandtheMessengermorethanhiskin,family,wealth,allmankind.’Andhesaid: ‘Aservant(ofGod)isnotabelieveruntilhelovesGodandtheMessengermorethanhiskin,family,wealth,allmankind.”44LoveforGodisclosely identified with faith, and the object of faith and the object of theVisionofGodareoneandthesame.Thewritingsofal‐Ghazzālīclearlyshowhisprojectofformationoftheheartof the human person. Burrell notes that the heart is the center of al‐Ghazzālī’s anthropology, togetherwith its desires.45 “The heart recognizesthevoiceofitscreatorintherecitationoftheQur’an,andtheheartrespondsto that voice, albeit erratically.”46 Al‐Ghazzālī holds that a human being’s“peculiarglory” is theaptitudewhichhehas for thathighestof all kindsofknowledge, the knowledge of God.47 It is the heart that is the core of thehumanperson, and through it thatone can come to the knowledge ofGodwhichone seeks. In thebookMarvels of theHeart, al‐Ghazzālī clarifieshisconceptof“heart”andstartsdevelopinghisprojectofvirtueformation.Foral‐Ghazzālī, theheart is theseatofknowledgeandheusesaverypowerfulimage,thatofthemirror.HeexplainsKnowthat the seatofknowledge is theheart,bywhich Imean the subtle tenuoussubstance that rules all the parts of the body and is obeyed and served by all itsmembers.Initsrelationshiptotherealnatureofintelligible,itislikeamirrorinitsrelationshiptotheformsofchangingappearances.Forevenasthatwhichchangeshas a form, and the image of that form is reflected in themirror and representedtherein,soalsoeveryintelligiblehasitsspecificnature,andthisspecificnaturehasaformthatisreflectedandmademanifestinthemirroroftheheart.48

42“TheultimateruleofperfectionoftheservantofGodisthattheloveofGodMostHightriumphinhisheart,sothathistotalityisengulfed(bythat).”Ibid.,15.43“ApersondoesnothavecompletefaithuntilhelovesGodMostHighandtheMessengermorethanallelse.”ibid.,16.44“Theyasked:‘Whatisfaith?’Hereplied:‘ThatoneloveGodandtheMessengermorethanhiskin,family,wealth,allmankind.’Andhesaid:‘Aservant(ofGod)isnotabelieveruntilhelovesGodandtheMessengermorethanhiskin,family,wealth,allmankind.”OnLove,LongingandContentment,1645DavidBurrell,FriendshipandWaysofTruth,(NotreDame:NotreDameUniversityPress,2000),78.46ibid.47MuhammadIHozienandValerieJ.Turner,eds.,AlGhazaliTheMarvelsoftheHeartBook21oftheRevivalofReligiousSciences(Louisville:FonsVitae,2010),xx.48“Knowthattheseatofknowledgeistheheart,bywhichImeanthesubtletenuoussubstancethatrulesallthepartsofthebodyandisobeyedandservedbyallitsmembers.Initsrelationshiptotherealnatureofintelligible,itislikeamirrorinitsrelationshiptotheformsofchangingappearances.Forevenasthatwhichchangeshasaform,andtheimageof


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Heillustrateshowthemirrorcanbeorientedtowardsreceivingtheimages,and applies it to how the heart can be prepared to eventually receiveknowledgeofGod.Themirrormaynotreflect theformsforfivereasons: first,defect in its formation,as, forexample,apieceof crude ironbefore it is turnedandshapedandpolished;second, because of its dirt and rust and dullness, even though it is perfect information; thirdbecause it is turnedaway fromthedirectionof theobject towardsomethingelse,as,forexample,iftheobjectwerebehindthemirror;fourth,becauseofaveilplacedbetweenthemirrorandtheobject;andfifth,becauseofignoranceofthedirectionoftheobjectdesired,sothatitisimpossibletoplaceitinfrontofthepositionanddirectionoftheobject.49Through the writings of Imam al‐Ghazzālī, I personally come to anunderstanding and appreciation of St. Thomas Aquinas’ explanation of hisnotion of happiness as beatific vision. All the more I appreciate that thehumanperson’scapacityto“see”GodasGodtrulyis,inHisDivineEssence,isadivineinitiativeandagiftofgrace.AsBurrellputsit,The point of encounter is the human heart, and the divine action is invariablydescribed as ‘removing the veil from one’s heart, in order that one can see withone’sheart,tobeelevatedtoGod’sownselfalongwiththosewhoarealreadyneartoGod.50ConclusionI follow David Burrell’s humble acknowledgement that it is “notoriouslydifficult” to speak for traditions sovariedasChristianityand Islam.51 Thisattemptatdoingcomparativetheology inreadingtheworkof twothinkerswho were both “given a central place”52 in their respective tradition,complimentedbythecommentariesofscholarswhohavedoneresearchonthem,isachallengefortheresearcherwhoisseriousinhisorherquestfor thatformisreflectedinthemirrorandrepresentedtherein,soalsoeveryintelligiblehasitsspecificnature,andthisspecificnaturehasaformthatisreflectedandmademanifestinthemirroroftheheart.”(ibid.,34).49“Themirrormaynotreflecttheformsforfivereasons:first,defectinitsformation,as,forexample,apieceofcrudeironbeforeitisturnedandshapedandpolished;second,becauseofitsdirtandrustanddullness,eventhoughitisperfectinformation;thirdbecauseitisturnedawayfromthedirectionoftheobjecttowardsomethingelse,as,forexample,iftheobjectwerebehindthemirror;fourth,becauseofaveilplacedbetweenthemirrorandtheobject;andfifth,becauseofignoranceofthedirectionoftheobjectdesired,sothatitisimpossibletoplaceitinfrontofthepositionanddirectionoftheobject.”MarvelsoftheHeart,36.50Burrell,FriendshipandWaysofTruth,79.51ibid.,68.52ibid.


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knowledgeofGod,whichultimatelyleadsto thehumanperson’s longingtobeunitedwithGod. Thehumanpersonhasadesire to reconnectwith theverysourceofhisorherexistence.One’sultimatehappinesscanbeachievedwhen one goes back to God. As one awaits thatmoment, one is called toprepare one’s heart, conforming it to the goodness of God, that it may beready to receive the grace of “unveiling” and “seeing God” in God’s DivineEssence.“Thebeatificvisionremainsagiftandagrace.”53BibliographyAlavi,HamidReza.“Al‐Ghazalionmoraleducation.”JournalofMoralEducation36,no.3:September2007.Al‐Ghazali,AbuHamid.TheAlchemyofHappiness,trans.ClaudField.Lahore:Sh.MuhammadAshraf,1954,accessedNovember27,2011,<http://www.sunnah.org/tasawwuf/alchemy.htm>.Aquinas,Thomas.TheSummaTheologicaofSt.ThomasAquinas,trans.byFathersoftheEnglishDominicanProvince,onlineed.2008,accessedNovember26,2011,<http://www.newadvent.org/summa/>._________.OnLoveandCharity:Readingsfromthe“CommentaryontheSentencesofPeterLombard.”TranslatedbyPeterAKwasniewski,ThomasBolinandJosephBolin.Washington,D.C.:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,2008.Aristotle.TheNicomacheanEthics,trans.byH.Rackham.NewYork:Putnam,1926.Burrell,David.FaithandFreedom:AnInterfaithPerspective.Malden,MA:BlackwellPublishing,2004.________.FriendshipandWaysofTruth.NotreDame:NotreDameUniversityPress,2000.Farrell,Walter.ACompaniontotheSumma:ThePursuitofHappinessVol.2.NewYork:Sheed&Ward,1939.Hozien,MuhammadIandValerieJ.Turner,eds.AlGhazaliTheMarvelsoftheHeartBook21oftheRevivalofReligiousSciences.Louisville:FonsVitae,2010.Macdonald,Jr.,Paul.“TheEschatologicalCharacterofourKnowledgeofGod.”ModernTheology22:2:April2006.

53GeorgWieland,“Happiness(IaIIae,qq.1‐5)”inTheEthicsofAquinas,ed.byStephenJ.Pope(Washington,D.C.:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2002),67.


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Salam,MuhammadNurAbdus,trans.AlGhazzaliOnKnowingThisWorldandtheHereafter.Chicago:GreatBooksoftheIslamicWorld,Inc.,2002._______.AlGhazalionLove,LongingandContentment.Chicago:GreatBooksoftheIslamicWorld,2002.Wieland,Georg.“Happiness(IaIIae,qq.1‐5)”inTheEthicsofAquinas,ed.StephenJ.Pope.Washington,D.C.:GeorgetownUniversityPress,2002.Williams,Anna.TheGroundofUnion.NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999.

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