Document of The World Bank

Report No: 27214

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(SCL-44200)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$111.11 MILLION

TO

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FOR A

HURRICANE GEORGES EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROJECT

12/23/2003

Finance, Private Sector Development and Infrastructure SMUCaribbean Country Management UnitLatin America and the Caribbean Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective November 30, 2003)

Currency Unit = Dominican Pesos (DOP) 1 Peso = US$ 0.025

US$ 1 = 40.20 Pesos

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS Country Assistance StrategyCCP Comision Coordinadora del Programa (Program Coordination Unit)CDE Corporacion Dominicana de Electricidad (Dominican Electricity Corporation)DGRS Direccion General de Reglamentos y Sistemas (General Directorate of Regulations and

Systems) ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the CaribbeanERL Emergency Recovery LoanGDP Gross Domestic ProductHDM Highway Development and Management ModelICR Implementation Completion ReportIDB Inter-American Development BankINDRHI Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hidricos (National Institute of Water Resources) IRR Internal Rate of ReturnNPV Net Present ValueONAMET Oficina Nacional de Metereologia (National Meteorological Office)ONESVIE Oficina Nacional de Evaluacion Sismica, Vulnerabilidad de

Infraestructura y Edificaciones (National Office for Seismic and Vulnerability Assessment of Infrastructure and Buildings)

O&M Operation and MaintenanceWMO World Meteorological OrganizationPAD Project Appraissal DocumentPIU Project Implementation UnitPMR Sub-Programa de Prevencion, Mitigacion y Respuesta (Disaster Risk Management

Subprogram)QAG Quality Assurance GroupSEOPC Secretaria de Obras Publicas y Comunicaciones (Secretariat of Public Works and

Communications)STP Secretaria Tecnica de la Presidencia (Technical Secretariat of the Presidency)

Vice President: David de FerrantiCountry Manager/Director: Caroline D. Anstey

Sector Manager/Director: Danny Leipziger Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Jose M. Alonso-Biarge

DOMINICAN REPUBLICHURRICANE GEORGES EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROJECT

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 55. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 116. Sustainability 147. Bank and Borrower Performance 158. Lessons Learned 189. Partner Comments 1910. Additional Information 20Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 23Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 25Annex 4. Bank Inputs 29Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 31Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 32Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 33Annex 8. Borrower's Project Completion Report 34Annex 9. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) -- Hurricane Georges Emergency Program

45

Project ID: P063201 Project Name: DO Hurricane Georges Emergency Recovery

Team Leader: Jose Alonso-Biarge TL Unit: LCSFTICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 23, 2003

1. Project DataName: DO Hurricane Georges Emergency Recovery L/C/TF Number: SCL-44200

Country/Department: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region

Sector/subsector: General industry and trade sector (55%); Roads and highways (20%); Irrigation and drainage (11%); Power (7%); Central government administration (7%)

Theme: Natural disaster management (P)

KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 09/30/1998 Effective: 03/11/1999 06/23/1999

Appraisal: 12/03/1998 MTR:Approval: 12/10/1998 Closing: 01/31/2002 06/30/2003

Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/SECRETARIA TECNICA DE LA PRESIDENCIA (STP)

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: David De Ferranti Shahid Javed BurkiCountry Director: Caroline D. Anstey Orsalia KalantzopoulosSector Manager: Danny M. Leipziger Danny M. LeipzigerTeam Leader at ICR: Jose Alonso-Biarge Eugene D. McCarthyICR Primary Author: Enrique Pantoja

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

The project was prepared in record time within an evolving emergency and reconstruction assistance framework supported by various development partners. Taking into account other projects and initiatives, project objectives were to: (a) help restore, or maintain, growth in key sectors of the economy; (b) support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of key social and economic infrastructure; (c) reinforce vulnerable infrastructure facilities in order to reduce losses and interruption of critical public services from future natural disasters; and (d) strengthen the country's institutional capacity to prepare for and respond to future natural disaster emergencies.

These objectives were highly relevant to the critical situation faced by the Dominican Republic in the aftermath of Hurricane Georges. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), due to this disaster, the country suffered US$1.3 billion in direct losses and US$644.5 million in indirect losses, equivalent to approximately 12 percent of GDP in 1998. The disaster, which killed almost 300 persons and injured 600 more, affected 70 percent of the Dominican Republic, including the capital city, Santo Domingo, and other important urban centers as well as key tourist destinations and agricultural areas. Funds were urgently needed to finance imports to help restore economic activity and to attend to immediate emergency reconstruction needs. Moreover, investment funds were required to rehabilitate or reconstruct social and economic infrastructure while applying improved standards to minimize losses in the future.

Importantly, the impact of the Hurricane underscored the country's weak disaster risk management capacity, characterized by a low level of emergency preparedness and response and an almost complete lack of disaster mitigation capability. Given the Dominican Republic's location and geography, building this capacity at the local and national level was, and remains today despite the improvement brought by the project, a key objective to ensure that future disasters will not hinder growth and poverty reduction efforts. The relevance of this objective has been emphasized in the latest Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the 2001 Poverty Assessment.

However, as detailed below, while the original objectives were well focused and comprehensive they were also too ambitious given institutional weaknesses, as well as the short project implementation period and the fiduciary requirements applied to the project. Among the various project objectives, longer-term institutional capacity strengthening was particularly challenging to achieve within the constraints of an emergency operation and inconsistent with the guidelines of OD8-50 on emergency operations.

3.2 Revised Objective:

Project development objectives were not changed during implementation.

3.3 Original Components:

Components were designed keeping in mind project objectives and other development partners' efforts. The main project considered was the Hurricane Georges Emergency Program, financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB-financed project and the Bank-financed project had similar objectives and their components complemented each other, and as agreed between the Bank, IDB and the Government, were implemented in parallel under a unified disaster reconstruction and mitigation program. In fact, both projects were part of a similar post-disaster assistance strategy followed by the Bank and IDB that

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consisted of reprogramming of investment funds from the existing country portfolio, as well as preparing emergency loans to finance urgently-needed imports (Bank) and recurrent social expenditures (IDB), infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction in sectors where each bank had a comparative advantage, and disaster risk management capacity building (see Annex 9 for further details on the IDB-financed project).

The project was accordingly structured into two major components and a small one to support project implementation:

Quick-disbursing Component to provide US$60 million to finance critically needed imports for the a.recovery program according to a positive list agreed with the Government. These imports included food for processing and/or for productive industries, medicine, housing construction materials, and chemical products. Retroactive financing was agreed for eligible imports purchased between the date of the disaster and the date of loan agreement signing.

Reconstruction and Mitigation Component to provide US$49 million to support rehabilitation and b.reconstruction efforts in three sectors, namely, roads and bridges, irrigation, and electricity; and to help strengthen disaster risk management capacity, including disaster preparedness and response as well as disaster mitigation.

Project Implementation Support to provide US$1 million to finance consultants such as the project c.co-management firm and independent auditors, equipment and other implementation-related costs.

The quick disbursing component was the responsibility of the Central Bank. The reconstruction and mitigation component was under the purview of a Program Coordination Unit (Comisión Coordinadora del Programa, or CCP in Spanish) in the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency (Secretaria Tecnica de la Presidencia or STP). Since CCP was responsible for the whole disaster program, it also had overall coordination and management responsibility of the IDB-financed project. A project co-management firm was financed by the Bank and IDB to assist CCP in its duties.

Project sub-components were directly implemented by the concerned line ministry or agency: the roads and bridges sub-component by the Secretariat of Public Works and Communications (Secretaria de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones or SEOPC), the irrigation sub-component by the National Institute of Water Resources(Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos or INDRHI), the electricity sub-component by the Dominican Electricity Corporation (Corporación Dominicana de Electricidad or CDE), and the institutional strengthening sub-component by a special unit within the CCP. Only SEOPC did not require the establishment of a new project implementation unit (PIU) because it used the PIU that was implementing the Bank-financed National Highway Project.

3.4 Revised Components:

Project components were not revised during the life of the project. Nevertheless, the disaster risk management sub-component evolved during implementation as it was not completely defined at the moment of Board project approval. To this end, US$5.7 million were left unallocated, in addition to funds allocated to INDRHI for several consultancies, equipment and works related to disaster risk management. During appraisal, the Government submitted an indicative Action Plan to restructure and modernize the institutions responsible for disaster management. Subsequently, as agreed between the Bank, IDB, and the Government, a participatory process involving concerned stakeholders was undertaken to finalize the disaster risk management sub-program (Sub-Programa de Prevencion, Mitigacion y Respuesta, or PMR

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in Spanish). This program, with a total estimated cost of US$11.4 million, was comprised of four components, one of which, vulnerability reduction of critical facilities and infrastructure, was financed by the Bank loan. The rest of the sub-program was implemented under the IDB-supported operation.

Once the sub-program was finalized, a new PIU was established in the CCP to manage it, after which terms of reference to implement the activities under the Bank-financed component were prepared. The whole process took almost one year and a half from the effectiveness date (almost two years after loan signing), leaving little more than a year until the original closing date to implement the sub-program. The closing date extensions granted by the Bank, which added about 17 months to the implementation period, helped to complete most of the project activities. However, due to the short span of these extensions (between 6 1/2 and 1 1/2 months) some of the activities under the Bank-financed component of the sub-program had to be divided into phases, a few of which could not be completed before the end of the project (see Section 4 for further details).

3.5 Quality at Entry:

Quality at entry was marginally satisfactory. This was an emergency operation prepared in two months, responding quickly and effectively to the Government’s request for post-disaster assistance. As such, we cannot expect the same level of preparation and readiness of a regular investment operation. In fact, to assess the quality at entry of an emergency project, it is important to consider that it is prepared in the aftermath of a devastating disaster that requires a timely and effective response. The latter demands an speed of project preparation and processing that does not provide enough time to deal in depth with all aspects of the project before it goes to the Board. Contrary to regular investment operations, there is actually a substantial amount of project preparation that needs to take place after the approval of an emergency operation.

The particular characteristics of emergency operations notwithstanding, there are some important aspects of quality at entry that should be emphasized in the case of this particular project:

First, the number of project objectives and the period required to achieve some of these objectives did not match well the short, three year implementation period allowed for an emergency operation. The objectives that would have benefited from deeper analysis include the reinforcing of vulnerable infrastructure facilities, and the strengthening of the country’s institutional capacity to prepare for and respond to future natural disaster emergencies. The need to build institutional capacity for disaster management had been made evident by the disaster. However, an assessment of whether an emergency operation was the best vehicle to achieve this objective, especially considering institutional capacity constraints in the country and, in general, the problems faced by other emergency operations in the Bank, was not undertaken.

Second, project implementation arrangements were not completely responsive to the country’s institutional context, characterized by weak inter-institutional cooperation and implementation capacity. The project was designed as a multi-sectoral operation requiring PIUs in four different agencies and arguably a central coordination unit. Although three of the agencies had experience with Bank projects, each PIU had different technical and implementation capacities and faced different bureaucratic procedures. In turn, developing a consolidated financial management system across all agencies – a disbursement condition for Components B and C of the project – became a complex, time-consuming task. This task was made even more complex by the need to include both the Bank and IDB-financed activities under the same financial management system.

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Third, given the complexity of the project, it was considered necessary to create a new Program Coordinating Unit (namely, the CCP). The latter was established under the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency, adding one more agency to the list of agencies and/or line ministries involved in the project. The CCP had to deal with the PIUs implementing the Bank and the IDB-financed projects. This proved to be a difficult job, even with the help of the co-management firm.

The above factors hindered the streamlining of implementation arrangements. Such arrangements are needed to ensure successful completion of three-year emergency projects, more so in Dominican Republic, where disbursements have traditionally been slow. It should be noted that, although its processing is streamlined, Bank fiduciary requirements related to procurement and financial management are the same for an emergency recovery loan (ERL) as they are for investment loans. Meeting fiduciary requirements (procurement, disbursement and financial management) particularly affected the start of project implementation, demanding significant effort on the part of the Borrower and Bank teams. While this situation was partially due to the fact that a good amount of project preparation was still needed after Board approval, it also indicates that emergency projects should be supported by more flexible requirements than usually applied to regular investment operations.

Finally, several studies and equipment related to disaster risk management were defined in the project appraisal document (PAD) and legal agreement, although it had been decided that the final disaster management sub-program would be defined in a participatory manner during implementation (see Section 3.4). This decision constrained the design of the sub-program and discouraged cooperation from INDRHI, the agency which had already been allocated resources for disaster risk management at the start of the project.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

Overall achievement of project objectives was satisfactory. Due to factors explained in Section 5, achievement of objectives required a project implementation period of almost four and a half years, or about 18 months longer than the three-year period normally considered for ERLs. (The emergency operation financed by IDB was also extended, which helped to maintain the synergies between the two projects).

The objective of helping restore or maintain growth in key economic sectors was satisfactorily achieved. While it is not easy to isolate the direct effects of the project on short-and medium-term economic recovery, much more so retrospectively, evaluations in other countries show that timely foreign exchange support to finance private sector imports in a disaster aftermath contributes greatly to economic recovery and/or maintaining growth. Dominican Republic had a dynamic, rapidly growing economy when Hurricane Georges hit. It had actually been among the world’s fastest growing economies since 1992. While this dynamism certainly helped the recovery, the project’s contribution can be expected to have been highly effective although relatively modest considering the total amount of foreign exchange provided and the delay in project effectiveness. Overall, according to the 2001 Poverty Assessment Report, despite the significant disaster losses, the country experienced a GDP growth of 7.3 percent in 1998. In 1999, GDP growth was up to 8.3 percent, not only higher than the 1997 rate of 8.2 percent but also the highest growth rate of the decade.

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Achievement of the objective of supporting the reconstruction and rehabilitation of key social and economic infrastructure was satisfactory. However, the immediate beneficial impact of the project in this respect was diminished as most of the damaged infrastructure included under the project could not be restored by the planned target dates. On the other hand, reconstruction and rehabilitation works were carried out under close technical supervision, utilizing improved hazard-resistant design and construction standards. Although no formal evaluation was undertaken, direct social and economic impact of rebuilding roads and bridges and flood mitigation works is estimated to be relatively high. According to available project data, flood mitigation works benefited over 2,500 people directly and helped to make over 15,000 hectares of key agricultural land safer. In the case of roads and bridges, the opportunity was taken to upgrade some road segments instead of rebuilding them to their pre-existing width and quality, which resulted in an improved road network and associated reduction in transport costs (see Annex 3).

Additional Bank assistance helped to enhance the achievement of the infrastructure reconstruction objective: first, US$24.2 million – approximately 14 percent of the existing country portfolio at the time of the disaster – was reprogrammed to provide immediate financing for emergency reconstruction and equipment needs in education, health, irrigation, and roads and bridges sectors. Second, in the latter sector, reconstruction works in 12 bridges were started before the emergency operation had been approved by adding these works to ongoing contracts under the National Highway Project (Loan 4127-DO). The financing of these bridges was compensated with resources from the emergency operation allocated for civil works for a road and two bridges originally included under the National Highway Project (see Section 4.2 for more details).

Achievement of the objective of reinforcing vulnerable infrastructure to reduce losses from future disasters was also satisfactory. The roads, bridges, irrigation infrastructure, and the transmission line and the Power Plant included in the project were reconstructed to better standards, keeping into account natural hazards such as high winds and earthquakes.

In addition to modest technical assistance, other project activities contributed to the achievement of this objective, including the preparation of a new national building code, a review of civil work supervision methods and practices, and a vulnerability assessment of dams and selected critical facilities such as hospitals, fire stations and schools. These activities resulted in several well received outputs which were being institutionalized by the end of the project. In particular, the National Office for Seismic and Vulnerability Assessment of Infrastructure and Buildings (Oficina Nacional de Evaluacion Sismica, Vulnerabilidad de Infraestructura y Edificaciones or ONESVIE) was established by a government decree on July 5, 2003, and made operational by a bylaw on September 23, 2003. ONESVIE will be in charge of reviewing and disseminating the final reports, and of implementing the recommendations given in the reports in cooperation with the corresponding government entity. The new building code is expected to be in effect by April 2004. To ensure enforcement of the building code, SEOPC was preparing a resolution to make mandatory the submission to that institution of all building projects for prior review and approval. To institutionalize improved civil works supervision practices, SEOPC reviewed the final guidelines prepared under the project to make the document more stringent, and was planning to make its implementation mandatory through a resolution. If carried out as planned, these measures will help to increase project impact. On the other hand, a key issue that was not addressed by the project, which might hinder project impact, is the need to strengthen the national capacity to ensure that the building code is actually applied on the ground. Finally, the objective of strengthening the country’s institutional capacity for disaster risk management was satisfactorily achieved, although marginally. This objective was the most challenging one, especially considering the initially short project implementation period, the multitude of agencies involved, the

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pervasive lack of inter-agency collaboration, the weak disaster risk management capacity of the country, and the need to coordinate with other development partners to maximize project impact. On balance, the project helped to increase knowledge of disaster vulnerability in the country while advancing the process to improve local and national disaster risk management.

Achievement of this objective cannot be assessed without considering the larger framework of the Sub-program for Disaster Risk Management, financed by both the Bank and the IDB. An important contribution of the project was that the sub-program was prepared through a participatory process that, for the first time, brought together all concerned stakeholders in the country. These included representatives of government agencies, NGOs, academic institutions and private sector. The process involved a series of workshops and seminars through which main institutional, technical and resource constraints were identified using the logical framework methodology, and conclusions and recommendations translated into the sub-program itself. Under the sub-program, progress was made in designing a National System for Disaster Risk Management which identifies more clearly the roles and responsibilities of different agencies and levels of government. These roles and responsibilities were made official through the Disaster Risk Management Law (Ley de Gestión de Riesgo) approved by Congress in September 2002. The law also mandates the establishment of a new, central coordinating unit for the system – the National Council for Disaster Management or Consejo Nacional de Prevención, Mitigación y Respuesta ante Desastres. These outcomes notwithstanding, making the national system fully operational and effective could not be accomplished before the end of the Bank-financed project. Further progress in this respect may be accomplished during the next months before the IDB-financed project also closes.

Two agencies were specifically targeted under the Bank-financed operation for building institutional capacity for disaster risk management: the National Meteorological Office (ONAMET) and INDHRI, which were expected to work together in establishing the national early warning system. In addition to financing one of the components of the sub-program, the project financed equipment, technical assistance and studies for these agencies (see details in Section 4.2). ONAMET and INDRHI were technologically stronger at the end of the project. Their data-sharing arrangements were being put in effect, albeit slowly. While ONAMET was receiving information from INDRHI, the opposite was not working satisfactorily. This was partially due to the fact that ONAMET had been recently transferred from the Secretariat of Agriculture to the Secretariat of Civil Aeronautics, which decided to revise the data-sharing arrangements between the two institutions. Additionally, it should be noted that many of the flood control and watershed management studies conducted under the project will not have any impact unless they are successfully implemented by INDRHI; and that operation and maintenance (O&M) remains a major challenge for both agencies.

4.2 Outputs by components:

The project had two major components: quick disbursement component, and reconstruction and mitigation component. Main outputs delivered under these components are discussed below.

Quick-Disbursement Component. The US$60 million provided under this component was fully disbursed shortly after the Loan became effective in June 1999. Over a third of this amount (US$22 million) corresponded to retroactive financing, which helped to mitigate the long delay in project approval by Congress. An experienced Bank consultant worked with the Central Bank to ensure eligibility of the imported goods proposed for financing as per the positive list agreed during project preparation.

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Reconstruction and Mitigation Component. Reconstruction and rehabilitation works under this component focused on three sectors: roads and bridges, irrigation and electricity. Whereas the first one was closely linked to the Bank-financed National Highway Project, the two last ones complemented sub-components included in the IDB-financed emergency project.

The Roads and Bridges Sub-component was the largest one, corresponding to almost one quarter of the total project costs and close to half of the funds allocated for civil works. As described below, this sub-component was divided in three phases. Given its link with the on-going National Highway Project (Loan 4127-DO), and revised rehabilitation needs, targets for and scope of this sub-component changed throughout the life of the project. At the end of the project, 209 kilometers of roads and 17 bridges had been reconstructed or rehabilitated (including a small amount to be completed with local financing).

Phase 1 included 12 bridges rebuilt with funds from the National Highways Project (US$4.5 million specifically), which was under implementation when Hurricane Georges hit the country. This decision was taken to accelerate reconstruction work. In turn, the financing of these bridges was "compensated" by allocating resources from the emergency project (Loan 4420-DO) to a road (Sabana Grande de Boya-Doña Maria, 18.5 km) and two bridges (Benito Moncion in Montecristi and Arasao) that had been originally included under Loan 4127-DO; and by transferring US$818,100 from the 4420-DO account to the 4127-DO account at the end of the project. All the 12 bridges were finished well ahead of the emergency loan closing date. However, Sabana Grande de Boya-Doña Maria was left paved with gravel due to the lack of asphalt AC-30. Since this road has a low traffic volume, SEOPC has some time to apply the asphalt pavement before the road suffers significant technical and economic consequences. In addition, works at Benito Moncion bridge could not be completed before the end of the project since it suffered delays related to problems with its foundation. The Borrower was planning to complete the bridge with local funds.

Phase 2 initially included 3 bridges (Chacuey, Maguaca and La Placeta) with a total length of 220 meters. Subsequently, four new bridges were added: Arasao and Montecristi (transferred from Loan 4127-DO), the access bridge to the Jimenoa Power Plant (the Jimenoa bridge), and the Yabón bridge. Bridges Arasao, Chacuey, Jimenoa, Maguaca and Yabon were finished by the end of the project. La Placeta bridge was not finished due to the unsatisfactory performance of the contractor, which forced the SEOPC to cancel most of the contract.

Phase 3 included five contracts covering several sections of partially or totally damaged roads with a total final length of 209 km. These are: (i) Cruce Palo Alto-Cruce Tamayo y Barahona-Enriquillo (only for three drainage works), (ii) Higuey-Nisibon-Miches, (iii) San Cristobal-Cruce Autopista Duarte y San Cristobal-Cambita, (iv) Hato Mayor-Sabana de la Mar, and (v) Jarabacoa-Manabao. The second and fifth of these contracts were successfully completed by the closing date. The other three were about to be completed at the end of the project, and the Borrower was planning to complete any remaining works with local funds.

The Irrigation Sub-component, which was fully completed by the project closing date, focused on both rehabilitation and flood prevention. Initial project targets were surpassed in the case of canals and river flood protection: the target for reconstruction and rehabilitation of canals was 17.6 kilometers while the final figure was 29.1 kilometers; and the target for river flood protection structures was 5.6 kilometers while the final figure was 6.4 kilometers. All 11 dikes initially planned for reconstruction were also successfully completed.

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Under the Electricity Sub-component, rehabilitation of the Jimenoa Power Plant was completed under the project. However, only the materials for the reconstruction of the 69 kv transmission line could be financed by the loan due in part to initial implementation delays. In addition, faced by uncertainty regarding loan closing date extensions and the extension periods, CDE had to agree to separate contracting of the financing of materials from the installation works. The transmission line is being installed by CDE with its own funds, and should be finished by January 2004.

Through the Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building Sub-component, INDHRI and ONAMET were provided with key equipment to improve the national early warning system as well as hydro-meteorological and seismic monitoring capacity. Specifically, INDHRI was provided with new telemetry and seismic networks, as well as with new bathymetry and communications equipment. INDHRI, at the same time, completed several key studies to improve flood hazard and watershed management in the country, including flood control studies in the main river basins of the country. Moreover, INDHRI successfully implemented a community-based program to monitor water quality (Programa de Cultura del Agua). ONAMET rehabilitated its manual meteorological stations, installed nine new automatic stations and one with sensors, and also acquired new communications equipment. ONAMET also received technical assistance from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to improve data monitoring and analysis, and to identify the equipment needed and prepare technical specifications.

Under this sub-component, several activities included in the Sub-program for Disaster Risk Management were also completed. As noted earlier, the Bank financed one of the four components of this sub-program. This component focused on vulnerability reduction of infrastructure and critical facilities, while the three remaining components financed by the IDB focused on building awareness and capacity among the population; on improving spatial / regional planning and environmental and natural resources management; and on establishing the national system for disaster risk management. More specifically, the component under the project included the preparation and dissemination of the new national building code and of a manual for improved supervision of civil works, in addition to vulnerability assessments of dams and critical infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, and fire stations. At the end of the project, the Building Code had been finalized and the unit in SEOPC in charge of making it operational – Dirección General de Reglamentos y Sistemas, or DGRS in Spanish – had been strengthened by providing it with new equipment and software. The vulnerability assessments and additional watershed management studies had also been completed. Further dissemination and mainstreaming of the code and the supervision manual is, nevertheless, needed.

A relevant additional output was the completion of the engineering design to improve drainage and flood hazard management in the Guajimía watershed, considered a high priority by the President of the country given the expected high beneficial social impact of the project. It is estimated that approximately 6 percent of Santo Domingo’s population lives in hazardous conditions along the 18 kilometers of the Cañada Guajimía, which is affected by floods not only caused by Hurricanes, but also by frequent albeit less intense tropical storms. A preliminary environmental and social impact assessment of the proposed engineering design was also carried out, which will help the Government seek financing for the project from development partners. The Government has recently approached several donors to obtain funds to implement the project in phases. Canada has expressed interest in financing the first phase.

The project also contributed positively to environmental management, although the majority of the complementary environmental management and regional planning activities were included in the IDB-financed project. The majority of investments under the project were for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, and did not have significant impact on the environment. The rehabilitation works in the irrigation sub-component, in particular, helped to improve conditions of the

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irrigation system as a whole in an environmentally friendly manner. In fact, some of the irrigation and flood mitigation works financed by the project were subsequently integrated under a major environmental management project developed for the watershed of the Yaque del Norte River, being implemented by INDRHI and the Ministry of Environment. The Programa de Cultura del Agua helped to improve water quality with the involvement of communities. Finally, the watershed management studies, if implemented, will likely have a positive impact on the rural environment.

A list of the main studies financed under the project is provided in Annex 7.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

Since the project was an emergency loan, prior economic analysis was not required to justify the infrastructure to be reconstructed. However, in Annex 3, this type of analysis is presented for investments under the road sub-component.

In regular investment operations the roads to be financed are selected during the preparation stage following agreed economic criteria. In contrast, the roads included under the emergency project and the scope of works were selected and defined during project implementation based on the extent of damage caused by Hurricane Georges and the available resources. As such, the PAD ex-ante economic evaluation lists standard economic returns for typical roads and road works. The scope of works for some roads changed during project implementation, evolving from surface distress repairs to full rehabilitation and reconstruction given availability of resources and additional technical needs of each road. Accordingly, the ex-post economic evaluation was done to assess if these investments were also justified from an economic perspective.

The ex-post economic evaluation covered the rehabilitation and reconstruction works for roads included in the project (about 209 km). It was carried out using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4), which is the new version of HDM-III. The HDM-4 Model was first used to simulate an ex–ante economic evaluation for each road project, which was then compared with an ex-post evaluation. An evaluation period of 20 years and a discount rate of 12 percent were assumed for both evaluations, while all costs are expressed in 2002 US Dollars.

The results show that, with the exception of the Sabana Grande de Boya-Doña Maria section, all projects are economically justified under the ex-ante or ex-post scenarios, with rates of return higher than 12 percent. Due to high actual costs, the Sabana Grande de Boya-Doña Maria section has an ex-post marginal economic rate of return of 11 percent. The resulting benefits for each road project stem from reasonable investment costs and the damaged road condition found before the project due to Hurricane Georges. For the eight projects analyzed, the overall ex-post IRR is 29.9 percent (against 21 percent estimated in the PAD), which corresponds to a total NPV of US$15.4 million.

4.4 Financial rate of return:

N.A.

4.5 Institutional development impact:

The project had a modest institutional development impact. At the end of the project, progress has been made in designing the National System for Disaster Risk Management with the help of international consultants financed by the IDB project; and in translating this design into a national law and taking initial

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steps to make the system operational. After the earthquake that hit the area of Puerto Plata on September 23, 2003, causing some losses of human lives and significant physical damage, the system's response was encouraging.

Despite this progress, the country still has a way to go before its disaster risk management capacity reaches an optimum level. Further improvement in inter-agency coordination is still needed, while technical capacity in various areas and focus on disaster mitigation (i.e., ex-ante measures and activities) need further strengthening. Moreover, the future evolution of institutional capacity at the local and national levels remains uncertain.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

The defeat of the governing party in the May 1998 congressional elections had redirected all parties’ attention towards short-term political considerations aimed at ensuring victory in the 2000 presidential elections. When the Hurricane hit, Government-Congress relations were not favorable. It was expected, on the other hand, that the need to respond rapidly to the national emergency would bring together the governing and opposition parties. The political impasse was not easily overcome, and congressional approval of the project was delayed until May 11, 1999 – five months after Bank’s approval. As a result, loan effectiveness date slipped from March to June. Due to a combination of lack of pro-activity and the complexity of the task, the disbursement condition of establishing the financial management system was only met in February 2000, when the presidential election was approaching. The change of government that resulted from the May 2000 elections slowed down project implementation, especially during the August-October transition period.

The above delays in effect reduced the original project implementation period to 18 months. The lost months were subsequently restored through four project extensions. Considering the above factors, the Bank granted a first extension of the Loan closing date from January 31, 2002 to July 1, 2002. To ensure achievement of project objectives, three more extensions were subsequently given, to January 15, 2003, May 15, 2003, and June 30, 2003, respectively. The final extension until June 30, 2003, was agreed primarily to allow the completion of the roads and bridges sub-component, which was affected by a suspension of supplies of asphalt products during the January-April 2003 crisis in Venezuela that paralyzed major road works (the suspension extended beyond April 2003 due to political problems that developed between the two countries). This problem added to the delay in counterpart funds that this sub-component had been experiencing throughout the life of the project (see Section 5.3).

The institutional strengthening sub-component was one of the most affected by the initial delays. A pre-requisite for the sub-program was a diagnostic of national disaster management capacity involving all concerned agencies, for which there was not enough time during the short project preparation period. The participatory process, led by IDB, to define the sub-program and its activities could not be started until July 1999, and the program itself would not be finalized until December 1999. As a result, neither the Bank nor IDB could decide on the activities of the sub-program to be financed under their respective emergency projects until January 2000; and the PIU needed to oversee the sub-program could not be established until after this date. Finally, terms of reference for the consultancies, technical specifications for equipment, and other required procurement documents, could not be prepared without knowing both the type of activities comprising the sub-program and which of the banks was financing them; and without having a fully functional PIU.

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Implementation of the electricity sub-component experienced difficulties in achieving full speed since CDE was under restructuring when the project began. As a result, organizing the PIU took time and its staff was constantly changed. In addition, the Government had decided to start the bidding process for the rehabilitation of Jimenoa Power Plant on its own without following Bank procedures. Consequently, a decision had been made to take this activity off the project. After several months had been lost, CDE realized that it did not have enough funds to complete the plant’s rehabilitation and stopped the process. After the Bank agreed again to include the power plant under the project, more time was lost as the first bid for the plant's rehabilitation works had to be declared unresponsive.

Starting in 2001, project implementation has also been affected by the deteriorating economic and fiscal outlook of the country. This year, economic growth has slowed down significantly while the fiscal situation has become more difficult. At the same time, the Dominican peso has lost more than half of its value vis-a-vis the dollar. Recently, a banking crisis has not only strained the government's treasury but also created inflationary pressures. Moreover, the country has also experienced some political unrest.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

While awaiting congressional approval of the project, the Government was not pro-active enough in ensuring that the CCP would be ready to start implementation at an accelerated pace and in finding staff with sufficient experience in Bank projects. CCP was not given adequate office space until January 2000, six months after project effectiveness. Moreover, the co-management firm hired to help the CCP was not utilized effectively during the critical project start up time because no clear delineation of duties and responsibilities had been established between CCP and the firm. Under these circumstances, important initial tasks such as development of the consolidated financial management system could not advance at the necessary speed. In fact, to avoid a near paralysis of the project, an exception was given by the Bank and the disbursement condition of having the system operational was considered fulfilled on the basis of an agreed Action Plan. SEOPC was the only implementing agency ready to start, given that it had good experience with Bank-financed projects, and its financial management system was used as a basis to develop the overall system adopted for the project. The CCP was never sufficiently empowered by the Government to facilitate project implementation across the various concerned agencies. It did not help that the head of CCP – the Executive Secretary – was changed three times in the first two years of the project, and that the co-management firm also suffered a similar number of changes in team leadership.

Importantly, despite allocations in the annual budget, and the priority that should have been given to an emergency operation, the project suffered from an almost continuous lack of counterpart funding. As the deficit in counterpart funding accumulated, the problem became increasingly difficult, contributing to project implementation delays. As this problem became critical, the Bank conditioned further disbursements and a new extension of the closing date to clearing counterpart arrears to match loan disbursements according to the pari-passu established in the Loan Agreement. For reasons explained below (Section 5.3), the roads and bridges sub-component under SEOPC was the most affected by the lack of counterpart funds. In the case of this sub-component, delays due to lack of these funds were significant and resulted in increased costs of some of the civil works. In December 2002 the counterpart arrears were substantially reduced and the Bank resumed disbursements and granted the third project extension.

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5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

The CCP did not attempt to mitigate the institutional constraints resulting from weak official support. It took time to define its role and responsibilities, and was slow in adapting to the implementation pace of agencies such as SEOPC, which was carrying out reconstruction works and preparing bid documents before the emergency project had effectively started. As a result, the CCP did not manage to keep all agencies working at a consistent pace and to build a cooperative working environment among them. Initially, there were serious logistical problems regarding the flow of documents and requests for no objections between the CCP, PIUs and the Bank. Furthermore, getting all PIUs up to speed with Bank procedures and the financial management system took longer than expected. Although these issues were resolved, for the most part agencies maintained a compartmentalized view of project implementation, and each agency’s own interest tended to prevail over the general objectives of the project.

The CCP faced its most difficult challenge in SEOPC, one of the strongest implementing agencies. SEOPC found the role of CCP difficult to understand, given that, as mentioned above, SEOPC had good implementation experience while CCP was seemingly weak, particularly in the initial phase of the project; the roads and bridges sub-component under SEOPC's responsibility was of a considerable size and intermingled with the National Highway Project being implemented by SEOPC on its own; and that SEOPC was in a way implementing its sub-component when CCP was actually organized. For the other agencies, starting up implementation was a slower process due, to a great extent, to the more complicated bureaucratic set up under which their PIUs had to operate (not to mention that it took these agencies some time to organize their own PIUs). SEOPC, in contrast, had an experienced PIU, with more relative freedom to take decisions, process project documents and carry out bid evaluations. Given these circumstances, the CCP and rest of PIUs tended to perceive SEOPC as standing on its own regarding project implementation.

The above situation exacerbated the problem of lack of counterpart funding. The general tendency was to try to solve this matter individually, and more specifically to leave SEOPC on its own (given the size of its sub-component, SEOPC needed substantial counterpart funds). As a result, while at times one of the other agencies was given more counterpart funds than what it needed at the moment, the funds given to SEOCP were often insufficient, causing it to fall behind in payments to contractors for civil works.

5.4 Costs and financing:

Total project cost at appraisal was estimated at US$125.20 million, including physical and price contingencies (but excluding the Bank’s front-end fee of US$1,111,000). Of this total, US$60 million would finance needed imports (Component A); and US$65.20 million would finance the costs of reconstruction / rehabilitation works, institutional capacity building for disaster management, and project implementation support (Components B and C). The Bank was expected to finance 100 percent of Component A and about 76.7 percent (US$50 million) of Components B and C.

The final total project cost is US$126.66 million, out of which components B and C account for US$66.66 million. Bank financing totals US$110,848,785.11, because a total of US$262,214.89 remained undisbursed at the end of the project. This amount corresponds to an inappropriately advanced payment by the Borrower to a supplier for the acquisition of equipment that finally was not delivered, due to financial problems of the supplier. As a result, the Bank requested that the amount be reimbursed to the Project account. The Borrower provided evidence to the Bank that it had issued instructions to the appropriate

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Bank for the refund to be made. At the time this ICR was sent to the print shop, receipt of the payment to the Project Account could not yet be verified. Once the payment is received the amount will be canceled.

As detailed below, several sub-components experienced substantial cost adjustments.

The final cost of the roads and bridges sub-component is US$37.17 million, US$8.5 million or 29.5 percent over the initial estimate without contingencies. Cost adjustments under this sub-component were due to the decision to upgrade some of the roads, rather than reconstructing them to their original width, and unforeseen site conditions in critical road segments. Specifically, some road work included realignment, widening and pavement improvement beyond what was initially planned. A road segment in particular, namely Hato Mayor-Sabana de la Mar, required re-design and additional work to deal with unforeseen geophysical and geotechnical failures. Moreover, several bridges were made wider and higher. Finally, delays caused by problems with payments to contractors, which resulted from lack of counterpart funds, increased the costs of civil works.

In the case of the irrigation sub-component, the final cost is US$11.78 million, US$1.6 million or 12.1 percent lower than the initial estimate, without contingencies, despite that the initial targets were surpassed (see Section 4.2). The main reasons for this decrease in cost are the lower prices of civil works and the transfer of the acquisition of some prevention related equipment requiring training of personnel to the institutional building sub-component.

The final cost of the electricity sub-component is US$7.69 million, US$0.61 million or 7.3 percent below the initial estimate without contingencies, due to the decision to take the financing of the installation of the transmission line out of the project.

The final cost of the disaster risk management capacity building sub-component is US$7.85 million, about US$1 million or 13.8 percent higher than initially estimated, due to the fact explained above concerning the irrigation sub-component and the inclusion of the study of the Cañada Guajimía.

Finally, the cost of project implementation support increased as a result of the additional 17 months taken to complete the project.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

Sustainability of project benefits, as a whole, is likely, although in this type of operations the concept of sustainability is difficult to apply and evaluate. Inadequate maintenance of infrastructure is a major factor determining damages and losses at the moment of a disaster. However, scarcity of resources, among other things, make it difficult for the Government, particularly in the current difficult economic and political environment, to guarantee continued budgetary or institutional support to maintain the reconstructed or rehabilitated infrastructure. In the case of SEOPC, for example, the problem lies in the lack of both a sustainable financing mechanism for road maintenance and of an effective unit for road maintenance planning and management. The precedent under the project is not good: the agreement made during project preparation of having each implementing agency made a provision in their annual budgets for operations and maintenance (O&M) has not always been fulfilled. Simultaneously, the poor past record of some of the beneficiary agencies regarding maintenance of equipment and networks spread throughout the country does not bode well for the new equipment financed by the project. INDHRI in particular let its previous

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telemetry network broke down to a great extent because of lack of maintenance. Therefore, from the strict point of view of infrastructure maintenance, we could rate sustainability as unlikely.

However, another important aspect of sustainability is the institutional strengthening to address emergency situations. A major disaster provides a window of opportunity to make changes in the compartmentalized behavior of public sector agencies, and to push ahead to establish an effective disaster risk management system based on the existing organizational strengths. The project has helped to take some steps towards developing institutional capacity, providing the country with a long term organizational framework. (Although if the National System is not made fully operational and its Coordination Unit organized and funded, the momentum gained through the Bank and IDB projects, and the efforts of other development partners, might be lost).

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

The infrastructure rehabilitated under the project will be the responsibility of the respective implementing agencies:

The roads and bridges financed under the project are part of the road network managed by SEOPC, and are to be included in future O&M plans under its Road Maintenance Directorate. Likewise, the dams and channels rehabilitated will continue under the control of the respective departments in INDRHI, which have developed O&M plans. As noted above, however, carrying out periodic maintenance remains a challenge in the country.

The Jimenoa Power Plant, once the testing phase is completed, will be connected to the network and will operate according to a program to be prepared by CDE and approved by the Coordinating Agency of the Interconnected Electrical System. Maintenance will be carried out following the recommendations of the equipment manufacturers and existing arrangements in CDE.

In INDHRI, the telemetry network will be operated by the Hydrological Forecast Center and maintained by the Maintenance Section of the Hydrological Network. The seismic network and the bathymetry equipment will be operated by the Department of Dams and the communications network operated and maintained by the Communications Unit of the Administrative Department. The implementation of the actions recommended in the flood control studies should be carried out by the Planning Department and the Department of Special Programs and Projects.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:

Bank performance was satisfactory. The Bank responded in a timely and effective manner to the Government’s request for emergency assistance, combining the new emergency loan with reprogramming of investment funds from the existing portfolio. Parallel implementation of the Bank and IDB emergency loans was ensured by processing the loan in record time to meet Board approval targets agreed with the IDB. Good coordination with development partners during preparation resulted in a project that avoided duplication of efforts and fostered collaboration among concerned partners. This impressive effort notwithstanding, given the short processing period, no adequate attention could be paid to critical issues that subsequently affected achievement of objectives and sustainability. Nevertheless, this is something inherent to an emergency operation and should be adequately taken into account when evaluating

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performance.

7.2 Supervision:

Bank performance was satisfactory. On average, the Bank fielded three supervisions a year. At the beginning, large multi-sectoral teams helped the various implementing agencies in getting started. These teams helped the agencies carry out a good amount of work that is usually done during project preparation under regular investment operations. Furthermore, the supervision team also worked with the implementing unit in CCP and concerned stakeholders to develop terms of reference, hire the necessary consultants and ensure that the objectives of the sub-program of disaster management were successfully achieved. As stated by QAG after the Quality of Supervision Assessment for FY00, a lot of effort had to be put initially into the fulfillment of fiduciary requirements, which normally would have been done during project preparation, to the detriment of the longer-term aspects of the operation. QAG found the quality of supervision to be fully satisfactory.

It was also noted by QAG at the time of the FY00 supervision assessment that a multi-sectoral operation of this nature requires additional funds for supervision. Nevertheless, during FY00 and afterward, budget constraints kept the supervision team relatively small -- basically two to three team core members, including the Task Team Leader, who attempted to maximize the supervision budget to balance the skill mix of the supervision team, including institutional development aspects. Partially because of this, the Borrower expressed some times concerns that the Bank was not providing timely answers to its requests or inquiries. On balance, however, the various sub-components were well supervised.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

Considering the performance during project preparation and supervision, overall performance of the Bank is rated satisfactory.

However, QAG noted in its assessment that, as the implementation delays became more evident, country and sector management should have been more active in seeking to speed up project implementation. One area where the Bank could also have performed better relates to loan closing date extension, once it was recognized that the project would need several additional implementation months in order to achieve development objectives. The short span of project extensions, based more on internal budgetary issues rather than actual project needs, made it more difficult to achieve a steady project implementation pace. These incremental extensions, ranging from 6.5 to 1.5 months, increased the uncertainty about the future of the project, and constrained planning of activities and issuing of contracts to be fully financed by the loan. On the other hand, it should be noted that this project was an emergency operation and Bank management was flexible enough to consider extending it beyond its expected three-year implementation period.

Disbursement pace was highly uneven and relatively slow throughout the life of the project, but the Bank endeavored to facilitate disbursements -- by lowering the threshold for direct disbursements, first from US$250,000 to US$150,000 and then to US$50,000, for instance. The Bank, however, should have paid more attention to the specific details of the financing categories of the project. Often, there were differences between the Bank and the Borrower regarding allocation of specific expenditures under the various financing categories, which caused delays according to the Borrower. (A case in point is that supervision of civil works was included under civil works in the Legal Agreement, but the Bank -- following regular practice -- often entered it under consultant services).

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Borrower7.4 Preparation:

Borrower performance during preparation was satisfactory. The Government was very active in requesting Bank emergency assistance and supporting project preparation. The concerned agencies, at the same time, worked closely with the Bank, IDB, and other development partners to identify emergency assistance needs and define the overall reconstruction program. As a result, the project was prepared in record time.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

Government’s implementation performance was marginally satisfactory. Although relatively outside its control, the Government could have taken a more proactive and conciliatory stance to solve the political impasse in Congress and expedite project approval. More critically, despite its professed commitment to the project, the Government did not take sufficient interest in ensuring that the effectiveness conditions of the loan would be met on a timely manner. In addition, the Government did not take the necessary steps to ensure that counterpart funds would be available when needed by the implementing agencies, did not give enough support to CCP to ensure collaboration among implementing agencies, and did not ensure continuity of staff within CCP – a critical factor to maintain and improve project implementation pace.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

On balance, performance of implementing agencies was marginally satisfactory. Performance across agencies was, nevertheless, uneven. Performance of the Central Bank was satisfactory, ensuring efficient implementation of the quick-disbursing component. In contrast, CCP performance was unsatisfactory. In general, despite the lack of government support, CCP could have asserted itself more in order to increase cooperation among implementing agencies and ensure better use of scarce counterpart funds. At the beginning of project implementation, a financial analyst consultant had to be hired to strengthen CCP to support IDB-IBRD liaison in processing replenishment applications, reconciliation of accounts etc. Furthermore, CCP should have made an effort to avoid making unnecessary mistakes that reflect poorly on its institutional performance, such as paying in advance for equipment because the project closing date was approaching (eventually, the supplier could not deliver the equipment as it was bought out by another firm due to financial problems); and asking the Bank to reimburse to the special account for procurement of trucks after the Bank has paid the commercial bank holding the letter of credit for this purchase.

Assessed separately, performance of the implementing agencies of the infrastructure and mitigation component was marginally satisfactory.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Considering the ratings discussed above, overall Borrower performance was marginally satisfactory.

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8. Lessons Learned

Bank Disaster Emergency Assistance

Bank post-disaster assistance needs to be rethought in light of the experience not only of this project, but also of other emergency operations which had faced similar problems. Significantly, some of the most successful emergency operations designed in a similar way to this project required several extensions and on average a five year implementation period (against an initial three-year implementation period) to meet its reconstruction and longer-term institutional capacity building objectives. These experiences suggest the following:

ERLs require rapid preparation, smooth implementation, and project objectives that can be lachieved in a short period of time. Although the pressure to respond rapidly to a government’s request for post-disaster assistance is great, special attention should be paid to flexibility of project design and scope, realism of development objectives and monitoring and evaluation of project outcomes and impact. To the extent possible, emergency assistance should take advantage of available funds in the existing country portfolio. However, the impact of reprogramming of funds on the CAS and the development objectives of the affected projects should be carefully assessed. In general, initial assistance should be focused on repairing / rehabilitating critical social and economic infrastructure.

Medium-term objectives of reconstruction and rehabilitation to hazard-resistant standards and llonger-term institutional capacity building objectives should, as much as possible, be dealt with through separate means or instruments. For instance, reconstruction efforts could be included, when feasible, under sector operations through supplements to existing loans, and new lending. Institutional capacity building could be addressed through a technical assistance loan with a longer preparation and implementation period. In vulnerable countries such as Dominican Republic, natural hazard mitigation should be mainstreamed in regular sector investment operations and promoted through Bank-Government dialogue, technical assistance and analytical and advisory work.

The above strategy has already been successfully tried in the post-Earthquake assistance provided to the state of Gujarat in India.

Fiduciary requirements -- financial management and procurement -- should be more flexible than in linvestment operations, particularly in projects with relatively short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

Project Implementation and Supervision

The development effectiveness of emergency operations depends on how fast results are obtained on the ground. To accomplish this, ERLs require experienced and properly staffed PIUs empowered to take decisions – even if up to a certain level, supported by more flexible procurement and disbursement procedures than usually applied to regular investment operations. In this respect, the Bank should pay special attention to effectiveness and disbursement conditions since project start up may be slow down if these prove to be too stringent.

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Once it is clear that project extension is needed to meet development objectives, decision on the length of closing date extension should be made on the basis of actual project needs. Under the circumstances experienced by the project, closing date extensions may be needed in order to complete project activities, disburse the loan resources and meet project objectives satisfactorily. On the other hand, the experience of this project also shows that extending a project for a shorter period than it actually needs, due to budgetary or other internal matters, increases the challenge of achieving a good and steady pace of project implementation, while diminishing the chances of having a larger project impact.

Emergency operations that are multi-sectoral and also include mid-or-long-term institutional components demand a larger amount of supervision resources than investment projects and should be budgeted accordingly.

Sustainability

Provision for adequate operation and maintenance (O&M) of assets financed by the emergency operation should be a major concern from the beginning of project implementation. The Government should be aware that without proper O&M, the investments in rehabilitation and reconstruction may be lost again.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

Main comments given by the implementing agencies, including CCP, are presented below. A more detailed discussion is included in the Borrower's Project Completion Report (Annex 8).

Achievement of Project ObjectivesThe Borrower considered that the project had a positive impact regarding disaster risk management in the country, and in its recovery after Hurricane Georges.

Performance of the Government and Implementing Agencies The implementing agencies considered that in general the PIUs performed well. However, they acknowledged that some of the project implementation delays could have been avoided through more concerted actions on the part of the Government and themselves. These include, inter alia, streamlining of bureaucratic procedures (i.e, evaluation of proposals, negotiation and signing of contracts, etc.) that were not compatible with the emergency nature of the project -- especially in CDE and INDRHI; ensuring adequate flow of project funds and availability of counterpart funds; and improving the relationship between CCP and all PIUs.

Bank PerformanceIn general, the implementing agencies expressed satisfaction with Bank performance during project preparation and supervision. They appreciated the guidance given during project implementation. However, the agencies felt that the Bank was somewhat constrained in dealing with the implementation needs of an emergency operation, particularly regarding disbursement and procurement requirements. More specifically, the implementing agencies, excepting SEOPC, felt that often the processing of routine matters (i.e., requests for no objections, confirming opening of letters of credit, etc) took longer than necessary, and this resulted in project implementation delays. The agencies also felt that the lack of a local Bank staff with decision making

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capacity regarding these matters further exacerbated the problem.

(b) Cofinanciers:NA

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):NA

10. Additional Information

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

Economic growth maintained in FY 1999 and FY 2000

GDP growth was 8.3 percent in 1999 and 7.3 in 2000

GDP growth was 8.3 percent in 1999 and 7.3 in 2000

Infrastructure rehabilitated / reconstructed to improved hazard-resistant standards

Most physical rehabilitation targets had been met by May 2003, and infrastructure has been rehabilitated utilizing improved hazard-resistant standards.

Physical rehabilitation / reconstruction targets met, although some road works were completed after project closing date

Technical capacity and knowledge to reduce vulnerability of critical infrastructure increased

It was expected that studies and technical assistance related to vulnerable infrastructure would be completed by end of project

Studies and technical assistance related to vulnerable infrastructure completed

Early warning capacity of ONAMET and INDHRI increased

Activities to increase capacity of ONAMET and INDHRI were expected to be completed by end of project

Activities to increase capacity of ONAMET and INDHRI completed

Capacity of GSDR in SEOPC increased to ensure effective implementation of the new National Building Code

All equipment and software needed by GSDR had been acquired by May 2003.

Equipment and software is fully functional. Training on the building code did not take place before the end of the project.

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Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

Reconstruction of 19 bridges damaged /destroyed by the Hurricane

All bridges to be completed by end of projects

17 bridges reconstructed, 2 bridges to be completed with local funds.

Rehabilitation of 242.3 kms of highways affected by the Hurricane

About 205 kms of roads had been completed by May 2003. It was expected that targets would be met, but a few additional weeks were needed.

209 km of roads completed applying better technical specs and standards than originally planned

Reconstruction / rehabilitation of 17.6 kms of canals, 11 dikes and 5.6 kms of river flood protection structures

All targets related to reconstruction / rehabilitation of canals, dikes and flood protection structures to be completed by end of project

Targets surpassed: 29.1 km of canals, 11 dikes and 6.4 km of flood protection structures reconstructed and/or rehabilitated

Reconstruction of 11.5 kms of 69 kv transmission line

As agreed during project implementation, only the materials for the reconstruction of the transmission line were financed by the project. The Government was expected to finance the installation of the line.

Materials for the transmission line being installed with local funds

Rehabilitation of Jimenoa Power Plant including new equipment and civil works

Jimenoa Power Plant had been rehabilitated by May 2003

Jimenoa Power Plant is functional again

Protection of agricultural lands from floods (*) Estimated figure of agricultural lands protected from floods by end of project (4,400 ha)

Final data indicate that 15,000 Ha of agricultural lands were made safer from floods

Protection of urban land from floods (*) Estimated figure of urban land protected from floods by end of project (315 ha)

Final data indicate that 25,000 Ha of urban land were made safer from floods

Population benefitting from flood protection measures (*)

Estimated figure of population benefitting from flood protection measures by end of project (at least 10,000 people directly and indirectly).

Final data indicate that about 2,500 people directly benefitted from flood protection measures

(Additional) Engineering design to reduce flood risk along the Quebrada Guajimia completed

Additional output agreed during project implementation, and completed before end of project

Engineering design and preliminary environmental and social studies completed. Government has initiated discussions with donors to carry out the project in a phased manner.

1 End of project

(*) Targets for these indicators were not defined initially.

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)AppraisalEstimate

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Component US$ million US$ millionA. Quick-disbursing Component 60.00 60.00 100

B. Reconstruction and Mitigation Component B.1 Roads / Bridges 28.70 37.17 129.5 B.2 Irrigation 13.40 11.78 87.9 B.3 Electricity 8.30 7.69 92.7 B.4 Disaster Risk Management Capacity Building 6.90 7.85 113.8

C. Project Implementation Support 0.90 2.17 241.1

Total Baseline Cost 118.20 126.66 Physical Contingencies 5.80 Price Contingencies 1.20

Total Project Costs 125.20 126.66Front-end fee 1.11 1.11

Total Financing Required 126.31 127.77

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 30.20 24.50 0.00 54.70(0.00) (22.10) (18.40) (0.00) (40.50)

2. Goods 4.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 4.30(3.10) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (3.30)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 6.20 0.00 6.20(0.00) (0.00) (6.20) (0.00) (6.20)

Total 4.00 30.20 31.00 0.00 65.20(3.10) (22.10) (24.80) (0.00) (50.00)

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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 33.63 1.97 18.03 0.00 53.63(25.55) (1.38) (10.27) (0.00) (37.20)

2. Goods 0.06 0.30 2.65 0.00 3.01(0.06) (0.30) (2.65) (0.00) (3.01)

3. Services 4.85 0.00 5.17 0.00 10.02(4.85) (0.00) (4.68) (0.00) (9.53)

Total 38.54 2.27 25.85 0.00 66.66(30.46) (1.68) (17.60) (0.00) (49.74)

Table is based on latest estimates (December 16, 2003). About US$0.26 remained undisbursed at the end of the project

1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest EstimatePercentage of Appraisal

Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF.A. Quick-Disbursing 60.00 0.00 60.00 0.00 100.0 0.0

B. Reconstruction and Mitigation B.1 Roads / Bridges 22.50 9.60 24.16 13.01 107.4 135.5B.2 Irrigation 12.00 3.00 9.72 2.06 81.0 68.7B.3 Electricity 7.40 1.90 6.33 1.36 85.5 71.6B.4 DRM Capacity Building

7.10 0.70 7.37 0.48 103.8 68.6

C. Project Implementation Support

1.00 0.00 2.16 0.01 216.0 0.0

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Roads and Bridges Component

The ex-ante economic evaluation was done using the Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model (HDM-III), which evaluated 273 km of reconstruction works on eight unspecified road sections and yielded a Net Present Value (NPV) of US$19.8 million and an average Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 21.4 percent.

In regular investment operations, roads are selected for financing during project preparation following defined economic criteria. In contrast, the roads and the scope of works of the emergency operation were defined during the implementation phase taking into consideration the damage caused by the hurricane and the available resources. As such, the ex-ante economic evaluation included in the PAD presents 'standard' economic returns for typical roads and road works in the country. The scope of works for some roads changed during implementation, evolving from necessary surface distress repairs to full rehabilitation and reconstruction based on the availability of resources and the technical needs of each road. For this reason, the ex-post economic evaluation was done to assess if the investments were also justified from and economic perspective.

The ex-post economic evaluation, carried out for the ICR, covers rehabilitation and reconstruction road works (209 km) using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4), which is the new version of HDM-III. The HDM-4 Model was first used to simulate an ex–ante economic evaluation for each road project, considering: (i) contract costs, (ii) estimated traffic at the beginning of the evaluation period, and (iii) timing and duration of the road works estimated at the signature of the contracts. The simulated ex–ante evaluation was then compared with an ex-post evaluation, which considered: (i) actual costs, (ii) actual traffic, and (iii) actual timing and duration of road works. On both evaluations, the evaluation period is 20 years, the discount rate is 12 percent, and all costs are expressed in 2002 US Dollars.

Road Works

The ex-post evaluation considered eight road projects, comprising 209 km, which required an investment of US$24.6 million, representing about 50 percent of the civil works project costs. The table below presents the road works evaluated at the ex-post study.

Road Works Evaluated at the Ex-Post Study Road Road Traffic

Project Road Road Length Width 2001 Investment Number Section Work (km) (m) (vpd) (US$ M.)

1 Hato Mayor - El Valle - Sabana de la Mar Reconstruction 43.9 9.0 554 5.1 2 C/Palo alto – Tamayo Reconstruction 9.2 8.0 407 1.4 3 San Cristóbal – Cambita Reconstruction 11.0 6.6 2250 1.5 4 San Cristobal - Hato Damas -C/Duarte Reconstruction 27.1 6.6 326 3.1 5 Barahona –Enriquillo Overlay 47.5 10.3 991 1.4 6 Higuey - Nisibon – Miches Overlay 31.4 10.0 289 1.5 7 Jarabacoa –Manabao Reconstruction 20.0 8.0 881 4.3 8 Sabana Grande de Boya - Doña Maria Reconstruction 18.5 6.3 510 6.2

Total 208.5 24.6

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The projects include either pavement reconstruction with an asphalt layer (50mm to 100mm) over a granular base (200mm to 300mm) or asphalt concrete resurfacing. The investments represent actual expenditures on each project, expressed on 2002 US Dollars, which were computed by first expressing the flow of disbursements in 2002 Dominican Republic Pesos, using the Dominican Republic Consumer Price Index, and then converting the resulting Dominican Pesos to Dollars using the average 2002 exchange rate. The following table presents the resulting average actual unit road works costs for different work types. On the PAD ex-ante economic evaluation of typical road works, the estimated average reconstruction unit cost was US$127,100/km, expressed in 2002 US Dollars, which indicates that the actual costs are 1.4 times higher than the average costs assumed in the PAD.

Average Actual Unit Road Works Number Cost Cost Work Class Work Type Predominant Work Activity Projects (US$/m2) (US$/km) Periodic Asphalt Mix Resurfacing Overlay 40 to 59 mm 2 3.9 38,943 Rehabilitation Reconstruction Reconstruction Bituminous 8 25.1 178,473

Costs in 2002 US Dollars

The table below presents actual costs and contract costs per km, expressed in 2002 US Dollars, and the ratio between the actual and contract costs. The average ratio, excluding the Sabana Grande de Boya – Doña Maria section, is 1.1 indicating that the actual costs, on average, did not increase much in real terms above the contract costs. In the case of the Sabana Grande de Boya – Doña Maria section, the increase in cost was a consequence of the relatively high standards adopted for the repair, which was in fact a total reconstruction.

Actual and Contract Unit Road Works Actual Contract Actual Cost Cost per (M US$/km) (M US$/km) Contract Hato Mayor - El Valle - Sabana de la Mar 0.117 0.117 1.0 C/Palo alto – Tamayo 0.149 0.175 0.8 San Cristóbal – Cambita 0.138 0.095 1.5 San Cristobal - Hato Damas -C/Duarte 0.115 0.079 1.5 Barahona –Enriquillo 0.029 0.038 0.8 Higuey - Nisibon – Miches 0.049 0.041 1.2 Jarabacoa –Manabao 0.214 0.173 1.2 Sabana Grande de Boya - Doña Maria 0.337 0.094 3.6 Average 0.144 0.101 1.4

The table below presents the ratio of actual execution time per expected execution time when the contract was signed, showing that all projects exceeded the expected execution time. The average ratio is 3.20 indicating that, on average, road works took around three times the expected time to be completed. At the signature of the contracts, it was expected that the works will be done, on average, in around 12 months but the average actual execution time was 33 months.

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Actual and Contract Execution Time Actual Contract Actual Road Time Time Per Section (months) (months) Contract Hato Mayor - El Valle - Sabana de la Mar 37 14 2.6 C/Palo alto – Tamayo 36 5 7.2 San Cristóbal – Cambita 34 12 2.8 San Cristobal - Hato Damas -C/Duarte 34 12 2.8 Barahona –Enriquillo 33 12 2.8 Higuey - Nisibon – Miches 13 8 1.6 Jarabacoa –Manabao 37 10 3.7 Sabana Grande de Boya - Doña Maria 37 19 1.9 Average 33 12 3.2

Originally the scope of works planned for each road were designed to restore the passability and safety of each road by performing necessary surface distress repairs. However, during the execution of the road works, it was determined that there were enough project funds to perform not only basic repairs but to perform full rehabilitation or reconstruction works on some roads that would technically need this level of investments. Therefore, the changes on the scope of works partially explain the cost increases and the increase on the execution times.

Traffic

The table below presents the annual average daily traffic estimated for 2001. The average daily traffic is 776 vehicles per day, with one road (San Cristóbal – Cambita) having 2,250 vehicles per day. The study found that the average vehicle fleet composition is a) 30 percent cars, b) 41 percent pickups, c) 1 percent buses, d) 9 percent light trucks, e) 12 percent medium trucks, f) 4 percent heavy trucks, and g) 3 percent articulated trucks.

Estimated Average Annual Daily Traffic in 2001 Total Light Medium Heavy Articulated Road Traffic Cars Pickups Bus Truck Truck Truck Truck Section (AADT) (AADT) (AADT) (AADT) (AADT) (AADT) (AADT) (AADT) Hato Mayor - El Valle - Sabana de la Mar 554 71 291 7 50 102 19 13 C/Palo alto - Tamayo 407 99 77 8 56 115 13 38 San Cristóbal - Cambita 2250 1833 76 2 79 45 202 11 San Cristobal - Hato Damas -C/Duarte 326 40 260 7 0 17 2 0 Barahona -Enriquillo 991 202 609 2 38 34 84 23 Higuey - Nisibon - Miches 289 30 152 0 75 25 4 3 Jarabacoa -Manabao 881 470 267 8 30 29 40 38 Sabana Grande de Boya - Doña Maria 510 144 158 5 42 155 7 12 Average 776 361 236 5 46 65 47 17

Economic Evaluation

The HDM-4 Model estimated the net benefits of each project in terms of reduction of vehicle operating costs, passenger time costs and road maintenance expenditures, which occurs after periodic maintenance or rehabilitation works. The following table presents the results of the ex-ante and ex–post economic evaluations, describing for each road project, the Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and the corresponding ratios of the ex-post results vis-a-vis ex-ante results.

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Economic Evaluation Results Net Present Value (Million US$) Internal Rate of Return (%) Road Ex-ante Ex-post Ex-post Ex-ante Ex-post Ex-post Section Evaluation Evaluation Ratio Evaluation Evaluation Ratio Hato Mayor - El Valle - Sabana de la Mar 2.47 2.08 0.85 21.2 20.9 0.99 C/Palo alto - Tamayo 0.07 0.22 3.18 12.9 15.8 1.22 San Cristóbal - Cambita 6.00 4.90 0.82 85.7 56.7 0.66 San Cristobal - Hato Damas -C/Duarte 1.10 0.30 0.27 21.3 14.2 0.67 Barahona -Enriquillo 7.30 6.95 0.95 63.3 87.8 1.39 Higuey - Nisibon - Miches 0.41 0.23 0.56 19.3 16.1 0.83 Jarabacoa -Manabao 1.82 0.95 0.52 21.4 16.8 0.79 Sabana Grande de Boya - Doña Maria 3.61 -0.24 -0.07 47.5 11.0 0.23 Average 2.85 1.92 0.89 36.6 29.9 0.85 Total 22.78 15.40

The table shows that, with the exception of the Sabana Grande de Boya-Doña Maria section, all projects are economically justified, under the ex-ante or ex-post scenarios, with rates of return higher than 12 percent. Due to the high actual project costs, the Sabana Grande de Boya-Doña Maria section has an ex-post marginal economic rate of return of 11 percent . The resulting project benefits are due to the reasonable investment costs and the deteriorated road condition found before the project due to the damage done by Hurricane Georges. For the eight projects, the overall ex-post IRR is 29.9 percent corresponding to a total NPV of US$ 15.4 million.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation10/98 13 1 lead eng (TL), 1 macroecon, 1

lead highway eng, 1 community & social dev spec, 1 irrigation spec, 1 energy spec, 1 municipal eng & housing spec, 1 country lawyer, 1 proc spec, 1 disb spec, 1 disaster management spec, 1 FM spec, 1 resident rep

Appraisal/Negotiation10/98 Same as above12/98

Supervision05/99 3 1 lead eng (TL), 1 dis

management spec, 1 lead highway eng

S S

07/99 8 1 lead eng (TL), 1 env spec, 1 proc spec, 1 lead highway eng, 1 energy spec, 1 irrigation spec, 1 dis management spec, 1 FM spec

S S

09/99 1 1 lead highway eng S S

12/99 7 1 lead eng (TL), 1 env spec, 1 FM spec, 1 lead highway eng, 1 dis management spec, 2 early warning/meteorology spec

S S

03/00 2 1 lead highway eng (TL), 1 dis management spec

S S

08/00 1 1 lead highway eng (TL) S S

11/00 4 1 lead highway eng (TL), 1 emergency operations coord, 1 dis management spec, 1 proc spec

S S

2/01 3 1 lead highway eng (TL), 1 dis management spec, 1 FM spec

S S

5/01 2 1 lead highway eng (TL), 1 dis management spec

S S

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10/01 2 1 lead highway eng (TL), 1 dis management spec

S S

01/02 1 1 lead highway eng (TL) S S

06/02 3 1 lead highway eng (TL), 1 dis management spec, 1 energy spec

S S

10/02 2 1 lead highway eng (TL), 1 energy spec

S S

02/03 1 1 lead highway eng (TL) S S

ICR06/03 1 1 lead highway eng (TL) S S

10/03 1 1 consultant S S

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 32.70 118.30Appraisal/Negotiation 13.60 48.0Supervision 70.74 305.0ICR 2.27 25.0Total 73.01 496.3

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Disaster vulnerability reduction

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

BID. 1998. "Programa de Reconstrucción y Mejoramiento ante los Efectos del Huracán Georges -- Informe del Proyecto." Washington, D.C.: Banco-Interamericano de Desarrollo. Doc. DR-0135.

CCP. 2000. "Ajuste del Subprograma de Prevención de Desastres." Santo Domingo, D.R.: Comisión Coordinadora del Programa (CCP), Secretaría Tecnica de la Presidencia.

ECLAC. 1999. Republica Dominicana: Evaluación de los Daños Ocasionados por el Huracán Georges, 1998. Santo Domingo, DR: Sectretaría Tecnica de la Presidencia; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

Studies Financed under the Project

Codigo de Edificaciones de la Republica Dominicana

Diseño de Ingenieria para el Proyecto de Cañada Guajimia

Estudios Ambientales Cañada Guajimia

Estudio de Control de Inundaciones del Rio Yaque del Norte

Estudio de Control de Inundaciones del Rio Yaque del Sur

Estudio General de Control de Inundaciones

Estudio de Vulnerabilidad de Presas

Revision del Sistema de Supervision de Obras

Programa de Cultura de Agua en Cauces Yaque del Norte, Higuamo and Yaque del Sur

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Additional Annex 8. Informe de Cierre del Proyecto (Borrower's Project Completion Report)

SECCION I SUMARIO GLOBAL, EVALUACIONES Y CONCLUSIONES

El Marco Lógico del Programa que figura en el Project Appraisal Document de fecha 3 de Diciembre del 1998 define los Objetivos generales y específicos que han de alcanzarse con la implementación de este Programa, mediante los Componentes y Subcomponentes (proyectos) que se han de ejecutar para el logro de esos Objetivos.

Objetivos Generales

Impulsar el Crecimiento Económico y la Mitigación de la Pobrezal

Mejorar la Gestión Ambientall

Objetivos específicos

Ayudar para mantener la estabilidad macroeconómica, financiando costos de importación asociados lal establecimiento de infraestructuras y niveles de producción afectados por el paso del huracán.

Reconstrucción y rehabilitación de la infraestructura social y económica afectada o destruida.l

Implementación de mejoras en infraestructura afectada, mitigando posibles daños que puedan locasionar futuros fenómenos naturales

Implementación de un programa de fortalecimiento institucional dirigido a mejorar la respuesta ante llas situaciones de emergencia.

Componentes

Financiación de importaciones criticas con fondos de rápido desembolso1.

Obras de infraestructura para la reconstrucción en:2.

2.1. Carreteras y puentes dañados2.2. Sistemas de irrigación dañados3.3. Líneas de transmisión eléctrica dañadas y Rehabilitación de la planta de generación

hidroeléctrica de Jimenoa4.4. Plan de acción para la adecuación de las instituciones para el manejo de las emergencias en

casos de desastres

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EVALUACIONES Y CONCLUSIONES

SECCION II COMPONENTE DE DESEMBOLSO RÁPIDO

A.1.- Con el objetivo de ayudar a mantener la estabilidad macroeconómica, el Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia acordó con el Banco Mundial, el financiamiento de bienes importados por un monto ascendente a US$ 60 millones correspondientes a la Categoría A.1 del Préstamo. Este financiamiento no requería de contrapartida. Con relación a los tipos de bienes que pudieran importarse, se hizo constar en el Apéndice número 6 del Contrato de Préstamo una Lista Positiva (se anexa listado) o de productos elegibles entre los cuales se identificaron los siguientes: Granos, Aceites Comestibles, Semillas, Equipos e Insumos Agrícolas, Cemento, Materiales de Construcción, Maquinaria Industrial, Repuestos, Materia Prima, Equipos y Suplementos Médicos.

La unidad ejecutora de este componente, el Banco Central, presentó 3 justificaciones de importaciones elegibles para financiamiento por un valor de US$ 61,086,004.04. Que correspondían a importaciones realizadas entre el periodo del 23 de septiembre de 1998 y el 31 de diciembre de 1999.

Finalmente el Banco Mundial, aprobó mediante 3 desembolsos las partidas correspondientes al total del componente A.1, es decir, US$ 60 millones (se anexa resumen de productos importados), procediendo el Banco Mundial a desembolsarlos de la siguiente manera: Un primer desembolso de US$ 22,000,000.00, luego un segundo desembolso por: US$ 36,913,995.96, y por último, un tercer desembolso por: US$ 1,086,004.04, de esta manera se alcanzaban los objetivos de equilibrio macroeconómico fijados, al inyectarse al sistema esa cantidad de divisas.

SECCION III COMPONENTES REALIZADOS POR EL INDRHI

Alcance del programaComo consecuencia de los efectos del huracán Georges se identificaron 84 obras de la infraestructura del INDRHI que fueron seriamente averiadas en los diez Distritos de Riego que tiene esa institución en todo el territorio Nacional. El INDRHI estableció sus prioridades y finalmente se seleccionaron 16 de las obras dañadas para rehabilitarlas con financiamiento del Préstamo No. 4420 DO. Las obras incluyeron 11 diques de tomas para canales de irrigación, 3 obras de defensa de riveras de ríos y rehabilitaciones de canales y drenajes. El subprograma incluyó adquisiciones de bienes destinados a la prevención y consultorías para diseños de obras, para supervisiones de construcción de obras y para estudios específicos.

Detalles de las actividades ejecutadas se encuentran en los cuadros del anexo “INDRHI” de este informe.

ObjetivosLos objetivos del programa consistieron, principalmente, en restaurar la estructura dañada por Georges y, de ser posible, mejorar su no-vulnerabilidad ante la ocurrencia de eventuales fenómenos semejantes. Con el propósito de mejorar el desempeño del INDRHI se ejecutó El Plan De Alerta Temprana Mediante el cual se recibe información en tiempo real y permite hacer predicciones y tomar medidas oportunas ante la eventual ocurrencia de fenómenos naturales.

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CUMPLIMIENTO DE OBJETIVOS

A.- Cumplimiento de objetivos generales

Implementación del crecimiento económico y mitigación de la pobreza.El subprograma del INDRHI cumplió este objetivo con la rehabilitación de 16 obras que fueron retornadas a su nivel de producción existente antes del huracán Georges. El rendimiento y la no-vulnerabilidad de las obras rehabilitadas fueron mejorados en los casos en los cuales fue posible.

Mejorar la gestión Ambiental. La Secretaría de Estado de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARENA), de reciente creación, sancionó los proyectos de las obras rehabilitadas. La intervención de SEMARENA garantiza el cumplimiento de los requerimientos ambientales de esas obras.

B.- Cumplimiento de objetivos específicos

Reconstrucción y rehabilitación de la infraestructura social y económica afectada o destruida.Es evidente que este objetivo se cumplió con la ejecución del programa de rehabilitación de las 16 obras citadas anteriormente.

Implementación de mejoras en infraestructura afectada, mitigando posibles daños que puedan ocasionar futuros fenómenos naturales. Los diseños efectuados para la rehabilitación de las obras fueron concebidos para mejorar la no-vulnerabilidad de las obras a rehabilitar.

Implementación de un programa de fortalecimiento institucional dirigido a mejorar la respuesta ante las situaciones de emergencia. Este objetivo fue ampliamente logrado por el INDRHI mediante las acciones siguientes:

El restablecimiento y ampliación de la red sísmica del INDRHI permitirá monitorear las principales a.fallas geológicas y respuesta de las presas ante este tipo de excitaciones.

La modernización y ampliación de la red de comunicaciones del INDRHI permitirá una eficiente b.comunicación de informaciones hidrometeoro lógicas complementarias a las transmitidas por vía satélite por la red telemétrica hidrológica e informaciones de interés para la respuesta y mitigación de los efectos de eventos extremos.

Los estudios de vulnerabilidad de presas han permitido diagnosticar la vulnerabilidad de las grandes c.presas, así como las intervenciones requeridas en varias de ellas para mejorar su seguridad.

El estudio de control de inundaciones en la cuenca del río Yaque del Norte ha definido un plan de d.obras a ser ejecutadas a largo plazo, así como un plan de gestión contra inundaciones en la principal cuenca hidrográfica del país.

El estudio de control de inundaciones en la cuenca del río Yaque del Sur ha definido las obras e.requeridas para disminuir los daños en esta importante cuenca hidrográfica.

El convenio INDRHI - ONAMET es un hito importante en la coordinación interinstitucional para f.acciones conjuntas en la prevención como en la mitigación y respuesta.

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Evaluaciones

A.- DE LA UES Y LECCIONES APRENDIDAS.La UES del INDRHI fue creada para manejar el subprograma asignado al INDRHI dentro del Préstamo No. 4420 - DO. Dispuso de local para sus operaciones a partir de noviembre de 1999 y completó sus equipos de oficina en marzo de 2000. Tuvo a su cargo la preparación de los documentos de licitación y/o contratación de los diseños, de construcción de obras y de consultorías. Los procesos de licitaciones y contrataciones de obras se ejecutaron con la colaboración del Comité de Licitaciones del INDRHI y del Departamento Legal. La eficiencia de la UES en el desempeño de las tareas a su cargo fue satisfactoria, sin embargo hubo algunos retrasos en los procesos de evaluación de propuestas, firmas de contratos y toma de decisiones.

B.- DEL GOBIERNO DOMINICANORetrasos en aportes de contrapartida y lentitud en el flujo de fondos a través de la estructura financiera del Gobierno influyeron en la extensión de los períodos de ejecución de las obras.

Los alcances para los estudios de las obras construidas, particularmente el canal Jimani y el encauzamiento del arroyo tenguerengue en San Juan de la Maguana, se obviaron algunos aspectos técnicos, por lo cual podrían surgir futuros inconvenientes que afecten las obras.

C.- DEL BANCOLa UES se siente satisfecha de la oportunidad de respuesta dada por el Banco a los asuntos que le fueron sometidos.

Situación financiera original: El monto del presupuesto original fue de US$ 14,750,000.00 de los cuales el banco financiaba US$ 12,750,000.00 y el gobierno US$ 2,000,000.00

Situación financiera modificada: El monto del presupuesto modificado fue de US$ 15,469,335.79 de los cuales el banco financio US$ 13,398,938.69 y el gobierno US$2,070,397.10, lo que represento un incremento de US$ 719,335.79.

SECCION IV COMPONENTES REALIZADOS POR CDE

Alcance del programaLas obras que integran el Componente se refieren a la rehabilitación de una línea de transmisión eléctrica de 69 KV con facilidad para operar a 138 KV y a la rehabilitación de la Central Hidroeléctrica de Jimenoa.

Presupuesto originalLínea Palamara-Arroyo Hondo US$ 2,098,482.27Central Hidroeléctrica de Jimenoa US$ 4,524,258.73Consultoria US$ 1,073,297.81Bienes adicionales para las obras US$ 52,800.00Total US$ 7,748.838.85

El presupuesto original para la CDE de US$ 7,812,500.00 fue modificado por cambios sufridos en la tasa de cambio del EURO respecto al dólar, la adenda a la obra de Jimenoa y a las extensiones en los plazos de la consultoria de supervisión DECON.

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Los compromisos quedaron finalmente en US$ 7,748,838.85; Debido a que el contrato para la construcción de la línea de transmisión Palamara - Arroyo Hondo; fue modificado motivado por problemas con la fecha de ejecución del prestamo establecida al momento de la toma de decisión, a solo suministro de materiales.

OBJETIVOS

A.- Cumplimiento de objetivos generales.

Implementación del crecimiento económico y mitigación de la pobreza.El Componente de la CDE cumplió este objetivo con la rehabilitación de las dos 2 obras que fueron retornadas a su nivel de producción existente antes del huracán Georges. El rendimiento y la no-vulnerabilidad de las obras rehabilitadas fue mejorado.

Mejorar la gestión Ambiental. La Secretaría de Estado de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales SEMARENA, de reciente creación, evaluó los proyectos de las obras rehabilitadas, lo que garantiza el cumplimiento de los requerimientos ambientales de las obras.

B.- Cumplimiento de objetivos específicos:Reconstrucción y rehabilitación de la infraestructura social y económica afectada o destruida. Es evidente que este objetivo se cumplió con la ejecución del programa de rehabilitación de las dos obras citadas anteriormente.

Implementación de mejoras en la infraestructura afectada, mitigando los posibles daños que puedan ocasionar futuros fenómenos naturales.

Evaluaciones

A.- De la UES y lecciones aprendidas

Consultora de apoyo a las licitaciones: Para la CDE, el problema principal se derivo del proceso de capitalización que se llevo a cabo en la empresa. La reducción de personal en la UES disminuyó el número de técnicos y de personal administrativo, habiéndose presentado la situación de que en los cuatro primeros meses de ejecución fueron tres los coordinadores de la UES que se sucedieron, lo que lógicamente representó lentitud en la ejecución. Los atrasos se debieron a los numerosos trámites que tienen que seguir los documentos dentro de la institución. La participación de una empresa consultora para la elaboración de diseños y de la Cogerencia en procesos licitatorios y de seguimiento han sido factores de importancia para lograr la culminación de las obras.

Equipos informáticos: Con la adquisición de equipos modernos de informática se logro obtener mejor control de las actividades y mejorar la gestión de los proyectos

Sistema de control contable ¨SAF¨Este sorfware permitió un mejor manejo y control de los recursos externos y facilito la preparación de los estados financieros del programa.

B.- DEL GOBIERNO DOMINICANOLos fondos de contrapartida fueron suministrados desde el principio, por lo cual no existió atraso en el paripasu

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C.- DEL BANCOLos procedimientos de aprobación de actividades, las no objeciones y la confirmación de aperturas de carta de crédito, tomaron mucho tiempo, lo cual afectó la celeridad del proceso de ejecución. La falta de un funcionario local del Banco, con capacidad para decidir con relación a los trámites de rutina y él tener que depender de una relación a distancia con la sede en Washington, restaron eficiencia al proceso y la perdida de una relación más estrecha y eficaz entre el Banco y las UES en conjunto con la CCP.

OBRAS DEL COMPONENTE ELÉCTRICO

Rehabilitación Central Hidroeléctrica de JimenoaSe prevé que con la rehabilitación de la Central de Jimenoa, se podrá disminuir el déficit en el suministro de energía eléctrica, mejorando la calidad del servicio en las zonas aledañas.

Línea de Transmisión 138 kv, Palamara-Arroyo Hondo:Obra ubicada en la zona norte del Distrito Nacional, parte urbana y parte rural 6 Km, en postes tubulares y 5.5 Km, en torres, respectivamente; incluyo el desmontaje de las líneas existentes en 69 kv en una longitud de 17 KM aproximadamente que corresponden a tramos paralelos.

Consultora de SupervisiónEl monto original previsto para los servicios de consultoria por US$ 509,259.00; fueron incrementados hasta un valor de US$ 1,104,084.35, motivado por cuatro extensiones en el contrato debido básicamente a:

1. - Preparación de los términos de referencia de los documentos para la licitación de la central de Jimenoa,

2. - Demora en los tramites de aprobación de documentos,

3. - Declaración de desierta la primera licitación

4. - Evaluaciones, firmas de contratos, pago de anticipos y emisión de cartas de crédito.

SECCION V COMPONENTES REALIZADOS POR PMR

Alcances del ComponenteEl Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia STP, por medio de la Unidad Ejecutora Sectorial de Prevención, Mitigación y Respuesta UES de PMR, fue el responsable de ejecutar un conjunto de acciones destinadas a alcanzar una capacidad de PMR fortalecida en la República Dominicana, según el documento de “ajuste del Subprograma de Prevención de Desastres”, con acciones e inversiones en los siguientes componentes:

Mejora de la capacidad de la ciudadanía para enfrentar desastres;i.

Implantación de instrumentos de gestión territorial y de recursos naturales;ii.

Mejora del sistema de control de la vulnerabilidad de obras;iii.

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Dotación de instrumentos modernos y efectivos a las Instituciones de PMR.iv.

El costo total original del Subprograma de US$ 11.4 millones, se financio con cargos a los recursos del préstamo BID 1152/OC-DR para los componentes i, ii y iv; y con cargo a los recursos del préstamo BIRF 4420-DO para el componente iii, El Gobierno de la República Dominicana GRD, aporto la contrapartida de acuerdo con lo establecido en los respectivos contratos de préstamo.

OBJETIVOS

A.- Cumplimiento del objetivo generalAlcanzar una capacidad de prevención, mitigación y respuesta ante desastres fortalecidos en la República Dominicana. Para alcanzar este propósito en lo que respecta al componente iii, financiado con recursos provenientes del préstamo BIRF 4420-DO, se emprendieron acciones destinadas a lograr un “Sistema de Control de Vulnerabilidad de Obras Mejorado en el País”, siendo la Dirección General de Reglamentos y Sistemas DGRS de la Secretaría de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones SEOPC, el principal coejecutor con el apoyo de la firma consultora CEP-GE2-INTEC. En lo concerniente a la Vulnerabilidad de las Grandes Presas, el co-ejecutor lo fue el Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hidráulicos INDRHI, con el apoyo de la firma consultora Sir John Halcrow y asociados.

B.- Cumplimiento de objetivos específicosElaboración del “Código de Edificaciones”. Esta actividad estuvo a cargo de la firma consultora CEP-GE2-INTEC y la supervisión de la DGRS-SEOPC y Sodosísmica, con la colaboración de diferentes consultores contratados para las áreas temáticas específicas del Código. Fueron realizados talleres participativos “para consensuar” la propuesta del nuevo código de edificaciones en la primera fase.

Por la tardanza en la entrega de los estudios por parte de La firma consultora, a la DGRS-SEOPC, a esta dirección le resulto imposible proceder con la implementación del código, por lo cual queda pendiente.

Revisión del “Sistema de Supervisión de Obras”. Actividad desarrollada y completada por contrato, a cargo del Dr. Manuel Gómez Achecar y la supervisión de la DGRS de la SEOPC.

Apoyo a la implantación de recomendaciones de la revisión del Sistema de Supervisión de Obras. Pendiente la puesta en marcha

Diagnóstico de obras de infraestructura y su vulnerabilidad. Actividad a cargo de la firma consultora CEP-GE2-INTEC con la supervisión de DGRS-SEOPC y Sodosísmica. Incluyendo estructuras hospitalarias; Hospital Cabral y Báez en Santiago), escolares, edificios de gobierno y del cuerpo de bomberos. En el caso de la Vulnerabilidad de las Grandes Presas, el trabajo estuvo a cargo de la firma consultora Sir John Halcrow y Asociados, con la supervisión del INDRHI y el apoyo de dos consultores internacionales y uno nacional.

Estudio de control de inundaciones en las cuencas hidrográficas. Actividades a cargo del INDRHI con la participación de diferentes consultores, incluyendo aspectos de “cultura del agua” con fines preventivos. Esta última actividad ha sido una de las más significativas por su efecto multiplicador al incorporar y capacitar a las comunidades de ciertas cuencas críticas como, Yaque del Norte, Yaque del Sur e Higuamo, en el control de la calidad del agua y su entorno ambiental en relación con la cuenca.

Una actividad adicional que resultó exitosa lo fue “El Diseño para el encauzamiento pluvial y sanitario de la Cañada Guajimía” a cargo de la firma Auding Latinoamerican Ingenieros Sanitarios, con la supervisión de

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la Corporación de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Santo Domingo CAASD.Con la venia del Banco, recibió un Addendun más para realizar el estudio de “impacto ambiental y reasentamientos” con cargo a la partida sin asignación específica del BIRF 4420-DO.

Otra de las actividades cruciales para el país, fue el “sistema nacional de alerta meteorológica”, a cargo de la Oficina Nacional de Meteorología ONAMET, con la asesoría general de la Organización Meteorológica Mundial OMM y el apoyo de las firmas consultoras: ELIOVAC para la instrumentación de la red de estaciones meteorológicas; RPG para el sistema de divulgación audiovisual y de CODETEL para la red de telecomunicaciones LAN-WAN con la supervisión y asesoría de Blanca Pérez y Alan Byrne /DELCAN Canadá.

Como parte del fortalecimiento institucional de la Dirección General de Reglamentos y Sistemas DGRS de la SEOPC, está la actividad de “adquisiciones” que incluye equipos de cómputo, periférico más software, audiovisuales, vehículo, “red de acelerómetros y acelerógrafos para movimientos débiles y fuertes contratados a SPRENGNETHER Instruments”, así como documentos, libros y actualización bibliográfica.

Avances físicos y financierosLos fondos del componente ascendieron a US$ 4,279,471.22, los cuales fueron financiados al 100%, por el BANCO.

EvaluacionesEvaluación de la UES de PMR y lecciones aprendidas (componente iii: Elaboración de códigos y vulnerabilidad de obras, fondos BIRF4420-DO.

Actividades bajo responsabilidad de la UES de PMR pero a cargo de otro ejecutor. Tal ha sido el caso de las actividades de “elaboración de códigos y vulnerabilidad de Obras” a cargo de la DGRS en SEOPC, en donde la iniciativa se ha cedido al eventual ejecutor, con la pérdida del “know how” desarrollado por la UES de PMR y las limitaciones en la gestión ejecutiva, el control y el seguimiento.

La UES de PMR cumplió satisfactoriamente con el procedimiento de selección del personal, bajo las normas establecidas para estos fines por el banco.

El BIRF no aceptó un coordinador de componente como sí existía en los otros tres a cargo del BID, esto sin duda alguna afectó al componente iii, que fue recargado al Coordinador Ejecutivo, quién tenía que manejar una UES “sombrilla”, con más de 40 actividades diferentes en las que participaban otras Secretarías de Estado y más de 10 Instituciones Autónomas o Semiautónomas, incluyendo actividades compartidas con otras UES pero bajo la responsabilidad de la UES de PMR.

B.- DEL GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA GRDEn lo que respecta al componente iii con fondos del BIRF, la UES de PMR recibió el apoyo de la CCP y del STP cuando fue requerido y con esta finalidad. El GRD dispuso de un fondo para facilitar la gestión de la UES la UES de PMR, ascendente a RD$ 3,158,698.50 equivalentes a US$ 89,597.75.

C.- DEL BANCOLos procedimientos de aprobación de actividades, las no objeciones y la confirmación de aperturas de cartas de crédito, tomaron mucho tiempo, lo cual afectó la celeridad del proceso de ejecución.

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SECCION VI COMPONENTES REALIZADOS POR SEOPC

Alcances originales: Originalmente se tenia previsto reconstruir 23 puentes 16 en una primera fase y 7 en una segunda fase; Además de evaluar y rehabilitar 242.30 Km, de Carreteras contempladas en 7 tramos y distribuidos en 5 grupos. Luego de una evaluación detallada de los daños ocasionados por el Huracán Georges, se determino que los puentes a construir serian 16; 13 en una primera fase y 3 en una segunda fase.

Alcances modificados: Al momento iniciar el plan de emergencia para restituir él trafico a las comunidades que quedaron aisladas, no había disponibilidad de fondos, porque el préstamo 4420 - DO no estaba ratificado por el Congreso Nacional y al no estar en vigencia, no se podía realizar ningún desembolso, por lo que la SEOPC, solicito al banco de un préstamo de los fondos disponibles del préstamo 4127-DO, que estaba siendo ejecutado por la SEOPC, para proceder con el inicio de las actividades de emergencia y el banco autorizo que se realizaran dichas contrataciones con contratistas que estaban realizando obras para la SEOPC y que dichos contratos fuesen consignados como addendum de los contratos en ejecución (obviando las licitaciones) en virtud de solventar la emergencia.

Al momento de entrar en vigencia el préstamo y disponer de fondos propios se trato de devolver los fondos tomados al 4127 D -O, pero el banco señala que los reglamentos no permiten realizar transferencia de un préstamo a otro, por lo que el banco recomendó que los 13 puentes de la primera fase quedaran bajo el financiamiento del préstamo 4127-DO y que como compensación el préstamo 4420-DO pasara a financiar la reconstrucción de la Carretera Sabana Grande de Boya Doña Maria, con una longitud de 18.51 Km.

El componente de carreteras y puentes concluyo con variaciones en las metas originales, pues la longitud total de carreteras se redujo de 242.30 km, a 160.36 km, contemplados en 7 tramos.La longitud final de los puentes fue de 276.88 ml, incluyendo los (52.00 ml) de los 2 puentes, (Arroyo Carpintero y Santiago) contemplados en el préstamo 4127 D-O, que pasaron a ser financiados por el préstamo 4420 D-O, pues por problemas con la ejecución de los puentes Las Placetas y Benito Moncion, los cuales solo dispusieron de recursos parciales del préstamo y estos dos puentes serán concluidos con fondos de contrapartida.

Cumplimiento de objetivos: Actualmente el cumplimiento no será satisfactorio, pues algunas de las obras no serán concluidas al 100% dentro de la fecha de vigencia del préstamo como fueron programadas, ya que en el proceso de ejecución se determino que los alcances planteados originalmente para determinadas obras debían ser modificados, produciéndose un incremento en los costos que excedían el monto del préstamo, por lo que la SEOPC se vio en la necesidad de reducir los alcances para mantenerse dentro de los limites presupuestarios, realizando la menor adición de recursos fuera del financiamiento para continuar con la ejecución de las obras inconclusas (ver cuadro situación obras)

Situación financiera original: El monto consignado en el préstamo para la Rehabilitación del componente Puentes y Carreteras dañados ascendía a US$ 28,285,700.00, de los cuales el 70%, o sea US$19,800,000.00 serian financiados por el BIRF. Por la categoría B.1 del préstamo y el GOB. el 30%; o sea US$8,485,700.00 como aporte de contrapartida.

Situación financiera modificada: El monto consignado en el préstamo para la Rehabilitación del Componente Puentes y Carreteras dañados fue modificado para suplir los incrementos en los insumos, partidas adicionales y los costos que se produjeron por las múltiples extensiones de los servicios de las firmas supervisoras durante el periodo de ejecución del proyecto, ascendió a US$ 37,236,805.23, lo que

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represento un incremento de US$ 8,951,105.23; de los cuales US$ 24,132,948.15 fueron financiados por el BIRF. y US$ 13,103,857.08 como contrapartida.

Evaluación de la UES: La Unidad Ejecutora Sectorial UES establecida en la Secretaria de Estado de Obras Publicas y Comunicaciones SEOPC para dar seguimiento durante el desarrollo del proyecto, esta bajo la responsabilidad de un Asesor del Secretario de Estado, a quien responde directamente. Este Asesor es también el responsable de todos los Proyectos con Financiamiento Externo, el cual cuenta con dos equipos de apoyo; un equipo Técnico que tiene la responsabilidad de realizar las actividades concernientes a licitaciones, las cuales fueron realizadas dentro de las fechas establecidas, al igual que las contrataciones de las obras, lo cual se cumplió satisfactoriamente según los objetivos trazados respecto a dichos procesos; Los cuales se llevaron a cabo según los lineamientos establecidos por el banco para este tipo de proyecto, por lo cual los fondos asignados a esta UES fueron comprometidos acorde con la programación, lo que permitió a la UES acceder a parte de los fondos consignados en el renglón si asignación especifica, los cuales debían ser comprometidos para una fecha determinada y también tiene bajo su responsabilidad la de supervisar en coordinación con las consultoras privadas contratadas para dar seguimiento a los procesos de ejecución de todas las obras; además cuentan con una unidad financiera DARE Dirección de Administración de Recursos Externos, la cual tiene por encomienda todos los aspectos relacionados con el manejo de los recursos externos.

B.- DEL GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA GRDLa unidad ejecutora de la SEOPC se manejo dentro de los limites que le impuso la falta periódica de recursos de contrapartida, durante la ejecución del proyecto.

C.- DEL BANCOLas relaciones de la UES con el Banco en el manejo de los procedimientos para las licitaciones de las obras y los tramites para las no objeciones estuvieron enmarcadas dentro de los parámetros establecidos; al igual que en los procesos de ejecución de las obras.

SECCION VII COMPONENTES REALIZADOS POR CCP

Financiación de los servicios de consultoría incluidos los costos de las firmas para el manejo del programa.

Comisión Coordinadora del Programa CCP Con el objetivo de apoyar la implementación del proyecto se creó una unidad dentro del Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia con equipo, personal y otra estructura y organización a satisfacción del Banco que coordinaría la implementación del proyecto

Dentro de las atribuciones asignadas a esta Comisión Coordinadora del Programa se le designó para contratar los servicios de gerencia del Proyecto para que la apoye en la administración financiera, en el monitoreo de las adquisiciones y en el apoyo de las entidades sectoriales. Por esta razón se le asignó originalmente de financiamiento del Banco:

US$ 1,500,000.00 a la CCP; US$ 891,603.00 para la firma Cogerenciadora y US$ 262,400.00 para las Auditorias, para un monto total de US$ 2,654,003.00. Este financiamiento no requería de contrapartida.

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El proyecto originalmente tenia fecha de cierre el 31 de enero del 2002, pero se han producido 4 extensiones. La primera extensión fue hasta el 31 de julio del 2002, y la segunda extensión o adenddum el 15 de enero del 2003, una tercera extensión o hasta el 15 de mayo de del 2003 y la ultima extensión hasta el 30 de junio del 2003

La unidad ejecutora de este componente, la CCP, ha comprometido en contratos para: Coordinación general, enlace, analista financiero, diseño de software para el control financiero del proyecto, manual de procedimientos y equipos para el monitoreo físico del proyecto US$ 473,405.73; con la firma Cogerenciadora Typsa, US$ 1,617,979.80; y con la firma auditora, PKF, US$ 257,503.00, para un total de US$ 2,348,388.53.

La CCP - STP, realizo la gestión para dotar de los fondos de contrapartida requeridos por las UES de CDE, INDRHI, PMR y en el caso particular de la SEOPC, los recursos obtenidos en determinado momento no llegaron a ser aplicados acorde con las necesidades del préstamo, por haber sido consignados de manera global a la institución y no por partidas como debió ser en este caso.

A.- DE LA CCP:La CCP debió contar con un fondo rotativo que le permitiera hacer frente a los requerimientos a tiempo de los recursos de contrapartida, lo que hubiese facilitado la gestión y evitado la prolongación del periodo de ejecución de las obras.

B.- DEL GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA GRDLa CCP - STP, realizo la gestión para dotar de los fondos de contrapartida requeridos por las UES de CDE, INDRHI, PMR y en el caso particular de la SEOPC, los recursos obtenidos en determinado momento no llegaron a ser aplicados acorde con las necesidades del préstamo, por haber sido consignados de manera global a la institución y no por partidas como debió ser en este caso.

La existencia temporal de la CCP, no permitirá continuar con el seguimiento de continuidad en las operaciones de los proyectos concluidos, lo que podría presentar un impasse en el caso de la realización de una evaluación ex post.

C.- DEL BANCOLa falta de un funcionario local del Banco, con poder de decisión respecto a los tramites de rutina y el tener que depender de una relación a distancia con la sede en Washington, restaron eficiencia al proceso y la perdida de una relación mas estrecha entre la CCP y las UES, lo que contribuyo a retrasar los procedimientos de aprobación, las no objeciones y la confirmación de cartas de crédito, lo cual afecto la celeridad del proceso de ejecución

Durante la gestión no se siguió un procedimiento estandarizado en el manejo de las relaciones Banco, UES y CCP, donde la CCP, mantuviera su papel como unidad coordinadora.

El Banco fue receptivo al bajar el monto de las solicitudes de desembolsos, de ÚS$ 100 mil, a US$ 50 mil, lo que facilito el proceso de pago para los contratistas, vía las UES responsables.

El Banco procedió a retener los fondos de todas las UES como medida de presión, en vista de los atrasos en los pagos de los fondos de contrapartida correspondientes a la SEOPC, lo que afecto significativamente el proceso de pago y la ejecución de las obras en un periodo de tres meses.

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Additional Annex 9. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) -- Hurricane Georges Emergency Program

The IDB-financed Hurricane Georges Emergency Program was approved on December 2, 1998. Total project cost was estimated at US$117 million, of which IDB was expected to finance close to 90 percent, or a total of US$105 million. The overall project development objective was to assist the Dominican Republic in the reconstruction of the infrastructure damaged or destroyed by Hurricane Georges, and in the sustainable recovery of the national economy, emphasizing support to the most vulnerable population and disaster mitigation with adequate civil society participation. Project components accordingly included:

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of social and productive infrastructure, including energy, water a.supply, resettlement of high risk population at el Cayucal, and designs to repair the Sabana Yegua Dam.

Assistance to low income communities most affected by the disaster through financing of small b.works identified through a participatory process;

Support to recurrent social expenditures, complementing the fast-disbursing component included c.in the World Bank-financed project; and

Preparation and implementation of a Disaster Risk Management Sub-program in coordination d.with the World Bank emergency operation.

Project Implementation. The project also suffered a significant delay in obtaining congressional approval. The latter was only given on June 24, 1999, almost seven months after approval by the IDB, and over a month after it had been given to the Bank-financed emergency operation. The project became effective two months later. Despite initial delays, 95 percent of the loan had been disbursed and 95 percent of physical targets had been completed by June 2003. To reach these levels, however, the original loan closing date was extended several times. Current closing date is June 2004.

The component to support recurrent social expenditures, for which US$30 million (28.6 percent of total loan amount) had been allocated, was fully disbursed in 1999.

Overall, the IDB supervision team considers that the project has helped the Government effectively to rebuild and rehabilitate the infrastructure damaged by Hurricane Georges; to increase national capacity for disaster risk management, environmental management, and regional planning; and to promote public awareness and participation as well as institutional development.

Specifically under the Disaster Risk Management Sub-Program, as agreed between the IDB, the World Bank and the Government, the project has financed three of its four components. These components were:

Increasing public awareness and education on disaster risk. Its main activities included limplementing a national educational campaign on disaster risk, improving the course on safety at schools (Curso de Seguridad Escolar, or CUSE in Spanish), establishing a management system for emergency relief supplies and donations, and carrying out yearly disaster emergency simulations.

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Improving spatial / regional planning and environmental and natural resources management, lincluding activities such as an assessment of spatial / regional planning capacity in the country, development and implementation of action plans to establish regional planning incorporating environmental and disaster risk management issues, and development of environmental assessment capacity at the national and local level through training of trainers and training on environmental and natural resource management, and conducting community-driven environmental assessments.

Establishing the national system for disaster risk management, which included activities such as ldesign of disaster risk management training modules; conducting training of trainers and delivering training to staff of concerned agencies; establishing a national system for effective emergency information dissemination, establishing an Emergency Operations Center (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia, or CODE in Spanish), designing and creating a National System for Disaster Risk Management; developing a national plan for early warning of emergencies, and establishing a system to assess disaster impacts.

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