The Vulnerability of the US Electric Power Grid to Se ere Space Weather E entsGrid to Severe Space Weather Events

J h G KJohn G. KappenmanMetatech Corp.

Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Space Weather

•The US Electric Power Grid is a Critical Infrastructure & Vulnerable to Space Weatherp

•Electricity is largest energy segment of US ~40% of all energy consumed (petroleum only 22% of current US energy consumption)

EMP C i i d FEMA E O d 13407 I ti ti•EMP Commission and FEMA Exec Order 13407 Investigation Results Indicate

•Space Weather Risks have potential to create Large Scale Blackouts, P D T f A d L h R i•Permanent Damage to Transformer Assets and Lengthy Restoration

•Loss of Electric Supply will Impact all other Interdependent I f t tInfrastructures

•Potable Water distribution, waste treatment impacted within several hours, •Loss of perishable foods and medications in about 12-24 hours, •Immediate or eventual loss of heating/AC sewage phones transportation fuel•Immediate or eventual loss of heating/AC, sewage, phones, transportation, fuel resupply, etc.

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A Quick Overview of the March 13-14, 1989 G ti St dGeomagnetic Storm and

North American Power Grid Impacts

5 minutes of storm conditions that precipitated the Quebec blackout

A Quick Overview of the March 13-14, 1989 G ti St dGeomagnetic Storm and

North American Power Grid Impacts

30 minutes of storm conditions later that day and impacts observed across the US

Great Geomagnetic Storms Disturbance Intensity PerspectivesDisturbance Intensity Perspectives

•Impacts on North American Power Grid on March 13-14, 1989 d di b i i i f 300 500 T/ ioccurred at disturbance intensities of ~300-500 nT/min

•Disturbance intensities of >2000 nT/min have been observed at latitudes of concern for US power grid infrastructure on at least 3 occasions since 1972

•Disturbance intensity of ~5000 nT/min was estimated for storm on May 14-15, 1921 (estimated to be largest storm of 20th Century and

bl C i E f 1859)comparable to Carrington Event of 1859)

•Power Grids should expect Storms 4 to 10 Times More Intense pthan the March 1989 Storm

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Great Geomagnetic StormsMarch 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Position ofPosition of Westward Electrojet

Boundaries of Eastward ElectrojetMarch 13, 1989

Great Geomagnetic StormsMarch 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Estimated BoundariesEstimated Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet

May 14-15, 1921

Great Geomagnetic StormsUS Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparednessy p

•New Awareness has developed on the Extremes of Severe Geomagnetic Storms

•Current Design Practices of Electric Grids have unknowingly and greatly escalated the Risks and Potential Impacts

•Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat•Present Operational Procedures are based upon limited experience do not reduce GIC•Present Operational Procedures are based upon limited experience, do not reduce GIC levels and are inadequate for Severe Storms

•Space Weather Community use of K and G Indices have also not communicated p ythe real risks to the Electric Power Industry

•Indices saturate and reach Maximum Levels at Low Thresholds•Many K9 Storms (post March 1989) have been less intense than March 1989 Storm –

ith i t d d f id twith unintended consequences for power grid operators•False Sense of Security & Complacency by Power Grid Operators

•Power Grids should expect Storms 4 to 10 Times More Intense than the pMarch 1989 Storm

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US High-Voltage Transmission Network Model for GIC Simulation

US Grid has world’s most Extensive Grid at 345kV & Above

Th B kb f th N t k765kV500kV345kV

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The Backbone of the Network

GIC Risk Factor – Growth of Transmission NetworkThe larger the Grid – the Larger the Antenna to cause GIC

Cycle 22

g g

4000 180Growth of US Transmission Grid & Electric Energy Usage

y

3000

3500

Wh)

140

160

00)

Annual Electric Energy Usage

High Voltage Transmission Line Miles

2000

2500

sage

(Bill

ion

kW

100

120

es (M

iles

x 10

0

Cycle 191500

2000

ctric

Ene

rgy

Us

60

80

gh V

olta

ge L

ine

US Grid is an Antenna to Space Weather that has grown over 10 Fold in past 50 Years 500

1000Elec

20

40

Hig

g pFuture Outlook 6-7 Times higher growth

01950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Year

0

Severe Geomagnetic Storm Disturbance Scenario Power System Disturbance and Outage Scenario of Unprecedented Scale

2 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 4 : 0 0 . 0 0 0

Power System Disturbance and Outage Scenario of Unprecedented Scale

Areas of Probable I t d R i i lPower System Collapse

Impacted Regions involve population of >130 Million

Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario At-Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers

24%

40% 97%

7%39% 30%

At Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers

33%

24%

34%47%

35%

7%39%

23%

12%

72%

32%26%

36%

55%

27%

18%19%

9%35%

30%7%

82%11%

17%

24%

55%15%6%

19%47%

17%27%

7%1%

37%

17%

38%

75%6%

21%8%

Estimated that ~365 large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC

365 Transformers At‐Risk,  ~300,000 MVA Rating~Severe Storm Scenario has larger geographic footprint than all other Natural Hazards 

Estimated that  365 large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC exposure to be At‐Risk of permanent damage & loss – replacement could 

extend into 4‐10 years at current world production rates

Power Grid Vulnerability and Future Outlook Summary

•Historically large storms have potential to create Power Grid Blackouts and Transformer Damage of unprecedented proportions

•Long term blackout, lengthy restoration times, and •Chronic shortages & associated social impacts (multiple years) are possible

•Economic and societal costs could be also of unprecedented levels;A t 14 2003 N th t Bl k t C t E ti t $4 $10 Billi•August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout Cost Estimate - $4 - $10 Billion

•Hurricane Katrina Cost Estimate - $81 - $125 Billion•Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario ~$1 - $2 Trillion in 1st Year

Depending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 – 10 YearsDepending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 10 Years

•Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readily available

•Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K/G Indices

•Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-Related Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures for the Grid (transformer neutral resistors) are readily feasible and cost effective

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