University of Tampa, Honors Research Fellowship 8 April 2023

Rights and CircumstanceThe Universality of International Human Rights Law

“It is a perversion of terms to say that a charter gives rights. It operates by a contrary effect — that of taking rights away. Rights are inherently in all the inhabitants; but charters, by annulling those rights,

in the majority, leave the right, by exclusion, in the hands of a few . . . They . . . consequently are instruments of injustice.

The fact, therefore, must be that the individuals, themselves, each, in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.”

Thomas Paine, from The Rights of Man, 17911

Introduction

Human Rights are situated uniquely within the vast field of International Law. Where

International Law in general has an ancient history built upon multilevel economic and military

contracts, International Human Rights Law is comparatively very recent, based on customs rather than

explicit legal agreements, and comprises the complex definitions of human morality. But, what is

perhaps most unusual, and most interesting, about human rights, is the particular circumstance in which

the philosophical concept became a piece of universal law. This circumstance – the Nuremburg Trials at

the close of World War II – was not the culmination of years of multinational agreements or even an

exchange of promises between interested parties, but a realization, by a few parties, that the existing law

was insufficient to address basic needs of all the parties “essentially” interested in its protection: every

human being.

This complex combination of metaphysical ideas with the realities of legal systems can have a

dizzying effect upon the political scientist, who must also contend with the field’s difficult teetering

between its particular origin in time and its asserted universal applicability throughout time. Perhaps, for

this reason, political scientists have generally left the subject of Human Rights to the philosophers, and

Human Rights Law to the lawyers.2

Our political policies and practices are severely lacking behind the ideals expressed in the United

Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), because there is a gaping lack of understanding

between what has happened and what should happen. In 2008, Marta Foresti commented that “Human

rights abuses are still too common, and dignity is still just a word, rather than a reality for many,

particularly men, women and children living in poverty or countries affected by conflict.”3 In order to

make human rights a reality, sheer awareness is not enough: “Many people in nearly every country are

well aware of their rights as enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights. The sense of

1 Chapter 5, Part 2.2 Waltz, 2001, p. 45.3 Foresti, 2008

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responsibility in many places is much less well understood.”4 The Preamble of the UDHR itself

reaffirms this need for understanding: “…a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the

greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge.”5

For this reason, this study takes up the challenge to add a plank to the still frail bridge that is

directing political scientists towards greater understanding as to how we are to implement international

human rights law, by utilizing a method of analysis that has scantly been employed in political science

circles: comparative textual analysis. While over 200 Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations6

world-wide have joined academics in researching, raising awareness, offering aid, and lobbying for

improvements in the practice of implementing human rights, beyond the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (UDHR), few have ventured to read into the growing bulk of regional human rights

instruments7 that have amassed over the past sixty years in order to extract a deeper understanding of

why implementation has failed in certain geographic contexts – even in those regions that have ratified

such instruments.

Through the use of recently developed textual analysis software and manual comparative content

analysis, this study addresses two entrenched critiques of the International Human Rights (IHR) Legal

system; The first questions the claim to universality made by the Universal Declaration: Are IHR laws

really universal in nature? Or, are they relative only to the Western world in which they were born? My

answer supports the “relativist” hypothesis, which asserts that human rights are not inherent or self-

evident, but can only be realized through a dominantly Western perspective. This contention will be

supported by an overview of the legal history of human rights and through a survey of the rights

language used in the Universal Declaration, its major regional successors,8 – the European Council’s

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (entered into force in

1953),9 the Organization of African Unity’s African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986),10 and

4 Fraser, 1998.5 UDHR, 1948.6 NGO Research Guide: NGOs: Human Rights, 2008.7 For a well-organized list of current, recognized regional human rights instruments, see: Regional Human Rights

Instruments, http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-project/humanrightsinstruments/regionalhumanrightsinstruments/.

8 Although other regional drafts and instruments have been produced, instruments have been selected amongst those recog-nized by the United Nations. It can be argued that the American Convention on Human Rights (1978), which established the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, should be considered here for its more binding enforcement mechanisms, but the American Declaration was selected for analysis because of its unique, preliminary position in this body of instruments, and in order to see what Western contributions were specifically “copied and pasted” from it into the UDHR. Additionally, Article 29(D) of the Convention holds that “No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: …D. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.” Thus, even though it is a non-binding agree-ment – not a treaty – it is still “in force.” Furthermore, the Convention has not been ratified by the United States of Amer-ica, or 10 of its other 35 member states, including Canada and Cuba, and, therefore, carries little force in any of its en-forcement mechanisms.

9 (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG.

10 University of Minnesota: Human Rights Library, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm.

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the Council of the League of Arab State’s Arab Charter on Human Rights (2008) 11 – and of the only

international expression of human rights to precede the Universal Declaration – the Organization of

American State’s American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted in 1948).12 This

“relativist” view explains why human rights practices are considerably better in the United States and

Europe than in Non-Western states: they are not, essentially, human rights, they are relative to a specific

culture13 – Western culture. Furthermore, the “relativist” hypothesis goes on to say that International

Human Rights Law is invalid; it claims that IHR Law is largely irrelevant to Non-Western states, and

that, since the system is lacking in enforcement mechanisms, regional productions of IHR instruments

are too easily penned without genuine meaning tied to them.

But, such a hasty conclusion is not complete – if these instruments are only the products of

Western influence and indirect Western coercion, why would Non-Western states sign on to them as

signatories and state parties? Are they just paying homage to greater world powers, in exchange for

possible trade alliances and international recognition? If so, why is signing onto Western “universal”

human rights instruments not enough for African and Arabian states? Why go to such efforts to define

human rights in their own declarations, if what they are asserting is only paying lip service to the

existing Western framework?

In this paper, the relativist view is accepted to an extent: history and language place IHR law

strongly in a Western context. But, this paper explores another perspective, which cites how the mere

intention of “universality” injected a potential energy and capacity for universal recognition of Human

Rights law within its founding documents that is foundational and substantial. Ultimately, this study

holds that the rise of regional endorsements of human rights reflects the law’s expansionary and

inclusionary capacities, and is evidence of unanticipated plurality within the International Human Rights

legal system.

Furthermore, deeper investigation into the meaning behind the differences, rather than the

similarities, in these regional IHR documents, reveals that the substance of human rights’ legal language

is changing positively, supporting both the relevancy and resilience of International Human Rights law

as a whole. From philosophical and legal perspectives, human rights look black and white. This study

looks at human rights as a political construct, and concludes that International Human Rights Law is not

simply universal or not, but becoming universal.

11 See text of the Charter at: University of Minnesota: Human Rights Library, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/arabcharter.html; see date of entry into force, verified by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at: Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Entry into Force of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/6C211162E43235FAC12573E00056E19D?opendocument.

12 The American Declaration is not a treaty, but, like the UDHR, is a Declaration, and therefore cannot enter into binding force. Thus, its date of adoption is used, whereas dates of entry into force are used for the remaining regional instruments (Univ. of Minnesota Human Rights Library, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm)

13 Ayton-Shenker, Diana. 1995. http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm.

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Western Origins

The philosophical origins of human rights can be traced on a direct line of Western thought back

to Plato and Aristotle in Ancient Greece, through the Roman Empire and its fall, and up to the one

surviving Roman infrastructure: the Catholic Church.14 The Church preserved thousands of ancient

Latin texts from these eras, which contain human rights legacies and traditions such as pursuing ideal

forms of virtue, justice, and truth,15 the establishment of a body of civil laws, and adherence to the rule of

law. 16 While the Church’s manipulation and exercise of hierarchical power kept these concepts at arm’s

length (or further) from the illiterate masses during the Dark Ages,17 they were also a source of liberation

centuries later, when British Puritanical philosophy asserted that monarchical rule was not absolute, but

rather subject to the authority of God. Within this line of thinking, individuals were thought to possess a

certain duty to hold monarchs accountable to God’s law. This form of self-rule was brought with the

Pilgrims to the Americas in the early 1600s.18

This idea of having an overruling authority was directly addressed by English philosopher

Thomas Hobbes, who spoke of a “Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortall God, our peace

and defence.”19 This notion of having a duty to a higher power, but also a mortal power – other

individuals; society – became the premise of the idea of a social contract. Hobbes, along with another

English philosopher, John Locke (1632-1704), and the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau

(1712-78), among other Western philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries,20 alluded to the necessary

and natural state of humans having the ability to reason, to determine their own wants, and needing

other people in order to preserve these abilities and advance them. The language of duty, something

constructed and obligated, began to be transformed into a language of rights,21 something deserved and

14 This section is drawn heavily from the concise, but comprehensive, work conducted by Carol Devine, Carol Rae Hansen, Ralph Wilde, and Hilary Poole in Human Rights: The Essential Reference. This reference comes specifically from pages 3-11.

15 The idea of “ideal forms” comes from Plato, whose works were further expounded upon and concreted in a body of historical works by Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430), who placed Plato’s forms within a theological setting. According to Human Rights: The Essential Reference,“The authority accorded to [Saint Augustine’s] works by the Roman Catholic Church throughout the Middle Ages helped secure a permanent place for Platonic views in Latin Christianity. Strong Platonist influences continued into many English theological writings through the nineteenth century. Similarly, the church applied Roman law to civil contracts, marriages, and wills, thereby preserving some of the best of the ancient world's civil protections of rights” (p.13).

16 Justinian (A.D. c. 483-565) codified Roman law and published Corpus Juris Civilis (Body of Civil Law). (The Essential Reference, Part 1, p.8).

17 From Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights (2007) (p. 35-69).18 Carol Devine, 1999, p. 17.19 As quoted in Mark Weston Janis’ International Law (5th ed., 2008). Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) was the work which took

monumental force following the formal organizing of states, from their fragmented medieval disorganization as feudal plots, through Treaties of Peace Between Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire and Between France and the Holy Roman Empire at The Peace of Westphalia in October of 1648 (p. 167).

20 Such as: Hugo Grotious (1583 - 1645) and Emerich de Vattel (1714 - 1767).21 (Carol Devine, 1999, p. 18)

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earned, inherently human and essentially freeing.

It was in French philosophical circles that we see the usage of the actual term “human rights,”

appear. One of its earliest appearances in text – as “the rights of humanity” in 1763 – was used more in

the distinguishing between humans and animals than of political rights. But, the French “droits de

l’homme,” or, “rights of man,” was a 1760’s development of the age-old French idea of droit naturel,

which can mean both “natural rights” and “natural law.”22 In this language context, rights, by their

utterance alone, were inseparable from the notions that humanity naturally shares something in common

(which makes them different from other existent beings – such as like animals – and – on some level, at

least – equal) and that this difference should be reflected in the rules that govern our societies.

These ideas emboldened the settlers of the New England colonies in America, and, soon

thereafter, the revolutionaries of France, to recognize that their governments did not reflect such rights

for them as citizens. The American (1775–1783) and French (1789–1799) Revolutionary Wars were

fueled by these conceptions of rights as in-born mechanisms of individual freedom from unjust

monarchical power. It is at this juncture that two significant documents in the history of civil and

political human rights emerged: The Declaration of Independence (American, 1776) and The

Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (French, 1789). The famous language written by

Thomas Jefferson in the United States of America’s Declaration of Independence in 1776 begins:

When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political

bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate

and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the

opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by

their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-

ness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers

from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these

ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foun -

dation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to ef-

fect their Safety and Happiness.23

The French Declaration notably declares “the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man.”24

These over-lapping statements of naturalness, or self-evidence, and inalienability in the American and

French Declarations are no mistake – historian Lynn Hunt points out that Jefferson was actually in Paris

22 Hunt, 2007, p. 23. Hunt draws from Emmerich de Vattel’s work: The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758) in reference to

this “1760’s development.”23 Jefferson, 1776, par. 1-2.24 Declaration of the Rights of Man , 1789, Preamble.

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at the time the French Declaration was being drawn up. The American Revolution had much support

throughout Western Europe, and it is perhaps for this reason that Jefferson’s ideas were written indirectly

into the Articles of the French Declaration, and directly – the French Declaration’s primary writer,

Marquis de Lafayette, was a “veteran of the War of American Independence,” and drafted the

Declaration “most likely with Jefferson’s help.”25

Language agreement in foundational human rights declarations up to modern IHR instruments is

significant. The French Declaration lists “the natural and imprescriptible rights of man” to be “liberty,

property, security, and resistance to oppression.”26 These rights strongly correlate with the American

Declaration’s “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” British philosopher John Locke’s list of

protected rights can also be tied into agreement with the French and American; his list included life,

liberty, and fortunes/property.27 To further solidify the grounding of human rights in Western

conceptualization, we can jump ahead to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which

states, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Art. 1). It is no coincidence that

the earlier French version – “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights”28 – sounds undeniably

similar.29

Literature Review

First, Second, and Third Generation Rights

From this background, it is apparent that declarations of freedom, and statements of rights, and

even the rise of philosophical and political discussion on the matter of rights, were a result of political

realities – of circumstances – that had to be condemned in order to be overcome.30 For instance, early

25 Hunt, 2007, p. 16.26 Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1789, Art. 2.27 Landry, 2006; Powell, 1996.28 Declaration of the Rights of Man , 1789, Art. 1(a).29 Professor John Kane concisely describes this “coincidence,” or lack thereof: “Because the Western Enlightenment is the

historical fons et origo of both human rights and American values, it is not surprising that there is a huge overlap in their substantive content. Both traditions insist on religious, political, and civic rights and freedoms, both advocate the rule of law and democracy, both lay claim to universality of application” (2003, under sect.: “Human Rights and American Values,” par. 1).

30 Morsink, 2000, p. 23. This point draws from Johannes Morsink’s in-depth examination of the process of drafting the Universal Declaration. He

contends that mutual condemnation is a unifying starting point that evidences the true universality of the UDHR; for all humans would condemn a government or authority, such as the Nazis, which kills its citizens for reasons outside their control. While this contention certainly holds within a Western understanding, condemnation of a particular circumstance that did not directly affect all cultures of the world may not be meaningful enough to hold up across regional divides. One cannot overlook the French, and especially the American, revolutionaries’ need for “moral support” in order to ensure the success of their endeavors, and what better way to bolster widespread support than to appeal to the universality and morality of their cause. But, attention to such political motives in the promotion of human rights as “inalienable” or “universal” again reduces them to a part of a Western agenda early on, regardless of their conceptual potential to unify universally later on.

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Americans condemned British taxation; they wanted freedom from the fear that they could be punished

by an authority for something they did not consent to and that did not directly benefit them. This

revolutionary political “freedom from…” mentality is an indicator of negative rights in academic

literature.31 Negative rights are closely associated with civil and political rights, which include the right

not to be killed, and the right to security of one’s personal property (or, not to have one’s property

stolen); basically, a government cannot breach these rights; citizens should be freed from the fear that

their government might oppress them.32 These first generation rights33 are said to have come out of the

American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen,

and focus on individual rights.34

First generation human rights came under international adjudication when Nazi leaders were

sentenced for “Crimes Against Humanity” during the Nuremberg Trials following World War II.35 This

was the first instance in which a grave crime against humanity, or a violation of human rights on a mass

scale, was given as a judgment on an international scale. Prior to this, International Human Rights Law

basically did not exist. If Human Rights Law existed, it was only within municipal law that individuals

could bring grievances or be tried.36

Although the Trials are largely seen as a great success in the history of human rights, some hold

that the rule of law was compromised, claiming that the Victors employed retrospective justice.37

Compellingly, in Ellis Washington’s Loyola Law Review article “The Nuremberg Trials: The Death of

the Rule of Law (in International Law),” it is argued that the U.S.’s orchestration and use of positive law

was unnecessary and unjust. He quotes legal theorist David Adams in differentiating between positive

law – “law that is posited or dictated by man” – and natural law: “[the] principles and standards not

simply made up by humans but rather part of an objective moral order, present in the universe and

accessible to human reason.”38 One of the major critiques relativists make of International Human Rights

Law is that “natural law” is not natural at all, but, rather, dictated by the West (or, more pointedly, the

United States), and foreign to indigenous experience.

There is considerable validity for this critique when one observes the historical account already

presented in this paper, and in the account provided by Johannes Morsink in his Human Rights; Origins

Drafting and Intent, which explains where pressures and drafts of the Universal Declaration came from

31 Williams, 1998, p. 16.32 Buchanan, 2004, p. 266.33 Brems, 2001, p. 482; Rich, 2002, p. 25.The distinctions of first, second, and third generation rights comes from Karel Vasak, the former director of the Division of

Human Rights and Peace of UNESCO. 34 Rich, 2002, p. 25.35 Carol Devine, 1999, p. 55.36 Janis, 2008, p. 264.37 Author Jeremy Colwill states that “…defendants should not be prosecuted in an ex post facto manner on the basis of

retrospective legislation, which is precisely what occurred at Nuremberg…” (1995).38 Washington, 2003, Section II(a).

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in the 1940s. To abridge this broad report, I would like to highlight the 1941 State of the Union address

by President Franklin Roosevelt, which named “the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of

worship, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear” – very much civil and political rights – as

the “Four Essential Freedoms.”39 The Preamble of the UDHR pays tribute to Roosevelt in proclaiming

these as “the highest aspiration of the common people.” In the same year, the National Catholic Welfare

Conference sent a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt and the Pope aired a radio message asking for an

international bill of human rights. In 1943, the American Institute of Law and the International Labor

Organization, in Philadelphia, produced an international bill of rights of its own.40 Roosevelt worked out

a compromise with Stalin, and a veto against the proposal of a Universal Declaration was withheld in the

UN’s Security Council. In 1945, the American Jewish Committee submitted a version of an international

bill of human rights along with the American Bar Association.41 Although the actual drafters were from a

variety of nations, and the text they produced affirms time and again its mission to include all of

humanity as equals (as Morsink emphasizes), given this compelling thrust from predominantly Western

(more specifically – American) associations, and taking into account the military and economic

superpower standing the United States had when World War II ended, it is impossible to dismiss the

possibility that other nations were just going along because they felt that they had to or ought to.

It is out of this critique that we recognize another set of rights, or, second generation human

rights. This set of rights does not stand in opposition to civil and political rights, but does most definitely

come from a different perspective – a perspective offered by the only nation that was powerful enough

after World War II to compete with the United States’ view: the Soviet Union. Said to have arisen after

the Soviet Revolution of 1917, 42 this second set of human rights includes social, economic, and cultural

rights, and are considered positive rights (versus negative rights, not to be confused with positive law);

in other words, a government must do something in order to enact these rights.43 They include “freedoms

to…” such as the right to a primary education, or the right to equal pay for equal work. While first

generation rights release citizens from fear of their government, second generation rights compel

citizens to pursue a full life within society. The socialist pull within second generation rights emphasizes

the need for material equality in order to ensure equal opportunity for all to realize their first generation

rights.

These two sets of rights provide a general framework for analysis that can set up a false

dichotomy in regard to consideration of economic and social rights. First generation rights are often

accused of overlooking economic rights entirely, but, in fact, they do attend to economic rights – just

39 Susan Waltz asserts that “So influential was the notion of “fundamental freedoms” that the 1941 speech is considered by many as the seminal contribution [to the UDHR]” (Waltz, 2001, p. 46).

40 Morsink, 2000, p. 1.41 Ibid., p.2.42 Rich, 2002, p. 25.43 Ibid.

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within laissez-faire recommendations that assert that only within a free market environment can civil

and political rights be guaranteed.44 In regard to social rights, while first generation rights explicitly refer

to the individual’s relationship with the state, the second is more unspecific in reference to the individual

within society’s relationship to the state.

They do correspond nicely to two international covenants (binding IHR instruments) that,

together with the Universal Declaration, comprise what is called the International Bill of Rights;45 first

generation rights correspond with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR,

1966), and second generation rights correspond with the International Covenant on Economic, Social,

and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966).46 Notably, the argument that suggests that the United States in

particular has, to an extent, pushed civil and political rights onto other states, without considering their

contributions to the human rights dialogue, gains support upon notice of the fact that the U.S. did not

ratify the ICCPR until June of 1992.47 But, worse, the United States has yet to ratify the ICESCR,

although 160 of the United Nations 192 member states have already entered it into force in their

countries.48

The third category of rights is one of particular interest to this study. Third generation rights

address the interests of the developing world, former colonies, or third-world countries.49 According to

the United Nations Statistics Division, the member states of the African Charter and the Arab Charter

constitute developing states (some of them least developed countries), 50 and, therefore, these two

charters are associated with third generation rights. These rights markedly include: the right to

development, the right to peace, the right to environment, the right to the ownership of the common

heritage of humankind, and the right to communication.51 These rights did not begin to emerge on the

international legal scene until the close of the Cold War.52 They are intriguing not only for their newness,

but because they are not confined to definitions of the relationship of an individual to her or his nation,

44 Brems, 2001, p. 482.45 The International Bill of Rights includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For access to these documents and an overview, see the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact Sheet at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm.

46 Rich, 2002, p. 25.47 Databases: Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=322&chapter=4&lang=en.48 Databases: Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=321&chapter=4&lang=en.49 Brems, 2001, p. 57; Rich, 2002, p. 26.50 Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-Regions, and Selected Economic

and Other Groupings, 2008, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed.51 Tseng, Chien-Yuan, 2003, http://www.asianresearch.org/Art.s/1150.html, par. 4; Brems, 2001, p. 57.52 Susan Koshy pays specific attention to the power constructs in the international human rights system that collapsed, were

realigned, and fortified after the Cold War. Her article, “From Cold War to Trade War: Neocolonialism and Human Rights,” notably mentions the emergence of drafts of regional human rights declarations throughout the 1990’s that are significant, but not given widespread, formal, international recognition, and are thus excluded from the analysis of this paper (1999).

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and are even more expansive than second generation rights’ interest in societies. Third generation rights’

scope is that of all, or collective rights. For this emphasis on fraternity, they are often referred to as

“solidarity rights.”53 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights marks this extension in its title:

“Peoples’” refers to groups, or societies, of people, while “Human” refers to all human individuals. One

can detect the African bloc’s emphasis on the distinction between individual-oriented first generation

rights, society-oriented second generation rights, and collectivity of third generation rights, which aims

to bring them together and expand them. Without this understanding, the title of the African bloc’s

human rights instrument might be confusing.

Taking this history and academic background into account, let us revisit the research questions

posed earlier: If these third generation instruments are only the products of Western influence and

indirect Western coercion, why would signing onto Western “universal” human rights instruments not be

enough for African and Arabian states? Secondly: Why go to such efforts to define human rights in their

own declarations, if what they are asserting is just paying lip service to the existing Western framework?

As it has been shown, developing nations did not really have an opportunity to contribute to the

International Human Rights legal language until the Cold War had ended. The League of Arab States has

faced enormous difficulty in entering this debate, considering human rights’ deep, historical

Catholic/Judeo-Christian roots and affiliations, which poses a problem for nations with similarly deep

Islamic roots.54 But, growing attention to this third branch, spurting out from the existing trunk of

International Human Rights instruments, is evidence that these documents may contain content unique

to Western standards.

Satisfactory answers to these questions cannot be derived without analysis of these actual texts.

So, in order to procure some answers, this study employs a number of tests with the mission to: 1) see to

what extent “lip service” is paid to Western values/rights sets by reviewing the rights mentioned in each

of the four regional instruments under analysis here against the Universal Declaration; 2) measure

adherence to these rights in practice, by utilizing data provided by The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI)

Human Rights Dataset, in order to determine hypocrisy or sincerity in proclaiming rights; 3) find out if

the language in each regional instrument correlates with its affiliated “generational” set of rights; and, 4)

ultimately, determine if the content of regional human rights instruments is meaningful in its own

regard, and within International Human Rights Law in general.

In specific regard to the third goal listed above, if there is an actual correlation between regional

rights language and the set of rights the region is affiliated with, we can expect to see strong language in

favor of first generation rights in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, language in

53 Tseng, Chien-Yuan, 2003, http://www.asianresearch.org/Art.s/1150.html, par. 5.54 See Al-Sayyid, 1997; Little, Tibi, & Mayer, 1990, p. 59-158; West, 2007.

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favor of first and second generation rights in the European Convention on Human Rights (for the

European Convention has both Western and former Soviet countries as member states), and strong

language in favor of third-generation rights in the African and Arab Charters.

Data Report 55 and Statistical Analysis

“Content analysis is the statistical semantics of political discourse.” 56

To make clear, only substantial content (versus procedural content), 57 of the human rights

instruments under study, is represented in the data put forth in this report. The first analysis was run on

the four regional human rights instruments in order to procure some preliminary descriptive statistics

about the texts. This first run was conducted using a software program called “CompareSuite.”58

CompareSuite has the capability to compare two non-related documents by keyword, and then produce a

percentage of shared keywords. For example, the following two sentences would have 30% similarity by

keyword according to CompareSuite because, out of ten total words in each sentence, they share three:

1) I read a book and walked to the store today. 2) Mom read that book yesterday, it was at the store.

Note that, although “the” was repeated in both sentences, it was excluded from the similarity

report. Likewise, a list of unsubstantial terms was compiled (containing articles, prepositions, and

numbers) that CompareSuite would not include in its analysis, because their inclusion could have

potentially detracted from the overall substantial contents’ similarities. See Appendix A for this list of

55 In order to help this report read easily, tables have been included within the text, rather than in the Appendix. Furthermore, for the sake of readability and saving space, titles of each regional human rights instrument have been shortened (for example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights will be listed as “African Charter” in tables) and color-coded.

56 As quoted in Holsti, 1969, p. 2.57 Procedural content includes any text that does not contain rights language, such as registration, ratification, reservation,

accession, and denunciation information. All material contained within the preambles of each instrument was retained for analysis. All provisions detailing the rights, freedoms, and duties of individuals, peoples, and the state were included for analysis. While inclusion of additional protocols and amended provisions to the analysis would certainly prove interesting to this study, including them in this analysis would be unfeasible and unhelpful, considering that not all states parties to the original instruments are parties to its protocols and amendments. Furthermore, this would defeat this study’s focus on the inherency of regional intentions derivable from these instruments’ originally ratified texts. Therefore, additional protocols and amended provisions have also been excluded. Since the UDHR and the American Declaration do not contain provisions that establish a committee, commission, or court, and since such provisions are of a procedural, rather than substantive, nature, all such provisions were excluded from analysis. The entire text of the UDHR can be found in Appendix B.

Explicitly, of the European Convention, introductory registration information and Articles 19-59, as well as additional Protocols 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13 have been excluded from this analysis. Of the African Charter, Articles 30-68 have been excluded. Of the Arab Charter, the introductory material and Articles 45-53 have been excluded.

It is the opinion of the author that exclusion of such materials from analysis aids to hone in on the concepts under analysis. Extreme care has been taken in the selection of such exclusions so as to retain any relevant text. Finally, the analysis of each region’s current human rights practices (Table 3) was included in hopes to take implementation efforts (excluded from the instruments’ texts) in reality into consideration, rather than discarding them altogether.

58 CompareSuite was developed by Denis Dmitriev and Alex Kaleniuk and is copyrighted material under AKS-Labs. Any additional information, including the free, full-software demo version used in this study, can be obtained at: http://www.comparesuite.com/.

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excluded terms. While this list was meant to refine the results as much as possible, it is undoubtedly not

all-inclusive and intended to produce a general, initial comparison. The results of this test are below

(Table 1).

Table 1Regional Instrument Similarity with UDHR by KeywordAmerican Declara-

tion(1948)

20%

Total Word Count: 1746 (UDHR) / 1731 (American)

Common: 208 Unique: 246

European Convention(1950)

19%

Total: 1746 (UDHR) / 2158 (European)

Common: 214 Unique: 279

African Charter(1981)

20%

Total: 1746 (UDHR) / 2396 (African)

Common: 211 Unique: 295

Arab Charter(2004)

16%

Total: 1746 (UDHR) / 4709 (Arab)

Common: 300 Unique: 638

From these results, a few interesting things can already be identified. Most generally, the more

recent the IHR instrument, the greater the total word count. The American Declaration – adopted in May

of 1948 – has 1731 words; the UDHR (in December, 1948) has 1746; the European (entry into force

date: 1950): 2158; African (1981): 2396; and the most recent, the Arabian, has a whopping 4709 words.

This could be evidence of the growing inclusivity of the IHR language, and the attaching of third

generation rights onto the earlier first and second generations. It could also show that the regions which

submitted their instruments later-on feel obligated to pay tribute to first and second generation rights in

order to be recognized as legitimate, and then tack on what they feel are true assertions of human rights.

While further investigation is still needed in order to come to more concrete conclusions, I would

like to note the interesting finding that about, or exactly, 20% of the language in the American,

European, and African instruments is exactly the same as in the UDHR, despite increasing word counts

as we move farther ahead in time. This percentage is reflected, also, in the approximately 210 words in

common between the documents and the UDHR. Again, it is so far undetermined in this paper as to if

this points to agreement within International Human Rights Law, or lip service.

Moving on, the textual analysis in this study begins to dig beneath the surface level. After setting

out the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration in Table 2,59 I was able to go through each

59 Famously, the UDHR contains 30 Articles. For this study’s purposes, these have been summarized into more concise, recognized rights. The 1st, 29th, and 30th of these Articles do not directly admit substantial rights content (the 1st recognizes rights’ inherency, the 29th pertains to duty to uphold these rights, and the 30th professes the validity of the rights therein), and are therefore not listed in our table of analysis. The entire Universal Declaration of Human Rights is

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regional instrument and mark a “0” in the corresponding cell if a UDHR right was not alluded to at all in

a regional instrument; a “1” if it was conveyed, but only partially or indirectly;60 and a “2” if the right

was fully recognized. Rights that were fully recognized in all IHR instruments under analysis were

highlighted in red. See Table 2.

Table 2 UDHR American Euro-

peanAfrican Arab

Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of Person 2 2 2 2

Prohibition of Slavery 0 2 2 2

Prohibition of Torture 0 2 2 2

Right to Legal Recognition 2 2 2 2

Right to Equality 2 2 2 2

Right to Effective Judicial Remedy 1 2 2 2

Prohibition of Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile 1 0 2 2

Right to Fair Trial 2 2 2 2

Right to Assumption of Innocence until Proven Guilty 2 2 2 2

Right to Private Life 0 2 0 2

Freedom of Domestic and International Movement 1 2 2 2

Right to Political Asylum 2 0 2 2

Right to Nationality 2 0 2 2

Right to Marry and Found a Family 1 2 1 2

Property Rights 2 2 2 2

Freedom of Religion 2 2 2 2

Freedom of Opinion and Expression 2 2 2 2

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association 2 2 2 2

Right to Equal Access/Opportunity to Public Service 2 0 2 2

Social Security (Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights) 1 1 2 2

Right to Work 2 0 2 2

Right to Rest and Leisure 2 0 0 2

Right to an Adequate Standard of Living 1 0 1 2

Right to a Primary Education 2 2 2 2

Right to the Benefits of Culture 2 0 2 2

Right to Social and International Order 0 2 1 1

First, notice the explicit recognition across all four regional instruments of Roosevelt’s “Four

included in Appendix B. 60 For example, surprisingly, the European Convention does not specifically list the right to social security, but in the

limitations placed upon the extent to which rights can be exercised, the protection of “national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country…the prevention of disorder or crime…the protection of health or morals, [and] the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” is mentioned multiple times. From this, it can confidently be assessed that social security is a recognized right, just indirectly or implicitly.

Coding on this table was conducted semi-formally since the purpose of this table is only to provide a general overview of consensus and disagreement between these regional instruments and the Universal Declaration. The Human Dimension Program at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies conducted a similar analysis of the American, European, and African declarations/charters against the Arab Charter, which lists the specific articles in which each right is referred. This comparison can be found at http://www.diplomacy.edu/arabcharter/human_interinst.asp.

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Essential Freedoms.” As a reminder, they are: the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of

worship, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear.61 The freedom of speech and expression is

acknowledged in the Universal Declaration’s “Freedom of Opinion and Expression.” Freedom of

worship is expressed simply enough in the UDHR’s “Freedom of Religion.” The freedom from want is

more difficult to interpret, and less-supported cohesively amongst the instruments, but can be aligned

with “Property Rights” when taken in context.62 Lastly, the “Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of

Person” along with legal recognition and remedies and the guarantee of equality frees individuals from

fear of injustice and aggression. The remaining rights which are guaranteed across the board are all civil

and political rights: the right to legal recognition, the right to equality, the right to a fair trial, the right to

assumption of innocence until proven guilty, and the right to peaceful assembly and association. Only

one right merits a “2” in all the instruments’ rights categories that is not strictly connected with first

generation rights: the right to an education.63

Without looking further into this table just yet, this appearance of cohesion across regional

assertions of human rights on these specific civil and political – and originally Western – rights is

striking. Immediately, one should wonder to what extent these rights are actually adhered to in practice.

If it is so that this set of rights has been genuinely realized by Non-Western regions, and come to fruition

in the writings of the African and Arab Charter, then we can establish one hypothesis by which to

measure implementation data against: We expect to see a strong correlation between civil and political

rights adherence in all of the regions under analysis. But, if it is the case that the West maintains a

stronghold on the definition of human rights as primarily civil and political, although this is not the view

actually held in Non-Western states, then we can ascertain a contending hypothesis, if it is true that

human rights are the product of Western values: We expect that first generation rights will be more

prevalent in the practices of Western regions (America and Europe) than in those of Non-Western states

(Africa and the Arab states).

The data source consulted in order to test these hypotheses is The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI)

61 Roosevelt, 1941.62 This interpretation is taken out of both Roosevelt’s explanation and the Western perspective considered in the Literature

Review, which holds that the capitalism, or laissez-faire economic policy, is the basic mode through which wants may be realized. Thus, freedom from want is essentially having stuff, or property, and everyone should have this right. Roosevelt claims, in his “Four Freedoms” speech, that the freedom from want “means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants” (emphasis added, Roosevelt, 1941). Although Roosevelt could have been referring to a form of economic understanding other than that of capitalism, given the context through which it was spoke, I take the liberty to invoke this Western understanding that “freedom from want” is secured through property rights.

A more philosophical understanding of the freedom from want could imply that the right to an education provides the freedom necessary to determine and achieve one’s wants. Notice that the right to an education is also strongly supported in the language of all four regional instruments.

63 The right to an education fits into almost all rights categories under different interpretations. As a first generation right, it is promised so that a government cannot impinge upon an individual getting ahead. As a second generation right, it is promised so to better the individual within a society of potentially educated individuals. It can also be seen as a third generation right, because education often goes hand-in-hand with development, and dissemination of information on a collective or mass scale can also constitute this right, although not under commonly accepted understandings.

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Human Rights Dataset, which can be found at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/.64 Principally investigated by

Dr. David L. Cingranelli of Binghamton University and Dr. David L. Richards of the University of

Memphis, this outstanding collection of data “contains standards-based quantitative information on

government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from

1981-2007. It is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and

consequences of human rights violations…”65 This needs no further explanation as to how perfectly this

information corresponds to our project at hand.

Because the Arab Charter was not adopted until 2004, and even then, not entered into force until

its seventh required member state ratified it in 2008,66 only the most recent data offered – for 2007 – has

been analyzed. Dependent variable was the level of adherence to each variable in practice. In order to

run adherence data for the states parties of a region, each state was coded according to what regional

IHR instrument it was party to, with mutual exclusivity preserved. 67 For instance, all states parties to the

European Convention, were coded with a “2.” CIRI adherence in practice data for all “2” countries was

then run through cross-tabulation against a number of different rights, or independent variables (detailed

below), using the statistical analysis software program SPSS (http://www.spss.com), in order to

determine the dependent variable: the average unit of adherence in practice of all states parties to the

European Convention to the right(s) being analyzed. For a full list of the states parties to each

instrument, please refer to the Appendix C.

The following are the independent variables, taken from the “Short Variable Descriptions

for Indicators in The CIRI Human Rights Dataset,”68 that were selected for analysis:

64 My deepest thanks go out to Dr. Mary Anderson of the University of Tampa’s Government and World Affairs Department for directing me to this source and giving of her free time and guidance in showing me how to best utilize the wealth of data offered though the CIRI project.

Additional gratitude is due to Dr. Bruce Friesen of the University of Tampa’s Sociology Department, for his assistance in running selected data through the statistical analysis software program SPSS (http://www.spss.com/).

65 The CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 2009.66 The Arab Chater on Human Rights was written in 1994, adopted in 2004, and ratified (in force) in 2008. 67 There are only two exceptions to this mutual exclusion: Libya and Algeria, which are parties to both the African Charter

and the Arab Charter. Since the African Charter has 53 states parties, and the Arab Charter only has 7, data on the human rights practices in Libya and Algeria were not included in the analysis of the African region, but were counted in the analysis of human rights practices in the Arab states.

68 This list of short descriptions of the CIRI variables is available at no charge in .pdf form at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_variables_short_descriptions.pdf. A full .pdf coding manual can also be accessed for free at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf.

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Variable Variable Full Name

Description

[PHYSINT]Physical In-tegrity Rights Index

This is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Im-prisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).

[NEW_EMP-INX]

Empowerment Rights Index

This is an additive index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers’ Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights).

[WORKER]Worker’s Rights

This variable indicates the extent to which workers enjoy internationally recognized rights at work, including a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children; and acceptable conditions of work with re-spect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. A score of 0 indicates that workers’ rights were severely restricted; a score of 1 indicates that workers’ rights were somewhat restricted; and a score of 2 indicates that workers’ rights were fully protected during the year in question.

[WOPOL]Women's Politi-cal Rights

Women's political rights include: The right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political par-ties, and the right to petition government officials. A score of 0 indicates that women's po-litical rights were not guaranteed by law during a given year. A score of 1 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but severely prohibited in practice. A score of 2 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice. Finally, a score of 3 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice.

[WOSOC]Women's Social Rights

The right to equal inheritance, the right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men, the right to travel abroad, the right to obtain a passport, the right to confer citizen-ship to children or a husband, the right to initiate a divorce, the right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage, the right to participate in social, cul-tural, and community activities, the right to an education, the freedom to choose a resi-dence/domicile, freedom from female genital mutilation of children and of adults without their consent, and freedom from forced sterilization. A score of 0 indicates that there were no social rights for women in law and that systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law. A score of 1 indicates that women had some social rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced. A score of 2 indicates that women had some social rights under law, and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in social mat-ters. Finally, a score of 3 indicates that all or nearly all of women’s social rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforced these laws in prac-tice.

Not only do these variables allow for the testing of this study’s hypotheses and analysis of the

impact of human rights instruments in reality, but they also provide the opportunity to look into the

effectiveness of first generation rights, addressed by the [PHYSINT] and [WOPOL] variables, and

second generation rights, measured by [WORKER] and [WOSOC]. The [NEW_EMPINX] variable

provides a look at how empowered citizens are overall by the rights their country guarantees them and

also comprises Roosevelt’s “Essential Freedoms.” While these variables do not correspond cut-and-dry

with our understanding of first and second generation rights, the results are very revealing.

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Descriptive Statistics

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

PHYSINT 192 0 8 5.01 2.192

NEW_EMPINX 192 0 14 8.54 3.931

WORKER 192 0 2 .85 .701

WOPOL 192 0 3 1.96 .577

WOSOC 184 0 3 1.26 1.018

Valid N (listwise) 184

ANOVA

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

PHYSINT Between Groups 93.206 3 31.069 10.334 .000

Within Groups 390.854 130 3.007

Total 484.060 133

NEW_EMPINX

Between Groups 547.348 3 182.449 23.294 .000

Within Groups 1018.204 130 7.832

Total 1565.552 133

WORKER Between Groups 5.043 3 1.681 3.918 .010

Within Groups 55.771 130 .429

Total 60.813 133

WOPOL Between Groups 4.487 3 1.496 6.932 .000

Within Groups 28.050 130 .216

Total 32.537 133

WOSOC Between Groups 63.200 3 21.067 34.128 .000

Within Groups 76.543 124 .617

Total 139.742 127

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Table 3

HR INSTRUMENTPHYSINT

(8)NEW_EMPINX

(14)WORKER

(2)WOPOL

(3)WOSOC

(3)

1 American Decl’ on the Rights & Duties of Man

Mean 5.31 11.29 .91 2.20 1.74

N 35 35 35 35 31

Std. Deviation 1.728 2.663 .781 .473 .855

2 European Conv. on HR Mean 6.36 10.58 1.22 2.20 2.09

N 45 45 45 45 43

Std. Deviation 1.708 2.751 .735 .505 .921

3 African Charter on HR Mean 4.42 7.38 .79 2.04 .65

N 48 48 48 48 48

Std. Deviation 1.796 3.057 .410 .410 .635

4 Arab Charter on HR Mean 4.33 4.17 .67 1.33 .00

N 6 6 6 6 6

Std. Deviation 1.366 .983 .816 .516 .000

Total Mean 5.30 9.33 .96 2.10 1.37

N 134 134 134 134 128

Std. Deviation 1.908 3.431 .676 .495 1.049

HR INSTRUMENTPHYSINT

(8)NEW_EMPINX

(14)WORKER

(2)WOPOL

(3)WOSOC

(3)

1 American Decl’ on the Rights & Duties of Man

% Adherence66.38 80.64 45.50 73.30 58.00

2 European Conv. on HR % Adherence 79.50 75.57 61.00 73.30 69.67

3 African Charter on HR % Adherence 55.25 52.71 39.50 68.00 37.36

4 Arab Charter on HR % Adherence 54.16 29.78 33.50 44.33 0.00

The descriptive statistics table is listed here first, as a reference. The ANOVA table shows that all

of the statistics presented in the cross-tabulation beneath it are statistically significant at the .01 level.

This firmly supports the force behind the statistics noted in Table 3. Table 3 is extended to include the

table below it, which portrays the adherence data in a percentage, rather than a scale, value.

It is evident from the results on the Empowerment Rights variable, which largely represents

Roosevelt’s “Essential Freedoms,” that the second hypothesis – first generation rights will be more

prevalent in the practices of Western regions (America and Europe) than in those of Non-Western states

(Africa and the Arab states) – is given strength. Member states of the American Declaration have the

highest score (11.29 out of 14 possible), followed by member states of the European Convention (with a

10.58 out of 14), while numbers continue to decrease as Non-Western states’ scores are assessed;

member states to the African Charter scored a 7.38 out of 14, and parties to the Arab Charter received

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the lowest score – a 4.17 out of 14 – in the results. On another variable measuring civil and political

rights – Women’s Political Rights – this trend is notable as well; both Western regions scored a 2.20 out

of 3 (73.30% adherence); Africa – 2.04 (68.00%); and, Arabia – 1.33 (44.33%).

In categories that do not measure traditional civil and political rights, the European region

dominates. The states comprising this bloc scored a little over 13% that of the American states on the

Physical Integrity Index measuring torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and

disappearance. Although the Physical Integrity Index fits into the definition of first generation rights as

guaranteeing “freedom from…” something, such as torture, note (see Table 2) that the American

Declaration does not explicitly express the right to protection from torture or arbitrary arrest, detention,

or exile. This seems to show that the American states signatories only preach what they practice, while

Non-Western countries are more eager to declare rights without the practices to back them up; thus,

supporting our second hypothesis again, in that, in this instance, Non-Western states seem to be paying

empty lip service to Western-affiliated rights. One could also argue that the Central and South American

states that make up the signatories of the American Declaration do not constitute “Western” statehood,

therefore their score on the Physical Integrity Index is lower than it would be had the American

Declaration only been signed by Western, developed nations. But, this too supports the second

hypothesis that assumes Western countries practice first generation rights more thoroughly than Non-

Western countries.

While the Physical Integrity Index, Empowerment Rights Index, and Women’s Political Rights

variables (variables measuring civil and political rights) all scored an average 66% or higher of their

allotted maximums for all regions combined, Worker’s Rights and Women’s Social Rights practices fell

just below half on the averages given in the “Total” row. This reveals that, on the whole, second

generation rights are adhered to less in practice than first generation rights.

Another interesting observation surfaces in highlighting these Worker’s Rights and Women’s

Social Rights variables on their own: both the American and European regions have higher scores under

Women’s Social Rights than they do Worker’s Rights. But, for the Non-Western regions, Worker’s

Rights received better scores than Women’s Social Rights. Notably, while the Arab bloc merited 33.4%

of their total possible points on the Worker’s Rights variable, they were the only region to earn a “0” in

any category – in this case, it was under Women’s Social Rights. So, although the Arab and African

blocs assert commitment to the rights to equality and to marry and found a family (see Table 2), clearly

these rights are not upheld in practice.

So, it can concluded that there are significant differences in implementation practices between

Western and Non-Western regions that contribute to the hypothesis that International Human Rights are

based on and mobilized by Western values and influence. It was also determined that worker’s rights

were treated more fully in the practices of the Non-Western regions than social gender equality, while

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women’s social rights were treated with more attention in Western regions than worker’s rights. What is

really interesting here is that both of these variables fall within the scope of second generation rights.

This indicates that there may be another variable intervening that is not available within the CIRI

dataset, such as societal views of gender roles or capitalist values. Perhaps, recalling the discussion of

IHR Law that has been put forward above, the Non-Western set of human rights – third generation

human rights, or collective human rights – are playing a role here.

In order to direct attention back from practices to provisions in IHR Law, and to find out if, and

how, these third generation human rights are addressed by Non-Western countries in comparison to

Western countries in their respective declarations, one last analysis of these instruments was performed.

This analysis utilizes cutting-edge content analysis software in the field of political science. While

textual analysis identifies key words and can break down texts into percentages of similarity by words

and characters (like the first test in this data report), content analysis looks at words within their

contexts. It identifies the frequency of which certain phrases occur and for single, recurring words, it

can display each instance of the word in a vertical list within its surrounding context to see how the

word is most often used. The availability of software for these purposes is growing, but the realm of

political science- or even social science-directed content analysis is still mostly comprised of very

expensive or very crude self-developed programs made for specific projects.69 An exception is a program

called TextAnz, which offers the features named above through a user-friendly interface and fairly

reliable tech support.70

Through TextAnz, the IHR instruments under study were analyzed one by one. After a document

was loaded into the program, a simple click of a button produced the most frequently appearing phrases

in the entire document. While, in first attempts, I sought to find which actual rights phrases71 (phrases

actually containing the word “right” in them; e.g. the “Right to Protection of…”) came up the most in

each instrument, it was found that a specific right usually only occurred once (frequency = 1), or it

appeared twice within one article; usually, as the article’s title, and also within its content. The American

Declaration was the only instrument that used identical rights language (the “right to an education”) in

three instances, each time pertaining to a different aspect of the right in question; but, even then, the

“right to an education” was only repeated within the same article. Therefore, from the list produced by

TextAnz, the three most frequently occurring rights-substantial phrases – phrases that embodied the

spirit of a right, although it may not have the word “right” in it – were selected and organized in Table 4.

69 A simple Google search will reveal how much of this software is directed towards finding grammatical errors and sorting corporate survey responses. Dr. Will Lowe’s report also shows how complex, and, thus, far-removed from widespread usage, content analysis software is (“Software for Content Analysis: A Review,” 2002).

70 A version of TextAnz with full capabilities is available for $22.95 at http://www.cro-code.com/textanz.jsp. Screenshots and additional information on the software can also be found at that URL address.

71 For the purposes of this paper, “rights phrases” and “rights language” specifically indicate phrases that include the word “right” in it.

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The number of different articles that the phrase was found in is included in the table, because

articles generally focus on only one topic. Finding a rights-substantial phrase in multiple articles is

evidence that it may hold a special value – a value that emerges within multiple topics, intentionally or

unintentionally – to the document’s authors.

Table 4

RegionTop 3 Most-Occurring Substantial Rights Phrases

In # of articles / out of total articles

Americas Right to Inviolability (of home and correspondence) 2/38

 Right to Protection (of honor, reputation, private and family life

and of intellectual property) 2/38

  Right to an Education 3; 1/38

Europe “Democratic Society” 5/18

 Protection of the rights and freedoms of others, public safety and

order, and health and morals 3/18

Africa Right to be Free 2/29

  Right to Development 2/29

  Equality (non-discrimination) 4/29

Arab States “Right to Seek…” 4/44

  Right to Free Assistance 2; 1/44

  “Everyone has the right” 7/44

From these results, it is apparent that privacy and individual development is of utmost

importance to the signatories of the American Declaration. As to these concepts, generally, and the “right

to inviolability,” more directly, Dr. Gregory C. Keating of the University of Southern California Law

School wrote: “To American ears, the idea has a libertarian ring, implying a realm of private freedom

beyond the reach of public power.”72 This notion of freedom through protection of one’s private life and

property resoundingly emphasizes first generation rights’ focus on the individual.73

72 Keating, “Personal Inviolability and 'Private Law’,” 2008, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081378.73 The right to an education, although only mentioned in one article of the American Declaration, is marked here, because in

each mention it alludes to a number of different philosophical guarantors for freedom. First, it claims the basis of education should be on “the principles of liberty, morality and human solidarity,” which lends itself to ideas enmeshed with third generation rights. But, this can quickly be dismissed, because, it goes onto say that “The right to an education includes the right to equality of opportunity in every case, in accordance with natural talents, merit and the desire to utilize the resources that the state or the community is in a position to provide” (emphasis added, Article 12). Now, in this context, it is to be understood that equal opportunity takes a backseat to the initiative of the individual; or, under a more critical interpretation, “natural talents” can be seen to really mean the social status and/or wealth one is born into, eliminating altogether any motive to uphold social equality for the higher cause of property rights, individualism, and capitalism.

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On the complete other hand, not even one rights phrase could be found to repeat itself in the

European Convention. In fact, not even three phrases holding some sort of substantial content about

rights could be derived from this human rights instrument. Instead, the European Convention included

strong socialist language – the kind that could easily be categorized under second generation human

rights. The European member states seemed much more concerned about rights of the individual

impeding upon rights of all the individuals that comprise society as a whole. The phrase “Democratic

Society” was found in 5 of its 18 articles – that is, in over a quarter of all of the articles of the European

Convention under analysis, “Democratic Society” was stressed. Limitations in favor of protecting the

rights and freedoms of others, public safety and order, and the health and morals of society were placed

on the extent to which rights could be exercised in 3 of these 18 articles.74

Refer now back to Table 2. Does it not seem strange that certain important civil and political, and

social, economic, and cultural, rights75 have “0”s in the Western instruments where even the Arab and

African Charters have a “2?” Stranger still, the right to work is named in all of the other three regional

instruments, but not in the European, and, as we saw in Table 3, it was the European states that held the

best record on the Worker’s Rights variable. Certainly, some of the political rights excluded from the

European Convention – such as the rights dealing with exile, asylum, access to public service, and

nationality – are most likely better dealt with in the rules and regulations of the Council of Europe. But,

there is something complex at work behind the exclusions of the rights to work, rest and leisure, an

adequate standard of living, and to the benefits of culture; and it has to do with power.

Gross domestic product, or GDP, and gross national income, or GNI, (popular measures of a

country’s wealth) were not considered in the data analysis of this project, because the unit of analysis

here is regions of countries, and GDP and GNI are measured per country alone.76 But, it would be

interesting to see to what direct effect a country’s wealth has to do with the kinds of rights it practices,

and what kinds of rights it proclaims. On a surface level, it is known that the United Nations Statistical

Division cites Europe and North America as two of only four developed regions in the world,77 and

African and Arab states constitute developing regions. Considering this informal78 global class

74 It is only in 3 articles that all three of these clauses are listed. In the “Right to respect for private and family life,” the “Freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” “Freedom of expression,” and “Freedom of assembly and association,” – four of the most essential civil and political American freedoms – some limitation on the extent to which these rights could be exercised is present in the form of a second sub-point, emphasizing the protection of society as a whole.

75 Namely, the Prohibition of Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile, the Right to Political Asylum, the Right to Nationality, the Right to Equal Access/Opportunity to Public Service, the Right to Work, the Right to Rest and Leisure, the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and the Right to the Benefits of Culture.

76 For definitions and rankings of GDP and GNI, see the World Bank’s Data and Statistics Department at: http://go.worldbank.org/B5PYF93QF0.

77 The other “regions” are Japan, and Australia and New Zealand. They also note that by international trade statistics, South Africa and Israel may also be considered developed. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed.

78 The UN Statistics Division also notes: “There is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or areas in the United Nations system.” Rather, designation is assigned by common practice. This shows that this distinction goes deeper than statistics – to some extent, it is a characteristic that has been internalized, and, thus, hard to shake. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed.

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distinction erected between developed and developing countries, it seems that these underdog regions

feel they have something to prove, that Europe did not, in chocking their Charters full of affirmed rights

language in order to gain formal recognition on the IHR playing field.

To illustrate, consider that both the African and Arab Charters had more keywords in common

with the Universal Declaration than the American Declaration (Table 1). Notably, the Arab Charter has

almost 30% more words in common with the UDHR than the American Declaration! Both of these

Charters explicitly name more of the rights mentioned in the UDHR than either of the Western regional

instruments (Table 2). Yet, statistically, human rights practices in the states that are parties to these Non-

Western human rights instruments are much worse than the records of practices of Western countries

(Table 3). This all points to the conclusion posited in the introduction to this paper, which answers the

overarching question this study has pursued: Are International Human Rights laws really universal in

nature? Or, are they relative only to the Western world in which they were born? The “relativist”

hypothesis, associated with the second hypothesis given earlier in the Data Report and Statistical

Analysis section, which asserts that human rights are not inherent or self-evident, but can only be

realized through a dominantly Western perspective, holds. These developing regions have gone to great

lengths in order to show that they understand, and adopt, the Western legal language of human rights in

conception, but their practices show that they are not capable of upholding these provisions in reality.

But something unique can be seen in the most frequently occurring phrases of the African and

Arab Charters: the intrinsic admittance of ineptitude. “The right to be free” – mentioned in the African

Charter – has a slightly, but substantially, different ring to it than “the right to life, liberty, and security.”

Indeed, the two rights are addressed separately in the Charter.79 While “the right to be free” refers to

Africa’s specific economically exploited and colonial history, the rights to life, liberty, and security draw

language from the International Bill of Rights. “The right to development” is, all-in-all, ignored by the

American and European instruments, but in the African, its Preamble acknowledges that the right to

development is equally important as the entirety of first and second generation rights: “Convinced that it

is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political

rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as

universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the

enjoyment of civil and political rights; …”80 Within the articles of this Charter, the right to development

is included within the content of Article 20(1), which first mentions all peoples’ right to existence. It is

as though the Charter is saying that humanity’s very existence is dependent in part upon the

79 The right to life is treated in Article 4; the right to liberty and security of person is treated in Article 6; the right to be free is treated with the right to self-determination in Article 20, which coincides with freedom from colonization (20(2)), in Article 21, in regards to property rights, which coincides with freedom from foreign economic exploitation or monopolies (21(5)).

80 Emphasis added. African Charter on Human and Peropls’ Rights, 1986, Preamble. http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm.

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development of one’s civilization, or at least its ability to develop. Why is this rights phrase stressed

here, and not in the Western instruments? Because these African states are speaking to a human

experience of which they are familiar, and which the Western world is not.

The Arab Charter curiously employs an unfamiliar phrase frequently – “the right to seek…”

Under one interpretation, this could be taken to mean that the authors of this Charter are just letting

themselves off the hook in allowing their constituents to seek, but not find fulfillment of their rights. But

another interpretation takes into consideration the Charter’s “right to free assistance.” In this light, it is

not so much that the governments of the states parties to this Charter are inhibiting their citizens in the

fulfillment of their rights, but admitting that their human rights record in practice is atrocious, and it will

take a lot of work, time, and assistance to improve it. Through this view, the Arab Charter is placing

itself within the realities of its states parties’ situations, but at least saying – establishing a written

promise that states can more or less be held accountable to – that its members will try to improve those

realities.

It is in these hidden admissions of weakness that these regional charters become truly

groundbreaking, and where the relevance and resilience of International Human Rights Law becomes

powerfully apparent: after sifting through the Western rhetoric in these documents, here can be found

articles of genuine, indigenous initiative vying for entrance into the international legal system of human

rights. These can be verified as genuine, because both of these Non-Western instruments establish both a

commission for human rights monitoring in their regions and a court for punishing violations of them.

For as effective or ineffective as they may be at this stage, this shows a level of commitment that goes

deeper than lip service. Such organizations take thought, time, people, and money – tangible sacrifices

that validate, at least in part, the worth these regions place on human rights.

Third generation rights – the right to development, the right to peace, the right to environment,

the right to the ownership of the common heritage of humankind, and the right to communication81 --

have no malicious or culturally exclusive motivation behind them. Instead, they intrinsically admit that

the International Human Rights legal language is one that was foreign to their ears, but, after being

exposed to it for decades now, they no longer need an interpreter. In fact, third generation rights signify

a new dialect of rights, and one that speaks not out of an elitist philosophy, nor out of a positive law

agenda, or even a revolutionary spirit to overthrow class distinctions, but, rather, they speak out of the

mouths of representatives of people in need of human rights. I see this new set of rights as a missing

puzzle piece – the piece which enables us to realize that we cannot see the whole picture, until all of the

pieces come together in solidarity.

Conclusion

This paper has gone, so far, without mentioning the opening quote of this paper by Thomas

81 Refer to footnote 36.

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Paine, an American revolutionary writer. His quote from The Rights of Man is moving, because it brings

in a less supported, yet century-old Western strain of the human rights debate that disregards the

legitimacy of the notion of natural rights.82 Although the defense of human rights as natural rights

constituted the basic philosophical grounding for the adjudication of modern IHR law at the Nuremburg

Trials, this study reinvigorates Paine’s take on human rights, to an extent. Perhaps rights are not handed

down from a god or a higher power, and it has been shown in this study that their codification in a

Charter does not guarantee adherence in practice. But, this does not invalidate them, nor does it

invalidate the governments that declare them. Yet, Paine raises a point that is paramount to this

discussion: if, as is the case, human rights are not authored by individual citizens and brought to the

attention of their government, they must be brought by their government to the attention of its people.

If human rights are not absolute, natural law, more importantly, this study has found that the

concept of rights is malleable, and, furthermore, that the structure of international human rights law is

adaptable, and becoming more inclusive because of its unnatural, or human, nature. According to Paine,

governments have no right to exist unless the individuals that it governs produce it. But, remember that

Paine was writing out of the circumstances relevant to his political contexts, in which concrete

governments were coming into existence, just as the Allies and drafters of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights were writing out of specific circumstances, in which concrete IHR law was coming into

existence. Neither of them could anticipate the circumstances our political world now faces. But, our

current circumstances demand recognition of human rights, and the emerging body of regional

international human rights documents is evidence of that. Since the end of the Cold War, not only have

less powerful states been able to come to pull up a seat at the roundtable of the human rights discussion,

but, as the African and Arab Charters show, they are raising a voice.

Although it is not listed in any tables here, one of the top 3 most occurring relevant words in the

American Declaration was “every” (followed by “person,” “human,” “man,” or “one”). In the European

Convention, “everyone” was in the top three. The African Charter encompasses both “every

[“individual” or “human being”],” which appears 20 times, and “peoples,” which appears 19 times –

both in the Charter’s top 3 most occurring relevant words. Finally, in the most recent instrument, the

Arab Charter, “all” (in reference to humans or people) came up in half of its articles, more than any

other word in its – or any of the other instruments’ – text, amounting to 43 total mentions. Maybe this

shows that the legacy of lip service is only becoming more compelling. But, maybe, as this study will

conclude, this shows that rights and circumstances, are improving, for all.

Addendum

82 Also supported by Jeremy Bentham, who wrote in his “Critique of the Doctrine of Inalienable, Natural Rights” (1843), that “Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, -- nonsense upon stilts.”

26Friesen

The histories, philosophies, social and practical realities of International Human Rights Law are

so complex and multifaceted that the ultimate, individual determinant of right and wrong is reduced to

the indecipherable, internalized amalgamations of all of these affects: feelings. I, personally, feel the

ache of that human desire to connect with all other humans in some meaningful dimension, solely

because we are human together. Perhaps this desire can be explained by some psychoanalytical process

derived from moments in my childhood, perhaps because my father is a sociologist I see humanity as a

mode of identifiable existence to which I belong, perhaps my protestant, yet politically liberal,

upbringing has directed me towards easy acceptance of secular humanism within the political realm, and

that all of this both drives and aligns my emotional and spiritual “self” with the Western defense of

human rights to which I feel so unreasonably attached.

The infinite web of occurrences that led us to where we are, who we are, and what our

understandings of social life are, though, is unreasonable. We do not all feel the same, and we never will,

and we never should. But, our International Human Rights Laws are starting to admit/reflect this, just as

the human individuals within that legal system, such as myself, are starting to admit our own cultural

contextualizations. But these admissions are no longer hostile proclamations of differences; legal

recognition sees these admissions as unique, but no longer uniquely understood, social identities.

Understanding – indeed, the mobilization of empathy – is the essential source of hope in eventual world

peace found in the International Human Rights legal system that upholds, and will continue to validate,

its existence and authority. That is why the whole experience of International Human Rights Law

ultimately reflects progress – not in the metaphysical development of humanity as a whole, not in the

proliferation of liberal democratic justice and equality, but in the advancement of our politics – purely,

and remarkably.

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Appendices

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Appendix A: Words excluded from CompareSuite similarity analysis

such 31 this 41 also across forthey 32 under 42 those after insideon 33 both 43 these along ontowithin 34 until 44 whether among overeach 35 its 45 had at pastbeing 36 but 46 nor before sinceso 37 about 47 than beneath throughwho 38 therefor 48 into beside uponthem 39 inasmuch 49 only between withoutif 40 there 50 above during  

Appendix B: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 1948

WHEREAS recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

WHEREAS disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear

and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

WHEREAS it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

WHEREAS it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

WHEREAS the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social

progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

WHEREAS Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

WHEREAS a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore, the General Assembly Proclaims

THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

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5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are enti-

tled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of the Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the de-

termination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.11.

1. Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.

2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offense was committed.

12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or at-tacks.

13.1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

14.1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or

from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.15.

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

16.1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to

marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dis-solution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and

the State.17.

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his reli-gion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his reli-gion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

20.1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

21.1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen rep-

resentatives.2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in peri-

odic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national ef-fort and international co- operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the eco-nomic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

23.1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and

to protection against unemployment.2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

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3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays

with pay.25.

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

26.1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental

stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made gen-erally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of re-spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.27.

1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, lit-erary or artistic production of which he is the author.

28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

29.1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is

possible.2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are deter-

mined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a demo-cratic society.

3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Appendix C: Ratification Status of States Parties

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man European Convention on Human Rights

Signatories (20)Date of Signa-

ture States Parties (47) RatificationEntry into

ForceArgentina 5/2/1948 Albania   2/10/1996   2/10/1996  

Bolivia 5/2/1948 Andorra   22/1/1996   22/1/1996  Brazil 5/2/1948 Armenia   26/4/2002   26/4/2002  Chile 5/2/1948 Austria   3/9/1958   3/9/1958  

Colombia 5/2/1948 Azerbaijan   15/4/2002   15/4/2002  Costa Rica 5/2/1948 Belgium   14/6/1955   14/6/1955  

Cuba 5/2/1948 Bosnia and Herzegovina 12/7/2002   12/7/2002  Ecuador 5/2/1948 Bulgaria   7/9/1992   7/9/1992  

El Salvador 5/2/1948 Croatia   5/11/1997   5/11/1997  United States of America 5/2/1948 Cyprus   6/10/1962   6/10/1962  

Guatemala 5/2/1948 Czech Republic   18/3/1992   1/1/1993  

33Friesen

Haiti 5/2/1948 Denmark   13/4/1953   3/9/1953  Honduras 5/2/1948 Estonia   16/4/1996   16/4/1996  Mexico 5/2/1948 Finland   10/5/1990   10/5/1990  

Nicaragua 5/2/1948 France   3/5/1974   3/5/1974  Panama 5/2/1948 Georgia   20/5/1999   20/5/1999  

Paraguay 5/2/1948 Germany   5/12/1952   3/9/1953  Peru 5/2/1948 Greece   28/11/1974   28/11/1974  

Dominican Republic 5/2/1948 Hungary   5/11/1992   5/11/1992  Uruguay 5/2/1948 Iceland   29/6/1953   3/9/1953  

Venezuela 5/2/1948 Ireland   25/2/1953   3/9/1953      Italy   26/10/1955   26/10/1955      Latvia   27/6/1997   27/6/1997      Liechtenstein   8/9/1982   8/9/1982      Lithuania   20/6/1995   20/6/1995      Luxembourg   3/9/1953   3/9/1953      Malta   23/1/1967   23/1/1967      Moldova   12/9/1997   12/9/1997      Monaco   30/11/2005   30/11/2005      Montenegro   3/3/2004   6/6/2006      Netherlands   31/8/1954   31/8/1954      Norway   15/1/1952   3/9/1953      Poland   19/1/1993   19/1/1993      Portugal   9/11/1978   9/11/1978      Romania   20/6/1994   20/6/1994      Russia   5/5/1998   5/5/1998      San Marino   22/3/1989   22/3/1989      Serbia   3/3/2004   3/3/2004      Slovakia   18/3/1992   1/1/1993      Slovenia   28/6/1994   28/6/1994      Spain   4/10/1979   4/10/1979      Sweden   4/2/1952   3/9/1953      Switzerland   28/11/1974   28/11/1974  

   The Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia 10/4/1997   10/4/1997      Turkey   18/5/1954   18/5/1954      Ukraine   11/9/1997   11/9/1997      United Kingdom   8/3/1951   3/9/1953  

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Arab Charter on Human Rights

States Parties (53)Date of Signa-

ture Ratification States Parties (9) RatificationAlgeria 10/04/1986 01/03/1987 Algeria ???Angola - 02/03/1990 Bahrain 06/18/2006Benin 11/02/2004 20/01/1986 Jordan ???

Botswana - 17/07/1986 Libya ???Burkina Faso 05/03/1984 06/07/1984 Palestine ???

Burundi 28/06/1989 28/07/1989 Saudi Arabia 02/24/2008Cameroon 23/07/1987 20/06/1989 Syria ???

Central African Rep. 04/02/2003 26/04/1986United Arab Emi-

rates 01/15/2008Cape Verde 31/03/1986 02/06/1987 Yemen ???

Chad 29/05/1986 09/10/1986Côte d’Ivoire 30/08/2005 06/01/1992

Comoros 07/12/2004 01/06/1986Congo 27/11/1981 09/12/1982

Djibouti 20/12/1991 11/11/1991

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Democratic Rep. of Congo 23/07/1987 20/07/1987Egypt 16/11/1981 20/03/1984

Equatorial Guinea 18/08/1986 07/04/1986Eritrea - 14/01/1999

Ethiopia - 15/06/1998Gabon 26/02/1982 20/02/1986Gambia 11/02/1983 08/06/1983Ghana 03/07/2004 24/01/1989

Guinea-Bissau 08/03/2005 04/12/1985Guinea 09/12/1981 16/02/1982Kenya - 23/01/1992Libya 30/05/1985 19/07/1986

Lesotho 07/03/1984 10/02/1992Liberia 31/01/1983 04/08/1982

Madagascar - 09/03/1992Mali 13/11/1981 21/12/1981

Malawi 23/02/1990 17/11/1989Mozambique - 22/02/1989Mauritania 25/02/1982 14/06/1986Mauritius 27/02/1992 19/06/1992Namibia - 30/07/1992Nigeria 31/08/1982 22/06/1983Niger 09/07/1986 15/07/1986

Rwanda 11/11/1981 15/07/1983South Africa 09/07/1996 09/07/1996

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Repub-lic 10/04/1986 02/05/1986

Senegal 23/09/1981 13/08/1982Seychelles - 13/04/1992

Sierra Leone 27/08/1981 21/09/1983Somalia 26/02/1982 31/07/1985

Sao Tome & Principe - 23/05/1986Sudan 03/09/1982 18/02/1986

Swaziland 20/12/1991 15/09/1995Tanzania 31/05/1982 18/02/1984

Togo 26/02/1982 05/11/1982Tunisia - 16/03/1983Uganda 18/08/1986 10/05/1986Zambia 17/01/1983 10/01/1984

Zimbabwe 20/02/1986 30/05/1986