The Status of Folk Psychology The Case for Elimination

What is “Folk Psychology”? Folk psychology is the commonsense understanding of the

mind that we use to understand ourselves and others.

The standard example involves beliefs and desires.

Q: Why did you go to the fridge?

A: Because I desired a beer and I believed that there was (at least) one in there.

You've been using belief-desire psychology to explain behavior since you were about two years old.  It is as familiar to you as the ground beneath your feet.

What is “Eliminative Materialism”? Eliminative Materialism is the view that FP is

a radically false theory which will be displaced by a completed neuroscience (Churchland, 67).

So the materialistic view of the universe, when the story is fully told, will eliminate rather than preserve our ordinary ways of thinking about the mind.

A Radical View Our future relatives will look

back and feel really sorry for us; sort of the way that you feel sorry for those characters in ‘The Crucible’ who believe in witches. 

They might even blame us for our epistemic promiscuity; after all, we excuse children who believe in the tooth fairy or Santa Claus, since they are not yet fully rational. But we think that adults should know better.

EM vs. IDT Question: What are the

crucial differences between Eliminative Materialism and Mind-Brain Identity Theory?

EM vs. IDT IDT: Maintains that FP will (eventually) be

smoothly reduced to neuroscience. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the taxonomy of the higher-level and lower-level theories.

EM: Maintains that FP will not (eventually) be reduced to neuroscience, there is no such correspondence, and thus should be jettisoned in favor of a better theory of mind.

Water vs. Phlogiston IDTs like the analogy of ‘water’: it was

smoothly reduced to chemistry. Water is really nothing but hydrogen and oxygen molecules in a certain arrangement.

EMs like the analogy of ‘phlogiston’: it was eliminated by chemistry. Phlogiston was thought to be an element in flammable objects that was released during combustion.

Is EM thrilling or revolting? Here is Churchland in the closing lines of the paper:

"[T]he principled displacement of folk psychology is not only richly possible, it represents one of the most intriguing theoretical displacements we can currently imagine" (90).

Here is Jerry Fodor: "if commonsense psychology were to collapse, that would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species . . ." (1987, p. xii).

Why care about the FP debate? There is a lot at stake. 

*If EM is right, then we must begin to completely rethink our mental lives.

*If EM is wrong, then things get to stay (by and large) the same. 

So let's turn the arguments pro and con.

Arguments for Elimination Question: Why does

Churchland think that EM is correct? What is his main argument?

The Master ArgumentP1: FP is a theory of mind (about ourselves and others).

P2: FP is a really bad theory of mind.

P3: Neuroscience can provide us with a much better perspective on the workings of the mind (ourselves and others).

C: We should reject FP and embrace a neuroscientific perspective (about ourselves and others).

P1? Question: Why does

Churchland think that FP is a theory?

P1: Why FP is a theory Grounds #1: Churchland argues that we could not explain

each other’s behavior (as we do) unless we relied upon psychological laws.

“Each of us understands others, as well as we do, because we share a tacit command of an integrated body of lore concerning the lawlike relations holding among external circumstances, internal states, and overt behavior” (69).

Worry: This is one avenue for understanding other minds. But is it the only way?

P1: Why FP is a theory Grounds #2: There is an obvious analogy between the

generalizations of folk psychology and those of mathematical physics (71).

(x) (f) (m) [(x has a mass of m) & (x suffers a net force of f)), → (x accelerates at f/m)]

(x) (f) (m) [(x hopes that p) & (x discovers that p)), → (x is pleased that p)]

Worry: Is this a weak analogy? Can you think of any important respects in which they differ?

P2? Question: Why does

Churchland maintain that FP is subject to elimination?

P2: Why FP might be radically false Grounds #1: massive explanatory failures.

-mental illness-creative imagination-individual differences in IQ-sleep-vision-memory-learning

FP sheds almost no light on these capacities.

P2: Why FP might be radically false Grounds #2: theoretical stagnation.

We have no reason to think that FP will ever solve these mysteries, given its shoddy track-record.

FP used to be applied to non-intelligent beings. And it hasn’t advanced an inch since the Greeks.

P2: Why FP might be radically false Grounds #3: FP does not fit into our modern

scientific worldview.

We are beginning to understand human beings in materialist terms… and FP does not play any part of “the greatest theoretical synthesis in the history of the human race” (75).

P3: Why neuroscience promises a more powerful theory of mind Question: Why does

Churchland believe that neuroscience can give us a more accurate view of ourselves and others?

P3: Why neuroscience promises a more powerful theory of mind Short Version: Neuroscience will provide us with a radical

new understanding of mental representation, knowledge, meaning, ethics, etc.

We limit ourselves in thinking of representation in terms of “propositional attitudes” and computation in terms of formal symbol manipulation.

We would get a much deeper picture of our minds if we conceptualize these capacities in terms of massively distributed representations and vector-transformations in the brain.

A simple connectionist model of distributed mental representation

P3: Why neuroscience promises a more powerful theory of mind Churchland maintains that it is conceivable that we could put

this new perspective into practice.

“It is not inconceivable that some segment of the population, or all of it, should become intimately familiar with the vocabulary required to characterize our kinematical states, learn the laws governing their interactions and behavioral projections, acquire a facility in their first person ascription, and displace the use of FP altogether, even in the marketplace. The demise of FP’s ontology would then be complete” (86).

Indeed, the Churchlands themselves have begun this project..

The Churchlands: theory and practice "Paul, don't speak to me, my

serotonin levels have hit bottom, my brain is awash in glucocorticoids, my blood vessels are full of adrenaline, and if it weren't for my endogenous opiates I'd have driven my car into a tree...Pour me a Chardonnay...."

-New Yorker, “Two Heads: A Marriage Devoted to the Mind-Body Problem”, 2/12/07 (see ‘links to further reading’)

Intermission

Objection #1: Functional Kinds Question: What

exactly is the objection?

Objection #1: Functional Kinds Objection: The psychological categories in

FP (beliefs and desires) are functional rather than natural kinds. And nobody expects functional kinds to reduce down to lower-level theories.

Response(s): ?

Objection #2: Self-Defeating Question: What

exactly is the objection?

Objection #2: Self-Defeating Objection: One cannot defend EM without relying upon FP;

so eliminativists pull the rug out from beneath their own feet.

“[T]he statement of EM is just a meaningless string of marks or noises, unless that string is the expression of a certain belief, and a certain intention to communicate, and a knowledge of the grammar of the language, and so forth. But if a statement of EM is true, then there are no such states to express. The statement at issue would then be a meaningless string of marks or noises. It would therefore not be true. Therefore it is not true. Q.E.D.” (89)

Response(s): ?

Other Objections? Final Question: What do you think is the

most fundamental objection to EM?