the social psychology of protest

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Why do people protest? This question has alwaysintrigued social scientists. Why are people prepared tosacrifice wealth, a pleasant and carefree lifestyle, orsometimes even their very lives for a common cause?This question brings us to the level of analysis of theindividual and therefore to the realm of social psy-chology. Obviously, other disciplines like sociologyand political science have protest as their study object

too (for an overview, see Klandermans andRoggeband, 2007), but in this article we focus on thesocial psychological approach and point to literaturefrom sociology and political science where applicable.People social psychologists never tire of asserting live in a perceived world. They respond to the worldas they perceive and interpret it. Indeed, this is what asocial psychology of protest is about trying tounderstand why people who are seemingly in the samesituation respond so differently. As social psychologyexplores the causes of the thoughts, feelings andactions of people and primarily how these are influ-

enced by social context it has a lot to offer to thestudy of protest participation. We illustrate this point with an overview of the state-of-the-art theoreticalapproaches and a review of the empirical evidence.

The question as to why people engage in protesthas occupied social psychologists for at least threedecades, and it has received diverging answers over theyears (see Klandermans et al. [2008] for empirical evi-

dence combining these explanations; VanStekelenburg and Klandermans [2007] for a theoreti-cal overview; and Van Zomeren et al. [2008] for ameta-analytical overview). In this section we try toassess where we stand and propose future directionsthat theorizing and research might take.

Before we proceed to the social psychologicalanswer as to why people protest, we devote a few

words to protest and protest behaviour itself. Protest isa form of collective action and of social movementparticipation at the same time. In this article we focuson protest participation rather than on the broadercategories of collective action and social movementparticipation (see Snow et al. [2004] for overviews).There is a vast array of specific protest behaviours thatpeople might exhibit. Wright et al. (1990) have pro-posed a framework based on three distinctions: thefirst between inaction and action, the second betweenactions directed at improving ones personal condi-tions (individual action) and actions directed at

improving the conditions of ones group (collectiveaction). The third distinction is between actions thatconform to the norms of the existing social system(normative action like petitioning and taking partin a demonstration) and those that violate existingsocial rules (non-normative action like illegal protestsand civil disobedience). This distinction is importantbecause one may expect that the motivational

The social psychology ofprotest

Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and Bert KlandermansVU University, The Netherlands

abstract Social psychological research has taught us a lot about why people protest. This article pro-

vides a theoretical and empirical overview. Discussed are grievances, efficacy, identification, emotions and

social embeddedness, followed by the most recent approaches, which combine these concepts into dual

pathway models. Finally, two future directions are discussed: (1) to shed light on the paradox of persist-

ent participation and (2) to clarify how perceptions of sociopolitical context affect protest participation.

keywords collective action N emotions N grievances N identityN social psychology of protest


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Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans Protest

dynamics underlying the different protests are differ-ent. Indeed, the fact that someone is prepared to takepart in street demonstrations does not automaticallymean that she or he is inclined to use violence toreach their groups goals.

Why people protest

Classical theories proposed that people participate inprotest to express their grievances stemming fromrelative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injus-tice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind and Tyler,1988). Scholars of social movements, however,began to question the effects of grievances on move-ment participation and proposed that the questionto be answered is not so much whether people who

engage in protest are aggrieved, but whetheraggrieved people engage in protest. They suggestedthat efficacy, resources and opportunities would pre-dict protest participation (Klandermans, 1984;McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977).Meanwhile, scholars such as Reicher (1984), Simonet al. (1998) and Klandermans and De Weerd(2000) began to explore the role of collective identi-ty in protest behaviour. Recently, the role of emo-tions has drawn the attention of protest researchers(Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In our work onmigrants protest participation we integrated theseelements into a single theoretical framework, and we

proposed a fifth element to consider social embed-dedness (Klandermans et al., 2008). Discussionsabout politics within networks increase efficacy andtransform individual grievances into shared griev-ances and group-based anger, which translates intoprotest participation.

Grievances

Grievance theories. Prominent among griev-ance theories was relative deprivation theory.Feelings of relative deprivation result from compari-

son of ones situation with a standard be it onespast, someone elses situation, or a cognitive standardsuch as equity or justice (Folger, 1986). If compari-son results in the conclusion that one is not receivingwhat one deserves, a person experiences relative dep-rivation. Runciman (1966) referred to relative depri-vation based on personal comparisons as egoisticdeprivation and to relative deprivation based ongroup comparisons as fraternalistic deprivation.Research suggests that fraternalistic deprivation isparticularly important for engagement in protest(Major, 1994; Martin, 1986). Foster and Matheson(1999), however, showed that the relation is morecomplex. They demonstrate that when the groups

experience becomes relevant for ones own experi-ence i.e. when the personal becomes political motivation to protest increases. People who experi-ence both personal deprivation andgroup depriva-tion are the most strongly motivated to take to the

streets. On the basis of a meta-analysis, VanZomeren et al. (2008) conclude that the cognitivecomponent of relative deprivation (as reflected in theobservation that one receives less than the standardof comparison) has less influence on action partici-pation than the affective component (as expressed bysuch feelings as dissatisfaction, indignation and dis-content about these outcomes).

Next to relative deprivation, social psychologistshave applied social justice theory to theorize ongrievances and protest (Tyler and Smith, 1998).Social justice literature distinguishes between two

classes of justice judgements: distributive and proce-dural justice. Distributive justice is similar to relativedeprivation; it refers to the fairness of outcomes.Procedural justice refers to the fairness of decision-making procedures and the relational aspects of thesocial process (being treated with respect, dignity,etc.; Tyler and Smith, 1998). People care more abouthow they are treated than about outcomes doauthorities treat them with respect, can authoritiesbe trusted to do well by their people? On the basis ofthese findings, Tyler and Smith proposed that proce-dural justice might be a more powerful predictor ofsocial movement participation than distributive jus-

tice, although they never tested this idea directly (butsee Blader [2007] for a test in the context of labourunion participation).

Grievances and protest. At the heart of everyprotest are grievances, be it the experience of illegiti-mate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feel-ings of injustice, moral indignation about some stateof affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance(Klandermans, 1997). Illegitimate inequality is whatrelative deprivation and social justice theories areabout. Suddenly imposed grievances refer to an

unexpected threat or inroad upon peoples rights orcircumstances (Walsh, 1981). Grievances resultingfrom violated principles refer to moral outragebecause it is felt that important values or principlesare violated. In more general terms, intergroup con-flicts can be framed as conflicts of principles or con-flicts of material interests (Van Stekelenburg andKlandermans, 2009). This distinction is importantin the context of protest, because in a conflict ofinterests people are more inclined to take an instru-mental route to protest to enforce change, whereas aconflict of principles more likely leads to protests in which people express their views and indignation(Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009).


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identification by examining the individuals beliefs,sentiments and commitment to the group. If a socialidentity becomes more salient than personal identity,people are inclined to define their personal self interms of what makes them different from others,

whereas they tend to define their social identities interms of what makes them similar to others. Theredefinition from an I into a we as a locus of self-definition makes people think, feel and act as mem-bers of their group and transforms individual intocollective behaviour (Turner, 1999).

Social identity theory. In the 1970s, a socialpsychological identity perspective on protestemerged in the form of social identity theory (SIT;Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Tajfel and Turner (1979)showed that social categorization according to some

trivial criterion such as the blue or the red groupsuffices to make people feel, think and act as a groupmember. Compared to this minimal group para-digm, real world intergroup conflicts with histories,high emotional intensity attached to them andsociopolitical consequences can be seen as maximalgroup paradigms that bring powerful group mem-bership to mind (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). SITproposes that people generally strive for and benefitfrom positive social identities associated with theirgroups. The only way for participants in minimalgroup studies to obtain a positive social identity is byidentifying with the groups into which they are cat-

egorized, and then ensuring that their group comesoff best in the only available comparison between thegroups (i.e. giving more rewards to the in-group thanthe out-group). Why, then, would people identifywith groups that reflect negatively on them (e.g. dis-advantaged or low-status groups)? SITs answer isthat three social structural characteristics affect howpeople manage their identity concerns. The firstsocial structural characteristic is permeability of the

group boundaries; the possibilities perceived by theindividual to attain membership of a higher-statusgroup. Permeable group boundaries allow disadvan-

taged group members to leave their group for a high-er-status group, whereas impermeable boundariesoffer no such exit (cf. Hirschman, 1970). Whenpeople do not perceive possibilities to join a higher-status group, they might feel commitment to thelower-status group. The second social structuralcharacteristic is stability, the extent to which statuspositions are stable or variable. People who conceivestatus positions as variable see protest as a possiblemethod to heighten group status, especially whenthe low group status is perceived as illegitimate.Members of a low-status group who perceive thedominant groups position as illegitimate and unsta-ble can use a variety of strategies to obtain a more

positive social identity. They may, for instance, rede-fine characteristics of their own group previouslyseen as negative (Black is beautiful!); or they mayengage in social competition of which protest is theclearest expression.

Protest of powerful vs powerless. Groupsin conflict often differ in power and status, andchanging status relations and their perceived legiti-macy are crucial in understanding intergroup con-flict. Traditionally, SIT studies have focused onlow-status groups collectively challenging the actionsof high-status groups. However, members of high-status groups may also challenge the authority in sol-idarity with members of low-status groups (Subasiet al., 2008). At the core of thispolitical solidarityispsychological change in the self-categorization of

members of high-status groups through which it isno longer the authority but the minority that bestembodies the relevant norms, values and beliefs thatdefine who we are and how we should relate toeach other. Through this process, high-status mem-bers embrace low-status members cause as their ownand become willing to collectively challenge theauthority. Moreover, members of high-status groupsmay perceive their own identity to be threatened tooif they believe that their status is being eroded or thatlow-status groups are becoming more powerful (VanStekelenburg et al., 2010). For instance, sociologicalapproaches show that structural social changes

immigration flows, increasing political power ofminorities or economic contraction induce threatsto majorities who may react with exclusionary meas-ures (Olzak and Koopmans, 2004) or protest (VanDyke and Soule, 2002). Interestingly, social psycho-logical approaches show that it isperceptionsof com-petition rather than actualcompetition that invokehostility to minorities (Sniderman et al., 2004).

Dual and multiple identities. Recent work onmultiple identities (cf. Kurtz, 2002) emphasizes thatpeople can hold many different identities at the same

time, which may push in the same direction or maycome into conflict. When two of the groups peopleidentify with end up on opposite sides of a contro-versy (for example, union members who are facedwith the decision to strike against their company),people might find themselves under cross-pressure(Oegema and Klandermans, 1994). Indeed, workerswho go on strike or movement activists who chal-lenge their government are often accused of beingdisloyal to the company or the country. (Gonzlezand Brown, 2003) coined the term dual identity topoint to the concurrentworkings of identities. Theseauthors argue that identification with a subordinateentity (e.g. ethnic identity) does not necessarily


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exclude identification with a supraordinate entity(e.g. national identity). In fact, they hold that a dualidentity is the desirable configuration as it impliessufficient identification with ones own group toexperience some basic security and sufficient identi-

fication with the overarching identity to precludedivisiveness (see also Huo et al., 1996). There is evi-dence that immigrants who display a dual identityare more inclined to take to the streets on behalf oftheir group (Simon and Ruhs, 2008). This is furtherspecified by Klandermans et al. (2008), who reportthat immigrants who display a dual identificationtend to be more satisfied with their situation thanthose who do not display such identity, but iftheyare dissatisfied they will be more likely to participatein protest.

Identification and protest. Why is groupidentification such a powerful motivational push toprotest? First of all, identification with others isaccompanied by an awareness of similarity andshared fate with those who belong to the same cate-gory. Furthermore, the strength of an identitycomes from its affective component (see Ellemers,1993 for a similar argument); the more the group isin me the more I feel for us (Yzerbyt et al., 2003)and the stronger I am motivated to participate onbehalf of the group. Collective identification, espe-cially the more politicized form of it, intensifies feel-ings of efficacy (see Simon et al., 1998; Van Zomeren

et al., 2008). Next to shared fate, shared emotionsand enhanced efficaciousness, identification withothers involved generates a felt inner obligation tobehave as a good group member (Strmer et al.,2003). When self-definition changes from personalto social identity, the group norm of participationbecomes salient; the more one identifies with thegroup, the more weight this group norm will carryand the more it will result in an inner obligation toparticipate on behalf of the group. Together thesedynamics explain why group identification functionsas a stepping stone to a politicized identity.

Politicized identity. Collective identities mustpoliticize to become the engine of collective action.Typically, politicization of identities begins with theawareness of shared grievances. Next, an externalenemy is blamed for the groups predicament, andclaims for compensation are levelled against thisenemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted,the power struggle continues. Politicization of iden-tities and the underlying power struggle unfold as asequence of politicizing events that gradually trans-form the groups relationship to its social environ-ment, whereby the tactical choices are again shapedby identity (Polletta, 2009). Hence, workers strike

and anarchists fight the police. If in the course of thisstruggle the group seeks to win the support of thirdparties such as more powerful authorities (e.g. thenational government) or the general public, identi-ties fully politicize (Simon and Klandermans, 2001).

Langner (2010) developed a measure of politicizedcollective identity (PCI) to assess individual differ-ences in the political meaning of an identity. Themore politicized group members are the more likelythey will engage in collective action directed at thegovernment or the general public. This has been alsodemonstrated meta-analytically (Van Zomeren et al.,2008).

EmotionsThe study of emotions has become a popularresearch area in the social psychology of protest.

Such was not always the case. As rational approach-es were the state of the art, emotions were oftenregarded as some peripheral error term in motiva-tional theories. Sociological emotional approachesfocus on the social nature of emotions whereby con-cepts such as emotion norms, emotion work andemotion culture play a major role (see Goodwin etal. [2001] for a sociological take on emotions andprotest). Group-based appraisal theories of emotionshave reintroduced emotions to the social psychologyof protest.

Appraisal theory of emotions. People are

continuously evaluating or appraisingthe relevanceof their environment for their well-being. After aquick and automatic evaluation of an events impli-cations for ones well-being and of ones ability tocope with the situation, other appraisal dimensionsare evaluated: How does the event influence mygoals? Who or what caused the event? Do I have con-trol and power over the consequences of the event?Are the consequences of the event compatible withmy personal values and (societal) norms (Lazarus,1966)? As a consequence, two persons can appraisethe same event differently and have different emo-

tional responses (see Roseman et al. [1996] for anoverview of different appraisals). Appraisal theory was developed to explain per-

sonal emotions experienced by individuals. Yet, theself implicated in emotion-relevant appraisals isclearly not only a personal or individual self. If groupmembership becomes part of the self, events thatharm or favour an in-group by definition harm orfavour the self, and the self might thus experienceemotions on behalf of the in-group. With such con-siderations in mind, Smith (1993) developed amodel of intergroup emotions that predicated onsocial identification with the group. The main postu-late of intergroup emotion theory is that when a


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social identity is salient, situations are appraised interms of their consequences for the in-group, elicit-ing specific intergroup emotions and behaviouralintentions. Thus people experience emotions onbehalf of their group when the social category is

salient and they identify with the group at stake(Devos et al., 2002).

Group-based emotions and protest. Angeris seen as the prototypical protest emotion (VanStekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). For those ofus who have been part of protest events or watchedreports on protest events in the news media, this ishardly surprising. Indeed, it is hard to conceive ofprotest detached from anger. Van Zomeren et al.(2004) show that group-based anger is an importantmotivator of protest participation. Leach and col-

leagues examined readiness for political actionamong advantaged Australians to oppose govern-ment plans to redress disadvantaged Aborigines.They found that symbolic racism and relative depri-vation evoked group-based anger which in turn pro-moted willingness for political action (Leach et al.,2006). But advantaged group members can also per-ceive the in-group advantage as unfair and feel guiltand anger about it. Anger related to in-group advan-tage, and to a lesser degree guilt, appears to be apotent predictor for protest (Leach et al., 2006).

There exists a relation to efficacy: people whoperceived the in-group as strong are more likely to

experience anger and desire to take action; peoplewho perceive the in-group as weak are more likely tofeel fearful and to move away from the out-group(Devos et al., 2002; Klandermans et al., 2008). Anger moves people to adopt a more challengingrelationship with authorities than subordinate emo-tions such as shame and despair (Taylor, 2009) orfear (Klandermans et al., 2008). In explaining differ-ent tactics, efficacy appears to be relevant too.Group-based anger is mainly observed in normativeactions where efficacious people protest. However, innon-normative violent actions contempt appears to

be the more relevant emotion (Fischer and Roseman,2007; Tausch et al., 2008). This suggests two emo-tional routes to protest: an anger route based on effi-cacy leading to normative action and a contemptroute when legitimate channels are closed (Wright etal., 1990) and the situation is seen as hopeless,invoking a nothing to lose strategy leading to non-normative protest (Kamans et al., 2010).

Social embeddednessThe decision to take part in protest is not taken insocial isolation. On the contrary, individual griev-ances and feelings are transformed into group-basedgrievances and feelings within social networks. As

early as 1965, Almond and Verba observed a positivecorrelation between active engagement in voluntaryassociations and political efficacy. They argued thatby engaging in voluntary associations people learnabout the working of political institutions. This

became known as social capital (Putnam, 1993),defined by Lin (1999: 35) as resources embedded ina social structure which are accessed and/or mobi-lized in purposive actions.

Social embeddedness and theory. The con-cept of social capital has important implications foradvancing our understanding of the role of socialembeddedness in protest participation. Exploringthe impact of social capital takes into account thesocial context in which the decision to participate ornot is produced. As a set of relationships, social cap-

ital has many different attributes, which are catego-rized into three components: a structural, a relationaland a cognitive component (Nahapiet and Ghoshal,1998). The structural component of social capitalrefers to the presence or absence of network tiesbetween actors and it essentially defines who peoplecan reach. Structural social capital encourages coop-erative behaviour, thereby facilitating mobilizationand participation (Baldassarri and Diani, 2007;Putnam, 1993). The relationalcomponent of socialcapital concerns the kinds of personal relationshipspeople have developed through a history of interac-tion (Granovetter, 1973). It focuses on the particular

relationships people have, such as respect, trust andfriendship. The structural position may be necessary,but it does not appear sufficient to help individualsovercome the collective action dilemma. Relationalcapital implies what people are actually able toreceive in terms of informational, physical and emo-tional support. When trust is built between peoplethey are more willing to engage in cooperative activ-ity through which further trust can be generated (ontrust: Lind and Tyler 1988, on respect: Simon andStrmer, 2003). The third cognitive component isdefined as those resources providing shared represen-

tations, interpretations and systems of meaning. Itconstitutes a powerful form of social capital in thecontext of protest. The cognitive dimension is inprotest literature referred to as raised consciousness a set of political beliefs and action orientations aris-ing out of an awareness of similarity (Gurin et al.,1980: 30). Consciousness raising takes place withinsocial networks. It is within these networks that indi-vidual processes such as grievance formation,strengthening of efficacy, identification and group-based emotions all synthesize into a motivationalconstellation preparing people for action. Bothresource mobilization theory and political processtheory emphasize the structural component, the role


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of social networks, especially as mobilizing structures(Diani and McAdam, 2003; Kitts, 2000; McAdam etal., 1996). Sociological and social psychologicalapproaches put more emphasis on the relational andcognitive component.

Social embeddedness and protest. Socialembeddedness plays a pivotal role in the context ofprotest, but why? The effect of interaction in net-works on the propensity to participate in politics iscontingent on the amount of political discussionthat occurs in social networks and the informationthat people are able to gather about politics as aresult (McClurg, 2003). Klandermans et al. (2008)provide evidence for such mechanisms: immigrantswho felt efficacious were more likely to participate inprotest provided that they were embedded in social

networks, especially ethnic networks, which offer anopportunity to discuss and learn about politics.Networks provide space for the creation and dissem-ination of discourse critical of authorities, and it pro-vides a way for active opposition to these authoritiesto grow (Paxton, 2002). In other words, this is wherepeople talk politics and thus where the factuality ofthe sociopolitical world is constructed and people aremobilized for protest. Being integrated in a networkincreases the chances that one will be targeted with amobilizing message and that people are kept to theirpromises to participate (Klandermans and Oegema,1987). For example, people with friends or acquain-

tances that are already active within social move-ments are more likely to take part in movementactions than others (Gould, 1993; Klandermans,1997). Social networks function as communicationchannels, discursive processes take place to formconsensus that makes up the symbolic resources incollective sense-making (Gamson, 1992;Klandermans, 1988) and people are informed ofupcoming events and social capital as trust and

loyalty accumulates in networks to provide individu-als with the resources needed to invest in protest(Klandermans et al., 2008).

Mobilization

When an individual participates in protest this is theresult of a sometimes lengthy process of mobiliza-tion. Mobilization is a complicated process that canbe broken down into several, conceptually distinctsteps. Klandermans (1984) proposed to break theprocess of mobilization down into consensus andaction mobilization.

Consensus mobilization. Participatingbecause of common interests or ideologies requires ashared interpretation of who should act, why andhow. Movements affect such interpretations by the

information they disseminate, a process known asframing (see Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow andBenford, 1988). Hence, framing is the bridgingmechanism between the more individual social psy-chological concepts of grievances and emotions andthe more sociological concepts of meaning and inter-pretation. Gerhards and Ruchts (1992) study of fly-ers produced by the various groups andorganizations involved in the protests against theIMF and the World Bank in Berlin is an excellentexample in this respect. These authors show howlinks are constructed between the ideological frameof the organizers of the demonstration and those of

the participating organizations in order to create ashared definition of the situation.

Action mobilization. Action mobilization isfurther broken down into four separate steps: peopleneed to sympathize with the cause, need to knowabout the upcoming event, must wantto participateand they must be able to participate (see Figure 1;Klandermans and Oegema, 1987).

Not a sypathizer

Sympathizer

Not targeted

Targeted

Not motivated

Motivated

Not a participant

Participant

Figure 1.


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motivations within protest participation studies. Wewant to emphasize that taking the ideological path toaction can be as rational or irrational as taking theinstrumental path to action. People can be furiousabout violated values and imperilled interests. And

instrumentally based participation can be purposefulin solving a social or political problem whereas ideo-logically based participation can be purposeful inmaintaining moral integrity by voicing ones indig-nation. Hence, emotional and rational factors form asingle motivational constellation in both instrumen-tal andexpressive routes to action.

Future directions: challenges for thesocial psychology of protest

What are the challenges a social psychology ofprotest faces? Probably, the most significant chal-lenge is the paradox of persistent participation(Louis, 2009). Activism frequently persists despitepessimism regarding the actions ostensible goals(Louis, 2009; Oegema and Klandermans, 1994). Why do people continue participating in protestalthough it does not effectuate their claims? Druryand Reicher (2009) suggests that participation gen-erates a positive social-psychological transforma-tion. They argue that participation in proteststrengthens identification and induces collectiveempowerment. The emergence of an inclusive self-

categorization as oppositional leads to feelings ofunity and expectations of support. This empowerspeople to offend authorities. Such action, they con-tinue, creates collective self-objectification, that is,defines the participants oppositional identity oppo-site the dominant out-group. Much of Drury andReichers research concerns the police as opponent,but one could wonder about the role of counter-movements. Would countermovements similarlyreinforce and polarize identity and lead to positivesocial psychological transformation?

Another approach to the paradox of persistent

participation would be to investigate how peoplerationalizetheir protest behaviour in the absence ofpositive outcomes? Do they transform politicalclaims into other aims, such as influencing the pub-lic opinion or making it into the newspapers? Littleis known about how protesters overcome theirdashed hopes to eventually protest again. Oftenprotest is not simply directed to the achievement ofshort-term political goals, but also to raise conscious-ness or to create solidarity (Taylor and Van Dyke,2004). Indeed, as suggested by self-perception theo-ry, protest participation can lead to identification asan activist, facilitating future action in the absence of

any external rewards. All in all, the underlyingprocesses as to why people protest over and again, area very interesting yet an understudied area and maybe an exciting theoretical challenge.

A second theme that begs for more social psycho-

logical research is that the impact of the sociopoliti-cal context affects peoples routes to protest. Indeed,the decision to protest is not taken in a social vacu-um. Collective struggles are rooted in a social orpolitical context and are, by definition, fought out inthis context. Koopmans and Statham (2000) andRoggeband (2004), for example, showed that thedynamics of participation are created and limited bycharacteristics of the national contexts in which peo-ple are embedded. So far, social psychologicalresearch has hardly focused on the subjective experi-ence of these macro-level factors. To be sure, three

decades ago SIT proposed that social structural char-acteristics such as permeability of the group bound-aries, stability and illegitimacy affect peoplesinclination to protest. These rather abstract structur-al characteristics were good to manipulate in the lab-oratories, but what do they tell us about how real lifeeconomic, social and political processes affect theroutes that individual participants take towardsprotest? How do political opportunities or restraints,or the strength or weakness of multi-organizationalfields, or organizational frames, or the proposed tac-tic affect the routes that individual participants taketowards participation? Future social psychological

research should try to identify variables at the meso-or macro-level that are important in affecting peo-ples subjectiveinterpretations of their collective dis-advantages.

Annotated further reading

The following three books and special journal issue lookat social movements and collective actions in general:

Klandermans B (1997) The Social Psychology of Protest.

Oxford: Blackwell.This book gives an overview of the first two decadesof the social psychology of protest.

Klandermans B, Roggeband CM (eds) (2007) TheHandbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines. NewYork: Springer.This collection provides an interesting overview ofhow different disciplines (sociology, political science,social geography, anthropology and social psycholo-gy) approach social movements.

Snow D, Soule SA, and Kriesi H (eds) (2004) TheBlackwell Companion to Social Movements.Snow et al. offer a collection of different topicsrelated to social movements.


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Iyar A, Van Zomeren (guest eds) M (2009) Special issueon: Social and psychological dynamics of collectiveaction. Journal of Social IssuesDecember.

Goodwin J, Jasper JM, and Polletta F (2001) PassionatePolitics: Emotions and Social Movements. Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press.Mackie DM, Smith ER (2002) From Prejudice to

Intergroup Emotions: Differentiated Reactions to SocialGroups. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

Aminzade R, McAdam D (guest eds) (2002) Specialissue on: Emotions and contentious politics.

Mobilization 7(2).These two books and special issue are suggested read-ing on emotions in the context of protest.

Stryker S, Owens TJ, and White RW (eds) (2000) Self,Identity, and Social Movements(2000) Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press.

This book is an interesting interdisciplinary overviewon identity in the context of social movements.

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