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NAUTICAL RESEARCH JOURNAL 105

The Scientific and Management Revolution inShipbuilding on the “Two Clydes,” 1880-1900

. . . . .

by Stuart A. McKenna and Larrie D. Ferreiro

Introduction

The introduction of metal construc-tion and steam propulsion into marinedesign during the 1800s provided ship-owners and mariners with ever-more reli-able vessels to ply the oceans. The study ofthe technology and infrastructure thatenabled those vessels to be created hasbeen of recent interest to maritime histori-ans. In particular, the twenty-year periodfrom 1880 to 1900 was a critical time,when marine design underwent a transfor-mation from using “rule of thumb” princi-ples to a more systematic, scientificapproach. Our study investigates thistransformation in detail through examin-ing archival company records along withexisting literature in order to determine thetrue causes for this monumental change ofdesign approach and examine the impactthis period has had on marine designtoday. This research will focus on the ship-yards of Great Britain and the UnitedStates of America (and specifically on the“Two Clydes”) for the reason that, duringthis period, these two nations dominatedthe merchant shipping world. In the1890s, for example, British shipbuilderswere known as “the naval architects of theworld;” its yards accounted for seventy-fivepercent of the world’s ship construction,and the tonnage it built for foreign ownersalone almost equalled the rest of theworld’s shipbuilding combined. Two-thirdsof British-built ships were launched on theClyde River in Scotland, around the city ofGlasgow. The United States was in distant

second place, building ten percent of theworld’s tonnage, of which half was builtalong the Delaware River nearPhiladelphia, earning it the nickname“The American Clyde.” Together the twonations had built seven out of every eightships plying the world’s oceans and water-ways. (Hall 1884, 260; Pollard, et al 1979,44-45; Gardiner 1993, 10; Matsumoto1999, 76)

Background

In order to investigate and analysethe underlying reasons behind the shift inmarine design practices in the time period1880-1900, we examined the largest andmost innovative shipyards from the “TwoClydes.” The River Clyde and its Firthwere once the location of over 300 ship-building firms and has seen the construc-tion of over 25,000 ships over threecenturies. The term “Clyde-built” becameknown as an industry benchmark of quali-ty and this was, in part, down to the pio-neering and high quality workmanship ofthe following shipyards selected by theresearchers of this paper:

• William Denny & Brothers wasopened by William Denny in Dumbartonin 1844 and was regarded as one of themost technologically advanced yards in theworld. It built ships until 1963. (Figure 1)• J & G Thomson was founded nearClydebank by pioneering brothers John andGeorge Thomson in 1871; it later wasabsorbed into the John Brown Company. In

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1847 the Thomson brothers had bothworked for “The Father of ClydeShipbuilding,” Robert Napier, and it wassurely Napier ’s influence that led to thebrothers’ shipyard gaining the reputation ofa prestigious and record-holding ship-builder. (Figure 2)

• Robert Napier & Sons was opened in1841 on the banks of the Clyde in Glasgownear an area known as Govan by RobertNapier. Napier ’s firm was another pioneer-ing shipyard and was responsible for pro-ducing some of the first iron vessels for theRoyal Navy, worked with eminent scien-

Figure 1. View of Denny yard from the Castle. Courtesy of the Scottish Maritime Museum.

Figure 2. J & G Thomson yard in 1907. Courtesy of theScottish Maritime Museum.

Figure 3. HMS Northampton ready for launching at RobertNapier’s yard, 1876. From the editor’s collection.


tists such as William J.M. Rankine, andprovided for the education of some of themost famous naval architects and marineengineers, including John Elder and theThomson brothers, before being taken overby the William Beardmore Company in1900. (Figure 3)

In the United States of America, theDelaware River near Philadelphia, knownas the “American Clyde,” was home tosome of the most important and innova-tive shipyards in the nation:

• William Cramp & Sons was foundedin 1825 and built ironclad warships duringthe Civil War, later becoming one of theUnited States Navy’s most important sup-pliers of battleships and destroyers throughWorld War II. (Figure 4)

• John Roach & Sons was founded in1864 and, between 1871 and 1885, wasthe largest ship building company in theUnited States. The Navy turned to Roachin 1883 to build its first modern, all-steelwarships. (Figure 5)

• Harlan & Hollingsworth was origi-nally founded in 1837 as a railroad carmanufacturer but soon moved into ship-building, specializing in destroyers, ferriesand coastal steamers, before being absorbedinto Bethlehem Steel. (Figure 6)

By examining these innovative ship-builders, we can compare and contrast thevarious organisational, science, engineeringand design changes that occurred over thisremarkable twenty-year period, whichbrought shipbuilding into the modern

Figure 4. Cramp’s shipyard in Philadelphia. From the editor’scollection.

Figure 5. The Roach shipyard in the 1890s. From the editor’scollection.

Figure 6. Panorama of the Harlan and Hollingsworth yard. From the editor’s collection.

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industrial age and professionalized role ofthe naval architect.

The Scientific and ManagerialRevolution in Industry

Before 1880, most industrial firmswere family-owned or partnerships, andcould be described as single-unit enterpris-es, employing a small number of men andcreating one (or just a few) products. Therewas usually little in the way of corporatespecialization, so (for example) the ownersmight be responsible for design, production,quality, receivable accounts and marketing,all at the same time. Most of the processeswere developed by careful trial and errorover long periods, resulting in effective (butoften inflexible) rules of thumb for guid-ance.

The last two decades of the nine-teenth century saw two revolutions, a man-agerial revolution and a scientificrevolution, that together created a new typeof industrial enterprise,. The managerialrevolution led to the vertically-integrated,hierarchical firm that brought many unitsunder its control. This was marked by thegrowth of specialised divisions within thefirm; for example, separate branches foraccounting, engineering, production, and soon. Each of these divisions was led by mid-dle managers, a new breed of worker whowas neither an owner nor a labourer, but asalaried professional responsible for thepeople, material and processes in his divi-sion. The coordination of the activities ofthese divisions, and of the entire company,was carried out by upper-level managers,who themselves often rose up from themiddle ranks. (Chandler 1977, 1-12)

In conjunction with this was a revo-lution in the application of scientific knowl-edge. The modern, hierarchical enterprisedemanded increasingly standardizedprocesses; and as the customer and supplier

networks grew, the creation of standardizedproducts as well. Industrial standardizationwas based upon scientific standardization:the ability to specify and predict the charac-teristics and performance of the technologywhile still in the design stage; to preciselycontrol the production processes; and toaccurately measure the results. Middle andupper-level managers of engineering firmswere increasingly men who did not come upfrom the shop floor, but rather had a solidacademic background in addition to practi-cal training. In short, the period from 1880to 1900 marked a major transition of indus-tries, in both Britain and the United States,from small-scale family-owned and partner-ship firms, to the modern, vertically-inte-grated business enterprise. (Noble 1977,5-6, 69-83)

Several innovations had cometogether since the beginning of theIndustrial Age (circa 1800) to give rise tothis new type of hierarchical, science-drivenenterprise. Reliable power in the form ofsteam; reliable transportation in the form ofrailroads; and reliable communications bytelegraph all contributed to the expansion oftrade networks that reduced risks andencouraged large capital investments. Atthe same time, the professionalization ofthe engineering disciplines was in fullswing, including the rise of professionalbodies (the Institution of Civil Engineers,for example), the growth in engineering uni-versities (such as the University ofGlasgow), and the gradual elimination ofthe apprentice-based technical education infavour of an academic model that eventual-ly incorporated scientific research.(Wengenroth 2000)

One of the first to undergo thissweeping change was the railroad industry.From around the 1850s, railroads in bothBritain and the United States evolved intomodern, vertically-integrated organisations,with salaried middle managers in charge ofinternal coordination of the various parts of

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the firm—rolling stock, fixed stock, coal,and so on—arrayed across a wide area.(Gourvish 1980, 10; Chandler 1977, 145)By the 1880s, railroad firms had developedsomething of a modern engineering organi-sation to oversee the design and testing ofcomponents, and creation of standards andspecifications for rail shapes, compositionof alloys, and other technologies. Duringthis period, many firms, such as Burlingtonand Baldwin, established drafting roomsand laboratories overseen by engineers, whowere increasingly university-educated andwho belonged to professional societies.Both universities and professional societieswere themselves becoming highly integrat-ed in the establishment and coordination ofindustrial standards and practices.Locomotive design became more and moreinformed by theoretical developments inmetallurgy and thermodynamics.(Usselmann 2002, 205-206, 227-230;Duffy 1983, 68-69; Brown 1995, 88-89;Noble 1977, 71, 79; Chandler 1977)

During the period 1880-1900, thevertical integration of organisations, andprofessionalization of its management,quickly spread to other manufacturingindustries, which often borrowed talentfrom the railroad industry. The steel manu-facturer Carnegie Company, for example,hired former railroad men who brought intothe firm the engineering and managementpractices that made railroads so successful.Former railroad engineers working forarchitectural firms gave the newfangledskyscrapers their light steel skeletons, basedheavily on railroad truss bridges. (Chandler1977, 267-273; Misa 1995, 64-66)

During this era, many other indus-tries were also becoming vertically integrat-ed and were increasingly employinguniversity-trained scientists and engineersto oversee the internal workings of theirplants. For example, chemical-based indus-tries such as petroleum distilleries, alkaliproducers such as glassmakers, even brew-

eries began using ever more sophisticatedchemical processes and laboratory analysesto improve production flow and quality, aswell as to develop new products. (Noble1977, 14-19; Chandler 1977, 243, 257;Anderson 2005)

The integration and professionaliza-tion of the maritime industries was “partic-ularly complex,” notes economic historianJohn Hutchins, during which time bothshipping companies and shipyards pro-gressed from an “unorganized, competitivesystem” to a “highly organized, rationalizedand concentrated type of organisation.”(Hutchins 1941, xx-xxi) The process ofincorporating scientifically-based navalarchitecture into the design of ships was acritical part of this transformation.

Transforming the Shipyard on the British Clyde

Innovations in iron, steel and steamshipbuilding developed more quickly in theClyde region than in many other parts ofBritain, due both to its proximity toAtlantic trade routes and to the network ofuniversities and engineering industries inthe region. (Schwerin 2004) For the purposeof identifying and analysing the various fac-tors involving the transformation of marinedesign through the scientific and manageri-al revolution that took place on the RiverClyde, we used the archival records fromthe University of Glasgow. As ship buildingdeclined on the Clyde leading to the ship-yards going out of business the records,plans and administrative paraphernalia wasgathered by the University in order to pre-serve this unique and important period ofhistory. By using this unique and invaluablesnap shot of the past along with other keydevelopments and events at this time, thisresearch was able to put together a detailedpicture of the factors leading to the changein the marine design approach.

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William Denny & Brothers (Figure 7)

Denny’s shipyard was a leading force in thedevelopment and practical use of theoreti-cal naval architecture. In 1883, WilliamDenny (the son of the founder) erected anExperiment Tank in his Dumbarton ship-yard to test hull forms and propellers,based on the one developed by the civilengineer, William Froude, in Torquay.(Bruce 1932, 192-205)

The Denny shipyard’s salary bookscover the period 1877-1907, providing aninvaluable record of all office staff, includ-ing secretaries, tracers, telephone/telegraphoperators in addition to the engineeringand design based roles. This information,such as dates for commencement and ter-

mination of employment, salary informa-tion, pay increases and pay terms ofapprenticeships, allows us to establish thevarious hierarchies of the organisation,track the progression and development ofcertain employees and even witness achange in terminology in relation to the jobtitles used as the profession of the navalarchitect is established.

For example, the title of CharlesHenry Johnson (Figure 8), who had begunas a draughtsman at Denny’s circa 1870,was changed from Chief Draughtsman toChief Designer circa 1882, apparentlyreflecting both a change in the companystructure as well as the role of what isregarded as a modern day naval architect.Johnson had been admitted to theInstitution of Naval Architects (INA) in

Figure 7. The Denny yard in 1963. Courtesy of the Scottish Maritime Museum.


1880 (TINA 1880, xiii) His assistant,Frank P. Purvis, was, at the same time, also“promoted” from Draughtsman toAssistant Designer, and soon becoming thesuperintendent of the Experiment Tank.Both their salaries nearly doubled in thespace of two years. Similarly, from 1880 to1882, the firm hired two ScientificDraughtsmen (a term embodying bothdrawing and calculations), James Thomsonand Richard Mumford. (Figures 9 and 10)These records indicate a substantial

Figure 8: Salary records for Charles Henry Johnson (DennyArchives). Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.

Figure 9: Salary records for James Thomson (DennyArchives). Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.

Figure 10: Salary records for Richard Mumford (DennyArchives). Courtesy of the University of Glasgow

Figure 11: Salary records for William Gray (Denny Archives).Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.

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change in both design and managerial prac-tices: that the “rule of thumb” buildingpractices (which required only drawingskills) were being superseded by a new rev-olutionary scientific approach thatdemanded both designers and calculators;and that these roles were being staffed bywell-salaried, technically skilled profes-sionals in order to deal with the increasingcomplexity of the organisation and itsproducts.

This assertion is further validatedthrough the investigation of salary recordsof a former Denny’s shipyard employee,William Gray. (Figure 11) Gray started hisemployment at Denny’s in 1884, serving a five-year apprenticeship at theExperimental Tank. In 1892 he becameHead of the Scientific Department and in1896 was promoted to “HeadDraughtsman o f the Sc ient i f i cDepartment.” In 1902, Gray left the firm“to be a naval architect for a company inLiverpool” (note that this is not theWilliam Gray whose shipyard inHartlepool opened in 1874). At that time,the ambiguous terms ‘Draughtsman’ and‘Designer’ referred to the work of what wecall today the ‘naval architect,’ a term thatappeared only once in Denny’s recordsbefore 1900.

Gray began his apprenticeship inthe scientific environment of Denny’sExperiment Tank, signalling both a newbreed of marine designer, that is, the navalarchitect, and indeed a new scientificapproach to marine design. This was partand parcel of a novel managementapproach to design, one of specializationand vertical integration, as the designoffices became separated into the technicaldepartment (steelwork), arrangements andscientific department. In particular, theappearance of the scientific departmentcharged with “calculations as to weights,capacities, displacement, stability, speed,trim, etc.,” demonstrates the rise of the

new middle manager class; a worker withboth academic and practical experiencedriving the organisation and new innova-tive marine design approaches. (Denny1894, 280; Walker 1984, 118-119) Thisdevelopment coincided with the specializa-tion and vertical integration of the produc-tion side of the shipyard, which wasproducing and installing high-efficiencytriple-expansion engines and newfangledelectrical generating and distribution sys-tems. (Denny & Brothers 1932, 27-30)

Denny’s often led the way amongcommercial shipbuilders in the use of sci-entific naval architecture. As early as 1869,the shipyard was computing displacementof its ships, a rare practice at the time forcommercial shipbuilders, although the cal-culations were sometimes inaccurate.Stability calculations first appeared inships’ plans in 1880. In 1884, WilliamDenny was the first to develop and use“cross-curves of stability,” a method ofquickly establishing stability conditions atvarious draughts and angles of heel, whichcame on the heels of the sinking on launchof the steamship Daphne, built byAlexander Stephen & Sons in 1883.Denny’s attention to detail led them todevelop a complete set of rules that stan-dardized each part of the design and pro-duction process, from specific calculationsthat had to be completed for each ship, tothe flow of materials in the productionyard. (Denny 1884; Denny & Brothers1932, 65-70, Lyon 1975 vol. 1, 11)

J & G Thomson (Figure 12)

In 1880, Thomson hired John HarvardBiles, a graduate of the Royal Naval CollegeGreenwich, as its first naval architect, “areflection of the growing influence of scien-tific ship design.” (Johnston 2000, 69) Thisevolution in scientific design and manage-ment is further evidenced by the compa-


ny’s wage books from 1880 to 1891, whichprovide a fascinating insight into the struc-ture of the company. The first wage book(Figure 13) in 1880 showed a businesswith highly specialised divisions: foreman,drawing office, and girls (presumably to dotracing), “counting office” and other inter-mediate roles. The wage book for 19March 1881 (Figures 14 and 15) mentionsa new Science Department, followed aweek later by a company restructure fromone to two drawings offices. (Figure 16)This restructuring is then referred to asdrawing office A & B (Figure 17) consis-tently until August 1883 when the wagebook reverts back to a single drawingoffice. As with Denny’s, the emergence ofa separate Science Department indicates agrowing specialization and vertical integra-tion within the front offices, and a transi-tion from “rule of thumb” principles, to asystematic, scientific approach towardsmarine design. At the same time, the

Figure 12. The Thomson yard in 1914. Courtesy of the Scottish Maritime Museum.

Figure 13: J & G Thomson wage book, 1880 (ThomsonArchives). Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.

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Thomson shipyard was also rationalisingand concentrating its production, creatinga set of specialised, vertically-integratedfacilities (boilerworks, engine works andfitting-out basin) into a single site.(Johnston 2000, 53-87) (Figure 18)

Some useful insights may be gar-nered by following a particular career. Aswith William Gray of Denny’s, WilliamDavid Archer was one of the highest paidmembers of the shipyard, which suggeststhat not only had he been there a long timebut his position within the company wasone of high levels of authority and respon-

sibility. Archer first appears in the wagebook for 29 July 1885, presumably whenhe was first engaged in the drawing officeand worked under John Biles. Archer wasadmitted to the INA in 1888, during their

Figure 14: J & G Thomson wage book, 19 March 1881(Thomson Archives). Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.

Figure 15: Scientific Department wage book, 19 March1881 (Thomson Archives). Courtesy of the University ofGlasgow.

Figure 16: Drawing office No.2 wage book, 2 April 1881(Thomson Archives). Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.

Figure 17: Drawing office A & B wage book, 1882 (ThomsonArchives). Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.


annual meeting held in Glasgow on theoccasion of the International Exhibitions ofScience, Art & Industry. (TINA 1888, 143)After Biles’s departure from Thomson in

1891, Archer was elevated to theposition of naval architect.(Figure 19) This use of the term‘naval architect’ here, in conjunc-tion with the information relat-ing to the scientific departments,is another indication of the trans-formation of marine design towhat we see and recognise inship design offices worldwidetoday.

Further information from thearchives provides a uniqueinsight into the scientific andtechnical complexity of theorganisation and their createddesigns. Prior to 1880, little tech-nical information was includedin ships’ plans or notebooks.Starting in 1880, coinciding withJohn Biles’s arrival, the generalcalculation notebooks (1880-1890) begin exhibiting specifica-tions and calculations thatdemonstrate a sophisticateddegree of scientific naval archi-tecture:• General calculations for thepassenger ship Servia (1881),which include longitudinal BM,moment of buoyancy, metacen-ter, volume, added weight and aninclining experiment. (Figure 20)Additionally, launching drafts arediscussed, compared and calcu-lated, referring to previously builtvessels Arab (1879) and Trojan(1880).• Launching calculations forthe passenger ship America(1883), showing stability param-eters such as the draft and trim,freeboard, load lines, centre of

gravity and the metacentric height.• Resistance and thrust calculationsfor paddlewheels and propellers, for exam-ple, for Trojan, 1880.

Figure 18. Plan of the Thomson yard in 1885. Courtesy of the ScottishMaritime Museum.

Figure 19: Salary records for William David Archer (Thomson Archives).Courtesy of the University of Glasgow.

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Robert Napier & Sons

Although titled as Robert Napier ’sshipyard, the firm was actually run by hissons, James R. and John Napier. Theextant business records do not includedetails of the shipyard organisation. Theydo, however, show that the shipyard, underthe influence of the scientifically-mindedpartner James R. Napier, was quiteadvanced in using scientific naval architec-ture. As early as the 1860s, he was carryingout longitudinal and transverse strengthcalculations for iron paddlewheel steamers.By the 1870s, he was making increasinglysophisticated calculations for ship launch(including the vertical and longitudinaltravel of the centre of gravity). From 1872to 1876, James R. Napier was correspon-ding with William Froude on the subject ofship’s rolling, which had been a topic ofpressing concern for the new steamshipsthat did not have the stabilizing influenceof masts and sails.

Transforming the Shipyard on the American Clyde

The American industrial revolutionlagged several decades behind that ofBritain, in particular in the development ofthe iron and coal industries. Britain, due toits shortage of wood, had developed theseindustries quite early; for example, by the1830s iron had become the favored materi-al for British railroad bridges, whereas inthe United States, with abundant stands oftimber throughout the vast countryside,wood was used in quite substantial bridgestructures until the turn of the twentiethcentury. (Kranakis 1996)

The transition from wood to ironwas especially slow in American shipbuild-ing, where the abundant wood supply andfederal protection of shipbuilding from out-side competition (called the “free ship” pol-icy) meant that many Americanshipbuilders were still working in woodwell after the Civil War. The majority of

Figure 20. The steamship Servia, 1880. Illustrated London News.


shipyards building these wooden vessels—both steam and sail-powered—were smallfamily-owned firms. (Fassett 1948 vol. 1,34-37) The facilities were generally quitesimple; a slipway on a river or protectedbay and small woodworking shops some-times fitted with steam-driven saws. Aforeman oversaw the small crew (generallybetween eight and twenty-five men), con-sisting of carpenters, caulkers, joiners, rig-gers and ropemakers, to construct amedium-sized vessel. The introduction ofiron hulls into American shipbuilding dur-ing the 1840s and 1850s did not automati-cally result in a restructuring of theshipyards. In many cases iron shipbuildersremained small in size and followed thesame procedures as wooden shipbuilders.

(Bames 1878; Fassett 1948 vol. 1, 38)The changeover from small-scale

shipyards to large-scale, vertically-integrat-ed shipbuilding firms began in the 1870sand was in full swing a decade later. By the1880s, the shipbuilding business hadbecome concentred on the Delaware River,in Philadelphia and the surrounding citiesof Chester and Wilmington. This wasalready a major hub of locomotive build-ing, and the availability of materials, infra-structure, skilled labour and managementgave rise to the most important metal-and-steam shipbuilding center in the nation,which became nicknamed “The AmericanClyde.” Three shipyards soon became themost important: William Cramp & Sons,John Roach & Sons, and Harlan &

Figure 21. The Imperial Japanese Navy protected cruiser Kasagi in 1898. Naval History and Heritage Command image.

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Hollingsworth. (Tyler 1958; Heinrich 1997;Thiesen 2006)

To identify the scope and breadth ofthe changes in these shipyards, weemployed the archives of the HagleyMuseum Library in Wilmington, Delawareand the Independence Seaport Museum inPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania. Unlike theshipyard records in Glasgow, most of theserecords were quite sparse and had little inthe way of business records; in particular,the papers of John Roach & Sons weredestroyed in a fire in 1887. The Harlan &Hollingsworth collections at the HagleyMuseum Library consist of a handful ofship specifications, corporate minutes andaccount sheets. The Cramp & Sons’ collec-tion of archived drawings and plans at theIndependence Seaport Museum,Philadelphia are by far the most complete.(Farr and Bostwick 1991) The plans con-sulted included: Pennsylvania (Hull 180,1872); Columbus (Hull 184, 1873);Zabiaka (Hull 203, 1878); Cetus (Hull219, 1881); Terror (Hull 195, 1883);Venezuela (Hull 263, 1889); Pittsburgh(Hull 289, 1896); Kasagi (Hull 291, 1898);

Variag (Hull 301, 1899); Pontoon (Hull307, 1901); and Kroonland (Hull 311,1902). See Figures 21 and 22.

William Cramp & Sons (Figure 23)

As with many industries during theperiod, this development was highly influ-enced by the railroad industry. This was noaccident, as many railroad magnatesextended their domains into shipping, andvice versa. Cornelius Vanderbilt, nick-named “The Commodore” for his vastmerchant fleet, also created a great railempire, thus pioneering the intermodalrailroad/shipping industry. This conceptwas extended by the PennsylvaniaRailroad, which funded a fleet of iron andsteam ships, starting with SS Pennsylvania,to transport passengers cross-country andthen transatlantic. (Roland et al. 2008,201-204)

Pennsylvania (Figure 24) was builtat the William Cramp & Sons ShipbuildingCompany in Philadelphia, and this was noaccident, either. Cramp had begun as ship-

Figure 22. The Imperial Russian Navy protected cruiser Variag. Naval History and Heritage Command image.


builder in 1825, but, unusually for mostbuilders of wooden vessels, his companywas able to transition to iron and steamduring the Civil War. Most other ship-builders had begun as machine shops, boil-ermakers and iron foundries. (Thiesen2006, 80-112) The yard was able to makethis transition by creating an integratedsystem similar to that found in locomotivebuilders. It also sent its chief engineers toScottish shipyards and engine manufactur-ers to study the newly-developed com-pound steam engines.

William Cramp noted, “the growthof complexity in modern ships haveentailed upon the naval architect and con-structor demands and difficulties neverdreamed of in earlier days…the staffrequired to design and construct [a modernship], and the complexity of its organisa-tion, has augmented almost infinitely.”(Buell 1906, 111-117, 196-197) In order toimprove efficiency, Cramp initiated a sys-tematic design and production schema so

that “the form of every plate must besketched before it is ordered.” Thus, by1880, draftsmen had moved beyond simplydrawing hull lines to creating highly com-plex shell expansion plans, which define aprecise two-dimensional shape for a platethat will be bent and curved to fit a three-dimensional hull. (Figure 25) By 1883,simple curves of form for displacementwere becoming commonplace. (Figure 26)By 1890, full stability curves includingmetacentric height were being developed,launching calculations began appearing in1898, and by 1901 hull stress curves werebeing developed. (Buell 1906, 108)

John Roach & Sons

The technology, equipment andexpertise to create these large, integratedindustrial plants did not exist in theUnited States, so shipbuilders went abroadto obtain them, primarily to Britain. JohnRoach made an extensive tour of the Clyde

Figure 23. Cramp’s shipyard in Philadelphia. From the editor’s collection.

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Figure 24. SS Pennsylvania departing for trials, 1872. From Edward Strahan (ed.), A Century After: Picturesque Glimpses ofPhiladelphia and Pennsylvania (1875).

Figure 25. Cruiser Zabiaka plate expansion, 1878. Courtesy Independence Seaport Museum, Philadelphia.


River shipyards to understand their tech-niques and organisation. In particular, theUnited States Navy facilitated the transferof British technology by purchasing thou-sands of plans and drawings for armoredcruisers and compound steam engines,

which formed the basis for the “ABCDships” (Atlanta, Boston, Chicago andDolphin) begun in 1883, which signalledthe birth of America’s new steel navy.(Cooling 1979; Swann 1965, 50-51;Thiesen 1999) (Figures 27-30)

As the Delaware River shipyardsexpanded in scale and scope, their manage-ment structure changed as well. JohnRoach, upon returning from an overseastour to the British Clyde in the 1870s,used what he had learned to create a verti-cally integrated plant “in which I couldbuild ships from the ore up,” including theproduction of plate, frames, boilers andpiping. During the 1880s, he enlarged hisworkforce by fifty percent to over 1,500men, consolidated functions into specificdepartments under direct control of super-visors, eliminated outmoded craft speciali-ties like blacksmiths and greatly increasedthe skilled trades like boilermakers. Healso created a strong middle managementteam of specialists in finance, labour man-agement and engineering, including adepartment of twelve naval architecturedraughtsmen to prepare ships’ plans.These were considered valuable employees,with their daily wage of $3.19 being twicethat of a ship’s carpenter. (Swann 1965,54-65)

Harlan & Hollingsworth

The engineering and naval architec-ture capabilities of the shipyards grew instep with the increasing complexity of thecompany and the ships it built. (Figures 31and 32) Harlan & Hollingsworth’s draftingdepartment (the forerunner of the navalarchitecture department), which had beenpreviously staffed by company-traineddraughtsmen, was by 1880 employing uni-versity-educated engineers. (Harlan &Hollingsworth 1898)

It is instructive to note the differ-ence in education and training of a father

Figure 26. Monitor Terror curves of form, 1883. CourtesyIndependence Seaport Museum, Philadelphia.

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Figure 27. Cruiser Atlanta. Library of Congress image.


Figure 28. Cruiser Boston. Library of Congress image.

Figure 29. Cruiser Chicago. Library of Congress image.

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Figure 30. Despatch vessel Dolphin. Library of Congress image.

Figure 31. Monitor Amphitrite. Library of Congress image.


and son employed at Harlan.Thomas Jackson came to Harlanin 1843 as a machinist, havingbeen previously apprenticed in awool mill. He rose up through thecompany during the transitionfrom wood to iron shipbuilding,and, in 1856, became head of theDraughting Department, where hebecame “an authority upon manybranches of marine architecture”by dint of his experience. His sonEdward Jackson, by contrast, wentto Cornell University and receiveda Bachelor of Science degree in1875 before coming to the firm asa draftsman. This developmentcoincided with increasingly pre-scriptive shipbuilding contractsand specifications (including call-ing for specific plate and framesizes, hull speed, and so on) thathad to be informed by theoreticaldevelopments in ship science, andindividuals capable of carrying outthose calculations. (Harlan &Hollingsworth collections; Harlan& Hollingsworth 1886, 291-292,301-302, 366)

ConclusionsThe institutionalisation of naval architecture

from 1870 to 1910, as part of ship design and indus-trial management on the Two Clydes, is shown inTable 1. The initial steps in this process began in the1870s with industry leaders like William Denny andJohn Roach, and quickly spread among major ship-builders who sought to rationalize their operationsin order to create the large, complex ships demandedby an increasingly globalized shipping industry

Table 1: Milestones in development of naval architecture on the two

Clydes.

Figure 32. Destroyer Hopkins. Naval History and Heritage Command image.

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The need for more highly-trainednaval architects to carry out such extensiveengineering and project oversight was amajor factor in the development of engi-neering universities and professional soci-eties devoted to the field. Britain wasalready ahead of the pack, having estab-lished the INA in 1860, and the RoyalSchool of Naval Architecture and MarineEngineering in 1864. In 1881, theUniversity of Glasgow became Britain’ssecond university to teach naval architec-ture and marine engineering, and withintwo years was endowed with a chair inmemory of John Elder. Many Glasgowshipyard apprentices followed this course,evenings or in winter months. (TINA 1889,65-89)

At the time, no American schoolshad programs in naval architecture, so theUnited States Navy took the first stepstowards remedying this problem by send-ing a select few Naval Academy graduatesto receive their naval architecture educa-tion in Britain and elsewhere. By 1900,naval architecture courses were beingoffered at universities such as Cornell,Webb, MIT and Michigan, whose programswere generally modeled on the British sys-tem. At the same time, an AmericanSociety of Naval Architects and MarineEngineers (SNAME) was also created, emu-lating the INA. (Thiesen 2006, 160-168)

By the end of the nineteenth centu-ry, therefore, a twenty-year transformationhad changed the face of the shipbuildingindustry, from a collection of small craftshops led by self-taught artisans, to a fewindustrialized, vertically-integrated plantsmanaged by scientifically-educated engi-neers, who used the latest theoreticaldevelopments to design and build the com-plex ships that became the hallmark of thetwentieth century.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the staffsof Glasgow University Archive Services,the Hagley Museum Library and theIndependence Seaport Museum for theirprofessional service and assistance.

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Stuart A. McKenna is a Researcher at theUniversity of Strathclyde, Glasgow. ANaval Architect graduate, he has beenreading for his Ph.D. in the field of ShipRecycling for the last four years. Within histime at the University of Strathclyde he hasbeen involved with numerous European-funded ship recycling projects; namelyDIVEST, which aimed to investigate andquantify the potential impacts that ShipRecycling activities cause to the humanand the environment, and Ship DIGEST,which is a vocational training initiative forthe Turkish Ship Recycling Industry. In hisspare time Stuart partakes in research ofthe extremely interesting archives of thehistorical ship builders of the River Clyde.

Larrie D. Ferreiro is Director of Research,Defense Acquisition University, FortBelvoir Virginia. He is a naval architect andhistorian. His book, Ships and Science: TheBirth of Naval Architecture in theScientific Revolution, 1600-1800 (MITPress, 2007), won the North AmericanSociety for Oceanic History John LymanBook Award in 2007 for science and tech-nology. He is currently at work on the fol-low-on volume, which will examine therise of naval architecture in the IndustrialAge.

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