the role of the military in latin american politics

8/13/2019 The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics

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University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

The Role of the Military in Latin American PoliticsAuthor(s): Theodore WyckoffSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Sep., 1960), pp. 745-763Published by: University of Utahon behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/444109.

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THE ROLE OF THE MILITARYINLATIN AMERICANPOLITICSTHEODORE WYCKOFF*

HE ROLE of themilitaryn contemporaryatinAmerican oliticsrequires he studyof a wide variety f statesranging romCosta Rica,halfthe sizeofOhio, with ess thana millionpopulation, o Brazil,160times arger,whose populationexceeds 60,000,000.The study encompassestremendouslyiversegeographicalrea containingocietiesranging rom omeof themost osmopolitano ndigenousnesvirtuallynchanged inceColumbus.These are stateswhose social and political nstitutions raw on a SpanishorPortugueseulturalheritage ather hananyAnglo-Saxon r NorthAmericaninstitutionsnd experience.Although he written onstitutionsfmanyof thembear a superficial imilarityo the Constitution f the United States,actualforms f politicalactionare much closer to the traditions nd practiceof thetwonations f Iberia.While the term Latin AmericanMilitary ncludeseverythingromanArgentine attleshipnAntarcticwaters o an infantrynit on the Mexicanbor-der,the military ithwhich this tudy s concerneds morenarrowly efined,consistingnlyofcertain oliticallyonscious nd politicallyriented ndividualswithin the armedforces.One of the objectives f the study s to determinepreciselywhattypes fpersons allwithin hiscategory.

There are threetypesof Latin Americancountries n which the militaryplaysthreedistinctypes f role: first,hecountrynwhichthemilitary lwaysplaysa role in politics, ear n and year out; second,the countryn which themilitary ever, r almostnever,playsa politicalrole (sinceperhaps 1900,to setan arbitraryimit); and third, he countryn which the military ccasionallyplaysa politicalrole. The twenty epublics fLatinAmericamaybe arrangedalong a spectrumn which these threetypesmark the two extremes nd anapproximatemid-point.Such a spectrum et up foranalyticalpurposesmightshow sixcountriest the always end: DominicanRepublic,Guatemala,Haiti,Honduras,Nicaragua,and Paraguay. Only two would appear at the neverend,CostaRica and Uruguay.The remainingwelve occasionals would rangesomewhere etween hetwoextremes:Argentina, olivia,Brazil,Chile,Colom-bia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.'In each of thefollowing tudies, nalysis f theproblemhinges n the an-swers to two questions: first,what non-militaryonditionscharacterize hetypeof state underdiscussion social structure, eographic actors, conomicconditions, olitical nstitutions,nd historical raditions and second,whatconditionsharacterizehemilitaryn thistypeofstate?*Major,United StatesArmy.1This conceptfollowsthe line of ProfessorRussell H. Fitzgibbon'snterestingtatistical onjec-tures on Latin American democracy. See How Democratic Is Latin America? Inter-AmericanEconomicAffairs,X (Spring,1956), 65-77, and StatisticalEvaluation of LatinAmerican Democracy, WesternPolitical Quarterly,X (September,1956), 607-19.745

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746 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYSTATES IN WHICH THE MILITARY Is ALWAYS A FACTOR IN POLITICS

Most states n this ategory2re small and relativelysolatedfrom hemaincurrents fworldpolitical ction. Beingsmall, they re physicallyasyto con-trolbymilitaryorce, nd being solated, herest f the world s little oncernedwith their internaltroubles. Their social structure s generally imple andclearly tratified. t thebase of thesocialpyramid requentlyreunassimilatedIndian or Negro groupswhich have absorbedvery ittlewestern ultureandwhichpossess lmostno political onsciousness. asicallyruralpopulations,uchnon-Europeans enerally orm groupquite apartfrom herestof thenationalsociety.A secondmajor egments usuallythe social groupofEuropeanoriginwhich considerstself o be the eliteof the nationoccupying he apex of thesocial pyramid.A thirdgrouptakes a positionbetween the first wo, and iscomprised fpersons fmixed descent. This last segment inds requentlyhatit has lost dentitywith the Indian (or Negro) culturefromwhich it is in partdescendedwhileat thesame time t is notable to feel a complete dentity ithitsotherforebears,heEuropean group. It is often rbanrather hanrural, ndis frequentlyharacterizedya distinct oliticalconsciousness nd bya certainsenseofgrievance gainstthe Europeanelitegroup.Roughlyparallelingthe racial structure s an economic stratificationnwhich the poorestare verypoor, the wealthiestverywealthy,with a smallmiddle classbetween he twoextremes.Only a smallminorityftheEuropeanscan properly e consideredwealthy, hemajorityonstituting middle class.In such societies nadequate schools result n a high rate of illiteracynd ageneral ndifferenceo socialwelfare ggravatesheeconomic mbalance.Economic backwardness requentlyeflectsonditions f chronicpoliticalinstability. arge land-holdings haracterize he economy,while the agricul-turalworkers ive in a state approximating eonage. One-crop agriculturesnormaland a single exportcommodity agriculturalr mineral frequentlydominatesthe country's oreign xchange. The few largeindustriesre oftenforeign-ownednd, since theypay heavyroyalties,must be lucrative. The fewsmall ndustries matches, igarettes,lourmilling,alt areoften tatemonop-olies or the personalpropertyf the chief of state. Urban workers re few,theirwages are low, and among them there s general rritation t the con-spicuous onsumptionfthewealthy.The laborunionmovement s oftenweak,underground,r controlled.Rural workers, conomically nd politically pa-thetic, re ignorant fanybetter ife thansurvival t a subsistenceevel. Withchronic oliticalnstability,ighrisks ttend ny capital nvestment;nterest atesare highand dividends re expectedto be high. The risks re such as to dis-couragemostcapital nvestments.Politically,power is concentrated in a small group of influential ndividualsdrawn from the bettereducated upper classes. In addition to the wealthyfamilies, omponents f thisupper class power structurenclude the Church,withitsstrongnfluence vermass opinion, nd themilitary,epresentinghe2 The author has in mind one nationwith whichhe is especiallyfamiliar.The reader is askedto makeallowances in thegeneralizationss theexample s varied.



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 747power fphysicaloercion. he general rientationf thepower tructurestoward hewelfaref theprivilegedocial lasses epresentedn it and on thisgoalthere s normallyeneral greement.Normallyhere s oppositiono theregimectually olding he reins fgovernmentt anyparticular oment,ut thisgenerallyomesfromwithinthebetter ducated oliticallyonsciouslite, ndisbitterestmongndividualswhohavebeenhurt y heregime. oliticalppositionscertaino existmonguniversitytudents hocomefrom isaffectedamilies. nsofar s possibleheregimemay eexpectedoattempto solate,ilence,rexterminateheopposi-tion,with heresultfdrivingtundergroundr nto xile.The lower nd middle lassesuntilvery ecent ears aveheldvirtuallynopolitical ower xcepts individualsaverisen opower hroughheArmy.Whilethiswas thepatternfthepast, hesegroupsreundergoing processof rapidpolitical cculturationnd are certain o be a force oreckonwithsoon. This sector fsociety as beenaptly haracterizeds therisingmiddlemass. Political cculturationn the ess-favoredlasses,riginallyby-productof thiscentury'sisingtandard f economic xpectations,as been tremen-dously cceleratedy the feverishctivitiesf Communists well as non-Communistoliticalmovements,hich n the lowerclassesof society avefound ertileieldsotill.With this xceptionartisan oliticalction xtends enerallynly o theeducatedndelitegroups, hile hesame s true fanyrational elief n anyform fpoliticaldeology. lectionsrea superficialontestnly.Nominationsand appointmentsremadefromwithinhesocial and political litegroups.Irregularracticesoth n elections ndbetween lectionsrenormal nd as-sumed,while he egal ystemndthecourtsresetup tokeeppeaceamongthewealthy nly.Police-stateethodsrefrequentlysedtodiscoveroliticalppositionndtorendert neffective.he oppositionson occasion rutalizedndpersecuted;innocentersons ay ehurt.Frequentlynly ommunist-ledppositionroupspossess he know-how o survive uchpolitical ersecution.he non-Com-munist ppositions themost ikely o die or disappear.The obvious on-sequence ftheuseofpolice-stateethodss a feelingf ntense atred or heregime sing hem.This hatredmay pread ver period fyears o a largeenough ortionfthepoliticallyonsciousopulace hat tmay ruptnmobaction, iot, rson, ndmurder,xtendingvento civilwarand overthrowftheregime.Historicalraditionsre generallyuthoritariannd/or ligarchic,eflect-ing ocial ndpoliticalonditions hichhaveprevailedenerallyromhetime3See John Gillin and K. H. Silvert, Ambiguities n Guatemala, Foreign Affairs,XXXIV(April, 1956), 469-82. Note also the politicalacculturationunderway mong the Indiansof Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. See Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of theAprista Movement (Berkeley: University f California Press, 1953); JamesDaniel, RedDesign for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude (New York: JohnDay, 1954); and TadSzulc's series of fourarticles on the Cuban revolution,New York Times, December 17,1959,p. 1,col. 1; December 18, 1959,p. 1,col. 2; December 19, 1959, p. 1,col. 1; December20,p. 1,col. 4.



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748 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYofSpanish olonial ule.Since ndependencen theearly 800's strongenseof patriotic ationalismas developed mongnationallyssimilated roupsinto lmost anaticalriden thepatria.There s frequentlystrongmilitarytradition,npart t least esultingrom hefact hat or ver centuryheonlyavenueto high chievement,ame nd fortune,as beenthrough militarycareer.There s some ntellectualraditionfaspirationoward democraticandopen ociety,utthis s confinedxclusivelyo the ducated nd Western-oriented roups.4In stateswhere hemilitarys always factornpolitics,rmies,lthoughsmall, reusuallyarge ncomparisono thecountry'sopulation. orthemost art hey onsist f combat roops ith elatively inor rovisionor hetechnicalervices rovidingogisticalupport. heyare not builtformodernwar andmaybe expectedo encounterifficultyhenforced o operate t adistance romheir ases.Morecorrectlyharacterizeds a policeforce rgendarmerie,heir rimaryunctions tobe preparedoprovide showofforce, ather han n actualfightingotential. or example,t maynotbenecessaryor tank's uns o be loadedwith mmunition,fthenoise ndmassof the tank tselfs enough o instill espectndfear.Air forcesregenerallyconsideredo be arms f theArmy,ubject o Army ontrol nd utilizednpursuancefArmy bjectives,s are theminuscule aval forces.In socialorigin,nlistedmen oftheArmy renormallyrawn rom hegroups t the lowerend of the socialscale. Non-commissionedfficersreusuallyMestizo r Mulatto, r outstandingndians r Negroes.Officersreusually rawn rom hewhite ector fsocietyr from etterducatedMestizoorMulatto amilies.Officersre in almost ll casesgraduatesftheMilitary cademy fthenationnquestion.Appointmentss cadets reusually vailable 1) toyouthsfrom heeducated lasseswhomaydesire opursue militaryareer r (2) tooutstandingndividualsrom heenlisted anks ecommendedytheir fficers.In not few ases he nation'sMilitary cademymay fferhebest ducationavailable n thecountry. here s evidence f a ratherwiderange f com-petencenthe officersraduatedromheacademies,eflectingnsomedegreethewidely ivergentducationalnd socialbackgroundsf the twotypes fcadet.Militaryervice,espiteomedrawbacks, ay fferoboth nlistedoldiersand officers any dvantagesver normal ivilian ife. For a civilian on-script,militaryervicemaymeanhisfirstdequate uitofclothingrhisfirstpairofshoes though,o be truthful,ot all soldiersn these ountries ear4Althoughthe dominant culturalheritageand philosophicalorientation f Latin America arethose of Latin and WesternEurope,mostpoliticaltraditionsnd practiceshave developedquite uninfluencedby the English, French, and German political philosophersof theseventeenth, ighteenth,nd nineteenth enturies. Thus to the extent that these philoso-phers have developed a Western school of political thought, t is proper to speak ofLatin Americanpolitical practicesas non-Western. To this extentalso themethodsofpolitical analysis applied in recent years to non-Western countries are applicable toLatin America. See, forexample,Pye,Pauker,and Kahin's studyComparativePoliticsofNon-WesternCountries: A Research Strategy or the Studyof Political Processes (NewYork: Social Sciences ResearchCouncil, 1955,mimeo.).



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 749shoes). Formany,militaryervice ringsife's irstntroductionoa classroom,for neoftheArmy'smportantunctionss to returniterateitizenso thenation.Disciplinen theArmys severe, utthis ontributeso a high evel ofsocialprestige. manhas tobe goodto stayn. Forregular rmy nlistedmen, lifetimef relative restige,conomicecurity,nd assured etirementoffers uch obe desired. orboth fficersnd enlistedmenbasepay susuallylow,butaddedemolumentssuallymakemilitaryervice inanciallyttractive.Thesemay nclude ousing, edical are, ecreationalacilities,ndforeignx-change rivileges andmaybe extendedeyondhemilitary an's mmediatefamilyvento includen-laws.Thereare in certain ituationstherways nwhich he ndividualmay dd to his income.Whilepromotionsre slow,career s an officer ayneverthelessrovide pportunitiesortravel o theUnitedStatesor to other ountriesn training issionsr on attache uty.Physicalonditionsarywidely from esirableervicenthe national apitalto very ndesirableervice n the frontierr in the ungle.Desirable ssign-ments re usually eservedorpolitical avoritesr ins ; undesirableostsgoto essfortunatendividualsrpoliticalouts.The political rientationfmilitaryersonnelarieswith hegrade, ge,and experiencef theindividual oncerned. he primaryrientationf theenlistedman s loyaltyo his mmediateommander,sually butnotalways)coupledwith feelingf ntense atriotism.atriotismnd loyaltyntodeatharethe firstnd mostbasic essons aughtn themilitarylassroom. he en-listedmanonlyrarely ives vidence fanydeeper olitical onsciousness,l-though he political cculturationf enlistedmen is a very ignificante-velopment.5In contrastoenlistedmen ntheArmy,unior fficersyoung raduatesof theMilitarycademy normallyeflectheir wn ocialbackgroundnd tsparticularoliticalrientation.heseyoungmen resuperficiallyamiliar ithmoderndeologies,hey re inveterateptimists,nd theyfrequentlyossessgenuinely igh deals and highhopesfor hefuture f their ountry. heirloyaltys given nquestionablyo their mmediateommanders,lthoughheymaybe disillusionedith opmilitaryndgovernmentalolicies nd leaders.Juniorfficersrenormallyssignedodutywith roopsnd have ittleoppor.tunityor ersonalontactwith oliticalvents.As officersttain he rank fmajor r lieutenantolonel, hey pproacha phaseoftheir areer nwhich hey evelop strongolitical onsciousness:there s usually breakwith roopife, ndassignmentostaffuties s tobeexpected. he officersillgooff o thenation's ommand ndGeneral taffSchool ortosimilar chools n the UnitedStates,France,Brazil, rArgentina oradvancedtraining.5Cuba's Sergeant's Revolution, ed by FulgencioBatista in 1933,was a rare exceptionto thegeneral rule, reflectinghe acceleratedpolitical acculturation, ven a quarter-centurygo,of themiddleand lower classes n Cuba.



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750 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYAs theofficernmid-careerravels nd studies, e becomes wareof hisnation's oliticalnd internationalosition.He maybecome ware of condi-

tionswhichhe believes o bewrongnd hemaydevelop certain isenchant-ment othwithhismilitaryuperiorsnd with hepoliticaleaders fhis coun-try.On theother and, fhiscountrys incapablehands ndthingsregoingwellhemay epleasedwith he tatus uo.At this tage, n outstandingndividual nown orhis personaloyaltytotheregimemaybegiven ommandf mportantroop nits n thevicinityfthecapital ity:thecavalry ivision,hepresidentialuardbattalion,hear-moredregiment. e maybecome he target f pressuresromnon-militaryout-groupsndpolitical artiesndcliques spiringopower.Also,he willcement ersonal riendshipshichhe mayhave formed ears efore.Occa.sionalnterpersonalivalries ay evelop s the ompetitionets tiffer.liquesmayform asedon prior ervicen eliteunits, n theArmy eneral taff,relsewhere.As he passesbeyondmid-careernd becomes seniorofficer---aeniorcolonel r a general fficer hispoliticalctivityand for hatmatter ll hisactivity) illdependprimarilyn hisage,vigor,nd health.Promotionsreslowand a largepercentagef officersetire nd disappear rom heactivescene.Vigorous,ealthyenior fficersho ontinueoenjoy avorrepromotedto thetopgeneralfficerositionsnd themost enior fthesemaybe namedChief fStaffrMinisterfWar. Often hetop position ill have beenpre-empted or speciallyavoredndividuals ithuniquefamilyrother onnec-tions.Linesof oyaltyt thetopechelons ftheArmyre often lurred ndthere s apparent marked endencyor enior fficerso buildthemselvespersonal ositionsfpowern the ocalities rmilitaryistrictsowhich heyareassigned. heremaybe evidencef ealousyndsome ort f ockeyingorposition.Military articipationn political ctionmaytakeone of threepossiblecourses: ndividualsn a positiono makedecisions or hemselves ayeitherdefend hestatus uo,be preparedooverthrowhe status uo,or stand sidewithoutecomingdentifiedith itheride. Action odefend hestatus uowillbe thenormalourse,lthoughn times fcrisis rgrievancetsoverthrowmayappearto offer solution o difficulties.mbitious ey ndividualsrgroups ithermong hesenior rmid-careerfficersaybe attractedythepossibilityf accelerateddvancement,nd maybe temptedo use a crisis san excuseforpolitical ction.Theymayhavereason o fear ction yanti-militaryroupsoundercuthemilitary'status nd jeopardizetsfuture. n-dividualswho decide to remain looffrom olitical ction are usuallyunwillingto riskreasonable ecuritynd comfort or the sake of chancing uccess. Suchprudentofficersre generally eluctant o get involved n any typeof troublewhich could hurt theirfamilies r theirfuture nd prefer o lie low until thetrouble lowsover.



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 751Military-politicalction ncludes varietyftechniques hich an be usedin theapplicationf forceopoliticalituations. he firsttep n preparationfor heexecutionfa coupd'dtatorgolpede estado) s toestablishhegrouptoexecute t: this roupwillbecome herulingunta fterhecoup ssuccess-ful. In thedaysbefore heemergencef thehighlyrganizedrofessionalili-tary lass, single trongnitcommanderrcaudillowas more ypical hanthe untaofrecent ecades.The juntamay enterround cliqueon theArmyGeneral taffranyother roup fofficershich anmeetwithoutrousinguspicion.Within hegrouppersonal elationshipsre extremelyritical:the besttalker nd thequickesthinker aytalkhimselfnto hetop ob. This individual eednotbe thesenior fficerf thegroup; e mayeasily e a brilliantoungmajor rlieutenantolonelwhose pinions iscolleagues espect.A senior fficerillfrequentlye invited o ointhegroup olendprestigeo themovement.Sometimeprior o themovement rumorampaignmaybe starteda-lumniatinghe ncumbentegimeut uggestingo connection ith heplottingjunta. Detailedplansaremadeprescribingheunits o be involved,heper.sonstotake ction,nd theprearrangedignals.The plotters aitfor n aus-picious pportunitynd at the ppropriateime henecessaryignalsregiven.6The actualmilitaryperationnvolveseizingontrol f thetelephoneentral,cuttingff ny inkbetween he ncumbentecision-makersndmilitarynitswhichmayremainoyal o them,nd the arrest f the ndividualsoncerned,holding hem ncommunicado.t involves ontrol f keytrafficntersectionsinthecapital ity, opreventhemovementfanyforces hichmay ometothe idofthegroup eing eposed,nd, s an essentialtep, ontrolfall radiostationsoannounce o thegeneral opulace hat changen thegovernmenthas taken lace. This astactions theclassic ronunciamiento.The next tep s theconsolidationfpower.Persons nown o be loyal othenew unta reput ntokey ositions hile ll possible ivals retransferred- especiallyenior fficersn commandfmilitaryegionsrdistricts to re-movethem romnypower ase which heymayhave established. he newregimemakes series fpublicpolicy ronouncementsn an attemptoassureitself fthewidest ossible opularupport, hile he nternationalommunityis reassured ithpromiseshat ll internationalbligations ill be respected.As soon s theunta ppears o becompletelyncontroltmay xpect o receivediplomaticecognition.he realchief fthemovementowemerges,fterhesenior fficerriginallyelectedo endprestigeothemovementas served ispurpose.The nextphase ntheapplicationfmilitaryorce opoliticalituationss

theretentionfpowerover a periodofyears.As Professorfokes nd Professor'See Kurt Conrad Arnade (formerly olonel, BolivianArmy,formerly ermanArmy), Tech-nique of the Coup d'&tat n LatinAmerica, United Nations World,IV (February, 950),21-25, and William S. Stokes, Violence as a Power Factor in Latin AmericanPolitics,WesternPoliticalQuarterly, (September, 952), 445-68.



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752 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYFitzgibbon ave pointedout, this is accomplishedby one or more of severaltechniques: heimposici6n,hecandidato 'nico,ontinuismo,ndevenhonestelections.7he extended etentionfpowersusually ttractive,s the poils fofficencreasewith the length f tenure.New monopoliesan be set up,new foreign-ownedndustries an be encouraged,new good quality ands canbe acquired or he account fthe chief fstate; nd thereturns romll ofthesemaynotbe apparentfor omeyears.

STATES IN WHICH THE MILITARY IS NEVER A FACTORIN POLITICSCosta Rica and Uruguay, hetwo states n thiscategory,re geographicallysmall: sizehas not made theproblems fgovernmentoo complex,nor has it

imposedtoo severea strainon thepolitical system.Small size has also madepossibleconditions f relative ocial homogeneity hich tend to be conduciveto a viable and opensocialsystemnd to somesocialmobility.Both stateshave,for the mostpart,a singleracial strain, enerally uropean. The bulk of thepopulationhas at least a primarychool education;the over-all iteracy ateishigh. The spreadbetweenpoor and wealthy s not excessive:there s a largemiddleclass. A fairdegreeofsocialmobility revails nd a generalregardforthe values of socialwelfare s apparent.Economically, here s evidence of relativewell-being.Labor is generallymoreproductive hanamongnon-European opulations nd wages are higher.There is moresecurity orbusiness, he risk s less,and interest atesand div-idends are lower. With greater olitical stability nd smallereconomicrisks,capital is more available foreconomicdevelopment han in mostotherareasof Latin America. There is generalevidenceof moderate economicprogress.Political ife s characterizedy a relativelyffectiveonstitutionalystem,personalpoliticalfreedom,he existence f a politicaloppositionwhich is notpersecuted, workable egal structure,nd a system f operating ourts.Cor-ruption nd publicscandal are relativelyminor nd elections, nderthe watch-ful supervision f effective oliticalparties, re generallyhonest.Althoughpoliticalconditions riorsto 1900 in Uruguayand Costa Ricabore ittleresemblance o thoseoftoday, here s now a real traditionffiftyrsixty years of relatively ffective onstitutional emocracy. Although bothcountrieshave seen deviationsfrom he pattern, he influence f themilitaryon politics ince 1900 has been generally egligible.8Since the Armed Forces of Costa Rica were formallybolished in 1948,necessary olicefunctions eing ssumedbya small GuardiaCivil,Uruguayre-mains the onlyexample of a countrywitha militarywhichalmost neveras-sumes political ole. Here the roleofthemilitarynrelation opolitical nstitu-'See Stokes, p. cit.,and RussellH. Fitzgibbon,Continuismon CentralAmerica nd theCaribbean,nterAmerican' uarterly,I (July,940).sSee RussellH. Fitzgibbon,ruguay: ortraitfa DemocracyNew Brunswick:utgers ni-versityress,1954),and HarryKantor, The Struggle orDemocracyn Costa Rica,SouthAtlantic uarterly,V (January,956),12-18.



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 753tions as had a very nterestingevelopment. hiletheArmed orces ccupya vitalpositionnUruguay's overnmentaltructure,hey re small n size ndare emphaticallypoliticaln the senseof beingnonpartisan.otal defenseexpendituresccount or essthan n eighthfthe national udget.9If theUruguayanmilitary an s non-political,owthendoeshe regardhisrole nsociety? e knowshathe inheritslong raditionfmilitaryartici-pationnthe ife fhisnation, nationwhose ndependenceas wonon thebattlefieldnd whose reedom asonly ssured fter ecadesoffighting.eknows hathis s a nation n which n itsyoungerays ll menbore rms,nwhich heArmynd thenationwere ynonymousndin which venthemosthumble auchowasa noblefightingan.10With thistradition,heprofessionaloldier xplains,t is impossibleortheArmyobeagainsthenation;t sunthinkable,or xample,or soldier ofiregainstnarmedivilians.t s mpossibleor heArmyo be in eaguewithoppression.Militarymentodayrememberhat whenArtigasn 1815 andLavalleja n 1825 nd evenGalarza n 1904found ower o be intheir ands,they gave tbacktothenation, oluntarilyelinquishingheir ersonal osi-tionof supremacy. ot one of themilitaryeadersremembereds nationalheroes odaysremembereds a caudillo.The Uruguayanmilitary an is a citizen f a nationwhichhas a longhistoryf bitter artisantrife. he Colorados nd Blancos ftodaywere n1835partisansf twoofficersf the Thirty-threemmortals ho split ntoopposing actionsomeyears fter ringingndependenceo Uruguay.Bothpartiesame tohave a broadbase n thenation's opulation, hich umberedin 1835barely 0,000.The partieswerecenteredroundpersonalities,uiteundifferentiatednthebeginningysocial, conomic,rideologicalactors.The party trifef theColorados nd Blancosbecamethe lifebloodfUruguayan ationality. round hem rystallizedll political evelopments.Eventuallyheparties iddevelop n ideologicalomplexion,s themerchantsandeducated lasses fMontevideohrewheirupportotheColorados.Thisleft heBlancos orelymainlyn the upportf eadersn therural reas, e-cominghus dentifiedithmore onservativelements;utbothparties e-tained ollowingsidely asedthroughouthecountry.At firstheconflictetween hepartieswas strictlycontest t arms,nwhich heCotorados ere bleeventuallyoestablishndmaintainupremacy.The Blancos, owever,ever llowed his upremacyogounchallenged,ndalthoughheColorados ontrolledheballotboxes, heBlancosnever ailed ocontestheresults felectionsyresortoviolence. artisantrifen themid-nineteenthenturyaused ontinuoushaos.9Statesman'sYearbook,1959 (London: Macmillan,1959), pp. 1533-34.o0Most of the comments n this section are from n interviewwithGeneral Horacio A. Pinto,formerUruguayanmilitary ttache in Washington, n officer iththirty-fiveears'servicein the UruguayanArmy.nThe developmentof political parties n Uruguay s fully tudied in the monumentalworkbyJuanE. Pivel Devoto, Historia de los PartidosPoliticos n el Uruguay 2 vols; Montevideo:TipografiaAtlkintida,942).



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754 THE WESTERNPOLITICAL QUARTERLYIntelligent en saw that solution f the dilemmawas imperative.hewaytosuch solution aspointed ythegenerouserms f thepeaceof1872,which nded n especiallyitterwoyears fwarfare. hevictoriousoloradosnotonlygrantedmnestyo theBlanco eaders utgavethemhalf-a-millionpesos or istributionotheirmen ndpromisedoappoint lancos s governorsoffour fthe fifteenepartmentsomposinghecountry. enerosityowardtheminorityameto be institutionalizedn the constitutionalmendmentsf1894and 1919,developingnto a permanentradition.Startingn the 1880'sand 1890'sunder he energeticeadershipfJoseBatlleyOrdonez,heColorado arty eveloped distinctlyiberal rientationandsucceededngivinghe ountrymarkedlyrogressiveharacter ith ocialsecurityaws,measuresosafeguardocial ustice,ndguaranteesfcivilrights.

The success nd popularityf theBatllista rogramssured hefortunesftheparty nd made possible onstitutionalhangeswhichassuredColoradoacceptancef theopposition's inorityightsnd Blancoacceptancefwhatwas,until1958, he Colorado'smajorityosition.n 1958,for hefirstime,the Blancopartywonmajorityower.The resolutionftheproblemsfpartytrifettheballot ox, n the awcourts,nd nthehallsofgovernmentadepossibleheend of armed artisanstrife.t became pparenthat ivilpower xercisedhroughheparties adbeen ble tosucceedwheremilitaryower adfailed,ndwhile heArmytillretainedheprestigef tshistoricalradition,ecourseo armswasthoroughlydiscrediteds a solution ornational roblems.Whenpeace,prosperity,ndsocial ustice ollowedn thewake of thispolitical eorientation,heprestigeofcivil upremacyngovernmentecame nchallengeable.here snoUrugua-yantodaywhodisputeshewisdomf thedemocraticolutionf hiscountry'sproblems. he military anis broughtp to believeheart nd soul n thisnational hilosophyndhe holds hebeliefs ferventlys do hiscivilian oun-trymen.As every ruguayans born ither Colorado r a Blanco, oeverymili-taryman holdshis ownpolitical iews owhichhe is passionatelyttached.The professionaloldierxplainshathispartisanassionsthe ame s that fhis fellow itizens,very ne ofwhomhe considers is equal. But politicalpassionsre tobe foughtutonly t theballotboxes, nd thethoughtf re-course oviolencesabhorrent.hemilitary anvotes n hiscountry'slectionsand is passionatelyroud fhisrightodo so. There s no feelinghathe isaboveparty. A man's pinionshismost acred ossession,ndany ction ocoerce hatopinions tantamountobetrayalf what s nowtheUruguayanwayof ife.The Uruguayanrmed orcesoday ave the ole mission fdefendinghenationagainstthe encroachment f powerfulneighbors who, fortunatelyorUruguay,act as deterrentso each other). Militaryforce n the solutionofdomesticpoliticalproblemss now a concepttotally lien to Uruguayanmen-tality. n truth, he role of the military as been so reducedthatmanyUru-guayans end even to forgethattheyhave an Army.



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 755STATES IN WHICH THE MILITARY Is OCCASIONALLY A FACTOR N POLITICSThe picture hanges n states n which the militarys onlyoccasionally

factor n politics. Althoughherethemilitary nlyupon occasionsteps nto thelimelight,he actorson thepolitical tageare well aware thatbutone stepoff-stagethemilitarytands an attentivend critical bserver f everythinghatgoes on.'2It is significanthat many such states are geographicallyarge,both inpopulationnd in area. Large izebrings ith t a diversityf economicn-terestsndsocialgroups groups hich re ealous f theirutonomyndfree-dom of ocalaction.These aregroupsnd interests hich requentlyytheirveryphysical istance rom he seatof central overnmentannot asilybecontrolledy t.The social tructuren such arge tates s oftenomplexnd characterizedbywidevariety. ifferentreasmayhave differentocial ystems,ome trat-ified nd immobile,thers galitariannd in continual erment.n some thepopulations primarilyndian, n othersNegro,n stillothers uropean. ncertain reas all three acial and cultural trains re found ogether,lus avarietyf mixed trains.Economically,heres a diversityfcrops, ccupations,nd industry.nregionsentered round argecities, griculture,ndustry,nd commercellhavepoliticals well s economicmportance.gricultureaybecharacterizedin oneplaceby arge states nd in another ysmall and-holdings.ndustrymay erepresentedyboth oreignnd domesticapital ndmay every aried,includingroducers's well as consumers'oods.Economic owern sucha large ountrys diffused. olders feconomicpower recertain o be active n their wnself-interest,nd are not ikely obe completelynited ntheirpproachonational roblems.pecificmeasuresgoodfor nemaynotbe goodfor nother.There s competitionithin heindustrialommunity.he labormovements characterizedydifferencese-tween reas,unions eing trongn one and weak ornonexistentn another.The lower conomic lassesmaybepoliticallyowerfuln onespot ndnegligi-bleinanother.The geographical,ociological,nd economic iversitys reflectedn thequality f educational acilities,nd consequentlyn varyingevelsof literaryanddegreesfpoliticalcculturation.olitically,hese tates recharacterizedbyseveral eaturesistinctnd differentrom hose fthesmaller tates is-cussed bove. Local political nits remuch more mportanto theaveragecitizennhisdaily ife han s therelativelyistant ational overnment.l-thoughhe citizenmay cceptmany fthefunctionsf ocalgovernmentn-consciously,hepublicworks,tilities,oads, axes, ndcorruptionf state ndlocal governmentffect imdirectly.On theotherhand, thenationalgovern-ment s a forcewhichdirectlyffectsheaveragecitizen n outlyingreasmuch12 Most of thegeneralizationswhichfollow are drawnfrom he author'sexperience s a memberof the U.S. militarymission n Brazil, although n most cases theyapplyequally to otherstatesof thetypebeingdiscussed.



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756 THE WESTERNPOLITICAL QUARTERLYlessthan n smaller ountries. ormally isonlycontactsrewith hepostoffice,herailways,ational axes, ccasional lection ampaigns,ndmilitaryconscription.ll other videncesfgovernmentaluthorityrestate nd local.Local and stategovernmentsan rarely e despotic ecause henationalgovernments alwaysmplicitlyecognizeds a higheruthority. otonly annationalroopsmove n to enforce national olicyn an extremenstance,utnationalmonies aised hroughederal axesusuallyprovide largepartofthe financialupportflocaland stategovernments. hilethey ossess hiscontrol goodmeasure fautonomy,ctually he national overnmentxer-cises n importantndimplicitlyecognizedetopower hroughontrol fthepursestrings.Political artiesre mportant,uttheymaydiffern characternd ncom-positionrom negeographicreato another. ven n cases where here s avirtual ne-partyystemas in Mexico),thepartiesn differentreas ofthecountryerve s channels or herepresentationf ocal nterestsn thenationalcouncils.13Personal olitical reedomenerallyrevailsn part, t least,because tseffectiveenial n large ndpopulous ountries ouldrequire political oliceforce oo arge ndexpensiveo be practical. he diversityf nterestslustheprevalentersonal oliticalreedomesultssuallyn the reationf two-partyora multipartyystem.If a dictator resumptivectually oescapture ower, e generallyindsthatto eliminateheeffectivenessf theoppositione has to create partyapparatusrother imilar tructurefcivilcontrolwith rancheshroughoutthenation.Neither heArmy or nymilitaryorcean control large opula-tion nhisbehalf; civilian otalitarianartymust e foundedoperformhisfunctionorhim, nd a systemfnationallyppointedinterventorsr stategovernors ustbe instituted. e can thenretain iscontrol yexercisingvetopower ver ppointmentsnimicalohim.Thisresultsnpracticaloliticalfreedomor hevastmajorityfthepopulation.The spoils fhigh ffice aybeas greatsorgreaterhan n smallertates,butthepublic nlyknows smuch bout hedoingsfthenational overnmentas thepress ells t. National candaland corruption aybe extensive,utthey nly ffecthe ndividualitizens he pays ndirectlyor uch poils, ndas thecircumstanceseportednthepress ffendis ndividualiew fthepro.perstandardsf officialonduct.Freedomfthepress s thusfrequentlyneofthemajor oliticalssuesn suchcountries.The national overnments confinedargelyo thecapital ity,nd deci-sion-makings nthehands f relativelymall roup fpeople n the egislativeandexecutive ranches fgovernment. hiletheexecutiveranchncludeslargebureaucracy oncernedwithmanyproblems,majordecisions re usuallymade onlyat thevery op levelofthebureaucratic yramid.This is significantforthefollowing eason: If and when themilitary orces ntervene n political3See theauthor's Brazilian olitical arties, outhAtlantic uarterly,VI (Summer,957),281-98.



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 757activity,ll they an do physicallys to seize control f thedecision-makingmachinery. hey can also seizecontrol f the public nformationachinethrough hich hegovernmentas primaryontactwith he massofcitizens.Beyond his, he effectn the rest fthecountrys negligible,eing pparentonly nsofars use ismade ofpropagandand thepublic nformationervicesand insofars new bureaucraticnstitutionsresetup.Unless hemilitaryroup eizing owerhas a majorpositive olitical ro-gram f tsown twill be forced oturn ackmost fthefunctionsfgovern-ment o thebureaucracynd evento the egislativeranch,etainingnlyvetopower ver pecificctions o which tmayhaveobjection. he fact hat hegovernmentfa large ountrys a bigbusinessequiringheservicesfmanythousands ftrained ureaucratsuts t effectivelyeyond hereachof any-thingmore hannominalmilitary-politicalontrol. nly rarelyn LatinAmer-icanhistoryas themilitaryeizure fpowern suchcountrieseenextendedto a realsystemf national ontrol.Historical raditionseveloped s a result f thepolitical onditionse-scribed ave served operpetuate ost ftheestablishedorms fpoliticalc-tion,many fwhichdatebackto colonial imes.Trulybasicsociety-shakingrevolutionsgainst istoricalraditionave beenrare, he MexicanRevolutionof 1910-17 nd theCuban Revolution f1958-59beingpracticallyheonlyinstances. argas' emi-FasciststadoNovoandPer6n's er6nismo ere emi-revolutionaryreakswith radition,ut n eachofthese ases, he nnovationseventually ere overthrownnd traditionalatternseinstated.t is worthcommentinghat civilian an be every it s much f a dictators a militaryman, s was GetulioVargas rom 930to 1945.Generallyrmies n these tates re arge nd includemportantechnicalandlogisticalervices.Members f themilitaryervice reprofessionallyom-petentnd themilitaryorcesreorganizedn a scale arge noughoengagenmodernwar. There s usually Navy, nd an Air Force,withdefinitendseparate raditions.Both restrongnough o act in somemeasures coun-terforceso theArmy counterforceshich n occasionmayassume riticalsignificance.Enlistedmen n themilitaryorceseflectenerallyheareas fromwhichthey rerecruited,ndthey suallyervenunits earhome.Cattlemenervein cattle ountry,rbanworkersn theirhomecities, lantationaborersnnearby lantation istricts. fficersre almostentirely rofessionalareerofficers,raduatesf thenation'sMilitary cademy. nitiallyhey eflecthesocietyrom hich heyweredrawn.Cadets reusually hosennnationwidecompetitivexaminations,requentlyrom raduatesf the localor nationalpublichighschools which are open to all classesthrough heirown system fcompetitiventrance xaminations.But here urbanstudents utnumber uralones. This system f competitivexaminations n several levels givesa highdegreeof selectivitynd a broad base fromwhichto draw,and results n theemergence f outstanding fficersf singular bility.They represent orthe



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758 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYmost art nurban, rofessionaliddle r owermiddle lass ocialbackground.Naval officersend o representigherconomicnd socialbackgroundshanArmy fficers;he atterregenerallyomparableo those f theAirForce.In political rientation,he attitudesfenlistedmenare againprimarilydominatedya spirit f loyaltyo the mmediateommander. atriotismsalso againpresents an undeniable actor,ut n large ountriest inevitablyisdiluted y spiritf oyaltyo the ndividual'swnregion,rovince,r state.The levelof political cculturationmong nlistedmen is low,but--mostsignificantlyis rising.The attitudesf unior fficersre ikewiseenerally on-politicala factresultingrom he arge izeof thecountrynd fromhe fact hat heyoungofficeronsidersimselfo be a verymall og na very argemachine.Officerspossess strongenseofloyaltyo their ranch fservice,nd they vincestrongechnicalndprofessionalnterest.oung fficersormallyervensmallunits arremoved romhecenter fnational ower ndmaybe expectedohave no concept fany nfluencehat hemilitary ayexert n politics therthan henewswhich heymayread ntheheadlinesf thepoliticalctions fa Minister fWar thirtyears heir enior a person o remotes to seemalmost nreal.However,n exceptionothis eneralizationsa phenomenon almost naberration--hich ppearedn Brazil n 1922, nd which n other ccasionssincehasreappeared,hat ftenentismo.n this lieutenantism, fewpoliti-cally lert nd dealisticallyotivatedunior fficers,isillusionedith hefail-ingsof their lders nd feelinghatbydramatic nd bloody-thoughfool-hardly actionshey an force eformsnthegovernment,ecide o chancerevolt hopelesshoughtbe- ontheirwn.14The officersho conformothenorm, oweveror tenentes ho aream-nestied nd returnedoduty),proceed omid-career,o thegrades fmajor,lieutenantolonel nd colonel,where hemajorityfofficersook forwardoservingut their ime nd retiringnpeaceful ecurity. fficersn mid-careerare dependable,olid citizensnjoying moderatelyomfortableamilyifefightinghestrugglegainstnflationn somemiddle-classommunity.romo-tionsn this hase reverylow ndfifteenearsmay assbeforehehandsomeyoungmajor ecomes hedistinguishedrayeniorieutenantolonel rcolonel.Onlya smallminorityan see general'stars n their uture.The officern mid-careerillprobablyave had somecontactwithU.S.training issionsndU.S. militarychools.This contact ithNorthAmericansandtheirways fthinking ayhaveverymportanty-productsnsofars theindividual's emocraticnd progressiveolitical cculturations concerned.While mid-careers theperiodwhen outside nfluences,uch as economic risis,politicalchaos,or executive ndecisionmaygiverise to strong oliticalfeelings,the officers careful o proceedwithcaution, incehis personal ecurity,n the14For a discussionof the FortCopacabana (Rio de Janeiro)revoltof 1922,see Hernane Tavaresde Sa, The Brazilians: People of Tomorrow(New York: JohnDay, 1947), pp. 179-87.



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 759form fretirement,as notyetbeen ssured hroughufficientears fservice,whilehisfamily esponsibilitiesreprobably eavy.

Vastly ifferent,owever,s thepersonal ituationf senior fficers,hothroughufficientengthfservice ave earned herighto retiretwill. Theworsthat anhappen osuch n individual hoexpressesisopinionsluntlyis thathe can be forcedo retire and life s a retiredeneral r colonel sreallynot tooundesirable. he critical actors ertainingo the individual'spersonalctivitiesnthisate-careereriodreagain ge,vigorndhealth.Theindividualfonlymoderateigormayprefero take ife asy, ettingtherpeopleworryboutthe world's roblems. ut active nd vigorousenior f-ficersan affordobevery ndependentntheir pinionsnd they o nothes-itate oassume political ole. The most enior igorousenerals usually heMinister f War and he is surroundedsually yother ike-mindedfficersjust s vigorouss he,but esssenior.In contrasto the ituationncountriesf esspoliticalmaturity,hechainof commandwithin hehigher niformedchelonss usually trong.nsub-ordinationsrare.There susuallyn identityfviewpointmong hegroup fsenior eneralswho have political pinions. heydiscusspolitics nd theirpolitical ole mong hemselvesndtheymaybe expectedodecide n coursesofaction enerallygreeableo thegroup.The normaline ofpoliticalctiontowhichtheywill agree s thesupport f theconstitutionaliviliangovernment,of the statusquo. This is the situationwhen conditions re normaland thenationfaces no seriouscrises. But if the situation s not normal, f a feelingof crisis, rievance,r danger s in the air,the situation an changedrastically.Should dangerthreatenwithwhichthe civiliangovernmentppearsunable tocope, the top military roup maybe persuadedthat t should takeover. Thistop groupmay even feel that t has a constitutionalutyto give the nationa governmentompetent o cope withtheseapparentdangers.Article176ofthe BrazilianConstitution f 1946defines hefunctionf theArmedForces: todefend henation nd toguarantee he constitutionalowers,law and order. Article177 adds significantlyhattheMinistersfWar, Navy,and Air are under the supreme authority f the President f the Republic,withinhe imits f aw (italics dded). This astphrasen effectives heseministersicense odeny hePresident'suthorityfthey eelhe hasexceededthe imits f aw.If t sdecided o ntervenen thegovernment,hegroup fmilitaryeci-sion-makersanbe expectedostep othe front fthestage nd takepositiveaction odominate he cene.The group ctuallymakinghedecisions smallandveryhighly laced;the vastmajorityf themilitarystablishments farbelowthedecision-makingevel. It is expected nly o obeyorders nd keepitsopinionso itself.n fact fficerst all butthevery op evelsmaybe veryspecificallywarned to stay out of politics.Clearlythis s no sinister lot hatched n the darkofnight n the privacyofsomeconspirator'some. This is officialctiontakenbydulyconstituted f-ficers f the governmentn accordancewithwhat theyconceiveto be their



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760 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYofficialuties ndresponsibilities.he decisionsremade n thecarpetedndcurtainedxpanse f the MinisterfWar'soffice,cross massivemahoganydesk flankedytheflags f thenation nd theArmy.The menmakinghedecision re the mmediateersonaltaffnd themost rusteddvisers ftheMinisterfWar. The MinistersftheNavyandAirForce nd trustedeniorofficersaybe invitedo ointhegroup, ut ngeneral hegroupwillconsistofthesameofficershom heMinisterf War sees nthe course f hisevery-daydutiesweek n and weekout.Most ftheMinister'saily usinesss consideredconfidentials a matterofroutine,nd limited opersons ho have a need-to-know,ut discussionsofpoliticalctionmust e treated ith speciallylose ecrecy.f thetopcivilauthority thePresident were ogetwind f thefact hatmilitarynterven-tionwasimpending,ecouldorder heremoval,ransfer,rretirementf theMinister,hough ispower o do this s notbeyond uestion. he Ministeranrefuseostepdown, reating stickyituationndeed.Thedecision o ntervenes not s a rule ne made uddenly. he ministerandhisadvisers ill have ncluded iscussionnd criticismfthe civilian u-thoritys a matter froutine usiness. lso as part fhisresponsibilityfpro-tectinghegovernmentgainst iots r subversive ovementshe Minister illhavehad detailedmilitarylanspreparednd maintainedor mergencyse.Thus all he needs o do to assume efacto ontrol f thegovernments togivethesignal oputthese orsimilar) lans nto xecution.The actualmechanicsfseizingontrol f the ituationna coupd'etat remuchthe same as thosediscussed bove aimed t makingt impossibleorthosedeposed o alarm hepublic, iveorderso anyone,mobilizenyone,rtalkto anyone ther han thetopmilitaryhiefwho is himselfrderinghemovement. ilitaryorcesxecutinghisplanmust e strongnough o makeany physical ppositionmpossible.When the aboveactionhas beentaken, hetopmilitary an is in thepositionfcalling heplays, or heres no one whocanopposehim.He hasthepower tohire ndfire ; e is the realboss el meroefe, s ProfessorTannenbaum as calledhim.15He may ithernstall newhead ofthegovern-ment,whomaybe a civilian r a military an he may ake he obhimself),orhemayputtheoriginalncumbentack noffice, erely etaininghevetopower veranyofficialctions r appointments.rombeginningo end,theinterventionrobably illnothave nvolved wholesalemilitaryictatorship,in theusual sense ftheterm. n thenormal ourse fevents, hen henextelectionsreheld, hepeople fthenationwillhave a chance oelect hemanof their hoice o be thenextPresident. ut thisman, s he takes ffice, illmost ertainly,n onewayor another,aydue homage o theArmyhailingit as protector f the nation and guardianof its traditions meaningofcourse that he understands hat his mandate to govern s predicatedon thecontinued onsentof the Army.1FrankTannenbaum,PersonalGovernmentn Mexico, ForeignAffairs,XVII (October,1948),44-57.



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THE MILITARYN LATINAMERICANOLITICS 761CONCLUSIONS

The above threeexamplesof the roleof themilitaryn contemporarya-tin Americanpoliticsrepresent nlythreepointson a continuum.Manyinter-mediatepoints re referred o onlybyimplication.Peru,Bolivia,orVenezuela,forexample,would show many elementsof similarityo both the alwaysand the occasional statescited. Likewise, studyof Chile or perhapsnowMexico,would showelements fsimilarityoboththe occasional and neverstates ited.The examplesgivenhave referrednlytotherole of regular rmyofficersn politics militaryrofessionals,hat s. Excludedfrom onsiderationare the irregularmilitarymovements f armed civilianswhich playedsuch alargepart n theMexicanRevolution f 1910-17 and in theCuban Revolutionof 1958-59.Bearing n mindthe continuum,t is believedthata comparison ffactorsin the threetypesof countrieswhich have been analyzedmay serveto pointup some conclusions oncerninghe role of the militaryn Latin America andthe possible olutions o the problem if problem t be.In the first lace, itwould appearto be a valid hypothesishatthe under-lying ocial and politicalconditions re moresignificantn the political ife ofa country hanthe actual roleof themilitary.The military ollows oursesofactionadaptedto thepolitical onditions f the countryn question, nd is notby tself rimarilyesponsibleor heabsenceorpresence fdemocracy rdemo-cratic nstitutions. lthough tmay frequentlye truethat although heArmydoes notgovern,n the astanalysis tdetermines ho does, 16theArmy s notresponsible orthe conditionswhich make thissituation ossible. The politicalrole of themilitarys not a politicaldisease ; rathert is but a symptom f acondition fpolitical mmaturity.In the second place, it would appear that wheredemocracy lourishes--and even where t flourishes ith occasionalmilitaryntervention therealsois to be foundthe condition fpowerful ountervailingorces. n homogenousUruguay, hecountervailingorces re the Colorado and Blanco parties, eitherpowerful noughto suppress he other. In thelarger nd morepopulouscoun-tries, ifferentections reopposedtoeach other, nd no one is powerfulnoughto impose tswill on theothers.The corollary f thissecondhypothesiss that n the countrieswherethemilitarys always factornpoliticswherethere re the eastdemocraticocial,political, nd economic onditions) here lso is tobe found n absenceof coun-tervailingorces.This is notto saythat there s no oppositionn suchcountries;rather, henatureof thecountrys such that theopposition an be suppressed.This secondhypothesiss sometimes xpressedn terms f politicalmatu-rity. This termusuallymeans a society's bility o govern tself ccording ocertain cceptedrules and regulations, iththe added proviso hatadaptabilityto changingcircumstances,rovisionfor both a majority nd minority,nd'Gillin ndSilvert,p.cit.



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762 THE WESTERNPOLITICAL QUARTERLYopportunitiesor ontinuingemocratizationndpolitical cculturationreallbuilt nto he ystem.17A third ypothesiss that hepoliticalcculturationorthe ttainmentfagooddegree fpoliticalonsciousness)f the lower lasses n the ess demo-cratic ountries ill turn hem nto political orcewhichwillchallengehesupremacyfthepresentlyominantupper lasses. f the ower lasses ando thiswithout oingo far s to suppressheupper lasses, here houldbeestablished systemf countervailingorceswithin hesocietywhich ouldserve s theframeworkor democraticartyystem. his, n fact, swhatseems ohavehappenednCostaRica.1sShould the ower lasses evelop hepower osuppressheupper lassesand thus verturnhe ocialorder, newdespotism illsimply e substitutedfor heold,since herewillagainbe an absence fcountervailingorces.t iswellrecognizedhat hedanger fCommunistr Communist-typeevolutionsisvery ealandvery eriousn several reas fLatinAmerica.A fourthandfinal)hypothesiss that nder ertainonditionshemilitary- farfrom eing threat odemocraticnstitutionsmay erve s a force ouphold ndsafeguardhem.Constitutionalrovisions ightvenbe rewrittenso as toformalizehis rrangement,akingfthetopuniformedfficerssortof udiciary, ithpower o interpretherightnessrwrongnessfactsoftheexecutivend the egislativeranchesfgovernment.fthishypothesishouldprove o be correct,emocracyn such countries ouldhavenothingo fearfrom hepoliticaloleof themilitary.t is suggestedhat his tepmight ruit-fully eaddedto the houghtfulndconstructiveuggestionsithwhichVictorAlbaconcludes isperceptivetudyfLatinAmericanmilitarism.19Wheredemocracylourishest sbecause he ociety asreached levelofpoliticalcculturationuch hat he afeguardsfdemocracyre nstitutionalizedand theteeth redrawnfrom heforceswhichmightmperilt. The socialsystemncludesountervailingorcesnstitutionalizeds effectiveolitical arties,jealousof their reedom faction nd expression,nd zealous n guardingt.Theyknowthetruth f thedemocratic axim hat thepriceof libertyseternal igilance. Military orce s employedo strengthen,ot to weaken,democraticnstitutions.One lastcomments appropriate.uccessfulovernmentas alwaysde-pended n strongnd skillfuleadership a fact s true fdemocratics it isofundemocraticovernments.n 1930 nd 1931, nder he tress feconomiccrisis,lmostvery overnmentnLatinAmerica ell, victimoviolence.Themilitaryimplyookt n tshands osetup governmentshich ould ct n the17Fora more ophisticatediscussionf this ubject,ee M. J.Levy, he StructurefSociety

(Princeton:rincetonniversityress, 952).sHarry antor,TheStruggleor emocracynCostaRica, it. upra.*VictorAlba,El Militarismon Iberoamerica,orthcomingublicationfthe nstituto e In-vestigacionesocialesof the Universidad acionalAutonoma e Mexico,Mexico,D.F.This studywas originallyublishedn Combate San Jose, ostaRica: Institutonter-nacionalde Estudios olitico-Sociales),ol. 1, No. 1 (July-August958) through ol.1,No. 6 (May-June959).



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THE MILITARY N LATIN AMERICANPOLITICS 763faceofcrisis. f democraticegimesre tosucceed, heymust e abletobringforthtrong,ntelligent,nd progressiveeaderswho can act in time fcrisisandwho cancommandherespectf both hegeneral ublic ndthemilitary.Such leadersmust omefrom omewhere. ne of themajor oncerns ffor-ward-lookingatinAmericanshould e todevelop venues esideshemilitarythrough hichpromisingnd ambitiousoungmencan reachpolitical ffice.In this earch or he eaders ftomorrows well as the olutionso theprob-lems oftoday heremaybe muchthat hedisciplinefpolitical cience ancontribute.

the role of the military in latin american politics

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