the road to military humanitarianism david chandler

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The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a NewHumanitarian AgendaAuthor(s): David ChandlerSource: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Aug., 2001), pp. 678-700Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4489352

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HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY

The Roadto MilitaryHumanitarianism:How the HumanRightsNGOsShapedA New HumanitarianAgenda

David Chandler*

I. INTRODUCTION

The transformationf humanitarianismrom he marginso thecenterof the

international olicy agenda has been achievedthrough he redefinition f

humanitarianolicy andpracticeand its integrationwithinthefast-growingagendaof humanrights.The new international iscourseof humanrightsactivismno longerseparates he spheresof strategic tateand international

aidfromhumanitarianism,utattemptso integratehetwo under herubric

of "ethical" r"moral"oreignpolicy.As thehumanitarian GOshavebeen

integrated nto policymaking orums,the policymakershave increasinglyclaimedto be guidedby humanitarian rinciples.

The humanrightsNGOs,inconjunctionwithgovernments nd interna-

tional institutions,have established a rights-based"new humanitarian"

consensus, which has succeeded in redefininghumanitarian olicy. Theuniversalprinciples,whichdefinedthe earlyhumanitariannternationalists,are now widely criticized by their NGO successors as the languageof

universalhumanitarianismasbeen reworkedo pursuehumanrights nds.

The "new humanitarians"ssertthat their ambitiousstrategicends inevita-

bly clash with their earlierprinciples,which developed in an age when it

was necessaryto obtainthe consent fromstates, in which they operated,andthe opportunitiesormorelong-term nvolvementwere limited.Today,

notonly is this more interventionistpproachseen as a legitimateresponse

* David Chandlers a ResearchFellow at the PolicyResearch nstitute,LeedsMetropolitan

University,United Kingdom.He has writtenwidely on democracy,human rights,andinternationalelations.Hisworkincludes:Bosnia:FakingDemocracyAfterDayton(1999)and HumanRights nd Internationalnterventionforthcoming001).

HumanRightsQuarterly3 (2001)678-700 ? 2001 by TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress



2001 TheRoado MilitaryHumanitarianism 679

to humanitarianrises in non-Westerntates, t is increasinglyunderstoodobe nonpoliticaland ethicallydriven.

Thispaperis concernedwith the processthroughwhich the core ethicsof humanitarianism ave been transformed,ocusing on the shift in the

politicsof humanitariannterventionisms advocatedby nongovernmentalorganizationsduringand afterthe Cold War.Itconsidersthe nonpoliticalapproachof traditional umanitarianrganizations ndthedevelopmentofmore politicized humanrights-basedhumanitarianNGOs, it furtherana-

lyzes some of the consequences of this change, the retreatfrom the

principlesof neutrality nd universalism, ndthe developmentof "military

humanitarianism."

II. HUMANITARIANUNIVERSALISM

The organizationhatoverthe lastcenturyhas mostepitomizedthe valuesof humanitarian niversalismhas been the International ommitteeof theRedCross(ICRC r RedCross).'The RedCrossestablished hathumanity,impartiality, eutrality, nd universalitywere the

underlyingprinciplesof

any humanitarianntervention.Theprincipleof humanitywas basedon thedesire to assistthewounded andsufferingwithoutdiscrimination,ecogniz-inga common humanity, ndthat"ourenemies aremen."Theprincipleof

impartiality erived fromthe desireto assistwithoutdiscrimination xcepton the basisof needs,givingpriorityo themosturgentcases of distress.The

principleof neutrality oundRedCrossworkers rom akingsides inconflictorengagingin politicalorsocial controversies.Theprincipleof universalityclaimed thatthe ICRC pproachwas the same the worldoveron the basis

thatthe humanitarianalueswere shareduniversally.Thesefourprincipleswere predicatedon separating he humanitarianpherefromthe political

one.2Theavoidanceof politicswas essential o thedefinitionof humanitari-anism.CornelioSommaruga,President f the ICRC,n hisspeech to the UNGeneralAssembly, n November1992, made this clear: "'[h]umanitarianendeavourand politicalactionmustgo theirseparateways if the neutralityand impartiality f humanitarianwork are not to be jeopardized."'3 eanPictet,one of the ICRC'seadingthinkerswarned that"'RedCrossinstitu-tions must bewareof politicsas they would of poison, for it threatensheir

1. For urthernformation,ee <httpV/www.icrc.org>.2. See DanielWarner,ThePoliticsof the Political/Humanitarianivide,81 INT'LREV. ED

CRoss09 (1999).3. Id. at 109 (quotingCornelioSommaruga,Humanitarian ction and Peace-Keeping

Operations, 76 INT'LEV.REDCROSS7 (1995)).



680 HUMANRIGHTSQUARTERLY Vol. 23

very lives.'"'4 s MichaelIgnatieffnotes, humanitarianism as the core of

the ICRC's onpoliticaloutlook:"[i]tmakes no distinctionbetween goodwars and bad, betweenjustand unjustcauses,or even betweenaggressorsand innocents."5

Amnesty nternational,ounded n 1961 with the aimof working orthe

releaseof "prisonersf conscience,"similarlypursueda universal ampaignfor the rights of political prisoners, regardlessof whether they were

persecutedby US or Sovietbacked regimes.6The politicsof the prisonerswere irrelevant:what matteredwas thatthey were held for theirreligious,political,orotherconsciouslyheld beliefsorby reasonof theirethnicorigin,

gender,color, or language.As well as workingfor the release of politicalprisoners,Amnestyalsocampaignedagainstcapitalpunishment nd the useof torture r inhumanpunishmentnallcases, notjustforpoliticalprisoners.Amnestywas not concernedwith the politicsor beliefsof the prisonersbutwith all prisoners eceivinga minimumof universal tandards f treatment.

The UnitedNationsalso established nstitutionsolely for the purposeof humanitarianid, such as the UN Reliefand Rehabilitation dministra-tion (UNRRA) 943-47, the UN InternationalChildren'sEmergencyFund

(UNICEF)n

1946,andthe UN

HighCommissioner or

Refugees UNHCR)in 1950.7The mandatesof these institutionswere explicitlyhumanitarian,not political. Privatecharityorganizationswere also involved in famine

relief,manyhavingbeenfounded n response o the First nd Second WorldWars.Save the ChildrenFundwas established n the aftermath f the FirstWorldWar.8Oxfamwasfounded n 1942, initiallyas theOxfordCommitteefor Famine Relief, in order to provide relief for the famine victims in

German-occupiedGreece.9These relief aid charities,like the ICRC, awthemselvesas fillingthe gapsof humanitarian eed thattemporarily,n the

aftermath f war,could not be metthrough he politicalsystem.Bythe endof the 1940s, the majorreliefcharitiesestablishedthemselvesin a more

permanentrole, not merelyaddressingwartime distressbut international

suffering n the developingworld.

During he ColdWar, heworkof reliefcharitiesachieveda highprofileprecisely because of their universalistapproachand political neutrality.They played an importantrole in providingaid where the international

4. LarryMinear,TheTheory ndPractice f Neutrality:omeThoughtsn the Tensions, 1INT'LREV. REDCROSS63, 66 (1999)(quoting EANICTET, HE FUNDAMENTALPRINcIPLESF THE RED

CRoss56 (1999)).5. MICHAELGNATIEFF,HE WARRIOR'SHONOR: ETHNICWAR AND THEMODERNCONSCIENCE 19 (1998)

[hereinafter IGNATIEFF,ARRIOR'SONOR).

6. For urthernformation,ee <http /www.amnesty.org>.7. For urthernformation,ee <httpV/www.unhcr.ch>.8. For urthernformation,ee <http//www.savethechildren.org.uk>.9. For urthernformation,ee <http//www.oxfam.org.uk>.



2001 TheRoado MilitaryHumanitarianism 681

geopoliticaldivide meantleadingWestern tateswere not willingto assistthose in need. The Biafracrisis in 1968 was one of the firstexamplesof

humanitarian id NGOs mobilizingin the face of Britishand international

disapproval.'0In the 1970s, NGO relief interventionwas repeated in

Bangladesh,Ethiopia,the West AfricanSahel, and Cambodiaafter thedefeat of the KhmerRouge government."In all these cases, the NGOs

campaignedagainstthe lackof officialinstitutionalntervention.While the

majorpowerspursued he realpolitik f the ColdWar,humanitarianNGOsclosed the gaps in humanitarianneeds. The nongovernmentalnature ofNGOs meant that they could operate despite political pressure.As Ben

Whittakernotes, these cases demonstrated hat Oxfam and other NGOscould "operatewhere huge governmentand internationalbodies were

stymiedand politicallyhamstrung.""This position gave humanitarianNGOs a radical edge, puttingthe

interests f people above the strategic oncernsof the East/West ivide and

providingaid against hewishesof Westerngovernments.Agenciessuch as

Oxfam, Impact,Concern,and Save the ChildrenFundbecame popularlyidentifiedwiththe pro-ThirdWorldcause, providing hese previously taid

organizationswith a new, more youthfuland popularappeal." The highpointof NGO humanitarianismame with the LiveAid campaignto raisefunds for the Ethiopian amine of 1984 to 1985. The aid agencies, incollaborationwith BobGeldof'sLiveAid,were instrumentaln defyingtheindifferenceof Westerngovernmentsand launcheda hugelypopularrelief

campaign.'4 Mostimportantly,eliefaid was avowedly nonpolitical-therewere no stringsattached.ReliefNGOs did not seek to linkaid to specificWesternstates or to dictateeconomic or social policy. Humanitarianeliefwas assumedto be given free of politicalconditions or associationwith

foreignor defense policy,deliveredpurelyon the basisof need. As BruceNichollssummarizes: the wo principlesof nondiscriminationndpolitical

neutralitypervade both Geneva law and the public face of modernhumanitarianism.Without hem, humanitarian racticewould be indistin-

guishablefrompartisanpoliticalactivism.""

For most of the Cold War period the division between state-led

developmentaid, open to politicalconsiderations,and politicallyneutral

10. See ALEXDE WAAL, FAMINECRIMES:POLITICS ND THE DISASTERRELIEFNDUSTRYN AFRICA72-77

(1997); Thomas G. Weiss, Principles, Politics and HumanitarianAction, 13 ETHICS INT'LAFF. 1, 3 (1999) [hereinafterWeiss,Principles].

11. See DEWAAL,supra note 10, at 77-79.

12. BEN WHITAKER,A BRIDGEOF PEOPLE:A PERSONAL IEWOF OXFAM's FIRSTFORTYYEARS11 (1983).

13. See HelenSearls,The NGO Revolution1995) (unpublished iscussionpaper,on filewith the author).

14. See id.15. BruceNichols,RubberbandHumanitarianism,ETHICS INT'LAFF.191, 195 (1987).




humanitarianism as clear and transparent. articularlyn the 1960s and

1970s, the problemsof war and famine in the non-Westernworld were

predominantlyeen in the context of Westerndominationand Cold Warclientelism.The existenceof broadsocial and politicalmovementsbased

on ThirdWorldsolidarity r critiquesof Westernmarketdominationmeantthatthe problemswere seen in a broader nternationalontext. It was this

broader ocus on the relationships f power and dependencythat meantthat the potentiallypatronizingaspects of charitableaid were contained,

and,at leastpublicly, herewas littlesupport orblamingorcondemningaid

recipientsnorthe non-Western overnments acinga humanitarian risis.

Ill. BEYOND HUMANITARIANISM

Untiltheearly1990s, "theRedCrosshad a monopolyon the definitionand

elaborationof humanitarianprinciples."'6Since then there has been a

proliferationf doctrinal hanges,led by pressurerom"newhumanitarian"

NGOs and institutional unders.Examplesof these changes include the

1994 RedCross/NGOCode of Conduct,1993 ProvidencePrinciples,andthe 1993 MohonkCriteria.'7 herearetwo strands o the "new humanitar-

ian"approachthatpredatethe post-ColdWarchanges.18The firststrand,

developed in responseto conflictsituations,was the extensionof involve-mentfrom he provisionof immediateassistance o victimsof conflictto the

greater commitment of solidarityand advocacy work for victims and

concernsforthe long-termprotectionof humanrights or "atrisk"groups.Thesecondstrand,whichdevelopedin response o problemsof famineand

drought,was the move of reliefNGOsfromemergencyhumanitarianid to

long-termdevelopmentalismn the 1970s.Boththese strandshavesoughtto move beyondthe traditional onstra-

tegic humanitarianaims of saving human lives and reducing human

suffering.Thegradualbuildupof pressure o aspireto achieve longer-termpolicy ends has reflectedthe changing perceptionsof the NGO role in

16. NicholasLeader,Proliferatingrinciples;OrHowtoSupwiththeDevilwithoutGettingEaten,22 DISASTERS 88, 295 (1998).

17. See WorldConferenceon Religionand Peace World Conferenceon ReligionandPeace-Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in HumanitarianAssistance,TheMohonkCriteriaorHumanitarianssistance n ComplexEmergencies1994) (visited3 Apr.2001) <httpV/www.wcrp.org/whatsnew/Humanitarian.html>;ode of Conductfor the InternationalRed CrossMovementand NGOs in DisasterRelief,SteeringCommitteeorHumanitarianesponse1994)(for nformationn the RedCross ode ofconduct, see <httpV/www.icrc.org/icreng.nsf/>); LARRYMINEAR ND THOMAS. WEISS,

HUMANITARIANCTIONNTIMESFWAR:A HANDBOOKORPRACTICIONERS1993)(for information

on the ProvidencePrinciples).18. See Leader, upranote 16, at 296-98.



2001 TheRoad o MilitaryHumanitarianism 683

international ituationsand the increasingsupportfor a more extensive

rights-orientednvolvement.NicholasLeader,romthe OverseasDevelop-ment Institute, ategorizesthese two challengesto the ICRC's rinciplesas

deepening and broadening the conception of humanitarianism.'9 heNGOs that want a more committed solidarityform of intervention nconflict situationshave emphasizedthe need for protectionor securityaswell as assistance.ThedevelopmentalNGOs have argued hathumanitar-ian intervention hould also include long-termassistancesuch as peace

building,capacitybuilding,empowerment,and developmentas reflected,forexample, in the MohonkCriteria.20

Once the"newhumanitarian"GOsfocusedon solidarity r long-termdevelopment, it became necessaryto make strategicchoices regardingwhich aims to prioritizeand with which groupsto work. The desire to

politicize involvement n aid provisionwithoutsacrificing heirneutraland

"non-political" tatus led NGOs to seek to justifytheir strategicchoices

through he languageof morals and ethics rather han politics. Itwas this

conflict betweenevolving policy practiceand the traditionalhumanitarian

basis for involvement hat laid the basis forthe humanrightsdiscourseof

today.The humanitarianNGOs were the firstinternational

rganizationsthatsoughtto use the terminologyof humanrights n an attempt o justify

political policy choices in the languageof ethics:

IT]he thicalbasisformakinghoices .. is oftena farmorecomplexand

politicaldecision as it impliesdecisions aboutrightness ndjustcauses .... Iftheprinciplef impartialitysrejected, hoistojudgewhich s which?This ssometimestermeda shift froma needs-based o a rights-based umanitarian-ism. In manyways the deeper notion of humanitarianismhat includesboth

protectionndassistances a rights-basedumanitarianism.2"

IV.DEEPENINGHUMANITARIANISM

Thebirthof the modernhumanrights-basedolidaritymovementhasoftenbeen locatedin NGOresponses o the Biafranaminein 1968.22Thefamine

resulted rom the independencewarfoughtby Igbosecessionistsof Biafrastate nsoutheasternNigeriaagainst hefederalgovernment.The secessionist

19. See id.20. HumanRightsWatchandAmnesty nternationalreexamplesof solidarityNGOswhile

the developmentalapproachbetterdescribes he workof charitiessuch as OxfamorSave the Children.There is no firmdividingline betweenthese spheresand manyNGOs, such as M6dicinssans FrontibresDoctorsWithoutBorders), re increasinglyinvolved n both.

21. Leader, upranote 16, at 298.22. SeeoEWAAL,supranote 10, at 72-77; Weiss,Principles, upranote 10, at 3.




strugglereceivedno diplomaticsupport romthe West,the Sovietbloc, orotherAfrican tates,which were concernedoverthe destabilizing ffects of

questioningstate borders.Within a few months, the dominance of the

government orcesand the lack of outsideaid haddoomed the struggle ofailure.AsAlex de Waalnotes, it was only by accidentthatBiafrabecamea cause celebre for the human rights movement.23The internationalattention temmed rom hefaminebecomingnewsthrough he publicationof photographs f severelymalnourishedchildren.24

The media coverage of the firstAfricanfamine to become headlinenews led to accusations hatthe British overnments' rmsshipments o the

Nigerian leadershipand lack of supportfor the Biafranswas makingitcomplicitin genocide by starvation.The lack of UN or outsidegovernmentrelief for the secessionists enabled the humanitarianaid effort to be

monopolized, for the firsttime, by the NGOs. Biafrawas the ICRC'sirst

large-scalerelief operationand Oxfam's second field operation.The firstreal test fornongovernmental umanitarianrganizations esulted n a splitbetween the ICRC ndmajorNGOsoverthe natureof humanitarianction.Oxfam broke its commitmentnot to act unilaterallyand took an openly

partisanapproachclaimingthat"'the

pricefora united

Nigerias

likelyto

be millionsof lives.'"25 everal internationalNGOs followed, arguing hat

breakingrom he ICRC ositionof noncriticismwas theonly ethicalwayof

assisting he populationbecause if the Biafranpeople lost the struggle or

secession, they would face systematicmassacreby Federal orces.The NGOs and the church-fundedcampaigns became the main

propagandists nd sourcesof internationalupport or the Biafran truggle.ThejointChurchAirlift uppliedaid andattemptedo establisha Biafran irforceagainstNigeriangovernment pposition.'2Thisactionled to a federal

ban on outside aid flights.The ICRCdid not engage in any publicity,acceptedthe federalgovernment's anon aid flights,and was condemned

by the more interventionist nd partisanaid NGOs. A leadingcritic wasFrenchdoctor BernardKouchner,who resignedfromthe ICRC,declaringthat the ICRC'silence over Biaframade its workers"accomplicesin the

systematicmassacreof a population."27n 1971 BernardKouchner stab-lished M6decinssans FrontibresMSF),which has since symbolized the

"newhumanitarian"ause.28Twosolidarityprincipleswere developedout

23. See DEWAAL,upranote 10, at 73-74.24. See id.25. Id. at 75 (a public statement by Oxfam as quoted in MAGGIELACK,A CAUSEOROuR TIMES:

OXFAM HEFIRSTIFTYEARS27 (1992)).26. See id. at 72-77.27. Id. at 76 (Bernard Kouchner as quoted in JONATHONENTHALL,ISASTERS,ELIEFNDTHEMEDIA

125 (1993)).28. Forfurtherinformation, see <httpV/www.msf.org>.



2001 The Roadto MilitaryHumanitarianism 685

of the Biafra xperienceand have since become centralto the new rights-based humanitarianism.29he firstprinciple is "freedomof criticism"or

"denunciation."As JamesOrbinski tatedupon acceptingthe 1999 NobelPeace Prize on behalfof MSF:

[S]ilence aslongbeenconfusedwithneutrality,ndhasbeenpresentedsa

necessary onditionor humanitarianction.From ts beginning,MSFwascreatednoppositiono thisassumption. earenotsure hatwords analwayssavelives,butwe know hatsilencecancertainly ill.Overour28 yearswehavebeen-and aretoday-firmly ndirrevocablyommittedo thisethicofrefusal.30

The second principle is "subsidiarity f sovereignty"or the "rightof

intervention,"he "sans rontieres" f theMSFmovement.Manycommenta-torshave cited MSF ounderand futureUN Governorof Kosovo,Bernard

Kouchner, s the humanitarianfficialresponsible orpopularizinghe legaltheoryof FrenchacademicMarioBettati,who developedtheconceptof the

"right f intervention."31

Boththese "new humanitarian"rincipleschallengedthe ICRCwork

thatdependedon the consentof the parties n the areain which itworked.

This invasiveapproachof "solidarity"as receivedwide support,particu-larlysince the end of the Cold War.As George Foulkesstates:"[h]uman-itarianism.. demandsthatwe standfirmlyalongsidethosestriving gainstoppression,and assisttheirstruggle ordignityand basic humanrights."32However, he NGOsthatchoose to engageinadvocacyandsolidarity reof

necessityerodingthe principlesof needs-basedhumanitarianismy subor-

dinatingneeds to thestrategic nds of humanrightsand the struggleagainstoppressiveThirdWorldgovernments.3

29. See Leader, upranote 16, at 300.

30. JamesOrbinski,The Nobel Lecturegiven by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 999:M6decinssans Frontibres10 Dec. 1999) (visited3 April2001) <httpv/www.nobel.no

/engjlect_99m.html>.31. See David Rieff, Humanitarian Intervention, in CRIMES FWAR: WHAT HE UBLICHOULD

KNOW 181, 184 (Roy Gutman & David Rieffeds., 1999); Michael Pugh, MilitaryInterventionndHumanitarian ction:Trends ndIssues,22 DISASTERS39, 341 (1998).

32. Leader,supranote 16, at 297 (quotingGeorgeFoulkes,UK Policy on ConflictandHumanitarian ssistance:Speech at the OverseasDevelopmentCouncil,London 17Mar.1998)).

33. See Pugh,supranote 31, at 340.




V. BROADENINGHUMANITARIANISM

The 1970s and 1980s saw the direct government undingof NGOs likeOxfam,ChristianAid,and CAFODas well as the integrationf internationalhumanitarianNGOs in internationalnstitutions nd theirgrowthin num-bers and influence.34 International GOs were increasingly elieduponto

administer overnmentand institutional elieffundsin disaster ituations nthe 1980s. Bythemid-eighties, 0 percentof UKaidto Sudanand5 percentof British eliefto Ethiopiawas managed hroughNGOs.35Asthey receivedwider recognitionand took on greaterresponsibilitiesowardsaidingthe

ThirdWorld, heybeganto look attheirown work na morecritical ashion.Manyaid agenciesbecame dissatisfiedwiththe limited mpactof reliefaid

on the plightof people in the developingworld.Inorderto address he problemsof the ThirdWorld,the moreradical

NGOs turnedto developmentand arguedfor a long-term nvolvement n

the South rather han short-termmergencyaid.36Mostof the international

agenciestookupthe Freedom romHunger ampaignmaxim:"[g]ivea man

a fish,and you feed him for a day;teachhim to fish,and you feed him for

alifetime."37 y

the end of the1970s,

Oxfam wasspending

less than

10 percent of its budget on emergency relief and over 50 percent on

development issues."8However, by the late 1970s, it was becomingincreasinglyclear that the state-leddevelopmentstrategiesof the Southwere having ittlesuccess.While a few commentatorsocatedthe problemsof development nthecontextof inequalitiespromotedbythe world market

system,most drewthe lessonthatThirdWorld tatescould notbe trusted o

pursuedevelopment.39The humanitarian gencies campaigned againstmuch of the interna-

tionaldevelopmentalaid for Southern tates,arguing hat, in the ColdWarcontext,Westernpowerswere more interested n shoringup corrupt litesthan tacklingpoverty.While US diplomatsfocused on people sufferingunderCommunist egimes,humanitarian GOs criticizedUSdevelopmentaid for authoritarianegimes in Africaand LatinAmerica.40State-led aid

34. See Searls,supranote 13.

35. SeeMarkRobinson,An UncertainPartnership:heOverseasDevelopmentAdministra-tion and the Voluntaryector n the 1980s, in BRITISHVERSEASIDSINCE 979: BETWEEN

IDEALISMND SELF-INTEREST71 (AnuradhaBose & Peter Burnell eds., 1999).36. "South"s usedinterchangeably ith"ThirdWorld" o indicate hegeopoliticaldivide

betweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries.37. WHITAKER,upra note 12, at 21.

38. See Searls,supranote 13.39. See generally DEVELOPMENTOLICYNDPUBLIucCTIONMarcWuyts, Maureen Mackintosh, &

TomHewitteds., 1992).40. See DAVID. FORSYTHE,UMANRIGHTSNDWORLDPOLITICS7 (2d ed. 1989).



2001 TheRoadto MilitaryHumanitarianism 687

programs were seen during the Cold War as tainted by superpower

geopolitics, with no examples of purely humanitarian actions. As US

President Nixon openly stated in 1968: "the main purpose of American aid

is not to help other nations but to help ourselves."41 While the superpowersand state-staffed UN agencies may have shared the language of human

rightsand development aid with the NGO community, there was little in the

way of shared assumptions, and different kinds of people staffed the

government-sponsored agencies and the NGOs.42In opposition to the development policies pursued by non-Western

states, international NGOs focused on alternative grassroots models of

development. This approach is explained by David Korten,a former workerfor the US Agency for International Development (USAID):

[Tlhewide spreadbeliefthatdevelopment sprimarily taskof government as

legitimisedauthoritarianismnd createdmajorbarriers o true developmentprogress n the Southand over the past fourdecades the people have been

expectedto puttheirfaith and resources n the handsof government. nreturn

governmentshave promised o bestow on the people the giftof development.Thispromisehasproveda chimerabornof a falseassessmentof thecapacityof

governmentand the natureof development tself.43

As Southern states were crippled by the debt crisis and later by the World

Bank structuraladjustment programs, state provision of welfare collapsed in

many societies. Internationalrelief NGOs funded by Western governments

attempted to fill in the gaps. As two Oxfam workers explained:

[Glallantly teppinginto the breach come the NGOs very much in the neo-colonial role. Whole districts,or once functioningsections of governmentministries,are handedover to foreigners o runespecially in health or social

services.Thisprocessis enhanced as Structural djustment rograms iteevendeeper . . . 40 percent of Kenya's health requirements are now provided byNGOs. . . . The more the NGOs are prepared to move in the easier it is for

government o reducesupport.44

In fostering "people-focused" approaches to development, focusing on

projects that attempted to help the poorest sections of society, the interna-

tional NGOs developed the concepts of "capacity-building," "empower-

ment," and "civil society" as they argued the need for a long-terminvolvement in

societyand a

sphereof influence

independentfrom the

Third World state. As Edwards and Hulme note:

41. WHITAKER, supra note 12, at 51.

42. See DEWAAL,supra note 10, at 65.

43. DAVID KORTEN,GErTINGINTO THE21ST CENTURY:VOLUNTARY CTIONAND THEGLOBALAGENDA 95

(1990).44. Searls,supranote 13 (citingR. Palmer&J. Rossiter).




NGOsandGROs grassrootsrganizations]avebeen awarded keyrole nthisprocessbydonoragencies, ndareseenas an integralomponentf a

thrivingivilsociety-an essential ounterweighto statepower, peningupchannels fcommunicationndparticipation,rovidinghetrainingroundoractivists,ndpromotingluralism.45

Inthe middleandlate 1980s, NGOs wereencouraged o establishnew

indigenousNGOsin the South,which increasingly eceiveddirectfunding.These Southernpartnersallowed Westerndonorsto create parallelstruc-tures of aid and reliefdistributionwhich further ctedto undermineand to

delegitimize the already weak and under-resourced tate structures.46

Nicholas Stockton makes the point that the central emphasis of thedevelopmentalist, ocal "capacity-building"pproachof many NGOs wasthe assumptionthat the root cause of the problems of conflict or of

development could only be found and resolved by long-term, locallyinvolvedNGOwork.47 hisassumptiongnored he internationalontextofconflict and economic restrictions nd tended to lay responsibility n thenon-Western tate and itscitizens.48

NicholasLeader uggests hatmanyNGOs now involvedin providingrelief nconflict situations

broughto theirworka setof

assumptions hapedbytheirexperienceof long-term evelopmentworkinthe 1970s and1980s.A tendencydeveloped forfield staffto look forframeworks,which wouldallow themto address he rootcauses of conflict notjustsymptoms.He also

suggeststhat,at a morecynical level, in the contextof donorwithdrawal,this tendency enabled access to more funding by workingon multipleends.49Today,nsteadof theshort-term pproachof providingaidto victimsof conflict,manyNGOsassert hat:"'[T]heres a need to re-focuspoliciesso that they enhance the capacity of humanitarian gencies to prevent,

mitigateand resolvethe effectsof violentconflict."'50

45. Michael Edwards& David Hulme, NGOs and Development:Performance nd Ac-

countabilityn the New WorldOrder(1994) (unpublished ackgroundpaperfor aninternational orkshop-NGOsandDevelopment:PerformancendAccountabilitynthe New World,University f Manchester, 7-29 June1994, on file withauthor);eealsoMichaelEdwards&DavidHulme,Introduction:GOPerformancendAccount-

ability, in BEYONDTHEMAGIC ULLET:GO PERFORMANCEND ACCOUNTABILITYN THEPOST-COLD

WAR WORLD 2 (MichaelEdwards& DavidHulmeeds., 1996).46. See SusanD. Burgerman,MobilizingPrinciples:TheRole of Transnationalctivistsn

PromotingHumanRightsPrinciples, 0 HUM.TS.Q. 905 (1998).47. See NicholasStockton, nDefense of Humanitarianism,2 DISASTERS52, 355 (1998).48. See NEILMIDDLETON& PHILO'KEEFE,DISASTER ND DEVELOPMENT:HE POLITICS F HUMANITARIANID

(1998); M. Duffield, The Symphonyof the Damned:Racial Discourse,ComplexEmergenciesnd Humanitarianid,20 DISASTERS73 (1996).

49. See Leader, upranote 16, at 297.50. Id. at 297 (quoting . Goodhand&D. Hulme,NGOs and Peace-buildingn Complex

PoliticalEmergencies; n Introduction (1998)).




JoannaMacraearguesthat"humanitarianismtrikesat the heartof the

professionalcultureof developmentalists."5' he anti-stateapproachand

basis of "sustainableapproaches" s hostile to short-termrelief. Devel-

opmentalistsarguethat reliefcreatesdependencyand reducesthe capacityof local communities, while long-term developmental support builds

capacity.Macraesees the "neo-peaceniks,"he conflictresolutionandcivil

society-buildingNGOs, as posinga similarcritiqueof humanitarianid asa barrier o "capacity-building."he makes the point that these critiquesmiss the pointthat humanitarianeliefwas neverexpectedto playa role inconflict resolution or sustainabledevelopment.52The engagement with

"political and social engineering"may aim to address the causes ofsuffering,but this level of direct and long-term nterferencehas littleto dowith the emergencyrelief of needs-basedhumanitarianaid.s3

By the end of the 1990s, those activists who still argued for the

prioritization f emergencyrelief were forced onto the defensive by thedominationof the developmentalistapproach.As Max Bootarguedin theinfluentialournalForeignAffairshat"[i]nterventionsuch as these [Soma-lia and Haiti]that addresssymptoms(famineor repression, or example)insteadof theircauses (suchas badgovernment) redoomedto disappoint.Thisis a lesson the Clintonadministrationearnedbelatedlyin Kosovoand

Bosnia,and perhapseven in Iraq."54

VI. THEHUMAN RIGHTS"VICTIM"

The sphere of NGO goal-oriented rights-basedhumanitarianism et upcrucial practical precursorsor more direct and invasivegovernment-led,

humanrights-basednterventionismf the late 1990s. Italso establishedanideologicalframework f the relationshipbetweenWestern nstitutions ndthe ThirdWorld,which became crucial to the legitimizationof "ethical"

foreignpolicy. This framework nabled the Cold Warsystemof interna-tional regulation o be reshapedon the basis of "capacity-building"nd

rightsprotection. nthisframework, on-Western overnmentsended to be

seen as a potentialthreat o theirown economic and social development,

incapable of rationalpolicy development, and prone to corruptionand

51. JoannaMacrae,TheDeathof Humanitarianism?:nAnatomy f theAttack, 2 DISASTERS

309, 312 (1998).52. See id. at 314.53. Pugh,supranote 31, at 340.54. MaxBoot,Paving he Road o Hell: TheFailure f UN Peacekeeping, 9 FOR.FF.143,

148 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAMHAWCROSS,DELIVERUS FROM viL:EACEKEEPERS,ARLORDS,ND

A WORLD OF ENDLESS ONFLICT 2000)).




nepotism.The citizens of non-Western tates were seen as easily manipu-lated by their corruptand inefficientelites and ill-versedin the skills of

political decision makingand economic exchange. Both the "solidarity"NGOs,with a deepercommitment o internationalnvolvement n conflict

resolution,and the "developmental"NGOs tended to portray he non-

Westernsubjectas needyand incapableof self-government nd in need of

long-term xternalassistance.This approachled relief agency guides to take visitors to the worst

places, stressingthe dependence of the people on outside support,and

makingexaggerated nd direpredictions f thefuture.Journalistsndmedia

editors knew in advance what a "humanitariantory"looked like. Theoverallplot has been characterizedby JonathonBenthallas a moral"fairy

story."55This "fairystory" had three components, which are familiarbecause they are the essence of the humanrights ntervention"stories" fthe present.s6The firstcomponentis the haplessvictim in distress.In thefamine "fairy tory," his victimwas always portrayed hrough ilm of theworstcases of child malnutritionn the worstfeedingcenters. Incases ofcivil conflict,the victimsareoftenwarrefugeeswho havebeen "ethnically-cleansed."Thesecondcomponentwas thevillain,the non-Western

overn-mentor stateauthoritieshatcaused famineand poverty hroughpersonalcorruptionor wrongspendingpolicies or thatconsciouslyembarkedon a

policy of genocide or mass repression.The third component in thehumanitarian"fairytale" was the savior-the external aid agency, theinternationalnstitution,or even the journalists overingthe storywhoseinterestswere seen to be inseparable romthose of the deservingvictim.

Thesearch for victimshas dominatedmediacoverageof humanitariancrises. The Kosovocrisis,forexample, saw journalists"impatiento finda

'good' story-i.e. a mass atrocity."s7Many Westernjournalistswere dis-patchedto MacedoniaandAlbaniawiththe sole purposeof findinga rapevictim.BenedicteGiaeverof theOrganizationorSecurityandCooperationin Europe OSCE)was angeredthat"almosteveryjournalistwho came tosee herasked one thing:could she give them a rapevictimto interview?"58Thisapproach,whichtakesthe humanitarianrisisoutof a politicalcontextto tell a "fairy ale" or moralstory,has been termedthe "journalism f

attachment."Thisstyleof journalismhas been forcefully ritiqued:

55. See DEWAAL,supra note 10, at 82-83.56. See id.57. AudreyGillan, The PropagandaWar,GUARDIAN, 21 Aug. 2000, at 20, available on

<httpV/www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4053656,00.html>.58. Id.




[F]arromraisingpublicunderstandingf the horrors f war,theirreportsmystify hatconflicts rereally bout.Byabstractingctsofviolence rom ny

wider onflict verpolitical ims, heyremove nypossibilityfpeople eeingwhat causedthe war.The resultof imposing ready-madeGoodv Evilframeworkn everysituations thatconflicts anonlybe understoods the

consequence f man's tavistic, estialurges. nsteadf "humanising"war,thisapproachltimatelyehumanisesllthose nvolved.59

Alex de Waal terms the outlook of the internationalhumanitarian

agencies, and media promotion of their cause, "disastertourism"; nhumanitarianrisestheyselectivelysaw theworstandassumed he worst.60

The lack of knowledge of the severityof the famine, drought,or civilconflict led to exaggeratedpredictionsof the deathtoll, and,of course,theneed forsupport or the agency'sdeclaredrights-based umanitarianims.Thepredominant pproachof humanitariannterventionistso the conflictsin formerYugoslavia nd Rwandademonstrates he dangers nherentn this

perspective.The humanitarianNGOs have explainedthe civil conflictsasevents in and of themselves,from which it can only be concluded thatthe

people of these regionsare uncivilized,proneto violentand savageethnic

passions,orat theveryleasteasily manipulated y governmentpropagandabecause they lack independentcriticalfaculties.61

Thecampaigninghumanrights-basedNGOsdid muchto denigrate henon-Western tate and legitimizeWesternactivismthrough he creationofthe incapablehumanrightsvictim. As PierreKrihenbuhlnotes:

[T]heegitimacyf thehumanitarianestures intimatelyonnectedwiththeabilityo considerhe"other",hepersonnneed,asa human eing, omethingwhich herepeatedseoftheexpressionvictim"ends o makemoredifficult.Itstrips f allhuman ignityheman,womanor childwhom tissupposedo

define.62

WhileColdWarpower politicstarnished he ideaof "human-centered"state-ledhumanrightsactivism, hecampaigning ndaid NGOsrevived he

concept of "ethical"Western nvolvementin humanitarianssues. As thelateJohnVincentnoted:"It]heres one sense, however, nwhich the arrivalof the issue of humanrightsin international ociety may be regardedas

whollyprogressive. tis thesense in whichthe idea of humanrights sborne

59. MICK UME,WHOSE ARsITANYWAY5 (1997).60. See DEWAAL,supra note 10, at 82.61. See Florence Hartmann, Bosnia, in CRIMESFWAR,upra note 31, at 50, 54; for a critique,

see BARRIECOLLINS,OBEDIENCEN RWANDA:A CRITICALQUESTION(1997).62. PierreKrahenbahl,Conflict n the Balkans:HumanTragedies nd the Challengeto

Independent HumanitarianAction, 837 INT'LREV.RED ROSS 1, 26 (2000).




by non-governmental rganizationswho act in defense of no sectional

interest."63Withthe end of theColdWar he geopoliticalstraitjacket as removed

and humanitariangencies and humanrightsadvocacygroupsseized the

opportunityo influencethe international genda.64 heagenciesthatwere

able to do this most successfullywere those that clearly pursuedrights-based"newhumanitarianism"ndrejected he post-1i45 humanitarian id

framework f ICRC eutrality nd needs-basedemergencyrelief,whichwas

tied to respect orstatesovereignty atherhanhumanrightsprotection.The

NGOs made the running n the New Orderbecause theywere less bound

by either official mandates or Cold War orientations han internationalinstitutions.The lack of legal mandateand organizational lexibilityhas

made it easy for NGOs to adapttheirperspective o be in tune with the

times. The major exception to this shift has been the ICRC, he onlyinternational elieforganization part romthe UN HighCommissioneror

Refugees UNHCR)ied to a mandateunder internationalaw (theGeneva

Conventionregulations).Thisnew sortof humanitarianism,hich insteadof operating eparately

frompolitical mechanisms,

saw itself as an alternativeguide

topolicymaking.Far rombeing neutral n relation o the aspirations f bothSoviet

Communismand US-led marketeconomies, boththese perspectiveswere

seen to be flawedbecausetheyputpoliticsabove people. Thelanguageof

humanrightswas the perfectfoil for advocatingan NGO-led approach.

Rejectingthe political Cold War framework and the narrow strategicconcernsof geopoliticalstrategy,he immediate ituationof the victimswas

held to be all thatmattered.MichaelIgnatieff uotesthe disillusionof Don

McCullin,a Britishwarphotographer:

[Blutwhataremy politics? certainlyake he side of the underprivileged.could never ayIwaspolitically eutral.Butwhether'mof theRight r theLeft-I can'tsay.... Ifeel, inmyguts,at one withthevictims.And I find there's

integrityn that tance.65

Ignatieff stutelynotesthatthis approach s a "wearyworldawayfrom

the internationalismf the 1960s"when therewas a politicalcause at stake

and conflict and interventionism ould be supportedor opposed on the

basisof Leftand Right.66 oday,he states"thereare no good causes left-

only victimsof badcauses."67Once politicalchange in non-Westerntates

63. R.J.Vincent, Conclusion, in FOREIGN OLICYAND HUMAN RIGHTS: SSUESANDRESPONSES61, 264

(R.J.Vincented., 1986).64. See DEWAAL, supranote 10, at 133.65. IGNATIEFF,ARRIOR'SONOR,upra note 5, at 22-23.

66. Id.at 23.67. Id.




is seen to be a flawed and pointlessexercise, the only sympathyis forvictims: "thetwentieth-centurynflection of moraluniversalismhas taken

the formof an anti-ideologicaland antipoliticalethic of siding with thevictim; he moralriskentailedbythisethic is misanthropy."68hisapproachrisks"misanthropy"ecause humanrightsactivists indlittlethat is positivein the societies in which they work. Instead, he activistssee only passivevictimsand evil or dangerousabusers.

On the basis of the incapacityof thehumanrightsvictim,thedeepeningand broadeningof humanitarianisms oftenproclaimed o be a radicaland

progressive pproach.Yet, n manycases, thetransitionromneeds-based o

rights-basedhumanitarianisms a strikingexample of this ethical misan-thropy. The extension of humanitarianaction is driven by the liberalconviction that the non-Westerntate lacksan adequatecapacityfor self-determinationor self-government.From short-termemergency aid, thehumanitarianmpulsehas been transformedntoa framework f long-terminvolvement,assistance, and capacity-building.69his new approach isreflected n the expandedUN agendason peace anddevelopmentand the

Secretary-General'sMillenniumReport,all of which advocate long-termsocial and politicalengineeringrather han traditional rantsof aid or the

placementof UN "bluehelmets" o keep armiesapartand to monitor he

peace.70There are three interrelatedreasons for this transformationn the

approach to humanitarianassistance. First,the demise of social and

politicalmovements,which supported he cause of ThirdWorld ndepen-dence and highlightedthe inequalitiesof power inherent in the world

market,has led to an increasingly ocalized focus on conflict and social

problems n isolation rom he international oliticalandeconomiccontext.

Second, once the questionsof humanitarian risis were interpretedpre-dominantlyfrom a local as opposed to an international tandpoint, he

68. Id. at 25.69. See JohnMackinlay& RandolphKent,A New Approach o ComplexEmergencies,

INT'L PEACEKEEPING1-49 (1997); Bradd C. Hayes & Jeffrey I. Sands, Non-Traditional

MilitaryResponses o EndWars:ConsiderationsorPolicymakers,6 MILLENNIUM19-44(1997);RolandParis,Peacebuilding ndthe Limits f Liberalnternationalism,2 INT't

SECURITY4-89 (1997).70. See Reportof the Secretary-General:n Agendafor Peace: PreventiveDiplomacy,Peacemaking ndPeace-keeping,U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 17 June1992);Reportof theSecretary-General:evelopmentand InternationalconomicCooperation,U.N.Doc. A/48/935 (6 May 1994); Reportof the Secretary-General:upplement o an

Agendafor Peace: PositionPaperof the Secretary-Generaln the Occasion of theFiftiethAnniversaryf the UnitedNations,U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1(3 Jan.1995);MillenniumReport f theSecretary-General:We thePeoples":TheRole of the UnitedNations n the21st Century,MillenniumReport f theSecretary-General,.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (2000),availableon <http /www.un.org/millennium/sg/report>.




failureof Southerndevelopmental trategieswas seen as rooted n problemsof the culture or mentalityof non-Westernpolitical leadersand peoples.Third,this diminishedview of the non-Western ubject then meant thathumanitarian ctorsincreasingly aw the involvementof themselves,andtheir Westerngovernmentbackers,as necessaryfor long-termpolitical,economic, and culturalchange.

Forsome commentators,he transition o rights-based umanitarianismis seen as an extension of the needs-based approach."This change is

clearly indicated in the terminologyof "deepening"and "broadening"humanitarian ction. The misanthropic ide to this developmentis drawn

out further n the followingsection,which highlights he danger hatratherthan supplementing raditionalhumanitarianism,ights-basednterventioncan lead to the "ethical"ustificationorsubordinating niversalhumanitar-ian needs to selective politicalends.

VII.FROMHUMANITARIANEEDSTO HUMANRIGHTS

Thedeepening

andbroadening

of humanitarianismrought

ntoquestionthe central principlesinforming he work of the ICRC.Nicholas Leader

notes that with the principleof impartialityhe ethical basisfor humanitar-ian action was clear-it was based on need and given in proportiono theneed.72Once the range of humanitarian ssistance was expanded, theethicalbasis of NGO intervention ecame humanrightsnot humanneeds.The transformation f humanitarianwork throughthe displacement ofneeds by rightshas been crucial to the "newhumanitarian"iscourse.

A. Neutrality

Humanrightsadvocates, like GeoffreyRobertsonQC (Queens'Counsel),have led the calls forthe reformof international umanitarianmechanisms

by railingagainstthe "obsessiveneutralityngrained n UN personneland

procedures."73s Michael Ignatieffnotes, "thedoctrineof neutralityhasbecome steadilymorecontroversial s the new politicsof humanrightshas

enteredthefield."74

He criticizesthe fact thatthe ICRC ontinues to go bythe book with its narrowadherenceto the Geneva Convention,and sides

71. See Leader, upranote 16, at 296.72. See id. at 298.

73. GEOFFREYOBERTSONQC, CRIMESGAINSTUMANITY:HE TRUGGLEORGLOBALUSTICExix (2000).74. IGNATIEFF,ARRIOR'SONOR,upra note 5, at 119.




with itscritics nMSFwho highlight he ICRC'sonservative"legalisticbias"and "cautious, awyerlyneutrality.""'he modernhumanrightsapproachsees conflict in non-Western tates not as a consequence of economic,political,and social tensions to be amelioratedby aid, butas a relationshipof abuse. Forevery act of abuse, there are victims to be supportedandabusers who must be punished: "humanitariannterventioncannot be

impartialbetween the Serb militiamanand the Muslimcivilian, or the

machete-wielding Hutu and the Tutsi victim. The ICRC'sdoctrine ofdiscretion and silence ... has shaded into complicity with war crimes."''76

As JeanPictetnoted:"[olnecannot be at one and the same time the

championof justiceand of charity.One mustchoose, andthe ICRC aslongsince chosen to be a defenderof charity."77heprioritizationf neutralaidover political and social engineeringhas been condemned by the RedCross'radicalcompetitors.As merelya "championof charity,"he ICRC sseen to be highly conservativeand out of touch.78Today, surveys ofhumanitarianelieforganizationshowthattheirofficersagreewiththeshift

away frompoliticalneutrality.As Hugo Slimhas notedafterconsultingallthe UK'smainagencies in the field, "neutrality as almostbecome a dirtyword."79 mmaBonino,EuropeanCommissioner or Humanitarian ffairs,noted in a September1998 paneldiscussion hat:"Ihavemydoubts .. that

being neutral s still at all possible,or indeedethicallyjust.""8n a forceful

critique,she questionswhether it is feasible that humanitarian genciesshould "be unable to distinguishright romwrong,the aggressor romthe

victim,the killers rom hedead bodies?Whatabsurdwisdomcouldcall forthis organized ethical confusion.""'A recent CaritasEuropadiscussion

paper notes: "Todayneutrality s seen as undesirable.Eitherbecause it'sconsideredamoral-remaining silent in the face of humanrightsabuses-

or,simplybecause the centralrole of NGOsin highly politicalemergenciesmakesit impossibleto achieve.""82

The new humanitarianNGOs have a very differentapproachto the

principleof neutralityand see their role as an engaged and radicalone,

75. MichaelIgnatieff,nternational ommitteeof the RedCross(ICRC),n CRIMESOFWAR,

supranote 31, at 202, 204.76. IGNATIEFF,ARRIOR'SONOR,upra note 5, at 124.

77. Minear, supra note 4, at 66 (quoting JEANICTET,HEFUNDAMENTALRINCIPLESFTHERED ROSS60 (1979)).78. See JOHN. HUTCHINSON,HAMPIONSFCHARITY:ARANDTHERISE FTHEREDCROSS1996).79. HugoSlim & IsobelMcConnan,A Swiss Prince,A GlassSlipperand the Feetof 15

BritishAid Agencies:A Studyof DECAgencyPositionson Humanitarianrinciples,Oxford:DisastersEmergencyCommittee1998).

80. Minear, upranote4, at 66.81. Id.82. FionaFox,The Politicisation f Humanitarian id (1999) (draftdiscussionpaperfor

CaritasEuropa).




aiming to fundamentally ransformnon-Westernsocieties to tackle the

underlying auses of violence. The 1990s codes forhumanitarianonduct

tended to avoid the commitments o strictneutralityof the ICRC. n theProvidencePrinciples,"neutrality"s replacedby "'non-partisanship'hilethe Code of Conductsimplystates that'[a]idwill not be used to further

particularpoliticalor religiousstandpoint.'"83 hile agencies like Oxfam,Save the Children,and UNICEF ave all adopted a "new humanitarian"

approach n recentyears,the leading advocate of the new humanrights-based humanitarianisms MWdecinsansFrontibres. lainDestexhe,formerMSF General-Secretary rgues: "[h]umanitarian ction is noble when

coupled with politicalaction and justice. Withoutthem, it is doomed tofailure.""8heawardof the Nobel Peace Prizeto MSF n 1999 was a highlysignificant tatement n supportof the transition o rights-based umanitar-

ian aid. Theagency'sfounderBernardKouchner cknowledged he impor-tance of the award:"MSF's orkwas political rom hestart. hopetheprizemarks he recognitionof a typeof humanitarian orkwhichfights njusticeand persecution, n contrast o traditional rganizations."8s

B. Universalism

During he 1990s, humanitarianid organizationshave come underfire if

they have followed a universalistapproachof providingemergencyaid

solely on the basis of need rather hanpolicyends. Itis now commonplaceto readof humanitarian id prolongingwars, feeding killers,legitimizingcorrupt regimes, creating war economies, and perpetuatinggenocidalpolicies. Humanitariansavegone frombeing angelsof mercywho can do

no wrongto beingseen as partof the problem.The British ecretary f Statefor InternationalDevelopment,ClaireShort,has expressedconcerns thataid agencies have prolonged he conflict in Sudanand has said thatshe is"hauntedbythe riskof reliefmaintainingonflict.""86imilarly,heEuropean

Community'sHumanitarianOffice (ECHO)has decided to shift to a new

humanrights-based pproach o humanitarianid, as a resultof sustained

criticism:"[blusinessas usual for the Commissionas humanitarian iddonorwould meancourting he riskof growingcriticismand isolation romthe donor

community,and a loss of

credibilitygenerally.""87The trendwas highlightedby thecontroversy verthedeliveryof aid to

83. Leader, upranote 16, at 299.84. Weiss,Principles, upranote 10, at 14-15.85. Fox,supranote 82.86. Id.87. Id.




the nearlytwo million Rwandanrefugeesin camps in Ngara,Districtof

Tanzania;Goma, Zaire; and Bukava, Zaire in 1996. From the verybeginning,agencieswere condemnedby humanrightsgroups orsavingthelives of "genocidaires"who would survive to reorganizeand reinvadeRwanda o finish off the genocide.8"As JamesOrbinski tatedon receivingthe Nobel Peace Prizefor MSF:

It]hemoral ntention f the humanitarianct mustbe confrontedith tsactualresult.And t is herewhereanyformof moralneutralityboutwhat s goodmustbe rejected.Theresult an be the useof the humanitariann 1985to

supportorcedmigrationnEthiopia,rtheuse in1996ofthehumanitariano

support genocidalregime n the refugee ampsof Goma.Abstentionssometimes ecessaryo that he humanitariansnotusedagainst populationincrisis.89

Thisperspective s often termed he "Do No Harm" pproach n whichnotprovidingaidto those in need is ethicallydefensible hrough he human

rightsdiscourse.90 hort-termssistanceis criticizedfor the potential ong-term harm, either in fueling conflict or legitimizingand strengtheningpoliticalfactions.91 hisapproachresulted n the deathsof up to 200,000

people in Zaire, includingfleeing troopsclearly intenton revengefor thegenocideof 1994.92ActingPolicyDirectoratOxfamBritain,PhilipBloomer,has attemptedto challenge the "trend o startblamingthe humanitarianassistance for the conflicts."93He has warned that: "lw]e've seen aconcertedpoliticalattackon the fundamentalhumanitarian rinciplesandassistance orperpetuatingwars."94 yno meanswere all refugeesguiltyof

genocide. As Nicholas Stocktonnotes, "some 750,000 of those forciblyrepatriatedr 'lostinZaire'werechildrenunder ive.Over 1.5 millionwereunder16 yearsof age."9"He concludes that:"[t]heapplicationof 'do no

harm'policies is tantamount o playingGod-a deadly, perhaps otalitarianbusinessto indulgein without the benefitof 20:20 futurevision."96

This perspective of subjecting humanitarianaid to human rightsconditionshas, since the Rwandancrisis, become the official UKgovern-mentposition.TessKinghamMP(Member f Parliament), memberof theInternationalDevelopmentCommittee,argues:"[slurely akinga view ofthe widergood-for the long term interestsof people-to actuallyachieve

88. See oEWAAL,supranote 10, at 195; Stockton, upranote47, at 353.89. Orbinski, upranote 30.90. See Macrae, upranote51, at 312.91. See Leader, upranote 16, at 304-05.92. See Stockton, upranote47, at 353.93. PhilipBloomer,TheChronicle nterview,UN CHRONICLE,:1999, at 18, 20.94. Id.95. Stockton, upranote47, at 354.96. Id.at 356.




realstabilityanddevelopment, hat it maybe better o withdrawaid now-to ensure that in the long term,it is in the best interestsof the people."97Attachingconditions to humanitarian elief on the basis of human rightsobjectives has brought into question the universal right enshrined in

international aw of every man, woman, and child to relief at times ofdisaster.The "new humanitarian"pproachof blamingthe "undeservingvictims"hasled to supportorsanctionsand the refusalof aid. Forexample,GeoffreyRobertsonarguesthat sanctionson postwarSerbia are justifiedbecause"[m]ostof Serbia's ightmillioncitizens wereguiltyof indifferencetowardsatrocities n Kosovo."98

The redefinition f humanitarianismnd the shiftawayfromuniversal-ism and neutralityhas thrown into questionthe internationally cceptedframeworkof internationalhumanitarianassistance. The mitigationofhuman suffering s no longerthe priority or internationalhuman rights-based humanitarianism.While withholdingdevelopmentaid until certainconditionsare met is commonpractice, he applicationof this principle ohumanitarianid is a dramaticdeparturerom raditional olicy.The notionof withholding mergencyaidfrompeople indireneed is anunprecedentedattackon humanitarian alues and

practices.

VIII.CONCLUSION

Once humanitarian ntervention s conflated with rights-based trategicends, these politicalends are redefinedas ethical and used to justifythedenial of humanitarianprinciples.Over the last decade, the universalhumanistcore of humanitarian ction has been underminedand humani-

tarianismhasbecome an ambiguousconcept capableof justifyinghe mostbarbaric of militaryactions. Today,leading commentatorssuggest that"thereis no generaldefinitionof humanitarianism"99r ask "'[w]hatonearthdoes the word"humanitarian" ean?'"'"00s PeterFuchs, he DirectorGeneralof the ICRC asstated:"therespectiveroles of politicians,generalsand humanitarian ctorsare not clear anymore."101umanitarianmilita-

rism,widely advocatedduring he 1999 Kosovowar,would have been an

oxymoronbeforethe 1990s; today it has become a tautology.

97. Fox,supranote 82.98. ROBERTSON, upranote73, at 417.99. OLIVERRAMSBOTHAM TOM WOODHOUSE, HUMANITARIANNTERVENTIONN CONTEMPORARYONFLICT:

A RECONCEPTUAUZATION(1996).100. Id. quotingA. Roberts, TheRoad o Hell":A Critique f Humanitarianntervention,6

HARV.NT'LREV. 0, 13 (1993)).101. P. Fuchs,Handling nformationn Humanitarian perationsWithinArmedConflicts,

1999, availableon <http://www.oss.net/Proceedings/ossaaa/aaa4/aaa4ae.html>.




Thetraditionalmageof humanitarianssistance,of sending oodparcelsand blanketsor grantingasylumto refugeesis today seen as a problempreciselybecause it is humanitarian:ecause itdoes notconcern itselfwitha humanrights olutionbeyondmeetingimmediateneed. Gil Loescher,or

example,condemns the UNHCRprecisely or itsnarrowhumanitarianism:

[a]majorbstacle otaking moreactive ole nrefugee rotectionn countriesof originderives rom he internationalefugee egimetself.TheUNHCR as

designedoappearo benon-politicalndstrictlyumanitarian.. UNHCR,sit is presentlytructured,s not mandatedo intervenepolitically gainstgovernmentsroppositionroups.102

The UNHCR,along with other humanitarian gencies, is being pres-sured into redefining its role in crisis situations. Reflectingthe "newhumanitarian"onsensus,the UNHCRsdownplaying ts humanitarianoleof aidingrefugeesandtakingon a new,moreinvasiveroleas a humanrightsactorassuming he rightsandresponsibilities f dealingwith the rootcausesof refugeeproblems.'03

Ironically,he strongestcritiqueof needs-basedhumanitarian ction isfrom the humanrightsmovementitself,which arguesthat responding o

crises by sending humanitarian elief is merelyan excuse to avoid morevigorous responses.'4 Humanitarian elief is increasinglyseen as givingWesterngovernmentshe appearanceof "doing omething"nthe face of a

tragedywhile providingan alibi to avoid makinga riskierpolitical or

militarycommitmentthat could address the "roots of a crisis."105 he

advocates of humanrights-based oreignpolicy are in the forefront f the

campaign against humanitarian pproaches.Under the slogan that "hu-manitarianismhould not be used as a substitute or politicalaction" hey

are in fact arguingfor a rights-basedhumanitarianismhat is entirelysubordinate o policy ends.'06

Today, nsteadof feedingfaminevictims,aid maywell be cut back,asthe UKgovernmenthas done over Sudan and Ethiopia.'07Humanrightsadvocates would seem to be happierwith military nterventionand theestablishmentof "safeareas"rather hangrantingasylum,which is seen as

102. G l Loescher,Refugees: a GlobalHumanRightsandSecurityCrisis, n HUMAN RIGHTS N

GLOBALPOLITIcs33, 241 (TimDunne&NicholasJ.Wheelereds., 1999).103. See DAVIDP. FORSYTHE,HUMAN RIGHTSN INTERNATIONALELATIONS4 (2000).104. See ThomasG. Weiss, The Politicsof Humanitariandeas,31 SECURITYIALOGUE1, 14

(2000).105. SeegenerallyAdamRoberts,TheRoleof Humanitarianssues nInternational olitics n

the 1990s, 81 INT'LREV.REDCROSS 9 (1999).106. Stockton, upranote47, at 356.107. SeeAndyMcSmith&JasonBurke,Britain lashesAid toEthiopia,OBSERVER,Apr.2000,

at 1; Editorial, orOurSake,Don'tCut ThirdWorldAid,OBSERVER,Apr.2000, at 28.




legitimizingethnic cleansing.108 s journalistDavid Rieffnotes:"[humani-tarianrelieforganizations] avebecome some of the mostfervent nterven-

tionists."'09 homasWeissobserves thatthe humanrightscommunityhaveredefinedhumanitarianisms itsopposite:"Theseactionsare,bydefinition,coercive andpartial.Theyarepoliticaland humanitarian;hey certainlyarenot neutral, mpartial, r consensual."110

The restrictions n humanitarian id and universalcharitymean that

those personsdependenton aid have even less opportunityor autonomythanpreviously. nBosnia,humanrightsNGOs like the International risis

Group(ICG)have lobbiedstrongly oreconomic aid to be conditionalon

the implementationof the Dayton Accords and have argued that aidconditionality s the mainsourceof leveragefor the internationalommu-

nity."'InSerbia,EuropeanUnion humanitarian id programs peratedon

the highlyselectivebasisof providing uel andprovisions o opposition-runmunicipalitieswhile applyingstrictsanctionsto the restof the country.TheUN Office forthe Coordination f Humanitarian ffairsn Belgrade nd the

InternationalFederationof the Red Cross challenged this approachby

arguing hat aid should be given on the basis of need and irrespective f

political partyaffiliation.112The

politicizationof humanitarianid has led to

even greater everageover non-Western ocieties as NGOs and interna-tional institutionsncreasingly ssumethe right o makejudgementsabout

what is rightand just,about whose capacitiesare built, and which local

groupsarefavored.Wherehumanitarianid startedout as an expressionof

empathy with common humanity, t has been transformedhroughthediscourseof humanrights nto a leverforstrategic imsdrawnup and acted

upon by externalagencies.Frombeingbased on the universalnatureof humanity,which inevitably

caused conflict with the pro-Westerngendaof the ColdWar, oday's"newhumanitarians"ave challengedevery principle hatdemarcated he tradi-

tional frameworkof humanitarian ction. No longerdo they advocate a

principledneutrality, ordefendthe most basic level of humanitarianeliefas a universalright f this threatens o underminebroaderstrategichuman

rights-based ims.Throughhe humanrightsdiscourse,humanitarianctionhasbecometransformedromrelyingon empathywithsuffering ictimsand

providingemergencyaid to mobilizing misanthropy nd legitimizing he

politicsof internationalondemnation, anctions,and bombings.

108. See Roberts, upranote 105, at 31.109. Rieff, upranote 31, at 184.110. Weiss,Principles,upranote 10, at 21.111. See Pugh, supra note 31, at 343; DAvlo CHANDLER,OSNIA:AKINGEMOCRACYFTERAYTON

(1999).112. See LauraRozen,Humanitarianid, BOSTON LOBE,30 July2000, at F2;LauraRozen,

Breadnstead f 2000

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