The rise and fall of multiculturalism?New debates on inclusion andaccommodation in diverse societies

Will Kymlicka

Ideas about the legal and political accommoda-tion of ethnic diversity have been in a stateof flux for the past 40 years around the world.A familiar way of describing these changes is interms of the rise and fall of multiculturalism.Indeed, this has become a kind of masternarrative, widely invoked by scholars, journal-ists and policy-makers alike to explain theevolution of contemporary debates about diver-sity. Although people disagree about whatcomes after multiculturalism,there is a surprising consen-sus that we are indeed in apost-multicultural era.

My goal in this articlewill be to explore and critiquethis master narrative and tosuggest an alternative frame-work for thinking about thechoices we face. In order tomake progress, I suggest, weneed to dig below the surfaceof the master narrative. Boththe rise and fall of multi-culturalism have been very uneven processes,depending on the nature of the issue and thecountry involved, and we need to understandthese variations if we are to identify a moresustainable model for accommodating diversity.

In its simplest form, the master narrativegoes like this (for influential academic state-ments of this rise and fall narrative, claimingthat it applies across the western democracies,see Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004; cf. Baubock2002. There are also many accounts of thedecline, retreat, or crisis of multiculturalism inparticular countries, such as The Netherlands

(Entzinger 2003; Koopmans 2006; Prins andSlijper 2002), the UK (Back et al. 2002; Hansen2007; Vertovec 2005), Australia (Ang andStratton 2001) and Canada (Wong et al. 2005):

� From the 1970s tomid-1990s therewas a cleartrend across western democracies towards theincreased recognition and accommodation ofdiversity through a range of multiculturalismpolicies and minority rights. These policies

were endorsed both atthe domestic level invarious states and byinternational organisa-tions, and involved arejection of earlier ideasof unitary and homo-genous nationhood.

� Since the mid-1990s,however, we have seena backlash and retreatfrom multiculturalism,and a re-assertion ofideas of nation build-

ing, common values and identity, and uni-tary citizenship – even a return ofassimilation.

� This retreat is partly driven by fears amongstthe majority group that the accommodationof diversity has gone too far and is threaten-ing their way of life. This fear often expressesitself in the rise of nativist and populist right-wing political movements, such as theDanish People’s Party, defending old ideasof ‘‘Denmark for the Danish’’.

� But the retreat also reflects a belief amongstthe centre-left that multiculturalism has

Will Kymlicka holds the CanadaResearchChair in Political Philosophy at Queen’sUniversity in Canada, and is a visitingprofessor in the nationalism studies pro-gramme at the Central European Univer-sity in Budapest. He is the author ofseveral books on issues of multicultural-ism and minority rights, including Multi-cultural citizenship (1995), and mostrecentlyMulticultural odysseys: navigatingthe new international politics of diversity(2007).Email: kymlicka@queensu.ca

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failed to help the intended beneficiaries –namely, minorities themselves – because ithas failed to address the underlying sourcesof their social, economic and political exclu-sion, and may indeed have unintentionallycontributed to their social isolation. As aresult, even the centre-left political move-ments that had initially championed multi-culturalism, such as the social democraticparties in Europe, have backed away from itand shifted to a discourse that emphasizesideas of integration, social cohesion, com-mon values, and shared citizenship (For anoverview of the attitudes of European socialdemocratic parties to these issues, seeCuperus et al. 2003. There are also politicalperspectives on multiculturalism beyond thepopulist right and the social-democratic left.For example, the radical left has tradition-ally viewed multiculturalism as a state-ledreformist project that seeks to contain thetransformative potential of subaltern politi-cal movements and thereby forecloses thepossibility of a more radical critique of thecapitalist nation-state (Day 2000; %izek1997). The French republican tradition, inboth its right and left strands, has alsogenerally opposed multiculturalism as anobstacle to its vision of equality and emanci-pation (Laborde 2009). However, since theradical left and the republicans were never infavour of multiculturalism their oppositiondoes not explain the rise and fall narrative.This narrative presupposes that formersupporters of multiculturalism have now lostfaith in it, and I believe that it is predomi-nantly amongst the social democrats thatone can see this sort of rise and fall).

� The social-democratic discourse of nationalintegration differs from the radical rightdiscourse in emphasising the need to developa more inclusive national identity and tofight racism and discrimination, but none-theless distances itself from the rhetoric andpolicies of multiculturalism. The term ‘‘post-multiculturalism’’ has often been invoked tosignal this new approach, which seeks toovercome the perceived limits of a naive ormisguided multiculturalism while avoidingthe oppressive reassertion of homogenisingnationalist ideologies. For references to post-multiculturalism by progressive intellectuals

and academics, who distinguish it from theradical right’s anti-multiculturalism, seeAlibhai-Brown (2000, 2003, 2004) re theUK, Ley (2005), Jupp (2007) re Australia,and King (2004) and Hollinger (2006) re theUSA.

This, in brief, is the master narrative of the riseand fall of multiculturalism. It helpfully capturesimportant features of our current debates. Yet insome respects it is misleading and may obscurethe real challenges and opportunities we face.

In the rest of this article, I will argue that themaster narrative (a) mischaracterises the natureof the experiments in multiculturalism that havebeen undertaken over the past 40 years, (b)exaggerates the extent to which they have beenabandoned and (c) misidentifies the genuinedifficulties and limitations they have encoun-tered. I then discuss the implications of thisdebate for the actions of international organisa-tions like UNESCO.

What is multiculturalism?

In much of the post-multiculturalism literature,multiculturalism is characterised as a feel-goodcelebration of ethno-cultural diversity, encoura-ging citizens to acknowledge and embrace thepanoply of customs, traditions, music andcuisine that exist in a multi-ethnic society.Alibhai-Brown calls this the 3S model of multi-culturalism in Britain – samosas, steel drumsand saris (Alibhai-Brown 2000). Multicultural-ism takes these familiar cultural markers ofethnic groups – cuisine, music and clothing –and treats them as authentic cultural practices tobe preserved by their members and safelyconsumed as cultural spectacles by others. Sothey are taught in multicultural school curricula,performed inmulticultural festivals, displayed inmulticultural media and museums, and so on.

This 3S picture ofmulticulturalism has beensubject to many powerful critiques:

� It entirely ignores issues of economic andpolitical inequality. Even if all Britons cometo enjoy Jamaican steel drum music orIndian samosas, this by itself would donothing to address the real problems facingCaribbean and South-Asian communities inBritain – problems of unemployment, poor

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educational outcomes, residential segrega-tion, poor English language skills andpolitical marginalisation. These economicand political issues cannot be solved simplyby celebrating cultural difference.

� Even with respect to the (legitimate) goal ofpromoting greater understanding of culturaldifference, the focus on celebrating discreteauthentic cultural practices that are uniqueto each group is potentially dangerous andmisleading. Firstly, not all customs that maybe traditionally practiced in a particulargroup are worthy of being celebrated or evenof being legally tolerated, such as forcedmarriage. To avoid this risk, there is atendency to choose safely inoffensive prac-tices as the focus of multicultural celebra-tions – such as cuisine or music – practicesthat can be enjoyably consumed by membersof the larger society. But this runs theopposite risk of the trivialisation or Dis-neyfying of cultural difference (Bissoondath1994), ignoring the real challenges thatdifferences in cultural values and religiousdoctrine can raise.

� Secondly, the 3S model of multiculturalismcan encourage a conception of groups ashermetically sealed and static, each reprodu-cing its own distinct authentic practices.Multiculturalism may be intended to encou-rage people to share their distinctive cus-toms, but the very assumption that eachgroup has its own distinctive customs ignoresprocesses of cultural adaptation, mixing andmelange, and renders invisible emergingcultural commonalities, thereby potentiallyreinforcing perceptions of minorities aseternally ‘‘Other’’.

� Thirdly, this model can end up reinforcingpower inequalities and cultural restrictionswithin minority groups. In deciding whichtraditions are authentic and how to interpretand display them, the state generally consultsthe traditional elites within the group –typically older men – while ignoring theway these traditional practices (and tradi-tional elites) are often challenged by internalreformers, who have different views abouthow, say, a good Muslim should act. It cantherefore imprison people in cultural scriptsthat they are not allowed to question ordispute.

According to post-multiculturalists, it is thegradual recognition of these flaws that explainsthe retreat from multiculturalism and the searchfor new post-multicultural models of citizenshipthat emphasise the priority of political participa-tion and economic opportunities over the sym-bolic politics of cultural recognition, the priorityof human rights and individual freedom overrespect for cultural traditions, the priority ofbuilding inclusive common national identitiesover the recognition of ancestral cultural iden-tities, and the priority of cultural change andcultural mixing over the reification of staticcultural differences.

Is this post-multiculturalist critique accu-rate and justified? If multiculturalism wasfundamentally about celebrating cultural differ-ence in the form of discrete folk practices, thenthe critique would indeed be justified. However,I will argue that the 3S account is a caricature ofthe reality of multiculturalism as it has devel-oped over the past 40 years in western democ-racies, at least as multiculturalism is affirmedand embodied in public policy. To be sure, the3S picture does accurately describe a certain sortof ethos or sensibility that exists in certain circlesin modern societies. Within these circles, beingable to enjoy a wide range of cuisines andcultural products from around the world is seenas a sign of sophistication and open-mindedness.But multiculturalism as a set of public policieshas never been exclusively, or even primarily,about inculcating such an ethos of culturalconsumption. If we focus on multiculturalismas a set of public policies rather than as aparticular cultural sensibility, I believe that wewill find a very different story from thatpresented in the post-multiculturalist critique.

In the rest of this article, therefore, I will befocusing on the rise and fall of multiculturalismpolicies – that is, on multiculturalism as apolitical project that attempts to redefine therelationship between ethno-cultural minoritiesand the state through the adoption of new laws,policies or institutions. (Thus, unless otherwiseindicated, references to multiculturalism shouldbe understood as references to multiculturalismpolicies). My focus is on whymulticulturalism inthis sense arose, what forms it has taken, whateffects it has had and what obstacles it faces.

I cannot rehearse the full history of multi-culturalism here, but I think it is important to

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situate it in its historical context. In one sense,multiculturalism is as old as humanity – differentcultures have always found ways of co-existingand respect for diversity was a familiar feature ofmany empires throughout history, such as theOttoman Empire. But the sort of multicultural-ism that is said to have had a rise and fall is amuch more specific historical phenomenon,emerging first in the western democracies inthe late 1960s. This timing is important, for ithelps us situate multiculturalism in relation tothe larger social transformations of the post-war era.

More specifically, multiculturalism can beseen as part of a larger human rights revolutionin relation to ethnic and racial diversity (for amore detailed discussion of the linkage betweenmulticulturalism and the human rights revolu-tion, from which these three paragraphs aretaken, see Kymlicka 2007). Prior to the SecondWorld War, ethno-cultural and religious diver-sity in the west was characterised by a range ofilliberal and undemocratic relations – includingthe relations of conqueror and conquered,coloniser and colonised, master and slave, settlerand indigenous, racialised and unmarked, nor-malised and deviant, orthodox and heretic,civilised and primitive, ally and enemy. Thesehierarchical relationships were justified by racia-list ideologies that explicitly propounded thesuperiority of some peoples and cultures, andtheir right to rule over others. These ideologieswere widely accepted throughout the westernworld, and underpinned both domestic laws (forexample, racially biased immigration and citi-zenship policies) and foreign policies (for exam-ple, in relation to overseas colonies).

After the Second World War, however, theworld recoiled against Hitler’s fanatical andmurderous use of such ideologies and the UNdecisively repudiated them in favour of a newideology of racial and ethnic equality. And thisnew assumption of human equality has gener-ated a series of political movements designed tocontest the lingering presence or enduring effectsof older hierarchies. We can distinguish threewaves of such movements: (a) the struggle fordecolonisation, concentrated in the period 1948to 1965; (b) the struggle against racial segrega-tion and discrimination, initiated and exempli-fied by the African–American civil rightsmovement from 1955 to 1965 and (c) the struggle

for multiculturalism and minority rights thatemerged from the late 1960s.

Each of these movements draws upon thehuman rights revolution and its foundationalideology of the equality of races and peoples, tochallenge the legacies of earlier ethnic and racialhierarchies. Indeed, the human rights revolutionplays a double role here: not just as theinspiration for struggle but also as a constrainton the permissible goals and means of thatstruggle. In so far as historically excluded orstigmatised groups struggle against earlier hier-archies in the name of equality, they too have torenounce their own traditions of exclusion oroppression in the treatment of, say, women,gays, people of mixed race, religious dissenters,and so on. The framework of human rights, andof liberal-democratic constitutionalism moregenerally, provides the overarching frameworkwithin which these struggles are debated andaddressed.

Each of these movements, therefore, can beseen as contributing to a process of democratic‘‘citizenisation’’ – that is, turning the earliercatalogue of hierarchical relations into relation-ships of liberal-democratic citizenship, both interms of the vertical relationship between themembers of minorities and the state and thehorizontal relationships amongst the membersof different groups. In the past it was oftenassumed that the only way to engage in thisprocess of citizenisation was to impose a singleundifferentiated model of citizenship on allindividuals. But the ideas and policies of multi-culturalism that emerged from the 1960s startfrom the assumption that this complex historyinevitably and appropriately generates group-differentiated ethno-political claims. The key tocitizenisation is not to suppress these differentialclaims but to filter and frame them through thelanguage of human rights, civil liberties anddemocratic accountability. This is what multi-culturalist movements have aimed to do.

The precise character of the resulting multi-cultural reforms varies from group to group, asbefits the distinctive history that each has faced.They all start from the anti-discriminationprinciple that underpinned the second wavebut go beyond it to challenge other forms ofexclusion or stigmatisation. In most westerncountries explicit state-sponsored discrimina-tion against ethnic, racial or religious minorities

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had largely ceased by the 1960s and 1970s, underthe influence of the second wave of human rightsstruggles. Yet evidence of ethnic and racialhierarchies remained and continues to be clearlyvisible in many societies, whether measured interms of economic inequalities, political under-representation, social stigmatisation or culturalinvisibility. Various forms of multiculturalismhave been developed to help overcome theselingering inequalities.

We can broadly distinguish three patternsof multiculturalism that have emerged in thewestern democracies. Firstly, we see new formsof empowerment of indigenous peoples such asthe Maori in New Zealand; Aboriginals inCanada and Australia; American Indians; Samiin Scandinavia or Inuit of Greenland. These newmodels of multicultural citizenship for indigen-ous peoples often include some combination ofthe following nine policies. (This and thefollowing lists of multicultural policies are takenfrom the index of multicultural policies devel-oped in Banting and Kymlicka 2006):

� recognition of land rights and title� recognition of self-government rights� upholding historic treaties and/or signing

new treaties� recognition of cultural rights (language;

hunting and fishing, sacred sites)� recognition of customary law� guarantees of representation and consulta-

tion in the central government� constitutional or legislative affirmation of

the distinct status of indigenous peoples� support and ratification for international

instruments on indigenous rights� affirmative action

Secondly, we see new forms of autonomy andpower-sharing for sub-state national groups,such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain, theFlemish and Walloons in Belgium, the Scotsand Welsh in Britain, Quebecois in Canada,Germans in South Tyrol, Swedish in Finlandand so on. These new forms of multiculturalcitizenship for national minorities typicallyinclude some combination of the following sixelements:

� federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy� official language status, either in the region

or nationally

� guarantees of representation in the centralgovernment or on constitutional courts

� public funding of minority language univer-sities, schools and the media

� constitutional or parliamentary affirmationof multinationalism

� accorded an international personality (forexample, allowing the sub-state region to siton international bodies, or sign treaties, orhave their own Olympic team)

Finally, we see new forms of multiculturalcitizenship for immigrant groups, which mayinclude a combination of the following eightpolicies:

� constitutional, legislative or parliamentaryaffirmation of multiculturalism at central,regional and municipal levels;

� the adoption of multiculturalism in schoolcurriculum;

� the inclusion of ethnic representation andsensitivity in the mandate of public media ormedia licensing;

� exemptions from dress codes, Sunday-closing legislation and so on (either bystatute or by court cases)

� allowed dual citizenship� the funding of ethnic group organisations to

support cultural activities� the funding of bilingual education or

mother-tongue instruction� affirmative action for disadvantaged immi-

grant groups

While there are important differences betweenthese three modes of multiculturalism, each ofthem has been defended as a means to overcomethe legacies of earlier hierarchies and to helpbuild fairer and more inclusive democraticsocieties.

In my view, therefore, multiculturalism isfirst and foremost about developing new modelsof democratic citizenship, grounded in humanrights ideals, to replace earlier uncivil andundemocratic relations of hierarchy and exclu-sion. Needless to say, this account of multi-culturalism as citizenisation differs dramaticallyfrom the 3S account of multiculturalism as thecelebration of static cultural differences. Thecitizenisation account says that multiculturalismis precisely about constructing new civic andpolitical relations to overcome the deeply

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entrenched inequalities that have persisted afterthe abolition of formal discrimination.

It is obviously important to determinewhich of these accounts provides a moreaccurate description of the western experiencewith multiculturalism. Before we can decidewhether to celebrate or lament the fall ofmulticulturalism or to replace it with post-multiculturalism, we need first to make sure weknow what multiculturalism has in fact been. Ihave elsewhere tried to give a fuller defence ofmy account (Kymlicka 2007, pp. 63–167), so letme here just note three ways in which the 3Saccount is misleading.

Firstly, the claim that multiculturalism issolely or primarily about symbolic culturalpolitics depends on a complete misreading ofthe actual policies. If we look at the three lists ofpolicies above, it is immediately apparent thatthey combine economic, political, social andcultural dimensions. Take the case of land claimsfor indigenous peoples. While regaining controlof their traditional territories certainly hascultural and religious significance for manyindigenous peoples, it also has profound eco-nomic and political significance. Land is thematerial basis for both economic opportunitiesand political self-government. Or consider lan-guage rights for national minorities. Accordingofficial language status to a minority’s languageis partly valued as a form of symbolic recogni-tion of a historically stigmatised language. But itis also a form of economic and politicalempowerment: the more a minority’s languageis used in public institutions, the more itsspeakers have access to employment opportu-nities and decision-making procedures. Indeed,the political and economic dimensions of themulticulturalist struggles of indigenous peoplesand national minorities are obvious: they areprecisely about restructuring state institutions,including redistributing political control overimportant public and natural resources.

The view that multiculturalism is about theapolitical celebration of ethnic folk customs,therefore, has plausibility only in relation toimmigrant groups. And indeed, representationsof cuisine, dress and music are often the mostvisible manifestations of multiculturalism in theschools and the media. It is not surprising,therefore, that when post-multiculturalists dis-cuss multiculturalism they almost invariably

ignore the issue of indigenous peoples andnational minorities and focus only on the caseof immigrant groups, where the 3S account hasmore initial plausibility.

But even in this context, if we look back atthe list of eight multiculturalism policiesadopted in relation to immigrant groups, wequickly see that they too involve a complexmixture of economic, political and culturalelements. While immigrants are (rightly) con-cerned to contest the historical stigmatisation oftheir cultures, immigrant multiculturalism alsoincludes policies that are centrally concernedwith access to political power and to economicopportunities – for example, policies of affirma-tive action, mechanisms of political consulta-tion, funding for ethnic self-organisation orfacilitated access to citizenship.

All three familiar patterns of multicultural-ism, therefore – for indigenous peoples, nationalminorities and immigrant groups – combinecultural recognition, economic redistributionand political participation. In this respect, thepost-multiculturalist critique that multicultural-ism ignores economic and political inequality issimply off the mark. (Nevertheless, the fact thatmulticulturalism policies were designed with anawareness of these inequalities and sought toaddress them does not show that they have beeneffective in redressing inequalities. Multicultur-alism policies, like all public policies, can haveperverse and unintended effects and it is possiblethat multiculturalism has unintentionallyobscured or exacerbated inequalities or wea-kened the welfare state. However, a major cross-national study of the impact of multiculturalismon the welfare state shows no evidence of suchunintended effects (Banting and Kymlicka2006).

Secondly, the post-multiculturalists’ claimthat multiculturalism ignores the importance ofuniversal human rights is equally misplaced. Onthe contrary, as we’ve seen, multiculturalism isitself a human rights-based movement, inspiredand constrained by principles of universalhuman rights and liberal-democratic constitu-tionalism. Its goal is to challenge the sorts oftraditional ethnic and racial hierarchies thathave been discredited by the post-war humanrights revolution. Understood in this way,multiculturalism as citizenisation offers no sup-port for protecting or accommodating the sorts

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of illiberal cultural practices in minority groupsthat have also been discredited by this humanrights revolution. The same human rights-basedreasons we have for endorsing multiculturalismas citizenisation are the same reasons we havefor rejecting cultural practices that violatehuman rights. And indeed, this is what we seethroughout the western democracies. Wherevermulticulturalist public policies have beenadopted they have been tied conceptually andinstitutionally to larger human rights normsand have been subject to the overarchingprinciples of the liberal-democratic constitu-tional order. No western democracy hasexempted immigrant groups from constitutionalnorms of human rights in order to maintainpractices of, say, forced marriage, the crimina-lisation of apostasy or cliterodectomy. Hereagain, the post-multiculturalist claim thathuman rights should take precedence over therecognition of cultural traditions simply reas-serts what has been integral to the theory andpractice of multiculturalism.

This in turn points out the flaws in the post-multiculturalists’ claim that multiculturalismignores or denies the reality of cultural change.On the contrary, multiculturalism as citizenisa-tion is a deeply (and intentionally) transforma-tive project, both for minorities and majorities.It demands that both dominant and historicallysubordinated groups engage in new practices,enter new relationships and embrace new con-cepts and discourses, all of which profoundlytransform people’s identities and practices.

This is perhaps most obvious in the case ofthe historically dominant majority nation ineach country which is required to renouncefantasies of racial superiority, to relinquishclaims to exclusive ownership of the state andto abandon attempts to fashion public institu-tions solely in its own national image. In fact,much of multiculturalism’s long march throughthe institutions consists precisely in identifyingand attacking those deeply rooted traditions,customs and symbols that have historicallyexcluded or stigmatised minorities. Much hasbeen written about the transformations inmajority identities and practices this hasrequired and the backlash it can create.

But multiculturalism is equally transforma-tive of the identities and practices of minoritygroups. Many of these groups have their own

histories of ethnic and racial prejudice, of anti-Semitism, of caste and gender exclusion, ofreligious triumphalism and of political author-itarianism, all of which are delegitimised by thenorms of liberal-democratic multiculturalismand minority rights. Moreover, even where thetraditional practices of a minority group are freeof illiberal or undemocratic elements they mayinvolve a level of cultural closure that becomesunattractive and unsustainable under multi-culturalism. These practices may have initiallyemerged as a response to earlier experiences ofdiscrimination, stigmatisation, or exclusion atthe hands of the majority and may lose theirattractiveness as that motivating experiencefades in people’s memories. For example, someminority groups have developed distinctivenorms of self-help, endogamy and internalconflict resolution because they have beenexcluded from or discriminated against in theinstitutions of the larger society. Those normsmay lose their rationale as ethnic and racialhierarchies break down and as group membersfeel more comfortable interacting with membersof other groups and participating in stateinstitutions. Far from guaranteeing the protec-tion of the traditional ways of life of either themajority or minorities, multiculturalism posesmultiple challenges to them. Here again, thepost-multiculturalists’ claim about recognisingthe necessity of cultural change simply reassertsa long-standing part of themulticultural agenda.

In short, I believe that the post-multi-culturalist critique is largely off target, primarilybecause it misidentifies the nature and goals ofthe multiculturalism policies and programmesthat have emerged over the past 40 years duringthe rise of multiculturalism.

The retreat frommulticulturalism?

But this then raises a puzzle. If post-multi-culturalist claims about the flaws of multi-culturalism are largely misguided, then whatexplains the fall of multiculturalism? If, as Iclaim, multiculturalism is inspired by humanrights norms and seeks to deepen relations ofdemocratic citizenship, why has there been sucha retreat from it?

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Part of the answer is that reports ofmulticulturalism’s death are very much exagger-ated. Here again, we need to keep in mindthe different forms that multiculturalism takes,only some of which have faced a serious back-lash. For example, there has been no retreatfrom the commitment to new models of multi-cultural citizenship for indigenous peoples.On the contrary, the trend towards enhancedland rights, self-government powers and cus-tomary law for indigenous peoples remains fullyin place across the western democracy and wasrecently reaffirmed by the UN’s General Assem-bly through the adoption of the Declaration ofthe Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.Similarly, there has been no retreat from thecommitment to new models of multiculturalcitizenship for national minorities. On thecontrary, the trend towards enhanced languagerights and regional autonomy for sub-statenational groups remains fully in place in thewestern democracies (although there has been aretreat from attempts to formulate the rights ofnational minorities at the level of internationallaw: see Kymlicka 2007, pp. 173–246). Indeed,these two trends are increasingly firmlyentrenched in law and public opinion, backedby growing evidence that the adoption of multi-cultural reforms for indigenous peoples andnational minorities has in fact contributed tobuilding relations of democratic freedom andequality (I survey the evidence in Kymlicka2007, pp. 135–167). Few people today, forexample, would deny that regional autonomyfor Catalonia has contributed to the democraticconsolidation of Spain or that indigenous rightsare helping to deepen democratic citizenship inLatin America.

So it is only with respect to immigrantgroups that we see any serious retreat. Here,without question, there has been a backlashagainst multiculturalism policies relating topost-war migrants in several western democra-cies. And there is also greater scholarlydispute about the impact of these policies. Forexample, while studies have shown that immi-grant multiculturalism policies in Canada havehad strongly beneficial effects in relation tocitizenisation (Bloemraad 2006), other studiessuggest that immigrant multiculturalism inThe Netherlands has had deleterious effects(Koopmans et al. 2005; Sniderman and

Hagendoorn 2007) (I discuss these Dutch studiesin Kymlicka 2008).

It is an important question why immigrantmulticulturalism in particular has been socontroversial, and I will return to this below.But we can begin by dismissing one popularexplanation. Various commentators have sug-gested that the retreat from immigrant multi-culturalism reflects a return to the traditionalliberal and republican belief that ethnicitybelongs in the private sphere, and that citizen-ship should be unitary and undifferentiated. Onthis view, the retreat from immigrant multi-culturalism reflects a rejection of the whole ideaof multiculturalism as citizenisation (for exam-ple, Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004).

But this cannot be the explanation. Ifwestern democracies were rejecting the very ideaof multicultural citizenship, they would haverejected the claims of sub-state national groupsand indigenous peoples as well as immigrants.After all, the claims of national groups andindigenous peoples typically involve a muchmore dramatic insertion of ethno-cultural diver-sity into the public sphere, and a more dramaticdegree of differentiated citizenship than isdemanded by immigrant groups. Whereasimmigrants typically seek modest variations orexemptions in the operation of mainstreaminstitutions, historically national minoritiesand indigenous peoples typically seek a muchwider level of recognition and accommodation,including such things as land claims, self-government powers, language rights, separateeducational systems and even separate legalsystems. These claims involve a much moreserious challenge to ideas of undifferentiatedcitizenship and the privatisation of ethnicitythan is involved in accommodating immigrantgroups. Yet western democracies have notretreated at all from their commitment toaccommodating these historic minorities.

Most western democracies are, in fact,increasingly comfortable with claims to differ-entiated citizenship and the public recognition ofdifference, when these claims are advanced byhistoric minorities. So it is not the very idea ofmulticultural citizenship per se that has comeunder attack. Commentators who argue thatwestern democracies are rejecting multiculturalcitizenship per se typically simply ignore theobvious counter-examples of national minorities

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and indigenous peoples – see, for exampleJoppke (2004) and Barry (2001). The problem,rather, is specific to immigration. What we needto sort out, therefore, is why multiculturalismhas proved to be so much more controversial inrelation to this particular form of ethno-culturaldiversity.

But even that way of phrasing the questionis too general. The retreat from immigrantmulticulturalism is not universal F it hasaffected some countries more than others. Publicsupport for immigrant multiculturalism inCanada, for example, remains at an all-timehigh. And even in countries that are consideredthe paradigm cases of a retreat from immigrantmulticulturalism, such as The Netherlands orAustralia the story is more complicated. TheDutch military, for example, which in the 1990shad resisted ideas of accommodating diversity,has recently embraced the idea of multicultural-ism, even as other public institutions are nowshying away from it. And in Australia, while theformer conservative federal government backedaway from multiculturalism, the state govern-ments (governed by the Labor party) havemoved in to adopt their own new multicultur-alism policies. What we see, in short, is a lot ofuneven advances and retreats in relation toimmigrant multiculturalism, both within andacross countries.

So the post-multiculturalists’ narrative of aretreat from multiculturalism is overstated andmisdiagnosed. Many new forms of multiculturalcitizenship have taken root and not facedany significant backlash or retreat. This is trueof the main reforms relating to both nationalminorities and indigenous peoples, backedby evidence of their beneficial effects. Evenwith respect to immigrant multiculturalism,claims of policy failure and retreat are over-stated, obscuring a much more variablerecord in terms of policy outcomes and publicsupport.

I now turn to some possible explanationsfor the distinctive fate of immigrant multi-culturalism. But notice that we cannot start toidentify these factors until we set aside the post-multiculturalists’ assumption that what is beingrejected is multiculturalism as such. What ishappening here is not a general or principledrejection of the public recognition of ethno-cultural diversity. On the contrary, many of the

countries that are retreating from immigrantmulticulturalism are actually strengthening theinstitutional recognition of their old minorities.For example, while The Netherlands is retreat-ing from immigrant multiculturalism it isstrengthening the rights of its Frisian minority;while France retreated from its brief flirtationwith immigrant multiculturalism in education(see Bleich 1998), it is strengthening recognitionof its longstanding regional minority languages;while Germany is retreating from immigrantmulticulturalism, it is celebrating the 50th

anniversary of the special status of its historicDanish minority; while Britain is retreating fromimmigrant multiculturalism, it has accorded newself-government powers to its historic nations inScotland and Wales; and so on. None of thismakes any sense if we explain the retreat fromimmigrant multiculturalism as somehow areturn of orthodox liberal or republican ideasof undifferentiated citizenship and the privatisa-tion of ethnicity.

In short, contrary to the post-multicultur-alists’ narrative, the ideal of multiculturalism ascitizenisation is alive and well, and remains asalient option in the toolkit of democracies, inpart because we now have 40 years of experienceto show that it can indeed contribute tocitizenisation. However, particular uses of thisapproach, in relation to particular forms ofdiversity in particular countries, have run intoserious obstacles. Not all attempts to adopt newmodels of multicultural citizenship have takenroot or succeeded in achieving their intendedeffects of promoting citizenisation.

The crucial question, therefore, is whymulticultural citizenship works in some timesand places and not others. This is aimed not onlyat explanations for the variable fate of multi-cultural citizenship in the west but also atexploring its potential role as a model forthinking about diversity in post-colonial andpost-communist societies. Unfortunately, thepost-multiculturalist debate is largely unhelpfulin answering this question. Since post-multi-culturalists ignore the extent to which multi-culturalism ever aspired to citizenisation andalso over-generalise the retreat from multicul-turalism, they do not shed light on the centralquestion of why multicultural citizenisation hasflourished in some times and places and failedelsewhere.

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The preconditions ofmulticultural citizenship

In my view, we do not yet have a systematicaccount of the preconditions for successfulmulticultural citizenship, and so a certain degreeof caution is required when making judgementsand recommendations in this area. However, ifwe explore the varying fate of multiculturalismacross different types of groups and differentcountries we can gain some preliminary indica-tions about the preconditions for a sustainablemodel of democratic multiculturalism.

The theory and practice of multiculturalismsuggests that multiculturalism can contribute tocitizenisation but the historical record suggeststhat certain conditions must be in place for it tohave its intended effects. Multicultural citizen-ship cannot be built (or imposed) out of thin air:certain sources and preconditions must bepresent. In a recent book (Kymlicka 2007, pp.87–134) I discuss a number of these conditions,but let me focus here on two: the desecuritisationof state–minority relations; and the existence ofa human rights consensus.

Desecuritisation. Where states feel insecurein geopolitical terms and fearful of neighbouringenemies they are unlikely to treat their ownminorities fairly. More specifically, states areunlikely to accord powers and resources tominorities that they view as potential collabora-tors with neighbouring enemies.

In the past this has been an issue in the west.For example, prior to the Second World War,Italy, Denmark and Belgium feared that theirGerman-speaking minorities were more loyal toGermany than to their own country and thatthey would support attempts by Germany toinvade and annex areas of ethnic Germanconcentration. These countries were anxiousthat Germany might invade in the name ofliberating their co-ethnic Germans and that theGerman minority would collaborate with suchan invasion.

Today, this is a non-issue throughout theestablished western democracies with respect tohistoric national minorities and indigenouspeoples, although it remains an issue withrespect to certain immigrant groups, particularlyArab andMuslim groups after 9/11. It is difficultto think of a single western democracy where thestate fears that a national minority would

collaborate with a neighbouring enemy andpotential aggressor. This is partly becausewestern states do not have neighbouring enemieswhomight invade them.NATOhas removed thepossibility of a western country invading itsneighbours. As a result, the question of whethernational minorities and indigenous peopleswould be loyal in the event of invasion by aneighbouring state is moot.

Of course, western democracies do havelong-distance potential enemies – such as SovietCommunism in the past, Islamic jihadism todayand perhaps China in some future scenario. Butin relation to these long-distance threats,national minorities and indigenous peoples areon the same side as the state. If Quebec gainsincreased powers or even independence, no onein the rest of Canada worries that Quebec willstart collaborating with Al-Qaeda or China tooverthrow the Canadian state. An autonomousor independent Quebec would be an ally ofCanada, not an enemy.

In most parts of the world, however,minority groups are still seen as fifth columnscollaborating with neighbouring enemies. This isparticularly true where the minority is related toa neighbouring state by ethnicity or religion orwhere a minority is found on both sides of aninternational border, so that the neighbouringstate claims the right to protect ‘‘its’’ minority.Consider the ethnic Serbs in Bosnia, or Kash-miris in India. If we move outside westernEurope, Cyprus and Israel are consolidateddemocracies that still exhibit this dynamic ofviewing their historic Turkish and Arab mino-rities as potential collaborators with externalenemies and, not coincidentally, have beenunable to agree on minority autonomy.

Under these conditions, ethnic relationsbecome securitised. Relations between statesand minorities are seen, not as a matter ofnormal democratic debate and negotiation, butas a matter of state security, in which the statehas to limit the democratic process to protectitself. Under conditions of securitisation, min-ority political mobilisation may be banned andeven if minority demands can be voiced, they willbe rejected by the larger society and the state.After all, how can groups that are disloyal havelegitimate claims against the state? So thesecuritisation of ethnic relations erodes boththe democratic space to voice minority demands

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and the likelihood that those demands will beaccepted.

In most western countries, however, ethnicpolitics have been de-securitised. Ethnic politicsis just that – normal, day-to-day politics.Relations between the state and minority groupshave been taken out of the security box, and putin the democratic politics box. This is oneessential precondition for multicultural citizen-ship to emerge and take root.

Human rights protection. A second precon-dition concerns the security, not of the state, butof individuals who would be subject to self-governing minority institutions. States are unli-kely to accept minority self-government if theyfear it will lead to islands of local tyranny in abroader democratic state.

This, too, has been a worry in the past in thewest, where some long-standing minorities wereseen as carriers of illiberal political cultures. Andthis fear persists in relation to some recentimmigrant groups. But at least in relation tonational minorities, it is now widely assumedthat there is a deep consensus across ethnic lineson basic values of liberal democracy and humanrights. As a result, it is assumed that any self-government powers granted to national mino-rities will be exercised in accordance with theshared standards of democracy and humanrights. Everyone accepts that minority self-government will operate within the constraintsof liberal-democratic constitutionalism, whichfirmly upholds individual rights. Where mino-rities have gained autonomy in the west, theirself-governing institutions are subject to thesame constitutional constraints as the centralgovernment, and so have no legal capacity torestrict individual freedoms in the name ofcultural authenticity, religious orthodoxy orracial purity. Not only is it legally impossiblefor national minorities in the west to establishilliberal regimes but they have no wish to do so.On the contrary, all of the evidence suggests thatmembers of national minorities are at least asstrongly committed to liberal-democratic valuesas members of dominant groups, if not more so.(For discussions of how self-government fornational minorities in the west fits withinbroader liberal-democratic constitutional normsand constraints, see Keating 2001).

The situation with respect to some indigen-ous groups is more complicated, since they are

sometimes perceived as falling outside theliberal-democratic consensus. But since indigen-ous self-government rarely involves the exerciseof power over non-members, unlike the regionalautonomy accorded to national minorities, thereis less concern that indigenous self-governmentmay harm the rights of non-members. More-over, the evidence suggests that indigenouspeoples are increasingly accepting broaderliberal-democratic principles (Schouls 2003).

This removes one of the central fears thatdominant groups have about minority autono-my. In many parts of the world there is the fearthat once national minorities or indigenouspeoples acquire self-governing power they willuse it to persecute, dispossess, expel or killanyone who does not belong to the minoritygroup. In western democracies this is a non-issue. Where there is a strong consensus onliberal-democratic values, people feel confidentthat however issues of multiculturalism aresettled, their own civil and political rights willbe respected. No matter how the claims ofethno-national and indigenous groups areresolved – no matter what language rights, self-government rights, land rights or multicultural-ism policies are adopted – people can restassured that they will not be stripped of theircitizenship, fired from their jobs, subjected toethnic cleansing, jailed without a fair trial ordenied their rights to free speech, associationand worship. Put simply, the consensus onliberal-democratic values ensures that debatesover accommodating diversity are not a matterof life and death. As a result, dominant groupswill not fight to the death to resist minorityclaims. This, too, is a precondition for thesuccessful adoption of multicultural citizenship.

There are other factors that underpin therise of multiculturalism in the west, includingdemographic changes, but desecuritisation andhuman rights are pivotal.

Where these two conditions are absent,multiculturalism is unlikely to emerge, exceptperhaps as the outcome of violent struggle orexternal imposition. This raises the paradox thatif these preconditions are in place, then the mostserious problems of potential violence andconflict are in a sense already solved, andwe do not need multiculturalism to solve them.Jan Nederveen Pieterse suggests as muchwhen he says, ‘‘The core problem of liberal

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multiculturalism is that it provides a solution forwhich there is no problem and a remedy forwhich there is no ailment’’ (Pieterse 2005,p.1271). In his view, multiculturalism cannotwork if the harsh circumstances preclude peoplefrom viewing their identities as multiple andcomplementary and, if those circumstanceschange sufficiently to allow for multiple andcomplementary identities, then violence andinstability are highly unlikely whether or notwe adopt multiculturalism. I think Pieterse isright that multiculturalism is not an effectivemeans for ending violence since it is eitherunworkable (in difficult circumstances) or unne-cessary in preventing violence (in fortunatecircumstances). What he ignores, however, isthat multiculturalismmay be necessary for otherpurposes – in particular, for democratic citize-nisation. For that goal, I believe that multi-culturalism is often necessary.

These two factors not only help explain therise of multiculturalism, but also help explain thepartial retreat from multiculturalism in somecountries in relation to recent Muslim immi-grants, who are often seen as both disloyal andilliberal. There are other factors at play as well inthe backlash against immigrant multicultural-ism, including concerns about illegal immigra-tion and about the economic burden ofsupporting unemployed immigrants, as well asold-fashioned racial prejudice. (For a more de-tailed discussion of these factors, see Kymlicka2004). For many people prejudice is the keyfactor. But prejudice is found in all countries –indeed, its existence is part of the justification foradopting multiculturalism – and so cannotexplain the variation across countries (or overtime) in support for multiculturalism. And if wetry to understand why this latent prejudice andxenophobia sometimes coalesces into powerfulpolitical movements against multiculturalismthe answer, I believe, lies in perceptions ofthreats to geopolitical security, human rightsand economic security. Where such perceptionsare lacking, as they are in relation to mostimmigrant groups in North America, thensupport for multiculturalism can remain quitestrong.

If this analysis is correct, it has importantimplications for the future of multiculturalism inthe west. On the one hand, despite all the talkabout the retreat from multiculturalism, it

suggests that multiculturalism in general has abright future. There are powerful forces at workin modern western societies pushing in thedirection of the public recognition and accom-modation of ethno-cultural diversity. Publicvalues and constitutional norms of tolerance,equality and individual freedom, underpinnedby the human rights revolution, all push in thedirection of multiculturalism, particularly whenviewed against the backdrop of a history ofethnic and racial hierarchies.

These factors explain the ongoing trendtowards the recognition of the rights of sub-statenational groups and indigenous peoples. Olderideas of undifferentiated citizenship and neutralpublic spheres have collapsed in the faceof these trends, and no one today seriouslyproposes that these forms of minority rights anddifferentiated citizenship for historic minoritiescould be abandoned or reversed. Even such afierce critic of multiculturalism as Brian Barry(2001) makes no attempt to apply his ideas tothe case of sub-state national groups andindigenous peoples. That minority rights, liberaldemocracy and human rights can comfortablyco-exist is now a fixed point in both domesticconstitutions and international law. There is nocredible alternative to multiculturalism in thesecontexts.

The situation with respect to immigrantgroups is more complex. The same factors thatpush for multiculturalism in relation to historicminorities have also generated a willingness tocontemplate multiculturalism for immigrantgroups and, indeed, such policies seem to haveworked well under low-risk conditions. How-ever, immigrant multiculturalism has run intodifficulties where it is perceived as carryingparticularly high risks. Where immigrant groupsare seen as predominantly illegal, as potentialcarriers of illiberal practices or movements or asnet burdens on the welfare state, then multi-culturalism poses perceived risks to both pru-dential self-interest andmoral principles and thisperception can override the forces that supportmulticulturalism.

On the other hand, one could also arguethat these very same factors also make therejection of immigrant multiculturalism a high-risk move. It is precisely when immigrants areperceived as illegitimate, illiberal and burden-some that multiculturalismmay be most needed.

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Without some proactive policies to promotemutual understanding and respect and to makeimmigrants feel comfortable in mainstreaminstitutions, these factors could quickly lead toa situation of a racialised underclass, standing inpermanent opposition to the larger society.Indeed, I would argue that, in the long-term,the only viable response to the presence of largenumbers of immigrants is some form of liberalmulticulturalism, regardless of how these immi-grants arrived or from where.

But we need to accept that the path toimmigrant multiculturalism in many countrieswill not be smooth or linear. Moreover, we needto focus more on how to manage the risksinvolved. In the past, defenders of immigrantmulticulturalism have typically focused on theperceived benefits of cultural diversity and inter-cultural understanding and on condemningracism and xenophobia. Those arguments aresound, I believe, but they need to be supple-mented with a fuller acknowledgement of theprudential and moral risks involved and withsome account of how those risks will bemanaged.

The implications forinternational organisations(IOs)

If this analysis is correct, it has a number ofimplications for how IOs like UNESCOapproach the issue of multiculturalism. On theone hand, the fact that multiculturalism isrooted in the broader human rights revolutionprovides a clear justification for IOs to promoteideas of multiculturalism. Indeed, given theirmandate, one could say that IOs have aresponsibility to do so.

Yet the analysis also suggests obviousdifficulties in diffusing multicultural citizenship,since the two factors of regional security andhuman rights protections are absent in much ofthe world. Indeed, it suggests that internationalefforts to promotemulticulturalism will not onlybe difficult but perhaps even counter-produc-tive. Where minorities are potential pawns inunstable regional geopolitics or where humanrights guarantees are weak or absent, attemptsto transplant western models of multicultural-

ism may exacerbate pre-existing relations ofenmity and exclusion rather than contribute tocitizenisation. Multiculturalism might givegreater power and resources to domestic orexternal political actors who are committed toundermining relations of democratic citizenship.

So caution is called for in this area. If we stillhave only a sketchy understanding of thepreconditions of multicultural citizenship in thewest, making generalisations difficult, then this iseven truer in relation to the post-communist orpost-colonial world. Given the lack of reliableevidence in the area, any provisions and recom-mendations should be cautious and provisional.

This does not mean that IOs shouldabandon the promotion of multiculturalism ordefer it to some utopian future where all theworld’s countries have become consolidatedliberal democracies united in common geopoli-tical security arrangements. On the contrary, it isprecisely in conditions of regional insecurity andpolitical tyranny that minorities are mostvulnerable and most in need of internationalprotection.

It does suggest, however, two importantchanges in how IOs approach the issue ofmulticulturalism. Firstly, it suggests the limitsof the best practices strategy for promotingmulticulturalism. Too often, the main way inwhich IOs promote multiculturalism is tocompile lists of best practices, identifying caseswhere multiculturalist policies have worked wellto promote peace, improve educational oreconomic outcomes for minorities or enhancepolitical participation. Such lists can help tocounter criticism that multiculturalism inher-ently or inevitably has pernicious effects and canhelp inspire actors and policy-makers to thinkmore creatively and innovatively. However,such lists typically ignore the crucial questionof preconditions.

For example, many IOs approvingly citeItaly’s policy towards South Tyrol, with itspackage of territorial autonomy and languagerights for the German-speaking minority, as abest practice for the accommodation of sub-statenational groups. And indeed it has been ademonstrable success. But they rarely discussthe preconditions that made this possible. Theagreement to establish autonomy in South Tyrolonly became possible under the larger rubric ofthe EU and NATO, which desecuritised the

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issue. As long as Austria was seen by Italy as aneighbouring enemy and the German minority inSouth Tyrol was seen as a potential collaboratorwith it, Italy refused to consider autonomy. Butonce Austria became a geopolitical ally under theEU and NATO, the German minority’s linguisticand ethnic ties to Austria became non-threateningand, indeed, a potential benefit in an increasinglyintegrated Europe, and there is now a democraticconsensus in favour of autonomy.

This is a success story, but it is misleading tosay that it is a model for how other states, inrougher neighbourhoods of the world, shoulddeal with their national minorities. For all weknow, perhaps Italy was right to refuse to adoptautonomy for South Tyrol before Austria hadbecome an ally in larger regional securityarrangements. We do not know whether adopt-ing autonomy for South Tyrol at a time whenItaly and Austria were still potential enemieswould have contributed to citizenisation. Toinvoke the South Tyrol example as the basis fordefending autonomy for ethnic Serbs in Croatia,therefore, as the European Commission did inthe early 1990s, is at best premature.

Similarly, several IOs have approvinglycited Canada’s multiculturalism policy as a bestpractice for integrating immigrants. And indeedthe evidence is overwhelming that the policy hashad beneficial effects and has wide publicsupport (Adams 2007). But they rarely discussthe unique set of circumstances that allowedCanada to adopt this policy. The reality is thatCanada simply does not face many of thechallenges confronting other immigrant coun-tries. Because of its geographical location thereis virtually no illegal immigration and hence nofear of losing control over the border. Because ofits points system for selecting immigrants,immigrants to Canada tend to be more educatedand skilled than immigrants to other countriesand so are not perceived as an economic burden.And because of its historic French–Englishdivide, immigrants to Canada are often seen ashelping to unify the country and, indeed, aremore committed to maintaining the countryintact than the fractious historical foundingnations (that is, the Aboriginals, British andFrench). For example, had immigrants notvoted overwhelmingly against secession in the1995 Quebec referendum, the secessionistswould have won.

This is truly an exceptional set of circum-stances that is not found in any other immigrantcountry. (For a more detailed discussion of theuniquely propitious circumstances of Canadianmulticulturalism and why we should be cautiousabout viewing it as a model for others, seeKymlicka 2004). And so, while Canada’s multi-culturalism policy has indeed been a success, itwould be misleading to say that it provides amodel for how to deal with the challenges facingmany other countries where immigration is oftenillegal or at any rate unselected and is composedmainly of low-skilled immigrants who are thendisproportionately unemployed and on welfare.We simply do not know whether the Canadianmodel works in these very different circum-stances.

So the first implication for IOs is that weneed to move beyond lists of best practices tolook more carefully at the preconditions thatenabled these practices to be successful. If wedo this we are likely to discover that thesepreconditions are not present in many countries,including the countries in which we are mostconcerned to promote multiculturalism. Multi-cultural citizenisation is often most neededprecisely in those countries where the precondi-tions are most absent.

And this in turn raises a second implicationfor IOs – namely, the need to distinguishbetween what is feasible in the short term fromwhat is desirable in the long term. At presentmany IOs waver between a naive idealism and aharsh pragmatism. They sometimes naivelypromote western models of multiculturalismwithout attending to the underlying precondi-tions, and sometimes abandon minorities totheir fate on the grounds that multiculturalismis too risky under the difficult circumstancesof many non-western states (I trace this waver-ing, particularly in relation to the claims ofnational minorities in post-communist Europe,in Kymlicka 2007, pp. 173–246).

If the international promotion of multi-culturalism is to be effective we need to rethinkhow different forms of multiculturalism fit intolarger sequences of political reform. We need todistinguish the minimal standards that canreasonably be expected of all countries, evenunder difficult circumstances, from the higherstandards appropriate to countries in propitiouscircumstances. In this respect, we might draw

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upon ideas of progressive implementation devel-oped in the broader human rights field. It iswidely recognised that some of the social rightslisted in the International Covenant on Eco-nomic, Social and Cultural Rights cannotimmediately be implemented by some of thepoorer countries (for example, access to freepost-secondary education). So it is common todistinguish between those social rights thatshould be immediately and universally appliedand those that we seek to achieve over time asthe facilitating conditions are put in place. Weneed a comparable theory of the progressiveimplementation of multiculturalism, with differ-ent minority rights kicking in as the underlyingconditions are established.

IOs have sometimes acknowledged the needfor such an account, but issues of sequencingremain poorly understood at the internationallevel. Without a plausible account of conditionsand sequencing, international efforts at diffusingmulticulturalism are doomed to futility.

The task for IOs like UNESCO, therefore,is not only to identify attractive models or bestpractices of multiculturalism but also to identifythe conditions under which those models areviable and to see what can be done to put thoseconditions in place. Unfortunately, much ofwhat is currently being done by internationalorganisations in this field, whether in relation to

diffusing models of multiculturalism or codify-ing international standards of minority rights,neglects this issue.

Nor is it easy to remedy this problem, sinceit requires drawing upon and integrating a rangeof expertise that is rarely available in individualIOs. It requires linking debates over culturalrights to debates about geopolitical security,debates about economic development anddebates over democratisation, all of which aretypically handled by different IOs. It is not evenclear which IOs have the resources (or themandate) to engage in the sorts of complexinvestigations needed to build a systematictheory of the conditions and sequencing ofmulticulturalism.

The key point, however, is that while earlierefforts at promoting multiculturalism were oftennaive, the problem is not solved by shifting tonew models of post-multiculturalism. As we’veseen, the post-multiculturalist critique is largelyoff target. The problem is not with the modelsand best practices of multicultural citizenship,of which there are indeed many successfulexamples, but with the lack of attention tothe conditions that enable those models to besuccessfully implemented – a lack that is foundas much in the new work on post-multi-culturalism as in the original work on multi-culturalism.

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