kymlicka - the ethics of inarticulacy

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The Ethics of InarticulacyWill Kymlicka

a

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Published online: 29 Aug 2008.

To cite this article: Will Kymlicka (1991) The Ethics of Inarticulacy, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 34:2,155-182, DOI: 10.1080/00201749108602250

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Inquiry,

34, 155-82

Symposium: Charles Taylor 's Sources

of the Self

The Ethics

of

Inarticulacy

Will Kymlicka

Royal Commission on New Reproductive T echnologies, Ottawa

In his impressive and wide-ranging new book, Sources of t he Self Charles Taylor

argues that modern moral philosophy, at least within the Anglo-American tradition, .

offers

a

'cramped' view

of

morality. Taylor attributes this problem

to

three

distinctive features

of

contemporary moral theory

- its

commitment

to

procedural

rather than substantive rationality, its preference for basic reasons rather than

qualitative distinctions, and its belief in the priority of the right over the good.

According to Taylor, the result of these features is that contemporary moral

theories cannot explain

the

nature

of a

worthwhile life,

or the

grounds

for

moral

respect. Indeed, they render these questions unintelligible. I argue that Taylor has

misunderstood the basic structure of most modern moral theory, which seeks to

relocate, rather than suppress, these important questions. In particular, he fails to

note the difference between gen eral and specific concep tions of the good, between

procedures

for

assessing

the

good

and

specific outcomes

of

that procedure,

and

between society's enforcement

of

morality

and an

individual's voluntary co mpliance

with morality. Each of these distinctions plays an important role in contemporary

moral theory. Once they are made explicit, it is clear that many contemporary

theorists operate with a more sophisticated account of moral sources than Taylor

attributes to them.

It

is

impossible

not to be

impressed

by the

breadth

and

wisdom

of

Charles

Taylor's

Sources of the

Self. His account of the mod ern identity will be of

interest to people in many different fields of study. My

field

s contemporary

Anglo-American m oral philosophy, and Taylor has some trenchant things

to say about the state of this school of thought. In particular, he claims

that it has a 'cramped' view of the nature and sources of moral value. The

problem, he is quick to admit, is not that this school trivializes the import-

ance

of

morality.

On the

contrary, Taylor complains that

it

uncritically

gives morality transcendence over all other human values and concerns,

expecting people to forgo their perso nal goals and relationships whenever

they conflict with the demands of impartial m orality (pp. 63, 87-88). The

problem, rather,

is

that

it has

lost sight

of the

'sources' which underlie

these moral demands, and which could empower people to live by them.

Certain basic questions about the hum an good have become unintelligible,

Charles Taylor,

Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.

Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, xii + 601 pp.,

37.50, £30.00. Unprefixed page references are to this work.


3/29

156 Will Kymlicka

and as a result we have become inarticulate about the goods of a moral

life, ..

I. Classical Versus Modern Moral Theory

I want to explore this claim in some depth. Taylor defends it by drawing

three contrasts between modern and earlier moral theories.

(1) According to Taylor, where earlier moral theorists worked with a

'substantive' conception of ethics, modern theorists work with a

'procedural' conception. He explains that these terms can be

applied

to

forms

of

ethical theory

by

derivation from their

use to

describe

con-

ceptions

of

reason.

I

call

a

notion

of

reason substantive where

we

judge

the

rationality

of

agents

or

their thoughts

and

feelings

in

substantive term s. This means

that the criterion for rationality is that one get it right. . . .By contrast, a procedural

notion of reason breaks this connection. The rationality of an agent or his thought

is judged

by how he

thinks,

not in the

first instance

by

whether

the

outcome

is

substantively correct. Good thinking

is

defined procedurally.

(pp.

85-86)

(2) Secon dly, where as earlier theorists based their mora l theories

on a

series

of

'quali tat ive dist inctions' , modern theorists reduce morali ty

to a

l imited set of 'basic reasons' . Taylor explains that in the case of basic

r easons , we

give

a

reason

for a

certain mo ral principle

or

injunction when

we

show th at

the act

enjoined

has

some crucial property which confers this force

on it. I

say:

'you

ought

to do A', and when you ask why, I add: 'because A = B', where 'B' allegedly offers

a description of an act-form which we're morally committed to. So typical fillings

for 'B' would be: 'obeying the law', or 'conducing to the greatest happiness of the

greatest number', or 'saving your integrity'. We say that B gives a reason because

we hold that the act picked out by the A-description is only enjoined because it

also bears the B-description. (p. 76)

According to Taylor, uti l i tar ianism and Kantianism organize everything

around one basic reason - i.e. the principle of uti l ity-maximization, or the

categorical imperative (p . 76). Ea rlier theorists, how ever, viewed morali ty

in terms

of

quali tat ive dist inctions,

and

art iculating th em

is not offering a basic reason. It is one thing to say that I ought to refrain from

manipulating your emotions or threatening you, because that is what respecting

your rights as a human being requires. It is quite another to set out just what makes

human beings worthy

of

commanding

our

respect,

and to

describe

the

higher m ode

of life

and

feeling which

is

involved

in

recognizing this .

(p. 77)

Qualitative dist inctions offer reasons, then, in the sense tha t 'ar t iculating

them is art iculating what u nderlies our ethical choices, leanings , intuit ions.

. . . It is to art iculate the moral point of our act ions ' (p. 77).


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The Ethics of Inarticulacy 157

(3) Thirdly, whereas earlier theorists were concerned to describe 'the

contours of a good life', modern theorists give priority to the right over the

good. That is to say, according to Taylor, modern theorists give rightful

obligations primacy over the pursuit of the good, both in the sense that

they take precedence, should the two conflict, and in the sense that they

are derived without appeal to any determinate theory of the good. For

example, Rawls tries to derive principles of justice based solely on a 'thin

theory of the good' which appeals only to 'weakly valued goods' - i.e.

instrumental, not intrinsic, goods (p. 89). Earlier theorists, however,

believed that we must start by 'spelling out a very thick theory of the

good' (p. 89). Whereas modern theorists give priority to the right over the

good, earlier theorists believe that

the reverse is the case, that in a sense, the good is always primary to the right. Not

in that

it

offers

a

more basic reason

in the

sense

of our

earlier discussion,

but in

that the good is what, in its articulatio n, gives the point of the rules which define

the right, (p. 89)

Accord ing

to

Taylo r , these three features

are

found

in

almost

all con-

temporary Anglo-American moral philosophy.

He

focuses particularly

on

utilitarian and Kantian moral theory , which he sees (rightly I th ink) as the

predominant contenders within the Anglo-A merican school. Both have a

procedural conception of reason, both are based on a single basic reason,

and both define morality in te rms of rightful obligations, rather than, and

pr io r to, the quest for higher goods. As a result, Taylo r claims, both offer

a cramped view

of

m orali ty .

A

utilitarian

or

Kantian theory

doesn't have much place

for

qualitative distinctions.

It is in the

business

of

offering

what

I

called above basic reasons.

Our

qualitative distinctions

are

useless

for

this; they give us reasons in a quite different sense. Articulating them would be

indispensable

if our aim

were

to get

clearer

on the

contours

of the

good life,

but

that

is not a

task which this theory recognizes

as

relevant.

All we

need

are

action-

descriptions, plus a criterion for picking out the obligatory ones. (pp. 79-80)

Not only

do

contemporary theoris ts

not

appeal

to

qualitative distinctions

in explaining the po in t of their rules, they in fact den y that th ese distinctions

a re coheren t :

Bu t it is not just that the distinctions are of no use for the particular goals tha t this

moral theory sets itself. There is a tendency among philosophers of this cast of

thought

to

deny them

any

relevance altogeth er,

or

even

in

some cases

to

deny them

intellectual coheren ce, or reality, to reduce them to the status of projections . . .

(p . 80)

A n d

so,

Taylor concludes, m odern moral philosophy cramps

our

under -

s tanding of the good :

Much contemporary moral philosophy, particularly but not only in the English-

speaking w orld, has given such a narrow focus to morality that some of the crucial


5/29

158 WillKymlicka

connections I want to draw here are incomprehensible in its terms. This moral

philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather than on what it is

good to be , on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good

life; and it has no conceptual place left for a notion of the good as the object of

our love or allegiance or, a s Iris Mu rdoch portrayed it in her wo rk, as the privileged

focus of attention or will. This philosophy has accredited a cramped and truncated

view of m orality in a narrow sens e, as well as of the whole range of issues involved

in the attempt to live the best possible life, and this not only among professional

philosophers, but with a wider public, (p. 3)

The re is clearly some truth in Taylor's description of contemporary moral

theory. It is certainly true that most modern moral philosophers are more

concerned with finding a procedure or formula for identifying obligatory'

acts than with describing the contours of the good life. For example, few

mode rn moral theo rists feel it is their task to assess the relative merits of

a life of contemplation versus a life of action, or a life of religion versus a

life of

unbelief,

debates which classical moral philosophers addressed at

length.

It is also true th at some contem porary theorists defend their inattention

to questions of th e good by denying that the re is such a thing as 'the go od'

to discuss. Taylor cites John M ackie's 'erro r theory ' of value judgments as

an example, according to which our judgments of good and bad, or right

and w rong, are simply projections of our subjective preferences, lacking any

objective basis (p . 6). Taylor provides some telling, if familiar, objections to

Mac kie's subjectivism. H e argues that in deciding whether there are objec-

tive value s, the best 'm easure of reality' we have is whether the assumption

of objectivity allows us to 'understand and make sense of the actions and

feelings of ourselves and oth ers' (p . 57). And on that criterion, it is clear

that the subjectivist model 'is false to the most salient features of our moral

phenomenology' (p. 74). According to Taylor, each of us recognizes, in

our everyday deliberations, that there are discriminations of 'better or

worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires,

inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer

standards by which they can be judged' (p. 4). We think that there are

genuinely higher, or more admirable, ways of living, which we aspire to

lead, as against the 'lower life of sloth, irrationality, slavery, or alienation'

which we hope to avoid, even though we are not always sure which ways

of life are worthy of our allegiance, and which are not (p. 23). Taylor

claims that the assumption that there is a distinction, independent of the

will, between the worthwhile and the trivial is central to our notion of

agency (p. 27). Without this assumption, we could not explain the way

people deliberate about, and sometimes anguish over, their most basic

decisions in life. Indee d, '[t]he condition of th ere being such a thing as an

identity crisis is precisely that our identities define the space of qualitative

distinctions within which we live and choose' (p . 30).


6/29


I accept T aylor's ce ntral argum ents against M ackie's subjectivism. Simi-

lar anti-subjectivist argu men ts about o ur aspiration to lead genuinely valu-

able lives can be found in Rawls, Dworkin, Nozick, Raz, and m any others.

1

However, subjectivists are not Taylor's main target. After all, Taylor is

concerned to describe 'the modern identity', and subjectivism of this sort

is not a distinctively mod ern ph enom enon . Fo r as long as moral philosophy

has existed, there have been sceptics about the objectivity of our value

judgments. Moreover, as Taylor recognizes, many modern moral philo-

sophers reject Mackie's claim. Most philosophers in the Anglo-American

school want to retain a notion of right and wrong which is binding on all

agents, whatever their subjective preferences or beliefs. Taylor's main

focus,

therefore, is not the age-old heresy of subjectivism, but the three

distinctively mo dern ideas I listed above: procedural rationality, the appeal

to basic reasons, and the priority of the right over the good. According to

Taylor, the se three features have made almost all mo dern m oral philosophy

inarticulate about the good. Taylor mentions Rawls and Habermas as

people who fall into this trap. E ven though they wish to retain some notion

of moral objectivity, Taylor claims that they are precluded by these three

features from saying anything coherent about what those values are, or

how they could have some claim on our allegiance.

II. An Alternative Interpretation of Modern Moral Theory

I think that Taylor has misunderstood the nature of, and motivation for,

the modern preoccupation with principles of right conduct. Part of my

difficulty with Taylor's argument is that his terminology is so idiosyncratic.

He says that utilitarians and Kantians are concerned with 'basic reasons'

rather than 'qualitative distinctions', and 'procedural rationality' rather

than 'substantive rationality'. These are not the terms that the theorists

themselves use, and I sometimes find it difficult to understand how these

terms relate to the mo re familiar terms used by the philosophers Taylor is

ostensibly discussing.

Before returning to Taylor's three contrasts, therefore, let me offer a

different interpretation of contemporary utilitarian and Kantian moral

theory. Both theories work from a basic moral commitment to the idea of

impartiality. Both theories accept tha t, from the mo ral point of view, each

person is equally worthy of moral consideration, each person is an end in

herself, whose interests must be given equal co nsideration. To act mo rally,

therefo re, is to act in a way that is impartially justifiable, in a way that each

person can accept as showing them equal concern and respect. As Taylor

shows, this has deep roots in our culture, both secular and religious (we

are all Go d's ch ildren). It is manifested in the everyday view that the basic


7/29

160 Will Kym licka

test of a m oral action is the 'Golden Ru le' - i.e. an action is morally justified

only if you could still endorse it after putting yourself in the other person's

shoes. This idea of putting yourself in other people's shoes is invoked, in

various forms, by almost every major mode rn moral theorist, utilitarian or

Kantian, from Mill's invoking of the Golden Rule, to Rawls's original

position, Hare's impartial sympathizer, and Scanlon's 'contractualism'.

2

An y theory that accepts this basic principle of impartiality must answer

two questions: what are people's interests, and what does it mean to show

equal concern for those interests? The differences between modern moral

theories can be traced, by and large, to different answers to these two

questions. For example, what divides Bentham from John Stuart Mill is

their answer to the first question. Bentham was a hedonist who believed

that p eople 's good lies in the maximization of their pleasure . For M ill, on

the other hand, people's well-being resides in the expression of their

uniqu enes s, or in the development of their most essential capacities, rather

than in the maximization of pleasure . Howe ver, both agreed on the second

question - that is, both agreed that the best account of equal concern for

people's interests (however these interests are defined) requires that we

act so as to satisfy as many interests as possible, even if this requires

sacrificing some people for the greater benefit of others. It is this shared

answer to the second question which forms the essential continuity of

utilitarian though t, from Bentham through M ill and Sidgwick to Ha re and

Griffin, despite their different answers to the first question. (Of course,

there are m inor variations in this shared answer to the second question -

some apply the test of utility-maximization to acts, some to rules, some

apply it directly, some indirectly.)

Like the utilitarians, Kantians disagree on how best to characterize

people's interests. Some give priority to people's interest in autonomy,

others accord different levels of 'urgency' to different sorts of choices.

However, they share a similar view about the second question - namely,

they agree that the best account of impartial concern for people's interests

(however these interests are defined) will set some limits on the extent to

which one person's interests can be endlessly sacrificed for the benefit of

others. It is this shared concern for the inviolability of certain basic human

rights which defines the essential continuity of contemporary Kantian

thoug ht, despite their different answers to the first question. Ag ain, ther e

are variations on this shared answer to the second question. Some K antians

are committed to a principle of equal rights and resources, others to

maximizing the well-being of the worst off; some use contrac tarian decision-

procedures in order to make impartial decisions, others don't.

This thumbnail sketch is, of course, full of lacunae that would have to

be filled in orde r to describe any particular theory. H owever, I hope the

basic outline will strike a familiar chord in most readers. It gives a fair


8/29


indication, I think, of what most people see when they look at modern

moral theories - a general principle of moral impartiality, an account of

our interests, and a procedure or formula for assigning weight to those

interests in an impartial way in particular moral contexts.

A large proportion of contemporary moral philosophy has been con-

cerned with refining one or other of these theories. Utilitarians have been

fighting internecine wars abou t how to characterize people's interests - e.g.

whether we should define people's interests in terms of an 'objective list'

of good s, or in terms of 'informed preferences' (and what if anything is the

difference between these two views), how do we evaluate preferences ab out

the future or past, how do we deal with the revisability or adaptability of

preferences, etc.? They have also been fighting internal battles over how

to apply the rule of utility-maximization - e.g. to acts or rules, directly

or indirectly.

3

Kantians are undergoing similar debates about how to

characterize people's interests (e.g. how we should understand the sig-

nificance of choice, or how we assess the urgency of different interests),

and about how to model the idea of impartial concern (e.g. veils of

ignorance

o.

impartial sympathizers

v.

social contracting).

4

III.

Finding Room for the Good

If this is a fair characterization of modern moral philosophy, I don't

und erstand how it can be said to have 'no conceptual place left for a notion

of the good as the object of our love or allegiance' (p. 3). Some of it, to

be sure, employs unsatisfactory accounts of the good - e.g. Bentham's

hedonism. But nothing in the structure of utilitarian or Kantian moral

theory precludes a richer theory of the good, and of course almost every

single utilitarian and Kantian since Bentham has rejected his hedonism.

The basic commitment of utilitarians and Kantians to showing impartial

concern for the interests of each mem ber of society allows for, and indeed

invites, debates about how we should characterize people's interests. And

even a cursory glance at the history of contemporary moral theories would

reveal that these debates have taken place, and that a wide range of

different theories of the good have been advanced. Most major utilitarian

moral theo rists for the last 150 years - from J . S. Mill and G . E . M oore to

Parfit and Griffin - have left 'conceptual room' for the idea that there are

goods independent of the will.

It is true, as I noted above, that few theorists have actually tried to list

the substantive goods which define a valuable life. There are a variety of

reasons for this. One reason, emphasized by Mill, is that the list will be

different for different peo ple. W hile there is a right and wrong answer for

each pers on, it is not th e same answer for each person, and little, then , can


9/29

162 Will Kym licka

be said at a general level. But another important reason is that even the

most informed and insightful person may come to doubt the correctness of

their earlier judgments about the good, in the light of new information,

opportunities, or experiences. Hence the freedom to re-evaluate our

notions of the good is critically important. Precisely because these judg-

ments concern distinctions that are independent of the will, no judgment

of the will is beyond question.

Given these difficulties, the strategy adopted by most modern moral

theorists is not to come up with lists of substantive goods, but rather to

think about what we might call 'discovery procedures' - i.e. about what

sorts of social conditions are best suited to enabling individuals to make

these judgments on an on-going basis. And this requires abstracting a bit

from particular ends, and thinking at a more general level about what is

involved in adopting and pursuing an informed conception of the good.

This,

of course, is what Rawls aims to do with his much-maligned 'thin

theory of the go od'. A ccording to Raw ls, whatever the differences between

peop le's ways of life, 'the re is something like pursuing a co nception of the

good life that all people, even those with the most diverse commitments,

can be said to be engaged i n . . . although people do not share one another's

ideals,

they can a t least abstract from their experience a sense of

wha t it is

like to be com mitted to an ideal of the good life

1

.* O n th e basis of this more

general conceptualization of what is involved in evaluating and pursuing a

conception of the go od, Rawls develops a theory ab out the rights, resources,

and social conditions which will enable individuals to make informed

choices on an on-going b asis, and which will enable worthwhile ways of life

to be sustained. Although Rawls himself does not try to make judgments

regarding the relative worth of particular ways of life, he leaves conceptual

room for these qualitative distinctions about the good by describing the

conditions under w hich these judgments can be made in a free and informed

manner.

6

Given this characterization of mode rn moral the ories, it should be clear

that Taylor's three contrasts between classical and modern moral theories

are either false or misleading. Consider the contrast between procedural

and substantive conceptions of

ethics.

It is true that Kantians and utilitarians

invoke various procedures to ascertain the right action. But this does not

compete with, or preclude, the idea that there are substantively correct

ends which define a valuable or worthwhile life. In order to apply a

procedural test of impartiality, we must have an account of people's

interests. And, as noted above, while some theorists accept a hedonistic

theory of the good, others use an 'informed preferences' theory of the

good, or a n 'objective list' theory of the good. Both of these are com patible

with the view that a good life requires a substantively correct perception

of qualitative distinctions. For those who do accept this view, it will be


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The Ethics of lnarticulacy

163

important that the p rocedure, in deciding upon the requirements of impar-

tial concern, operate with some account of the conditions under which

individuals can best identify and pursue those substantively correct ends.

And, indeed, this is just what Rawls does. His belief that people can

rationally evaluate and revise their ends affects how he describes the

motivations of the parties in his original position.

7

Nothing in the idea of

a proc edural modelling of impartiality precludes the idea of substantively

correct ends.

Taylor may be misled by the fact that some moral philosophers don't

define 'rationality' in terms of the correct apprehension of qualitative

distinctions, but rathe r define it in terms of (say) adjusting m eans to ends.

But that is often just a matter of terminology. It doesn't mean that these

philosophers do n't think the re is such a thing as qualitative distinctions, or

that correctly perceiving them is not a virtue . They would just employ other

terms to describe that virtue - e.g. sensitivity, or maturity, or wisdom,

or insight. It is true that on the definition of rationality used by some

contemporary moral theorists, a person who is 'rational' may not be very

insightful, and so may be leading a trivial life. But that just shows that

rationality (so defined) is not the only value, and few of these theorists say

it is. Th e failure to include the co rrect perception of qualitative distinctions

within the definition of 'rationality' would only be a problem if these

theorists said that rationality was the only criterion we should use to

evaluate ways of life, and they don't say this.

IV. Basic Reasons and Qualitative Distinctions

Consider, next, the distinction between basic reasons and qualitative dis-

tinctions. I find this contrast the most difficult to unpack. Taylor seems to

be using the contrast in a number of different ways. On one charac-

terization, the difference is that qualitative distinctions underlie basic

reasons, in the sense that qualitative distinctions explain the point of the

basic reason. Qualitative distinctions offer reasons in the sense that

articulating them is articulating what underlies our ethical choices, leanings,

intuitions. . . . It is to articulate the moral point of our actions. . . . that is why it

cannot be assimilated to giving a basic reason. Relative to the most basic action-

description, we can still strive to make clear just what is important, valuable, or

what commands our allegiance . . . (p . 77)

For example, Taylor says that 'We can get a sufficient grasp of the com-

mandment, "Thou shalt not k i l l" , or can obey the order , "Don' t ta lk l ike

that to Granddad " before we can grasp articulations about the sanctity of

human life, or what it means to respect age' (p. 80).


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164

Will Kym licka

On this characterization, the problem with modern moral theory is

that by focusing on the basic reason of impartiality, while neglecting the

underlying qu alitative distinctions, it has failed to explain why humans are

worthy of impartial concern, why they are owed concern and respect. At

the end of the book, Taylor claims that without a clearer sense of this

underlying qualitative distinction w e cannot expect people to be m otivated

to comply with the commands of impartiality. (I will return to this issue

below.)

On this first characterization, there does not seem to be any inherent

conflict between basic reasons and qualitative distinctions. On the contrary,

as Taylor no tes, for every basic reason, we can always ask for its underlying

moral point. A comm itment to basic reasons invites, rather tha n preclude s,

a deb ate a bout qualitative distinctions. Taylor apparently thinks that mod-

ern theorists deny that we can ask about the point of their basic reasons.

But of course many utilitarians and Kantians do discuss the question of

why humans are worthy of respect and concern. Even Bentham discusses

this,

arguing that it is people's capacity for pain and pleasure that makes

them worthy of impartial consideration. Indeed, he pursued this issue in

some de pth, noting that his answer implies that sentient animals also have

claims to moral status. In what has become the slogan for animal-rights

groups around the world, Bentham said, 'The question is not "Can they

reason? , nor "Can they talk? , but "Cera they suffer?

1

. Other theorists

in the utilitarian and Kantian tradition have given different answers. Rawls,

for exam ple, invokes rationality as one key basis for m oral concern .

8

While

they do not always agree on the answer, utilitarians and Kantians have

certainly not avoided the question.

However, Taylor offers a second characterization of the difference

between basic reasons and qualitative distinctions. He som etimes describes

it as a difference between the right and the good. Recall Taylor's claim

that a utilitarian or K antian theory 'do esn 't have much room for qualitative

distinctions' and is 'in the business of offering . . . basic reasons '.

Our qualitative distinctions are useless for this; they give us reasons in a quite

different sense. Articulating them would be indispensable if our aim were to get

clearer on the contours of the good life, but that is not a task which this theory

recognizes as relevant. All we need are action-descriptions, plus a criterion for

picking out the obligatory ones. (pp. 79-80)

On this characterization, the problem with modern moral theory is that it

focuses to o m uch on what it is right to d o, and fails to give a clear account

of 'the contours of the good life'. Or, as he elsewhere puts it, it neglects

'the goods of the spirit' in a 'single-minded' commitment to impartiality

(p . 496).

This is clearly different from the first characterization, since there is no

guarantee that the worthwhile activities which make up a good life will


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The Ethics of

Inarticulacy

165

always be com patible with the requirem ents of morality. As Taylor himself

notes, 'the source which-gives heightened vibrancy to our lives can be

detached from benevolence and solidarity' (p . 373), and 'higher fulfilment

might take us outside the received morality' (p. 423). There are some

genuinely valuable things in life - not m erely trivial things - that m ay lead

us away from impartiality, such as the needs of family and friends. Hen ce

qualitative distinctions in the first sense - that is, explaining the point of

impartiality, explaining why others are worthy of consideration - are not

identical to qua litative d istinctions in this second sense - that is, explaining

the contours of a valuable life, a life worth living.

On both of these chara cterizations, employing basic reasons seems com-

patible with affirming the validity of qualitative distinctions. Indeed,

employing the basic reason of impartiality invites us to consider the intrinsic

worth of human life, and the contours of a truly valuable life. On yet

anoth er characterization , how ever, the comm itment to basic reasons seems

to preclude qualitative distinctions. Taylor says that:

Much of this [modern moral] philosophy strives to do away with these distinctions

altogether, to give no place in moral life to a sense of the incomparably higher

goods or hypergoods. Utilitarianism is the most striking case. A good, happiness,

is recognized. But this is characterized by a polemical refusal of any qualitative

discrimination. There is no more higher or lower; all that belongs to the old,

metaphysical views. There is just desire, and the only standard which remains is

the maximization of its fulfilment. The critic can't help remarking how little

utilitarians have escaped qualitative distinctions, how they in fact accord rationality

and its corollary benevolence the status of higher motives, commanding adm iration.

But there is no doubt that the express theory aims to do without this distinction

altogether, (pp. 78-79)

On this characterization, the commitment to basic reasons is intended to

replace all qualitative distinctions, be it the contours of the good life or the

underlying basis of im partial concern. Utilitarians, Taylor claims, wish to

do without any notion of 'discriminations of right or wrong, better or

worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires,

inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer

standards by which they can be judg ed' (p . 4). They seek to avoid claiming

that there are any values - even impartiality (or benevolence) - that are

independent of the will.

I find this claim bizarre. It is one thing to say that utilitarians do not

explain why benevolence is a value (although I think even this is unfair).

But it is quite another to say that utilitarians do not expressly accord

benevolence a higher moral value than, say, egoism, or maliciousness.

Taylor admits that '[i]t seems that they are motivated by the strongest

moral ideals, such as freedom, altruism, and universalism' (p. 88). But he

says that utilitarians do not, and cannot, explicitly affirm these goods.


13/29

166 Will Kym licka

Instea d, Taylor claims, utilitarians presen t impartiality as a kind of default

position:

In the now neutralized world of the psyche, there is only de facto desire; there is

no longer a place for a higher good, the object of a strong ev al ua tio n. ... An ethic

can be constructed taking simply this de facto desire as its basis: the higher good

just is the maximization of de facto goals. This will be utilitarianism, (p . 249)

Having reduced all questions of the good to the satisfaction of de facto

des ires, the only ration al conclusion is to maximize the satisfaction of these

desires in society, and so utilitarians invoke utility-maximizing as a basic

reason, without having explicitly adopted impartiality as a qualitative

distinction.

Th ere is an obvious problem w ith this interpretation of utilitarianism. If

Bentham had denied that there are any goods higher than his de facto

desires, the ethic he would adopt is not utilitarianism, which may require

him to sacrifice his desires for the greater good of others, but egoism, or

some form of mutual a dvantage the ory. If utilitarians took de facto desire

as their basis, and d enied all higher goods, then their slogan would be 'the

greatest happiness for

myself,

not 'the greatest happiness of the greatest

num ber'. Only a belief in bene volence, as a qualitative distinction, could

generate utilitarianism.

Taylor is aware of this problem. He notes that '[j]ust embracing some

form of m aterialism is not sufficient to engen der the full ethic of utilitarian

benevolence. One needs some background understanding about what is

worthy of strong evaluation: in this case, it concerns the moral significance

of ordinary happiness and the demand of universal beneficence' (p. 336).

And he recognizes that utilitarianism requires more sacrifice from indi-

viduals than their de facto desires may allow, even when those desires

include an element of sympathy. H e admits that for utilitarians, '[sjympathy

is treated not just as a de facto motivation but as a strongly valued one:

something you ought to feel, an impulse whose unrestricted force in us is

part of a higher way of being' ( p . 337). How ever, Taylor claims that while

utilitarians implicitly believe that benevolence and sympathy are strongly

valued goods , they

explicitly

deny that th ese, or any other values, have any

rational s tatus. According to Taylor, utilitarians simply dismiss or ignore,

rather than frankly reject, the alternative of egoism.

The idea that utilitarians do not expressly endorse impartiality as a value

seems clearly false to me. Indeed, Taylor quotes Bentham's cry, 'Is there

one of these my pages in which the love of humankind has for a moment

been forgotten? Show it me, and this hand shall be the first to tear it ou t'

(p .

331 ). According to T aylor, this is a momentary lapse from Bentha m's

official line, which is that the 'love of mankind' has n o more claim on o ur

allegiance than any other possible standard. But Taylor does not provide

any quotes from Bentham, or any other utilitarian, in which the claim of


14/29

The Ethics of

Inarticulacy 167

benevolence to be a higher standard that we should respect, regardless

of our subjective desires, is rejected.

9

Perhaps Taylor thinks that his

interpretation is so obviously correct that h e need no t provide any textual

support for it. Indeed, he says that 'there is no doubt' that the 'express

theo ry' of utilitarianism aims to d o without th e qualitative distinction which

accords benevolence a higher status (p. 79). To me, however, this seems

obviously false. Ev en Bern ard Williams, one of utilitarianism's m ost vocal

critics, disagrees with Taylor. He talks about 'that picture of man which

early utilitarians frankly offered, in which he has, ideally, only private or

otherwise sacrificeable projec ts, tog ether with the o ne m oral disposition of

utilitarian benevolence'.

10

A ccording to W illiams, utilitarians are , and have

always been, frank about the priority of benevolence over de facto desires.

W hether o r not Taylor provides a plausible account of nineteenth-century

utilitarianism, th e fact is that modern-day utilitarians are well aware of the

alternative of egoism, and recognize that their com mitment to benevo lence

requires a com mitment to qu alitative distinctions. This has been cen tral to

utilitarian self-consciousness since at least J. S. Mill and Sidgwick, who

dealt at length with these issues. Conversely, advocates of naturalism in

ethics are well aware that some form of mutual advantage theory, rather

than utilitarianism, is the natural corollary of their rejection of qualitative

distinctions (e.g. Gauthier or Harman).

11

For the sake of argument, however, let's accept Taylor's claim that

utilitarians have heretofore sought to deny benevolence the status of a

higher good. What prevents utilitarians today from explicitly recognizing

and affirming that it has that status? Why would having to accept the

existence of this qualitative distinction be embarrassing to the utilitarian

claim that impartiality requires the maximizing of utility? According to

Taylo r, utilitarianism is 'shot th rough with contradiction. I mean pragm atic

contradiction. It does not necessarily bring together incompatible propo-

sitions; but it speaks from a moral position which it can't acknowledge'

(pp . 339-40). But why can't it expressly acknowledge its moral position?

Taylor says that a com mitment to m oral goods is 'built into [utilitarianism's]

background assumption th at the general happiness, and above all the relief

of suffering, crucially matters. . . . But in the actual content of its tenets,

as officially defined, none of this can be said; and most of it makes no

sense' ( p . 332). I simply don't see Taylor's point here. Why can't utilitarians

say (what they have in fact repeatedly said) that the relief of suffering

matters? How would it be embarrassing or contradictory for a utilitarian

to say that?

One answer seems to be that Taylor often equates utilitarianism with

'naturalism', a metaphysical position which seeks to reduce all human

behaviour to externally-describable events and so denies the existence of

qualitative distinctions. Thus he says that any utilitarian affirmation of


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Will Kymlicka

qualitative distinctions would 'put paid to its penchant for reductive

accounts' (p. 342). Now if Taylor is simply saying that naturalism is

incom patible with the affirmation of qualitative distinctions, then of course

that is true (by definition). But it is misleading to present this as a criticism

of utilitarianism, since most utilitarians are not naturalists, just as most

naturalists are not utilitarians. And it is even more misleading to present

this as a criticism of 'the whole class of modern positions which descends

from the radical Enlightenment' (p. 339), since, as Taylor recognizes,

Kantians have been especially critical of naturalism.

Taylo r's equation of naturalism w ith utilitarianism is not only misleading,

it removes m uch of the interest of his argument. It is fair enough if Taylor

wishes to defend the objectivity of moral sources against naturalist attacks.

But, as I noted above, this is an age-old debate. What was new about

Taylor's argum ent w as his claim that even those modern theories which do

not reject moral objectivity are none the less inarticulate about their moral

sources. And his argument for this claim, I thought, was that certain

distinctively new features of moral thought - e.g. procedural rationality,

basic reasons, and the priority of the right over the good - generate a

tendency towards reductionism, by obscuring the source of morality in

qualitative distinctions. Yet the only argument he gives to explain why

these features of utilitarianism preclude the affirmation of qualitative dis-

tinctions is simply to equ ate utilitarianism with reductionism. His argum ent

presupposes, rather than establishes, that utilitarianism is inherently

reductionist.

I cannot find a conflict between basic reasons and qualitative distinctions

in any of the three senses that Taylor invokes - i.e. the moral point

underlying the affirmation of benevolence, the contours of the good life,

or the affirmation of benevolence

itself.

On the contrary, the utilitarian

and K antian a ppeal to basic reasons leaves conceptual room for, and invites

debate on, all of these qualitative distinctions.

V. The Tasks of Moral Philosophy

That leaves the third contrast Taylor draws between classical and modern

moral theories, concerning the priority of the right over the good. As we

have seen, it is true that modern theorists have been more concerned with

rightful obligations than with the c ontours of the good life. But it is wrong

to say, as Taylor doe s, that m odern m oral theories seek to give their basic

reasons 'a special status by segregating them from any considerations

about the good' (p. 496). Utilitarians and Kantians do not eliminate 'all

considerations about the good'. Rather, they draw on a more abstract


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The Ethics

of

Inarticulacy 169

account of the good, in order to assess the sort of social conditions required

for people to judge and pursue more particular conceptions of the good.

Is it a problem that contemporary moral philosophers have not tried to

determine the particular content of a worthwhile conception of the good?

This depends on one's conception of the task of moral philosophy. Taylor

clearly believes that moral philosophers have abandoned their true calling

to distinguish the truly valuable from the merely trivial. This is reminiscent

of the preface to E. J. Bond's Reason and Value, where Bond speaks of

the disappointment he felt with what he was taught in a moral philosophy

class:

I Temember being puzzled, as an undergraduate, when my professor and my fellow

students

all

seemed

to

accept without question that only moral considerations stood

in

the way of

doing what

one

pleased,

and

that otherwise there

was

nothing

problematic about

the

pursuit

of

ends.

One

simply

had

desires

for

certain things,

and

if one

could,

and if

there were

no

mo ral reasons against

it,

then

one

just went

ahead

and set out to do or get or

keep them.

. . .

Here, then, were

a

couple

of

dozen

or so

people equipped with

a set of

ready-made wants, which

it was the

business

of

their lives

to set

about satisfying, only taking care

not to

violate

the

principles

of

m orality.

I

was certainly

the

odd-man-out,

for I did not

have

any

such

set

of

wants (except

the

obvious appetites

of

course)

and did not

know what

to do

with

my

life.

I

wanted

to

find

out

what

was of

value, what goals were genuinely

worth pursuing, before

I

could formulate

a

'rational life plan',

and

that required

something more than the consultation of my already existing desires or 'concerns'

or speculations about my future on es. My fundamental practical questions were not

'When can I not do what I want?' or 'How can I best accomplish what I want the

most with the least frustration of my desires along the way?' but 'Wh at ends would

be worth my while?' or 'What, of the things open to me, would be most profitable

or rewarding?'

and 'How can I

realize

the

most worth

or

value

in my

life?'.

12

Like Bond, Taylor looks

to

moral philosophy

to

find

out

what ends

are

most worth while , and is disappointed to find out that the philosophers are

only discussing what is morally imperm issible.

Moral philosophers today, however,

do not

view themselves

as

having

that task. This is not because they think that qualitative questions of the

good are un impor tan t . On the contrary , as Rawls em phasizes, enforcing

principles

of

right 'would serve

no

purpose

-

would have

no

point

-

unless

[they] not only perm it ted but also sustained ways of life that citizens can

affirm

as

worthy

of

their full allegiance .

. . . In a

phrase: justice draws

the

limits, the

good shows

the

po in t ' .

1 3

Their belief

is

simply that

the

ways

of

life whic h

are

worthy

of our

allegiance

are

suitably protecte d

by

principles

of

right which provide pe ople with

the

resour ces, rights,

and

social conditions

under which they can make the i r own informed judgments about the good

on an on-going basis . Indeed, as Rawls says, this ability to pursue goods

tha t

are

worthy

of our

allegiance

is the

whole point

of

having principles

of

right.


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WillKymlicka

The rea son why contem porary moral philosophers do not view it as their

task to articulate the good, despite the importance of this task, is that the

specific features of morality, as a social institution, are not required to

convince people to look for w orthwhile ways of life. Peop le, they assum e,

will naturally be interested in attending to questions of the good. This is

the natura l object of our everyday practical reasoning. There is no need to

add the weight of morality to issues which people already have sufficient

non-moral m otivation to attend to . What we need m orality for is to impress

on people the importance of respecting other people's good. Hence modern

theorists work according to a division of labour. They often distinguish

questions about th e con tours of the good life, which are the natural object

of each person 's practical reasoning, from 'morality', which deals with ou r

obligations to others, and which requires specifically moral reasoning.

Theorists concentrate on morality, not because they think questions about

the good life are not worth attending to, but because they think they are

already being attended to in our non-moral modes of thinking and acting.

This view of the scope of moral philosophy is reflected in our everyday

moral vocabulary. In o ur everyday language, an imm oral person is someone

who doesn't consider other people's good, even if they are leading quite

interesting and fulfilling lives. Converse ly, we do not call someone imm oral

who is content with leading a trivial life, so long as they respect the

legitimate claims of othe rs. The former person needs m oral education, the

latter person needs inspiration.

On this view of the task of moral philosophy, it is enough for moral

philosophers to leave room for others to engage in the process of clarifying

the good. Moral philosophers like Rawls and Habermas discuss the need

for forums in which individuals can share their insights about the good, bu t

it is othe r people (e.g . artists, ministers) who are expected to initiate public

deba tes in these forums over the w orth of the ways of life we are heading

towards, or leaving behind.

Of cou rse, if artists and o thers lack the initiative or imagination to share

their insights about the good with friends, family, or the broader public,

despite the opportunity to do s o, then we all may be condemned to lead

less worthwhile lives.

14

Tha t is a failing. But it is not a m oral failing. A n

unimaginative society is not an immoral society. And, on this view, it is

not the responsibility of moral philosophers to ensure a more imaginative

use of our collective expe riences of the good . What such a society needs is

inspiration, not moral education.

This,

then , is one p opular conception of the role of moral philosophy. It

is a restricted role, compared to earlier theories which sought to come up

with the detailed contours of the good life. But,

contra

Taylor, it does not

deny the validity or importance of qualitative judgments about the good.

It allows for, and indeed insists on, both the conceptual and the social

space required for others to make these judgments in an informed way.


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The E thics of

Inarticulacy 171

I suspect that even if Taylor had recognized the extent to which this

account of the task of m oral philosophy allows conceptual space for qu ali-

tative judgme nts about th e goo d, he still would have rejected it. I think he

objects to the way that moral philosophers have abandoned the task of

evaluating the good to artists, theologians, and pop psychologists. He

worries about the fact that questions of what makes life meaningful or

fulfilling 'are too concerned with the self-regarding . . . to be classed as

moral issues in most people's lexicon' (p. 4). Unfortunately, while Taylor

almost certainly opposes this restricted view of the task of m oral philosophy,

he never gets it sufficiently in focus to describe what exactly he dislikes

about it. Rather than explain why moral philosophers cannot leave the

job of evaluating the good to others, Taylor mistakenly says that moral

philosophers do not leave any room for others to discuss the good. Hence

his arguments focus on th e relatively uncontroversial claim that it is impor-

tant to make qualitative judgments about the good, while neglecting the

real question - namely, is it moral philosophers who must make those

judgments?

15

V I.

Empowering Morality

The re are a variety of possible objections he m ight mak e to this restricted

account of the role of moral philosophy.

16

However, rather than speculate

about w hat Taylor might have said, or about w hat might be said in response

to it, let m e return to the issue of the qualitative distinction underlying the

appeal to impartiality. As we have s een, Taylor claims that utilitarians and

Kantians do not address the question of why people are owed equal

concern. While this is unfair as a blanket statement, it is true that many

contem porary moral theorists do not give a lot of attention to this question.

Many theorists simply take it for granted that each of us, in our everyday

moral und erstandin g, has some notion of why others are worthy of concern.

The commitment to impartiality is taken to be relatively uncontroversial,

and so theorists spend most or all of their time on the more controversial

question of how best to interpret impartiality.

Taylor suggests that w hile impartiality may be an uncontroversial stand-

ard , the failure to explain why impartiality is a value decreases the likelihood

that people will in fact live up to its demands. People need to be 'em-

powered' to act morally, and 'the issue is what sources can support our

far-reaching moral commitments to benevolence and justice' (p. 515). We

have to be able to see the good of moral behaviour, and the question is,

do we have 'ways of seeing-good which are still credible to us, which are

powerful enough to sustain these standards?' (p. 517).


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172 Will Kymlicka

Taylor considers two sorts of answers to this question. O ne answer is the

Christian view that grace m akes benevolence possible. Being dedicated to

the cause of God includes the affirming of life, and

What differentiates God from humans in this respect is the fulness, the force of the

affirmation - something humans can't match on their own, but which they can

participate in by following God. . . . In the Christian case, the key notion is that

of agape, or charity, God 's affirming love for the world (John 3:16), which humans

through receiving can then give in turn. (p. 270)

The second answer is secular, emphasizing either our natural sympathy

which is troubled at the site of human suffering, or our respect for the

dignity of human reason (p. 411).

Deciding between these two sorts of answers is important, Taylor says,

because '[h]igh standards need strong sources' (p. 516). The issue of

empow erment is particularly acute for contemporary theorists because they

demand greater sacrifices than earlier theorists did, and 'any belief that w e

can and ought to lay stronger demands on ourselves than prevailed in the

pas t, must contain at least implicitly some answer to this question' of moral

sources (pp. 398-9). We aspire to universal justice, but 'What can enable

us to transcend in this way the limits we normally observe to human

moral action?' - i.e. the limits created by 'our restricted sympathies, our

understandable self-preoccupation, and the common human tendency to

define one's identity in opposition to some adversary or out group' (p.

398).

According to Taylor, the only answer which can provide these 'strong

source s' is the C hristian one : 'It all depends on what th e most illusion-free

moral sources ar e, and they seem to m e to involve a G od' (p . 342). Without

the belief that creation is good, it is likely that critics of morality, like

Schopenhauer, will undermine 'the grounds on which universal bene-

volence was seen as a good, the value of human life and happiness' (p.

448).

I will not pursue Tay lor's answer to this question of moral sources - i.e.

his views of the relative m erits of secular and theistic sources, and of where

the burden of proof lies.

17

Instead, I want to step back and consider the

way he poses the question. According to Taylor, high standards require

strong sources, and so '[t]he question which arises from all this is whether

we are not living beyond o ur m oral mea ns in continuing allegiance to o ur

standards of justice and benevolence' (p. 517). If we do not have strong

sources, we must mode rate our claims, because it is important that we not

'live beyond our m oral me ans '. It is 'morally corrupting, even dangero us' to

make mora l dema nds wh ere it will simply create 'the feeling of undischarged

obligation, [or] guilt, or its obve rse, self-satisfaction' (p . 516).

I think that Taylor is raising an important point, although, here as

elsewhere, it is obscured by his insistence that modern theorists seek to


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The Ethics of

Inarticulacy 173

eliminate qualitative distinctions altogether (p. 399), and by his running

together of different kinds of 'moral sources'.

18

It is certainly true that if

we want people to live up to high moral standards, it helps if we can

empower them to do so. And this raises important questions about the

nature and preconditions of an effective sense of justice, and the answer

to these questions may affect some of our moral principles.

19

But I do not think the ability to empower people should be seen as a

precondition for accepting a moral principle. Moral principles may be

legitimate even if some of those affected by them are incapable of being

empowered to abide voluntarily by them. There are some circumstances

where it is legitimate to be 'living beyond our moral means'.

The problem, I think, is that Taylor works with too individualistic a

mod el of morality, a m odel which focuses too m uch on the individual agent.

This may sound ironic, given Taylor's repeated criticism of contemporary

moral philosophy for its focus on the individual

qua

agent, its 'focus on

what it is right to do rather than on what it is good to be' (p. 3). But

Tay lor's preferred focus - what it is good to be - is still too agent-focused.

Mo rality is, in the first in stance, a social institution, and cannot be reduced

to questions about what particular individuals should be or do.

Consider the issue of human rights. The idea of human rights has been

used as the basis for movem ents by disadvantaged grou ps in many societies,

like the blacks in the U nited S tates and South Africa. They had (and hav e)

legitimate moral claims for a greater share of economic resources. Our

comm itment to providing equa l opportun ities to people of other races is one

of Taylor's examp les of the higher standards we set ourselves. According to

Taylor, since it is important that we not live beyond our moral means, if

we cannot give whites a way of 'seeing-good' which will empower them to

hand ov er their resources to blacks, then we should m oderate o ur standards

of human rights.

This is not, I think, the right way to consider the issue. The claim that

blacks have a moral claim to more resources is not, in the first instance, a

claim about what individual whites can be empowered to voluntarily give

up. It is a claim about what we as a society can rightfully take from the

whites. Of course, societies cannot enforce certain standards unless there

are individuals who are willing and able to enforce the m . But th e individuals

who are able and willing to enforce the standards need not be the same

individuals who are asked to make the sacrifices. In many cases, moral

progress is achieved by disadvantaged groups simply taking whatever it is

they are entitled to, sometimes at the point of a gun. It would be nice if

we could persuade whites to voluntarily relinquish their resources, if we

could show them a way of 'seeing-good' which motivates them t o meet high

standards. But that may not always be possible, given the kind of personal

expectations and identities they may have built up around their existing

practices.


21/29

174 Witt Kymlicka

Taylor says that high standards require strong sources that can mo tivate

people to make great sacrifices. In some cases, that may well be true. In

other cases, however, high standards require coercion that forces people

to do w hat they cann ot freely a ccept. This coercion may tak e the form of

passive disobedience, in the case of Martin Lu ther K ing, or it may take th e

form of armed insurrection, in the case of Nelson Mandela. What high

standards have historically required in order to be implemented is that

some people are motivated by strong sources, some are subject to brute

force, and some peo ple are too lazy or indifferent to put up a struggle one

way or the other.

This may mean t ha t, as a society, we are living beyond our m oral means.

But why is this a problem? Whenever our moral means run out we use

other means, including the coercive power of the state. And even where

other means are not available, so that there is no social possibility of

meeting a high moral standa rd, it does not follow th at we should lower our

standards. Consider the issue of Third World poverty. It is quite possibly

true that secular accounts of our moral sources are proving inadequate to

motivate people in the First World to engage in the massive transfer of

resources that many people believe is morally required of us. And there is

no on e else who is capable of forcing us to do so. H ence we a re living with

a sense of undischarged obligation. That is unfortunate. But it would be

much worse if we started thinking that we are entitled to our massive

wealth, as if we are somehow more deserving of a decent existence than

people in Ethiopia. It is unfortunate if we cannot motivate ourselves to

meet the legitimate claims of people in the Third World. It may even be

'morally corrupting' or 'dangerous' to affirm these claims when we know

we will not meet them (p. 516). But it is obscene to deny that Ethiopians

have legitima te claims. To limit the scope of human rights to what privileged

people can be motivated to be or do is to offer a cramped, and extremely

conservative, view of m orality.

Of course, if we make moral demands that we know some individuals

will be unable to comply with, then th ere will be cases where people canno t

be blamed for failing to do the right thing. But that just shows again that

morality cannot be reduced to questions of individual agency. There are

going to be cases of blameless immorality on any moral theory, since

there will always be some people who, from fear, ignorance, mental

incom petence, o r weakness of will, are un able to comply with moral norms,

and so cannot be blamed for failing to do the right thing. W here individuals

are unable to comply with moral norms, we do not change the norms, we

simply try to ensure that someone else will compel their compliance. In

these cases, morality is not about empowering individuals to act morally,

but about constraining individuals from acting immorally. A functioning

moral society must not only empower those who are able to act morally,


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The Ethics of

Inarticulacy 175

it must also disempower those who are unable to act morally. Taylor focuses

solely on the first.but modern moral philosophers accept the necessity of

the second.

He nce , even if North A mericans cannot be blamed for not relinquishing

all our unjust advantages (although clearly we can be blamed for not

relinquishing some of them), this is no reason to lower moral standards.

Th e fact that someo ne's behaviour is blameless is no reason to tolerate it,

let alone endorse it, if it violates the legitimate claims of othe rs. In deciding

on the justice of international distributions, the basic question is not

whether we can be blamed for holding on to our advantages. A more

relevant question w ould be whether other people can be blamed for trying

to talce them away from us. And, put that way, the answer is obvious. If

we possess resources which other people have a legitimate claim to, then

they are entitled to take them from us, even if our desire to retain (some

of) those advantages is entirely blameless. There is no reason in the

world why the disadvantaged should have to respect our desire for unjust

advantages, just because it is a blameless desire. Even if we cannot be

morally empowered to give resources away, they are morally justified in

taking them from us.

It is not clear whether Taylor is in fact proposing that the ability to

empower people is a precondition for the acceptability of moral principles.

He may simply want us to reconsider this issue. He says that one of the

'revisionist' aspects of modern moral theory is its insistence that morality

'in some unexplained way has in principle priority' over the non-moral ( p .

88).

According to Taylor, this revisionist claim for the priority of the moral

neglects 'ou r sense of the value of what must apparently be sacrificed' in the

process, e.g . the 'ordinary goo ds' of comm unity, friendship, or traditional

identity (p. 101). And while this belief in the priority of impartiality

over ordinary goods may ultimately be defensible, 'the philosophies I am

criticizing here prejudge [the issue] irrevocably' (p. 103).

This conflict between impartiality and ordinary goods is an important

one, and perhaps should be revisited. Unfortunately Taylor obscures the

issue by insisting that it is the 'rigid boundary between the "moral" and the

"non-moral"' which has led to a neglect of the value of ordinary goods,

and which 'prevents us from asking one of the crucial questions of modern

moral thought: to what extent the "revisionist" claims made on behalf of

[impartiality] ought to be accepted at all' ( p. 98). According to Taylor, the

effect of this rigid boundary is that mainstream moral theory 'can't deal

with the clash between [impartiality] and "ordinary" goods. . . . it can't

even properly conceive of the kind of diversity of goods which underlies

this conflict' (p. 102).

This is misplaced. The reason why mod ern moral theorists give priority

to the moral is not that they neglect the value of ordinary goods like


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176

Will Kymlicka

community, friendship, and traditional identity. Quite the opposite. It is

precisely because ordinary goods are so valuable that modern theorists

accept the possibility that moral sources may be unable to motivate the

rich and powerful to relinquish voluntarily the ordinary goods that their

advantages bring . In a w orld full of injustices, people's com munity, friend-

ship, and traditional identity will often be bound up with their unjust

advantages. Under these circumstances, relinquishing one's unjust advan-

tages may involve a great sacrifice, a sacrifice that some people may be

unable to make voluntarily. Modern theorists are perfectly aware of this.

That is why they believe that the claims of the disadvantaged may go

beyond what others can be empowered to accept. It is precisely because

ordinary goods are so strong that the moral claims of the disadvantaged

cannot be restricted to what the fortun ate can voluntarily accept. As I said

above, to impose such a restriction would be to offer a cramped and

conservative view of morality.

20

It is impo rtant not to overstate th e problem he re. For some people, even

some p eople who currently possess unjust advantage s, living morally will

be a great goo d. Th ere is no inherent conflict between the requirem ents of

morality and the desire for the most valuable and fulfilling life. But for

others, given their traditional attachments and identities, living morally

will be a great sacrifice. As Taylor recognizes, 'the source which gives

heightened vibrancy to our lives can be detached from benevolence and

solidarity' (p. 373). We must accept the 'worrisome possibility' that 'this

higher fulfilment might take us outside th e received morality' ( p . 423).

While ma ny; and pe rhaps most, peop le can find 'higher fulfilment' and

'heightened vibrancy' in a moral life, modern theorists do not think that

we can take this for granted.

21

H ence we cannot equate morality with the

pursuit of a truly worthwhile life. The decision to draw a sharp boundary

betwe en m oral and non-moral does no t deny or obscure the conflict between

ordinary goods and im partial mora lity, but rath er stems from that conflict,

and draws attention to it.

VII. Conclusion

According to Taylor, modern moral philosophy offers us a cramped view

of morality. His evidence for this claim is that philosophers have focused

exclusively on a narrow set of questions about our rightful obligations to

other people, while neglecting a wide range of other moral questions, like

what it is good to b e, or why we should show concern and respect for other

people's lives. Taylor's explanation for this narrow focus is that modern

moral philosophy denies the existence of 'qualitative distinctions' which

are independent of the will. This denial renders moral theory 'inarticulate'


24/29


about the 'moral sources' which underlie our beliefs about the good life,

or about the worth of human life.

I have tried to offer an alternative account of the modern focus on

principles of right conduct. T aylor is right to note that con temporary moral

philosophers do not attempt to describe the precise contours of the good

life. But his explanation is wrong. The explanation is not that they deny

the existence of qualitative distinctions. Most theorists affirm that there is

a real difference, independent of the will, between trivial and worthwhile

ways of life. They just do not view it as the task of moral philosophy to

ma ke that distinction. This is because each person has a natural pre-moral

interest in sorting ou t the contours of a worthwhile life, and the institution

of morality is not required to get people to take that question seriously.

All moral philosophy must do on this question is ensure that people have

the social space requ ired to let this aspect of their practical reasoning work

itself out.

For m odern th eorists , the institution of morality has a different function.

It is required to focus attention not on the worth of one's own activities

but on the ne eds of other peo ple, since other people 's good is as important,

from a mo ral point of view, as one 's own. O ur everyday practical reasoning

cannot be relied on h ere , because the pursuit of a fulfilling or worthwhile

life,

as opposed to a trivial or alienating one, will not necessarily lead us

towards morality. The line between fulfilling and trivial lives cuts across

the line between moral and immoral lives. The pro blem , from the point of

view of modern theorists, is not that there are no such things as truly

worthwhile goods, but rather that there are too many of them, and some

of them can conflict w ith the dem ands of morality. Hen ce, modern theorists

believe, a different kind of reasoning is required to ensure that attention

is focused on the legitimate claims of oth ers.

Taylor is aware of this view of the function of morality. He responds that

contemporary moral philosophers fail to provide any guidance even with

respect to this more limited function, because they refuse to m ake explicit

that impartiality is a value comm anding our allegiance, and fail to explain

why other p eople are worthy of our concern. H ere , I think, Taylor is simply

wron g. Many m odern theorists do make clear that impartiality has a higher

claim on our allegiance than egoism or maliciousness, and they do tie this

to some theory of why humans are worthy of moral consideration. Most

appeal t o either sentience or rationality as grounds for saying that hum ans

are worthy of consideration.

Onc e again, Taylor is aware that some moral philosophers have advanced

such views. He responds that these philosophers have failed to prove that

these secular accounts of moral sources are sufficient to empower people

to live up to standards of universal justice. In particular, theorists have

failed to show th at th ese moral sources are strong enough to outweigh our


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178 WillKymlicka

attachment to the ordinary goods of friendship and community, and so

have failed to defend the priority of the moral over the non-moral.

This is certainly true. But, once again, Taylor's explanation is wrong.

His explanation is that, by drawing a sharp boundary between the moral

and the non-m oral, theorists ignore or deny the value of the ordinary goods

that m ight conflict with a moral life. This is wrong - modern theorists are

very awa re of these conflicts. The problem , howe ver, is that morality would

be rendered powerless in an unjust world if we had to prove that moral

sources outw eighed all conflicting ordinary goods for each person subject

to them. Hence the priority of the moral over the non-moral is as much a

claim abo ut wha t society can tole rate as a claim about what individuals can

voluntarily acce pt. M orality, in the first instance, is a social institution, a

social code w hich is applied by society to its mem bers. Of course, this code

is intended to provide reasons for individual behaviour. But the way in

which social morality provides each individual with reasons for action is

complex. In some cases it provides a motivation and justification for a

person to m ake a great sacrifice. But in other cases it provides a motivation

and justification for someone else to impose that sacrifice by force. And,

in some cases, it simply provides a social sanction for actions that the

person would have performed for non-moral reasons.

In the best of all worlds, the extent of voluntary compliance would dwarf

the nee d for coerced compliance. But contem porary moral theorists believe

that the latter can never be entirely eliminated, and in an unjust world,

morality may be as much about what individuals can rightfully take by

force as it is about what individuals can voluntarily sacrifice.

If this is a fair description of contem porary m oral theory, then it can be

said to rely on three assumptions:

(1) People have a natural, pre-moral interest in discovering what is truly

fulfilling and worthwhile in life.

(2) Impartiality, or universal benevolence, is a fundamental moral value.

Each perso n, from the m oral point of view, ma tters and matters equally.

(3) Given the genuine value of the goods of ordinary life, and the extent

to which the se goods may lead away from respect for universal justice,

morality may sometimes require more of people than they can vol-

untarily acce pt. In these c ircumstances, it is legitimate for oth er pe ople,

using other means, to compel compliance.

Given these three premises, we can see why contemporary moral philo-

sophers do what they do. Given (1), there is no need for moral philo-

sophers to describe the precise contours of the good life. Given (2), there

is a need for moral philosophers to describe principles of right conduct.

Given ( 3), ther e is no need to prove that moral sources are always capable

of empowering the people subject to them, and it would unduly cramp


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morality to try to prove this. Each one of these three assumptions is

compatible with, and indeed presupposes, the affirmation of qualitative-

distinctions. Each o ne is based, not on th e denial of qualitative distinctions,

but on an interpretation of them.

N O T E S

1 I discuss the ce ntrality of this argument to rece nt liberal political theory in my

Liberalism,

Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University P ress, 1989), ch. 2.

2 'In the Golden Rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of

utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as

yourself,

constitute

the ideal perfection of utilitarian m orality.' J. S. M ill, Utilitarianism, L iberty, Representative

Government

(London: Dent & Sons, 1968), p. 16. I discuss the various ways that putting

yourself in other people's shoes is used by utilitarians and Kantians as a model of

impartiality in my Contemporary Political

Philosophy

(Oxford: Oxford U niversity Pre ss,

1990),

chs 2-3 . See also the discussion in Ronald Dworkin, 'In Defense of Equ ality', Social

Philosophy and Policy

1 (1983).

3 On utilitarian definitions of people's interests, see Richard Brandt,

A Theory of the Right

and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning,

Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1986); Derek Parfit,

Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Pres s, 1984). On the application of the principle

of utility-maximization to rules and acts, see David Lyons, F orms and L imits of Utili-

tarianism

(London: Oxford University P ress, 1965), and R ichard Ha re,

Freedom and

Reason (London: C larendon P ress, 1963).

4 On Kantian debates about the good, see David Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action

(Oxford: Clarendo

kymlicka - the ethics of inarticulacy

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