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TH E REGI ONAL SECURI TY CRI SI S

I N TH E ANDES:

PAT TERNS OF STATE RESPONSE

J udi t h A. Gent leman

J u ly 2001


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ISBN 1-58487-058-3

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FOREWORD

Colombia is a paradigm of the fai l ing state that has enormousimplications for American foreign policy and the adaptation ofU.S. air and landpower to the hemispher ic threat envi ronment .The instabil i ty, corrupt ion, displacement of people, and violencegenerated by Colombias unholy trinity of narcotics traffickers,insurgents, and paramil i taries are spil l ing over into vir tually allof nor thern South Amer ica and Panama. Thus, the stabi l i ty and

pol i t ical sovereignty of the region are being compr omised. And, atthe same t ime, progress toward achieving the Free Tr ade Ar ea ofthe Americas (FTAA) and the economic integration of theWestern Hemisphere by 2005 are being severely threatened.Clearl y, vi tal interests are at stake.

In thi s t imely monograph, a col league at t he Ai r War Col lege,Dr. Judith Gentleman, outl ines some of the detai l andimplications of the regional security crisis in the Andes and

makes recommendations for U.S. civil-military involvement inthe hemispher ic secur i ty arena. She argues for the United Statesto lead in the art iculation of st rategic object ives, whi le designinga defensible and feasible policy that critical elements in NorthAmerica, Central and South America, Europe, and Japan canunderstand and support. She specifically argues for the U.S.military to build stronger and more cooperative securityrelationships within the circle of affected states aroundColombia.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with theNorth-South Center in offer ing this monograph as a cont r ibutionto the internat ional secur i ty debate on t he si tuat ion i n Colombia.I t is cr i t ically impor tant t o the vit al interests of the Uni ted States,Colombia, the hemisphere, and the global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Inst i tute

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PREFACE

This monograph is an invaluable contribution to theongoing study of Plan Colombiabegun in February 2001 bythe U.S. Army War College and the Dante B. FascellNorth-South Center of the University of Miami. In herpresentati on, Dr . Judit h A. Gent leman of the U.S. Air WarCollege demonstrates the widening impact of the spi l lovereffect int o each of Colombias neighbors and int o Br azi l andPanama. She then proposes sensible ideas worthy ofpolicymakers consideration.

For some time it has been apparent that the crisis ofColombia is no longer confined to that country. In fact,under no imaginable scenario can Colombias problems becontained within it. The activities of drug traffickers and

guerr i l las are on t he r ise in t he ent i re region, coming fromColombia.

Given such compelling evidence of spillover, why has aregional, cooperat ive response been so slow in t aking shape?Dr. Gentleman goes right to the heart of the matter: apattern of competing objectives and inherent tensions. Tobegin, Plan Colombia was seen in the region as a

U.S.-inspired initiative by Colombia, about which theneighboring countries were not consulted in advance. Itsobjectives, while broad, were supported only in theirmilitary component (and by the United States alone).Moreover, the Uni ted States and Colombia were not reallyin harmony as to the true objective, which, for the UnitedStates was suppr ession of t he drug t rade; and for Colombia,paci fication of t he guerr i l la insurgency.

The Andean countr ies have also come around slowly andgrudgingly to the concept, as the author point s out , that onlyextensive int ernat ional cooperati on wil l work in an age ofglobalization. To do so, however, requires at least partialrenunciation of the cherished principles of noninterven-

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t ion, national self-determination, and sovereignty.Meet ing in Cartagena in Apr i l 2001 before the Quebec City

Summit of the Americas, Andean leaders agreed on aregional counternarcot ics st rategy. They also call ed on theUnited States to renew the Andean Trade Preference Actand to include Venezuela in i t . Such agreement is a greatstep forward.

Much depends on the support of the United States forsuch a compr ehensive r egional approach. The Bush

administration has responded positively with its newAndean Regional Initiative (ARI) of over $800 million,announced in May 2001. I t wi l l expand assistance intoseven countries in the areas of alternative economicdevelopment, infrastructure development, human rightsactivities, and initiatives other than fighting narcoticstrafficking. The new U.S. approach may well draw thepromised (but not delivered) European assistance to the

developmental aspects of Plan Colombia.Dr . Gent leman recommends, however, that the new U.S.

regional approach avoid simply responding to politicalconstraints rather than strategic analysis, by which shemeans the pol i t ical predilect ions of Colombias neighbors.She makes the case that a bet ter level of analysis be appliedto design a defensible and feasible policy and that aspecial envoy be appointed for the Andean region tooversee and coordinate the program.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.Director

The Dant e B. Fascel l Nor th-SouthCenterUniversit y of Miami

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BI OGRAPHI CAL SK ETCH OF TH E AUTH OR

JUDITH GENTLEMAN is a Professor of InternationalSecur i ty and Lat in Amer ican studies in the Depar tment ofStrategy and International Security at the U.S. Air WarCollege. She previously taught at the University of NewHampshi re and was a Fulbright Scholar at the Universidadde los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, and at El Colegio de Mexico,Mexico City, Mexico. She was also a Research Fel low at theCenter for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of Cali fornia,San Diego. She earned her Ph.D. degree at the StateUniversi ty of New York at Buffalo. Among her publi cationsare articles and reviews published in Political ScienceQuarterly, the Journal of I nteramer ican Studies and Wor ldAffairs, the Latin American Research Review and theAmer ican Pol i t ical Science Review. She is the author , editorand co-editor of Mexican Oil and Dependent Development,Mexican Politics in Transition and Mexicos AlternativePolitical Futures. Her recent work has focused uponColombias pol i t ical confl ict , regional secur i ty in the Andes,and Mexicos pol i t ical t ransit ion.

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TH E REGI ONAL SECURI TY CRI SI SI N TH E ANDES:

PATTERNS OF STATE RESPONSE

TH E ANDEAN CRI SI S AND GLOBAL I ZATI ON

The growing secur ity cr isis in the nat ions of t he AndeanRidge has focused attent ion upon t he seemingly int ractable

problem of consolidating democratic governments in thecontext of increasing political, economic, and militarydifficulties. Throughout the region, the governments ofColombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, alongwi th neighbor ing states Panama and Brazi l , f indthemselves confronted by a series of security challengesthat reflect the influence of globalization upon traditionaldimensions of conflict in the region. Globalization has notonly r edefined secur i ty issues in a generic sense,1 but nowcompl icates and dramaticall y increases the diff icul ty statesface in shaping responses by t radit ional nat ional means.

Analysts have suggested that effect ive state sovereigntyis being whittled away under pressure from the forces ofregionalization and globalization. While there is littleagreement on the precise defini t ion of globali zat ion, several

elements have gained broad cur rency. Of part icular note isthe growing phenomenon of the inabil i ty of nation-states tocope with global problems that require global solutions,such as demography, ecology, human rights, and nuclearproliferation.2 The nat ions of the Andean Ridge appear tobe increasingly overwhelmed by external forces thatconverged with domestic problems to create nearlyinsurmountable obstacles to crisis management and

development.

Specifi cally, the weak states of t he Andean area are nowconfronted by networks of drug and arms trafficking, bypressure from rising domestic discontent and insurgency,and increasingly by internati onal cr iminal networks t ied to

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these i l legal fi nancial resour ces. They also face demands byother international actors that national leaders confront

these challenges to national authority. Simultaneously,these states face demands from internat ional organizationsand external states to conform to norms of political andeconomic liberalization deemed to be foundational forcontemporary market democracy. Throughout the AndeanRidge, levels of democratic pract ice that had been achievedearlier have now eroded in the face of these challenges.From Peru to Venezuela, their are increasing indications

that the regional states lack the capaci ty t o surmount thesediff icul t ies by tr adit ional means.

Historically, states in the region have placed highestpriority upon the values of sovereignty, nonintervention,and nat ional sel f-determinat ion, thereby resist ingmultilateral or collective approaches to problems affectingthe region. The record of successful collaboration for

regional problem-solving has been spotty at best. Whiles ta tes have been eager to u t i l i ze i n te rna t i ona lorganizati ons and forums and internat ional law as meansto achieving national ends, much less common has been awi l l ingness to work col lect ively on a sustained basis at theregional level. The acute nature of the deepening crises inthe region may be promoting a new direction in regionalrelations, however, with far greater emphasis upon

collective determination than has been seen before. Thismonograph wi l l examine the sources of t he secur ity cr isis inthe region, discuss national responses to the challengesfaced by t hese states, and assess the likel ihood that regionalstates may begin to successful ly overcome the constraint s oftraditional political culture while mapping out strategiesfor col lect ively confront ing the regions secur i ty chal lenges.

TH E COL OMBI AN CRISI S

The current axis of the Andean crisis is to be found inColombia, where a histor icall y weak state has been al l butoverwhelmed by an insurgency now harnessed tonarcotrafficking, in turn propelling the development of

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powerful paramilitary forces and assorted criminalelements, many wi th t ies to internati onal networks. At the

same time that these forces continue to become morepowerful, the Colombian states capacity to respond hasbeen weakened further due to corruption, an impotent

justice system, a weak military, woefully outgunned lawenforcement capability, and the inability of the politicalclass to make progress toward a negotiated peacesettlement. So riven with conflicts at this point in itshistory, the Colombian state, as some argue, may have

ceased to exist as measured by any conventionalunderstanding of sovereignty, certainly when defined interms of ter r i tor ial cont rol .

Colombias deepening crisis pushed the United Statesinto far greater involvement in t he region for three reasons.First, Colombia had become the premier cocaine source forthe United States. Second, the United States identified

Colombia as one of a group of key states whose democracieswere in jeopardy and upon which special effor ts needed to befocused. This group also included I ndonesia, Ukraine, andNigeria.3 Thi rd, the Uni ted States regards Colombia as thegreatest threat to regional stability now facing the SouthAmer ican region. At the Four th Defense Minister ial of theAmericas, convened at Manaus, Brazil, in October 2000,then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen likened

Colombias political pathology to a disease, observing thatit will spread like a cancer to other regions.4 He arguedthat democracy in Latin America was, simply put, at riskbecause of Colombias crisis.5 As the Colombia Task Forcereport of the Council on Foreign Relations and theInter-Amer ican Dialogue reported,

Colombias deterioration spreads instability and conflictbeyond i ts borders. Insurgent and paramil i tary groups havemade frequent incursions into the neighboring countries ofVenezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Such i ncursions could wellincrease. The wider region is increasingly uncertain,reflecting both real spillover effects and independent,troublesome political developments. A stronger Colombiameans a str onger region and a str onger Western Hemisphere.6

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I n st i l l another perspect ive, former Assistant Secretaryof State Bernard Aronson argued that U.S. interest in

Colombias security crisis was shaped by three issues:drugs, migration, and oil.7 Although the Colombia crisislong remained a second tier matter for the United Stateswhen compared to security issues involving Asia or theMiddle East, for example, the increasing destabilizationthere came to be viewed in the late 1990s as a prioritymatter. The former U.S. Drug Czar, General (Retired)Barry McCaffrey, urged that more attention be focused

upon the growing regional crisis, but recognized that theU.S. domestic political environment would more easilysupport such effor ts i f t he emphasis were placed upon drugsand military and law enforcement assistance. At the sametime, the Pastrana government was urged to develop acomprehensive approach t o the cr isis and, wi th substant ialU.S. involvement , unvei led the ambit ious Plan Colombiain2000.

The Clinton administration enthusiastically endorsedPlan Colombiaas the coherent , feasible approach t hat wasneeded. Problems soon emerged, however . The Uni tedStates was widely seen to have all but developed the plani t sel f. Nei t her Colombia nor the Uni t ed States hadconsulted neighbor ing states, nor even kept them informed.Ecuadors Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller complained, for

example, that t his was a ball to whi ch we were not invi ted.Ecuador was not consulted at all.8 The failure to consultonly made matters worse when U.S. officials also readilyacknowledged that the plan would put pressure onborder ing states, increasing the secur ity problems for thosenations. Nonetheless, the United States pushed for theplans acceptance and campaigned to build support for theplan throughout the region.

In the meant ime, dramat ic upheava l unfo ldedthroughout the Andes. Of all the states affected bynarcotrafficking and by the Colombia crisis, Ecuador wasperhaps the most severely affected because of its limitedability to respond. Having thus far successfully avoided

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being pul led int o the Colombian confl ict , Ecuador now sawitself t hreatened by major incur sions of refugees that were

likely to flee Colombia once the counternarcotics offensiveint o sout hern Colombia commenced in t he per iod 2001-2002under the terms of Plan Colombia. Foreign MinisterMoeller worr ied about t he cancerous tumor being removedfrom Colombia and metastasizing in Ecuador.9 Wishingnot to be drawn into the conflict, Ecuador acknowledgedthat the Colombian insurgents and paramilitaries had formany years freely used Ecuadorian territory for rest and

recuperation as well as for resupply. In addit ion,Revolut ionary Ar med Forces of Colombia (FARC) element swere known to have established settlements for familymembers, and, indeed, intermarriage had becomecommonplace between FARC elements and Ecuadoriannat ionals on t he nor thern Ecuador ian border .

Northern Ecuador had also become an impor tant supply

point for growing narcot rafficking and guerr i l la int erests insouthern Colombia. Given its weak military capabilities,and not wishing to directly confront Colombian irregularmilitary forces, Ecuadors approach had been to rely uponthe FARCs stated commitment to avoid using Ecuador iannational territory for armed activity. In a bargain withcompell ing out side force, Ecuador sought to keep Colombianincursions confined to noncombatant purposes. No such

agreement had been reached, however, either with theColombian paramilitaries who had been growing instrength, or with narcotraffickers. In effect, Ecuador,already beset by its own overwhelming political andeconomic difficulties, including a recent attempted coup,found itself politically and militarily threatened by theColombia crisis. Evidence suggested that the implicitbargain with Colombias narcot rafficking int erests had run

ser ious ly aground. U.S . Southern Command s(USSOUTHCOM) Commander-in-Chief General PeterPace test i fi ed before the U.S. Senate in 2001 that nurser iesof coca and heroin poppy seedlings had been found in remoteareas of Ecuador, and that guerrillas working with drug

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traffickers had been spotted moving across Colombiasborders int o both Ecuador and Panama.10

Despit e progress by the Fuj imor i government in quel l inginsurgency and drug trafficking throughout the 1990s, Peruhad emerged from the summer 2000 national elections incomplete disarray, the subject of an Organization ofAmer ican States (OAS) diplomat ic sanct ion and diplomat icintervent ion. These were then fol lowed by the dramati cimplosion of the Fujimori government itself. Further, new

assessment s suggested that coca cult ivat ion had once againbegun to increase, wi th i ndications that the acreage undercoca cul t ivat ion had in fact grown over the previous 2 years.Arguably, it was the political firestorm ignited by thealleged involvement of President Fujimoris principalpolitical associate and director of national intelligence,Vladimi ro Montesinos, in arms t rafficking and arms sales toColombian guerrillas, all with the apparent complicity of

the Peruvian mil i tary, that brought an end to the Fuj imor iregime.11 While certainly Fujimoris record of electoralmanipulations also contributed to public demands forpolitical change, it was not until Fujimori found himselfmi red in t he Colombian problem over arms t rafficking wit hthe FARC did the regime collapse, opening the door towide-ranging investigations of the militarys and othergovernment offi cialscompl ici ty in drug t rafficking.12

Elsewhere in the Andes, Bolivia experienced aresur gence of chr onic instabil i ty, once thought to have beenlargely al layed due to success in the counterdrug war anddue to the Banzer government reforms. While not directlyt ied to the Colombian cr isis, it s dif fi cul t ies stemmed in largepart from controversy over the governments counterdrugpolicy. Fol lowing decades of tur moil , under the leadership of

former General Banzer, now Bolivias elected president , thenation seemed to be on the brink of resolving the issue ofi l legal drug product ion, having succeeded in implement ingall but the final elements of i ts Digni ty Plan. I ndeed, alongwith Peru, Bolivia had been touted internationally as asuccess story, one demonstrating that it was possible to

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defeat the scourge of illegal drug production through anaggressive policy of crop eradication and alternative

development.

With the onset of 2001, however, it became clear thatneither eradication nor alternative development had wonthe day.13 I ndeed, the plan to buil d several small garr isonsto hold the line on the dismantled fields incited thecoca-producing peasantry to violence against thegovernment . Despite all the public declarations of success,

the cocaleros apparent ly had every int ent ion of r eturning tococa production once the crop eradication sweeps hadterminated and counterdrug forces had returned to thebarracks. Clearly, the lucrative nature of drug productioncontinued to appeal to Bolivias impoverished peasantrywho were unwilling to follow through with the wholesalerelocation of population from drug-producing regions tozones sui table for al ternat ive development .14

At the same time, for Venezuela, Colombias crisisincreasingly put pressure on the Chavez government andled to st rained relati ons with t he Uni ted States. Venezuelaviewed itself as the victim of Colombias crisis, sufferingfrequent incursions by r efugees, guerr i l las, paramil i tari es,and narcotraffickers, and it thus voiced concerns over theprospects for a further widening of the conflict. Venezuelahad already become home to hundreds of thousands ofColombian economic migrants in the 1980s and 1990s, andthe prospect of further conflict in Colombian territoryadjacent to the Venezuelan border promised to escalate thenumbers of Colombian nat ionals seeking refuge out side forreasons of personal safety.

On Colombias northern border, Panama soundedalarms over the extensive, repeated terr i tor ial incur sions of

insurgent and paramil i tary elements fr om Colombia. Neverter r i tory wel l cont rol led by cent ral author ity, and wi thout ami l i tary of i ts own t o, at least in theory, defend the ter r i toryfr om i l l ici t use, the Darien province of Panama became anarea of essentially free reign for Colombian insurgent and

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parami l i tary forces. Increasingly, Panamanians expressedconcern that the Moscoso governments prospects for

dealing both wi th of the internal pressures (stemminglargely from cor rupt ion, some owing to narcotrafficking andmoney laundering) and with the external pressures( invo lv ing na rco t ra f f i ck ing , i nsu rgency , andparamil i tari es) were sl im at best . A tendency to ignore theproblem was made more difficult to sustain with thepromise delivered by United Self Defense Forces ofColombia (AUC) paramil i tary commanders that they would

consider Panama fair game if Colombian insurgents wereable to use Panamanian terr i tory wit h impuni ty.

Of all the countries considered, Brazil arguably facedsome of the more daunting challenges deriving from theColombian crisis, chiefly owing to its vast unguardedAmazonian terr i tor ies. To begin with, count erdrug effor ts inthe Andes increasingly had pushed narcotrafficking

operations into Brazil as a result of the widely notedbal loon effect . With Brazi l ian nat ional ter r i tory (land, air ,and riverine) increasingly impacted by this traffic, Brazilfelt increased pressure upon its already weak ability toprotect nat ional resources and t he sovereignt y of nat ionalterritory. Essentially, Brazil could control neither itsair space, ground, or r iver ine t raffic. Wit h only relatively fewfederal pol ice to moni tor the ent i re count ry for counterdrug

operations, Brazi l faced heavy odds in cont ending wi th t hethreat to it s ter r it ory.

While Brazils Amazon region had never been wellcontrolled, Brazils national security officials increasinglyrecognized that the future pattern of development in theregion could be seriously affected by the myriad illegalunmonitored activities taking place. Mining activity,

forestry, and indigenous communities were all affected bythe uncontrolled situation in the region. The arrest ofBrazils leading drug lord, Luis Fernando Da Costa(Fernandinho Beira-Mar), by Colombian forces onColombian terr i tory in the spring of 2001 brought into boldrel ief t he growing t ies between narcot ics t rafficking and the

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Colombian insurgency. Fernandinho had allegedly servedboth as a major t rader in cocaine fr om the FARC and as a

supplier of arms to the FARC, all via Brazilian territory,reportedly relying upon Paraguayan, Russian, andSur inamese organized cr ime element s in the process.15

STAT E RESPONSES TO TH E AND EAN CRI SI S

Colombia.

With the success of counterdrug operations in Peru andBol ivia in t he fi rst half of the 1990s, and with the successfulinterdiction of the Andean air bridge, more and moreelements of cocaine production moved to Colombia fromformer, more dispersed producing areas. With t he defeat ofthe cent rali zed cartels in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s,the industry moved in several new directions, the mostimportant of which came to be the strengthening of ties

between producers and both the FARC and the AUC, theso-called paramilitaries. Initially, the FARC swelled itscoffers with t ax payments from coca producers, as did theAUC at a later point. Over time, however, the FARCrepor tedly became more direct ly involved in var ious stagesof coca production, increasing coca product ion by a thi rd inthe demilitarized zone, the despeje, over which it hadexclusive control.16 Ceded temporari ly to the FARC by the

Pastrana government as a confidence-building measuredesigned to get the peace negotiations off the ground, thisarea the size of Switzerland also came to be used as aplatform for hiding kidnap victims and for increasedmi li tary preparat ions.

The Colombian crisis had now all but spiraled out ofcontrol. Law enforcement was incapable of dealing with

either escalating traditional crime or the escalating crimeassociated directly or indirectly with drugs. The justicesystem was equall y incapable of cont r ibut ing to a solut ion,as it had been both corrupted and intimidated. The firstpriority, that of regaining control over the national

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ter r i tory, was now arguably beyond t he reach of either theColombian military or the police without substantial

improvements in capabilities. Nearly two million personshad been displaced by the violence and ei ther were int ernalrefugees flooding into Colombias cities, or had leftColombia for neighboring countries.17 The nations eliteshad left en masse, with immigrat ion r ates into the Uni tedStates skyrocketing and with a special protected statusdesignation for such Colombians under consideration by theU.S. Congress. The economy had gone into a tailspin, wi th

the country experiencing its first serious recession inmodern history. Nearly half of the nations territory waseffect ively beyond state cont rol . The most compell ing armedforces in the Colombian state were the near ly 20,000 armedelements of the insurgent armies (along wi th their 36,000civi l ian mi l i t ia supporters) and the over 8,000 (and growing)AUC parami l i tary forces.

At the behest of t he Uni ted States, as we noted earl ier ,the Colombian government developed Plan Colombiaas anapproach to resolving some of these issues. The mult i-year,mult i-bi l l ion dol lar plan existed at two levels: theconceptual level and the practical level. At the conceptuallevel , the plan appeared to be a comprehensive approach toissues of socia l development, human r ights, lawenforcement, economic development, and peacemaking. At

the pract ical level, however, the only par t that was l ikely tobe funded was the U.S.-sponsored element that targetedcounterdrug effor ts. The U.S. cont r ibut ion of $1.3 bi l l ion (ofthe total proposed $7.5 bi l l ion) focused upon thedevelopment of a military capability designed to supportlaw enforcement counterdrug efforts. Pledges of non-U.S.internati onal financial suppor t were disappoint ing. Whilethe European Union pledged several hundred million

dollars, and the Inter -Amer ican Development Bank (IADB)offered support to social development projects, the bulk ofthe financing had to be shouldered by Colombia itself,chiefly t hrough loans.18

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The approach espoused by the Colombian governmentfor confront ing it s int ernal cr isis was based on a two-track

process: (1) peace negotiations with insurgents where andwhen possible, and (2) armed confrontation with thenarcot raffi ckers, principal ly wi th U .S. suppor t . Put simply,the primary preferred goal of the Colombian governmentwas to reach peace wi th the insurgency, whi le the pr imarygoal of U .S. pol icymakers was to cur tail the product ion andexport of Colombian cocaine to the United States. In otherwords, in principle (though not in practice) the Colombian

governments objectives and the U.S. Governmentsobjectives were very different. Reflecting this distinction,the United States provided assistance to supportColombias development of three specially trainedanti-narcotics battalions, and provided several hundredU.S. mi l i tary personnel along wi th several hundred civi l iancont ractors to suppor t count erdrug training act ivi t ies.

At the same time, despite substantial efforts tomodernize the organization of Colombias armed forces,those combatant forces remained very limited in theircapability to confront their principal foe, the insurgents.Despite these l imi tations, as a resul t of i ts par tnership withthe Untied States, the government concentrated scarceresources on those forces it believed to be of secondaryconcern, narcotraffickers. While the profits earned by the

FARC fr om narcot raffi cking connect ions cer tainly played apivotal role in their abi l i ty to sustain operati ons, Colombiananalysis suggested that drug trafficking could not be shutdown if the insurgency were not first defeated. In otherwords, the government apparently saw no other source ofsupport available to meet its urgent requirements. In itsweakened state, it accepted the U.S. initiative as the onlygame in town.

As noted previously, at the outset both the Colombianand the U.S. Governments acknowledged that the plan wasl ikely t o produce spil lover effects, broadening the confl ict asnarcotraffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary forcesincreased their use of neighboring states territories,

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thereby regionalizing the conflict. While regional leaderswere wi l l ing to suppor t President Past ranas effor ts to reach

a negot iated peace set t lement , they voiced ser ious object ionto Plan Colombiadue to the spillover potential resultingfrom the mil i tary rather than socio-economic emphasis thatwas felt to character ize the plan. Whi le defenders noted thatnearly 80 percent of the proposed funding was fornonmilitary expenditures, detractors noted that the onlyfirm commitment was, in fact, the U.S. commitment tomi l i tary and law enforcement expenditure.

Despite anxious U.S. and Colombian appeals for supportat the meeting of the presidents of South Americas 12countries, convened by Brazil in Brasilia in September2000, such appeals met with only measured success.Chilean President Lagos repor ted that the presidents ful lysupport the peace process, which implies negotiations asdistinct from the problem of narcotics trafficking.

Colombian Foreign Minister Guillermo Fernandez de Sotocomplained about this response, arguing that i t is unjustand count er intui t ive that Colombias effor ts to st rengthenitsel f t o fight the threat i t faces are the subject of complaint swhen no one criticizes the arms buildup of the insurgents.We want cooperation, not unfair cr i t icism.19

A vocal opponent of the plan was Venezuelan PresidentHugo Chavez, who declared, We support Plan Colombiasolong as it does not generate combat activities that couldcompl icate our situat ion, not ing fur ther that he feared thethreat of the Vietnamization of the entire Amazonregion.20 Chavez also argued that [the plan] is going tomake the conflict even more tense and is going to worsenarmed clashes. He further observed, Peace cannot beachieved by arms, that is a great contradiction.21 Earlier

assur ances offered by both President s Past rana and Clint onapparently did little to allay the fears of regional leadersthat the spillover effects of Plan Colombia could beadequately handled. Dur ing his visi t to Colombia in August2000, President Clinton admit ted that the plan would l ikelycause the problem to spil l over the borders of neighbor ing

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count r ies, but added that the Uni ted States would providea substant ial amount of money to help other countr ies deal

wi th t hose problems at the border when t hey start .22 Suchassurances were in no way sufficient to bridge the gapbetween the U.S. plan and South American objections.

Venezuelas Response.

Under President Chavezs leadership, Venezuela soughtto chart an independent course with respect to the

Colombian cr isis and the problem of narcot raffi cking. Theseefforts ref lected the cont inuing and longstandingdiffi cul t ies in Venezuelan-Colombian relations, along wi ththe increasingly t ense relations between Venezuela and theUni ted States. From t he out set , Chavezs popul ist messagehad st ruck a discordant note wi th Colombian author it ies, asthe Venezuelan leader never missed an opportunity tocr i t icize the Colombian ol igarchy, point ing to unfavorable

contrasts between Colombias internal social policies andhis own Bolivarian Revolution. To the consternation ofBogota, Chavez sponsored talks in Caracas betweenrepresentat ives of the FARC and the Colombiangovernment itself. Although Bogota viewed Chavez asengaging in unwanted meddling, it did send the nationsAt torney General t o par t icipate in t he talks. Yet relationswere rubbed raw by the experience. Venezuelas Defense

Minister Rangel went so far as to state publicly thatVenezuela has the right to talk with those who havepower. Further commenting upon the Colombiansannoyance over the matter, he suggested that theColombians would get over it.23 A FARC delegation,including Olga Marin, daughter of FARC chief ManuelMarulanda, had been hosted at a meeting of the LatinAmerican Parl iament in the Venezuelan Nat ionalAssembly in November 2000.24 Caracas was generallythought to have good contacts wi th t he FARC, i f for no otherreason t han t o be in a posit ion t o hold the insurgency at bayand to maint ain some leverage over their forces. They wouldthus not pose uncontainable problems to the Venezuelan

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government, or so it was hoped. At the same time, suchout reach to Colombias insurgent s was designed t o serve as

testimony to Chavezs domestic constituency as to theirleaders progressive credentials.

Such irr itations notwithstanding, Venezuela hadsuffered incursions from Colombians over its border formany years. As one news broadcast descr ibed the si tuat ion,Venezuela is constantly suffering the negative effects ofColombian drug tr affi cking: the air , r iver , and land routes

are disrupted and those who are not part of the problem st i l lhave to suffer the consequences of this same problem, onethat is unpredictably grave. Colombian insurgents hadkidnapped scores of Venezuelan ranchers and businessleaders, and the 1,400-mile border offered porous transitpoints for illicit trafficking of narcotics, weapons, andpeople. Recent ly Colombian k idnapping gangs were formedto seize Venezuelan ranchers to sell them to Colombian

guerrillas.25

At the same time, Colombian authoritiescharged that Colombias insurgents routinely obtainedweapons from the Venezuelan armed forces.26

Venezuelas release in 2001 of National L iberation Army(ELN) insurgent Jose Maria Ballestas, hijacker of aColombian commercial f l ight in 1999, only served to fur thersour relations.27 Finally, Venezuela complained thatColombian t raffi ckers used Venezuelan terr i tory as a majorroute for shipping drugs destined for the Europeanmarket.28 Nonetheless, Venezuela remained steadfastunder Chavez in refusing to allow U.S. counterdrugoperations on Venezuelan national t err i tory and cont inuedto refuse to reauthor ize counterdrug sur vei l lance fl ights bythe United States in Venezuelan airspace that had beenstopped by the Chavez government. In that regard,

Venezuelan authorities also suggested that the new U.S.Forward Operati ng Locations (FOLs) in Aruba and Curacaorepresented nothing more than a staging platform for theinvasion of South America by the United States. Morerecently, however, Defense Minister Rangel reportedly

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agreed to visit with USSOUTHCOM and Americanoperations at Key West .

Venezuela suffered increasing influxes of refugees asColombian paramil i taries cleared towns on t he Colombianside of the border of suspected insurgent sympathizers.These influxes were in addit ion to the tens of thousands ofColombians who had previously, f rom the Venezuelan pointof view, colonized western Venezuela.29

Both President Chavez and Venezuelas former defense

minister warned that Colombias efforts must not worsenVenezuelas diff icul t ies, suggest ing that Colombias confl ictcould spread and provoke a medium intensity regionalconflict.30 Then Defense Minister Ismael Hurtado Soucrenoted, Were worr ied about the mi l i tary plan. The way thati t s done could generate more violence.31

Chavez commented at length about Plan Colombia:

We are terribly affected by the war in Colombia. Peasantshave been kidnapped or murdered; there is terror on theborder. I t is a lawless land. We want peace. But peace cannotbe achieved with 80 Blackhawks or military trainers, but bydialogue. So it is a terrible mistake that the governments ofthe Uni ted States and Colombia are making. We are warningthat the confl ict could escalate and become another Vietnam.32

Indeed, such fears seemed to be well borne out asColombia accused Venezuela of an i l legal mi l i tary incur sion(not the first ) in October 2000. Colombias Defense MinisterLuis Ramirez charged that Venezuelan forces invadedColombian national territory with 30 helicopter-bornetroops, and that Venezuelan military aircraft had firedrockets and destroyed houses and livestock. Venezuelasthen Foreign Minister Jose Rangel denied this and called

Colombias claim i r responsible and a vulgar l ie.33

In the meantime, Venezuela deployed thousands ofreinforcements to i ts Colombian border to deal with r isinglevels of conflict, stationing 10,000 soldiers in what weredescr ibed as t wo theaters of operation.34 I n an earl y sign of

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what would later come to be a wi l l ingness to cooperate on aregional basis, however , Chavez also fl oated a tr ial ball oon

proposing that South American states form a NATO-likemi l i tary al l iance to deal wi th regional problems, a measurethat was vetoed by Brazils Foreign Minister Luiz FelipeLampreia as ant i thet ical t o Brazi l s own interests.35

President Chavez sought to distance himself fr om U.S.influence in the region in a number of different ways,particularly with respect to U.S.-sponsored counterdrug

operations. In addit ion t o the suspension of U .S. over fl ightr ight s, the Venezuelan government also issued a diplomat icprotest to the United States over the presence of a U.S.Coast Guard vessel that had ent ered Venezuelan waters insupport of counterdrug operation. The United Statesargued that this arr angement had been provided for under apr ior t reaty arrangement . More generall y, Chavez sought todeclare hi s independence fr om the Uni ted States by, among

other things, developing close relations wi th Cuba, and byturning to Organization of Pet roleum Expor t ing Count r ies(OPEC) through over tur es to Saddam H ussein, including avisi t to I raq as well as a planned visit to I ran.36

In sum, Venezuelan authorities deplored what wascharacter ized as pr imari ly a mi l i tary approach toColombias internal problems and one that set the stage forU.S. intervention in the region. Moreover, Venezuelanoffi cials went so far as to argue that U.S. mil i tary suppor t toColombia would create a worrisome regional militaryimbalance, but offered assurances that Venezuela wouldnot embark upon an arms buildup in response to PlanColombia.37

Ecu ador s Response.

Of all the frontline states, Ecuador faced what may bethe bleakest implications deriving from the Colombiancrisis. The 1990s had been a time of enormous domesticfinancial and political turmoil that left the state teeteringon the brink of collapse. As pressure from Colombia

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mounted with the increasing penetration of Ecuadorianterritory by Colombians, Ecuador had little in the way of

resources that i t could bring to bear upon i ts problem, givenits already severe internal crisis. Gustavo Noboa, the fifthEcuadorian president in 5 years, came to office in theaftermath of a coup staged by a coali t ion force of disgrunt led

junior army officers and indigenous rights activistsaggrieved by the nations economic crisis.38 The coupattempt fizzled only after the very direct diplomaticintervent ion by t he leaders of neighbor ing states and most

particularly by the United States. All issued strongwarnings concerning the isolat ion Ecuador would face werei t to abandon democracy.

Ecuadors difficulties stemmed from an array of bothinternational and domestic factors. Its most recent crisisemerged as a result of pressures from political, financial,investor, human rights, indigenous rights, and insurgent

forces.39

Desperate for solut ions, the government sought toachieve economic stability by dollarizing the economy.Most observers agreed that this measure alone could dolittle to secure stability for an economy in need of seriousstructural reform. So severe were Ecuadors political andeconomic difficulties that fully 4 percent (500,000) of thepopulation had left the count ry in the 1999-2000 per iod. Atleast one observer pointed to globalization and the

economic transition that has hit the region hard40

as thechief reasons for Ecuadors (and other similarly afflictedstates) acute difficulties. Ecuador had little capacity torespond to rising pressure from the Colombian situation,although it moved some forces to the Colombian border inorder to t ry to increase secur ity.41

Sensing weakness, the FARC bluntly demanded that

Ecuador remain strictly neutral with regard to theColombian confl ict , that i t should refrain from suppor t ingPlan Colombia, and that it should resist the use of thefusarium oxysporum fungus to eradicate coca crops.42

According to FARC representatives,

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There are certainly democratic sectors in Ecuador which are notgoing to support Plan Colombia, and we believe there are

sectors within the Ecuadorian armed forces that are also notgoing to open f ire on their Colombian brothers. The Colombianguerr i l las do not consider the Ecuador ians or their army as theirenemies, neither do they consider the Venezuelans, Peruvians,Brazi l ians, or Panamanians as their enemies. We have enoughland there. To come and fight here, to Ecuador; that would beoutrageous.43

Despite such assurances, Ecuador nonetheless felt

compelled to double i ts border forces to 4,000 t roops44 as thepressure in southern Colombia mounted. EcuadorianFo re i gn M in i s t e r He inz Moe l l e r announced t heimplementation of a combined armed forces and policeborder patrol program.45 According to Colombian sources,Ecuador had become the pr incipal sour ce of suppl ies for theFARC, including food supplies, medicine, provisions,weapons, ammuni t ion, explosives, uni forms.46 Ecuadorian

authorities struggled to respond with limited resources.Farmers were being dr iven off of their land; the Ecuador ianarmy had discovered four cocaine labs in Ecuadorianterritory; Colombian paramilitaries were reported to berunning extortion rings in Ecuador; and FARC and ELNarmed belligerents crossed regularly into Ecuadorianterr it ory with impunity.47 Reports indicate that hundreds ofEcuador ian resident s of t he border area had fled in t he face

of threats from both Colombian guerr i l las and Colombianparamilitaries.48 New evidence suggested FARC compl ici tyin the kidnapping of oil workers in Ecuador, an act thatoriginally was thought to have been the work of internalcriminal elements.49 For Foreign Minister Moeller,however, the problem, more ominously, was that of theideological infi l t rati on of the border .

In the summer of 2000, the Ecuadorian NationalSecur i ty Counci l (CSN), under the leadership of PresidentNoboa, announced that the war on drugs would be a pr ior i tyof the Ecuadorian government, and that the governmentwould devote special efforts to this objective through the

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creation of an Execut ive Uni t t hat would focus upon socialand economic development in the region to be impacted by

Plan Colombia.50At the same time, President Noboaendorsed Plan Colombia51 and asked the Uni ted States for$160 mi l l ion i n assistance to help create an economic bufferzone on its border with Colombia. In particular, Ecuadorsought assistance to deal with Sucumbios province whereColombian i r regular forces congregated fr eely. Ecuador alsosought additional assistance to acquire helicopters, fastboats, and reconnaissance equipment. The $160 million

would be part of Ecuador s 4-year $300 mi l l ion program tostabilize the border region.52 According to Noboa, most ofthe funds would be used to support social and economicdevelopment initiatives in the region. Ecuador had beenallotted $20 million in the emergency supplementalappropriation passed by the U.S. Congress in support ofPlan Colombiain 2000, but much more would be needed tostabi l ize the situation. Ecuador requested furtherassistance in f inancing fi ve camps for refugees planned forlocation on the Colombian border . The Uni ted Nations hadwarned Ecuador to expect an influx of 25-30,000 refugees,with the number potentially exceeding 40,000. Refugeeswould be expected to st ream int o Ecuador fr om ColombiasPutumayo province once the southern offensive intoColombia began, and indeed Ecuador reported that 8,000refugees had arrived in the early days of the Colombianoperation.53 Without enhanced financial support, theEcuadorian President suggested that Ecuador might haveto reconsider i ts agreement wi th t he Uni ted States to allowthe use of i ts ter r i tory by U.S. ant idrug aircraft.

The U.S.-Ecuador ian agreement in quest ion establi sheda Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Manta Air ForceBase on Ecuadors Pacific coast. Under the terms of a

50-year lease agreement and wi th a $62 mil l ion expendi turein runway, hangar, dormitory, and other constructionupgrades, Manta stood as one of t he leading U.S. mi l i taryinitiatives in the region.54 Manta would have 400 U.S.service personnel by October 2001, and would serve as a

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base for airborne warning and control system (AWACS)reconnaissance aircraft and tanker refueling capability

deployed in support of counterdrug reconnaissance.55 Fromthe FARC point of view, the establ ishment of t he U.S. FOLat Manta const i tuted a declarat ion of war, and the FARCwarned that if U.S. aircraft were to fly out of Manta toeradicate crops, the guerrillas would strike targets inEcuador.

In response to the perceived threat, Ecuador stationed

5,000 troops along the Colombian border in t he provinces ofNapos and Sucumbios. According to Ecuadorian sources,the FARC had previously identified Sucumbios as astrategic area, and its intention was to hold this as asecure sanctuary.56 In sum, Ecuador faced intensepressures from virtually all quarters and, because of itsweakness, sought to stengthen its relationship with theUnited States, a measure that was likely to draw it more

direct ly into Colombias cr is is. Some Ecuadorianauthorities worried that Manta would transform Ecuadorinto the new Panama, stripping it of any sovereignpretensions and exposing it to even greater externalthreat.57

Th e Per uvi an Response.

Unlike other states in the Andean Ridge, Peru hadconducted an int ensive counterdrug and counter insurgencyoffensive for over a decade. With President Fujimorisascent to power and subsequent ini t iat ives, Peru developeda set of capabil i t ies that enabled i t to establ ish sovereignt yover its territory and to attack fundamental economicissues. Whi le the process led to an increasinglyauthoritarian and violent pattern of rule, replete with

human r ights abuses and pol i t ical r epression, equil ibriumappeared to be maintained wi thin the system. A consensushad been forged between the political class, the businessclass, and the mi l i tary over the courses of act ion that had tobe taken to reestabl ish sovereignty over Peruvian terr i tory.

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Peru aggressively pur sued narcot raffi ckers and insurgent s,essent iall y winning a mi l i tary victory over both groups.

One clear Peruvian advantage was a well -developed andcredible mi l i tary capabil i ty and a wil l ingness to use force. Inaddit ion, Perus insurgent forces never developed the kindsof l inks with narcotraffickers that proved to be sodevastating in Colombia. Further, Peru developed astrategy for defeating the insurgents that focused uponarming the rural population through the mechanism of

state-sponsored rondas campesinasor self-defense forces.Compared to the Colombian self-defense forces that evolvedover time, the Peruvian rondas proved much moresuccessful , coming to serve as a legit imate auxi l iary to thearmed forces of the state. Peru also adopted an aggressivepolicy of air interdict ion of drug traffickers, shoot ing downscores of nat ional aircraft involved in i l l ici t act ivi ty.

The onset of t he Colombian cr isis proved to be more thana match even for the tested Fuj imor i establ ishment . In part ,the political failures of the 2000 electoral period may havebeen a manifestation of the exhaustion of Fujimorispol i t ical acumen, after years of apparent success. One couldnot argue that a revolt by civi l society caused the defeat ofthe system, since Peruvian civil society was exceedinglydocile. Instead, the fundamentally corrupted character ofthe regime, coupled with the inflammatory nature of theFARC-arms trafficking allegations, triggered a collapse ofconsensus among the ruling political and military elites,causing the regimes profound deterioration beginning inthe summer of 2000. Neither rigged elections, norComandante Gonzalo, nor the Tupac Amaru Revolut ionaryMovement (MRTA) seizure of the Japanese Embassy, northe contest of wi l ls between the Uni ted States and Peru that

often characterized their relationship in the 1990s couldcompare with the delegitimizing impact of the armstrafficking charges, especially as seen within the widercontext of massive government corruption. VladimiroMontesinos involvement in arms trafficking to theColombian FARC forces proved to be a far more devastating

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event than the accumulated difficulties of 10 years ofinternal war i n Peru.58

In the meant ime, evidence suggested that theweakening of the Peruvian state led opportunist ic elementsin the drug industry to begin once again to revive cocaineproduction in Peru despite much progress on the issue.59

Al though data show that coca product ion fel l in 2000 for thefi ft h consecut ive year, dropping from 233,168 acres plantedto 84,474, there were numerous indications that Peru faced

new trafficking challenges ahead. The FARCs 14th frontwas repor ted to cont rol labs in t he Peruvian jungle betweenthe Napo and Putumayo r ivers that r an direct ly into Brazi l .Observers suggested that local narcotrafficking interestswere preparing to bui ld up production in Peru inanticipation of the implementation of Plan Colombia,essent ially by paying higher pr ices to producers. Prices rosesteadil y in Peru; poppies were now being grown and more

cocaine processing was evident , as was the development ofmore labs. More Colombians and M exicans were found t o beinvolved. Regrowth was observed in once abandoned areas,and many new fields and new seed beds were alsoobserved.60

Perus former Minister of Foreign Relations, former U.NRepresent at ive, and cur rent chai r of t he Congresss ForeignRelations Commission, Francisco Tudela van Breugel-Douglas, argued that, within the context of the regionsstruggle for development, a major potential threat is therejection of globalization in the name of defendingr eact ionary utopias or bucol ic ut opias. Tudela suggestedthat bucol ic react ionary pol i t ics may increasingly be l inkedto drug trafficking in the Andean (and other regional) areasbehind what he terms the smokescreen of ethnic pol i t ics.

In other words, some of those defending such bucol ic ut opiasmay be doing so disingenuously, using this pol i t ical agendato mask their true illegal intentions. According to Tudela,Plan Colombia created huge awareness and big fears,pr incipal ly the fear of inject ing large amount s of money intoan economy with rampant illegal activity. Resources may

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fall into the wrong hands, producing far worse outcomes.There were also fears of diasporas and of a domino effect.

For Peru, the spillover from the Colombian crisis wasexpected to come through Ecuador, which is contiguous toPeru. In addition, there was concern as to whether theFARC would move into eastern Ecuador, thus tr igger ing theColombianizati on of t hat count ry.61

The Bol i v i an Di l emma.

In the fall of 2000, Bolivia found itself confronted byprotests and labor strikes, leaving numerous dead andwounded. While teachers were part of the strikingcont ingent , most of t he rancor stemmed from the fai lure ofalt ernat ive development programs to adequately subst i tut efor coca product ion. The United States had commit ted $25mi l l ion for count erdrug effor ts in t he Chapare and Yungasregions and a l located $85 mi l l ion for a l ternat ive

development in these two areas.62 Coca growers unions,however, as they had for years, fought to stop theeradicati on program and t o demi l i tarize the Chapare regionby staging roadblocks throughout the nation, leadingBol ivia to economic and pol i t ical cr isis. Bol ivias capit al ci ty,La Paz, faced food shor tages and was all but blocked off fr omthe rest of the country, as 35,000 coca growers stood theirground. 63 Yet the Banzer government remained commit ted

to the total eradication of i l legal coca leaf by the end of t he2002 presidential term. Even so, peasants who dependedupon the crop for their livelihood in one of the regionspoorest countries resisted: The government says it willtake our land and send us to jail if we persist in growingcoca. We will have no alternative but to defend ourselves,like in Colombia.64 The cocal er os were particularlyincensed over the news that the government wouldconstruct, with U.S. financing, several small garrisons inthe coca growing areas to insure that the crop would not bereplanted.

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I n the 1990s, Bol ivia in fact achieved dramatic success inreducing nat ional acreage devoted to coca product ion. Coca

cultivation was reduced from 78,400 illegal acres to 4,000,according to U.S. sources.65 According to Boli vian sour ces,this signified a loss of some $700 million in illegal drugincome in just 2 years.66 Ironically, the economic deficitcreated by success in the counterdrug effort helped toplummet Bolivia into financial and social crisis. Thegovernment responded by appealing to Washington for debtrel ief and for improvement in t rade relations in text i les, an

economic sector emphasized by Bolivia to provide laboralt ernat ives to the drug industry. Such appeals appeared tohold little promise, particularly vis--vis textiles. As U.S.Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted during herAugust 2000 visit to Bolivia: We did discuss the issue oftextiles. I have to tell you, though, that this is a verycompl icated problem as far as our t rade relations wi th anycountry is concerned. Nevertheless, Albright noted thatBolivia had received $450 mi l l ion i n debt forgiveness fr omthe period 1991 to 1999 and also received $115 millionannually in other assistance.67

Boli vias economic problems cont inued to worsen dur ingthe years of the counterdrug regime and the Banzergovernment . In t he spr ing of 2000, the nat ion was gr ippedby a paralyzing st r ike involving a water project that was to

pr ivatize water investments, dramati cally raising pri ces forthe population. Ambushes, protests, and small-scaleinsurrections increasingly became the stuff of everydayBolivian life.68 While few observers believed that thegovernment faced a threat to i ts existence solely due to theincreasing ferment, it was unable to quell rising levels ofdiscontent . In an at tempt to mol l i fy t hose who decr ied thegovernments mistreatment of the indigenous population

and who urged the white populati on to leave the count ry,the government agreed to appoint a minister for peasantand indigenous affairs. An array of economic concessionswere also promised, suggest ing that the cycle of pr otest andconcession would cont inue to spiral farther . In this context ,

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the potential for a balloon effect in Bolivian narcoticsproduction was a real concern despite the governments

pledge to end al l i l legal coca production by the end of 2002.

Th e Chall enge t o Panama.

Despite Panamas desire to maint ain a pose of neut rali tyas its best shield against being drawn into the Colombiancrisis,69 Carlos Castano, the head of Colombias feared AUCparamilitary self defense forces, accused Panamas

National Guard of openly cooperating for financial gainwi th Colombias insurgent s and declared that he regardedthe Guard as a mi l i tary object ive.70 Despite these threats,some such as Ricardo Ar ias Calderon argued that Panamamust insist upon maintaining its neutrality to safeguardthe Canal, and further suggested that a Contadora-likeeffort be developed to forge a regional peace, with Brazilpotentially taking the lead in the effort.71 Panamas

ambassador to the United States, Guil lermo Ford,commented that Plan Colombiais for Colombia. Panamadoes not want to get involved in the internal problems ofColombia. Weve been shying away from that in everyway.72

Threats to Panamanian citizens were escalating. TheRoman Catholic bishop of Darien, Romulo Emiliani, was

forced to flee the province because of threats from theColombian paramilitary forces. While Panamas PresidentMireya Moscoso promised more support to those attempt ingto po l i ce the bo rde r , Panaman ian te r r i t o ry wast ransgressed and ut i l ized with impunity by insurgents andparamil i tary forces. Colombian civi l ians fled in increasingnumbers to Panama as refugees from both insurgents andparamil i taries. Al though Panamanian pol ice twice engaged

wi th FARC insurgents in Panamas Dar ien province dur ing2000, these Panamanian forces had li t t le or no capacity t orespond and were no match for the well-equipped andcomparatively well-trained forces of the FARC and theAUC.

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Panama has been used cont inuously as a major venue forarms shipments, a pract ice that was l ikely to increase as the

FARC boosts i ts forces to an expected 30-35,000 combatant sin response to Plan Colombia. By the same token, the AUCwas expected to increase its forces in response to theexpected FARC increases. To the extent that armsshipments traversed Central America and implicatedCent ral Amer ica, the expansion of the network of corrupt ionand cr iminal i ty could only be expected to expand fur ther .73

I ndeed, the problem of arms-for-cocaine t rafficking reached

deeply into Mexico, Americas own neighbor, where FARCcooperation wi th Mexicos Ti juana Car tel was under attackby Mexicos new Fox administ ration.

Since the implementation of the Panama CanalTreaties, discussions have taken place concerning thepossibility of establishing a new arrangement for a U.S.presence in Panama. At the time of final implementation,

negotiations had taken place to establish a MultinationalDrug Center, but final agreement was never reached. Theprospect of a retur n of U.S. forces to Panama was a diff icul tmatter for Panamanians, but the Panamanian governmentwas able to forge an agreement wi th t he Uni ted States forthe t raining of 1,000 Panamanian pol ice assigned to borderpatrol.

Panamas substant ial involvement in money launder ingact ivi t ies was a source of cont inuing concern. I n July 2000,the U.S. Department of Treasury included Panama on ablackl ist of states that were not cooperating with effor ts tocontrol money laundering activit ies.74 Panama wasincluded on the U.S. Financial Action Task Force list ofNon-Cooperative Countries and Territories. Panama,however, pressured the United States to be removed from

the li st as acknowledgement of i ts cooperation i n r eceivingPerus Vladimiro Montesinos into the country on atemporary asylum basis at the request of t he Uni ted Statesand the OAS. Panama did so because it had been allegedthat a mil i tary coup was in the offi ng in Peru as a resul t ofthe Montesinos affair .

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President Moscosos position was that Plan Colombiawas a matter between Colombia and t he Uni ted States, and

declared her intention to avoid having Panama becomeinvolved in the program. At the same time, Panama wassingularly ill-equipped to grapple with the illegal andcr iminal operati ons that were at the root of t he Colombiancrisis. Some would argue that Panama faced the choice ofbecoming entirely overwhelmed by Colombian forces orseeking to establ ish, once again, what could only amount toa protectorate relationship with the United States.

Ultimately, concern for the security of the Panama Canalmay further increase pressures on Panama to take moreformal steps in t hat direct ion. The recent seizure of ai rcraftby FARC forces from a former U.S. base may indicate ar ising threat in Panama.

Th e Br azi l i an Calcul us.

At the Fourth Defense Ministerial of the Americasconvened in the city of Manaus, Brazi l , Brazi l ian presidentFernando Henrique Cardoso issued a call for sharedcooperation t o deal with the drug problem. This would formpart of a new concept of secur ity for the region. We share abroad concept of regional security which depends ondemocracy and sustainable development, values that havetaken root from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.75 One of the

presidents greatest concerns was the need to shield theAmazon region from t he fur ther spread of narcot rafficking.Toward that end, some years ago the Brazi l ian governmentlaunched i ts plan for the Survei l lance of t he Amazon System(SIVAM/SIPAM). The $1.7 billion system of radars andsensors, to be supported by reconnaissance and fighteraircraft, was to provide the eyes and the reach for theBrazilian government into the Amazon to establishsovereignt y in i ts vast , unwatched, and uncont rol led areas.The system, according to Cardoso, would enable thegovernment to r einforce our presence with t echnology, not

just with men.76 Yet Cardoso stated at the DefenseMinister ial meet ings held in Manaus that the problem i s a

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domest ic problem, and that we are not interested at all inany kind of Br azi l ian intervent ion in Colombia.77

There was no doubt about Br azi l s deep concern over i tsborder areas and i ts Amazon terr i tor ies. Brazi l scommitment to i ts new enormously expensive sur vei l lancesystem came in a period of dramatically reduced overalldefense spending for the Brazilian state. Further, itdovetail ed wi th t he wholesale redesign of Brazi l ian defensepolicy that shifted the focus of the nations defenses from

Brazi l s southern border wi th Ar gent ina to i ts nor thern andwestern borders in the Amazon region. In addition topreparati ons for the deployment of SIVAM /SIPAM, Brazi lalso deployed additional police along its 1,000 mile borderwith Colombia. More dramatically, in reaction to pressureon i ts border , Brazi l stat ioned a total of 23,000 t roops alongthe border in 63 locations, up fr om a force of 6,000 in 1991.These forces were to remain stationed in these positions

throughout the duration of Plan Colombia.78

Put most direct ly, however , Brazi l ian author it ies did not

support Plan Colombia. Whi le they suppor ted a negot iatedsettlement, they did not support what was viewed as amilitary approach to the problem. They feared U.S.intervention in the region, worried about sovereigntyissues, and wished to preserve their own leadership opt ionsas the major regional power. Brazilian officials chose tocharacter ize the insurgent cr isis as an exclusively int ernalpol i t ical matt er (much as did the Uni ted States) that wouldhave to be resolved politically within Colombia. As withother states in the region, the government feared thatheightened mi l i tary act ivi ty in Colombia would simply pushthe problem across Brazils borders. Moreover, Brazilianauthor it ies worr ied about the envi ronmental effects of crop

fumigation in Colombia and the potential for winds fromColombia to carry chemicals over the Amazon.

According to General Alberto Cardoso, PresidentCardosos chief security advisor, For Brazil, Colombia iscausing the biggest worry. Our attent ion is dedicated to the

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effects it could have on Brazil, like the flight of guerrillasand the transfer of [drug] laboratories and plantations. 79

Although President Cardoso indicated that PresidentPastrana deserves our firm support,80 Foreign MinisterLampreia clearly delineated Brazils intent during anAugust 2000 visit to Brasilia by U.S. Secretary of StateAlbright who was seeking Brazils support for PlanColombia. The Foreign Minister outlined Brazilian policywi th r egard to possible cooperati on with t he Uni ted Statesand Colombia as foll ows:

Now, your quest ion about possible common action programs:No, I would say that we do not have the same degree ofcommitment with the drug trafficking program of PresidentPastrana or his peace plan. But that being said, weve toldPresident Pastrana that we will review with interest, and ofcourse, within our possibilities, we will try to answerpositively to any request from Colombia to try to help theirdevelopment and their peace process, but we have no intent ion

of participating in any common or consorted internationalact ion in the count ry.81

According to one newspaper report, Minister Lampreiastressed the autonomy of Brazil, Latin Americas largestcount ry, and said Brazi l would not par t icipate in the majorWashington campaign to help battle Colombian drugtraffickers.82 In a similar vein, Minister Lampreia also

outlined Brazils disagreement with regional calls forsanct ions on Peru for i ts electoral i r regulari t ies of t he spr ingand summer 2000.

Warning of t he l ikely fl ight of drug operati ves into Brazi lonce Colombias southern offensive began in December2000, representatives of the USSOUTHCOM reportedlysought to encourage col laboration wi th Brazi l and proposed

police, military, and intelligence cooperation, but found aless than ent husiast ic response.83 On the other hand, whi leBrazil did not support what it viewed as the militaryapproach taken by the United States and Colombia, itnonetheless expressed willingness to share intelligencegathered from t he SIVAM system with Colombia. Al though

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the Brazilian legislature in 1998 passed an aggressiveshoot-down policy designed to control aircraft entering

Brazilian airspace illegally,84 the policy had yet to beimplemented to the consternat ion of some mil i tary and lawenforcement authorities. Nevertheless, Brazil reportedlyintended to spend $3.5 billion for fighter aircraft andtransport aircraft to support its new surveillance system,and planned to refurbish 100 jets in support of theprogram.85 Brazil also reportedly entered a partnershipwith t he European Aeronaut ic Defense and Space Company

(EADS) to support Amazon surveillance operations andheld discussions for purchase of heavy troop transportheli copters wi th Russias Rosoboronexpor t .86 In sum, Brazi lmoved aggressively t o respond at the national level to theperceived regional threat despite its marked reluctance toparticipate in region-wide, collective security solutions tothe cr isis.

FARC insurgents routinely used Brazilian territory assanctuary and to obtain food, medicine, and suppl ies. Brazi lalso served as an important transshipment venue fornarcot ics, and had become a substant ial sour ce of pr ecursorchemicals. Brazi l ian ter r i tory had already been the si te (onrare occasion) of mi l i tary engagement involving Colombianforces. Yet a precedent was set when Colombian t roops fl edto Brazil ian ter r it ory foll owing the FARC assault in Mit u in

1998. Although Colombian forces counterattacked andpartially retook the city by staging from Brazil, Brazilianauthorities preferred to declare this use of Braziliannational territory as primarily involving humanitarianconsiderations for the beleaguered Colombian troops inorder to avoid a confrontation with Colombia over theissue.87

Brazils overall policy conformed to its longstandingprinciples of independence and reluctance to cooperate informal military terms with projects involving the UnitedStates. More than any other state touched by the spreadingcont agion, Brazi l had t he resour ces to marshal a defense ofits territory and sovereignty largely on its own terms, yet

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this would be no guarantee of success because of theelusiveness and mobility of opposing forces and the

insidiously corrupting influences upon what were nowout-manned law enforcement and military forces.

At present , despite the fact that there are 23,000 tr oopsstationed in the Amazon area, they are poorly prepared totackle the agile forces that constitute the potentialadversary. Fur ther , Brazi l cur rent ly only has a handful ofpol ice outposts available to contest i l legal ent ry and i l legal

act ivi t ies. Whi le Brazi l recognized that the border must befor t i fied, i t did not adopt a Maginot l ineapproach. I t fearedmore the ons laught o f mass ive d rug use , d rugmanufacturing, and arms trafficking, recognizing thatdomestic Brazilian drug consumption levels had latelyskyrocketed. Brazi l has already suffered spi l lover effects for2 decades in i ts border region with Colombia: cocaine pastehad routinely been routed in from Peru, and the refined

drug was impor ted from Colombia for export or for domest icconsumpt ion. Brazi l also feared the prospects of U .S. armedforces on i ts border , owing to longstanding suspicions aboutU.S. intentions in the Amazon region. In recognition ofthese growing fears, Brazi l recent ly announced a 3-year $10million program dubbed Operation COBRA which wouldincrease pol ice presence at border crossings, on waterways,and in air space. The program involved seven Brazilian

federal agencies as well as the army.88

A NEW AGENDA

Although U.S. authorit ies readi ly admitted thatattent ion would have to be paid to the regional impl icati onsof both the crisis in Colombia and Plan Colombia, theapproach taken tended to be bilateral and reactive rather

than proact ive on a mult i lateral basis. As Ecuador s ForeignMinister admitted, Colombia had provided no informationabout its plan to neighboring states. Indeed, few withinColombia had much of a sense of the plans object ives. Yet ,the regional nature of the problem was clearly noted by

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senior U.S. officials. Former Under Secretary of StateThomas R. Picker ing observed that , wi th r espect to requests

for aid to the region, I think this is evolving now into notjust a pure Colombia issue, but an Andean regional issue,something i t has always been. I think in future years therewill be a broader regional aspect to this as we plan andpropose to the Congress new budgets for this kind ofactivity.89

Though the Clinton administrations reaction to the

growing crisis in the Andes had focused narrowly uponColombia, the hemispheric summi t process had also tendedto over look the expl ici t regional threat. Indeed, at the 1998Santiago summit, virtually no mention was made of thethreat to Colombia and adjacent states, al though the issueof narcotraffi cking was cer tainly addressed.90 The situat ionwould change in important ways wi th t he advent of t he 2001Quebec Summi t .

Prior to the Summit, regional leaders traveled toWashington in unprecedented numbers (for such an earlypoint in a new U.S. administration) to consult about theurgency of the regional crisis and to appeal for a newapproach. While the Bush administration sought to movecautiously, it was clear that even the more limitedcounterdrug option that had previously characterized U.S.policy in the region was facing more and more complexchallenges. The State Departments annual report onnarcotics stated:

With t he drug tr ade now an organic part of t he Colombian civi lconfl ict , the quest ion facing the antidrug coali t ion wi l l be how toreduce the supply of illegal drugs without exacerbating localconfl icts that threaten regional stabil i ty.91

Several factors appear to have converged to encour age aseries of new initiatives from regional leaders concerningthe crisis. To begin with, the election of Vicente Fox inMexico appeared to have facilitated Colombias apparentrapprochement with President Chavez of Venezuela,

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leading to the revival of t he long mor ibund Group of Three(Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico). The subsequent

improved spir i t of amicabi l i ty, fol lowing intense diplomaticefforts to mend relations, led to new initiatives in theColombian-Venezuelan relat ionship, including theannouncement of joint border operations with theColombian and Venezuelan armed forces.92

This measure of progress in turn facilitated theconvening of the meeting of the Andean leaders in

Cart egena, Colombia, on Apri l 19, 2001, immediately pr iorto the Quebec Summit. This meeting produced severaldramatic developments. First, in a remarkable turnabout,President Chavez announced that he no longer had anyreservat ions concerning Plan Colombia. Whi le denying thathi s pol icy had changed, he declared, What we had warnedabout, not against Plan Colombia, but against it s mi li tarycomponent, that chapter has been closed. Doubts that

existed in any instance regarding Plan Colombiahave nowbeen clarified.93 Chavez elsewhere explained that thebr iefi ngs he had received revealed a plan for socio-economicdevelopment that addressed inequality and that deservedsupport.

With Chavez no longer an obstacle to a regionalapproach, the Andean leaders next developed what theytermed a Regional Counternarcotics Strategy.94 Thestrategy called for the formation of a bloc for politicalcooperation to deal with the scourge of illicit drugs and tocreate alternatives for development that would promotelegal employment.95 As a cornerstone of the approach, t heAndean leaders call ed for renewal of the U.S. Andean TradePreferences Act set to expi re in December 2001 to st imulateeconomic growth and employment in the region. The

proposal called for the inclusion of Venezuela in t he group ofbeneficiary nations. The leaders asked that the Act beamended to cover all products manufactured in t he region,specifically emphasizing the inclusion of textiles.96 It alsoprovided for a full exemption from tariffs and quotas forAndean product ion. The new strategy, among other things,

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called for cooperating states to create joint policies and toreach border agreement s in order to combat dr ug cartels.97

At the Quebec Summi t , the Andean leaders present ed aletter to President Bush, again urging renewal of a moregenerous Andean Trade Preferences Act, declaring Weneed real help. Together, the leaders of Colombia, Peru,Bol ivia, and Ecuador (act ing on their own and Venezuelasbehalf) urged swi ft act ion to improve the regions economicprospects. While a spirit of cooperation prevailed despite

President Chavezs declaration t hat Venezuela might not beable to join the Free Trade of the Americas Act (FTAA)unless approved by popular referendum, the prospect forAndean regional cooperation in problem-solving appearedto have bright ened considerably.

For its part, the Bush administration unveiled itsproposal for Fiscal Year 2002 support for the region. ItsAndean Regional Ini t iati ve proposed to t r iple the amount ofsupport for Colombias neighbor ing states and substant iall yincreased the proportion of funds devoted to economicdevelopment as compared to int erdict ion. While appearingto be responsive to calls for a broader approach to theregions problem, the Andean Regional In i t ia t ivenonetheless established performance goals of a 30 percentreduction in Colombian coca production between January2000 and December 2002, and cal led for the el iminat ion ofall i l legal coca product ion i n Bol ivia by the end of calendaryear 2002.98

Whi le the per formance goals ident i fied by the ini t iativeappear to be predictably one-dimensional, the Summi t alsoproduced a commitment to support investment in the regionpreparatory to the FTAA. The Wor ld Bank and the IADBreportedly pledged $20 billion to strengthen democratic

foundations in the region.99 Performance cri ter iaassociated with these funds were l ikely to targetfoundational issues of national development as stipulatedby t he programs purposes.

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The multifaceted crises of the Andean Ridge states andspillover from the acute Colombian crisis threatened

stabil i ty, democracy, and economic prospects in t he region.The complexity and the reverberatory internationalcharacter of t hese threats outst r ipped the capabi l i ty of themajority of states in the region to resist these pressures.Within the context of expanding globalization, one mighthave expected that the first inclination on the part of thebesieged states would have been a col laborat ive approach t omeet ing these chal lenges. Yet , as globalizat ion increasingly

undermined state sovereignty, leaders in turn found itcorrespondingly more difficult to embrace approaches thatfurther reduced national sovereignty, even for plausiblepurposes. This is particularly the case in the LatinAmer ican envi ronment where the pol i t ical cul ture of foreignpolicy t radit ion has so emphat icall y elevated to pr imacy thepr inciples of non-intervent ion, nat ional self-determination,and sovereignty.

The Andean cr isis had reached such pr opor t ions in theminds of regional leaders, however, that they began toconsider the benefits of collective action. While theseleadershad yet t o agree upon a regional secur ity approach t othe crisis, their efforts to coordinate economic policy,develop an avenue to cooperative border management,arrive at coordinated counterdrug policies, and, perhaps

most importantly, reach a unified position on the UnitedStates, were positive steps toward fashioning a regionalstance. At the same t ime, opt imism had to be tempered bythe record of prior efforts toward Andean regionalcooperation that have proved disappoint ing.

Cer tainl y U .S. react ion t o these ini t iati ves would be ofthe u tmos t impor tance in e i ther encourag ing o r

discouraging such innovation. Also important would beBrazils decision either to embrace a new approach on theissue, taking a cue from the Andean leaders, or to remainlargely aloof from regional security cooperation. Bycontrast, Mexicos new leaders appeared to be creating amodel for the region for a new era of regional security

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cooperation. For their part , as the Andean states sought torecover stability and defeat their adversaries, they were

being forced to grapple wi th complexi t ies in theinternational environment that would require changes intheir approach to interstate behavior, changes that theywere now apparent ly more wi l l ing to accept.

CONCLUSION

For the moment, despite speculation concerning its

future att i tude to the Colombian cr is is, the Bushadministration remains committed to supporting PlanColombia.100 Early reports from the administrat ionsuggested a degree of uncertainty regarding the overallpolicy approach, the heightened emphasis upon WesternHemisphere affairs notwi thstanding. Indications have beenthat the ent i re pol icy wi l l be undergoing extensive review.

In the interim, the administration has broadened itsfocus on the issue to include more emphasis upondevelopment programs along with more emphasis uponsupport for Colombias neighbor ing states.101 U.S. Secretaryof State Colin Powell has suggested that the AndeanRegional Initiative represents a more comprehensiveperspective. Powell stated that the

regional ini t iati ve that I wi l l be defending before the Congress . . .allows us in future years not just to focus on narco-tr afficking inColombia but to see the problem as a regional problem and toinvest in human rights activities, to invest in infrastructuredevelopment, to invest in economic opportunities that willencourage people to move away from narco-trafficking , and tosee this problem as a regional problem and not just a simpleproblem of narco-traffickers in Colombia alone. 102

The Andean Regional Initiative has been described asproviding comprehensive and coordinated assistance toseven di fferent countr ies impacted by the Colombian cr isis,and was developed in consultation wi th the seven recipientstates and with European and other potential donors. 103

This new level of coordination represents a positive

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beginning for what needs to be a systematic multistateanalysis of t he problem. U.S. author i t ies have argued that

this k ind of coordinat ion was not possible in the moment ofcr isis to which t he $1.3 bil l ion supplemental Plan Colombiaappropr iat ion responded.104

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State forWestern Hemisphere Affairs William R. Brownfield, theshift resulted from criticism of the plan and of the UnitedStates package of support for the plan which was labeled as

being too focused on security and law enforcement andoverly focused on Colombia.105 The complaints of int erestgroups, the United States Congress, the news media, andEuropean donor countries; consultations in Bogota andMadr id; and t he inf luence of M exico and Brazi l pushed theadminist rat ion to redirect i ts energies and resources to thethree dsdemocracy, development, and drugs. Elsewhere,other administration officials had argued that the initial

package of U.S. support for Plan Colombia emphasizingsecurity and hardware acquisition had laid the necessarygroundwork that would permit more emphasis later uponprograms geared to social stabi l ization.

Whi le the shi ft in emphasis had much t o commend i t , theconclusion implicit in the change was that Colombiassecur i ty s i tuat ion had improved to the point thatsubstantial new sums could be profitably introduced intoColombian social programs designed to defend democracyand to promote development, including improvement of

just ice systems, alt ernat ive crop development , and so for th.Yet no evidence to that effect was present ed or even hint edat. Indeed, Colombian government plans called for theaddit ion of 10,000 more soldiers per year to the army unt i lthe army and pol ice are large enough t o provide secur ity for

their entire country.

106

the regional security crisisin the an des patterns of state response pub21

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