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Harry Truman's Recognition of IsraelAuthor(s): Michael OttolenghiSource: The Historical Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 963-988Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4091664 .

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TheHistoricalJoumrnal,7, 4 (2004), pp. 963-988 ? 2004 CambridgeUniversityPress

DOI: Io.ioi7/Sooi8246Xo4004o66 Printed n the United Kingdom

HARRY TRUMAN'S RECOGNITION

OF ISRAEL*MICHAEL OTTOLENGHI

FordhamUniversity choolofLaw

ABSTRACT. HistoriographicalccountsfHary Truman'srecognitionf Israelhaveplacedundue

importancenthisapparentlyuddencton14May1948. US Palestinepolicyhasnotbeenlacednthe

correctistoricalontextftheColdWar.Asa' ColdWar onsensus'evelopedn Washingtonnthe arly

post-wareriod,alestine

mergedsa

secondaryssueothe

majoroncernhatwas heNorthernier'

ofGreece,urkey,nd ran.TheUSwasguidedybroad ut lear bjectivesn Palestine:heattainmentfa

peacefulolution, desirenot to implicateUS troops, nd thedenialof theregiono theSoviets.

DisagreementsetweenheWhiteHouseand heStateDepartmentere ll expressedithinhese road

policyobjectives.sraeli ourcesavebeensignificanty theirabsencen theexisting istoriographyf

recognition.heseourcesevealhator the ewishcommunityn Palestine,iplomaticictoriesere f

secondaSmportanceothe racticalchievementfstatehood.rom oth Washingtonerspective,nd he

perspectivefromalestine, Srecognitionasnotregardedsa crucialssue t the ime.t wasa decision

takenwithinhecontextfbroadUS objectivesn Palestine,nd t didnot nfluencehedecisionf the

Yishuvodeclaretatehood.

In a 1966 speech, Eliahu Elath (ne Epstein), then president of the Hebrew

University of Jerusalem, affirmed that Harry Truman's recognition of Israel

would remain forever inscribed 'in golden letters in the four thousand years'

history' of theJewish people.1 This was one example of the lavish praise bestowed

upon Truman by Israeli officials, who came to see US recognition as a symbol of

the United States's special affinity towards the State of Israel. In 1949, for ex-

ample, the chief rabbi of Israel told Truman that God had put him in his mother's

womb so that he could be the instrument 'to bring about the rebirth of Israel after

two thousand years'.

Historiographical accounts that deal with Truman's recognition have also

placed great importance on Truman's apparently sudden act, a mere eleven

* Iwouldike o thank heBritishCouncil, rinityHall,Cambridge,nd heCambridgeuropeanTrustor heirgenerousunding, nd hestaff t the Truman ibrarynIndependence, issouri,ndtheCentralZionistArchivesnJerusalemor theirassistanceo myresearch. hankso Prof.A.J.Badger,DrS.P.Martland,ndProf.J.Steinbergor heirhelpful uggestions,swellastomyparentsfor their

support throughout.1 Cited nG.C.GrossmanndR.Kirschener,ds.,Onmoralrounds:residentarry. Trumannd he

birthf heStatefIsraelLosAngeles,Ca.1998), . i8.2 MerleMiller,Plainpeaking:noral iographyfHarry. TrumanNewYork,1973), . 218.

963







964 MICHAEL OTTOLENGHI

minutes after the birth of Israel.3But it is far from clear that the importance givento Truman's act of recognition is at alljustified from a historical perspective. One

of the main problems with the historiography of recognition is the peculiar placeit

occupiesat the intersection of various historical 'sub-fields'. Truman scholars

analysing recognition have tended to focus on the direct personal motivations ol

the president, while diplomatic historians have approached the issue of recog-nition by following the paper trail pointing to the feuds between the State

Department and the White House on Palestine policy.4This article attempts to reconcile the different historiographies of US recog-

nition of Israel by adopting a methodological approach that has emerged in

studies of diplomatic history. As a result, the prevailing view that recognition was

a crucial event will be challenged.What Michael Hogan and others have called the 'realist' approach to the

history of foreign policy has been subjected to numerous critiques. These critiques

point out that realist diplomatic history relies excessively on official US docu-

ments, which results in the adoption of the 'view from Washington' and the

exaggeration of the influence of the United States in the world.5 Christopher

Thorne, for example, described 'realist' diplomatic history as plagued by

'national, cultural and disciplinary parochialism'.6 The critics of realist diplo-matic history called for multiarchival research and a greater emphasis on the

domestic sphere, and how this influenced foreign policy.These criticisms are relevant to the historiography of the recognition of Israel.

This article will focus on the most significant charge that could be levelled againstthe existing accounts of recognition: the disregard for the Israeli perspective.Some historians have recently used some Israeli source material, but only tcreinforce their points on the importance of recognition.' This article will seek tc

apply a multiarchival approach to Truman's recognition of Israel, reconciling the

different historiographies involved by using Israeli sources alongside American

ones. Recognition will emerge as a minor point in US policy towards Palestine,

and an event of minimal importance to the Jews in Palestine.

The first section will place Palestine in the proper strategic and regional context

of the post-war period (until the UN partition resolution of November 1947), as

seen from a Washington perspective. This contextualization will reconcile the

historiography of recognition with the broader historiography of the Cold War,

'See, for example,David McCullough, TrumanNewYork,1992),p. 619;ZacharyKarabell,Th7

lastcampaign:owHary Trumanon he 948 electionNewYork,2000), p. 94; PeterGrose,Israeln themine

ofAmericaNewYork,1983),pp. 288-95.

4 For an accountby a Trumanscholar,see RobertFerrell,Harry . Truman: life Columbia,MS.

andLondon,1994); or a diplomatichistoryperspective, ee RitchieOvendale,Britain,heUnitedtates,and heendofthePalestineMandate,942-1948 (Woodbridge,1989).

5 Michael Hogan and RobertPaterson, 'Introduction', n Michael Hogan and Robert Paterson,

eds., Explaininghe

historyofAmericanoreignelationsCambridge,1991),pp. I-9.6 Robert McMahon, 'The studyof Americanforeignrelations:nationalhistoryor international

history?', in Hogan and Paterson, eds., Explainingthehistoiy,p. 12.

7 Michael Benson, Hary S. Trumanand theoundingof Israel(Westport, CT, 1997), pp. I64-7I-







TRUMAN'S RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL 965

which is often lacking in accounts of recognition.8 While important differences

existed between the State Department and the White House over Palestine, by

1947 a strong 'Cold War consensus' had emerged on domestic and foreign policy,

according to a leading historian of the era.9 The differences between the WhiteHouse and the State Department were being formulated within a series of broad

strategic objectives for Palestine, and ultimately contrasting views were the result

of tactical differences over how best to achieve the strategic objectives for

Palestine.

The second section will address the same time period from the perspective of

the Yishuv (theJewish Community in Palestine), by using documents from the

Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. Regardless of the Washingtonian policy

debates, the Yishuv was committed to declaring statehood. The events of the

post-war period, until the partition resolution of 29 November 1947, were all

considered within the prospect of statehood. After the partition resolution, the

Yishuv stepped up its preparations for statehood, with little concern for diplo-matic niceties such as recognition.

The third section will combine the 'view from Washington' with the perspec-tive from Palestine, to analyse the chronological developments in Palestine from

the partition resolution of November 1947 through to recognition in May 1948.The multiarchival approach will show how recognition was not regarded as a

crucial issue. In Washington, recognition was a decision taken within the context

of the broad objectives of policy towards Palestine, whereas for the Yishuv rec-

ognition was of secondary importance compared to the desire to obtain a sus-pension of the American embargo on arms to Palestine.

I

While the importance of the Cold War 'geopolitical code' in US foreign policyhas been the focus of a rich historiography, it has been surprisingly under-

emphasized in the historiography of United States foreign policy towards

Palestine.1oHistorians seem to have focused more on the immediate interaction

between the United States and the Jewish and Arab sides than on the broader

framework within which US foreign policy was formulated. The emphasis ofcertain studies on clashes between the State Department and the White House on

Palestine misses the important point made by the historiography of the early Cold

War about the emergence of a foreign policy consensus by 1947.12Furthermore,

8 See, for example,DonaldNeff,Fallen illars:U.S.policyowardsalestinendIsrael ince 945(Washington,C, i995);Ovendale, ritain,heUnitedtates;enson,Trumannd heoundingfIsrael.

9 MelvynP.Leffler, preponderancefpower:ationalecurity,heTrumandministrationnd heColdWar

(Stanford,A,1992),pp.138-40.10JohnLewisGaddis, trategiesfcontainment:criticalppraisalfpostwarmericanationalecurityolicy

(Oxford,982),p. ix.11See,forexample,Neff,Fallenillars; vendale, ritain,heUnitedtates.12Foranemphasisn StateDepartment-Whiteouseclashesee,forexample,Benson,Truman

and heoundingfIsrael;orthe Cold War 'consensus' see Leffler,Preponderancefpower,p. I38-40.








the fact that this consensus was elaborated by the same State Department and

administration officials who would later clash bitterly over Palestine calls for a less

simplistic understanding of the relationship between the White House and the

State Department.The relationship between Harry Truman and the State Department was

mostly a close one. This can be seen by the handling of the USSR, which was

largely based on the vision of the American charge d'affaires in Moscow, George

Kennan, in his 'long telegram' of 22 February 1946.13 InJuly 1946, Truman asked

Clark Clifford, his special counsel, and his assistant, George Elsey, to write a

report analysing the Kremlin's motivations and recent actions, and suggest di-

rections for American policy. Clifford and Elsey solicited the help of the State,

War, and Navy departments, theJoint Chiefs of Staff, and others.14Such an inter-

departmental effort highlights the emergence of a common position towards the

USSR.15

Indeed, the report adopted Kennan's view of the Soviet Union as seekingworld domination, and prescribeda detailed course of action for the United

States. The reportadvocatedthat the United Statesmobilize its economic and

militarypowerto 'assistall democraticcountrieswhichare in anywaysmenaced

by the USSR', and emphasizedthe importanceof WesternEurope,the Middle

East,andJapan.16These are the same areashighlightedby Kennan throughout

1946and 1947as 'an irreducibleminimumof nationalsecurity'.1 This stemmed

from convictionas much as from necessity,as the limitedresourcesavailableto

pursuethispolicyof containmentrequired hatspendingfocuson areas essentialto national security,or 'strongpoints'.1s This extended the global objectivesof

containment practicallyinto differentregional spheres, including the Middle

East,althoughnot to Palestine,which was neverseriouslyregardedas a locus of

containment of Soviet power.The similarities between the Clifford-Elsey report and Kennan's views on

Soviet power indicate that there was a 'Cold War consensus' developing by late

1946, regardless of the validity of its assumptions on Soviet motivations. 1Both the

Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey should be

understood in thelight

of thisemerging

Cold War consensus, which focused on

la Leffler,Preponderancefpower, p. 26-7; long telegram n GeorgeF. Kennan,Memoirs,925-1950

(London, 1968),pp. 557-9. The relationshipbetween Kennan'swritingsand the Truman adminis-

tration'spolicieshas been termed'inherentlycomplex'by Gaddis n Strategiesfcontainment,p. 26, 54.14 Clifford o Truman,September 1946,in ArthurKrock,Memoirs:ixtyyearsnthefiringine New

York,1968),p. 419.

15Forexamplesof the stance of the StateDepartment,see StateDepartmentIntelligenceReview,

March/April 1946, n Dennis Merrill,ed., DocumentaryistogyftheTrumanpresidency20 vols.,Bethesda,

Md., 1996),vii, pp. 117-21. FortheJointChiefsof Staff,see Leahyto Truman,26July1946, n Merrill,

ed., Documentaryistoly ftheTrumanresidency,n, pp. 184-97.16 'American relations with the Soviet Union': a report to the president, in Krock, Memoirs,

PP. 479-80. 17 Gaddis, Strategies f containment, . 30.

s18Leffler, Preponderancefpower, p. 147. 19 Ibid., p. 138.








resisting the spread of Soviet influence by shoring up regimes favourable to US

interests militarily and economically, and focusing on essential regions.

The Middle East was one such strongpoint region to be defended.20 This

particular region was under immediate threat from the Soviet Union alongits 'Northern Tier' of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The policies of the Truman

administration in this region reflected the shift from diplomatic negotiations to

containment, as the Soviet Union failed to live up to its guarantees in Iran, and

was accused of continuing to subvert the political stability of Greece and Turkey.

It was in the Northern Tier that the Truman administration learnt the effective-

ness of taking a firm stand against the USSR, first in Iran, and then by enacting

the Truman Doctrine.21

It is within this context that the issue of Palestine should be seen, although

Palestine itself was not considered a vital region. Additionally, there was the

complication of the incoherent policy inherited from Franklin D. Roosevelt, who

had managed to commit his support for a 'Jewish Commonwealth' as well as a

promise not to change the basic situation in Palestine without 'full consultation'

with the Arab states.22The complexity of the situation, and the lack of a direct

Soviet threat, enabled the proponents of different solutions to the Palestine

problem to anchor their diverging arguments in the rhetoric of a defence against

the unknown intentions of the USSR.

This is precisely the issue which has been surprisingly overlooked by the his-

toriography of the Truman administration's relations with Palestine. Indeed, ra-

ther than looking at Palestine from the perspective of the Cold War, historianshave argued about the true motivations of the Truman administration's stance

toward Palestine, making arguments for humanitarian, political, and 'moral'

motivations.23 These accounts note the important differences between the presi-

dent's sympathy with the cause of the Jewish people and the reluctance of State

Department specialists to alienate the Arab states. However, while both State

Department and White House documents do reveal important differences over

the handling of specific issues, there also emerges a consensus on the fundamental

objectives of US policy in Palestine. These were a refusal to implicate US troops

inPalestine, and an emphasis on denying the country

to the Soviets while work-

ing towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Bearing these broader concerns

in mind is useful, for they clearly stem from the economic and geographical

20 DeanAcheson, resenttthe reation:y earsn the tate epartmentLondon, 969), . 219.21BruceKuniholm, he riginsf heColdWarn theNearEast: reatoweronflictnddiplomacynIran,

TurkeyndGreecePrinceton,NJ, 1980),p. 303.22 Support forJewish Commonwealth see, Roosevelt to Wagner, 15 Oct. 1944, Foreign Relations of

the UnitedStates(FRUS)1944,vol.v, pp. 615-16; assuranceo Arabstatessee,forexample,Roosevelt

to IbnSaud,5 Apr.1945,FRUS1945, ol.viii,p. 698.2' For hehumanitarianerspectiveeeJonathanDaniels,Theman f ndependenceNewYork, 950),

andChristopherykes,Crossroadso sraelNewYork,1965);orthepoliticalrgumenteetheearliestaccount fJohnSnetsinger, ruman,heewishote nd he reationfIsraelStanford,A, 974),andZvi

Ganin, Truman,American ewry and Israel, 1945-1948 (New York, 1979); for the 'moral' argument, see

Benson, Trumanand theoundingofIsrael.








constrictions imposed by containment. Because Palestine and the Arab world

were not seen as central to Cold War concerns, differences of opinion between

the State Department and the White House were possible, as they did not jeop-

ardize fundamental US interests.24The first point of contact between the Truman administration and Palestine

was the issue of the Jewish displaced persons (DPs) in Europe in 1945. The issue

was defined by the report of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees,headed by Earl G. Harrison. The report, presented on 24 August 1945, was highlycritical of the conditions in which these Jewish DPs lived, and noted that the

treatment of the Jews by the Allies was little different than what they knew under

the Nazis, 'except we do not exterminate them'. 2 Since many of the DPs wanted

to go to Palestine and not remain in Europe, the report recommended 'the quickevacuation of all non-repatriable Jews in Germany and Austria, who wish it, to

Palestine '.26

It is clear that Truman was moved by the report, which prompted him to send

a copy to the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, with a request for the easingof restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine.27This correspondence led to

the creation, in December 1945, of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiryinto the Palestine question, with the stated aim of examining the 'political,economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of

Jewish immigration'.28

Importantly, and as noted by those historians who focus on State

Department-White House friction, the Near East and African Affairs Division(NEA) of the State Department, headed by Loy Henderson, was not enthusiastic

about the recommendations of the Harrison report.29Henderson, a self-professed'hard-liner' on Soviet affairs, feared developments in Palestine would cause up-heaval in the Arab world which the USSR might capitalize on.30 The NEA's

recommendation was that the government 'should not favor mass or unrestricted

Jewish immigration into Palestine' before a definite settlement was reached.31 Its

arguments were based on the volatility of the region, and were repeated by

24

Steven piegel,The therrab-Israelionflict:akingmerica'siddleastpolicy,romTrumanoReagan(Chicago, 985), . 19;JosephHeller,The irthf srael,945-i949: en-Gurionnd iscriticsGainseville,2000),pp.22-3.

25HarrisonReport,HarryS. TrumanOfficeFile(HSTOF), art n,Reel33,Roosevelt tudyCentreRSC)Middleburg,heNetherlands.

26Harrison eport,HSTOF,PartIII,Reel33,RSC.27 EbanAyers,Truman'sssistantress ecretary,ccountsowTrumanaid naregularmorning

meetinghat hereport ad madehimsick',n RobertFerrell, d.,TrumanntheiWhiteouse:hediaryofEban .AyersColumbia,MS,1991), . 72;and nhisdiary,Trumanalled hereport moving',n

Truman,Yearsftrial ndhope:946-1953London, 956), . 146;Truman o Attlee,31Aug.1945,FRUS1945, ol.viii,pp.737-9.

28 Statementythepresident,o Dec.1945,HSTOF,Part II,Reel34,RSC.29

Neff,Fallenillars,p.31-2.s0 Oral HistoryInterviewwith LoyW. Henderson,HarryS. TrumanLibrary HSTL).

31 Immigration into Palestine Previous to a Final Decision with regard to the Future Status of

Palestine, 29 Aug. 1945, HSTOF, Part III,Reel 34, RSC.








Secretary of State Byrnes in a memo to Truman regarding the impact of Palestine

policy on Saudi Arabia.32

But although Truman focused on the DP issue and proceeded to create the

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, he was far from ignorant of develop-ments in the Arab world with which the State Department was concerned. As

early as May 1945, Acting Secretary of State Grew informed Truman of President

Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud assuring him that 'there should be no decision

altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs

and Jews '.33

This knowledge was incorporated into Truman's basic position on the

Palestine issue. At a press conference on his return from Potsdam on 16 August

1945, the official statement released by the White House noted that

the Presidentsaid the United States'sview was thatwe wantedto let as manyof theJewsinto Palestineas possibleand still maintaincivilpeace ... it would have to be workedout

with the British and the Arabsfor aJewish State. He said there was no idea in mind of

sendinga ... military orce of, say500,0oo to keeppeace in Palestine.34

The president was acknowledging that he was going to continue Roosevelt's

policy of consultation with the Arab states, and he continued to have close con-

tacts with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.35

Truman was here laying out his basic objectives for Palestine. While the refu-

gee issue was noted as important, it was considered within the context of a

peaceful solution in Palestine, and to the desire not to implicate US forces.These

were objectives that would underlie US policy in Palestine until 1948 and beyond,

with different degrees of success. Furthermore, they were objectives that

were shared by the State Department and other government departments. A

19 September 1945 memorandum from the War Department to the State

Department, for example, pointed out that the commitment of US troops to

Palestine would have to be large and would probably lead to more deployments

in the region, a serious concern in a period of demobilization.36 And a re-

commendation by a joint State-War-Treasury Committee on Palestine in the

summer of 1946 reaffirmed this point in the most basic way: 'Is the U.S. willing to

employ military forces? No.'37 These were objectives in line with the strategy of

containment, as a firmer stance was being taken in the Northern Tier, indicating

the regional priorities of the United States.

32ByrnesoTruman, Nov.1945,HSTOF,Part II,Reel34,RSC.33Grew oTruman, May1945,HSTOF,Part II,Reel34,RSC.

34StatementnPalestine,6Aug.1945,HSTOF,PartiIi,Reel34,RSC.

35 See Truman o IbnSaud,13 Sept.1945,Papers f HarryS. Truman,Confidentialile,State

Departmentorrespondence945-6,HSTL.36MemorandumromheWarDepartmento theDepartmentfState,19Sept.1945,FRUS1945,

vol. vIII,pp. 742-3-37Matters re Palestine to be Considered before London Conference, in Papers of Harry S.

Truman, President'sSubject File (PSF), Subject File Cabinet Committee London Conference,HSTL.








Agreement on these broad principles notwithstanding, differences were ap-

parent between the State Department and the White House on the handling of

specific issues. This was notably the case once the report of the Anglo-AmericanCommittee was released on 20

April 1946.The report called for the entry into Palestine of Ioo,ooo Jewish refugees, and

for a UN trusteeship that would lead to a binational state, rather than separate

states.38Anxious for results on the DP issue, Truman singled out only the immi-

gration issue for immediate action.39 The State Department, however, felt that

the report should be considered as a whole, and continued to worry about poss-ible repercussions in the Arab world, where reactions to the report, and the

president's response to it, were unfavourable.40 The extent of these repercussionswere thought to be even more dangerous because of the unwillingness to intro-

duce US troops to maintain a settlement. This unwillingness was reiterated by

a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on 21 June 1946 urging that 'no U.S. troops beinvolved in carrying out the Committee's recommendations'.41 The British were

particularly concerned that US pressure for Jewish immigration would not be

backed up by military commitments in the region, leaving them to deal with the

political and military consequences.42Truman remained committed to the question ofJewish DPs, even as the British

bought themselves more time with the creation of a commission to study the issue,

culminating in the London Conference in late 1946. This attachment to the fate

of the refugees, however, should not be seen simply through the lens of the 'hu-

manitarian' or 'moral' argument. Indeed, while revisionist historians of the i970osundoubtedly went too far in seeing a political motive in every action on Palestine,

political considerations were important to the president in addition to his genuineconcern for the plight ofJewish refugees.

On 4 October 1946, the eve of theJewish Day of Atonement, Truman issued a

statement favourable to the Jewish position in Palestine, agreeing with a Jewish

Agency proposal for a 'viable Jewish State ... in an adequate area of Palestine

instead of in the whole of Palestine'.43Truman was under political pressure to issue

this statement, less than a month away from congressional elections, notably from

his administrative assistant for minority affairs, David Niles, a New Dealer with

close links to both the Democratic Party and the AmericanJewish community.44In the days preceding Truman's statement of 4 October, for example, Niles

knew that the Republican governor of New York, Thomas Dewey, was going to

38 Michael Cohen, Trumanand Israel(Oxford, 1990), p. 127.

39Statementythepresident,0 Apr.1945,HSTOF,Part II,Reel35,RSC.40 See, orexample,Wadsworthosecretaryfstate, May1946,FRUS1946, ol.vII, p.599-601.41 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee,

21June1946,HSTOF,Partiii,Reel34,RSC.42 Attlee o

Truman,oJune1946,FRUSI946,vol.vii,pp.623-4.43 New YorkTimes,5 Oct. 1946.

44DavidB. Sachar,DavidK. Nilesand UnitedStatespolicy owardsPalestine'MAthesis,Harvard, 1959), p. 6.








make a strong statement in favour ofJewish immigration on 6 October, and urgedTruman to pre-empt Dewey, as the New York vote would be crucial in the

upcoming elections.45 There was also lobbying from within the cabinet and the

Democratic Party. On I October 1946, Robert Hannegan, the postmaster-general, advised Truman to pressure the British government for greater Jewish

immigration into Palestine, in order to 'clear the atmosphere' with American

Jewry.46These political factors were certainly important to the issuance of the 4

October statement, but perhaps more important was the effect of this politiciza-tion on relations with the State Department. State Department officials felt that

the timing of this statement went against the ongoing negotiations at the London

Conference. Predictably, the statement infuriated the Arab world, and the State

Department was placed in a difficult position in this regard. A memorandum on

Middle East policy written by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

noted that 'our policy ... is disliked and feared by the Arabs; it already handicapsand may eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arab

world'.47 Loy Henderson attested to his uneasiness at the fact that 'we have

practically been forced by political pressure and sentiment in the US in direction

of a viable Jewish state '.48

The State Department did not appreciate the president's apparent disregard

for US commitments in the Arab world. But the problem appeared to be one of

different perceptions of the situation. Truman may not have been receiving the

indignant telegrams of consular officials, but he did receive, in mid-October, aletter from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia who expressed his 'astonishment' at

the 4 October statement and its apparent contradiction of previous US assurances

to him.49 In his response of 25 October, Truman informed the king of his outlook

on the situation: 'I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a con-

siderable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with regard to

the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to

the Arab people.'50Truman believed that supporting immigration did not necessarily represent a

basicchange

in the situation. His vision of apeaceful

solution to the Palestine

issue may have been naive given the information presented to him by the State

Department, but the president, juggling political and humanitarian concerns,knew that Saudi Arabia, with its important oil reserves, was intricately tied to the

United States economically.51 This consideration was repeated in memoranda

45 Sachar,DavidK.Niles, . 44.46 HannegantoTruman,I Oct. 1946,HSTOF, PartIII,Reel 34, RSC.

47 Merriam to Henderson, 27 Dec. 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. vii, p. 733.48 HendersonoAchesonnFRUS1946, ol.vii,p. 732n.

49IbnSaud oTruman, RUS1946, ol.vii, pp.708-9.50TrumanoIbnSaud,25Oct.1946,FRUS1946, ol.vii,pp.716-17.

51 Aaron Miller, Searchor security:SaudiArabian oil andAmericanforeignolicy, 1939-1949 (Chapel Hill,

NC, 1980), p. I89.








from the American charge d'affaires in Saudi Arabia who indicated that US policytowards Palestine would not affect Ibn Saud's relations with the US.52 Indeed,

according to a 1948 memorandum from the files of Clark Clifford, Ibn Saud was

demandinga

strongerUS

guarantee againstSoviet

hostilityto Saudi Arabia be-

cause of Saudi support of American policies in the Middle East.53Truman and his

White House advisers were considering Palestine as a regional matter and within

the context of Saudi oil, albeit not in the same manner as the NEA.

Despite these differences between the White House and the State Department,further evidence of the agreement on broad principles is found in a more detailed

study of the reaction to Truman's October statement endorsement of the idea of

partition, which was not met with the complete hostility some historians have

alleged.54The memorandum written by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs,

mentioned above, seemed to at least accept the possibility of partition advocated

by theJewish Agency and endorsed by Truman's October statement, by referringto a settlement in Palestine as comprising a 'political entity or entities'. Another

NEA memorandum, inJanuary 1947, mentioned the possibility that a 'workable

partition of Palestine' into an Arab state and aJewish state 'could be supported

by the United States', with the acquiescence of 'all Arab states to whatever sol-

ution' would eventually be endorsed. State Department resentment was none-

theless present, due to the Department's low regard for the politicization of the

Palestine issue by White House advisers such as David Niles and Clark Clifford,

who dealt with both the political and foreign policy aspects of Palestine.57Partition at this point took centre stage in Washington policy debates as the

British handed over the Palestine matter to the United Nations in February 1947.The United Nations formed a special committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to find

a solution for the problem. On 31 August, the UNSCOP majority report was

released, recommending that the British end their mandate immediately and that

the country be partitioned into separate Arab andJewish states.58

Here again, while disagreements were voiced, the fundamental objectives of

policy prevailed in Truman's stance, as he steered a middle course between the

conflicting advice given to him. He continued to hope, rather naively, that the

UNSCOP majority plan could avert bloodshed and avoid the implication of US

troops in the region.

52 KennethR.Bain,TheMarchoZion:Unitedtatesolicyndhefoundingf sraelTexas, 979), .152.

3 Childsosecretaryfstate, oNov.1948,Clifford apers, olitical ile,Box20,HSTL.

54Benson,Trumannd heoundingfIsrael,p.78-81.

55Merriamo Henderson,7Dec.1946,FRUS1946, ol.vii,pp.732-5.

56MemorandumyFraserWilkinsNEA), 4 an.1947,FRUS1947, ol.v, pp.Ioo4-5.

57See,for

example,memorandumnwhich he

president,t the

urgingfNiles,expressed

ome

oppositionothenaming f twoNEAofficials,HendersonndGeorgeWadsworth,oadviseheUS

delegationo theUN, presidento under ecretaryf state,6 Aug. 947,HSTOF,Part II,Reel34,RSC. 58 UNSCOP Report,31 Aug. 2947,HSTOF, PartIII,Reel 34, RSC.








Loy Henderson and the NEA were opposed to the majority report. Their

majorproblemswere that supportingpartitionwould inevitablyrequire sendingUS troopsto enforceit, as any such plan would be 'unworkable',and also that

supporting partition would 'be certain to undermine our relations with theArab ... world'. 5Thisviewwaspartlyadoptedby Secretaryof StateMarshallat a meetingof the

US delegationto the GeneralAssembly n September1947.Marshallhighlightedthat 'adoptionof the majorityreport... would mean veryviolent Arabreaction',and that the United States should avoid activelyarousingthe Arabsby comingout in favourof partitionat this early stage as this may precipitatetheir 'rap-

prochementwith the Soviet Union'.60 The Soviet threat was perceptible,and

therewas also the questionof enforcement,which would have created a depar-turefrompreviouspolicy. Indeed,at this samemeeting,Marshallnoted that the

proposedadoptionof the partitionplan would mean that the United States'willhave to be ready to put troopsinto Palestine'.61 While Marshallsupportedthe

reportand thoughtthatUS troopscould be sentto the region,theJoint Chiefsof

Staffhad explicitlyrejected he majorityreport,preciselyout of fear thatit would

implicateUS troops in Palestineand beyond, creatinga possible new area of

confrontationwith the USSR.62The course of action eventually adopted by the administrationwas a

compromisebetweenthesepositions:supporting he report,but refusing o send

troopsto Palestine.WhileMarshallhad apparentlyacceptedthattroopsmightbe

needed to enforcepartition,Trumanhimselfcontinuedto refuse an implicationof US forces in Palestine.Two days before instructingthe US delegation to

support the majority plan, Truman informedthe US delegation that 'we arenot going to pick up ... responsibility or the maintenanceof law and orderin

Palestine',but only, possibly,within the context of a UN-led police force. 6This

vague proposalfor a UN force was clearlydestinedto be stillborn,as neitherof

the greatpowerswould alloweach other to introducetroopsto the region.On II October1947,Trumaninstructed he delegationto support he majority

report,andtwodayslaterthe Soviets alsobackedpartition, o the mystification f

the StateDepartment.64

This alteredthestrategic

situation nPalestine,

aspre-vious fears that hostileArab states would turn to the USSR for help seemed to

have,at leasttemporarily,disappeared.65gainstStateDepartment ndicationsof

Arabintent,Trumancontinuedto pin his hopes of a peacefulsettlementon the

59 Henderson to secretaryof state,22 Sept. 1947,FRUS 1947,vol. v, pp. 1153-9.60 Positionon Palestine,15 Sept. 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. v, p. 1147.

61 Ibid.62 JCS 1684/5, in Benson, Trumannd hefounding fIsrael, . 10o4.63 Hilldring o Marshall,9 Oct. 1947,FRUS 1947,vol. v, pp. 1177-8.

64 Memorandumof Conversation,15Oct. 1947,FRUS 1947,vol. v, pp. 1181-3.65

This point was made by EliahuEpstein,theJewishAgencyrepresentativen Washington,after

initial ndicationsof USSR support orpartition, n Epstein o SumnerWelles,29 May 1947,S25-483,CentralZionistArchives(CZA).








possibility that both sides would accept partition, as it was a solution backed bythe two great powers and an independent UN report.

Support for the UN, through the validation of a report by one of its com-

missions,was here the

unifyingforce between Truman's

positionand that of

the Department. A State Department position paper, for example, concurred in

Truman's support for the UN over partition.66 Truman also highlighted this

factor in a letter to Ibn Saud after the United States had formally adopted the

partition plan on ii October 1947. Truman told the king that 'One of the

important factors influencing the decision of the United States government to

support the majority plan ... was the fact that it represented the majority view

of a committee appointed by the United Nations to consider the question.'67

Furthermore, Truman resisted the tremendous political pressure he received in

this period to intervene more forcefully in the matter, specifically with other

delegations at the UN. He refused, for instance, to discuss the matter with his oldfriend Eddie Jacobson, tellingJacobson that he did not think 'it would be right or

proper for me to intervene at this stage'.68 It was only after the matter had been

settled on 29 November, with the adoption of partition in the General Assembly,that Truman wrote to Chaim Weizmann, the elder statesman of the Zionist

movement, complaining that he had 'never had as much pressure and propa-

ganda unnecessarily aimed at the White House'.69

Truman saw partition as both a test for the United Nations as an organization,and as a resolution of the long-standing issue of refugees. Furthermore, he stood

to his beliefs that US troops would not have to be introduced to the region. Thismay have been a naive view of the Arab reaction to partition, but the crucial

interest of Saudi Arabian oil was safe, and the threat of Soviet infiltration of the

Arab world was considerably lessened by Soviet backing for partition.

Recognizing rather tardily the explosion of violence that partition had caused,

Truman imposed an arms embargo on the region with the consent of the State

Department, in the hope that this would lessen the violence. 7 Even when his

vision was bloodily proved wrong by the Arab rejection of partition, Truman

reacted by supporting the arms embargo, and continued to reject the involvement

of US troops throughout 1948 and beyond, as the third section will show.

II

But the 'view from Washington' is not everything, as critics of diplomatic history

have pointed out.71 The American perspective on events in Palestine cannot be

66 Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, 30 Sept. 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. v,

pp. 1166-70. 6 Truman to Ibn Saud, 21Nov. 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. v, pp. 1277-8.

6' Truman to Jacobson, 3 Oct. 1947, Jacobson Papers, Correspondence File -White House

1946-52, HSTL.

69 Truman to Weizmann, I Dec.1947, HSTOF,

PartIII,

Reel34,

RSC.

70 Shlomo Slonim, 'The 1948 American embargo on arms to Palestine', PoliticalScienceQuarterly, 4

(1979), P. 498.

71 See, for example, McMahon, 'The study of American foreign relations', p. 12.








seen in isolation of the perspective of the Jewish community in Palestine (the

Yishuv). The Yishuv had its own clear objectives in Palestine, sometimes framed

within the context and rhetoric of US aims, but which were ultimately driven bythe

desirefor

statehood in Palestine. For the Yishuv leadership, the post-warperiod was the opportunity to attain the ideological objective of Zionism: aJewishstate. All other issues were considered in this context.

The Yishuv came to be represented during the Mandate by the Jewish Agencyfor Palestine, a body created by Article 4 of the League of Nations Mandate in

1922. During the Mandate period, the Agency became a powerful force on the

ground in Palestine. An effective local government, it operated various depart-

ments, directed urban and agricultural settlement, negotiated with the

Mandatory power, wielded its considerable economic resources, and organized

Jewish immigration. As the British Peel Commission Report of 1937 noted, the

Jewish Agency had 'created a complete administrative apparatus. This powerfuland efficient organisation amounts, in fact, to a Government existing side by side

with the Mandatory government.'72 The most influential figure in the Agency

leadership was the chairman of its Executive Committee from 1935 to 1948,David Ben-Gurion, a Russian-born immigrant and deft political operator who

had become the uncontested leader of the Yishuv after the Second World War.73

For theJewish Agency, the end of the Second World War was a time of despairover the tragedy that had befallen European Jewry, but also of hope about

the political effect this could have on the future of Palestine. Immigration of

the Jewish DPs was one major issue for the Yishuv leadership, as was defence inthe face of the surrounding Arab threat. But all these issues were considered

within the ideological context of the demand for aJewish State. This goal was not

shared by the United States until the UNSCOP report was discussed in the

General Assembly. Relations between the Yishuv and Washington before then

focused on specific issues, especially immigration, although the US saw this as a

humanitarian issue whereas the Yishuv viewed it as a necessary step towards the

creation of the Jewish state.

In order to understand the overriding objective that was the establishment of a

Jewish state,it is essential to understand that the

ideological underpinningof the

Yishuv was a classic nineteenth-century European national movement: Zionism.

Its major tenets were the unity of the Jewish people as a nation, and the creation

of an appropriate nation-state to host them. These aims had been reaffirmed most

recently by the Biltmore Conference of May 1942, called by American Zionist

leaders in the presence of veteran Zionists like Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann,and Moshe Shertok (later Sharett). The Conference called for the establishment

of a 'Jewish Commonwealth' in all of Palestine and increased Jewish immigrationinto Palestine.74 Immigration, however, was but one of the necessary powers

72 Geoffrey Wigoder, ed., New encyclopediaf ZionismandIsrael(New York, 1994), p. 751.

7 MartinGilbert,srael:historyLondon, 998), p. 46-7.74 Walter Laqueur, A historyof Zionism New York, 1972), p. 546.








which the Yishuv wanted in the context of statehood. As Ben-Gurion noted in his

diary in November 1945, 'the Zionist role is not to rescue the survivors in Europe,but to rescue Eretz Israel [the Land of Israel] for the Jewish people'.75

It is within thisideology

that thepolicies

of theJewish Agency

should be

understood. The survivors were seen as a useful political tool to obtain immediate

immigration rights by capitalizing on international sympathy, and edging closer

to statehood. Furthermore, immigration was also seen as a way to consolidate the

power of the Yishuv, politically by increasing the numbers of the 6oo,ooo strong

Jewish minority in Palestine (as against the I-2 million Arabs), and militarily by

filling the ranks of the Jewish military organizations. The Jewish Agency lifted its

wartime ban on attacks against the Mandatory power in 1945, as a protest againstthe strict limits on immigration enshrined in the British White Paper of 1939, and

still followed by the British after the war.76 Security issues were crucial in the

Yishuv, in the immediate struggle with the British, but mostly in the perspective of

an imminent showdown with Arab forces. In October 1945, for example, the

United Resistance Movement was formed, bringing the right-wing Irgun Zvai

Leumi (IZL) and Lehi groups into an alliance with the Jewish Agency's defensive

arm, the Haganah.77The Mandate was disintegrating, and the Yishuv was effectively shoring up its

power, with the ideological goal of statehood being pursued through the practicalmeans of immigration and defence. The fundamental ideological objective that

was statehood can be seen, for example, in the two ways the case for immigration

was made to the world by the Jewish Agency, which show that immigration wasnot being thought of as a humanitarian issue.

First, the Jewish Agency issued a series of papers on the 'immediate prospectsof absorption' of immigrants into Palestine, which were given to the Anglo-USCommittee of Inquiry.78The papers made a point about the economic necessityfor immigration into Palestine, building on the British concept that immigration

depended on 'economic absorptive capacity'. 7 The end of the war had produceda labour shortage in Palestine, and these papers outlined the manpower needs of

most sectors of agriculture and industry, with details of existing and planned

housing capacities.80These

papers highlightthat in June 1945 theJewish Agency

was considering statehood from an economic perspective, and planning accord-

ingly.81The second way the Jewish Agency case for immigration was made was in a

more purely ideological way, through the testimonies of Zionist leaders to the

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in March 1946. Ben-Gurion, for example,

5 Heller,The irthfIsrael,. 27. 76Gilbert,srael,. 121.

7 Heller, The birthf Israel,pp. I16-I7.78 See, for example, Note on Immediate Prospects of Absorption, June 1945, S25-650I, CZA.

7 Gilbert, Israel,p. 48.80 The Immediate Prospects for the Absorption of 120,000 Immigrants, Feb. 1946, S25-8045, CZA;

Supplementary Note on Immediate Prospects of Absorption - Mar. 1946, S25-650I, CZA.

S' Note on Immediate Prospects of Absorption,June 1945, S25-650I, CZA.








emphasizedthat theJews were a nation ust as any other,and thatthey deserveda state. He was askedwhether, if a Jewish majorityin Palestine had not been

secured, and Palestine was shown to be unable to accommodate more im-

migrants, heJewishAgencywouldhaltimmigration.Ben-Gurionresponded hatthe goal of immigrationwasnot to secureaJewish majority n Palestine,and thateconomic absorptivecapacitywas not a primaryconcern,but ratherthat immi-

grationwas drivenby otherconsiderations:

The other reason [forbringing mmigrants nto Palestine]is that these people have rea-sons ... forwantingto be here.They wantto be here;theyhavetherightto be here;and a

place for them can be createdhere and not at the expense of others. That is the otherreasonand that is the test.82

Immigrationwas clearlyseen throughan ideological ens,not a simpleeconomic

one, as the immigrantshad a 'right' to be in Palestine.Moshe Sharett's estimonyequallyemphasized he inalienableright ofJews to immigrate o Palestine,as didChaimWeizmann's.83All these Zionist leadersfurthermorecalledfor the estab-lishment of a state to guaranteethese inalienable rights, which included the

'security' ofJews world-wide.84

This ideologicalstand,which placed immigrationwithin the contextof state-

hood, was different rom the initialhumanitarianperspectiveof the US admin-

istration,andborefewresults.The reportof theAnglo-USCommittee of Inquiryhad recommendedthat Ioo,oooJewishDPs be allowedto emigrateto Palestine,but not within the context of a

Jewish state,which was

rejectedin favour of

aUN trusteeship.TheJewishAgency'simmediatereaction to this reportwas dis-

appointment,and thereaffirmationhat theirgoalwas not immediate mmigrationfor Ioo,oooJews, but statehood.As the officialJewishAgencyreactionpapertothe reportput it, '[t]heJews are a nationlikeunto all the other nations andhavethe samerightto live theirnationallife in theirland, which is Palestine.85

The reportalsocontributed o the resumptionof militaryactionsby the UnitedResistanceMovement,which in turnled the British o launcha massive counter-

operationon 29June, 'Black Sabbath', which imprisonedmost of the Yishuv

leaders,with the notable exception of Ben-Gurion who was in Paris.86Under

these critical circumstances,Ben-Gurion and the remaining members of the

JewishAgencyExecutiveagreedto accept anyplan thatwouldgrantthe Yishuv

autonomy(withcontrol of immigration)n an 'adequatepartof Palestine'.87Thiswas a significantdeparture romthe Biltmoreresolution,which had called for a

82 DavidBen-Gurion,Testimonyto the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry,S25-3276,CZA.83 Chaim Weizmann,Testimonyto the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry,S25-3276,CZA;

Moshe Sharett,Testimonyto the Anglo-AmericanCommitteeof Inquiry,S25-3276,CZA.84 David Ben-Gurion,Testimonyto the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry,S25-3276, CZA.

85Jewish Agency reactionto reportof the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry, 5 May 1946,S25-6442,CZA.

86 YoramHazony, The ewish tate:he truggleforsrael'soul NewYork,2000),p. 254.87 Heller, Thebirth fIsrael, p. 31-2.








Jewish Commonwealth in all of Palestine. It was a policy born of necessity,

designed to attract wider international support, and it influenced the stand of the

Truman administration, as seen by the 4 October 1946 statement.

A further crucial consideration here is that Truman's statement increased thedrive towards an 'American orientation' of Yishuv policies, at a time when most

Yishuv leaders were imprisoned by the British. This American orientation was

actively pursued by theJewish Agency, especially after the British had handed the

matter over to the United Nations in February 1947. Sharett, for example, was

eager to counter any claims of communist involvement in Palestine, acknowl-

edging the framework within which US policy was being made. At a meeting with

Dean Acheson, then under secretary of state, on 28 May 1947, Sharett stressed

that 'Palestine Jewry and the Zionist movement are wholeheartedly and irrevo-

cably democratic ... the economic structure of the PalestineJewish community is

based on free enterprise', and that communism was not an option.88The Jewish Agency's acceptance of partition made it easier for the United

States to back the UNSCOP majority report. But partition for the Yishuv was not

a departure from the ideological goal of statehood with immigration into

Palestine, merely a tactic to achieve this. This continued attachment to statehood

can be seen in the realm of defence, where it is clear that although international

politics were seen as important, statehood was always the overriding concern.

The issue of security for the Yishuv stemmed from the knowledge that statehood

would be viewed with hostility by both the Arabs of Palestine and the newly

independent Arab states. As Sharett pointed out, 'the focal point of the conflict isaliyah [Jewish immigration], but an Arab-Jewish agreement is feasible only with

very limited aliyah'.89 And since it was impossible for the Yishuv to renounce its

ideological attachment to immigration, a confrontation was seen as inevitable.

This led to intense preparations for the imminent conflict. Ben-Gurion, who

held the defence portfolio in the Yishuv, noted in a defence committee meeting a

month before the UNSCOP majority report was passed that 'the defence issue is

the major issue now'.90 He called for a greater mobilization of Yishuv resources,and also for military equipment and training facilities. These considerations were

made within the context ofapproaching statehood,

for the Yishuv wasclearly

preparing to step into the vacuum left in Palestine after the Mandate was to be

terminated on 15May 1948. The Jewish Agency created a 'technical plan' for the

transfer of power, which stated that, 'the transfer of power should be, to the

extent that it is possible, without resort to force '.91The main emphasis was on

how best to secure the institutions of power in Palestine, and all the administrative

offices of the Mandatory power were listed in order of importance in case the

88

Sharett to Meyerson, 24 Apr. 1947, S25-3965, CZA.89 Heller,The irthfIsrael,. 76.9o Minutes of Defence Committee Meeting, 19 Oct. 1947, S25-9342, CZA.

91 Technical Plan for the Transfer of Power, 19 Oct. 1947, S25-3735, CZA.








transfer of power would be effectuated by stages.92It is significant that this plan

was issued on 17 October 1947, more than a month before the partition plan

passed the UN General Assembly, for it indicates the heightened preparations for

statehood at the local level.

III

The United States's recognition of Israel remains a key moment in the rhetoric of

a 'special relationship' between Israel and the United States. 9 The enduring

glorification of Truman's recognition of Israel seems to have seeped through to

the historiography of the Truman administration's Palestine policy, which mostly

sees recognition as a crucial moment both for the administration and for

Palestine.

Indeed,while

significant historiographicaldifferences exist in accounts of

Truman's Palestine policy, almost all place undue importance on the issue of

recognition, seeing it either as a departure from previous policies or as a mo-

mentous decision in itself.94Yet neither the White House nor the Yishuv placed

great strategic importance on the issue of recognition at the time. In terms of the

broader objectives of US policy in the area, recognition changed little, especiallynot the arms embargo which the Yishuv found so constraining. Furthermore,

recognition did not mark a change from the support of the United States for the

partition resolution at the United Nations in November 1947, and therefore of a

Jewish State. For the Yishuv, the diplomatic struggle had been won with the

partition resolution, and theJewish leadership in Palestine focused on creating the

organs of statehood and organising its defence, not on recognition.95

Following the partition resolution, civil war raged in Palestine, and the

Mandatory government made it abundantly clear that it would in no way assist in

the enforcement of partition.96 The rise of violence and the need to have an

acceptable solution by 15 May, the date set by the British for the end of the

Mandate, led both the State Department and the White House to re-examine the

situation in Palestine, in the context of broader US objectives in the area.

Within the State Department, various divisions seized on the growing violence

in Palestine to repudiate partition. George Kennan, director of the StateDepartment's Policy Planning Staff, noted in a memorandum to Secretary of

State Marshall that partition had become unworkable, and since the US should

not send any troops to the region, he recommended returning the matter to the

92 Technical Plan for the Transfer of Power, 17 Oct. 1947, S25-3735, CZA.

93A relativelyecent llustrations theonepageadvertisementakenout n theNewYork imesythe America-Israelriendshipeague, eaturing picture f HarryTruman eceiving menorahfromDavidBen-Gurion,ndfocusing n the fact hatTruman ecognizedsraelroma convictionthat hecausewas just', nNewYork imes,Sept. 991.

94 See,forexample,Benson,Trumannd heoundingfIsrael,. 188;Neff,Fallenillars,p.64-5;Grose, sraelnthemindfAmerica,p.288-92. 95Heller,The irthfIsrael,. 36.

96 Off the Record Background Press Conference with Sir Alan Cunningham, 30 Dec. 1947, S25-

9215, CZA; Spiegel, TheotherArab-Israeliconflict,p. 30.








UN.97 This feeling was shared by the NEA, with various proposals for a tran-

sitional trusteeship being considered.98 Despite this opposition to partition, these

alternative proposals were framed within the traditional US objectives for

Palestine. 9These objectives were shared by Truman and his White House advisers. At a

Press Conference on I5January 1948, Truman clearly reaffirmed that he had no

intention of sending US troops to Palestine.100His advisers, the most prominent of

whom was special counsel Clark Clifford, were also thinking within the bound-

aries of US objectives in Palestine, although their tactical approach was different

from that of the State Department.xlo Clifford concluded that the best tactic was

to continue to support partition and lift the arms embargo so as to render effective

Jewish self-defence in Palestine, and consequently avoid having to send US troopsthere.102The State Department, on the other hand, recommended that if the UN

Security Council found the partition resolution to be unworkable, 'some form of

United Nations trusteeship for an additional period of time will be necessary'.103

Truman's own position on the issue was essentially a compromise. He gaveMarshall his approval to trusteeship 'in principle', while pointing out that

'nothing should be presented to Security Council that could be interpreted as a

recession on our part' from partition.104Truman did not consider trusteeship to

be a repudiation of partition; he would have accepted a trusteeship only if

partition was found to be unworkable by the UN, against the advice of Clifford.

This position was not a repudiation of US objectives in Palestine, but rather

an acceptance of the State Department's tactics on how best to achieve theseobjectives.

The important point of the trusteeship issue was the usual concern of all sides

for the fundamental US objectives in Palestine. The existing historiographicalfocus on whether Truman knew of the speech seemingly proposing a trusteeshipdelivered to the Security Council by Warren Austin, the US representative, and

its timing, completely misses this point and serves merely to reinforce acceptedversions of White House-State Department tensions.105Truman was certainly

97MemorandumyKennano secretaryfstate,2oJan.1948,FRUS1948, ol.v, pp.546-54.98 See,forexample,MemorandumyNEA,27Jan.1948,FRUS1948, ol.v, pp.563-5.9' For hedesireo avoid ommittingS troopseeMemorandumyRusk oLovett, Feb.1948,

FRUS1948, ol.v, p.588,fortheconcern f Soviet nvolvementeeReportbythePolicyPlanningStaff, 4Feb.1948,FRUS1948, ol.v, pp.655-7.

100PublicPapers f the Presidentsf the UnitedStates:HarryS. Truman,1948 Washington,1964),p. ioi.

101SeeMemorandumyClifford,Mar.1948,FRUS1948, ol.v,p.687, nwhichCliffordrguesthat heongoing ivilwar nPalestinemustbe dealtwith or earofSovietntervention.

102MemorandumyClifford, Mar.1948,FRUS1948, ol.v,pp.688-9.103DepartmentfState oPresidentruman,1Feb.1948,FRUS1948, ol.v, p. 640.

104 President Truman to the secretary of state, 22 Feb. 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 645.105 See, for example, Benson, Truman and thefounding of Israel, pp. 136-7; Clark M. Clifford,

'Recognizing Israel', AmericanHeritage,28 (1977),No. 3, p. 4; Margaret Truman, HarryS. Truman New

York, 1973), p. 387; Snetsinger, Truman, heJewish vote,pp. O103-6.








annoyed with his State Department, but this resentment was not about the policy

itself, which Truman had approved, but about timing.106 Truman felt he should

have been informed of the wording and timing of Austin's statements.107

Ultimately, trusteeship had been approved by Truman because he felt it was inline with the broad objectives of US policy in Palestine, specifically pacification of

the area.

But trusteeship was not to be. Events on the ground proved diplomatic sol-

utions to be largely irrelevant. As the tide of war started to turn in its favour, the

Jewish Agency rejected trusteeship outright, for fear of delaying a declaration of

independence.x0s It also became apparent that trusteeship would not be able to

secure the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly delegations necessaryfor its adoption.'09 British withdrawal grew nearer and nothing had been

achieved to reduce the fighting in Palestine, or impose a new political settlement.

Truce negotiations floundered, and on i i May, the US delegation at the United

Nations had submitted a new plan, which Truman approved, for the appoint-ment of a UN Commissioner for Palestine to mediate a cease-fire. 11

But these attempts at finding a diplomatic solution did not confront the realityof the situation on the ground, where partition was 'coming spontaneously to

life'. ' The Yishuv had secured the territory given to it by the partition declar-

ation, and was moving toward statehood. It was in this context that recognitionarose as an issue for the United States in early May of 1948, and the decision to

recognize Israel was taken, once again, within the traditional boundaries of

United States policy in Palestine.The historiography of recognition itself does not consider Truman's act as a

simple acceptance of the facts on the ground, but rather sees recognition as either

a political act or a backroom deal between Truman and Chaim Weizmann, the

Jewish Agency leader who was shortly to become president of Israel.112But while

political considerations were important, arguments in favour of recognition were

clearly framed within the context of US objectives in the region, and it is also

clear that Truman did not make his decision until sometime between 12 and 14

May, a period of time in which he did not have any contact with Weizmann at all.

Furthermore, recognitionwas but one of the demands made

byAmerican

Zionists, and it did not reduce the political pressure for other objectives such as

the lifting of the arms embargo.

106 Truman famously remarked in his diary that the StateDepartment had 'pulled the rug' from

under him by announcing trusteeship, in Robert Ferrell, ed., Offthe record: heprivatepapers of HarryS.

Truman(NewYork,I980), p. 127. 107 Ferrell,Harry . Truman:life,p. 309.

108Meeting etween hertok, pstein,Marshall,ndLovett, 6 Mar.1948,PDD,pp.509-20.109See,forexample, hertokoBen-Gurion,I Apr.1948, 25-i704,CZA;andFahy oLovett, 6

Apr.1948,PDD,pp.643-6.110MarshalloAustin, 2May1948,FRUS1948, ol.v,p. 979.

11 AbbaEban,Abba ban:nautobiographyLondon, 978), . 105.112SeeSnetsinger, ruman,heewishote, . 133;Sykes,CrossroadsoIsrael,. 360;M. W.Weisgaland Joel Carmichael, eds., Chaim Weizmann: a biographyby severalhands (New York, 1967); Vera

Weizmann, The impossibleakes onger: hememoirs f VeraWeizmann New York, 1967), pp. 231-2.








Political considerations were important to Clark Clifford. He was the presi-

dent's most influential political adviser, and had been partly responsible for the

drafting of the famous memorandum on the 'Politics of 1948', which dealt with

Palestine only superficially.113On the

questionof

recognition, althoughClifford

was clearly influenced by political factors, his stance was framed within a vision of

US objectives in Palestine.

At a famous 12 May meeting at the White House, Clifford, at Truman's

request, presented the pro-recognition case.14 The fact that Truman called this

meeting indicates that that he wanted to sound out State Department advice on

recognition, even though recognition is a presidential prerogative power and

Truman could have taken the decision by himself.115Although Clifford was

influenced by the lobbying of American Zionists, he was also thinking within the

framework of United States objectives in Palestine, and framed his position

accordingly.116In his preparations for his statement at the 12 May meeting, Clifford selected

clippings from articles relating to Palestine, and underlined key passages, which

are useful in pointing out his thinking on recognition. On 2 May Clifford under-

lined passages in a New York Times article which pointed out that the Arab

armies were 'incapable of preventing the establishment of a Jewish state in

Palestine'. '17On the following day, Clifford underlined another New York Times

article which mentioned indications that 'the Soviets plan to give further impetus

to defactopartition by recognizing the Jews'.118

At the 12 May meeting itself, Clifford did not mention political considerationsat all. He argued that in accordance with the desire to prevent bloodshed in

Palestine, in line with the United States's support of the partition resolution, and

in order to pre-empt the Soviets, Truman should accept the reality on the ground

in Palestine. The Jewish State was going to be declared on 15 May and Truman

should announce his intention to recognize Israel at his press conference the next

day, 13 May.119Both Under Secretary of State Lovett and Marshall were opposed to Clifford's

stance. Lovett pointed out that premature recognition would compromise

trucenegotiations, appear

as atransparent political

move, and it was like

'buying a pig in a poke', in the sense that the nature of the Jewish State was

113Memorandum to the president, 19 Nov. 1947, Papers of Clark Clifford, Political File, 1947,

HSTL; letter from Elsey to the author, 12 Apr. 2002.

114WilliamDoyle, nsideheOvalOffice:heWhite ouseapesfromDRoClintonLondon,999), . 62.

11'Richard ious,The residencyBoston, 996), p.34,83-5.116See,forexample,WilliamRabinowitzo Clifford, May1948,Papers f HarryS. Truman,

OfficialFile-204, HSTL.

117New YorkTimes,5 May 1948, in Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File 1945-54, Palestine, Press

Clippings,HSTL.118

New YorkTimes,6 May 1948, in Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File 1945-54, Palestine,Press

Clippings, HSTL.

19 Statement by Clifford at the White House Meeting of 52 May 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v,

pp. 977-8; Memorandumof Conversationby Marshall,12 May 1948,FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 974-








unknown.120Marshall's opposition to Clifford was more vehement, as he ques-

tioned Clifford's mere presence at the meeting, since his considerations were

'based on domestic political considerations'. The meeting ended without appar-

ent resolution.The fact that Truman had called the meeting on 12 May is a strong indication

that his decision about recognition had not yet been made. Furthermore, the

position he took was a pragmatic one, clearly influenced by some of Lovett's

arguments. The president did not, for example, announce recognition on 13

May.121But further indications from the US delegation at the UN that the USSR

was intent on recognizing Israel emphasized the risk of losing ground to the

Soviets.122Truman seems to have made up his mind on 14 May, when the reality

of the potential vacuum of power that would follow the end of the mandate

became apparent.On 14 May, Clifford and Lovett spoke numerous times, with Clifford empha-

sizing that 'at six o'clock there would be no government or authority of any

kind in Palestine', and that Truman was intent on averting such a situation.123

Clifford eventually secured Lovett's guarantee that Marshall would not oppose

Truman's position.124 Lovett also helped Clifford to obtain a proper demand for

recognition from the Jewish Agency representative in Washington, Eliahu

Epstein.125This document arrived at the White House on 14 May, and allowed

Truman officially to extend recognition to the 'provisional government as the de

facto authority of the new state of Israel' only eleven minutes after the State of

Israel had come into being.126The fact that the recognition was defacto ratherthan a full dejure recognition indicates a further concession to Lovett's 'pig in a

poke' argument.Truman evidently did not see recognition as antithetical to truce efforts then

current in the United Nations, and did not inform the US delegation about his

decision to recognize Israel. While this development surprised the US delegation,

who later railed about the unfortunate timing of recognition, it did not prevent

the resolution for the appointment of an international mediator in Palestine from

passing in the General Assembly that same day.127Furthermore, Truman did not

lift the USembargo

on arms toPalestine,

a further indication of the essential

120 Memorandum of Conversation by Marshall, 12 May 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 975.121PublicPapers f the PresidentsftheUnitedStates:HarryS.Truman, 948,p. 253.122EleanorRoosevelto Truman,i May1948,Papers f HarryS. Truman,PSF,Personal ile,

Roosevelt leanor, older ,HSTL.123Memorandumof Conversations,byLovett,17May 1948,FRUS 1948,vol. v, p. 0oo5.124 Papersof HarryS. Truman,White House TelegraphOffice, 1948, HSTL; Clifford,

'RecognizingIsrael',p. I ; Memorandumof Conversations, y Lovett,17May 1948,FRUS 1948,vol.

v, pp. o005-7-125Epsteino Truman,Papers f HarryS. Truman,OfficeFile204-D,JewishState,1948-9,

HSTL;Spiegel,The ther rab-Israelionflict,. 37.126Statementby the President,HSTOF, Partii, Reel 34, RSC.127PhilipC.Jessup,The irthfnationsNewYork, 974),p. 289; UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly

resolution 186, FRUS 1948, vol. v, pp. 994-5.








continuity of US policy. This is also an indication that Truman's motivation was

not solely political, for American Jewish groups had lobbied not only for recog-

nition, but for the lifting of the embargo also. Recognition did not reduce this

political pressure, as letters poured in to urge the extension of full dejure recog-nition, as well as a lifting of the arms embargo.128As Arthur Krock wrote in the

New York Times on 20 May 1948, defactorecognition of Israel 'simply testified to

the facts that Israel exists, that its regime is accepted by the inhabitants of the area

and that there is no evidence this regime cannot take care of its immediate

obligations '.129

Following the partition resolution of 29 November 1947, the Jewish Agency

proceeded with its preparations for statehood in Palestine, which incorporatedboth military and political manoeuvres. From a military perspective, the aims

of theJewish Agency were to gain effective control over both the territory allotted

to them by the United Nations and to secure communications with the remaining

Jewish settlements which fell outside the proposed boundaries of the Jewish

State.'30 As the British proceeded with evacuation plans, Jewish Agency forces

were ready to assume military control over these areas, but their efforts were

partly frustrated by the steadfast opposition of the British to aid in the implemen-tation of partition.131 Ben-Gurion protested to the high commissioner on

8 December 1947, for example, that 'the [Mandatory] Government's refusal to

provide the Jewish Civil Guard with arms, while at the same time distributingarms to the Arab Civil Guard [was] utterly unjustified and ... fraught with grave

danger'.132The initial phase of the conflict went badly for the Yishuv. By March 1948 the

Arabs had cut off from the coast the entire Negev desert, included in the JewishState by the UN partition plan, and isolatedJerusalem. It was these developmentsthat led the State Department to conclude that partition was 'unworkable' and

that trusteeship would be a preferable option.133The course of the conflict turned,

however, towards the end of March 1948, when an Arab attempt to cut off the

strategically important port of Haifa failed, and Jewish forces launched a suc-

cessful counter-offensive, opening up the road to Jerusalem, as well as capturingHaifa and Tiberias

bylate

April.134On

I6 AprilBen-Gurion informed Shertok in

New York that 'from day to day our conquests are expanding'.135

128 See, forexample: Max Levinto Truman,21May 1948,PapersofJ. HowardMcGrath, HSTL;DavidGinsburgoNiles, 1July1948,Papers f DavidNiles,HSTL;Sol Bloom oTruman, Aug.1948, HSTOF, Part

III,Reel 35;EmmanuelCellerto Truman,4 Aug. 1948, HSTOF, Part

III,Reel 35;

BartleyCrum to ClarkClifford,3 Oct. 1948,Papersof ClarkClifford,CorrespondenceFile, 1948,HSTL. 129

New YorkTimes, 0 May 1948. 130 Gilbert,Israel,p. 166.131 See, for example, Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 27 Dec. 1947, S25-I700, CZA.132 Ben-Gurion o SirAlan Cunningham,8 Dec. 1947, S25-5583,CZA.

133 See, for example, Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff,11Feb. 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v,pp. 619-25.

134The counter-offensivewas calledOperationNachschon.Bregman,Israel'swars,p. 12.135 Ben-Gurion o Shertok,16 Apr. 1948, PDD, p. 648.








The military campaign was broadly connected to political developments aimed

at securing the organs of statehood. From December 1947 onwards, the Jewish

Agency concentrated not only on military matters, but also on progressing

towards statehood politically, by securing administrative control of the areas itruled, in anticipation of statehood. Thus Shertok declared to the UN Palestine

Commission on 15January 1948, that 'we [the Yishuv] already have a kind of

Jewish national authority operating as a security authority'.136A few days after his address to the Commission, Shertok approved a plan for

the creation of a Foreign Ministry, which he was to head, based on the model of

the British Foreign Office.137 On 23 March, Ben-Gurion communicated to

Shertok that the Jewish State would be declared on 'May I6'.138On 25 March,

Shertok forwarded a memorandum to the Palestine Commission indicating the

creation in Israel of a Provisional Council of Government for the Jewish State,

complete with the names of the members of the Council.139Significantly, this was

the same day that Truman, at a press conference, indicated that the trusteeship

proposal was not meant as a repudiation of partition. Shertok's communication to

the Palestine Commission showed that such diplomatic niceties were not relevant

to developments on the ground in Palestine.140Shortly afterwards, the Jewish

Agency set up a separate police force with a clear view to expanding it for internal

security in the new state.141As these preparations were underway, Shertok was involved in continuing

diplomatic negotiations in Washington, DC, and New York. The negotiations

Shertok took part in were twofold. As the effective foreign minister of the Yishuv,he was summoned to negotiate US proposals for obtaining trusteeship and a truce

in Palestine. But his role was not merely a reactive one, and Shertok also spent

these months lobbying for the lifting of the arms embargo on Palestine.

The position of the Jewish Agency regarding the trusteeship and truce pro-

posals was unambiguous. Although the course of the military conflict in Palestine

influenced the acceptability of a truce, the Jewish Agency refused any proposalthat would delay statehood. This steadfast attitude first applied to trusteeship,

which the Jewish Agency rejected unconditionally, as Shertok told Marshall he

wouldoppose

a measure thatpromoted

'a denial ofindependence'.142

The same opposition to any postponement of statehood applied to truce

proposals. As Shertok informed Ben-Gurion, the line he was following in

Washington with regard to truce negotiations was that the Agency's conditions

136 Shertokaddress o the UN PalestineCommission, 5Jan. 1948,PDD, p. 167.137Eytan o Shertok,9Jan. 1948,PDD,pp. 194-6;Gabriel heffer,Mosheharett:iographyfa

political oderateOxford, 996), p.281-2.138 Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 23 Mar. 1948, S25-17o3, CZA.

139ShertokoUN Palestine ommission,5Mar.1948,PDD,pp.506-7.

140 ConfidentialPressand RadioConference,25Mar.1948, apersof HarryS. Truman,HistoricalFile, TrumanPapers' ile,HSTL.

14' Minutes of Defence Committee Meeting, I Apr. 1948, S25-9348, CZA.

142MeetingbetweenShertok,Epstein-Marshall,Lovett,26 Mar. 1948,PDD, p. 515.








for a truce were military, not political, and that the Agency would 'resist politicalconditions put by others'.143 The military conditions Shertok was referring to

were essentially the withdrawal of all Arab irregulars from neighbouring states,

and the prevention of new infiltration.144The politicalconditions were a reference

to any scheme which may postpone statehood. On 8 May, Shertok reiterated to

Marshall that 'the main point of the truce proposal was that we should forego

proclaiming aJewish state immediately', and that this demand was 'tantamount

to asking us to renounce our most fundamental right'.145

While these negotiations occupied much of his time, Shertok was also con-

stantly being pressed from the Yishuv to lobby for the lifting of the arms embargo,

which the Jewish Agency saw as extremely harmful to its cause.146As early as 24

December 1947, for example, Shertok pleaded with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr, a

leader of the Americans for Democratic Action, to 'obtain military equipment, in

part immediately and in part after the withdrawal of British forces'.147 In a 6

January 1948 meeting betweenJewish Agency and State Department officials, the

issue of military equipment was high on the agenda. One of the Jewish Agency

officials, Abba Eban, remarked that the Haganah was 'adequately manned but

poorly equipped' and that 'it was essential that supplies be obtained'. He hoped

that the arms embargo would be lifted, as this 'would indicate American deter-

mination [to implement partition] and would thus have a stabilising effect on the

situation in Palestine'.148 This issue remained at the forefront of Jewish Agency

concerns, and was raised at nearly every meeting between Agency officials and

the State Department, to no avail.While military procurements were important, diplomatic niceties such as rec-

ognition were relegated to a lesser sphere. The only time recognition was brought

up at an official meeting between State Department and Jewish Agency

representatives, on 8 May, Shertok revealed that he had not given the issue much

thought. Shertok was on his way back to Israel, to be present at the birth of the

State, and he spent most of the meeting making it clear that theJewish State was

to be declared imminently, and rejecting truce proposals. When the issue of rec-

ognition came up, brought up by Lovett, Shertok answered that 'we were not a

movementgiven

tohunting

after formal shibboleths; ...Recognition

canonly

apply to something which effectively exists. It would not be our first step to rush

headlong into the quest for recognition.'149

143ShertoktoBen-Gurion,ii Apr. 1948, S25-1704,CZA.144 American Section ofJewish Agency to Ben-Gurion, 15Mar. 1948, PDD, pp. 462-3.145Secret Report of Discussion between Sherok and State Department Representatives, 8 May

1948, Z6-59,CZA.146SeeSlonim,The1948Americanmbargon arms oPalestine',. 499.147 hertokoRoosevelt,4Dec.1947,PDD,p. 102.148

MemorandumfConversationetweenEpstein, banandStateDepartmentNEA,OfficeofSpecial Political Affairs), 6Jan. 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 538.

149Secret Report of Discussion between Sherok and State Department Representatives, 8 May

1948, Z6-59, CZA.








Shertok clearly did not consider recognition to be a matter of great importance,and had not given it much thought, otherwise he would certainly have raised

the issue of a possible defactorecognition as opposed to the dejure one he seems

to have had in mind. The conversation proceeded, and recognition remaineda highly peripheral issue for the Jewish Agency. On 14 May, Shertok cabled

Epstein from Jerusalem telling him that State Department policy for recognition

required the submission of a 'specific request for recognition by State claimingit' and that no evidence was yet available whether the request 'would be com-

plied with if submitted'.150 That Shertok was cabling Epstein about recognition

only on the day that the State was being proclaimed, and not before, indicates

that he was not particularly concerned with obtaining this recognition, as he

realized the nascent State of Israel had more important, military, struggles on its

hands.

The multiarchival perspective used in this article points to an importantre-evaluation of the historiography of the United States's recognition of Israel. The

analysis of the 'Washington perspective' has shown that in order fully to com-

prehend this perspective, Palestine policy has to be viewed in its correct historical

context of the Cold War, because Palestine policy, as indeed all foreign policy at

the time, was viewed through a Cold War perspective. Previous historiographyhas somehow missed this crucial consideration, and has therefore failed to see that

US policy towards Palestine was framed within a clear set of Cold War objectives,

which both the White House and the State Department followed from late 1946onwards.

Recognition itself was not the momentous event it has been billed as. This

is true from both the 'Washington perspective' and the 'Yishuv perspective',which has not yet been seriously addressed in accounts of US Palestine policy.As seen from Washington, recognition was ultimately a decision to accept the

reality on the ground in Palestine without altering any of the fundamental ob-

jectives in Palestine, and without lifting the arms embargo which was hurtingthe Yishuv militarily. For the Yishuv, recognition was clearly a secondary

concern,as the

ideological goalof statehood had been

pursued practicallyat

least since 1945, and was now becoming reality through military and adminis-

trative advances. Diplomatic efforts focused on procuring arms and lifting the

embargo, not on recognition, which seems to have come almost as an after-

thought.Because most of the existing historiography of recognition sees the event itself as

a turning point of great magnitude from a US foreign policy perspective, the

reassessment presented in this article has important consequences. Probably the

most important of these is the question of the existence or not of a 'special

relationship' between the US and Israel. Indeed, if recognition did not mark a

watershed in US policy that led to such a 'special relationship', as the evidence

150 Shertok to Epstein, 14 May 1948, S25-I553, CZA.








presented in this article indicates, then the origin of such a relationship needs to be

questioned. While some historians have looked at this issue recently, they have not

properly analysed the alleged starting point of such a relationship: US recog-

nition. 51 The reassessment of recognition presented here therefore provides auseful addition to the historiographical debate about the US-Israeli special

relationship.

151Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948: a special relationship ?' in

DiplomaticHistory,22(1998) No. 2, p. 231.

the recognition of israel

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