the pruitt igoe myth

8/18/2019 The Pruitt Igoe Myth

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The Pruitt-Igoe MythAuthor(s): Katharine G. BristolReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Architectural Education (1984-), Vol. 44, No. 3 (May, 1991), pp. 163-171Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, Inc.

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slumswere

racially

egregated.

lacks

occupied

he area

immediately

north of

downtown,

while whites

tended to live to the south.

The

black

ghetto expandedparticularly

ast with

the

postwar

nflux of

poor

black

population

romthe South. As the

growing

lums

crept

closer o the

central

business

district,

ity

officials

nd the localbusi-

ness

community

eared he

accompanying

ecline n

property

alues

would threaten

he economichealthof

downtownrealestate.

They

responded

y

developing comprehensive

lan

to

redevelop

he zone

immediately

urrounding

he

downtownbusiness

ore.2

Using

the

urban

redevelopment

rovisions

f the

1949

Hous-

ingAct, St. Louis' Land Clearance ndRedevelopmentAuthority

planned

o

acquire

nd clear xtensive

ractswithin

the slums

and

to

sell

them at

reduced ost to

private

evelopers.

hese

redevelopment

projects

were

slated o

accommodate

mainly

middle-income

housing

and

commercial

development

n an

effort to lure the middle class

back o the

central

ity.

At

the same

ime,

the St.

Louis

Housing

Au-

thority

wouldclear

and

or the

construction

f

public

housing.

These

projects

were

ntended o

provide

arge

numbers f

low-rentunitsto

the

poor

n

order o stem

ghetto

expansion,

nd also o accommodate

households

displaced

by

redevelopment

nd other slum

clearance

projects.3

Pruitt-Igoe

was

one

of

these

publichousingprojects.

Located

on

a

57-acre

ite on the northside black

ghetto,

t was one

of several

tracts hathad been

targeted

or slumclearance nder he

postwar

e-

development lan.

In

1950

St. Louis

received federal

ommitment

for

5800

public

housing

units,

abouthalfof which

were

allocated

y

the St.

Louis

Housing

Authority

to

Pruitt-Igoe.

The

2700-unit

project

wouldhouse

15,000

tenants t

densities

higher

han he

origi-

nal slum

dwellings.

The

high

density

esulted rom

housing

and rede-

2. Aerial iewof

Pruitt-goe.Courtesy

Missouri istorical

ociety)

I _ _

\

/

'

IJ

1.

.L. J.

,

1~

I

I ii

I I

3. Site

plan.

Courtesy ogerMontgomery)

velopment

fficials'

expectations

hat

these

projects

would

eventually

come to

housenot

only

those

displaced

y

slum clearanceor

Pruitt-

Igoe,but alsobydemolition orredevelopmentrojectsndforfuture

public

housing.

In

1950

the St. Louis

Housing

Authority

commissioned

he

firm

of

Leinweber,

amasaki

& Hellmuth o

designPruitt-Igoe.

he

architects'

askwasconstrained

y

the sizeand ocation

of the

site,

the

numberof

units,

and the

projectdensity,

all

of which had been

pre-

determined

by

the St. Louis

Housing

Authority.

Their first

design

proposals

alled for a mixtureof

high-rise,

mid-rise,

and

walk-up

structures.

Though

this

arrangement

as

acceptable

o the local

au-

thority,

t

exceeded he federal

goverment's

maximum

llowable

ost

per

unit.At

this

point

a

fieldofficer f the

federal ublic

Housing

Ad-

ministration

P.H.A.)

ntervened nd

insisted

on

a scheme

using

33

identical

eleven-story

levator

buildings Figures

and

3).4

Thesede-

sign changes

ook

place

n the context of a strict

economy

and effi-

ciency

drive within

the P.H.A. Political

opposition

to the

public

housingprogram

was

particularly

ntense n

the

conservative

political

climateof the

early

1950s.

In

addition,

he outbreak

f the

Korean

war hadcreated nflation

and materials

shortages,

and the

P.H.A.

found tself n the

position

of

having

o

justifypublic

housingexpen-

ditures

o an

unsympathetic

ongress.5

Despite

the intense

pressure

or

economical

design,

he archi-

tects

devoteda

great

deal of attention o

improving

ivability

n the

high-rise

nits.

One of their

strategies

asto

use two

popular

ew de-

May

1991 JAE

44/3

164

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4/10

4. View c

Society)

5.

Diagr

^,,

eJ~

.J1,_~,z

-I

t

X

'

-U.

-

sign

features:

kip-stop

levators nd

glazed

nternal

alleries Figures

L

*~izIjifrEEh--

"

..'i

r

---^

4

and

5).

Thesewere ntended o create"individual

eighborhoods"

I

.W

m_t*i;-lli "

*-

lh;

..

g 4

:;r

conceived s

"vertical

allways."

kip-stop

levators

ransported

esi-

'7i

i~,

Lrr:

<

11

. . ...

dents

o

the

gallery

evel,

romwhich

they

wouldwalk

o

their

apart-

U

rt:l.'_-,,'

.

'

(

..

ments.

Laundry

and

storage

rooms also

opened

off the

galleries.

:,,B

11;W w;.xt.

i:

i

^When

Pruitt-Igoe

was

published

n

the Architecturalorum

nd Ar-

i:

jiy

,'~y

l

-,tt

dg

chitectural

ecord,6t was these

specific

design

eatures hatreceived

^

;

tlt:

_

the

most attention.

The Architecturalecord

praised

he

skip-stop

l-

^k^^CtS?w-

^i^I

_ evators

nd

galleries

s innovative

compensations

or the shortcom-

_9fB |^ ^ ^_

~

~a.h~-.~ingsf thehigh-rise ousing orm:

Sinceall of

these

are,

under ederal

egislation,

ombined ow-

)f

a

Pruitt-lgoe

uilding.Courtesy

Missouri

istorical

rent

housing

andslum-clearance

projects,

ocatednear he heart

of the

city,

a

high-rise,high-density

olution

was

inescapable,

and

the

problem

was how to

plan

a

high-rise

roject

n a

huge

scale,

and still

provide,

o the

greatest

xtent

possible

under

.....m---i...~

present

legislation,

ommunities ith

individualcaleandchar-

acterwhich

would avoid the

"project" tmosphere

o

often

criticized.7

Even after the architects

had

switched

to an all

high-rise

scheme,

hey

facedcontinued

pressure

romthe Public

Housing

Ad-

ministrationo keepcosts o a bareminimum. n a 1975studyof the

St. Louis

Housing

Authority's

xpenditures

n

Pruitt-Igoe,

olitical

scientist

Eugene

Meehan

analyzed

he extentto

which these

budget

constraints ffected he final

design.

n addition

o the elimination f

amenities,

uchas children's

play

areas,

andscaping,

nd

ground-floor

bathrooms,

he cost

cutting targeted

points

of

contactbetween he

[jB|B

tenants

nd the

living

units."The

quality

f

the hardware as

so

poor

..Jj-jI^^

~~that

doorknobs

nd ockswerebroken n initial

use.

..Windowpanes

wereblown from

inadequate

rames

by

wind

pressure.

n

the kitch-

ens,

cabinets

weremadeof the thinnest

plywoodpossible."8

Pruitt-Igoe

was

completed

n

1954.

Though originally

on-

ceived as

two

segregated

ections

(Pruitt

for blacks

and

Igoe

for

^^^B

i~ |whites),

a

Supreme

Court decision handed down that same

year

.~l~

^JIBiB-~

forced

desegregation.Attempts

at

integration

ailed,

however,

and

ammaticection.

Courtesy

oger

ontgomery)

Pruitt-Igoe

was an

exclusively

black

project

virtually

from

inception.

Overall

Pruitt-Igoe's

irsttenants

appeared

pleased

with their new

housing.Despite

the

relatively

heap

construction

quality,

he units

still

represented

much

higher

evelof

amenity

han the

dilapidated

units

hey

had

vacated

r been

orced o leave.

By

1958, however,

onditions ad

begun

o

deteriorate. ne of

the first

signals

was a

steadily

declining occupancy

rate.As

Roger

Montgomery

has

persuasively

rgued,

St. Louis'

housing

officials

failed o

anticipate

hanging

postwar

demographic

rends hat dra-

1 65

Bristol




5/10

matically

ffected he

inner-city

housing

market

nd threatened

he

viability

of

public housing projects.9 Pruitt-Igoe

was conceived at a

time when the

demand

for

low-income

housing

units

in

the inner

city

had never been

higher,

due

to

widespread

dislocation caused

by

slum

clearance,

urban

renewal,

and the federal

highway program.

However,

by

the time the

project opened

in

1954,

this

demand

had

tapered

off.

Slow

overall

metropolitan

population

growth

and

the

overproduction

of

inexpensive

suburban

dwellings

helped open

up

the

previously

tight

inner-city

rental market to blacks.

Many

chose to live in inex-

pensive private dwellings

ratherthan in

public

housing.

Pruitt-Igoe's

occupancyratepeakedin 1957 at 91% and immediatelybegan to de-

cline.

This

decline

in

occupancy

directly

impacted

the St. Louis

Housing

Authority's ability

to

maintain the

project,

as

Eugene

Meehan has

amply

demonstrated.?1

Under the

1949

Housing

Act,

lo-

cal

housing

authorities were

expected

to

fund

their

operations

and

maintenance out of rents

collected

from tenants. In

a

period

of

rising

costs and

declining occupancy,

the

Housing

Authority

was

placed

in a

cost-income

squeeze

that

impeded

its

ability

to

conduct basic

repairs.

In

addition,

average

tenant income was

declining.

The

project

came

increasingly

to be inhabited

by

the

poorest

segment

of

the black

population: primarily

emale

heads

of households

dependent

on

pub-

lic assistance. These

demographic

shifts and economic

pressures

re-

sulted in chronic

neglect

of maintenance and mechanicalbreakdowns.

Elevators ailed to work and vandalism went

unrepaired.

In a

project

increasingly

nhabited

by

the

poorest

and most

demoralized

segment

of

the

population,

the vandalism came also

to

be

accompanied

by

in-

creasing

rates of violent crime.

The

ongoing problems

of

vandalism, violence,

and fiscal insta-

bility

prompted

a number

of

efforts to

salvage Pruitt-Igoe.

In

1965

the first of severalfederal

grants

arrived

o

provide physical rejuvena-

tion

and

the

establishment

of social

programs

to benefit the

residents

and to

combat further

rent

arrearages.

The

programs

had little effect:

Occupancy

rates

continued

to

decline,

crime rates

climbed,

and

rou-

tine

management

and maintenance were

neglected.

In

1969

Pruitt-

Igoe

tenants

joined

residents of

two other

St. Louis

public housing

projects

n

a massive nine-month rent strike. This further

depleted

the

Housing

Authority's

limited financial

reserves

and

aggravated

he

va-

cancy

problem,

prompting

H.U.D. to consider

closing

the

project.1

In an effort

to determine whether

explosion

or

traditional

headache-

ball demolition would be

cheaper,

all the

remaining

tenants were

moved to

11

buildings,

and

on

March

16,

1972

a

demolition

experi-

ment levelled three

buildings

in

the center

of

the

project.

Despite

some last-minute rehabilitation

plans,

in

1973

H.U.D. decided to de-

molish the rest

of

the

project,

and

finally

finished

it

off

in

1976.

Rise

of

the

Pruitt-lgoe

myth

Clearly

here

were

a

number f

powerful

ocialand economic actors

at

play

n the riseand fall of

Pruitt-Igoe.

Yetfor most architects he

entire

tory

can be reduced o a one-line

explanation:

he

design

was

to

blame.This

interpretation

ained

ts

greatest

cceptance

n the af-

termath

of

the

project's

demolition.The roots of the

Pruitt-Igoe

myth,

however,

o

back

o

the first

years

f

the

project's

istory.

The deterioration f

Pruitt-Igoe

becameevident

only

a

few

years

fter ts

completion

n

1954,

andthe local

press

notedas

early

s

1960thatcertaindesign eaturesxacerbatedheproject's roblems.'2

The

skip-stop

levators

nd

galleries,

ar

rom

promoting

ommunity

association,

had

proved

o be

opportune

environments or

violent

crime.

Forced

o walk

through

he

galleries

o reach

heir

apartments,

residents

were

threatenedand attacked

by

gangs,

who

used these

spaces

as

hangouts.

Residents

were also

frequently

ttacked n the

elevators.

This connection between

imputed

design

flaws

and

Pruitt-

Igoe's

deteriorationirstcame

o

the attentionof awide audience f

design professionals

n

1965,

when the

growing

notoriety

of

the

project

prompted

Architecturalorum o

publish

a secondarticle n

Pruitt-Igoe.

n "TheCase

History

f a

Failure,"

ames

Bailey

etracted

virtually

ll of Forum's arlier

tatements bout he

project,

cknowl-

edging

that

many

of the features

praised

n their 1951 articlehad

proved

o be

hazards,

atherhan

improvements

o the

quality

f life:

The

undersizedlevators re

brutally

attered,

nd

they

reekof

urine

rom

children

who

misjudged

he time

it

takes o reach

their

apartments.

y

stopping

nly

on

every

hird

loor,

he el-

evators fferconvenient

settings

or

crime. ...The

galleries

re

anything

but cheerful ocial enclaves.The

tenantscall them

"gauntlets"

through

which

they

must

pass

o

reach

heir

doors.

...Heavy

metal

grilles

now

shield he

windows,

but

they

were

installedoo late o

prevent

hree hildren

rom

falling

ut.

The

steam

pipes

remain

exposed

both

in

the

galleries

nd the

apart-

ments,

frequentlyinflicting

severe burns. The

adjoining

laun-

dry

rooms

are

unsafe

and little

used. ....The

storage

rooms are

also locked-and

empty. They

have been

robbed of

their con-

tents so often that tenants

refuse to use them.'3

To his

credit,

Bailey

tempered

his criticism of the architecture

by

pointing

out

that the

problems

at

Pruitt-Igoe

went

deeper

than

physi-

cal

design.

He

mentioned,

in

particular,

he absence of adult males as

heads of

households,

the

project's

notoriety,

and the deficient man-

agement

and maintenance.

Nonetheless,

Bailey's

article aid the

foun-

May

1991

JAE

44/3

166




6/10

dation for a continuous rearticulationof the

Pruitt-Igoe

story

throughout

the late sixties

and

early

seventies

as the situation at

Pruitt-Igoe

ontinued o deteriorate.

The trialdemolitionof

1972

brought Pruitt-Igoe

unprec-

edented

attention

n

the architecturalnd

the national

press.

Architec-

tural

Forum,

AIA

Journal

Architecture

lus,

and

The

Architects

ournal

all

published

articles

n the failure

of the

supposedly

nnovative

de-

sign

features.'4

Life,

Time,

The

Washington

ost,

and

The

National

Observer,

mong

others,

reported

n the demolition

experiment

nd

pointed

o

the

architecture

s one of the

contributing

auses.'5

hese

articles

represent

he first

appearance

f

the

Pruitt-Igoemyth.

No

longer

confining

their criticism o

particular

rchitectural

eatures,

suchas the

open

galleries,

he criticsnow

began

o relate he

project's

failure o flaws

n

the overall

approach

r

designphilosophy.

he

gen-

eral heme hat

emerged

was

that he architects

ere nsensitiveo the

needsof the

lower

class

population

ndwere

trying

o use the

design

to forcea

middle-class,white,

lifestyle

on

Pruitt-Igoe

esidents.For

example,

an

article

n

Architecture lus

argued

hat the

design

was

simply nappropriate

or the social tructures

f

the

people

who were

going

to live there.

George

Kassabaum,

ne of the

project

rchitects,

was

quoted

as

saying,

"Youhad

middle

classwhites ike

myself

de-

signing

for an

entirely

different

group."'6

The

implication

was that

low-income

urbanblacks

constituted a tenant

group

with

special

needs:Theywere not instilledwith the middleclassvalueof taking

pride

n the

upkeep

of their

environment,

nd

they

also

brought

with

them certaindestructivebehaviors.As the

Washington

ost

put

it,

therewasan

"incompatibility

etween he

high-rise

tructure nd the

large

poor

familieswho

came o

inhabit

t,

only

a

generation

emoved

from

the farm."17

This

interpretation

f thedemiseof

Pruitt-Igoe

eceived

strong

reinforcement

hen it

appeared

n

OscarNewman's

Defensible pace

in

the

same

year

as the trialdemoliton.This seminal ext

of the then

emerging

discipline

of environment nd behavior

argued

hat there

was a

direct

relationship

etween

physical

nvironments nd

human

behavior.

According

o

Newman,

he

widespread

andalism

nd

vio-

lence at

Pruitt-Igoe

esulted romthe

presence

f excessive

indefen-

sible"

public

pace.i8

Corridors ere oo

long

andnot visible rom he

apartments.

he

residents id not feel that hese

spaces

"belonged"

o

them and so

made

no

effort to maintain or

police

them. The

entryways,

ocated

n

large,

unprotected pen

plazas,

did not allow

tenants

any

control

overwho entered

he

buildings.

Newman

urther

argued

hat

by

designing

public

housing

n

such a

way

as to

provide

an

appropriate

mountof

private, emiprivate,

nd

public

space,

ar-

chitects ouldreduce iolence

andvandalism

n the

environment.

With all the attention

beingpaid

to the

project's

esign

n the

early

1970s,

a

strong

associative

ink

was

forged

between rchitectural

flaws

and

Pruitt-Igoe's

eterioration.

n

1965

James

Bailey

hadtaken

care o

point

out that

two of

the

major

auses

of the

deterioration

f

Pruitt-Igoe

ere

chronically

nadequate

maintenance

nd

the increas-

ing poverty

f tenants.

By

1972

thesecrucial lements f the

story

had

been all but

forgotten

n

the

rush

o

condemn

he

architecture.

t is

the

privileging

f

these

designproblems

ver

the much more

deeply

embedded conomicandsocialonesthatconstitutes he coreof the

Pruitt-Igoe

myth.

The

mythignores

he connection

between

Pruitt-Igoe's rob-

lems and the fiscal risis

of the

St. Louis

Housing

Authority,

r what

Eugene

Meehanhas calledthe

"programmed

ailure" f American

publichousing.'9

Politicaland socialambivalenceo

public

housing

had resulted

n

a token

housingprogram

urdened

y

impossible

is-

cal

management

onstraints. he federal ublic

Housing

Administra-

tion also

impededpublichousing

fforts

y

insisting

n

unrealistically

low

constructioncosts. The

myth

also omits the

subordination

f

public

housing

to

postwar

urban

redevelopment

rograms.

Federal

dollars

helped

cities

clear

unsightly

lums

and assisted

private

nterests

in

developing

aluable

nner

city

land. Public

housingprojects

were

confined

o

the unwanted ites n theheartof the

slums,

and

devel-

oped

at

high

densities o

accommodatehose

displaced

y

the whole-

saleclearance fpoorneighborhoods.

The

myth

also

ignores

heconnection

between ocial

ndiffer-

enceto the

poverty

f inner

city

blacks

nd

the

declineof

Pruitt-Igoe.

In

1970

sociologist

Lee

Rainwater rote Behind

Ghetto

Walls,

ased

on the

findings

of a

massive

participant

bserver

tudy

conducted

during

he

mid-1960s

at

Pruitt-Igoe.20

ainwater

argued

hatthe vio-

lence

andvandalismhat

occurred t the

project

werean

understand-

able

response

y

its

residentso

poverty

andracial

discrimination.

n

his view

architectural

design

was neither

he

cause

nor

the cure for

these

problems.

mproved

housing

conditionsand other

effortsdi-

rectedat

changing

he behavior f the

poor

were,

n his

opinion,

use-

less

f

not

accompanied

y

efforts o

raise heir

ncome evel.

This evidence

directly

contradicts he

Pruitt-Igoe

myth

by

demonstrating

he

significance

f the

political

and

economic ources

of

Pruitt-Igoe's

ecline.In

addition,

t

reveals hat

the

type

of

argu-

ment

proposed

n

Defensible

pace

s a subtle orm

of

blaming

he vic-

tim.

The idea of

defensible

space

s

basedon the

assumption

hat

certain

"populations"navoidably

ring

with them

behavioral

prob-

lems hathave

o be

designed gainst.

This

kind

of

argument

oesnot

question

why

public

housingprojects

end to be

plagued

by

violent

crime n the

first

place.

It

naturalizeshe

presence

of

crime

among

1

67

Bristol




7/10

low-income

populations

ather han

seeing

t

as

a

product

of

institu-

tionalized

conomic

nd

racial

oppression.

Pruitt-lgoe

and the end

of

Modernism

Despite

he

extensive

vidence f

multiple

ocialand economic auses

of

Pruitt-Igoe's

eterioration,

he

Pruitt-Igoe

myth

hasalso

become

a

truism

f the environment nd behavioriterature.or

example,

ohn

Pipkin's

Urban

Social

Space,

standard

ocial-factors

extbook,

uses

Pruitt-Igoe

s an

example

f indefensible

space

and of the lackof fit

between

high-rise uildings

nd

owerclass ocial tructure. In ocial

terms,

public

housing

has beena failure.

ocial

tructures

avedisin-

tegrated

n the desolate

high-rise ettings....Many

rojects

re

ripe

or

demolition.

One of the most notorious...was

Pruitt-Igoe.

When

built,

it

won an

architectural

prize,

but...

it

epitomized

he ills of

public

housing."21

This

passage

s notable

because t illustrates

ne

particular

x-

ample

of how the

Pruitt-Igoe

myth

has

grown

by

incorporating

is-

information.

Though

it is

commonly

accorded

the

epithet

"award-winning,"

ruitt-Igoe

neverwon

any

kind

of

architectural

prize.

An earlier t. Louis

housingproject

by

the same eam

of

archi-

tects,theJohnCochranGardenApartments, idwin two architec-

turalawards.

At some

point

this

prize

eems

o

have

been

ncorrectly

attributed o

Pruitt-Igoe.

This

strange

memory

apse

on the

part

of

architects

n theirdiscussions

f

Pruitt-Igoe

s

extremely

ignificant.

Beginning

n the

mid-1970s,

Pruitt-Igoe

began

ncreasingly

o be

usedasanillustration

f

the

argument

hat he

International

tyle

was

responsible

or the failure

f

Pruitt-Igoe.

he fictitious

prize

s essen-

tial

to

this

dimension

f the

myth,

because

t

paintsPruitt-Igoe

s the

iconicmodernist

monument.

The association

f

Pruitt-Igoe's

emise

with the

perceived

ail-

uresof the Modern

movementhad

begun

as

early

s

1972.

In

the af-

termathof the

project's

demolition,

several

writers

suggested

hat

insensitivity

o

residents' eeds

was

typical

of modern

architecture.

The Architectsournalalled hedemolition f Pruitt-Igoethemod-

ern movement's

most

grandiloquent

ailure."22 ith

the

critique

of

Modernism

emerging

n

the

1970s,

t was not

surprising

hat

a num-

ber of criticsand

theorists,

who can

be

loosely

ermed

Postmodern,

began

to use

the

project

n

their

writing

to

represent

he

Modern

movement.

The first

mportant ppearance

f

Pruitt-Igoe

n a

critique

of

Modernism

ame

n

1976

when

Colin

Roweand Fred

Koetter

used

the

photograph

of the demolition

n their introduction

o

Collage

City.

This section

of

the

bookwasdevoted

o

a

demonstration

f the

premise

hatthe Modernmovement's rchitecturalnd socialrevolu-

tion

had backfired. nstead

of

furthering

he

development

f a new

society,

"the

city

of modern

architecture,

oth as

psychological

on-

struct and

as

physical

model,

had been

rendered

tragically

ridiculous... he

city

of

Ludwig

Hibersheimer nd Le

Corbusier,

he

city

celebrated

y

CIAM and advertised

y

the Athens

Charter,

he

former

city

of

deliverance

s

everyday

ound

increasingly

nad-

equate."23

hough

Roweand Koetter o

not refer o

Pruitt-Igoe

pe-

cifically,

the

implication

of the

photograph's

nclusion

is

clear.

Pruitt-Igoe

s usedas

an

example

f this

"city

of modernarchitecture"

whose revolution ailed. It

presents

Pruitt-Igoe

s a

product

of the

ideasof

Hibersheimer,

e

Corbusier,

nd

CIAM

and

implicates

he

inadequacy

f their deas

n the demolition f the

project.

Only

one

year

after he

publication

of

Collage

City,

Charles

Jencks

urther

advanced his

interpretation

n The

Language

f

Post

Modern

Architecture. n the introduction

to his discussion

of

Postmodernism,

encks

asserted

hat

the

demolitionof

Pruitt-Igoe

represents

hedeath

of

modernarchitecture.

ikeRoweand

Koetter,

he associated

Pruitt-Igoe

ith the rationalist

principles

f

CIAM,

and

particularly

ith the urban

design

principles

f Le Corbusier. ccord-

ing

to

Jencks,

ven

though

the

project

was

designed

with the inten-

tion of

instillinggood

behavior

n the

tenants,

t

was

incapable

of

accommodatingheir ocialneeds:

Pruitt-Igoe

was constructed

according

o the most

progressive

ideas

of CIAM.. and

it won an

award

romtheAmerican

n-

stitute

of Architects hen t

was

designed

n

1951.

It consisted

of

elegant

slab blocks fourteen

storeys

high,

with rational

"streets

n

the

air"

which

weresafe rom

cars,but,

as it turned

out,

not safe

rom

crime);

"sun,

pace

and

greenery",

hich Le

Corbusier alled

he "three ssential

joys

of

urbanism"

instead

of

conventional

treets,

ardens

nd

semi-privatepace,

which

he

banished).

t had a

separation

f

pedestrian

nd vehicular

traffic,

he

provision

f

play

space,

and ocal

amenities uch

as

laundries,

reches

and

gossip

centers-all rational ubstitutes

for traditionalpatterns.24

Theseuses

of the

Pruitt-Igoe

ymbol

added

significantly

o the

Pruitt-Igoe

myth.

Like he

defensible

spaceargument

opularized

y

Oscar

Newman,

heseaccounts

ailed o locate

Pruitt-Igoe

n its

his-

torical

ontext

and

thereby

gnored

videncehateconomic

risis

nd

racialdiscrimination

layed

he

largest

ole

in

the

project's

demise.

Now,

they

addeda set of ideas

about he

architects'ntentions

n

de-

signing

the

project.

Both accounts

presented

he

project

as the ca-

nonicalmodernistmonument

Jencks

n

particular

erpetuating

he

May

1991

JAE

44/3

168




8/10

mistaken dea that t was an

award-winning esign).

They

described

the

project

s

Modernist ot

only

n

formal

erms,

but

in

political

nd

social ermsas

well,

as

reflecting

n

agenda

or social

engineering.

These uses

of

Pruitt-Igoe

misrepresented

he

designers'

nten-

tions and the extent

to

which the architects ontrolled he

project's

design.

As

the

summary

f

Pruitt-Igoe's

istory

demonstrates,

much

of the

project's esign

was determined

y

the St. Louis

Housing

Au-

thority

ndthe federal ublic

Housing

Administration.

he

architects

had

no

control

over he

project's

solated

ocation,

ts excessive

ensi-

ties,

the elimination

of

amenities,

or the use

of

high-rise

elevator

buildings.Their taskwas limitedto providing heformof the indi-

vidual

buildings

nd

incorporating

s much

amenity

s

possible, iven

the

restricted

budget.

In

carrying

ut

this

task,

the architects id follow the formal

conventions

of modern architecture.

Pruitt-Igoe

was one of

Leinweber,

amasaki

& Hellmuth's irst

major

ommissions,

o it is

certain

hat

they

wished o

makean

impression

n their

architectural

peers.

The

glazedgalleries

ombinedwith

skip-stop

levators,

he

ex-

tensive

open spaces

between

the

slabs,

and

the minimalistsurface

treatment

ertainly

eflected he

prevailing

nterest

n Modernism s

elaborated

y

CLAM.

However,

he use of these ormal onventions

doesnot demonstrate

hat the architects

ad

particular

ntentionsor

social

reform. n

fact,

n

published

tatements

MinoruYamasaki x-

pressed

doubt thatthe

high-rise

ormwould havea beneficial ffect

on

public

housing

enants.

These

statements

appeared

n a series f articles

n

the

Journal

f

Housing

n whichYamasaki

engaged

n a debatewith the

progressive

housing

reformer atherine

auer.25 amasaki efended

high-rise

e-

sign,

not

on

its

architectural

erits,

but as

the best

possible esponse

to

whathe

perceived

s the social

imperative

f

slum

clearance

nd

the

economic

necessity

or urban

redevelopment.

iventhe

high

cost of

urban and

occupied

by

slum

housing,

he

argued,

t is most economi-

cally

efficient o

acquire

mall

parcels

nd buildat

high

densities.Yet

despite

ts economic

advantages,

amasaki

as

skeptical

f the value

of the

high-rise

as

a

form

for mass

housing:

"the ow

building

with

low

density

s

unquestionably

more

satisfactory

han

multi-story

iv-

ing.

...If I hadno economic r social

imitations,

'd

solveall

my

prob-

lemswith

one-story

uildings."26

e

defended

high-rise esign

as

the

onlyway

to

respond

o

external

conomicand

policy

conditions.

In her

defense

of low-rise

housing,

CatherineBauer

suggested

that the

policy

of

clearing

slums and

then

rehousing

ow-income

populations

n

high-density

entral

ity

projects

s not

necessarily

he

result

of

economic

imperatives

ut

a

conscious hoice

on

the

part

of

policy-makers.

igh-density

nner

city

projects

re he resultof mak-

ing

publichousing

subordinate

o

urban

redevelopment

chemes:

f

business nterests

nd

city

officials

were

willing

to

locate

projects

n

the urban

periphery

hen the

high-density,

igh-riseprojects

would

be

unnecessary.

Bauercriticized

Yamasaki

ess for

his

architectural

views han

for

his

politics;

he was

too

willing

o

give

in

to

prevailing

profit-motivated

edevelopment

nd

housingpolicy.

In his

statements

n this

debate,

Yamasaki

hardly

its the

image

of the radical ocial

reformer

depicted

by

the

Pruitt-Igoe

myth.

His

firm

did indeed

adoptparticular

esign

eaturesn order o conform

to the latest rends ndwas

nsensitive

o

the

potential

ffects f

those

features.

The

architectsalso

incorrectly

assumed hat the

galleries

wouldhelppromote ommunitynteractionnwhatwasbound o be

a harsh

nvironment.Yet before

making

any

of

these

decisions,

hey

had

agreed

o

workwithin

he frameworkf the

large-scale,igh-rise,

high-density

project

mandated

by

urban

redevelopment ractices.

Rather

han

socialreformers

destroying

he

public

housingprogram

with their

megalomaniac esigns,

he architectswere

essentially

as-

sive n their

acceptance

f the dominant

practices

f

their

ociety.

Despite

its

dubious

authenticity

or

historical

accuracy,

he

Pruitt-Igoe

myth

had achieved

he

status

of

architectural

dogma

by

the late

1970s.

The idea

hat

Pruitt-Igoe's

ailure

esulted

rom he in-

sensitivity

f orthodoxmodernist

design

ound a

receptive

udience

and became

an

illustration

or

many

Postmodern nd

anti-Modern

texts. Peter

Blake,

n Form

FollowsFiasco:

Why

ModernArchitecture

Hasn tWorked,choed he assertionhat

Pruitt-Igoe

ollowed"Ville-

Radieuse"

design

deas.

As a

result,

he

argued,

herewas

"no

way

this

depressing

roject

ouldbe

made

humanly

habitable"nd communi-

ties

of

high-rises

re

nherently

oomed.27

t

alsobecame convenient

symbol

or

Tom

Wolfe to include n his

attackon the

importing

of

German-inspired

930s

architectureo the

UnitedStatesafter

World

War

II.28

n FromBauhauso Our

HouseWolfe

repeated

he

by

now

generally ccepted

iction

that the

project

was an

award

winner,

and

then added

a

fabrication f

his

own,

asserting

hat n

1971

a

general

meeting

was held at which the residents

alled

for

blowing up

the

buildings.29

The

Pruitt-lgoe

myth

as

mystification

Why

is the

Pruitt-Igoe

myth

so

powerful?

here s

clearly

mple

evi-

dence that architectural

design

was but

one,

and

probably

he

least

important,

f several

actors

n

the demiseof the

project.Why

then

has

the

architecture

ommunity

been so insistent hat

the failure

of

Pruitt-Igoe

as ts

own

fault?

At one

level,

the

myth

can be

understood

simply

as a

weapon

in

an

ongoing

conflict

betweendifferent actionswithinthe architec-

1

69

Bristol




9/10

ture

profession.

he

two mostcentral

critiques

f

the

design

of

Pruitt-

Igoe

have come fromsuccessormovements o

High

Modernism:

Postmodernism,

nd environment nd behavior.For

proponents

f

these new

approaches,

uch as Oscar

Newman or Charles

Jencks,

Pruitt-Igoe

rovides

convenient mbodiment f all the

alleged

ail-

ings

of Modernism.

However,

hough

hese

successors re

critical f

the

modernist

approach

o

the

design

of

public

housing,

hey

do not

question

he

fundamental otion that

it

is at the level of

design

hat

publichousing

ucceeds

r

fails.

They

attribute

he

problems

f

pub-

lic

housing

o

architectural

ailure,

and

propose

as a solutiona new

approacho design.Theydo not in anysignificantway

acknowledge

the

political-economic

ndsocial ontext or the

failure

f

Pruitt-Igoe.

This

is because he

myth

is more

than

simply

the

result

of

debate

within architectural

ulture: t serves t a much more

profound

evel

the

interests

f

the architecture

profession

s a whole.

As

we

have

een n

tracing

he

riseof the

Pruitt-Igoemyth,

the

architects'ersionhas

consistently

nsisted

n

the

primary

ignificance

of the

project's

verall

design

n its

demise.This

interpretation

enies

the

existence f

larger roblems

ndemic o St. Louis'

publichousing

program.

By

attributing

more

causal

power

to

architecturehan to

flawed

policies,

rises

n

the local

economy,

or

to class

oppression

nd

racism,

he

myth

conceals he

existence

f

contextualactors

tructur-

ing

thearchitects' ecisions nd

fabricates central

olefor architec-

ture

n the success r failure f

public

housing.

t

places

he

architect

in the

position

of

authority

ver

providing

ow-income

housing

or

the

poor.

This

presentation

f

the architect s the

figure

of

authority

n

the

history

of

Pruitt-Igoe

s reinforced

y

linking

he

project's

ailure

to the defects

of

High

Modernism.

The

claim hat

Pruitt-Igoe

ailed

because t was

based

on an

agenda

or

social

reform,

erived

rom

he

ideas

of Le

Corbusier

and the

CIAM,

not

only

presupposes

hat

physical

design

s central o the successorfailureof

public

housing,

but also that the

design

was

implemented

o

carry

ut the

architects'

social

agenda.

Whatthis

obscures

s

the

architects'

passivity

n

the face

of a much

larger

genda

hat

has ts rootsnot

in

radical ocial

reform,

but in thepolitical conomyof post-WorldWarIISt. Louisandin

practices

f racial

segregation. ruitt-Igoe

as

shaped

by

the

strategies

of

ghetto

containment

nd inner

city

revitalization-strategies

hat

did not emanate rom the

architects,

ut rather rom

the

system

n

which

they

practice.

The

Pruitt-Igoe

myth

therefore ot

only

inflates

the

power

of the

architecto effect ocial

change,

butit masks he ex-

tent to which the

profession

s

implicated,

nextricably,

n

structures

and

practices

hat t

is

powerless

o

change.

Simultaneously

with its function

of

promoting

he

power

of

the

architect,

he

myth

serves o

disguise

he actual

purpose

nd

im-

plication

f

publichousing

by

diverting

he debate o the

question

f

design.

By

continuing

o

promote

architecturalolutions o whatare

fundamentally

problems

of

class and

race,

the

myth

conceals the

complete

nadequacy

f

contemporary

ublichousingpolicy.

It

has

quite

usefully

hifted he blamefrom the sourcesof

housingpolicy

and

placed

t on the

design

professions.

y

furthering

his

misconcep-

tion,

the

myth

disguises

he

causesof the failureof

public

housing,

and

alsoensures he

continued

participation

f the

architecture

pro-

fession n

tokenand

palliative

fforts

o

address he

problem

of

pov-

erty

n

America.The

myth

is a

mystification

hatbenefits

everyone

involved,

xcept

hose o whom

public

housingprograms

re

suppos-

edlydirected.

Notes

1.

St. Louis

City

Plan

Commission,

Comprehensive

ity

Plan

(St.

Louis,

1947),

pp.

27-34;

James

Neal

Primm,

Lion

of

the

Valley

Boulder,

CO:

Pruett,

1981),

pp.

472-473.

2.

"Progress

r

Decay?

St.

LouisMust Choose:The

Sordid

Housing

Story,"

St. Louis

Post-Dispatch,

arch

3, 1950,

Part

Four

n

a Series.

3.

For the role

played

by

the

public

housing program

n

St. Louis redevel-

opment

plans,

ee

RogerMontgomery,

Pruitt-Igoe:

olicy

Failure

r

Societal

Symp-

tom,"

in

BarryCheckoway

and Carl V.

Patton,eds.,

The

Metropolitan

Midwest:

Policy

Problemsnd

Prospectsfor hange

Urbana:

University

f Illinois

Press,

1985),

pp. 230-239; andKateBristolandRogerMontgomery, TheGhostof Pruitt-Igoe"

(paper

delivered t the

Annual

Meeting

of

the Association

of

Collegiate

Schoolsof

Planning,

Buffalo,

NY,

October

28,

1988).

On the

relationship

f

public

housing

o

urbanrenewalmore

generally,

ee

Mark

Weiss,

"The

Origins

and

Legacy

f

Urban

Renewal,"

n

P.

Clavell,

J.

Forester,

nd W.

Goldsmith,

eds.,

Urbanand

Regional

Planning

n

an

Age

ofAusterity

New

York:

Pergamon

Press,

1980);

Richard

O.

Davies,

HousingReform uring

he Truman dministration

Columbia:

University

f

Missouri

Press,

1966);

and Arnold

Hirsch,

Making

the SecondGhetto:Raceand

Housing

n

Chicago,

940-1966

(Cambridge:

ambridge

University

Press,

1983).

4.

Eugene

Meehan,

The

Quality f

Federal

Policymaking:rogrammed

ail-

ure

n

Public

Housing

Columbia:

University

f

Missouri

Press,

1979),

p.

71;

James

Bailey,

"TheCase

History

of a

Failure,"

rchitecturalorum

123

(December1965):

p.

23.

5.

U.S. Public

Housing

Administration,

nnual

ReportWashington,

D.C.,

1951);

Davies,

HousingReform,

p.

126-132.

6. "SlumSurgeryn St. Louis,"Architectural orum 4 (April1951):pp.

128-136;

"Four

Vast

Housing

Projects

for

St. Louis:

Hellmuth,

Obata and

Kassabaum,nc.,"

Architecturalecord

20

(August

1956):

pp.

182-189.

7.

"FourVast

Housing

Projects

orSt.

Louis,"

.

185.

8.

Meehan,

Quality,

.

71.

9.

Montgomery, Pruitt-Igoe,"p.

235-239.

10.

Meehan,

Quality, p.

60-63, 65-67,

74-83.

11. In

1965

the U.S. Public

Housing

Administration

P.H.A.)

was

incorpo-

rated

into the

newly

created

Department

of

Housing

and Urban

Development

(H.U.D.).

12.

"What's

Wrong

with

High-Rise?,"

t. Louis

Post-Dispatch,

ovember

14,

1960.

13.

Bailey,

"Case

History,"

p.

22-23.

May

1991 JAE

44/3

170




10/10

14. "St.

Louis

Blues,"

Architectural orum

136

(May

1972):

18;

Architect's

Journal

uly

26,

1972);

Wilbur

Thompson,

"Problems

hat

Sprout

n

the Shadow

of

No

Growth,"

AIA

Journal60

(December1973);

"The

Experiment

hat

Failed,"

Ar-

chitecture lus

October

1973).

15.

"The

Tragedy

of

Pruitt-Igoe,"

Time,

December

27,

1971,

p.

38;

Jerome

Curry,

"Collapse

f a

Failure,"

The

National

Observer,

ay

20,

1972,

p.

24;

Andrew

B.

Wilson,

"DemolitionMarks

UltimateFailure f

Pruitt-IgoeProject,"

Washington

Post,

August

27, 1973,

p.

3.

16.

"The

Experiment

hat

Failed,"

.

18.

17.

Wilson,

"Demolition,"

.

3.

18.

Oscar

Newman,

Defensible

pace

New

York:

Macmillan,

1972)

pp.

56-

58,66,77,83,99,

101-108, 188,207.

19.

Meehan,

Quality, p.

83-87,

194-198.

20. Lee

Rainwater,Behind GhettoWalls;BlackFamilies n a FederalSlum

(Chicago:

Aldine

Publishing,

970),

pp.

9,

403.

21. Mark

LaGory

and

John

Pipkin,

Urban Social

Space

(Belmont,

CA:

Wadsworth,

981),

p.

263.

22.

Architect'sJournal

.

180.

23.

Colin Rowe

and Fred

Koetter,

CollageCity

(Cambridge,

MA: MIT

Press,

1976),

pp.

4,

6.

24. Charles

Jencks,

The

Language

f

Post-Modern

rchitecture

New

York:

Rizzoli,

1977),

pp.

9-10.

25.

Minoru

Yamasaki,

"High

Buildings

for

Public

Housing?"

Journal

of

Housing

9

(1952):

p.

226;

Catherine

Bauer,

"Low

Buildings?

atherine

Bauer

Ques-

tions Mr.

Yamasaki's

rguments,"

ournal

fHousing

9

(1952):

p.

227.

26.

Yamasaki,

HighBuildings," .

226.

27.

Peter

Blake,

Form

Follows Fiasco:

Why

Modern

Architecture

Hasn't

Worked

Boston:

Atlantic

Monthly

Press,

1977),

pp.

80-81.

28.

Tom

Wolfe,

From

Bauhaus

to Our

House

(New

York: Simon

and

Schuster,

981),

pp.

73-74.

29. Actually n the late seventiesa localcommunityredevelopment roup

that

ncluded

ormer

Pruitt-Igoe

esidents

madea

proposal

o

buy

and

renovate our

of the

buildings,

but were

urned

down

by

H.U.D.

Mary

Comerio,

"Pruitt-Igoe

nd

Other

Stories,"

ournal

fArchitectural

ducation

4

(Summer,

1981):

pp.

26-31.

1

71

Bristol

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