the peso crash and financial market performance in mexico
TRANSCRIPT
The Peso Crash and Financial Market Performance in Mexico
José Antonio GonzálezChief of Staff
Deputy Minister of Finance in MexicoOctober 25, 2002
Outline
• Stylized facts about the financial market performance in México.
• Some basic lessons:– Monetary policy– Good prudential regulation of banks– Corporate governance – Fiscal discipline
Looking back
• The early 1990s financial liberalization had four components (Aspe 1993):– Transparent monetary policy– Liberalization of capital account and financial
innovation to mobilize savings– Solid prudential regulation– Strong public finances as foundation
Like many other LAC countries, Mexico embarked on an ambitious liberalization program
00.10.2
0.30.40.50.60.7
0.80.9
1
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Mexico
Chile
Latin AmericaAvg
Liberalization Index. Morley et al
Financial Development or Credit Boom?
• Financial sector depth doubled and fixed capital formation increased from 15% to 20% of GDP .
• However, since1995 financial depth decreased from a high of 100% in 1994 to close to 70% of GDP in 1999.
Figure 3.1Financial Sector Assets
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(% o
f G
DP)
Development Banks Assets Commercial Banks Assets Stock Market CapitalizationPublic Bond Capitalization Private Bond Capitalization
The puzzle: Bank lending fell but investment did not and GDP growth averaged 5.4%
from 1996-2000Figure 3.3
Investment Flows by Source
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(Flo
ws/
GD
P)
Foreign Savings
Private Bonds
Public Bonds
Commercial Banks
Development Banks
Gross Domestic Investment
Bank vs market based?: Wrong question
Bank Credit to Non-financial Private Sector/Value Traded in the Stock Market
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Relative Activity
Lower Middle Income(1986-1993)
High Income (1986-1993)
Stylized facts conclusions:financial depth is still shallow
Figure 3.2Financial Sector Assets
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Switzerl
and
Mala
ysia
Japa
n
United
Stat
es
United
Kin
gdom
German
y
France
Spain
Canad
aChi
le
Korea
Mex
ico 19
94
Mex
ico 19
99
Brazil
Argen
tina
% o
f G
DP Private Bond Capitalization
Public Bond Capitalization
Stock Market Capitalization
Banks Assets
Looking ahead: Do more of the same…with some twists
– Monetary policy based needs to prevent moral hazard in exchange rate behavior (Gil 2000)
– Bank recovery: solid banking prudential regulation needs to include banking resolutions and limited deposit insurance.
– Sound market and corporate governance regulations to promote stock and bond markets.
– Strong public finances (including public banks) is key to allow institutional investors and forced savings turn into private investment.
Monetary policy: The probability of a vicious exchange rate-interest rate cycle has diminished.
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
230
250
90
100
110
120
130
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
90
100
110
120
130
140
FondeoFondeo
Tipo de Tipo de Cambio Cambio
FondeoFondeo
Tipo de Tipo de Cambio Cambio
Indices Abril =100
Abril- Octubre 1998
Abril- Octubre 2001
Mexican banks need to recover
Figure 3.5Bank Credit to Non-financial Private Sector
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Japa
n
German
y
France
U.K.
U.S.A
.
Mala
ysia
Thaila
nd
Indo
nesia
Chile
Mex
ico 1
994
Filipi
nas
Brazil
Indi
a
Argen
tina
Mex
ico 1
999
Ecuad
or
Costa
Rica
Colom
bia
Venez
uela
Peru
% o
f G
DP
Policies to reactivate bank lending: (i) Improve repossession laws (2002) and
(ii) let go of the past (Gonzalez 2002)
IPAB Bonds as a share of Goodstanding Loans
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
BBVABANCOMER
BANAMEX SERFIN-SANTANDER
BITAL BANORTE SCOTIABANKINVERLAT
(% o
f go
od s
tand
ing
loan
s)
At the same time
• Keep banks healthy with sound prudential regulation that reduces moral hazard (Gil 2000):– Limit deposit insurance and have a credible
resolution framework.– Complement monetary policy with liquidity
requirements on dollar liabilities to level the playing field
The stock market is shallow and needs to develop
Figure 3.9Stock Market Capitalization
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
Mala
ysia
U.K.
Chile
U.S.A
.
Japa
n
Thaila
nd
Philip
ines
Mex
ico 1
994
France
Mex
ico 1
999
Spain
Indi
a
German
yBraz
il
Turke
y
Colom
bia
Venez
uela
Peru
Argen
tina
Ecuad
or
Costa
Rica
% o
f G
DP
Orígen de las Leyes (países)
Derechos de
Accionistas (0 a 6)
Derechos de Acreedores
(0 a 4)
Eficiencia del Sist. Judicial
(0 a 10)
Estándares Contables
(0 a 10)
Inglés (18) 4.00 3.11 8.15 7.01
Francés (21) 2.33 1.58 6.56 5.12
México 1.00 0.00 6.00 6.00
Alemán (6) 2.33 2.33 8.54 6.27
Escandinavo (4) 3.00 2.00 10.00 7.40
Mundo (49) 3.00 2.30 7.67 6.09
Fuente: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shliefer, Vishny, "Law and Finance," (1998).
A clear indicator of regulatory lag is poor minority rights
As a result there has been a migration to the US stock market
05
10152025303540
English
Germ
an
Scandin
avia
n
French
Méx
ico
Capital Listed in US/Total capital
Firms with ADR in US/Firms listed locally
Indicators of migration by legal system
In April 2001 Mexico passed changes to the stock market laws which aimed to increase transparency.
• Minority rights Corporate governance of stock issuers and
intermediaries. Related transactions Restricted stock emissions. Control changes through public offerings Information standards Use of inside information.
Accounting practices homologated to U.S. standards
Imitate de SEC in the practice of certifying accounting statements.
Firms with ADRs in the U.S. will have to subject themselves to SEC requirements.
Install a national corporate governance board.
New reforms to corporate governance given corporate scandals in the U.S.
Pension reform and financial innovation have already and will continue to increase savings
Saldo de Activos Manejados por Aseguradoras y Siefores(Miles de Millones de Pesos)
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Aseguradoras Siefores Rentas Vitalicias
Financial Reform is not enough. It needs to be anchored with sound fiscal policies otherwise the public
sector consumes most of the financial resources
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Public Sector Private Sector
Use of financial resources in México
Crowding out has real effects
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
-5 0 5 10 15 20
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Déficit Financiero y Déficit Financiero y Tasa de InterésTasa de Interés
(1982-1999)(1982-1999)
Déficit Financiero e Déficit Financiero e Inversión PrivadaInversión Privada
(1982-1999)(1982-1999)
Déficit del Sector Público (% del PIB)(miles de millones de pesos de 1993)
Déficit del Sector Público (% del PIB)(miles de millones de pesos de 1993)
Ren
dim
ien
tos
Ce t
e s 2
8
Inve
rsió
n P
r iv a
da
(mil e
s d
e m
i llo
ne s
de
pes
os
de
1993
)
Fuente: SHCP y Banco de México
Conclusions
• Initial reforms were in the right direction but they need to be implemented carefully.
• Looking ahead requires the same basic principles:– Sound fiscal policies– Banking credit needs to recover.