the performance of palestinian local governmentsdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/...the...

THE PERFORMANCE OFPALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES

AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE

WEST BANK AND GAZAJune 2017

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ReportNo:ACS22456StandardDisclaimer:

ThisvolumeisaproductofthestaffoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBank.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheExecutiveDirectorsofTheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.TheWorldBankdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthiswork.Theboundaries,colors,denominations,andotherinformationshownonanymapinthisworkdonotimplyanyjudgmentonthepartofTheWorldBankconcerningthelegalstatusofanyterritoryortheendorsementoracceptanceofsuchboundaries.

CopyrightStatement:

Thematerialinthispublicationiscopyrighted.Copyingand/ortransmittingportionsorallofthisworkwithoutpermissionmaybeaviolationofapplicablelaw.TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBankencouragesdisseminationofitsworkandwillnormallygrantpermissiontoreproduceportionsoftheworkpromptly. Forpermissiontophotocopyorreprintanypartof thiswork,pleasesendarequestwithcomplete informationtotheCopyrightClearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470,http://www.copyright.com/. Allotherqueriesonrightsandlicenses,includingsubsidiaryrights,shouldbeaddressedtotheOfficeofthePublisher,TheWorldBank,1818HStreetNW,Washington,DC20433,USA,fax202-522-2422,[email protected].

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................. i

Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................................... ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................................ iii

I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 11.1 Country Context ............................................................................................................................. 21.2 Sector Context ............................................................................................................................... 31.3 Key Challenges ............................................................................................................................... 91.4 Objective and Methodology ........................................................................................................ 12

II. The State of Basic Service Delivery in Palestinian Local Governments ............................................ 142.1 The Institutional Framework Governing Local Service Delivery .................................................... 182.2 Water and Waste Water ............................................................................................................... 242.3 Solid Waste Management ............................................................................................................ 322.4 Local Roads .................................................................................................................................... 342.5 Socio-Demographics of Service Provision .................................................................................... 392.6 Citizen Willingness to Pay ............................................................................................................. 41

III. Drivers of Service Delivery Performance ......................................................................................... 473.1 The LGPA Performance Index ....................................................................................................... 483.2 Geography and Administrative Set-up ......................................................................................... 503.3 Population Size, Density, and Wealth ........................................................................................... 523.4 Area C and Separation Barrier ..................................................................................................... 543.5 Joint Service Councils ................................................................................................................... 593.6 Fiscal Capacity .............................................................................................................................. 613.7 Governance and Accountability ................................................................................................... 63

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations ................................................................................................ 714.1 Prioritize the Improvement of the Quality and Reliability of Services ......................................... 724.2 Reform the Local Government Financing System as a Pre-condition for Success ........................ 734.3 Strengthen LGU Accountability and Responsiveness to Increase Citizens’ Willingness to Pay ... 754.4 Consolidate and Professionalize Service Delivery ........................................................................ 804.5 Increase Density and Connectivity, and Support the Marginalized that the PA Cannot Reach .... 814.6 Benchmarking for Improving Local Government Performance .................................................... 82

References ............................................................................................................................................. 83

Annex .................................................................................................................................................... 85Annex 1: Methodology of Household Survey ........................................................................................ 85Annex 2: Methodology Qualitative Analysis .......................................................................................... 86Annex 3: Methodology LGPA Performance Index .................................................................................. 87Annex 4: Regression Results .................................................................................................................. 88Annex 5: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions ...................................... 120Annex 6: Key Informant Interviews and Focus Groups Discussions Referenced ................................. 121Annex 7: LGU Performance Ranking .................................................................................................... 125Annex 8: LGU Revenue Assignment, Management Responsibility, and Final Destination of Funds ... 139

ReportNo:ACS22456StandardDisclaimer:

ThisvolumeisaproductofthestaffoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBank.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheExecutiveDirectorsofTheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.TheWorldBankdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthiswork.Theboundaries,colors,denominations,andotherinformationshownonanymapinthisworkdonotimplyanyjudgmentonthepartofTheWorldBankconcerningthelegalstatusofanyterritoryortheendorsementoracceptanceofsuchboundaries.

CopyrightStatement:

Thematerialinthispublicationiscopyrighted.Copyingand/ortransmittingportionsorallofthisworkwithoutpermissionmaybeaviolationofapplicablelaw.TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBankencouragesdisseminationofitsworkandwillnormallygrantpermissiontoreproduceportionsoftheworkpromptly. Forpermissiontophotocopyorreprintanypartof thiswork,pleasesendarequestwithcomplete informationtotheCopyrightClearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470,http://www.copyright.com/. Allotherqueriesonrightsandlicenses,includingsubsidiaryrights,shouldbeaddressedtotheOfficeofthePublisher,TheWorldBank,1818HStreetNW,Washington,DC20433,USA,fax202-522-2422,[email protected].

THE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

List of Figures:

Figure ES-1: Service Access across Sectors ............................................................................................. viFigure ES-2: Satisfaction with Service Quality and Reliability .................................................................viiFigure ES-3: Population Size (left) & Density (right) as Performance Drivers ..........................................ixFigure ES-4: Operating Revenues (left) & Operating Expenditures (right) as Performance Drivers ........... xFigure ES-5: Citizen Service Center Use (left) & LGU Responsiveness (right) as Performance Drivers .....xi

Figure I-1: Fiscal Decentralization in the Palestinian territories and World Regions ................................ 4Figure I-2: Revenues by Type in Municipalities (left) and VCs (right) ........................................................ 5Figure I-3: Expenditure Allocation by Budget Type in Municipalities (left) and VCs (right) ..................... 5Figure I-4: Total Per Capita Expenditures with (left) and Without Outliers (right) .................................... 6Figure I-5: Average Per Capita Expenditures in Operating Budget (left) and Enterprise Fund (right) ...... 6Figure I-6: Operating Budget Expenditure Categories Municipalities (left) and VCs (right) ..................... 7Figure I-7: The Dynamics of Net-Lending in the West Bank ................................................................... 11Figure I-8: LGPA Survey - Municipality and Village Council Size-Groups and Population ........................ 13Figure II-1: Service Access across Sectors .............................................................................................. 16Figure II-2: Satisfaction with Service Quality and Reliability .................................................................. 17Figure II-3: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Improved Drinking Water ................................. 25Figure II-4: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Piped Water ...................................................... 25Figure II-5: Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability: Piped Water ......................................................... 26Figure II-6: Trends in Service Delivery: Change in Quality of Piped Water in Last 3 Years ....................... 27Figure II-7: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities ........................... 28Figure II-8: Geography of Service Provision: Access to Piped Sewage .................................................... 28Figure II-9: Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability: Piped Sewage ....................................................... 29Figure II-10: Trends in Service Delivery: Change in Quality of Piped Sewage in last 3 Years ................... 30Figure II-11: Access to Improved Drinking Water Sources (% of Population with Access) ..................... 30Figure II-12: Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities (% of Population with Access) ........................... 31Figure II-13: Geography of Service Provision: Solid Waste Collection .................................................... 32Figure II-14: Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability: Solid Waste Collection ........................................ 33Figure II-15 : Trends in Service Delivery: Change in Quality of Solid Waste Collection in last 3 Years ..... 33Figure II-16: Geography of Service Provision: Paved Roads ................................................................... 34Figure II-17: Impact on the Poor: Likelihood of Service Access ............................................................. 39Figure II-18: Gender Gap: Likelihood of Service Access ......................................................................... 40Figure II-19: Impact on the Poor: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability ...................... 40Figure II-20: Gender Gap: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability ................................. 41Figure II-21: Payment across Sectors ..................................................................................................... 42Figure II-22: Likelihood of Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services ......................... 43Figure II-23: Maximum and Actual Willingness to Pay: Piped Water ...................................................... 43Figure II-24: Maximum and Actual Willingness to Pay: Solid Waste Collection ...................................... 44Figure II-25: Timely Payment without Major Problems .......................................................................... 45Figure II-26: Likelihood of Timely Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services ............ 45Figure III-1: LGU Performance Index: High and Low Performers ........................................................... 48Figure III-2: Differences in LGU Performance across Regions and LGU Types ......................................... 50Figure III-3: Remoteness: Distance to Governorate Center and LGU Performance ................................ 51Figure III-4: Remoteness: Built-Up Area and LGU Performance ............................................................. 51Figure III-5: LGU Population and Performance ...................................................................................... 52Figure III-6: Population Density and Performance ................................................................................. 53Figure III-7: Household Wealth and LGU Performance .......................................................................... 53Figure III-8: Area C and Separation Barrier ............................................................................................ 54


Figure III-9: Area C and Separation Barrier: Likelihood of Service Access ............................................... 56Figure III-10: Area C and Separation Barrier: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction ..................................... 56Figure III-11: Share of Households in Area C and LGU Performance ..................................................... 57Figure III-12: Share of Built-up LGU area in Area C and LGU Performance ............................................ 57Figure III-13: Joint Service Council: Planning & Development ................................................................ 59Figure III-14: Joint Service Councils: Water and Waste Water Management ......................................... 60Figure III-15: Joint Service Councils: Solid Waste ................................................................................... 61Figure III-16: LGU Finance I: Per Capita Operating Budget Revenues ..................................................... 62Figure III-17: LGU Finance II: Per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures .............................................. 63Figure III-18: LGU Finance III: Fiscal Sustainability.................................................................................. 63Figure III-19: LGU Responsiveness ......................................................................................................... 64Figure III-20: Usage of Citizen Service Centers and Performance .......................................................... 65Figure III-21: LGU Responsiveness and Performance ............................................................................ 65Figure III-22: Trust in the Role of Elections in Improving Service Delivery .............................................. 66Figure III-23: Participation in Future Elections ....................................................................................... 66Figure III-24: LGU Responsiveness and Trust in Role of Elections for Service Delivery ........................... 67Figure III-25: LGU Responsiveness and Future Voting Behavior ............................................................ 67Figure III-26: Knowledge about Existence of One-Stop-Shops ............................................................... 68Figure III-27: Usage and Satisfaction with Feedback Instruments across Sectors .................................. 69Figure III-28: Channels for Citizens’ Feedback and Complaints ............................................................. 70Figure IV-1: Pre-paid Meters and Citizens’ Willingness to Pay ............................................................... 77Figure IV-2: Non-payment: How Should Service Providers Respond? ................................................... 79

Figure A2-1: Municipalities and VCs Selected for Qualitative Analysis ................................................... 86Figure A3-1: Methodology LGPA Performance Index ............................................................................ 87

List of Tables:

Table I-1: LGUs in the West Bank and Gaza .............................................................................................. 3Table I-2: Shares of Government Budget by Administrative Tier in 2011 and 2012 ................................. 5Table I-3: Access to Core Services ............................................................................................................ 9Table II-1: Overview of the Current Institutional Arrangements by Service Sector .............................. 22

Table A4-1: Likelihood of Service Access - West Bank ............................................................................ 88Table A4-2: Likelihood of Service Access - Gaza ..................................................................................... 89Table A4-3: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - West Bank .................................... 90Table A4-4: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - Gaza .............................................. 91Table A4-5: Likelihood of Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services ......................... 92Table A4-6: Likelihood of Timely Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection ........................... 93Table A4-7: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) .............................. 94Table A4-8: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) ................................. 95Table A4-9: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) ................................. 96Table A4-10: Likelihood of Service Access: Area C ................................................................................. 97Table A4-11: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) .................... 98Table A4-12: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) ....................... 99Table A4-13: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) ..................... 100Table A4-14: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Area C ....................................................................... 101Table A4-15: Likelihood of Payment - Pre-Paid Meters & Citizen Willingness to Pay ........................... 102Table A4-16: Likelihood of Timely Payment - Pre-Paid Meters & Citizen Willingness to Pay ................ 103Table A4-17: Differences in LGU Performance across Regions and LGU Types .................................... 104Table A4-18: Remoteness - Distance to Governorate Center and LGU Performance ........................... 105


Table A4-19: Remoteness - Built-Up Area and LGU Performance ........................................................ 106Table A4-20: Population Density and Performance ............................................................................. 107Table A4-21: Household Wealth and LGU Performance ...................................................................... 108Table A4-22: Share of Households in Area C and LGU Performance ................................................... 109Table A4-23: Share of Built-up LGU Area in Area C and LGU Performance .......................................... 111Table A4-24: Joint Service Councils I: Membership in JSC for Planning & Development ...................... 111Table A4-25: JSC II: Membership in JSC for Water & Waste Water ...................................................... 112Table A4-26: JSC III: Membership in JSC for Water and Waste Water .................................................. 113Table A4-27: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste ......................................... 114Table A4-28: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste ......................................... 115Table A4-29: LGU Finance I: Per Capita Operating Budget Revenues .................................................. 116Table A4-30: LGU Finance II: Per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures ........................................... 117Table A4-31: LGU Finance III: Fiscal Sustainability................................................................................ 118Table A4-32: Usage of Citizen Service Centers and Performance ........................................................ 119Table A5-1: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions .................................. 120Table A6-1: Key Informant Interviews Referenced ............................................................................... 123Table A6-2: Focus Group Discussions Referenced ............................................................................... 124Table A7-1: LGU Performance Ranking ................................................................................................ 138Table A8-1: LGU Revenue Assignment (in the LGA), Management Responsibility and Final Destination of the Funds ........................................................................................................................................ 140Table A8-2: Expenditure Assignments According to Local Government Law ...................................... 142



i

Acknowledgements ThisreportwaspreparedtoinformtheongoingpolicydialogueandinvestmentprogramoftheWorldBankwiththePalestinianAuthorityonmunicipalandlocaldevelopment.TheteamwasledbyBjörnPhilipp (Program Leader,MNC04) and Tobias Lechtenfeld (Social Development Specialist, GSURR),withstrategicguidancefromMarinaWes(CountryDirectorforWestBankandGaza)andunderthedirectionofAyatSoliman(PracticeManager,GSURR).ThestudyteamwascomprisedofAdrianBlatt-ner(Consultant,GSURR),RafeefAbdelrazek(OperationsOfficer,MNC04),YahiaAbuhashem(Consult-ant,GSURR),AnnaPaluszek(Consultant,GSURR),andMahaBali(SeniorProgramAssistant,MNCGZ).ThedataanalysisandreportwritingwereorganizedbyAdrianBlattner.ThehouseholdsurveywasconductedbyAlphaInternational,withsupportfromtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDe-velopment(USAID)andtheRepresentativeOfficeofDenmarktothePalestinianAuthority(DRO).TheteamwouldliketoacknowledgeBenjaminP.Stewart(Geographer,GGSCE)andDanaAlmubaied(Con-sultant,MNCGZ)fortheirvaluablecontributions.BaderAlaraj(AssistantProfessor,BirzeitUniversity)conductedinterviewsforthequalitativeanalysis.USAIDalsosupportedseparatedatacollectionef-fortsviaanexitpoll,gatheringinformationoncitizenexperiencesinaccessingservicesinmunicipalofficesandcitizenservicecenters.Thereporthasbenefitedtremendouslyfromdiscussionswithandcommentsfromcolleaguesatdif-ferentstagesofpreparation,inparticularEllenHamilton(LeadUrbanSpecialist,GSURR),NorikoOe(UrbanSpecialist,GSURR),PhilipBottern(SeniorSocialDevelopmentSpecialist,GSURR),SarahKeener(SeniorSocialDevelopmentSpecialist,GSURR),andManuelFigueredo(Consultant,GSURR).Thepeerreviewers were Stephen Karam (Consultant, GSURR), Paula Restrepo Cadavid (Senior Economist,GSURR),andChristopherPablo(SeniorUrbanSpecialist,GSURR).WearealsogratefultoAlexanderKlaits(Democracy&GovernanceDirector,USAID),ReemJafari(Democracy&GovernanceSpecialist,USAID),andAstaOlesen(SeniorAdvisor,DRO)fortheircommentsandinputs.TheteamisindebtedtoofficialsfromthePalestinianAuthority,particularlytheMinistryofLocalGov-ernment(MoLG),theMunicipalDevelopmentandLendingFund,andothergovernmentagenciesandnon-governmentalorganizationsforprovidingkeyinputs,dataandhelpwiththeanalysis.TheteamisindebtedtoJamalNuman(HeadofGeoMOLGPortalforPalestineSpatialInformation)andtheteamatGeoMOLGdepartmentoftheMoLGfortheirsupportwiththeGISmaplayersofthelocalgovern-mentunitsacrosstheWestBankandGazautilizedforthesurveysampling.TheteamisalsogratefulforcommentsanddiscussionswithcolleaguesfromtheDevelopmentPartners.Thedataanalysisben-efittedtremendouslyfromtheinputsanddiscussionswiththeteamfromUSAIDandtheResearchConsortiumcomprisingofReneeHandley,BrianKirchhoff,CarlosFierros,andJeffreyTelgarsky(NORCattheUniversityofChicago);andFotiniChristia(MIT),RubenEnikolopov(UniversitatPompeuFabra),andErinYork(ColumbiaUniversity).AnearlyversionofthereportwaspresentedanddiscussedwithrepresentativesfromthePalestinianAuthorityandDevelopmentPartnersataworkshoporganizedbytheWorldBank,USAID,andDRO,heldinRamallahonMarch9,2017.


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Abbreviations and Acronyms CAPEX CapitalExpenditureCoM CabinetofMinistersCSC CitizenServiceCenterDISCO DistributionCompanyEQA EnvironmentQualityAuthorityFCS FragileandConflict-affectedsituationsFGD FocusGroupDiscussionGDP GrossDomesticProductGoI GovernmentofIsraelICA IsraeliCivilAdministrationIEC IsraelElectricCorporationJSC JointServiceCouncilKII KeyInformantInterviewkm Kilometerkm2 SquareKilometerLGPA LocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentLGSIP LocalGovernanceandServicesImprovementProgramLGU LocalGovernmentUnitMDLF MunicipalDevelopmentLendingFundMDP MunicipalDevelopmentProgramMoEHE MinistryofEducationandHigherEducationMoFP MinistryofFinanceandPlanningMoH MinistryofHealthMoLG MinistryofLocalGovernmentMoNE MinistryofNationalEconomyMoPWH MinistryofPublicWorksandHousingNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganizationNIS NewIsraeliShekelNPA NationalPolicyAgendaNSP NationalSpatialPlanO&M OperationsandMaintenanceOPEX OperatingExpenditurePA PalestinianAuthorityPCBS PalestinianCentralBureauofStatisticsPENRA PalestinianEnergyandNaturalResourcesAuthorityPERC PalestinianElectricityRegulatoryCouncilPWA PalestinianWaterAuthorityRDP RegionalDevelopmentPlanUNICEF UnitedNationsChildren'sFundUNRWA UnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineVC VillageCouncilVIP VentilatedImprovedPitLatrineWASH Water,Sanitation,andHygieneWDI WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsWHO WorldHealthOrganizationWSRC WaterSectorRegulatoryCouncil


II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Why does the performance of Palestinian Local Governments matter?

1. PalestinianlocalgovernmentsrepresentakeypillarofthefuturePalestinianstate.Predat-ingthePalestinianAuthority,manyhavelongandproudhistories,includingsomeoftheoldestinhab-itedcities in theworld.With increasingpoliticalandgeographical fragmentationover the last twodecades,LocalGovernmentUnits(LGUs)havebecomeofparamountimportanceregardingthepro-visionofservicestothelocalpopulation,particularlyinareaswheretherelativelyyoungcentralgov-ernment ispolitically,geographically,andfiscallyconstrained.SomeexistingLGUswerecreatedasearlyasthesecondhalfofthe19thcentury,andoverthedecades,theyhaveperformedunderthecomplexitiesofdisparatepoliticalandlegalregimes.Asthelowestlevelofgovernance,Palestinianlocalauthoritiesfulfillacriticalrole,notonlyasakeypublicserviceproviderbutalsoasthegovern-ment tier closest to citizens,withelectedcouncils critical for representationandaccountability tocitizens.ThemostrecentlocalelectionswereonMay13,2017,andinOctober2012,onlyintheWestBank;followingthemostrecentlocalelectionsinboththeWestBankandGazain2006.StrengtheningLGUsandenablingthemtoperformasfullyfunctionallocalgovernmentsaccountabletocitizensarekeyprioritiesforthePalestinianAuthority.

2. Ahighleveloffragmentationwithlargevariationsinfiscalandinstitutionalcapacityaffectslocalservicedeliveryperformance. In1997,therewere350localauthorities;todaythereare417.Thismaynotbefinanciallyviableandcouldadverselyaffectallocativeefficiencyinahighlyfinanciallyconstrainedenvironment.Inshort,Palestinianscouldbepayingforalargebutinefficientlocalgov-ernmentsectorthatisdrainingscarcepublicresourcesandexternalaidatthecostoferodinginfra-structure,decliningservices,andsuboptimaldevelopment.However,thereiscurrentlynoevidencetosubstantiatethisclaim,anditisimportanttogetabetterunderstandingofthedriversofservicedeliveryperformanceandthemosteffectivewaystosupportLGUstobetterperformforthebenefitofthePalestinianpeople.

3. AlackofcomprehensivedatathatisrepresentativeattheLGUlevelhasmadeitimpossibletoassessandcompareservicedeliveryoutcomesacrossPalestinianLGUs.DataonservicecoverageandbasicgovernanceindicatorsinPalestinianLGUsexists,butitdoesnotcoveralllocalservicesandiscollectedfromthesupplyside,i.e.,localauthoritiesandserviceproviders.AlthoughthePalestinianCentralBureauof Statistics (PCBS) conducts regularhousehold surveys,whichwouldallow for as-sessingserviceoutcomesfromthedemand-side,i.e.,citizensandserviceusers,thedataisnotrepre-sentativeatthelevelofindividualLGUs.Thoseconstraintshavelimitedthepossibilitiesforacompre-hensiveperformanceassessmentinthepast.However,itisimportanttounderstandwhatdrivestheservicedeliveryperformanceofPalestinianLGUsinordertomakemeaningfulpolicyrecommenda-tions,addresstheissuesthatarefullyunderPalestiniancontrol,andhighlighttheadverseimpactsthatexternallyimposedconstraintshaveonthelivingstandardsofthePalestinianpeople.However,todate,norobustevidencebaseexiststoanswerthosequestions.

How do Palestinian Local Governments perform and how can it be measured?

4. TheanalysispresentedinthisreporthastheobjectivetofillthiscriticalknowledgegapandhelptargetinginterventionstoimproveservicedeliveryintheWestBankandGaza.ThePalestinianLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessment(LGPA)establishesthequantitativebasisforanalysisandaperformancebaselineforfuturebenchmarking.Existing localservicedeliverydatahasbeenverylimited,despitesubstantialexternalsupporttothesectoroverthelastdecades.Generally,thescope


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ofexistingdataonlycoversselectsupply-side informationcollectedfromLGUsorhouseholddata,which isnot representativeat theLGU level.Hence,under theLGPA,acomprehensivehouseholdsurvey,coveringmorethan380Palestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils,wasconducted,provid-ingthequantitativebasisforthefollowinganalysis.Inaddition,dataavailablefromearlieranalysesconductedbytheWorldBankwasusedtobetterunderstandthesupplysideofservicedelivery,in-cludinglocalgovernmentfinancing,performanceofJointServiceCouncils(JSCs),andinstitutionaldatacollectedundertheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram(MDP).Complementaryqualitativeanalysisandcasestudieswereimplementedtoallowforamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofperformancedriversanddeterminingfactorsrelatedtoinstitutionalcapacity,governance,andpoliticaleconomy.

5. ServiceoutcomesvarysubstantiallybothacrossLGUsandsectors.TheLGPAassessesservicedeliveryoutcomesforthekeypubicservicesundertheresponsibilityoflocalauthorities,i.e.,watersupply,sanitation,solidwastemanagement,andlocalroads.Theassessmentreviewsoutcomevaria-tionsacrosssectors,individualLGUs,andgeographicareas.Dataonelectricitysupply,educationandhealthwasalsocollectedbytheLGPAhouseholdsurvey,butarenotsubjecttothisanalysis.Althoughdataforthoseservicesectorswillbeimportantforfollow-upanalysis,theLGPAlimitsitselftothefourbasicservicesmentionedabove.LGUshavenooronlylimitedroleindeliveringeducationandhealthservices,whichareadministeredandoperatedbythenationalauthority, internationalagenciesornon-governmentalorganizations,orinelectricitydistribution,whichfallsundertheresponsibilityofelectricitydistributioncompanies.

6. Outcomevariationsalone,whileimportanttounderstand,donotallowforbettertargetingofinterventionsandpolicyrecommendations.AmorecomprehensivemeasureisneededtoassessLGUservicedeliveryperformancebasedoncitizenaccessandsatisfactionwithserviceoutcomesthatwouldallowforcomparisonsofLGUperformanceacrosstheWestBankandacrossGaza.Aperfor-manceindexwasthereforedevelopedforpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartnersasatooltoiden-tifyandtargetinterventionsinmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.

7. TheLGPAPerformanceindexusestenindicatorstomeasureoverallLGUperformance.Thetenindicatorsrepresentthethreedimensionsofaccess,qualityandreliabilityforpipedwater,pipedsewage,andwastecollection,andajointmeasureforlocalroads.TheLGPAPerformanceindexranksLGUsaccordingtotheirperformancescoresandallowsforananalysisofkeydriversforservicedeliv-eryperformance,includinggeographysize,wealth,fiscalstrength,institutionalcapacity,governance,andmodesofservicedelivery.

How satisfied are households with service delivery outcomes?

8. Palestinianshaveachievedhighratesofaccess,althoughservicesarenotalwaysavailableandqualitydiffers.PalestinianLGUshaveachievedremarkablelevelsofaccesstobasicservices,par-ticularlygiventhechallengingcircumstancesofoccupationandanoverallcontextoffragility,conflictandviolence.Pipedwatersupplyconnectionshavereachedalmostuniversalcoverageat94percentintheWestBankand88percentintheGazaStrip.Over80percentofhouseholdsinGazaandupto95percentintheWestBankhaveaccesstoregularsolidwastecollection.Around77percentofhouse-holdsintheGazaStripareconnectedtoapipedsewagenetwork.At30percent,accesstopipedsew-ageismuchlowerintheWestBank,althoughthisislargelyareflectionofthemoreruralcharacterofWestBankvillagescomparedwiththehighlyurbanizedGazaStrip:intheWestBank,accesstopipedsewageisat8percentinVillageCouncils,comparedto37percentinmunicipalities.Forthosehouse-holdsconnectedtoapipedsewagenetwork,around80percentreportthatthequalityandreliabilityofservicesisacceptable,suggestingthatwastewaterprioritiesshouldfocusonincreasingtreatmentcapacityandaccesstothosehouseholdsnotyetconnected.Comparingoutcomesinthewastewatersectortoothercountries,coveragewithimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisclearlyhigherinthePalestin-ian territories (96percent) than inLebanon (80.7percent)and theaverageof fragileandconflict-


V

v

affectedsituations(FCS;43.5percent),slightlyhigherthantheaveragefortheregion(89.6percent),andjustbelowneighboringJordanian(98.6percent).1

FigureES-1:ServiceAccessacrossSectors

9. Only1percentofGaza’spopulationhasaccesstoan improvedsourceofdrinkingwater.Despitehighaccessrates,decadesofunderinvestment,protractedrehabilitationandrepeatedepi-sodesofviolentconflictandwarhaveaffectedthequalityofservices,particularlyinGaza.Therapidlydeterioratingqualityofgroundwatercausedbyseawaterintrusionanddischargeofuntreatedsewagehasmademostof thepipedwaterundrinkable.Onlyonepercentofhouseholds in theGazaStripreporttohaveaccesstoimproveddrinkingwaterandmorethan97percenthavetorelyondrinkingwaterdeliveredbytankertrucks.AlsooverallsatisfactionratesforpipedwatersupplyarelowestinGazaacrossthePalestinianterritories.Only36percentofhouseholdsintheGazaStriparesatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwater,comparedwith54percentintheWestBank.Thisfindingisconfirmedbyqualitativeinterviews,whichshowthatdespitehighconnectionrates,watershortagesandqualityremaincriticalchallenges.Comparingserviceoutcomes inthewatersectortothoseofneighboringcountriesandcountriesofsimilarstructuralcharacteristics,accesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesinthePalestinianterritories(57percent)islowerthaninbothJordan(96.9percent)andLebanon(99percent),aswellastheregion(92.6percent;excludinghighincomecountries),andotherfragileandconflict-affectedsituations(67.8percent).2

10. Acrosssectors,accessratesarelowestforlocalroads.Fewerthan2in3Palestinianhouse-holdshaveaccesstopavedroads.Only42percentofhouseholdsinGazareporthavingimmediateaccesstoapavedroadfromtheirhome,comparedwitharound74percentintheWestBank.ThisfindingisconsistentwiththehighshareofroadsinvestmentprojectsprioritizedinlocaldevelopmentplansacrossPalestinianLGUs,suggestingthatinvestmentneedsforlocalroadswillremainhighintheforeseeablefuture.ItalsoreflectstheshortageoffundingLGUshaveavailablefortherehabilitation,extension,andmaintenanceofroads.Comparedtorevenue-generatingservices,suchassolidwastecollectionandwatersupplyforwhichserviceprovidersgenerallychargeuserfees,LGUshavenodirectincomesourcetocoverroadrehabilitationandmaintenancecost.Instead,LGUshavetorelyentirelyonownorsharedtaxes,grantsfromthecentralgovernment,orfromexternaldonorswhich,however,

1WorldDevelopmentIndicators.2ibid.

94%

30%

95%

74%

88%

77%

83%

42%

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Gaza

SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageSource:LGPA2017

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tendtoprioritizeothersectorsorinvestmentsintheirsupportprograms.

11. Thequalityofsolidwastecollectionhasroomtoimprove.Only59percentofhouseholdsintheWestBank,andsurprisingly70percentofhouseholdsinGazaexpresssatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservices.DespitetheincreasingcoverageofcollectionservicesandsubstantialinvestmentsinsanitarylandfillsinboththeWestBankandGaza,LGPAfindingssuggestroomforimprovingserviceoutcomes.Investingindisposalinfrastructureandcollectionequipmentalonewillnotsuffice.Experiencefromanoutput-based investmentprograminthesouthernWestBanktargetingLGUsintheHebronandBethlehemGovernoratesprovidesgoodlessonshowusersat-isfactioncanbeincreasedthroughimprovingthetimelinessofcollectionservices,cleanlinessatcol-lectionpoints,andeffectivenessoffeedbackandcomplaintmechanisms.Strengtheningthemanage-mentcapacityandimprovingresponsivenessofserviceoperatorsshouldbeapriorityforsupport.

FigureES-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability

12. Overall,municipalitiesachieveconsistentlyhigherserviceoutcomelevelsthanvillagecoun-cils.Ingeneral,serviceoutcomelevelsaredeclininginlinewithLGUsizegroups.Thisholdsforbothaccessandsatisfactionratingsacrosssectors,exceptwatersupply.Butsizealonedoesnotexplainthedifferenceinoutcomes.Interestingly,householdsrateaccessandsatisfactionwithwatersupplyser-viceshighestinsmallmunicipalities,whilelargeandmediumsizemunicipalitieshaveoutcomesmorecomparabletothoseofvillagecouncils.Thismaybedrivenbythemorerapiddemographicgrowthinmunicipalitiesoutstripping theavailabilityofbulkwater andadversely affectingwaterquality andavailability.However,withthisexception,LGPAfindingsconfirmthatserviceoutcomesaregenerallylowerinvillagecouncils.Villagestendtostruggletoprovideandmaintainthesamelevelofservicescomparedtomunicipalities.Thecurrentstatusquoisnotsustainableandmoreneedstobedonetoconsolidateservicedeliveryinvillagecouncilstobringthematparwithmunicipalities.

13. Serviceoutcomesvaryacrossregions.Forthemostpart,LGUsinthecentralandnorthWestBankachievehigheroutcomesthanthesouthWestBankandGaza.Thisfindingisconsistent,exceptforpipedsewage,forwhichaccessishigherinGazaasaresultofthehighlevelofurbanization;andsatisfactionisthehighestinthesouthforthosehouseholdswhoareconnectedtothesewagesystem.ThereisgreateraccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesinthenorthWestBank,withalmostuniversalcoverage,butsatisfactionrateswiththeserviceisthelowest;thisissomewhatcounterintuitivegiventhelong-standingsupporttoimprovingsolidwastemanagementinthenorthernWestBank.Thereis

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nostraightforwardexplanationfortheregionalvariations,beyondthemorepronounceddividebe-tweentheWestBankandtheGazaStrip.However,somehavearguedthatalargernumberofmove-mentrestrictionsandproximityofLGUstotheseparationbarrierandAreaCmightbeamongthedeterminantsforregionalvariationsinserviceoutcomes.

14. Whilethelikelihoodforaccesstopipedwaterislowerforpoorerhouseholds,genderisnotadeterminingfactordrivingserviceoutcomes.Householdsatthebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionaremorelikelytobeaffectedbylowaccessratescomparedwithhigherincomegroups,particularlyintheWestBankandforpipedwatersupply.Non-poorhouseholdsintheWestBankarealmosttwotimesmorelikelytohaveaccesstopipedwaterthanthoseinthebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution.FindingsalsosuggestthatpoorerhouseholdsintheWestBankarelesssatis-fiedwithwastecollectionservicesthanthenon-poorare.ThelikelihoodofbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetworkisslightlyhigherforhouseholdsintheupperthreewealthquintilesinGaza,butthisgapisnotstatisticallysignificant.LGPAfindingsalsosuggestthatthereisnosignificantgendergapinbasicservicedelivery.Serviceoutcomesforfemale-headedhouseholdsarestatisticallynotsig-nificantlydifferentfrommale-headedhouseholds,exceptforaccesstopipedwaterandsatisfactionwithpipedsewageinGaza.Overall,PalestinianLGUshaveachievedremarkablyequitableservicepro-vision,despitesignificantneedstoimproveservicequalityandreliability.

What is driving the performance of Palestinian local governments? Size, Density and Location

15. Whilepopulationsizeandlocationmatter,municipalitiesperformbetterthanvillagecoun-cilsevenwhenrulingoutdifferencesinLGUsizeandgeography.Sizeandlocationaffectoverallper-formanceofPalestinianLGUs,but,importantly,theperformancedifferencesidentifiedintheLGPAgobeyondapuresizeorregionaleffect.Thisisanimportantfinding,underliningthatothercrucialfactorsdrivetheperformancegapbetweenmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.Whilehouseholdsinvillagesclearlyrateserviceoutcomeslowerthaninmunicipalities,afocusonmergingLGUsintolargerentitieswillnotnecessarilyimproveservicedeliveryperformancebyitself.Additionalpolicyinstru-ments,capacitydevelopment,andincentives,thatgobeyondsizeand‘amalgamation’arerequiredtoachievebetterperformanceinPalestinianLGUs.

16. Higherpopulationdensityisstronglyassociatedwithbetterperformanceoutcomes.Popu-lation density varies substantially across Palestinian LGUs, ranging from less than four people persquarekilometer(km2) inoneofthesmallvillages intheWestBank,theVillageCouncilofMarjalGhazalintheJerichoGovernorate,tomorethan11,000peopleperkm2inGazaCity.Inmorethan75percentofLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,theaveragepopulationperkm2islessthan1,000,andin34municipalitiesandvillagecouncils,itisbelow100.Thesewidegapsareseverelyaffectingservicedeliveryoutcomes,becauseLGUpopulationdensityandservicedeliveryperformancearestronglycorrelated.Themostpopulated20percentofLGUsonaverageperform6.2pointshigherthantheleastpopulated20percentofLGUs.Onaverage,a1percent increase inpopulationdensitycorre-spondstoa3.3-pointhigherperformancescore.Thisfindingisconsistentwithglobalexperience,sincethecostofinfrastructureandserviceprovisiondeclinesonapercapitabasiswithincreasingdensities.PalestinianLGUsshouldaimtoachievehigher levelsofpopulationdensityandavoidcostlysprawlthatishamperingservicedeliveryperformance.


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FigureES-3:PopulationSize(left)&Density(right)asPerformanceDrivers

Source:LGPA2017

17. RemoteandmarginalizedLGUsperformsignificantlyworse.MostPalestinianLGUsarelo-catedwithina5–10kmradiusoftheirgovernoratecapital,butdistancequicklytranslatesintolowerperformance.UsingthegeographicalspreadofLGUsrelativetotheirgovernorateasaproxyforre-motenessrevealsastrongcorrelationwithservicedeliveryoutcomes:themostremote20percentLGUsonaverageperform11points lowerthanthe leastremote20percentLGUs.Onaverage,a1percentincreaseindistancecorrespondstothestatisticallysignificantdecreaseinperformanceout-comesof5.2points.Economicactivityandfiscalcapacitytendtobeconcentratedintheurbancen-ters, explainingpart of theperformance variations associatedwithdistance.However, PalestinianLGUssufferfromadditionallayersofmarginalizationassociatedwiththemovementrestrictionsim-posedbytheGovernmentofIsrael,magnifyingtheadverseimpactofremotenessanddistancetotheurbancentersobservedelsewhereintheworld.

18. Ingeneral,households inAreaCorclosetotheseparationbarrierare less likelytohaveaccesstobasiclocalservices.SatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityofservicesisalsonotablylowerinAreaCandnearthebarrier.Incomparingthelikelihoodofserviceaccessforhouseholdsthatlivewithina1kmradiusoftheseparationbarrier,nostatisticallysignificantcoefficientsareobserved.However,ifthedistanceconsideredisnarrowed,significantdifferencesemergeinthewatersector:householdsliving500oreven250metersfromtheseparationbarrierareonaveragejusthalfaslikelytohaveaccesstopipedwaterthanthoselivingfartheraway.ThiseffectisstatisticallysignificantforboththeentireWestBanksampleandthesubsampleofLGUsthatare intersectedbythebarrier.WhilethecoefficientsfortheAreaCindicatorsuggestthat,onaverage,householdslivinginAreaCarelesslikelytohaveaccesstoallofthefourbasicservices,onlytheindicatorforsolidwastecollectionyieldsastatisticallysignificantresult:theoddstobecoveredbyawastecollectionserviceofhouse-holdsthatliveinAreaCareonlyone-thirdaslargeasthoseofhouseholdsthatliveinAreasAandB.

19. Overall,AreaC isassociatedwith lowerLGUperformancescores.This findingholdsevenwhencontrollingforimportantperformancedrivers,suchasremotenessandsizeofLGU.Onaverage,LGUsservingareaswhereatleast60percentofthebuilt-upareaisinAreaChaveastatisticallysig-nificantperformancescore,whichis5.8pointslowerthantheotherWestBankLGUs.LGUswithadevelopedAreaCareashareofmorethan70and80percentperform8.0and8.5pointsloweronaverage.PalestinianLGUshavelittlemeanstoimprovingservicedeliveryoutcomesofcommunitiesliving in Area C, given their limitedmandate beyond Areas A and B. Development Partners havesteppeduptheirsupporttocommunitiesinAreaC.Since2012,around113masterplanshavebeenpreparedtosupportcapitalinvestmentandservicedeliveryimprovementsin77LGUswithPalestiniancommunities living inAreaC.However, todate,only fiveof theplanshavebeenapprovedby theIsraeliCivilAdministration (ICA).Theothermasterplans submitted to the ICA forapprovalare still

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awaitingadecision,81ofthemhavebeenpendingformorethan18months.

Fiscal Capacity and Responsiveness

20. FiscalcapacityisamaindriverofLGUperformance.Overall,percapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformanceandarobustrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperformanceexists,disproportionallyconstrainingsmallermunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsduetotheirlimitedrevenuebaseandinstitutionalcapacity.A1percentincreaseinpercapitaoper-atingrevenuesonaveragecorrespondstoa4.7-pointshigherperformancescore;anda1percentincreaseinpercapitaoperatingexpenditurestoaperformancescoreincreaseof5.2points.Thiseffectisevenmorepronouncedamongmunicipalities,wherea1percentincreaseinpercapitarevenuesisassociatedwithanaverage6.5higherperformancescore,andan8.9higherscoreforpercapitaex-penditures.Fiscalcapacitycanbeidentifiedasone,ifnotthestrongestdriverofLGUperformance,evenwhen rulingoutdifferencesdue to sizeand location.Eroding localbudgets limit the fundingavailable to invest inextending,upgradingorevenmaintaining servicesat satisfactory levels. ThisfindingurgesgivinghighestprioritytoadvancinglocalgovernmentfinancingreformandaddressingthelargeimbalancesoffiscalcapacityacrossLGUs,inparticularbetweenvillagecouncilsandmunici-palities,butalsoacrossmunicipalities.Thecurrentinter-governmentalfiscalarchitectureinPalestineischaracterizedbylocalrevenueassignmentsthatareinsufficienttocovertheoperationalexpendi-tureneedsofLGUs;andlackofafiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernmentthatwouldincludeequal-izationelementstocorrectimbalancesacrosslocalauthoritiescharacterizedbyvaryingfiscalcapacity.Withoutaddressingthosehorizontalandverticalfiscalimbalances,onlylimitedprogresscanbeenvi-sionedforimprovingPalestinianlocalgovernmentperformance.

FigureES-4:OperatingRevenues(left)&OperatingExpenditures(right)asPerformanceDrivers

Source:LGPA2017

21. Citizens’ willingness to pay and actual payments vary significantly, suggesting that LGUsneedtoimprovebotheffortstocollectrevenuesandserviceoutcomes.Giventhelimitedresourcesmadeavailablefromtransfersandsharedtaxes,LGUshavetorelymostlyonown-sourcerevenues.However,LGPAfindingssuggestlargevariationsinthewillingnesstopayforlocalservicesandactualcollectionacrosslocalauthorities.Forexample,averagemonthlypipedwaterpaymentsarehigherinmunicipalitiesthaninvillagecouncils,andthehighestinmedium-sizedmunicipalitiesintheWestBank(136NewIsraeliShekel(NIS)). IntheWestBank,citizens inmunicipalitiesalsopaymoreforwastecollectionservices(NIS24)thancitizensinvillagecouncils(NIS21).AcrossthePalestinianterritories,morethanhalfofthehouseholds(52percent)reportamaximumwillingnesstopayforpipedwaterthatislowerthantheiractualpayment.Theseresultscorrespondtoaconsiderablenumberofhouse-holdsreportingdissatisfactionwithpipedwatercosts:39percentofhouseholdsinGazaand1in4


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householdsintheWestBankaredissatisfiedorverydissatisfiedwiththecostofpipedwater.Inlinewithglobalexperience,enhancinglocalrevenuecollectionneedstogohand-in-handwithimprovingservicedeliveryoutcomessinceusersatisfactiontendstobedrivingwillingnesstopayforservices.

22. CitizensaremorelikelytopaytheirbillsontimeiftheyaresatisfiedwithservicereliabilityandLGUresponsiveness.Onaverage,PalestinianhouseholdsthatagreetheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizens’concernsorcomplaintshaveabout1.75timeshigheroddstopayontimeforpipedwatersupplyandsolidwastecollection.AssumingthatareformofthePalestinianlocalgovernmentfinanc-ingsystemwouldyethavetoevolveovertimeandislikelytobeimplementedonlyinthemedium-term,asapriorityLGUswillneedtoincreaseown-sourcerevenuecollectiontoenhancetheirfiscalcapacityasthemaindriverofservicedeliveryperformance.Comparedtoallothermeasures,resultsfromtheLGPAsuggestoneshortcutforLGUstocollectmorerevenuesfromuserfees:increasere-sponsivenesstocitizens’needs.

23. Higher LGU responsiveness corresponds to better performance. Responsiveness helps in-creasingcitizens’willingnesstopay.However,inaddition,householdsthathaveusedacitizenservicecenter,orgenerallyagreewiththestatementthattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints,alsorateserviceoutcomeshigher.RegardlessofthesizeorlocationofaLGU,theLGPAfindsapositiverelationshipbetweenresponsivenessandservicedeliveryoutcomes:onaveragethe20percentofLGUswiththehighestshareofhouseholdsreportingtheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaintsperform16.4pointshigher.

24. Lessthanone-thirdofPalestiniansagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive.Thereisplentyofroomtomakelocalauthoritiesmoreresponsive,increasecitizensatisfaction,andenhancelocalrev-enuecollection.Governmentresponsivenesshasalsobeenfoundtobeakeyfactorintheparticipa-torybehaviorofcitizensandbelievedtobeakeydrivertoencouragingresponsiblecitizenry,regainingtrust ingovernment,andenhancingpoliticalparticipation. InthePalestinianterritories,theoverallsatisfactionratewiththeresponsivenessofLGUsislow:lessthanone-thirdofhouseholdsagreethattheirmunicipalityorvillagecouncilisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints.TherateintheWestBank(30percent)isonlyslightlylowerthaninGaza(37percent),butitvariessubstantiallyacrossgovernorates:inTubas,only1in10householdsagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,whileinTulkarmandQalqilya,almosthalfofthehouseholdsagreedwiththestatement.Comparingsatis-factionratesacrosstypesofLGUs intheWestBank, theshareofhouseholdsagreeing ishigher inmunicipalities(31percent)thaninvillagecouncils(24percent).

FigureES-5:CitizenServiceCenterUse(left)&LGUResponsiveness(right)asPerformanceDrivers

Source:LGPA2017


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25. While citizen service centers correspond tohigher LGU responsiveness, only fewcitizensseemtoknowthattheyexist.TherelationshipbetweenLGUresponsivenessandserviceoutcomesisalsopronouncedwhenassessingtheroleofcitizenservicecenters.ThequintileofLGUswiththehigh-estshareofcitizenswhousedacitizenservicecenter,includingone-stop-shops,onaveragehavea5.39higherperformancescore.

26. LGUsneedtoreachoutmoreactivelytotheircitizensandpromotetheexistenceanduseofacitizenservicecenter. InWestBankmunicipalitieswherecitizenservicecentersexist,only16percentofsurveyedhouseholdsreportknowingaboutit,37percentreportnotknowingwhetherornotitexists,and46percentreportnotbelievinginitsexistence.Knowledgeaboutfeedbackinstru-mentsisslightlyhigherinlargemunicipalities,whereatleast1in5householdsreportknowingthatacenterexists.Inmediumandsmallmunicipalities,onlyabout15percentofhouseholdsknowaboutcitizenservicecenters.Giventheeffortsandresourcesprovidedtoestablishone-stop-shopsandotherservicecenters inPalestinianLGUs,DevelopmentPartners, thePalestinianAuthority,and localau-thoritiesneedtogivemuchmoreattentiontopromotetheirexistenceandusebythepublic.

Institutional Arrangements

27. Institutionalarrangementsforservicedeliveryvaryacrossthebasicservicesectors,buttendtobefragmented.Functionsaredistributedacrosscentralandlocalauthoritieswithavarietyofstake-holdersinvolvedinthepolicymaking,prioritysetting,financing,operationandmonitoringofservices.LGUshave full authority over local roads and are responsible for theplanning, development, andmaintenanceofthenetwork,withtheMinistryofPublicWorksandHousingresponsibleforregionalroadsoutsidethemunicipalmasterplans.LGUsalsohavefullauthorityoversolidwastemanagementservices,althoughdisposalfunctions,andtoalesserextendprimarycollectionandtransferfunctions,aregenerallydelegatedtoaJSC.TheMinistryofLocalGovernmentisthepolicymakingauthorityandalsomonitorsLGUperformanceinthesolidwastesector.However,thewaterandsanitationsectorischaracterizedbyahigh levelof fragmentation,withpolicymakingandsector investmentplanningfunctionsatthePalestinianWaterAuthority,regulationandperformancemonitoringattheWaterSectorRegulatoryCouncil,andserviceoperationatthelocallevel.Intotal,therearemorethan100municipalwaterdepartments,andmorethan160villagecouncilsoperatingwaterservices.13JSCsdeliverwaterandsanitationservices,butthereareonly3operatingwaterutilities,2intheWestBankand1inGaza.Thehighleveloffragmentationcauseshighinefficienciesandaconstrainttogeneratingeconomiesofscale.

28. Jointserviceprovisioncanhelpinreachingeconomiesofscale,increasingfinancialsustain-ability,andimprovingservicedeliveryperformance.TheestablishmentanddevelopmentofJSCshasbeencrucialtoimprovingservicedeliveryinPalestinesincetheadoptionoftheLocalGovernmentActin1997andisan importantelementofthePalestinianAuthority’sconsolidationeffortto leverageeconomiesofscaleandsustainmanyexistingvillagecouncilsinrecentyears.Broadly,therearethreetypesofJSCs:thoseprovidingasingleservice,thoseprovidingmultipleservices,andthosethatwereestablishedforplanninganddevelopment.TheJointServicesProvisionAssessmentcarriedoutbytheWorldBankin2015identifiedthatoutofthe82existingJSCsintheWestBankandthe10inGaza,only55areactive.Most(32)activeJSCsarecategorizedasplanninganddevelopment,16assolidwastemanagement,and7aswatersupplyandsanitationservices.SomeJSCsprovidemultipleser-vicestotheirmemberLGUs.

29. JSCcapacityandgovernancearrangementsarecriticaltodeliveringbetterresults.Thecur-rentinstitutionalframeworkandgovernancestructureforserviceprovisionbytheJSCshaveseverallimitations.Themanagementanddecision-makingstructure,accountabilityframework,financingar-rangement,publicparticipation,and social accountability systemsaregenerally inadequateorun-clear.Aspartofthe2015assessment,amoredetailedreviewoftheactivecouncilswasconducted


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basedonagoodgovernanceframeworkassessingperformanceacrosssixthematicareas:ruleoflaw,effectiveandefficientservicedelivery, transparency,accountability, responsiveness,andparticipa-tion.Findingsoftheassessmentconfirmedlargeperformancevariations,withonly16councilsscoringatanacceptablelevel.Thewatersectorhadthebestscore;thescoresforsolidwastemanagementandplanninganddevelopmentJSCswereloweronaverage.

30. Membership inaJSCdoesnot in itself improveservicedeliveryoutcomes inLGUs,but itdoesappeartohaveapositiveimpact,particularlyforvillagecouncils.LGPAfindingssuggestthatamemberofaplanninganddevelopmentJSCachievesanaverage4.0-pointhigherperformancescorethananonmember, regardlessofpopulationsizeand location.Theperformancegain ishigher forvillagecouncils,performinganaverageof5.2pointshighercomparedwithmunicipalities,whichseeaverageperformancegainsof4.1points.Thisfindingconfirmsthatpoolingresources,includingforbetter institutionalcapacity inbasicplanninganddevelopmentfunctions,hasapositive impactonLGUperformance. It iscriticaltoreachaminimumscale inordertoachieveadequate institutionalcapacityforoperatingservicesatsatisfactorylevels,whichisparticularlyimportantforvillagecoun-cils.However,becausemanyplanninganddevelopmentJSCshavealsobeenestablishedatthere-questofDevelopmentPartnerstochannelandmanagedonorfunds,performancegainsmightalsoberelatedtotheadditionalfinancingthatisavailabletothem.Scalealoneisnotenough.

31. With increasingdegreesof specialization, the technical and institutional capacityof JSCsdrivesservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthewatersector,membershipinaJSCdoesnotguaranteesatis-factoryservicedeliveryoutcomes.However,remarkableperformancegainscanbeobserved,forex-ample,inJenin,whichwasratedoneofthebestperformingJSCsinthe2015assessment.Ingeneral,membershipinawatersupplyandsanitationJSCdoesnotyieldbetteroutcomesinthesector,butwhenlimitingthesampletotheJeninGovernorate,wheresomeLGUsbelongtoaJSCandothersdonot,membershipinaJSCcorrespondstoaverystrongandstatisticallyhighlysignificantperformancegaininwaterserviceoutcomes,scoringmorethan30pointshigherthantheaverage.Itwillbeimper-ativetocontinueandaccelerateconsolidatingthewatersector,sinceoperatingindividualmunicipalandvillagewaterdepartmentsisneithersustainablenorviableinthelongrun.However,significantinvestments in reducing technicalandcommercial losses, inparallel to targetedutility reformandinstitutionalstrengtheningprograms,arerequiredtoimproveserviceperformance.

32. For solid waste services, the effect of JSC membership on performance outcomes variesacrossregionsintheWestBank.Onaverage,membershipinasolidwastemanagementJSCseemstosuggestslightly lowerservicedeliveryoutcomes.However,thismightbeareflectionofthefactthatonlyasmallnumberofLGUscanbeusedascontrolgroup.Amoredisaggregatedanalysisisre-quiredtounderstandthedifferences.Forexample,focusingonperformance-levelvariationsbetweenLGUsinSalfitandQalqilyagovernoratesthatbelongtoasolidwasteJSC,andthoseLGUsthatdonot,JSCmembershipcorrespondstoanotable,howeverstatisticallynotsignificant,performancegaininsolidwastecollectionperformancescores.

GovernanceandAccountability

33. Morethan3outof4Palestinianhouseholdsthinkthatvoting inmunicipalelectionscanhaveapositiveimpactonlocalservicedelivery.ThisreflectsaverystrongbeliefintheimportanceofbasicaccountabilitymechanismstoimproveLGUperformance,butalsosuggestssignificantroomforimprovement.Households’trustintheroleofelectionsforservicedeliverydiffersacrossthePal-estinianterritories.InGaza,almostafifthofthehouseholdsdonotbelieveinsucharelationship,andalmostathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBankdonotthinkthatvotingandserviceoutcomesareinterrelated.Overall,trustintheroleofvotingisslightlyhigherinmunicipalities(69percent)thaninvillagecouncils(66percent).


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34. BuildingmoreresponsiveLGUsstrengthencitizens’trustintheimpactofvotingandtheirwillingnesstovoteinfutureelection.CitizenswhoaresatisfiedwithLGUresponsivenessonaveragereportmoreoftenthatvotinghasanimpactonservicedelivery.AmongthehouseholdswhostronglyagreetheirLGUisveryresponsive,86percentbelievethatvotinghasanimpactonpublicservices.Incontrast,amongthosehouseholdswhostronglydisagree,only59percentthinkthatelectionsandservicedeliveryoutcomesareconnected.Asaresult,amongcitizenswhobelievethatvotinginmu-nicipalelectionsinfluencesservicedeliveryoutcomes,80percentplannedtovoteinthenextelec-tions,comparedtojust28percentamongthosewhothinkvotingandpublicservicesarenotrelated.Overall,atthetimeoftheLGPAsurvey,morethan4outof10PalestiniancitizensintheWestBankdidnotplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections,aswasreflectedinthevoterturnoutofthelatestWestBankelectionsinMay2017.

35. BasicaccountabilitymechanismsneedtoimprovetoenhancecitizensatisfactionwiththeirLGUs.NotmanyPalestinianhouseholdsuseafeedbackorcomplaintmechanismandsatisfactionisonlymoderate.Overall,despitetheirexistenceinsomeLGUs,fewhouseholdsuseavailablemecha-nismstoprovidefeedbackorfileacomplaint.Only16percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankand8percentinGazareporthavingusedeitheracitizenservicecenter,municipalwebsite,LGUorservice-providerfeedbacksystem,orabooklettoaddressaserviceissue.Only6percentofWestBankhouse-holdshaveusedafeedbacksystemorLGUwebsitecomparedwith3percentand5percentinGazarespectively.NoneofthesurveyedhouseholdsinGazaclaimtohaveusedaservicecenter;intheWestBank,thefigureisaround4percent.Only40percentofthosewhohaveusedafeedbackmechanismreportedbeingsatisfiedwithit.ThevastmajorityofcitizenswouldratherfileacomplaintdirectlytotheirLGUratherthanworkingthroughacitizenservicecenterorafeedbackorcomplaintsystem.

Conclusion and the Way Forward

36. Palestinianlocalgovernmentshavealmostachieveduniversalcoverageintermsofaccesstobasicservices.Thisisaremarkableachievement,particularlygiventhecontextoffragilityandcon-flict inthePalestinianterritories.AlthoughsatisfactionratesvaryacrossLGUsandsectors,andthebottom40percentexperienceanoverallsomewhat lowerqualityofservices,household incomeisnotamaindeterminantof servicedeliveryoutcomes,and there isnogendergap.Theseareverypositiveachievementsunderextremelydifficultcircumstancesinahighlychallengingenvironment.

37. Increasingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatershouldbegiventhehighestpriority,particu-larly inGaza.Withalmosttheentirepopulation inGazadependentonpotablewaterdeliveredbytankertrucks,solvingtheGazawatercrisiswillremainthegreatestchallengeforlocalservicedeliveryforyearstocome.ImprovementsinLGUperformancewillnotsolvethecrisis,whichgoeswellbeyondlocalgovernmentissuesandrequirescriticalactionsfromthePalestinianAuthority,theGovernmentof Israel,andthe internationalcommunity, suchassupport to increasingbulkwatersupply to theGazaStrip, includingthroughpurchasefromIsraelandprivatewaterpurifierstoaddresstheshorttermneedsofagrowingGazapopulation,reducingtechnicalandfinanciallossesinamoribundwaterdistributionnetwork,treatingandpromotingthereuseofwastewater,andincreasinglocaldesalina-tioncapacity.

38. LGUsmuststrivetoconvergequalityandreliabilitystandardsforbasicservices.Whilethelocalgovernmentmandateisbroaderthanbasicserviceprovision,citizensatisfactionlevelswillnotincreaseunlesslocalgovernmentsdeliverontheirmaintasksofsupplyingreliabledrinkingwaterandsanitationservices,collectthegarbagefromhouseholds,andensureawellmaintainedlocalroadnet-work.KeyelementsofgoodgovernanceandprofessionalmanagementwillbecriticaltomakingLGUsmoreresponsive to theneedsofcitizens,andwillalsohelpmakeLGUsmorereliablepartners forprivateenterprisesandpromotinglocaldevelopment.Lackofreliablebasicservicesratesamongthehighestoftheconcernforinvestors.Inaddition,targetedpoliciestosupportcitizensinmarginalized


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communitiesneedtobedeveloped.LocalgovernmentsectorsupportalonewillnotsufficetoaddressthedisparatelivingstandardsacrossPalestine.AsignificantgroupofLGUshavereceivedsubstantialexternalsupport,butservicedeliveryoutcomesremainatlowlevelsof,includingmarginalizedLGUswithhigh ratesof poverty and/or those that aredeeply affectedby theprevailing restrictions tomovementandaccess.

39. Addressingverticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesiscriticaltoimprovinglocalservicede-liveryperformance.Whilesizeandlocationmatter,theirimpactonLGUperformanceislimitedcom-paredwithlocalfiscalcapacity.PalestinianLGUsarelargelydependentonservicefeesandchargestocovertheiroperationalexpenditures,nottomentioncriticalcapitalinvestments.AlthoughPalestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsareresponsibleforprovidingcriticalpublicservices,theyhavenotbeenassignedsufficient revenuesources.Onaverage,chargesandservice feesaccount for50–70percentoftotalrevenues,mostlyfrompublicutilityservices,suchaselectricityandwater.Asacriticalfirststep,MinistryofLocalGovernmentneedstoreviewandreviseLGUrevenueandexpenditureassignments.ThecurrentrevenueassignmentsarenotsufficienttodeliverevenonthecoreLGUfunc-tions.Thepropertytaxcouldprovidealargepotentialrevenuesourceformunicipalities,butcollectionneedstobeextendedtoallLGUsandshouldbedecentralizedfromtheMinistryofFinanceandPlan-ningatleasttothelargestmunicipalities.Finally,establishingafiscaltransfermechanismthateffec-tivelyaddressesimbalancesislongoverdueandrequireshighestattentionfrombothMinistryofLocalGovernmentandtheMinistryofFinanceandPlanning.

40. Changingthefinancialincentivestructureforserviceprovisionmustbeatthecoreofthereformagenda.Duetochronicunderfunding,LGUshavedevelopedapracticeofdivertingrevenuesfromservicefeestomeettheirexpenditureneeds.Cross-subsidiesandpaymentarrearsarewide-spreadandcommonpracticeacrossmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.Currentincentivesarestrong:datafortheyears2011–13showsthattotalrevenuespercapitaforvillagecouncilsinchargeofelec-tricitydistributioncanbeuptofourtimeshigherthanthosewithoutthatresponsibility.Villagecoun-cilswithelectricitydistributionfunctionswereabletospendovertwiceasmuchinpercapitaoperat-inganddevelopmentexpendituresthanthosewithouttheresponsibilityforeachyearduringthepe-riodof 2011–13. Formunicipalities, there is a differenceof almost 100percent between the twogroupsofmunicipalitiesintermsoftotalrevenuepercapita.Despitetherecentseparationofelec-tricitydistributionfromlocalgovernments,LGUscontinuetoreceivedividendsfromelectricityreve-nuesthattheyrequestfromdistributioncompaniesintheirroleasshareholders.Incentivesandcur-rentpracticesaresimilarinthewatersector.

41. Breakingthisviciouscirclewillrequiredecisiveactionatlocalandnationallevels.Keyprior-itiesinclude:(1)increaselocalrevenuecollection;(2)improvetransparencyofpaymentflows,includ-inginteragencyarrears;(3)sanctionentitiesthatdivertfundsfornonessentialorunproductiveuse;and(4)providefinancialsupporttoLGUswithoutthefiscalcapacitytoensurebasicserviceprovision.Absentaregularfiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernment,improvinglocalfiscalcapacitywillre-quireenhancingrevenuecollectionandexpenditureefficiency.However,ourknowledgeaboutthecostofserviceprovisionremainslimited.Althoughanewbudgetformatdistinguishingbetweenfunc-tionalcategorieshasbeen introduced,themajorityofLGUsdonotreportactualrevenuesandex-penses,whichmakesefficiencyassessmentsdifficult.Moreemphasisneeds tobegiven tocorrectreportingduringthebudgetreviewandapprovalprocess,includingasaconditionforallocatingcapitalinvestmentgrants.

42. Responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentsarecriticaltobetterperformance.Regard-lessofthesizeandlocationofaLGUortheinstitutionalarrangementforserviceprovision,theLGPAshowsaconsistentlybetterperformancebyresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovernments.ThereisalargeandgrowingnumberofLGUsthathaveachievedhigherlevelsofservicedeliveryperformance


XV

xv

throughstrengtheningcitizenengagement,improvingtransparencyandaccountability,andenhanc-ing local revenues.Moreattentionmustbepaidtosupportingeffectivegovernancearrangementsthatengagecitizensatallstagesofdevelopmentplanning,investmentprioritization,andfeedbackonservicedeliveryperformance.ThisshouldbeapriorityforthePAbutalsoforDevelopmentPartners.GiventhedualpositiveimpactonLGUperformancefromhighercitizensatisfactionandwillingnesstopay,supportingmoreresponsiveandaccountableLGUspromisesthehighestreturnoninvestmentinparallel toa localgovernment financingreformoverhaulingthe inter-governmental fiscalarchitec-ture.

43. Aclearpolicyneedstobedevelopedformoreprofessionalandcorporatizedservicedeliv-ery.JSCsplayacriticalroleinconsolidatingservicedeliverybecausetheycangraduallyassumeserviceoperationfunctionsfromsmallandmostlyweakLGUs,providethenecessaryscale,anddevelopintothenucleusoffutureregionalpublicutilities.However,JSCsdonotguaranteeimprovedperformanceinservicedeliveryiftheyarenotmatchedwithmoreprofessionalmanagementandstrongaccounta-bilitymechanismsintermsofserviceusersandthelocalauthoritiestheyrepresent.Overall,Palestin-ianpolicymakers shouldaim to integratevillagesandmunicipalities intomoredenselypopulatedurbanareastoachievebetterperformanceoutcomes.Publicutilitiesareaneffectivemeansofre-gionalintegration.Thereisanurgentneedtoestablishaclearactionplantoseparateandprofession-alizeserviceoperation,withclearlyassignedrevenuestreamsandmeasurableperformancestand-ards.Giventhehighfragmentationinthewatersector,thisinitiativeshouldbelaunchedjointlybe-tweentheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandPalestinianWaterAuthority.Afirstcriticalsteptodisen-tanglefinancialflowsandunderstandexpenditureefficiencywouldbetoestablishseparatecostac-countsforutilityservices,particularlyforwater,wastewaterandsolidwastemanagement.

44. Finally,performancebenchmarkingshouldbemadean integral instrument forevidence-basedpolicymaking.TheLGPAhasdevelopedaninstrumenttotrackperformancetrendsandim-provements,assessefficacyofpolicymeasures,andevaluatedonorsupportonaregularbasis,whichcanbereplicated.Palestinehasuniqueandsuccessfulexperienceinmanagingaperformance-basedgrantmechanismandprovidingtargetedcapacity-buildingsupporttomunicipalities,implementedbytheMunicipalDevelopmentandLendingFund(MDLF).Inparallel,MinistryofLocalGovernmenthasstarteddevelopinganonlinecitizenportalforallLGUsthroughtheirGeoMOLGDepartment.Thisex-perience,inadditiontothenewdatafromLGPA,canassistinthescaling-upthesystematiclinkingofcapitalgrantallocationstoclearperformancetargetsinLGUsandmeasuringexpenditureefficiencytobetterunderstandtheuseofscarcepublicresourcesatthelocallevel.LGUscanalsousetheLGPAtoproduceandpublishcitizenscorecards,whileDevelopmentPartnersmayconsiderusingthebase-lineestablishedbytheLGPAtomonitorprogressandmeasureimpactoftheirsupporttoPalestinianLGUs.ThesearetremendousassetsthatPalestinianlocalgovernmentscanrelyandbuildonastheystrivetocontinueimprovingperformancetobenefittheircitizens.


XVI

I. Introduction


1

I. Introduction

1.1 Country Context

1. PalestinianlocalgovernmentsareakeypillarofthefuturePalestinianstate.TheypredatethePalestinianAuthority(PA)andmanyhavealongandproudhistory,includingsomeoftheoldestinhabitedcities intheworld.With increasingpoliticalandgeographicalfragmentationoverthe lasttwodecades,LocalGovernmentUnits(LGUs)havegainedparamountimportanceprovidingservicestothelocalpopulation,particularlyinareaswheretherelativelyyoungcentralgovernmentwaspolit-ically,geographically,andfiscallyconstrained.SomeoftheexistingLGUswerecreatedasearlyasthesecondhalfofthe19thcenturyandoverdecades,LGUshaveperformedunderthecomplexitiesofdifferentpoliticalandlegalregimes.Asthe lowest levelofgovernance,Palestinian localauthoritiesfulfillacriticalrolenotonlyasakeypublicserviceprovider,butalsoasthegovernmenttierclosesttocitizens,withelectedcouncilscriticalforrepresentationandaccountabilitytocitizens.ThemostrecentlocalelectionstookplaceonMay13,2017andinOctober2012intheWestBankonly,whilethelastlocalelectionsinboththeWestBankandGazawerein2006.2. However,PalestinianLGUsoperateinachallenginganddeterioratingenvironment.Lackingapermanentpeaceagreement,prospectsforsocialandeconomicdevelopmentareheavilyaffectedbyfragmentationandrestrictionsonaccesstolandandresources.ThePAwasinitiallyestablishedforafive-yearinterimperiodaftertheOsloAccordsin1993withresponsibilityfortheadministrationoftheterritoryunderitsjurisdiction.However,theOsloaccordswereneverfullyimplementedandcametofullhaltwiththebeginningofthesecondIntifadain2000.Theconsequencetodayisamulti-layeredsystemofphysical,institutionalandadministrativerestrictions,whichhavefragmentedthePalestinianterritoriesintosmallenclaves.ThefragmentationgoesbeyondadividebetweentheWestBankandGaza,withtheWestBankfurtherdividedintoAreasA,BandC.Effectively,thePAonlyhasfullcivilandsecuritycontrolover18percentoftheWestBank(AreaA),andmanagescivilaffairsinaround21percentoftheWestBank(AreaB),withsecurityunderIsraelicontrol.Theremaining61percentoftheWestBankareunderfullIsraelimilitaryadministration(AreaC).33. Awell-functioning localgovernment sector is critical toensurebasic servicedeliveryandcreateaconduciveenvironmentforprivate-sectordrivengrowth.ThePalestinianeconomyisfailingtogeneratethejobsandincomesneededtoimprovelivingstandards.Restrictionsontradeandtheaccesstoresources,alongwithadecadelongblockadeofGaza,haveledtoacontinuingdeclineintheproductivebaseoftheeconomy.Unemploymentishighat30percentonaverage,withyouthunem-ploymentinGazaevenhigher,reachingaround60percent.ThePAisunderseverefiscalstress,expe-riencingamajordownturninbudgetsupportfromdonorswhichdroppedfrom32percentofGDPin2008to5percentin2016.Despiteadecline,thedeficitin2016amountedtoUSD1.09billion,equiva-lentto8percentofGDP.

3AreaCisdefinedbythe1995Israeli-PalestinianInterimAgreementontheWestBankandtheGazaStripas“areasoftheWestBankoutsideAreasAandB,which,exceptfortheissuesthatwillbenegotiatedinthepermanentstatusnegotiations,willbegraduallytransferredtoPalestinianjurisdictioninaccordancewiththisAgreement”.Source:WorldBank.2013.WestBankandGaza:AreaCandtheFutureofPalestinianEconomy.


2


2

1.2 Sector Context

4. StrengtheningLGUsandenablingthemtoperformasfullyfunctionallocalgovernmentsac-countabletocitizensarekeyprioritiesforthePA.ThePalestinianNationalPolicyAgenda(NPA)2017-2022“PuttingCitizensFirst”assignsacriticalroletoLGUstoachieveitsambitiousobjectives.Respon-siveLocalGovernmenthasbeenidentifiedanationalpriority,alongwithimprovingservicestocitizens,strengtheningtransparencyandaccountability,andbuildingresilientcommunities.Bothcentralandlocallevelauthoritieswillneedtoworkintandemtodeliveronthisagenda.

5. TheMinistryofLocalGovernmentwasestablishedbythePAin1994.Increasingtheterrito-rialadministrationunderthePA’sautonomouscontrolwasamongtheMinistryofLocalGovernment’s(MoLG)initialobjectives,whichresultedincreationofseveralnewLGUs.By1997,thenumberofLGUsincreasedfrom139tomorethan350.Today,417LGUsexistintotal,outofwhich142areclassifiedasmunicipalitiesand275asVillageCouncils(VCs).However,exceptforslightdifferencesinrevenueas-signments,i.e.,VCsarenotassignedpropertytaxrevenuesbutcollecteducationtaxinstead,thereisnodistinctioninthefunctionalassignmentsbetweenthosetwogroupsoflocalauthorities.Inpractice,populationsizeisthedistinguishingfactor,althoughwithoutclearprinciples.Mostmunicipalitieshaveapopulationabove5,000inhabitantswhilegenerallyVCsaresmallerthanthat,althoughthereareseveralexceptionsandpopulationalonedoesnotdefinetheadministrativeclassification.

WestBank Gaza Palestinianterritories

Municipalities 117 25 142

Villages 275 - 275

Total 392 25 417

TableI-1:LGUsintheWestBankandGaza

6. Overall,Palestineishighlyurbanizedat74percent,withalmost1.9millionlivinginthe12largestcities.AroundhalfamillionPalestiniansliveinmedium-sizedmunicipalitiesbetween25,000to50,000inhabitants,whilethesecondlargestgrouplivesinsmallmunicipalitiesofthesizebetween4,000to25,000inhabitants.VCsarehometoonlyaround600,000people,althoughtheycomprisethebiggestshareofLGUs.

7. However,decentralizationhasmadeonlymodestprogress.Palestinianlocalgovernmentrev-enuesamountto11.5percentoftotalrevenues,equivalenttoaround4percentofGDP;whilelocalgovernmentexpendituresaccountforonly6percentofexpenditures,slightlymorethan3percentofGDP.Althoughinlinewithothercountriesintheregion,comparedtootherworldregions,thelocalgovernmentsectorinthePalestinianterritoriesisrathersmall,withfiscaldecentralizationstillbeingintheearlystages.


3


3

FigureI-1:FiscalDecentralizationinthePalestinianterritoriesandWorldRegions

Sources:PAandIMFGovernmentFinanceStatistics2012

8. LGUsareassigned27functionalresponsibilities,butonlydeliverafractionofthose.Withincreasingpoliticalandgeographicalfragmentation,LGUshavegainedparamountimportanceprovid-ingservicestothelocalpopulation,particularlyinareaswheretherelativelyyoungcentralgovernmentwaspolitically,geographically,andfiscallyconstrained. IntheLocalGovernmentAct(LGA)of1997,some27functionsandresponsibilitiesforLGUswereoutlined,whichincludemostbutnotallofthepublicservicesthatarecommonlydeliveredatthelocallevelincountriesatasimilarstageofdevel-opment.Despitelargedisparitiesinpopulationsizeandadministrativeandfinancialcapacity,theLGAassignsthesamesetof functionsandresponsibilities tomunicipalitiesandVCsalike,anddoesnotdistinguishbetweendelegatedandownresponsibilities.4Inthecaseofdelegatedresponsibilities,thePAwouldbeultimatelyresponsiblefortheregulationandfinancing,whileimplementationwouldbeundertheresponsibilityofLGUs.5Incontrast,inthecaseofownresponsibilities,LGUswouldbegen-erallyresponsibleforallstagesofserviceprovision.6Theabsenceofconditionalgrantsortransfersfrom thePA to LGUs,apart from interceptedpartial revenue sharingandemergencygrants in thecurrentsystemof intergovernmental finance, indicates that theLGAof1997had little intentiontofosterthedelegationofresponsibilities.

9. LGUs’budgetsare insufficienttoprovidethefundingnecessarytofulfill thefunctionsas-signedtomunicipalitiesandVCs.DespitethecomprehensiverolesandfunctionsofLGUs,localgov-ernmentrevenueandexpendituresconstituteonlyaminorshareoftheoverallpublicbudget,indicat-ingthatfiscaldecentralizationisstillatanearlystageinthePalestinianterritories.7TheonlysourcesofsharedrevenuesandtransfersforLGUsincludethePropertyTax(notleviedinVCs),ProfessionalLicensingFees,andtheTransportationFee,whichiscentrallycollectedandthensplitbetweenLGUsandthecentralgovernment.8Asaconsequence,verticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesremainlargeand localgovernmentbudgetsare rather small compared toothercountriesandworld regions: in

4ArticleNo.1oftheLGA;seeAnnex8foralistoffunctionsassignedtoVCs.5Examplesinothercountriesincludeeducation,health,andsocialwelfareservices.6Examplesincludestreetlighting,localroads,andparks.7WorldBank.2016.PublicExpenditureReview-PalestinianTerritories8TheTransportationFee iscollectedbyMinistryofTransportationand50percentofthetotalrevenuecollected istobeallocatedtotheLGUsonpercapitabasis–however,inreality,themajorityofthe50percentshareisinterceptedbytheMoFPtorecoverthearrearsLGUsowetotheirelectricitysuppliers.

11.5 11.3

30.9

18.319.3 18.7

6.29.0

32.4

19.7

28.9

18.8

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

Palestine Turkey EasternAsia EasternEuropeandCentralAsia

Europe LatinAmericaandCaribbean

Subnationalrevenue,%oftotal Subnationalexpenditure,%oftotal


4


4

2012,revenuesandexpendituresofmunicipalitiesaccountedfor10percentoftotalgovernmentrev-enuesand5.5percentoftotalexpenditures,whiletherevenuesandexpendituresofthe275VCscon-stitutedforlessthan2percentoftheoverallgovernmentbudget.

Municipalities VCs CentralGovernment

Revenues 10% 1.5% 88%

Expenditures 5.5% 1% 93%

TableI-2:SharesofGovernmentBudgetbyAdministrativeTierin2011and2012

10. Localbudgetsaredominatedbyrevenuesfromuserfeesandseverelyconstrainedcapitalinvestmentfunds.Localfeesandservicechargesrepresentmorethan50percentoftotalrevenues,butaredivertedawayfromtheservicesectorsandmostlycross-subsidizegeneraloperationalexpend-itures.Asaresult,servicenetworkrehabilitationandmaintenanceislargelyneglected,leadingtode-cliningservicestandardsandassetdepletion.Overall,capitalinvestmentfundsareverylimited,andoverallLGUslargelydependonexternalsourcesfortheirdevelopmentexpenditure.

FigureI-2:RevenuesbyTypeinMunicipalities(left)andVCs(right)

FigureI-3:ExpenditureAllocationbyBudgetTypeinMunicipalities(left)andVCs(right)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

Actual2010

Actual2011

Actual2012

OperatingBudgetRevenue

EnterpriseFundRevenue

DevelopmentBudgetRevenue

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

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Actual2012

Actual2013

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0

100,000,000

200,000,000

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500,000,000

2010 2011 2012

Muni.OperatingBudgetExpenditure

Muni.EnterpriseFundExpenditure

Muni.DevelopmentBudgetExpenditure

0

20,000,000

40,000,000

60,000,000

80,000,000

2011 2012 2013

VCOperatingBudgetExpenditure

VCEnterprise FundExpenditure

VCDevelopmentBudgetExpenditure




5


5

11. Adistortedsystemofinter-governmentalrelationscauseslargehorizontalandverticalfiscalimbalances.Noregularfiscaltransferexiststosupplementfortheshortageinown-sourcerevenuesandmanyLGUshaveengagedinlarge-scalediversionofservicefeerevenuesowedtoIsraelisuppliersintheelectricityandwatersectors,causingtheso-called“netlending”(seeBoxI-1).Thisdiversionofrevenuesfurtherdistortsexistinginequalitiesinthelocalfiscalcapacity,leadingtoahighconcentra-tionofpercapitarevenuesandexpendituresinafewLGUs.Forexample,municipalities’percapitaown-sourcerevenuewasmorethantwicethatofVCs’in2010and2011;andVCswithaccesstoelec-tricitydistributionrevenueswereabletospendalmosttwiceasmuchinpercapitaoperatingandde-velopmentexpenditureperyearcomparedtothosewithoutduringtheperiod2011-2013.

FigureI-4:TotalPerCapitaExpenditureswith(left)andWithoutOutliers(right)

FigureI-5:AveragePerCapitaExpendituresinOperatingBudget(left)andEnterpriseFund(right)

12. Thehighleveloffragmentationhaspotentialimplicationsonlocalservicedeliveryperfor-mance,giventhehugevariationsinfiscalandinstitutionalcapacity.Inaddition,alargenumberoflocalauthorities,thatcannotbefinanciallyviablebythemselves, iscostlyandmayadverselyaffectallocativeefficiency inahighly financially constrainedenvironment. In short,Palestiniansmightbepayingforalargebutinefficientlocalgovernmentsectorthatisdrainingscarcepublicresourcesandexternalaidatthecostoferoding infrastructure,decliningservices,andsub-optimaldevelopment.However,noevidenceexiststodatetosubstantiatethisclaimanditisimportanttogetabetterun-derstandingofthedriversofservicedeliveryperformanceandmosteffectivewaystosupportPales-tinianLGUstoperformbetterforthebenefitofthePalestinianpeople.

95

95

195

197

PerCapitaExpenditures

PerCapitaRevenues

OperatingBudget

Municipalities

VCs

271

328

295

381

PerCapitaExpenditures

PerCapitaRevenues

EnterpriseFund



6


6

FigureI-6:OperatingBudgetExpenditureCategoriesinMunicipalities(left)andVCs(right)

13. Severalattemptshavebeenmade inthepasttoconsolidatePalestine’s fragmented localgovernmentsystem.Apolicyofamalgamation,adoptedin2010,hasaimedatmergingmunicipalitiesandVCstolargerentities.However,thispolicyhasyieldedonlymixedresultstodateandoverall,thetotalnumberofmunicipalitiesincreasedduringthelasttwodecadesfrom350in1997to417in2017.Inparallel, thePAhas increasingly focusedonconsolidatingservicedeliveryarrangementsthroughinter-municipalcooperationandtheestablishmentofJointServiceCouncils(JSCs).TheobjectiveistoharnesseconomiesofscaleandimprovebasicservicesacrossPalestine,withoutgettingtangledupinthechallengingprocessoftacklinglocalpoliticaldynamics,difficultquestionsoflocalidentity,andtheoveralldesireofestablishingandmaintainingPalestinianrepresentationacrosstheterritories.Suchanapproachhasthepotentialtoimprovethefinancialsustainabilityofservicedeliverywhilemain-tainingabroadbaseofpoliticalrepresentationandparticipationinlocalplanningandinvestmentpri-oritization.Inaddition,thisapproachisinlinewithsectoralpolicies,namelyinthecriticalbasicservicesofelectricitysupply,watersupplyandsanitation,thatareundergoingoraimingatacommercializationandregionalizationofserviceoperation.However,todate,nodatahasbeenavailabletotrackandsupportperformanceimprovementsacrossthelocalgovernmentsector.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Actual2010 Actual2011 Actual2012ExpensesnotrelatedtoacertaindepartmentCommunityPlanningandDevelopmentSocialactivitiesCulturalactivitiesSecurity&firefightingPublicworkHealthServicesGeneralexpenses- PublicAdministration

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Actual2011 Actual2012 Actual2013

Generalexpenses- PublicAdministration

HealthServices

Knowledge/educationalandculturalservices

Loanrepayment

GeneralServices


7


7

BoxI-1:PopulationDiscrepancies

InternalmigrationtoleadingurbancentersintheWestBankhaveaddedsignificantlytotheloadonservicedeliveryinsomeLGUs.Ascertainareashavegainedeconomicpromi-nence, internalmigration to these locations has drastically increased, particularly in theRamallah-AlBirehurbanarea,whichhoststheseatofgovernmentforthePA.MigratorypopulationbulgeshaveaddedpressuretofinanciallyconstrainedLGUsandoverburdenedservices,affectingservicedeliveryqualityandavailability.Infrastructureinmanyofthear-easisnotsufficienttoaccommodatetheaddedload,especiallysinceLGUshavenotade-quatelyplannedforthelong-termeffectsofthepopulationinflux.Thishasledto:(i)height-enedtrafficcongestion;(ii)increasedOperations&Maintenance(O&M)costs;(iii)installa-tionofunplannedoff-site infrastructure;and(iv)opportunitycostsfor investing inotherneededmunicipalservices.

PotentiallysizeablediscrepanciesinofficialpopulationfigurescauseresourceconstraintsforsomelargemunicipalitiesinthePalestinianterritories.LGUshavereportedthatinac-curatenationalpopulationfiguresfurtherexacerbatethesituation.ThesharedrevenuestosupportLGUbudgetsarebasedonthePalestinianCentralBureauofStatistics(PCBS)popu-lationdata.ItisakeyfactordeterminingthetransferamountstoLGUsfromtheTranspor-tationFee,whichissharedbetweentheMoFPandLGUs.FiftypercentofthetotalrevenuecollectedfromtransportationfeesistobeallocatedtotheLGUsonapercapitabasis.Ad-ditionally,municipalgrantsfromtheSecondMunicipalDevelopmentProgram(MDP-II),oneoftheonlyreliablesourcesoffinancialsupportmunicipalitiesreceive,ispartially(30per-cent)basedonPCBSpopulationfigures.ThePCBSpopulationrecordsfortheLGUsarebasedontheregisteredresidencyofcitizens’nationalidentificationcards.Oftenresidency,how-ever,isnotupdatedwhenpeoplerelocate,asitisadifficultprocesswithveryfewinduce-mentsforupdating.UnlikePCBS,LGUscalculatetheirpopulationbasedonserviceuserfeeandtaxcollectionfigures.AlBireh’spopulationfor2016,forexample,is48,887accordingto PCBS estimates,however themunicipalityestimates their residentsataround81,000basedonwaterandelectricityuserratesandtaxcollection.

VariousproceduresshouldbeconsideredtoupdateresidencyandsupportLGUsdealingwith population discrepancies.While this isnotawidespread issue forall LGUs, the PAshouldconsidermeasures,whichcanbetakentosupportthoseaffected.Proceduresforestablishing residencyshouldbe reassessedand eased toencourageproper registration.Currently,unlessacitizenhasatenancycontractinhis/hernameitisverydifficulttorequestachangeofresidency.TheuseofasimpleregistrationformtobefiledatthelocalLGUcouldbeintroducedasanalternativewayforcitizenstoestablishresidency.Thisiscommonprac-ticeinmanycountries.Additionally,updatedresidencyisnotamitigatingfactorforaccesstogeneralservices,howeveritcouldbelinkedtothenationalIDdatabase.Afterasignificantperiodofusageandaccessforservicesinanareadifferingfromofficialresidency,acalltoupdateresidencycouldbetriggered.LGUsandserviceproviderscouldcollaborateonthis.Furthermore,asthefiscaltransferamountisdeterminedbytheMoLG,theycanconsideralternativeprocedureswhereLGUpopulationisdeterminedbyregisteredserviceusersandtaxpayers,rather thanPCBSpopulationdata.ThiscourseofactionwouldalsoencourageLGUs tocrackdownonillegalserviceconnections toensureallusersare in theofficiallycountednumbers.


8


8

1.3 Key Challenges

14. LGUsareresponsiblefortheprovisionofcriticallocalservicesbutdonotfulfillthefullspec-trumofassignedtasksandresponsibilities.TheroleofLGUsinpublicservicedeliveryfallsfarshortofwhatisprescribedinthe1997LGA.Availabledatafromhouseholdsurveysandbudgetdocumentsindicatethatmostmunicipalitiesonlyprovideuptofourcoreservices,whichareshowninTableI-3:AccesstoCoreServices.Forotherimportantfunctionssuchaspublictransportationprovision,capitalinvestmentsinpublicinfrastructure,firefighting,primaryhealth,localschoolmaintenance,andsocialwelfareprograms,themandateandfundingremainsunclear.Often,thesefunctions,primarilypublicinfrastructure,arenotimplementedunlessinternationaldonorprogramsexisttospecificallyfinancethem.

WestBank Gaza Palestinianterritories

PipedWaterSupply 94% 88% 91%

SolidWasteCollection 95% 83% 91%

WasteWaterManagement 30% 77% 48%

PavedLocalRoads 87% 46% 62%

TableI-3:AccesstoCoreServices

15. Identifyingmeanstoaddressthechallengeofexcessivelocalfragmentationwillneedtobeakeystepinimprovingservicedelivery.Facingseverefiscalconstraints,smallandremoteVCsintheWestBankbelongtothelowestperformingLGUsinthePalestinianterritories,oftenfallingshortofguaranteeingservicesofsatisfactoryqualityornotprovidingaccesstothecoreservicesatall.AlthoughaclearpolicydirectiveexistsfortheestablishmentofjointadministrativestructuresamongbothVCsandmunicipalitiesintheformofJointServiceCouncils(JSCs)toaddresscapacitylimitations,sufficientincentivesremaintobebuiltintothesystemtofacilitatetheformulation,financing,andimplementa-tionofsuchinitiatives.Moreover,selectedVCswiththesizeandcapacitytoevolveintoviablelocalauthoritiesneedfurtherinstitutionalsupport.Suchsupportwouldneedtobeprovidedthroughacom-binationofincentivesandcapacitybuildingthatwillenableVCstofunctionasaccountableandfinan-ciallysustainable localgovernments.However,quantitativeresultspresented inthisreportsuggestthatacarefulassessmentofperformanceoutcomesforLGUspartofaJSCisdetrimentalbeforeaimingforawiderapplicationoftheJSCmodel.

16. Localgovernmentsectorreformwillbeacrucialkeyconditiontoimprovebasiclocalservicedelivery,particularlyinthewatersector.SecuringsustainablewatersupplyinthePalestinianterrito-rieswillrequirecollectiveactionacrosssectorsandstakeholders,butcannotadvancewithoutwell-functioningandmoreefficientlocalgovernments.Existingresourceconstraintsandgeopoliticalchal-lengesareamongthemainchallengestosecuringsustainablewaterinthePalestinianterritories.De-cliningaquifer yieldpairedwith rapidpopulationgrowthhas resulted inadecreaseof internal re-sourcesfordomesticsupplyintheWestBankfrom190literspercapitaperdaytoonly100litersin2013.9Morethan95percentof thewater fromtheGazamainaquifer isnon-drinkablebecauseofpollutionandseawaterintrusion.Inordertomeetinternaldemand,thePAincreasinglyreliesonwa-terpurchasesfromIsrael.However,whileincreasingbulkwatersupplytotheWestBankandGazawillbecriticaltomeetthegrowingdemandandaddresstheGazawatercrisis, improvingtheefficiency

9WorldBank.2017.WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic.


9


9

andreducinglossesinthePalestinianwaterdistributionsystemisequallyimportant.Withmorethan230waterserviceproviders,mostlyembeddedinVCandmunicipalwaterdepartments,addressingthewidespreadperformanceissuesinthewatersectorwillnotadvancewithoutaparallelreformef-fortinthelocalgovernmentsectorthataddressestheunderlyingissuesoffragmentationandlackoffinancialsustainability.

17. Breakingtheviciouscircleofpoorservicequalityandreliability,consumers’limitedwilling-nesstopay,andunstableLGUfinances,willrequireamulti-levelapproach.Theprevailingnet-lend-ingissueposesasignificantfiscaldrainforthePAandcreatesperverseincentivesforLGUsthatcon-tradictreforminitiativestoimproveservicedelivery.Particularlyinthewatersector,serviceprovidersareentrappedinaviciouscircleofserviceprovision.AcrosstheWestBankandGaza,unsatisfactoryserviceoutcomesarecloselyrelatedwithconsumerdisengagementandfailuretopay.ThisisposingaseriousrisktothefinancialpositionofwaterserviceprovidersandLGUs,furtherunderminingthecapacitytofinanceregularmaintenanceletaloneinvestmentincapitalreplacementandnetworkre-habilitation,eventuallyaffectingoverallperformance.Breakingthisspiralofdegradingserviceprovi-sionwillrequiretargeting:(i)demandsidefactors,e.g.byaffrontingcitizens’deficientpaymentbe-haviorthroughinnovativebestpractices,suchaspre-paidservicedelivery,pro-poorsubsidiesorpay-mentplans;aswellas(ii)supplysidefactors,e.g.bylimitingunsustainablebudgetarypractices,suchascross-subsidizationofLGUactivitieswithenterprisebudgetfunds.

18. ExtendingaccessandraisingawarenessforaccountabilityandfeedbacktoolsisdetrimentaltoenablingLGUstorespondtocitizens’needs.Theestablishmentanduseofpublicfeedbackandaccountabilitytools,suchascitizenservicecenters(CSC),one-stop-shops(OSS)andLGUwebsites,en-hancestransparencyandresponsivenesstocitizens,andenablescitizenstoparticipateandmonitorlocalgovernmentperformance.However,themajorityofLGUsprovidesnoneoronlyonesuchfeed-backchannel.Moreover,evidencefrombothquantitativeandqualitativeresearchsuggeststhatonlyaminorfractionofcitizensinLGUswithsuchmechanismsknowoftheirexistence,letaloneusedthemtoredressgrievancesaboutservicedelivery.NudgingcitizenstoprovidefeedbackthroughinteractionwithlocalrepresentativesorserviceprovidersallowsLGUstoeffectivelytargetexistingservicedeliv-erybottlenecks,whileincreasingcitizensatisfactionwithbothserviceoutcomesandLGUresponsive-ness,whichareempiricallyshowntobecloselyrelatedtocitizenpaymentbehaviorandwillingnesstopay.


10

BoxI-2:TheNet-LendingIssue

ThePalestinianterritoriesarehighlydependentonenergyimportsfromneighboringcoun-triesduetothelackofdomesticenergysources.TheIsraelElectricCorporation(IEC)isthelargestenergysupplierproviding88percentofelectricityconsumedinthePalestinianter-ritories.ElectricitydistributioninthePalestinianterritoriesiscarriedoutbyPalestinianmu-nicipalities,villagecouncils,anddistributioncompanies(DISCOs).NetlendingariseswhenPalestinianentitiesfunctioningasdistributorsofelectricityandwa-terservicescollectservicefeesfromresidentsandratherthanusingthoserevenuestopaywaterandelectricitysuppliers,makeonlypartialornopaymentatall,thusaccumulatingarrears.LGUsseecollectedfeesasanecessarysourceofrevenueandclearlyusethemtocross-subsidizeotheractivities,includingtheiroperatinganddevelopmentbudgets.OutstandingpaymentsowedtotheIEC,includinglatepaymentfees,areeither;1)deductedbytheIsraeliMinistryofFinancefromrevenuesthattheGovernmentofIsrael(GoI)collectsonbehalfofthePA(clearancerevenues)andarerecordedinthePA’sbudgetas“netlend-ing”;or2)accumulatedasdebtowedtotheIEC.Asaresult,thePAfindsitselfprovidingunplannedsubsidiesofoverUS$200millionperyear(2percentofGDP)totheLGUs.TheMoFPattempts to recover those lossesbywithholding revenues otherwisedue toLGUs(municipalpropertytax,professionalpermitfees,transportationtaxetc.),buttheseinter-ceptsbynomeansoffsetutilitynon-paymentsandleadtoacomplicated,opaqueanddis-tortedintergovernmentalfiscalrelationssystem.Onereasonforthepersistenceofthenetlendingproblemisthatithasallthefeaturesofa“perverse”equilibrium.First,Israeliauthoritieseventuallygettheirfundsplusafine,whichmeanshigherrevenues.ManyLGUsprefertokeepthe“cashinhand”fromelectricityfees,asopposedtothepromisedtransferredfundsfromlocaltaxes,whicharelikelytobesmallerinsize,assomeBankcomputationsalsoseemtoconfirm.ThePAgetssandwichedinthemiddlebutgetstoretainthepropertytax,professionalpermitfee,andtransportationtax,thusatleasttemporarilyminimizingtheblow.

FigureError!Notextofspecifiedstyleindocument.-1:TheDynamicsofNet-LendingintheWestBank


11


11

1.4 Objective and Methodology

19. ThisreportestablishesthequantitativebasisforanalyzingperformanceofPalestinianlocalgovernmentsandabaselineforfuturebenchmarkingtotargetinvestmentandpolicyinterventions.Differenthypothesesaredetermininggovernment interventionsandpolicydecisions tostrengthenPalestinian localgovernments,drivenby theultimateobjectiveofenablingLGUs toprovidebetterservices.However,withoutreliabledataitisdifficulttoassesstheinterrelationbetweeninputs,out-puts,andoutcomesofservicedelivery.Thisreportfocusesonanassessmentofthe‘demandside’ofservicedeliveryoutcomes,suchasaccess,qualityandreliability,responsiveness,andwillingnesstopayforservicesmandatedtomunicipalitiesandVCs.Theanalysisisbasedonacomprehensivehouse-holdsurveyandan indexdeveloped toassessoverall LGUperformance.Theanalysis is furtherex-tendedwithinsightsfromqualitativeinterviewsandfocusgroups,andmatchedwithfactorsinfluenc-ingthe‘supplyside’ofservicedelivery,suchasLGUinstitutionalandfiscalcapacity.TheresultsallowforarobustunderstandingofthefactorsthatinfluenceLGUperformance,andprovideforstrongevi-dence-basedpolicyrecommendationsforfutureinterventionsinmunicipalitiesandVCs.

20. Asexistingmunicipaldataisverylimitedinitsscopeandonlycoversminimal inputsintoservicedelivery,ahouseholdsurveycoveringmorethan380PalestinianLGUswasconducted.Thehouseholdsurveydatafocusesonaccesstopublicservices,qualityandreliabilityofservicedelivery,andcitizens’participationandwillingnesstopay,whichallowsforanin-depthanalysisofthedriversofLGUperformanceinservicedelivery.ThestudyincludesapollonservicedeliveryoutcomesforallLGUsinthePalestinianterritories10,establishingabaselinedatasetforbothfutureanalysis,e.g.onwhetherthebottom40percentaredisproportionallyaffectedbyexisting limitations,anddevelop-mentprogramsinthelocalgovernmentsector.Thesurveymodulesincludeaservicedeliveryassess-mentofthefollowingsectors:(i)watersupply;(ii)wastewater;(iii)electricity;(iv)solidwastecollec-tion;(v)education;(vi)publictransport;(vii)healthcare;and(viii)localroads.Inaddition,themodulesalsocollecteddataon:(ix)householddemographicsandsocio-economics;(x)citizenparticipation;and(xi)willingnesstopay.DetailedinformationonthesurveysetupcanbefoundinAnnex1.

21. Parallelqualitativeanalysisallowsforamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofperformancedriversrelatedtoinstitutionalcapacity,governance,andpoliticaleconomy.ThequalitativeanalysisconductedfortheLGPAdrawsonbothKeyInformantInterviews(KIIs)andFocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs).KIIswereconductedwithasampleofmunicipaladministrations,civilsocietyorganizations,andotherrelevantstakeholders.KIIsprovideinsightsinto:(i)whichsectorsarebestcovered;(ii)pro-videamorecompletenarrativeoftheLGUperformancedrivers;and(iii)presentinsightsintothefi-nancialchallengesfacedbyLGUs.Inaddition,FDGswereconductedtogaininsightintocitizenpercep-tionsonthecurrentstateandexistingchallengesregardingserviceaccess,quality,affordability,andtrendsinthequalityofservices,whichallowsfortheformulationofprioritiesfortheexpansionandimprovementofservicedelivery.Thediscussionsalsoexaminedthequalitativedimensionofpartici-pation, transparencyandaccountability, investigatinghowcitizenswould like toengagewith theirLGU.Moreover,thediscussionsexploredcurrentfeedbackmechanismswithlocalpolicymakersandhowqualityandaccessproblemswithservicedeliveryarecurrentlybeingaddressed.FocusgroupswereheldinNablus,Hebron,GazaCity,Jabalya,KhanYunis,Rafah,Ramallah,andBethlehem,andanadditional10FGDswereconductedinsmallermunicipalitiesandselectedvillagesintheWestBankandGaza.Themethodologicalframeworkappliedinthequalitativeanalysisisdescribedindetail inAnnex2.

10Intotal,20LGUscouldnotbeaccessedduetosecurityrestrictions.SeeAnnex1foradetaileddescription.


12


12

FigureI-8:LGPASurvey-MunicipalityandVillageCouncilSize-GroupsandPopulation

22. Theanalysisfocusesonthedriversforlocalservicedeliveryperformance.Existinghypothe-sescanbeexpressedinstatisticalmodelswithseveraldeterminants, including:thesizeof localau-thorities(economiesofscale);thelevelofincome(GDPpercapita);fiscalstrength(revenuespercap-ita,totalrevenues,expenditurepercapita,totalexpenditure);institutionalcapacity(planning,finan-cial management, etc.); governance arrangements (transparency, accountability, participation);modesofservicedelivery(individualLGU,JSC,utility);butalsoconsidertheenablingenvironmentandinstitutionalframework,e.g.,revenueandexpenditureassignments,sectorpolicyandstrategies,andservicestandards.Whileallmandatedserviceswillbeanalyzed,theemphasiswillbeonthecoreser-vices, (i)pipedwatersupply, (ii)wastewatermanagement, (iii) solidwastecollectionand(iv) localroads.

45

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Population


13

II. The State of Basic Service Delivery in Palestinian Local Governments


13

II. The State of Basic Service Delivery inPalestinian Local Governments

23. ServiceaccessandsatisfactionratesvarysubstantiallybothacrossLGUsandsectors.Accessandsatisfactionwiththefourbasicservices,(i)pipedwatersupply,(ii)wastewatermanagement,(iii)solidwastecollection,and(iv)localroads,isgenerallyhigherintheWestBankthaninGaza,andthehighestinlargemunicipalitiesinthecentralWestBank.Overall,thevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesisconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork(91percent),eventhoughactualwateravailabilityislimitedandqualityinsufficientinmanyLGUs.91percentofPalestinianhouseholdshaveaccesstoawastecollectionservice,whileonly2outof3Palestinianhouseholdsreportsimmediateaccesstopavedroads(62percent),andlessthanhalfaconnectiontoapipedsewagenetwork(48percent).

24. ComparingservicedeliveryoutcomesbetweentheWestBankandGaza,notablegapsinac-cessratesemerge.IntheWestBank,95percentofhouseholdshaveaccesstosolidwastecollectionservicesand74percenttolocalroads,comparedtojust83percentand42percentinGaza,respec-tively.Alsointhewatersector,accessratesarehigherintheWestBankthaninGaza.94percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankhaveaccesstoapipedwaternetwork,comparedto88percentinGaza.Comparingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersources,coverageisalmostuniversalintheWestBank,whileonly1percentofthehouseholdsinGazaiscovered,and97percentrelyonwaterdeliveredbytankertrucks. Incontrast,overallcoveragewithsanitationservices ishigher inGazathan intheWestBank.AccesstopipedsewageismorethantwiceashighinGaza,where3outof4householdsareconnectedtoasewagenetwork(77percent),comparedtolessthan1outof3intheWestBank(30percent),whichismainlydrivenbyahighdegreeofurbanizationinGaza.Accesstoimprovedsan-itationfacilitiesisuniversalinGaza(99percent),andsimilarlyhighintheWestBank(94percent).

FigureII-1:ServiceAccessacrossSectors

25. Somewhatunexpectedly,accessratestocoreservicesarerelativelyhigh,whileavailability,

94%

30%

95%

74%

88%

77%

83%

42%

WestBank

Gaza

SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewage


13






94%

30%

95%

74%

88%

77%

83%

42%

WestBank

Gaza

SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageTHE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

16


13






94%

30%

95%

74%

88%

77%

83%

42%

WestBank

Gaza

SolidWasteCollection PavedLocalRoadsPipedWater PipedSewageTHE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF

SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

14

qualityandreliabilityofservicesfluctuatesignificantly.Onthepositiveside,therequiredinfrastruc-tureinvestmentsforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservicesarelargelyavailableinboththeWestBankandGaza,especiallyinlargemunicipalitiesintheWestBank.However,inpractice,servicesarenotavailablethroughout,andcitizensinmanyLGUsareaffectedbyinterruptionsandlackofser-vicedelivery,asexpressedbysatisfactionlevelswithqualityandreliability.

26. Overall,satisfactionratesarethehighestforwastewaterservices,andthelowestforlocalroads. IntheWestBank,54percentofhouseholdsaresatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityofpipedwaterservices,comparedtojust1outof3inGaza.Takingonlysatisfactionwithreliabilityintoaccount,thegapbetweentheWestBankandGazaisslightlynarrower:60percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankaresatisfiedwithpipedwater reliability,comparedto45percent inGaza. In thewastewatersectorincontrast,inboththeWestBankandGaza,roughly4outof5householdsaresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability.Somewhatsurprisingly,GazaoutperformstheWestBankintermsofsatisfactionwithsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileintheWestBankonly59percentofhouse-holdsstate tobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,morethantwo-thirds (70percent)ofhouseholdsinGazaaresatisfiedwithservicedeliveryoutcomesinthesolidwastesector.Thelowestsatisfactionratesarereportedforlocalroads.IntheWestBank,onlyeveryotherhousehold,andinGazaonly1outof4householdsissatisfiedwithboththephysicalconditionandthewaterdrainageduringrainoftheroadoutsidetheirhouse.

FigureII-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability

27. Followingadescriptionofthesector-specificinstitutionalarrangements,thissectiongivesanoverviewofthegeographicandsocio-economicvariations inserviceoutcomesacrosssectors.Notablegaps inservicedeliveryoutcomesacrossLGUsexist forall sectors,especially foraccess towastewaterservicesandpavedroads.Socio-demographicsatthehouseholdlevelplayaconsiderablerolewhenpredictingserviceoutcomes,particularlyinthewatersector,butcannotfullyexplainexist-ingdifferencesinservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthissection,firsttheinstitutionalarrangementsacrossservicesectorsarediscussed(Chapter2.1),thenthegeographicalvariation inserviceoutcomesforwaterandwastewater(Chapter2.2),solidwastemanagement(Chapter2.3),andlocalroads(Chapter2.4)isevaluated,differencesinserviceoutcomesacrosshouseholdsocio-demographicsareanalyzed(Chapter2.5),andfinallycitizenwillingnesstopayisassessed(Chapter2.6).

54%

84%

59%

45%

36%

79%

70%

23%

WestBank

Gaza



14

qualityandreliabilityofservicesfluctuatesignificantly.Onthepositiveside,therequiredinfrastruc-tureinvestmentsforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservicesarelargelyavailableinboththeWestBankandGaza,especiallyinlargemunicipalitiesintheWestBank.However,inpractice,servicesarenotavailablethroughout,andcitizensinmanyLGUsareaffectedbyinterruptionsandlackofser-vicedelivery,asexpressedbysatisfactionlevelswithqualityandreliability.

26. Overall,satisfactionratesarethehighestforwastewaterservices,andthelowestforlocalroads. IntheWestBank,54percentofhouseholdsaresatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityofpipedwaterservices,comparedtojust1outof3inGaza.Takingonlysatisfactionwithreliabilityintoaccount,thegapbetweentheWestBankandGazaisslightlynarrower:60percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankaresatisfiedwithpipedwater reliability,comparedto45percent inGaza. In thewastewatersectorincontrast,inboththeWestBankandGaza,roughly4outof5householdsaresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability.Somewhatsurprisingly,GazaoutperformstheWestBankintermsofsatisfactionwithsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileintheWestBankonly59percentofhouse-holdsstate tobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,morethantwo-thirds (70percent)ofhouseholdsinGazaaresatisfiedwithservicedeliveryoutcomesinthesolidwastesector.Thelowestsatisfactionratesarereportedforlocalroads.IntheWestBank,onlyeveryotherhousehold,andinGazaonly1outof4householdsissatisfiedwithboththephysicalconditionandthewaterdrainageduringrainoftheroadoutsidetheirhouse.

FigureII-2:SatisfactionwithServiceQualityandReliability

27. Followingadescriptionofthesector-specificinstitutionalarrangements,thissectiongivesanoverviewofthegeographicandsocio-economicvariations inserviceoutcomesacrosssectors.Notablegaps inservicedeliveryoutcomesacrossLGUsexist forall sectors,especially foraccess towastewaterservicesandpavedroads.Socio-demographicsatthehouseholdlevelplayaconsiderablerolewhenpredictingserviceoutcomes,particularlyinthewatersector,butcannotfullyexplainexist-ingdifferencesinservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthissection,firsttheinstitutionalarrangementsacrossservicesectorsarediscussed(Chapter2.1),thenthegeographicalvariation inserviceoutcomesforwaterandwastewater(Chapter2.2),solidwastemanagement(Chapter2.3),andlocalroads(Chapter2.4)isevaluated,differencesinserviceoutcomesacrosshouseholdsocio-demographicsareanalyzed(Chapter2.5),andfinallycitizenwillingnesstopayisassessed(Chapter2.6).

54%

84%

59%

45%

36%

79%

70%

23%

WestBank

Gaza



17


15

2.1 The Institutional Framework Governing Local Service Delivery

28. Institutional arrangements differ across sectors, with functions distributedacross centraland localauthorities.Avarietyofcentraland localstakeholdersare involved inthepolicymaking,prioritysetting,financing,operationandmonitoringofbasicservicedelivery.Anumberoflawsandbylawsgovernsservicedeliveryacrosssectors.Institutionalarrangementsarefragmentedandinmanycases,LGUshaveverylimitedauthorityovertheservicestheyaremandatedtoprovidebasedontheLGA.Forexample,educationandhealtharecriticalpublicservicesdeliveredatthelocallevel,butwithnoinvolvementofthelocalauthorities.Similarly,LGUsusedtoplayaroleinthedistributionofelec-tricityandcollectionofservicefees,buthavecededthisfunctiontotheDISCOs.Hence,theanalysisinthisreportfocusesonthefourbasicservicesunderthedirectcontrolofLGUs:watersupply,sewage,solidwastemanagement,andlocalroads.TableII-1providesanoverviewofthecurrentinstitutionalarrangementsbyservicesector.

29. De-factoassignmentsdonotalwaysreflectthelegalinstitutionalframework.Attimes,thedistinctioninjurisdictionalcoveragefromcentraltolocalauthoritiesresultsinserviceprovisiongapsforcitizenslivingoutsideLGUandJSCjurisdictions.ThePAhascometorecognizetheproblemsstem-ming fromconfusingandoverlappingmandates,andsomesectorshaveattemptedtoaddress thisthroughupdatedlawsandbylaws.However,inmostsectorsthedelegationoffunctionsinthelaws,policies,andstrategiesdoesnotaddressoraccountforthelackoffiscalandtechnicalcapacityatthedesignatedagencies.Therefore,andasaresultofthemismatchbetweeninstitutionalframeworkandcapacities,anumberofagenciesaredefactounabletodeliveronthedesignatedfunctions.

30. Inthewaterandwastewatersector,responsibilitiesaredistributedacrossseveralactors.At thecentral level, theprincipal stateactors include (i) thePalestinianWaterAuthority (PWA), ineffectthePalestinianwaterministry;(ii)theWaterSectorRegulatoryCouncil(WSRC),setupunderthe2014WaterLawwiththemandateofsectorregulator;(iii)theMoLG,supporting,monitoring,andregulatingLGUs, including theirwaterandsanitation services;and (iv) theMinistryofFinanceandPlanning(MoFP),allocatingsectorfinanceandmanagingfinancialflows.Atthesub-nationallevel,thestateactorsareLGUs:municipalwaterdepartmentsprovidewaterand/orsanitationservices(76intheWestBankand25inGaza).Inaddition,anumberofmunicipalitiesandVCshavejoinedtogethertoformJSCs(13single-servicewatersupplyandsanitationJSCstodate),whichprovidewaterand/orwastewaterservices.Some162VCsalsodeliverwaterandwastewaterservices.Inaddition,thereisalargenumberofdonorsthatoperateinthesector,andnumerousnationalandinternationalnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)thatveryactivelysupportdevelopmentandservicedeliveryinthewatersector.


18

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y Gr

iev-

ance

Red

ress

); M

oH a

nd E

QA

(Out

-sid

e LG

U ju

risdi

ctio

n);

JSCs

(with

in ju

risdi

c-tio

n);

LGUs

(with

in ju

risdi

c-tio

n)

MoP

WH;

MoL

G;

LGUs

PE

RC; i

ndiv

idua

l DI

SCO

s

MoF

P; U

NWRA

; NG

Os; P

rivat

e Se

c-to

r; Pa

lest

inia

n Ce

ntra

l Bur

eau

of

Stat

istics

(PCB

S w

ith M

oH re

gula

rly

cond

ucts

the

Na-

tiona

l Hea

lth A

c-co

unts

and

oth

er

natio

nal h

ealth

sur-

veys

); Pa

lest

inia

n Pu

blic

Heal

th In

sti-

tute

MOE

HE; N

a-tio

nal I

nstit

ute

for E

duca

tiona

l Tr

aini

ng; H

ighe

r Ed

ucat

ion

Inst

i-tu

tes;

UNW

RA;

PCBS

Tabl

e II-

1: O

verv

iew

of t

he C

urre

nt In

stitu

tiona

l Arr

ange

men

ts b

y Se

rvice

Sec

tor


19

THE

PERF

ORM

AN

CE O

F PA

LEST

INIA

N L

OCA

L G

OVE

RNM

ENTS

. AN

ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

SER

VICE

DEL

IVER

Y O

UTC

OM

ES A

ND

PER

FORM

AN

CE D

RIVE

RS IN

TH

E W

EST

BAN

K A

ND

GA

ZA.

17

Polic

ies &

Pl

ans

Wha

t are

the

plan

s and

st

rate

gies

for t

he se

ctor

?

2009

Act

ion

Plan

fo

r Ref

orm

; W

ater

Sec

tor

Polic

y an

d St

rat-

egy

2012

−203

2;

Wat

er S

ecto

r Re

form

Pla

n 20

16−2

018;

W

ater

Sec

tor

Stra

tegi

c Dev

el-

opm

ent P

lan;

2009

Act

ion

Plan

for

Refo

rm;

Natio

nal S

trat

egy

for

Solid

Was

te M

anag

e-m

ent i

n Pa

lest

ine

(201

0-20

14);

Upda

ted

Natio

nal

Stra

tegy

for S

olid

W

aste

Man

agem

ent

in P

ales

tine

(201

7 –

2022

) (dr

aft);

2011

-201

3 Na

-tio

nal H

ealth

Str

at-

egy;

Educ

atio

n De

vel-

opm

ent S

trat

egic

Plan

(201

4-20

19)

Regu

latio

n

Who

regu

late

s the

sect

or

incl.

the

licen

sing

regi

me,

pe

rmits

, sta

ndar

d se

ttin

g,

sanc

tion

mec

hani

sms,

etc.

WSR

C (d

u jo

ur),

Gap

(de

fact

o);

PWA

(sta

ndar

d se

ttin

g);

MoL

G, LG

U w

a-te

r dep

artm

ents

(w

ithin

LGU

ju-

risdi

ctio

n)

MoL

G; C

abin

et o

f M

inist

ers;

EQA;

MoH

; M

oNE

(Indu

stria

l w

aste

)

MoP

WH

Pale

stin

ian

Elec

-tr

icity

Reg

ulat

ory

Coun

cil (P

ERC)

; PE

NRA

MoH

M

oEHE

; UNW

RA

Supe

rvisi

on

Who

mon

itors

com

plia

nce

with

the

sect

or re

gula

tion

incl

verif

icatio

n of

lice

nses

, da

ta a

naly

sis, r

egul

ar in

-sp

ectio

n, a

nd o

ther

cont

rol

mea

sure

s.

WSR

C (d

u jo

ur);

*Sup

ervi

sion

gap

(de

fact

o);

MoL

G; E

QA;

MoH

; JS

Cs (w

ithin

JSCs

juris

-di

ctio

n); L

GUs (

with

in

LGU

juris

dict

ion)

*N

ote

ther

e is

a di

s-cr

epan

cy b

etw

een

the

role

as s

tate

d in

legi

s-la

tion

vers

us in

pra

c-tic

e.

MoP

WH;

MoL

G;

LGUs

PE

RC; P

ENRA

M

oH

MoE

HE; U

NWRA

Enfo

rcem

ent

Who

enf

orce

s san

ctio

ns in

ca

se n

on-c

ompl

ianc

e?

JSCs

and

LGUs

(with

in

own

juris

dict

ion)

in

coop

erat

ion

with

law

en

forc

emen

t e.g

. po-

lice;

PERC

; PEN

RA

MoH

M

oEHE

; UNW

RA

THE

PERF

ORM

AN

CE O

F PA

LEST

INIA

N L

OCA

L G

OVE

RNM

ENTS

. AN

ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

SER

VICE

DEL

IVER

Y O

UTC

OM

ES A

ND

PER

FORM

AN

CE D

RIVE

RS IN

TH

E W

EST

BAN

K A

ND

GA

ZA.

16

Func

tion

Desc

riptio

n W

ater

&

Sew

age

Solid

Was

te

Road

s El

ectr

icity

He

alth

Ed

ucat

ion

Polic

y m

akin

g W

ho se

ts th

e m

ain

polic

y gu

idel

ines

?

Pale

stin

ian

Wa-

ter A

utho

rity

(PW

A)

MoL

G; E

nviro

nmen

t Q

ualit

y Au

thor

ity

(EQ

A); M

inist

ry o

f He

alth

(MOH

); Na

tiona

l Com

mitt

ee

on S

olid

Was

te M

an-

agem

ent (

in a

dditi

on

to th

e ab

ove

inclu

des:

MoF

P; P

WA;

Min

istry

of

Nat

iona

l Eco

nom

y (M

oNE)

; Min

istry

of

Educ

atio

n an

d Hi

gher

Ed

ucat

ion

Min

istry

of P

ublic

W

orks

and

Hou

s-in

g (M

oPW

H);

MoL

G (w

ithin

LG

U ju

risdi

ctio

n)

Pale

stin

ian

En-

ergy

and

Nat

ural

Re

sour

ces A

u-th

ority

(PEN

RA)

MoH

; Su

prem

e M

edica

l Co

uncil

MoE

HE; H

ighe

r Co

uncil

of E

duca

-tio

n

Legi

slatio

n W

hat a

re th

e ke

y le

gal p

a-ra

met

ers i

n th

e se

ctor

?

2014

Wat

er

Law

; 201

7−20

22

(SDP

); Lo

cal

Gove

rnm

ent A

ct

(LGA

) of 1

997;

JS

C By

law

201

6;

Tarif

f Reg

ula-

tions

Byl

aw

2013

; Uni

fied

Regu

latio

n fo

r W

ater

and

W

aste

wat

er T

ar-

iff a

nd C

onne

c-tio

n Se

rvice

s Fe

es 2

017

(dra

ft)

Loca

l Gov

ernm

ent A

ct

(LGA

) of 1

997;

En

viro

nmen

tal L

aw

No. (

7) o

f 199

9;

Publ

ic He

alth

Law

of

2004

; JS

C By

law

s 201

6;

Pale

stin

ian

Min

ister

ial

Cabi

net D

ecisi

ons N

o 53

(200

8), 4

9 (2

010)

, 50

(201

5), 1

08 (2

016)

, 15

0 (2

017)

; JS

C By

law

201

6;

Natio

nal S

olid

Was

te

Man

agem

ent B

i-Law

(d

raft)

;

Loca

l Gov

ern-

men

t Act

(LGA

) of

1997

; Dr

aft R

oad

Law

20

00;

Road

Tra

ffic L

aw

(No.

5)

Gene

ral E

lect

ric-

ity La

w 2

009;

Re-

new

able

Ene

rgy

and

Ener

gy E

ffi-

cienc

y (R

E&EE

) La

w 2

015

Coun

cil o

f Min

ster

s

Com

miss

ion

for

Deve

lopi

ng

Teac

hing

Pro

fes-

sion;

Ac

cred

itatio

n an

d Q

ualit

y As

-su

ranc

e Co

mm

is-sio

n fo

r Hig

her

Educ

atio

n


20

THE

PERF

ORM

AN

CE O

F PA

LEST

INIA

N L

OCA

L G

OVE

RNM

ENTS

. AN

ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

SER

VICE

DEL

IVER

Y O

UTC

OM

ES A

ND

PER

FORM

AN

CE D

RIVE

RS IN

TH

E W

EST

BAN

K A

ND

GA

ZA.

18

MoH

(with

in LG

U bo

unda

ries f

or p

ublic

he

alth

issu

es);

Plan

ning

W

ho p

lans

impl

emen

tatio

n?

Who

app

rove

s pla

ns?

PWA

in co

nsul

-ta

tion

with

st

akeh

olde

rs

(Sec

tor s

trat

egy)

LG

Us (t

hrou

gh

SDIP

s);

Utili

ties (

Loca

l St

rate

gies

)

Natio

nal C

omm

ittee

on

Sol

id W

aste

Man

-ag

emen

t (Na

tiona

l Pl

ans)

, MoL

G, LG

Us, &

JS

Cs (L

ocal

and

Dis-

trict

Pla

ns)

MoP

WH;

LGUs

; Hi

gher

Pla

nnin

g Co

uncil

; PEC

DAR

PENR

A Pl

anni

ng

Depa

rtm

ent

MoH

M

oEHE

; UNW

RA

Fina

ncin

g

Who

fina

nces

serv

ice p

rovi

-sio

n? W

ho is

resp

onsib

le fo

r bu

dget

ing

incl.

capi

tal i

n-ve

stm

ents

, wag

es, o

pera

-tio

n &

mai

nten

ance

.

MoF

P; P

WA

(Na-

tiona

l Bud

get-

ing)

; Se

rvice

Pro

vid-

ers (

loca

l bud

g-et

s);

LGU

and

JSC

user

fees

& n

et

lend

ing

subs

i-di

es (O

PEX)

; CA

PEX

≥ 76

% e

x-te

rnal

fina

ncin

g *O

PEX

& C

APEX

fund

ing

gap

in

was

te w

ater

(no

user

fees

)

LGU/

JSC

User

fees

(O

PEX)

; Ex

tern

al fi

nanc

ing

(CAP

EX)

MoF

P;

LGU

reso

urce

s (tr

ansp

orta

tion

tax;

pro

ject

s bu

dget

); Ex

tern

al F

inan

c-in

g (C

APEX

)

User

fees

; Ext

er-

nal S

ourc

es;

Clea

ranc

e re

ve-

nues

MoF

P; U

NWRA

; lo-

cal N

GOs;

priv

ate

sect

or se

rvice

pro

-vi

ders

; ext

erna

l so

urce

s

MoF

P; U

NWRA

; pr

ivat

e se

ctor

se

rvice

pro

vid-

ers;

exte

rnal

so

urce

s

Adm

inist

ratio

n

Who

adm

inist

ers t

he se

r-vi

ce?

This

inclu

des b

iddi

ng,

cont

ract

ing,

& d

aily

resp

on-

sibili

ties

LGU

wat

er d

e-pa

rtm

ents

; JSC

s; Se

rvice

pro

vid-

ers

LGUs

; JSC

s; M

oLG;

M

DLF

(on

beha

lf of

ex

tern

al fi

nanc

ing

- Ga

za)

MoP

WH;

LGU;

PE

CDAR

Pale

stin

ian

Elec

-tr

icity

Tra

nsm

is-sio

n Co

mpa

ny

Ltd

(onc

e th

ey

beco

me

oper

a-

MoH

; UNR

WA;

lo-

cal N

GOs;

priv

ate

sect

or se

rvice

pro

-vi

ders

;

MoE

HE; U

NWRA

THE

PERF

ORM

AN

CE O

F PA

LEST

INIA

N L

OCA

L G

OVE

RNM

ENTS

. AN

ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

SER

VICE

DEL

IVER

Y O

UTC

OM

ES A

ND

PER

FORM

AN

CE D

RIVE

RS IN

TH

E W

EST

BAN

K A

ND

GA

ZA.

16

Func

tion

Desc

riptio

n W

ater

&

Sew

age

Solid

Was

te

Road

s El

ectr

icity

He

alth

Ed

ucat

ion

Polic

y m

akin

g W

ho se

ts th

e m

ain

polic

y gu

idel

ines

?

Pale

stin

ian

Wa-

ter A

utho

rity

(PW

A)

MoL

G; E

nviro

nmen

t Q

ualit

y Au

thor

ity

(EQ

A); M

inist

ry o

f He

alth

(MOH

); Na

tiona

l Com

mitt

ee

on S

olid

Was

te M

an-

agem

ent (

in a

dditi

on

to th

e ab

ove

inclu

des:

MoF

P; P

WA;

Min

istry

of

Nat

iona

l Eco

nom

y (M

oNE)

; Min

istry

of

Educ

atio

n an

d Hi

gher

Ed

ucat

ion

Min

istry

of P

ublic

W

orks

and

Hou

s-in

g (M

oPW

H);

MoL

G (w

ithin

LG

U ju

risdi

ctio

n)

Pale

stin

ian

En-

ergy

and

Nat

ural

Re

sour

ces A

u-th

ority

(PEN

RA)

MoH

; Su

prem

e M

edica

l Co

uncil

MoE

HE; H

ighe

r Co

uncil

of E

duca

-tio

n

Legi

slatio

n W

hat a

re th

e ke

y le

gal p

a-ra

met

ers i

n th

e se

ctor

?

2014

Wat

er

Law

; 201

7−20

22

(SDP

); Lo

cal

Gove

rnm

ent A

ct

(LGA

) of 1

997;

JS

C By

law

201

6;

Tarif

f Reg

ula-

tions

Byl

aw

2013

; Uni

fied

Regu

latio

n fo

r W

ater

and

W

aste

wat

er T

ar-

iff a

nd C

onne

c-tio

n Se

rvice

s Fe

es 2

017

(dra

ft)

Loca

l Gov

ernm

ent A

ct

(LGA

) of 1

997;

En

viro

nmen

tal L

aw

No. (

7) o

f 199

9;

Publ

ic He

alth

Law

of

2004

; JS

C By

law

s 201

6;

Pale

stin

ian

Min

ister

ial

Cabi

net D

ecisi

ons N

o 53

(200

8), 4

9 (2

010)

, 50

(201

5), 1

08 (2

016)

, 15

0 (2

017)

; JS

C By

law

201

6;

Natio

nal S

olid

Was

te

Man

agem

ent B

i-Law

(d

raft)

;

Loca

l Gov

ern-

men

t Act

(LGA

) of

1997

; Dr

aft R

oad

Law

20

00;

Road

Tra

ffic L

aw

(No.

5)

Gene

ral E

lect

ric-

ity La

w 2

009;

Re-

new

able

Ene

rgy

and

Ener

gy E

ffi-

cienc

y (R

E&EE

) La

w 2

015

Coun

cil o

f Min

ster

s

Com

miss

ion

for

Deve

lopi

ng

Teac

hing

Pro

fes-

sion;

Ac

cred

itatio

n an

d Q

ualit

y As

-su

ranc

e Co

mm

is-sio

n fo

r Hig

her

Educ

atio

n


21

THE

PERF

ORM

AN

CE O

F PA

LEST

INIA

N L

OCA

L G

OVE

RNM

ENTS

. AN

ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

SER

VICE

DEL

IVER

Y O

UTC

OM

ES A

ND

PER

FORM

AN

CE D

RIVE

RS IN

TH

E W

EST

BAN

K A

ND

GA

ZA.

19

tiona

l); D

istrib

u-tio

n Co

mpa

nies

(D

ISCO

s)

Ope

ratio

n W

ho d

eliv

ers (

“pro

duce

s”)

the

serv

ice?

Publ

ic or

pri-

vate

ope

rato

rs, o

r a m

ix.

Publ

ic (L

GU/ J

SC

wat

er d

epar

t-m

ents

, util

ities

) Bu

lk S

uppl

y:

Wes

t Ban

k W

a-te

r Dep

artm

ent

purc

hase

d fro

m

Mek

orot

; LG

U w

ells

Publ

ic; p

rivat

e op

era-

tors

MoP

WH;

LGU;

Hi

red

Priv

ate

Cont

ract

ors (

con-

stru

ctio

n &

m

aint

enan

ce

wor

k)

Publ

ic (D

ISCO

s, LG

Us);

Priv

ate

(JDEC

O; G

PP)

MoH

; UNR

WA;

NG

Os;

Priv

ate

Sect

or

MoE

HE; U

NRW

A;

Priv

ate

Sect

or

Mon

itorin

g

Who

mon

itors

serv

ice d

eliv

-er

y in

cl. re

gula

r rep

ortin

g,

eval

uatio

n of

out

puts

, dat

a co

llect

ion,

stat

istics

, & co

n-su

mer

feed

back

mec

ha-

nism

s.

WSR

C

MoL

G (m

ainl

y Gr

iev-

ance

Red

ress

); M

oH a

nd E

QA

(Out

-sid

e LG

U ju

risdi

ctio

n);

JSCs

(with

in ju

risdi

c-tio

n);

LGUs

(with

in ju

risdi

c-tio

n)

MoP

WH;

MoL

G;

LGUs

PE

RC; i

ndiv

idua

l DI

SCO

s

MoF

P; U

NWRA

; NG

Os; P

rivat

e Se

c-to

r; Pa

lest

inia

n Ce

ntra

l Bur

eau

of

Stat

istics

(PCB

S w

ith M

oH re

gula

rly

cond

ucts

the

Na-

tiona

l Hea

lth A

c-co

unts

and

oth

er

natio

nal h

ealth

sur-

veys

); Pa

lest

inia

n Pu

blic

Heal

th In

sti-

tute

MOE

HE; N

a-tio

nal I

nstit

ute

for E

duca

tiona

l Tr

aini

ng; H

ighe

r Ed

ucat

ion

Inst

i-tu

tes;

UNW

RA;

PCBS

Tabl

e II-

1: O

verv

iew

of t

he C

urre

nt In

stitu

tiona

l Arr

ange

men

ts b

y Se

rvice

Sec

tor

THE

PERF

ORM

AN

CE O

F PA

LEST

INIA

N L

OCA

L G

OVE

RNM

ENTS

. AN

ASS

ESSM

ENT

OF

SER

VICE

DEL

IVER

Y O

UTC

OM

ES A

ND

PER

FORM

AN

CE D

RIVE

RS IN

TH

E W

EST

BAN

K A

ND

GA

ZA.

16

Func

tion

Desc

riptio

n W

ater

&

Sew

age

Solid

Was

te

Road

s El

ectr

icity

He

alth

Ed

ucat

ion

Polic

y m

akin

g W

ho se

ts th

e m

ain

polic

y gu

idel

ines

?

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22


20

31. IntheWestBank,two-fifthsofbulkwaterissuppliedfrominternalresources,largelyman-agedbytheWestBankWaterDepartment,andthree-fifthsispurchasedfromIsrael.11Bulkwaterpro-visionintheWestBankistheresponsibilityoftheWestBankWaterDepartment,whichmanageswellsandpurchaseswater fromthe Israelibulk supplier,Mekorot,anddistributesandsellsbulkwater toserviceproviders.InGaza,theCoastalWaterManagementUtilityoperatesasawaterprovidertothemunicipalitiesandasaprojectimplementer.Waterandsanitationretailserviceprovidersfallintosev-eralcategories.Thereareonlytwoformallyestablishedautonomous“utilities”:(i)theJerusalemWaterUndertakingprovideswaterservicestoEastJerusalemandsurroundingcommunities,andtomuchoftheRamallahandAlBirehGovernorates;and(ii)theWaterSupplyandSanitationAuthorityprovideswaterservicestotheBethlehemarea.Theothermainprovidersaredepartmentsofmunicipalities,VCs,andJSCs.ServicestosomerefugeecampsareprovidedbytheUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestine(UNRWA).InboththeWestBankandtoagreaterextentinGaza,thereisanactiveprivatesectorofwaterpurifyingplantsandprivatewatertankers.Involvementofcivilsocietyandtheservedpopulationisthroughcitizengroupsandindividualconsumerswhoengageonwaterissues,althoughinalimitedway.

32. Institutionalassignmentsforsolidwastemanagementinvolvebothcentralandlocalstake-holders.Themainactorsinthesolidwastesectoratthecentral level include:(i)theMoLG,whichisresponsiblefortheNationalSolidWasteManagementStrategyandregulatesandmonitorsLGUperfor-manceinthesector;(ii)theEnvironmentalQualityAuthority(EQA),overseeingenvironmentalprotec-tion and ensuring enforcement of environmental laws, primarily through licensing, regulations, andmonitoring solidwastemanagement facilities including land fill sites;and (iii) theMinistryofHealth(MoH),whichcoordinateswiththeEQAandMoLGtoregulatethedisposalofcertainwasteandtheclosureand/orrehabilitationofdumpsites.Alsoinvolvedatthecentrallevelinlegislation,policy,andstrategydevelopment istheNationalCommitteeforSolidWasteManagement,whichreportstotheCabinetofMinisters(CoM).ThisbodyincludesinadditiontotheMoLG,EQA,andMoH,theMoFP,andrecentlyaddedthePWA,MinistryofNationalEconomy(MoNE),andtheMinistryEducationandHigherEducation(MoEHE).TheCommitteehasrecentlypreparedanupdateddraftoftheSolidWasteMan-agementStrategyfor2017–2022,andadraftSolidWasteManagementBylawproposedforapprovaltotheCoMandpublicdisclosureinsummer2017.Wastemanagementatthelocallevel,includingcol-lection,transport,andfinaldisposal,isadministeredbybothLGUsandJSCswithintheirrespectiveju-risdictions.ExamplesincludetheJeninJSCfortheJeninandTubasGovernoratesandtheHebron-Beth-lehemHigherJSCforSolidWasteManagement.However,thereisagapbetweenwhatisproscribedinthepoliciesregardingassignedrolesandtasks,andwhatdefactotakesplace.Thenewdraftbylawwilladdresstheconflictingrolesandprovideclaritytotheinstitutionalandimplementationarrangementsforthestakeholdersinthesector.

33. Similarly,LGUssharemandatesintheroadsectorwithcentralauthorities.AtthecentralleveltheMinistryofPublicWorksandHousing(MoPWH)isresponsibleforthedevelopment,maintenance,andrehabilitationofthemainandregionalroadsoutsidethejurisdictionofmunicipalitiesandVCs.Atthelocallevel,municipalitiesandVCsareresponsiblefortheroadswithintheirimmediatejurisdiction(masterplans),which includesplanning,development,andmaintenanceof thenetwork. In theWestBank,theauthorityoftheseagenciesislimitedtothePAcontrolledareas(AreasAandB),whiletheGoIhasfulladministrativecontrolofAreaCincludingmanagementoftheroadnetwork,whichrepresentsabulkof theexistingroads.Currently, there isa limitedrole for theprivatesector inmanagingandinvestinginthepublicroadnetworkinthePalestinianterritories.



23


21

34. Theroadnetwork,whichisthemostimportantanddominantmodeoftransportinWestBankandGaza,facesnumerouschallenges.Thestudyfoundthatbetterroadsremainoneofthemostde-siredservicesinWestBank(47percent)andGaza(74percent).FurtherindicationroadsremainahighpriorityforPalestinianslivingintheWestBankandGaza,undertheMDP,whichpoolsfundingfromtheBank,internationaldonors,andthePA,1251percentofCycle1and71percentofCycle2fundingformunicipalitieswenttoroads13.Thesectorhoweverfacesinstitutional,fiscal,andexternalchallenges.The current institutional arrangements, with the responsibilities for road planning, construction,maintenance, and funding split betweenmultipleministries and agencies depending on the typeofwork,fundingsource,androadcategory,areconfusingandoverlapping.14Thesectorlacksacompre-hensiveRoadMasterplan,whichcouldstreamlinetheorganizationalmanagementofthemultiplepro-jectsbyassortedstakeholdersandfacilitatethecoordinationofmaintenanceactivities.Similartotheother core services, the sector also lacks the sufficient funds for executing necessary projects andmaintenance.Roadsrepresentthebiggestpubliccapitalasset,andthereisacompleterelianceonthepublicsectorforthedevelopmentofthenetwork,sincecommercialinfrastructurefinancingisnotuti-lized.Lastly,theroleofthegeo-politicalsituationcannotbeignored.TheGoIseverelyrestrictsthePal-estiniansability toupgraderoadsorconstructnewroutes inAreaCwithoutpreviousconsent,mostoftennotgiven.Thishas leftareascutoffwith limitedaccesstoservices(e.g.solidwastecollection,healthandeducationservices)andconstrainedaccesstootherareasoftheWestBank.ThesituationhasalsocreatedarelianceonthedonorcommunitytoupgraderoadsinAreaCasitiseasierforthemtoobtainIsraelipermissionfortheinfrastructureworkneeded.

2.2 Water and Waste Water

35. LackingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesforhouseholdsinGazaremainsakeychal-lenge.FigureII-3demonstratesthatacrossregionsinthePalestinianterritories,significantdifferencesinaccesstodrinkingwatersourcesconsideredimprovedbytheWHO/UNICEFJointMonitoringPro-grammeexist.15Following a sharp deteriorationof access towater services in all five governorates,mainlyduetoover-exploitationoftheCoastalAquifer,Gaza’sonly internalrenewablewatersource,only1percentofthehouseholdsinGazahasaccesstoanimproveddrinkingwatersource.TheWorldBank’s2017WASHPovertyDiagnosticfindsthatthemajorityofthe260municipalwellsintheGazastripdonotmeet thesaltandnitratemaximumthresholdssetby theWorldHealthOrganization (WHO),forcing97percentofthepopulationinGazatoacquiredrinkingwaterfromprivatetankertrucks.IntheWestBankincontrast,accesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesreaches94percent,withVCshavingslightlyhigheraccessrates(95percent)thanmunicipalities(93percent).However,whendefiningaccessascontinuousaccesswithoutinterruptionforafulldayduringtheprevioustwoweeks,accesstoim-proveddrinkingwaterdropsto81percent,mainlydrivenbylargedecreasesinJenin,Nablus,andHeb-ron.

12AprogramwhichpoolsfundingfromtheBank,internationaldonors,andthePAthatincentivizesthedevelopmentofmu-nicipalmanagementcapacitythroughperformance-basedgrantstomunicipalities.13MDLF.2016AnnualReport.14WorldBank.2007.WestBankandGazaTransportSectorStrategyNote.15Thefollowingdrinkingwatersourcesareconsideredimproved:Pipedwaterintodwelling,yard,orplot;publictaporstand-pipe;tubewellorborehole;protecteddugwell;protectedspring;rainwatercollection;bottledwater.


24


22

FigureII-3:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoImprovedDrinkingWater

36. AccesstopipedwateristhehighestinmunicipalitiesinthecentralWestBank.FigureII-4pro-videsanoverviewonspatialdifferencesinaccesstopipedwater,measuredattheLGUlevel.AccessratesarethehighestinLGUsinthecentralWestBank,withanaveragecoverageof99percent,andthelowestinthesouthWestBankandGaza,whereonaverage1outof10householdslacksaconnectiontoapipedwaternetwork.However,inneitherbetweentheWestBankandGaza,norbetweenregionswithintheWestBank,doestheoutcomegapexceed10percentagepoints.AcrossLGUsintheWestBank,accessratesareslightlyhigherinmunicipalities(94percent)thanVCs(92percent)butnoclearstructuralrelationshipbetweenLGUsizegroupandaccesstopipedwateremerges.

FigureII-4:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoPipedWater

1%

95%

93%

87%

98%

96%

VCs

Municipalities

South

Central

North

97%ofhouseholdsinGazarelyondrinkingwaterdeliveredbywatertanker-trucks

WestBank

Gaza

94%

North

99%

Central

90%

South

88%

Gaza

97%

91%

93%

Small

Medium

Large

Municipalities- WestBank

89%

94%

92%

Small

Medium

Large

VillageCouncils- WestBank


25


23

37. TheGazawatercrisisisfurtheraggravatedbythelackofregularenergysupply.Gazasuffersfromfrequentpowercutsandrationedsupplywhichonlyprovidesaround8hoursofelectricityperdaytocitizens.However,thelackofcoordinationbetweenelectricityandwaterdistributionschedulefur-theraffectshouseholdwatersupplyinadditiontoelectricityrestrictionsaffectingtheoperationofwellsthatfeedthepipednetwork.MostofFGDparticipantsinGazacomplainedbecausethey“donotreceivewaterandelectricityatthesametime”16orbecauseofwhatsomecitizenscalled“thelackofcoordina-tionbetween‘watersupplyschedule’andthe‘provisionofelectricityschedule.’”AFDGparticipantfromGazaexplainedwhythismatterstoalargenumberofGazaresidents:“Peopleneedelectricitytooperatetheirwaterpumpsandstorewaterintankslocatedontheirroofs.However,theycannotdothiswhentheyhavewaterwithouthavingelectricity.Sometimes,peoplestayupatnightwaitingforelectricitytobeabletofilltheirtanks…”ThesefindingsareconfirmedbythemayorofGazaCitywhoexplainedthereisa“difficultyofoperatingsomewaterwellsduetopoweroutages.”

38. SatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwaterishigherinthenorthandcentralthaninthesouthWestBankandGaza,anddiffersnotablywithLGUsize.FigureII-5providesanover-viewonspatialdifferencesinsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwater,conditionalonbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork.InthenorthandcentralWestBank,onaverage2outof3citizensaresatisfiedorverysatisfiedwithpipedwaterqualityandreliability,comparedtoonlyhalfofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBank.SatisfactionratesarethelowestinGaza,whereonly36percentofhouseholdsstatetheyaresatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityoftheirpipedwaterconnection.BothacrossmunicipalitiesandVCsintheWestBank,satisfactionisthehighestinsmallLGUs.

FigureII-5:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:PipedWater

39. Qualitativeanalysisunderlinessurveyfindingsthatdespitehighconnectionratestothewaternetwork,watershortagesandqualityremaincriticalchallenges.MostaffectedisthesouthernWest

16QuotesthroughoutthereportarefromKeyInformantInterviews(KIIs)andFocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs),andaretrans-latedfromArabic.SeeAnnex2foradetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyandanoverviewofthequotesusedinthisre-port.Araj,Bader.2017.QualitativeResearchReportFocusGroupDiscussionsandKeyInformantInterviews.

44%

South

60%

Central

36%

Gaza

58%

North

58%

41%

52%

Small

Medium

Large


62%

61%

47%

Small

Medium

Large



26


24

Bank(e.g.Hebron,BethlehemandBeitSahour)wheresomeresidentsreportreceivingpipedwater,onaverage,onceeverythreeweeks.Incomparison,thepoorqualityofwateristhemostchallengingissueinGaza,becauseofthe lackoffreshwateravailablefromtheoverdrawncoastalaquiferand limitedwastewatertreatmentcapacitycausingfurtherpollutionfrominfiltrationofuntreatedsewage.Inad-dition,mostLGUsintheWestBankandGazasuffersignificantwater-lossesfromoldleakingwaternet-worksthatrequireexpensivemaintenanceandrenewal.

40. AthirdofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankandinGazareportadeteriorationinthequalityofpipedwaterduringthelast3years.FigureII-6demonstratesthatwhilethemajorityofhouse-holdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterritoriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofpipedsew-ageservices,qualityinthesouthWestBankandinGazadeterioratedforathirdofthepopulation.Incontrast,44percentofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankand43percentinthecentralWestBankreportanimprovementduringthelast3years.Incontrasttothesewageandsolidwastesector,servicequalityimprovedinsmallerVCsandmunicipalitiesintheWestBank,relativetolargerLGUs.InsmallmunicipalitiesandVCs,only1outof5and1outof8householdsreportadeterioration,respectively,comparedto1outof3inlargemunicipalities,and1outof4inlargeVCs.

FigureII-6:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofPipedWaterinLast3Years

41. ThevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritorieshaveaccesstoanunsharedim-provedsanitationfacility.FigureII-7illustratesthataccesstoimprovedunsharedsanitationfacilitiesasdefinedbytheWHO/UNICEFJointMonitoringProgramexceeds90percentinallregionsofthePales-tinianterritories.17With99percentand97percentcoverage,accesstoimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisuniversalinGazaandinthesouthWestBank,respectively.InthenorthandcentralwestBank,92per-centofhouseholdsarecoveredbyanimprovedsanitationfacility.IntheWestBank,accessratesarehigherinmunicipalities(95percent)thaninVCs(88percent).

17Thefollowingtypesofsanitationfacilitiesareconsideredimproved:flushorpour-flushtopipedsewagesystem,septictank,orpitlatrine;ventilatedimprovedpitlatrine(VIP);pitlatrinewithslab;compostingtoilet.Allsanitationfacilitiesthataresharedwithindividualsnotbelongingtotheownhouseholdareconsideredunimproved.

19

35

32

52

40

43

29

26

25

Small

Medium

Large


12

15

25

59

55

50

28

29

25

Small

Medium

Large

VCs- WestBank

20

18

32

36

56

52

38

52

27

43

44

24

NorthWestBank

CentralWestBank

SouthWestBank

Gaza

Regions

Deteriorated NoChange Improved


24

Bank(e.g.Hebron,BethlehemandBeitSahour)wheresomeresidentsreportreceivingpipedwater,onaverage,onceeverythreeweeks.Incomparison,thepoorqualityofwateristhemostchallengingissueinGaza,becauseofthe lackoffreshwateravailablefromtheoverdrawncoastalaquiferand limitedwastewatertreatmentcapacitycausingfurtherpollutionfrominfiltrationofuntreatedsewage.Inad-dition,mostLGUsintheWestBankandGazasuffersignificantwater-lossesfromoldleakingwaternet-worksthatrequireexpensivemaintenanceandrenewal.

40. AthirdofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankandinGazareportadeteriorationinthequalityofpipedwaterduringthelast3years.FigureII-6demonstratesthatwhilethemajorityofhouse-holdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterritoriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofpipedsew-ageservices,qualityinthesouthWestBankandinGazadeterioratedforathirdofthepopulation.Incontrast,44percentofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBankand43percentinthecentralWestBankreportanimprovementduringthelast3years.Incontrasttothesewageandsolidwastesector,servicequalityimprovedinsmallerVCsandmunicipalitiesintheWestBank,relativetolargerLGUs.InsmallmunicipalitiesandVCs,only1outof5and1outof8householdsreportadeterioration,respectively,comparedto1outof3inlargemunicipalities,and1outof4inlargeVCs.

FigureII-6:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofPipedWaterinLast3Years

41. ThevastmajorityofhouseholdsinthePalestinianterritorieshaveaccesstoanunsharedim-provedsanitationfacility.FigureII-7illustratesthataccesstoimprovedunsharedsanitationfacilitiesasdefinedbytheWHO/UNICEFJointMonitoringProgramexceeds90percentinallregionsofthePales-tinianterritories.17With99percentand97percentcoverage,accesstoimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisuniversalinGazaandinthesouthWestBank,respectively.InthenorthandcentralwestBank,92per-centofhouseholdsarecoveredbyanimprovedsanitationfacility.IntheWestBank,accessratesarehigherinmunicipalities(95percent)thaninVCs(88percent).

17Thefollowingtypesofsanitationfacilitiesareconsideredimproved:flushorpour-flushtopipedsewagesystem,septictank,orpitlatrine;ventilatedimprovedpitlatrine(VIP);pitlatrinewithslab;compostingtoilet.Allsanitationfacilitiesthataresharedwithindividualsnotbelongingtotheownhouseholdareconsideredunimproved.

19

35

32

52

40

43

29

26

25

Small

Medium

Large


12

15

25

59

55

50

28

29

25

Small

Medium

Large

VCs- WestBank

20

18

32

36

56

52

38

52

27

43

44

24

NorthWestBank

CentralWestBank

SouthWestBank

Gaza

Regions



23

37. TheGazawatercrisisisfurtheraggravatedbythelackofregularenergysupply.Gazasuffersfromfrequentpowercutsandrationedsupplywhichonlyprovidesaround8hoursofelectricityperdaytocitizens.However,thelackofcoordinationbetweenelectricityandwaterdistributionschedulefur-theraffectshouseholdwatersupplyinadditiontoelectricityrestrictionsaffectingtheoperationofwellsthatfeedthepipednetwork.MostofFGDparticipantsinGazacomplainedbecausethey“donotreceivewaterandelectricityatthesametime”16orbecauseofwhatsomecitizenscalled“thelackofcoordina-tionbetween‘watersupplyschedule’andthe‘provisionofelectricityschedule.’”AFDGparticipantfromGazaexplainedwhythismatterstoalargenumberofGazaresidents:“Peopleneedelectricitytooperatetheirwaterpumpsandstorewaterintankslocatedontheirroofs.However,theycannotdothiswhentheyhavewaterwithouthavingelectricity.Sometimes,peoplestayupatnightwaitingforelectricitytobeabletofilltheirtanks…”ThesefindingsareconfirmedbythemayorofGazaCitywhoexplainedthereisa“difficultyofoperatingsomewaterwellsduetopoweroutages.”

38. SatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwaterishigherinthenorthandcentralthaninthesouthWestBankandGaza,anddiffersnotablywithLGUsize.FigureII-5providesanover-viewonspatialdifferencesinsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedwater,conditionalonbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetwork.InthenorthandcentralWestBank,onaverage2outof3citizensaresatisfiedorverysatisfiedwithpipedwaterqualityandreliability,comparedtoonlyhalfofthehouseholdsinthesouthWestBank.SatisfactionratesarethelowestinGaza,whereonly36percentofhouseholdsstatetheyaresatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityoftheirpipedwaterconnection.BothacrossmunicipalitiesandVCsintheWestBank,satisfactionisthehighestinsmallLGUs.

FigureII-5:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:PipedWater

39. Qualitativeanalysisunderlinessurveyfindingsthatdespitehighconnectionratestothewaternetwork,watershortagesandqualityremaincriticalchallenges.MostaffectedisthesouthernWest

16QuotesthroughoutthereportarefromKeyInformantInterviews(KIIs)andFocusGroupDiscussions(FGDs),andaretrans-latedfromArabic.SeeAnnex2foradetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyandanoverviewofthequotesusedinthisre-port.Araj,Bader.2017.QualitativeResearchReportFocusGroupDiscussionsandKeyInformantInterviews.

44%

South

60%

Central

36%

Gaza

58%

North

58%

41%

52%

Small

Medium

Large


62%

61%

47%

Small

Medium

Large



27


25

FigureII-7:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoImprovedSanitationFacilities

42. Whilecoveragewithimprovedsanitationfacilitiesisalmostuniversal,pipedsewagecoverageis low, differing significantly by LGU type and size, and is notably higher in Gaza. Fig-ureII-8demonstratesthesharpcontrasttothedistributionofpipedsewagecoverage.77percentofthehouseholdsinGazaandonly30percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankareconnectedtoapipedsewagenetwork.Drivenbyhighaccessinitslargecities,GazaclearlyoutperformstheWestBank:inthefivelargestcitiesinGaza,accessratesreach93percent,comparedtojust76percentinthefivelargestcitiesintheWestBank.AcrossthethreeregionsoftheWestBank,onaverageslightlylessthanathirdofcitizenshaveaccesstopipedsewage,withaccessratesdifferingnotablybyLGUtypeandsize.ThebestperformingLGUsarelargemunicipalitieswithaccessratesover70percent,whileinVCs,lessthan1outof10citizensisconnectedtopipedsewagesystem.

FigureII-8:GeographyofServiceProvision:AccesstoPipedSewage

99%

88%

95%

97%

92%

92%

VCs

Municipalities

South

Central

NorthWestBank

Gaza

96%ofPalestinianhouseholdshaveaccesstoanimprovedsanitationfacility

30%

Central

30%

North

29%

South

77%

Gaza

21%

36%

77%

Small

Medium

Large


1%

8%

8%

Small

Medium

Large



28


26

InthesmallestLGUsizegroup,VCswithlessthan1,000inhabitants,pipedsewageisvirtuallynotavail-able.ThemunicipalitiesintheWestBankwherepipedsewageispredominantlyonlyavailableincludeNablus,Qalqiliya,Salfit,Ramallah,Bethlehem,andHebron,ascanbeseeninFigureII-8

43. Amonghouseholdsthathaveaccesstoapipedsewagesystem,satisfactionisthehighestinthenorthandsouthWestBank.FigureII-9showsthegeographicalvariationofsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedsewageservicesforhouseholdsthatareconnectedtothesewagenet-work.SatisfactionishigheramongcitizensintheWestBank(86percent)thaninGaza(79percent)andthehighestinthesouthWestBank(89percent).Amaindeterminantofsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedsewageisthereliabilityofsewagepipes:whileofthehouseholdsthatdonotexperi-enceanoverflowingorcloggedpipeonaregularbasis,state91percenttobesatisfiedwithpipedsew-agequality;only17percentofthehouseholdsthatexperienceanoverfloworclogofsewagepipesatleastoncepermonthreporttobesatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityofsewageservices.

FigureII-9:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:PipedSewage

44. ThebroadmajorityofthehouseholdsintheWestBankandGazareportsanimprovementornochangeinthequalityofpipedsewageservicesinthelast3years.FigureII-10demonstratesthatthevastmajorityofhouseholdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterritoriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofpipedsewageservices.InthesouthWestBank,morethan4outof10householdsreportanimprovement,whileonly1outof4householdsinboththenorthWestBankandinGazaexperiencedan improvement.Compared to theoutcomes forpipedwater and solidwaste collection,only smallsharesofhouseholdsreportadeteriorationforpipedsewageservices.AcrossLGUs,householdsreporthigherratesofimprovementinmunicipalities(30percent)thaninVCs(29percent),andinlargerLGUs.

89%

South

79%

Gaza 82%

Central

86%

North

86%

84%

87%

Small

Medium

Large


88%

74%

Medium

Large



29


27

FigureII-10:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofPipedSewageinLast3Years

45. Comparingtrends inwaterandsanitationacrosscountries, thePalestinianterritorieshaveseenasubstantialdeclineinaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatersourcesinthetenyearsleadingupto2015. Through theWorldBank’sWorldDevelopment Indicators (WDI), informationonaccess to im-proveddrinkingwaterandsanitationispresentedbelowinFigureII-11andFigureII-12,respectively.TheserviceaccessratesforthePalestinianterritorieswerecomparedtotheneighboringcountriesofJordanandLebanonaswellastoregionalaveragesincludingforfragileandconflict-affectedsituations(FCS).Countriesofsimilarstructuralcharacteristicsincludingsize,geographicallocation,landlockedna-ture,havinglowlaborforceparticipationrates,andahighdependencyonaidandremittanceswerealsoconsidered.

FigureII-11:AccesstoImprovedDrinkingWaterSources(%ofPopulationwithAccess)

a. Selectedpeersbycountry b. Byregionexcludinghighincome

Source:WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsasofMarch15,2017.Note:Countrieswereselectedbyneighboringlocationandbywhichhavesimilarstructuralcharacteristicssuchassize,geographicallocation,landlocked,andhavinglowlaborforceparticipationratesinadditiontoahighdepend-encyonaidandremittances.Regionsexcludehigh-incomecountries.

404550556065707580859095

100

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Jordan LebanonBosniaandHerzegovina HaitiMali MoldovaPalestine

404550556065707580859095

100

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

EastAsia&PacificEurope&CentralAsiaLatinAmerica&CaribbeanMiddleEast&NorthAfricaSub-SaharanAfricaFragileandconflictaffectedsituations

4

8

5

77

62

59

29

26

25

Small

Medium

Large


0

5

2

100

73

80

28

29

25

Small

Medium

Large

VCs- WestBank

4

7

5

13

76

66

53

72

27

43

44

24

NorthWestBank

CentralWestBank

SouthWestBank

Gaza

Regions



30


28

AccordingtotheWDI’slatestfigures,thepercentofthepopulationwithaccesstoimproveddrinkingwaterhasdeclinedfrom78.2percentin2005toonly58.4percentwithaccessin2015.Thisissignifi-cantlymuchlowerthanforLebanon(99percent)andJordan(96.9percent),andtheregion(92.6per-centexcludinghighincomecountries).Therateisalsolowerthanthe67.8percentaverageforFCS.Thisispredominantlyattributable to thedeterioratingqualityofurbanwatersupply inGaza.18While theLGPAsurveyfoundhigheraccessratestopipedwater,accesstodrinkingwaterremainssignificantlylowforthePalestinianterritories.

46. Incontrast,access to improvedsanitation facilities in thePalestinian territorieshasslowlybeenontherise.TheWDInumbersindicatethatthepopulation’saccesstoimprovedsanitationhasincreasedfromalreadyhighnumbersto92.3percentby2015,10percentagepointshigherthanLeba-non(80.7percent)andclosertoJordanianaccessrates(98.6percent).ThisisverysimilartotheLGPA’sfindingthat96%ofPalestinianhouseholdshaveaccesstoanimprovedsanitationfacility.Accessratesin thePalestinian territoriesare significantlyhigher than theFCSaverage (43.5percent)andslightlyhigherthantheaveragefortheregion(89.6percent).

FigureII-12:AccesstoImprovedSanitationFacilities(%ofPopulationwithAccess)

a. Selectedpeersbycountry b. Byregionexcludinghighincome

Source:WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsasofMarch15,2017.Note:Countrieswereselectedbyneighboringlocationandbywhichhavesimilarstructuralcharacteristicssuchassize,geographicallocation,landlocked,andhavinglowlaborforceparticipationratesinadditiontoahighdepend-encyonaidandremittances.Regionsexcludehigh-incomecountries.


20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Jordan LebanonBosniaandHerzegovina HaitiMali MoldovaPalestine

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

EastAsia&PacificEurope&CentralAsiaLatinAmerica&CaribbeanMiddleEast&NorthAfricaSub-SaharanAfricaFragileandconflictaffectedsituations


31


29

2.3 Solid Waste Management

47. AvailabilityofsolidwastecollectionservicesishigherinlargerLGUsandthehighestinthenorthWestBank.FigureII-13showsthegeographicaldistributionoftheavailabilityofsolidwastecol-lectionservicesattheLGUlevel.WhileintheWestBank,over90percentofhouseholdsarecoveredbyawastecollectionservice,almost1outof5householdsinGazaisnotcovered(17percent).IntheWestBank,nearly100percentofhouseholdsinmunicipalities,and90percentofhouseholdsinmediumandlargeVCshaveaccesstowastecollectionservices.InsmallVCshowever,oneoutoffourhouseholdsstilllacksaccesstoanyformofwastecollectionservice.Thereisanoticeablecorrelationbetweenlowaccesstosolidwastecollectionandlowaccesstopavedlocalroads,particularlyinthesouthernWestBankandareasinGaza.Itwouldbedifficultforsolidwastecollectiontruckstoaccessareaswithoutpavedroads,whichhighlightsagaintheinterdependenceofthecoreservicesandthecoordinationneededfortheirprovision.

FigureII-13:GeographyofServiceProvision:SolidWasteCollection

48. SatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservicesislowinthenorthWestBankandinsmallLGUs.InGaza,andintheCentralandsouthWestBank,2outof3householdsaresatisfiedwithwastecollectionservices,comparedtoonlyeverysecondhouseholdinthenorthWestBank.TheseresultsaremainlydrivenbydifferingfrequenciesofsolidwastecollectionacrossregionsandLGUsizegroups:inWestBankVCssolidwasteiscollectedlessthan2timesperweek,comparedto4timesinmunicipalitiesintheWestBankand5timesformunicipalitiesinGaza.

93%

South

97%

98%

98%

Small

Medium

Large


95%

Central

98%

North

83%

Gaza

74%

92%

87%

Small

Medium

Large



32


30

FigureII-14:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:SolidWasteCollection

49. Onaverage,morethanathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBank,andafourthofthehouse-holdsinGazaexperiencedanimprovementinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservicesinthelast3years.FigureII-15demonstratesthatthemajorityofhouseholdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterri-toriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileinthenorthWestBankandinGaza,only1outof4householdsreportsanimprovement,aclearlylargershareofhouseholdsexperiencedanimprovementinthecentralWestBank(43percent)andinthesouthWestBank(44percent).

FigureII-15:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofSolidWasteCollectioninlast3Years

Theshareofhouseholdsthatexperiencesadeteriorationinservicequalityrangesfrom13percentinthecentralWestBankto18and19percentinGazaandthenorthWestBank,respectively.AcrossLGUs,

65%

South

54%

North

69%

Central

70%

Gaza

59%

69%

70%

Small

Medium

Large


57%

50%

49%

Small

Medium

Large

VillageCouncils

17

14

18

50

40

40

34

47

43

Small

Medium

Large


14

19

20

59

51

54

27

31

26

Small

Medium

Large

VCs- WestBank

19

13

17

18

54

44

40

58

27

43

44

24

NorthWestBank

CentralWestBank

SouthWestBank

Gaza

Regions



33


31

householdsreporthigherratesofimprovementinmunicipalities(39percent)thaninVCs(29percent),andinlargerLGUs.

2.4 Local Roads

50. AccesstopavedlocalroadsistwiceashighintheWestBankthaninGaza.IntheWestBank,9outof10householdsarelocatedbyapavedroad,whilelessthanhalfofthehouseholdsinGazahavedirectaccesstopavedroads.Asaconsequence,almostthreequartersof thecitizens inGazadesirebetterroads.Accesstopavedroads is26percenthigher inmunicipalitiesthanVCs,withthehighestpercentageofaccessfoundinthecentralWestBank.Resultsalsoindicatedconcernswiththeopera-tionsandmaintenanceofexistingroads.

FigureII-16:GeographyofServiceProvision:PavedRoads

Overhalfofthehouseholds(60percent)reportthattheyarenotsatisfiedwiththeconditionsofroadsoutsidestheirhouses.ThenumberissignificantlyhigherinGaza,whereonlyaquarterofhouseholdsreportsatisfaction.IntheWestBank49percentreporttobesatisfiedwithroads,withmorehouseholdsinmunicipalities(40percent)reportingsatisfactionthaninVCs(34percent).HalfofthehouseholdsinGazareportthattheroadoutsidetheirhousecannotbeusedduringheavyrainforwalkinganddriving,andoneoutof threehouseholdssurveyed inGazamentiondrainageduringrainasoneof themainproblemswithroadsintheircommunities.IntheWestBankincontrast,only1outof4householdsdonothaveaccesstoaroadwhichcanbeusedevenduringheavyrain,andonly1outof5householdsmentiondrainageduringrainasamainproblemwithlocalroads.ThepoorsituationforroadsinGazawasexacerbatedbythesignificantdamagetoinfrastructureduringthe2014GazaWar.

51. DespitetheprovisionofroadsbeingasharedservicebetweencentralgovernmentandLGUs,thereremainanumberofroadissuesinadditiontoinfrastructurewhichLGUsareresponsiblefor.HouseholdsinboththeWestBankandGazareportno/irregularstreetcleaningasthemostimportant

83%

South

88%

88%

91%

Small

Medium

Large


76%

85%

79%

Small

Medium

Large


46%

Gaza 92%

Central

87%

North


30

FigureII-14:SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability:SolidWasteCollection

49. Onaverage,morethanathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBank,andafourthofthehouse-holdsinGazaexperiencedanimprovementinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservicesinthelast3years.FigureII-15demonstratesthatthemajorityofhouseholdsacrossLGUsinthePalestinianterri-toriesdidnotexperienceachangeinthequalityofsolidwastecollectionservices.WhileinthenorthWestBankandinGaza,only1outof4householdsreportsanimprovement,aclearlylargershareofhouseholdsexperiencedanimprovementinthecentralWestBank(43percent)andinthesouthWestBank(44percent).

FigureII-15:TrendsinServiceDelivery:ChangeinQualityofSolidWasteCollectioninlast3Years

Theshareofhouseholdsthatexperiencesadeteriorationinservicequalityrangesfrom13percentinthecentralWestBankto18and19percentinGazaandthenorthWestBank,respectively.AcrossLGUs,

65%

South

54%

North

69%

Central

70%

Gaza

59%

69%

70%

Small

Medium

Large


57%

50%

49%

Small

Medium

Large

VillageCouncils

17

14

18

50

40

40

34

47

43

Small

Medium

Large


14

19

20

59

51

54

27

31

26

Small

Medium

Large

VCs- WestBank

19

13

17

18

54

44

40

58

27

43

44

24

NorthWestBank

CentralWestBank

SouthWestBank

Gaza

Regions

Deteriorated NoChange ImprovedTHE PERFORMANCE OF PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. AN ASSESSMENT OF

SERVICE DELIVERY OUTCOMES AND PERFORMANCE DRIVERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

34


31

householdsreporthigherratesofimprovementinmunicipalities(39percent)thaninVCs(29percent),andinlargerLGUs.

2.4 Local Roads

50. AccesstopavedlocalroadsistwiceashighintheWestBankthaninGaza.IntheWestBank,9outof10householdsarelocatedbyapavedroad,whilelessthanhalfofthehouseholdsinGazahavedirectaccesstopavedroads.Asaconsequence,almostthreequartersof thecitizens inGazadesirebetterroads.Accesstopavedroads is26percenthigher inmunicipalitiesthanVCs,withthehighestpercentageofaccessfoundinthecentralWestBank.Resultsalsoindicatedconcernswiththeopera-tionsandmaintenanceofexistingroads.

FigureII-16:GeographyofServiceProvision:PavedRoads

Overhalfofthehouseholds(60percent)reportthattheyarenotsatisfiedwiththeconditionsofroadsoutsidestheirhouses.ThenumberissignificantlyhigherinGaza,whereonlyaquarterofhouseholdsreportsatisfaction.IntheWestBank49percentreporttobesatisfiedwithroads,withmorehouseholdsinmunicipalities(40percent)reportingsatisfactionthaninVCs(34percent).HalfofthehouseholdsinGazareportthattheroadoutsidetheirhousecannotbeusedduringheavyrainforwalkinganddriving,andoneoutof threehouseholdssurveyed inGazamentiondrainageduringrainasoneof themainproblemswithroadsintheircommunities.IntheWestBankincontrast,only1outof4householdsdonothaveaccesstoaroadwhichcanbeusedevenduringheavyrain,andonly1outof5householdsmentiondrainageduringrainasamainproblemwithlocalroads.ThepoorsituationforroadsinGazawasexacerbatedbythesignificantdamagetoinfrastructureduringthe2014GazaWar.

51. DespitetheprovisionofroadsbeingasharedservicebetweencentralgovernmentandLGUs,thereremainanumberofroadissuesinadditiontoinfrastructurewhichLGUsareresponsiblefor.HouseholdsinboththeWestBankandGazareportno/irregularstreetcleaningasthemostimportant

83%

South

88%

88%

91%

Small

Medium

Large


76%

85%

79%

Small

Medium

Large


46%

Gaza 92%

Central

87%

North


32

problemwithroadsintheircommunity.However,attheLGUlevel,VCs(22percent)reportthatpot-holes/badroadsurfaceasthemostimportantissueoverno/irregularstreetcleaning(20percent).BothcategoriesfallunderthemandatesoftheLGUstoaddress.Accesstostreetlightsishigh(71percent)butagainsimilartopavedroadaccess,thereisalargegapbetweentheWestBankandGaza.Only51per-centofhouseholdsinGazareportthattheroadoutsidetheirhousehasfunctioningstreetlights,com-paredto84percentintheWestBank.AhigherpercentageofhouseholdsinVCs(79percent)reporttheroadhadfunctioningstreetlightstothaninmunicipalities(71percent),withthenorthWestBankre-portingthehighestpresenceofstreetlights(87percent).


35


33

1920212223

19 This is a policy remaining and adopted from the British Mandate for Palestine’s Regional Master Planning Schemes of 1942 Jerusalem District RJ/5 and Samaria District 1945 S15. 20 Source: GeoMOLG 21 This excludes portions within Area C for which Israel has full control of security matters and all land-related civil administra-tion, including land allocation, planning and construction, and infrastructure. 22 There are also situations in which people build without permits in these areas and then pay a building fine post-construc-tion. 23 Palestinian Authority. 1994. Town, Village and Building Planning Law, No. 79, 1966.

Rapid urban growth is putting substantial pressures on service delivery systems. The Pal-estinian territories are facing rapid urbanization and spatially concentrated development with limited space to expand. Already today, 74 percent of the West Bank and Gaza is con-sidered urban. Frequently, spatial expansion outpaces administrative growth and capacities, coupled with incomplete and outdated local government laws, regulations, and systems. Building often precedes planning and service delivery, resulting in inefficient land use and infrastructure development.

LGUs are mandated to provide services within their masterplan boundaries, however there remain built-up areas requiring core services outside the boundaries. LGU adminis-trative boundaries (city limits) govern the expanse LGUs are responsible to provide services to, and these correspond with the approved masterplan borders.19 However, in most cases the LGU masterplan boundaries do not cover the full land area of the LGU, nor do they align and link with neighboring LGU masterplans as is typically standard for municipal demarca-tion. These boundaries also differ from the electoral boundaries which encompass further districts than the masterplans. This has resulted in sizeable in-between areas or spaces of exception across the West Bank, totaling 1,225.65 km2 (22.44 percent).20 The lands of these in-between areas, originally designated as “green” or for agricultural use, are associated with certain municipal or village lands, but do not fall within the LGU masterplans. There-fore, they do not come under the jurisdiction of the LGUs who in turn are not responsible to provide services to the areas.

Much of the land outside the masterplans was designated as green or agricultural use, however they are increasingly being used for multi-purpose use. According to the Town, Village and Building Planning Law, No. 79, 1966, since these areas were originally considered green land or for agricultural use, only agricultural buildings and roads were allowed. Ser-vices for the areas come under the administrative authority of the assorted PA line ministry departments or directorate offices – MoLG, MoPWH, PWA’s West Banks Water Depart-ment, and the EQA.21 In practice however, these locations are now going through more ex-panded development with building permits provided by the MoLG Directorate Offices.22 The core services should be connected to the closest LGU by the corresponding line ministry.23 The sites vary in levels of built environment. Some may be indistinguishable from city cen-ters which have built out to them, but as more often is the case, most of the land tends to be located on LGU peripheries. Additionally, regional planning is weak in Palestine; if the corresponding line ministries have regional plans including these spaces, which many do not, they are not developed or detailed for residential and mixed land-use.

Box II-1: Spaces of Exception


36


34

24

24 As reported by the PWA.

Due to the lack of affordable centrally located urban land particularly in Area A, citizens of urban centers are opting to build in the peripheries of major urban centers. Much of the unbuilt and unplanned areas where expansion is taking place falls within the in-between spaces; however, line ministries and LGUs do not have the financial capacities nor invest-ment interest to provide off-site infrastructure to the areas. Citizens or private developers building in the unplanned peripheries cover the burden of installing the needed offsite in-frastructure and coordinate with line ministries and LGUs to connect to the main service lines. Despite the regulation requiring connection to the closest LGU, the process is in actu-ality done at the discretion of the individual citizens or private developers, and has resulted in service provision by different LGUs to one neighborhood and in extreme cases to the same home. This happens for various reasons, including: (i) interest in connecting to the more prominent LGU, which is perceived as providing more reliable services; (ii) weak ser-vice availability at the closest LGU requiring the service provision to be connected to another LGU or shared by multiple LGUs24; and (iii) interest by an LGU to increase its user fee reve-nue. Examples can be seen in: (i) the new neighborhoods between the Nablus Municipality and the VC of ‘Iraq Burin; (ii) the land area between Beit Kahil VC, Hebron Municipality, and Taffuh Municipality; and (iii) Al Rehan neighborhood between Ramallah Municipality and Surda-Abu Qash Municipality.

Despite some LGUs interested in increasing their user base, many are forced to respond to expanding peripheries and unplanned built-up areas with costly ad hoc service and in-frastructure provision as well as post-construction, de facto planning within outdated masterplans. Some see the provision of services to spaces beyond their masterplan bound-aries and mandate, as additional burdens to over utilized, under capacitated services. Also, LGUs, which provide the services, may not benefit from the property tax of these residents if they are on another LGU’s land. This further adds to municipal resource constraints, espe-cially for smaller LGUs with very limited financial sources.

Masterplan boundaries are hindered from sorely needed extensions due to Area C re-strictions. A significant lag in the extension of the masterplan boundaries is compounding the situation. Most require coordination and approval from the Israeli Civil Administration, and LGUs wait years for approval to expand, and if given, it is often lacking the needed ex-tent. This is because the majority of proposed municipal and VC expansions partially include Area C. It is very difficult for urban centers to proceed with natural expansion, since most are partially or entirely surrounded by it with a significant portion of unbuilt lands located there.

The PA can take steps to improve coordination and sectoral policies at the central level to address the spaces beyond masterplan boundaries. The situation will become increasingly problematic for the future, as the population continues to grow with limited available space and the geopolitical spatial divides of the West Bank remain unresolved. However, there are steps the PA can take to improve the situation. At the central level, the NPA that provides two- to five-year sector strategies and policies should have coordination and alignment with the National Spatial Plan (NSP). At this stage the NSP only provides an environmental pro-tection layer, and does not link with the existing built-up areas or infrastructure networks


37


35

25

25 Formerly known as the National Development Plan, the National Policy Agenda was presented in 2016 as the follow-up to the NDPs of previous years.

at the local or regional scales. Additionally, while the NPA is regularly updated25, the NSP does not have a defined timeframe for development. This is a setback for short- to long-term development planning. Without an NSP in place, it becomes challenging to spatially analyze national sector policies holistically and their implications on the ground. Equally important is the need for clearly defined policy on the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential and mixed-use, which should take place at the central level in line with long-term strategic plans.

Regional and local level policies and procedures could be put in place to address the situation. Line ministry coordination and regional planning also play an important role in addressing the development of these transitional areas. There is no institutional structure to manage and implement regional development plans (RDPs), which could govern the lands outside of LGU masterplans. Additionally, there are conflicting and unclear man-dates for the line ministries, their regional offices, and the governorates. This vacuum has allowed for the irregular, ad hoc service delivery for these places. A clear cross-sectoral joint policy to govern regional development of these spaces needs to be agreed on by the PA. At the local level, a service delivery provision plan agreed upon or certified by the line ministries, and surrounding LGUs and JSCs, should be a prerequisite for the issuance of building permits in these locations. Until such a system and policy can be put in place, the MoLG Directorate offices should involve concerned LGUs and JSCs in the current permit-ting process. A joint committee of the involved LG stakeholders should predetermine the optimal course of service provision before approving building permits within these transi-tional areas.


38


36

2.5 Socio-Demographics of Service Provision

52. Accesstocoreservicesislowerforthebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution,particu-larlyintheWestBank.Forthepovertyanalysis,awealthindexbasedon10durableassetswascon-structedtoidentifythebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution.Toaccountforthedivergentdis-tributionofassets,andtoallowforaclearidentificationofthebottom40percent,twoseparateindexeswereconstructedforboththeWestBankandGaza.FigureII-17showstheresultsoflogisticregressionmodelsthatmeasuretheoddsofserviceaccessforpoorhouseholdsandforfemale-headedhouseholds,comparedtotheoddsofserviceaccess fornon-poorandformale-headedhouseholds, respectively,whencontrollingforservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevelandVCandregionaleffectsintheWestBank.2653. InboththeWestBankandGaza,statisticallysignificantdifferencesintheoddsofaccesstopipedwaterandlocalroadsbetweenpoorandnon-poorhouseholdsexist.IntheWestBank,whenpredictingaccess,non-poorhouseholdsaremorethantwiceaslikely(115percent)tohaveaccesstopipedwaterthanhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution.InGaza,thelikelihoodofbeingconnectedtothepipedwaternetworkismorethan1.6timeshigherforhouse-holdsintheupperthreewealthquintiles.WhileintheWestBank,non-poorhouseholdsare24percentmore likely to be located at a paved road, the difference between poor and non-poor householdsamountstomorethanathirdinGaza.FigureII-17:ImpactonthePoor:LikelihoodofServiceAccess

54. Accesstocoreservicesforfemale-headedhouseholdsisstatisticallynotsignificantlydifferentfrommale-headedhouseholds,exceptforpipedwaterinGaza.FigureII-18showstheresultsofthesameregressionmodelsasabove,measuringthelikelihoodofserviceaccessformale-headedhouse-holdscomparedtofemale-headedhouseholds,whilecontrollingforservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevel.27IntheWestBank,smalldifferences inthe likelihoodofaccesstothecoreservicesexist,

26Estimatesaretheoddratiosfromweightedlogitregressionsofanindicatorforserviceaccessonanindicatorforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution,andanindicatorforfemale-headedhouseholds,controllingforLGUperformance(measuredwithaperformancescorefortherespectiveserviceasoutlinedinsectionIV),indicatorsforthenorthandsouthWestBank,VCsandfemale-headedhouseholds.StandarderrorsareclusteredattheGovernoratelevel.DetailedoutputsforallregressionscanbefoundinAnnex4.27Estimatesarefromthesameregressionasabove.

0.53***

0.74 0.69**0.84 0.81

0.97 1.010.78

Higherforbottom40%households

Equal

Lowerfor

bottom40%households

WestBank Gaza

PipedWater PipedSewage WasteCollection LocalRoads


39


37

whicharehoweverstatisticallynotsignificant.Male-headedhouseholdsonaveragehave1.58higheroddstohaveaccesstopavedroads.DifferencesinserviceaccessbetweengendersismorepronouncedinGazabuthardlystatisticallysignificant:female-headedhouseholdsareonaveragealmost1.5timesmorelikelytohaveaccesstopipedwater,whichistheonlystatisticallysignificantgendergapacrosssectors.

FigureII-18:GenderGap:LikelihoodofServiceAccess

55. BesideswastecollectionservicesintheWestBank,satisfactionwithservicequalityandrelia-bilityisstatisticallynotdifferentforhouseholdsofthebottom40percent.FigureII-19showsthere-sultsofregressionmodelsthatmeasurethelikelihoodofsatisfactionwithservicequalityandreliabilityfornon-poorhouseholdscomparedtopoorhouseholds,whencontrollingforservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevel.28

FigureII-19:ImpactonthePoor:LikelihoodofSatisfactionwithQualityandReliability

28Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorforsatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityoftherespectiveserviceonanindicatorforfemale-headedhouseholds,bottom40%households,LGUperformance,andindicatorsforthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.StandarderrorsareclusteredattheGovernoratelevel.

1.29 1.00 0.981.08

1.9*

0.79

1.41

1.09

Higherforfemale-headedhouseholds

Equal

Lowerforfemale-headedhouseholds

WestBank Gaza


0.99

1.131.3*

1.02 1.04

0.63

1.151.38Higherfor

bottom40%households

Equal

Lowerforbottom40%households

WestBank Gaza



40


38

OnlyforsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesintheWestBankandGaza,statisticallysignificantdifferencesinthelikelihoodofsatisfactionexist:poorhouseholdsare13percentmorelikelytobesat-isfiedwithqualityandreliability.Comparingsatisfactionwithpipedsewagesystems,poorhouseholdshaveasmallerlikelihoodofbeingsatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinboththeWestBank(17percent)andGaza(40percent).

56. Satisfaction with core services is statistically not significantly different for female-headedhouseholds.FigureII-20showstheresultsofregressionmodelsthatmeasurethelikelihoodofsatisfac-tionwithservicequalityandreliabilityformale-headedhouseholdscomparedtofemale-headedhouse-holds,when controlling for service delivery outcomes at the LGU level.29In theWest Bank, female-headedhouseholdsareonaveragemorelikelytobesatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinallfourcoresectors,statisticallyhowevernotsignificant.InGaza,differencesinthesatisfactionlikelihoodforpipedwater(8percent),roads(5percent),andsewage(31percent)arelowtomoderate,whileastronggen-dergapinsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesexist:male-headedhouseholdsarealmost2timesaslikelytobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliabilitycomparedtofemale-headedhouseholds.

FigureII-20:TheGenderGap:LikelihoodofSatisfactionwithQualityandReliability

2.6 Citizen Willingness to Pay

57. InvestigatingthedriversofLGUcollectionefficiencyandcitizens’paymentbehaviorisofma-jorimportancetoimprovingbothLGUbudgetsandpublicservicedelivery.AsdemonstratedinChapter3,insufficientbudgets,oftenduetolowcollectionefficiency,arestronglyassociatedwithlowperfor-manceoutcomesandposeamajorconstraintforLGUsinenhancingservicedeliveryoutcomes.GiventhatthelargestshareofLGUrevenues,abouthalfofmunicipalities’revenuesandtwothirdsofVC’srevenues,comefromtheenterprisebudget,ismadeupprimarilybybillspaidforpublicutilityservices,suchaswaterandelectricity; investigatingcitizens’paymentbehaviorandfindingmeansto improvecollectionefficiencyprovidesacrucialsteptoachievesustainableLGUfinancingandthusbetterservicedeliveryoutcomes.

58. While the vastmajority of households in theWestBankpays for services, large shares ofhouseholdsinGazadonot.AmongthehouseholdsintheWestBankwithserviceaccess,onlyaminor29Estimatesarefromthesameregressionasabove.

1.14

1.35

1.021.26

0.96

1.42*

0.49

1.01


Equal

Lowerfor

female-headedhouseholds

WestBank Gaza



41


39

fractionof6percent(pipedwater)to1percent(electricity)reportstonotpayforservices.InGazaincontrast,thenon-paymentsharesaremuchhigherforallservicesexceptinternet:43percentofhouse-holdsreportnopaymentforpipedwater,despitebeingconnected,andonlyeverythirdhouseholdre-portstopayforwastecollectionservices.Also,1outof4householdsinGazadoesnotpayforsewageservices,andforsewageservicesincludedjointlywithwaterbills,theshareofnonpaymentrisesto6outof7households(86percent).Insharpcontrasttothewater,wastewater,solidwaste,andelectricityservices,willingnesstopayforinternetisatsimilarlevelsinGazaasintheWestBank,witha96percentshareofhouseholdspaying.

FigureII-21:PaymentacrossSectors

59. Satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliability,andhouseholdwealtharekeydriversforthelikelihoodofcitizenstopayforservices.FigureII-22showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofseveralcovariatesonthe likelihoodthathouseholds’payforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,whencontrollingforgeographicalattributes.30Householdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionoftheWestBankandGazaareonaverageonlyhalfaslikelytopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservices,respectively.Strongerbutstatisticallynotassignifi-cant,satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliabilityalsocorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodforservicepayment.Inthewatersector,satisfiedhouseholdshave1.29timeslargeroddstopay,comparedto1.41timesinthesolidwastesector.Interestingly,householdsatisfactionwithLGUresponsivenesstocitizenconcernsandcomplaintscorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodofpayment,theeffectishoweverstatisti-callynotsignificant.LGUperformanceintherespectivesectordoesnothaveanotableimpactonthewillingnesstopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection.

30Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorforpaymentfor1)PipedWaterand2)SolidWasteCollection,indicatorsforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percent,aresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,andagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,andtheLGUperformancescoreforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,respectively,andforGaza,andthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.

94%

57%

97%

76%

98%

38%

98%

96%

99%

70%

WestBank

Gaza

Electricity

PipedWater

Internet

SewageServices SolidWasteCollection


39

fractionof6percent(pipedwater)to1percent(electricity)reportstonotpayforservices.InGazaincontrast,thenon-paymentsharesaremuchhigherforallservicesexceptinternet:43percentofhouse-holdsreportnopaymentforpipedwater,despitebeingconnected,andonlyeverythirdhouseholdre-portstopayforwastecollectionservices.Also,1outof4householdsinGazadoesnotpayforsewageservices,andforsewageservicesincludedjointlywithwaterbills,theshareofnonpaymentrisesto6outof7households(86percent).Insharpcontrasttothewater,wastewater,solidwaste,andelectricityservices,willingnesstopayforinternetisatsimilarlevelsinGazaasintheWestBank,witha96percentshareofhouseholdspaying.

FigureII-21:PaymentacrossSectors

59. Satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliability,andhouseholdwealtharekeydriversforthelikelihoodofcitizenstopayforservices.FigureII-22showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofseveralcovariatesonthe likelihoodthathouseholds’payforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,whencontrollingforgeographicalattributes.30Householdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionoftheWestBankandGazaareonaverageonlyhalfaslikelytopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservices,respectively.Strongerbutstatisticallynotassignifi-cant,satisfactionwithservicequalityandreliabilityalsocorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodforservicepayment.Inthewatersector,satisfiedhouseholdshave1.29timeslargeroddstopay,comparedto1.41timesinthesolidwastesector.Interestingly,householdsatisfactionwithLGUresponsivenesstocitizenconcernsandcomplaintscorrespondstoahigherlikelihoodofpayment,theeffectishoweverstatisti-callynotsignificant.LGUperformanceintherespectivesectordoesnothaveanotableimpactonthewillingnesstopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection.

30Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorforpaymentfor1)PipedWaterand2)SolidWasteCollection,indicatorsforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percent,aresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,andagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,andtheLGUperformancescoreforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,respectively,andforGaza,andthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.

94%

57%

97%

76%

98%

38%

98%

96%

99%

70%

WestBank

Gaza

Electricity

PipedWater

Internet

SewageServices SolidWasteCollection


38

OnlyforsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesintheWestBankandGaza,statisticallysignificantdifferencesinthelikelihoodofsatisfactionexist:poorhouseholdsare13percentmorelikelytobesat-isfiedwithqualityandreliability.Comparingsatisfactionwithpipedsewagesystems,poorhouseholdshaveasmallerlikelihoodofbeingsatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinboththeWestBank(17percent)andGaza(40percent).

56. Satisfaction with core services is statistically not significantly different for female-headedhouseholds.FigureII-20showstheresultsofregressionmodelsthatmeasurethelikelihoodofsatisfac-tionwithservicequalityandreliabilityformale-headedhouseholdscomparedtofemale-headedhouse-holds,when controlling for service delivery outcomes at the LGU level.29In theWest Bank, female-headedhouseholdsareonaveragemorelikelytobesatisfiedwithqualityandreliabilityinallfourcoresectors,statisticallyhowevernotsignificant.InGaza,differencesinthesatisfactionlikelihoodforpipedwater(8percent),roads(5percent),andsewage(31percent)arelowtomoderate,whileastronggen-dergapinsatisfactionwithwastecollectionservicesexist:male-headedhouseholdsarealmost2timesaslikelytobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliabilitycomparedtofemale-headedhouseholds.

FigureII-20:TheGenderGap:LikelihoodofSatisfactionwithQualityandReliability

2.6 Citizen Willingness to Pay

57. InvestigatingthedriversofLGUcollectionefficiencyandcitizens’paymentbehaviorisofma-jorimportancetoimprovingbothLGUbudgetsandpublicservicedelivery.AsdemonstratedinChapter3,insufficientbudgets,oftenduetolowcollectionefficiency,arestronglyassociatedwithlowperfor-manceoutcomesandposeamajorconstraintforLGUsinenhancingservicedeliveryoutcomes.GiventhatthelargestshareofLGUrevenues,abouthalfofmunicipalities’revenuesandtwothirdsofVC’srevenues,comefromtheenterprisebudget,ismadeupprimarilybybillspaidforpublicutilityservices,suchaswaterandelectricity; investigatingcitizens’paymentbehaviorandfindingmeansto improvecollectionefficiencyprovidesacrucialsteptoachievesustainableLGUfinancingandthusbetterservicedeliveryoutcomes.

58. While the vastmajority of households in theWestBankpays for services, large shares ofhouseholdsinGazadonot.AmongthehouseholdsintheWestBankwithserviceaccess,onlyaminor29Estimatesarefromthesameregressionasabove.

1.14

1.35

1.021.26

0.96

1.42*

0.49

1.01


Equal

Lowerfor

female-headedhouseholds

WestBank Gaza



42


40

FigureII-22:LikelihoodofPayment:PipedWaterandSolidWasteCollectionServices

60. Across regionsandLGUtypes,payments forwaterandsolidwastediffernotably,andarehigherthanhouseholds’maximumwillingnesstopay.Thismaypotentiallyreflectlowlevelsofsatis-factionwithservicequality,reliability,andcosts.Comparingaveragemonthlypaymentsforpipedwateracrossregions,householdsinthecentralWestBankspendonaveragetwotimesmore(130NIS)thaninGaza(60NIS).PipedwaterpaymentsarehigherinmunicipalitiesthaninVCs,andthehighestinme-dium-sizedmunicipalities(136NIS).

FigureII-23:MaximumandActualWillingnesstoPay:PipedWater

61. Across the Palestinian territories, more than half of the households (52 percent) report a maximum willingness to pay for piped water that is lower than their actual payment.Thegap isthe largest inGaza and in largemunicipalities in theWestBank,where actual payments are almostover50percenthigher

0.46**

1.36*1.24

1.0

0.37**

1.4

1.01 0.99

Bottom40% SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability

AgreethatLGUisveryresponsive

1pointhigherLGUperformance

PipedWater SolidWasteCollection

Higher

Equal

Lower

35

79

100

75

61

114

130

89

Gaza

SouthWestBank

CentralWestBank

NorthWestBank

ActualPayment(NISperMonth)

MaximumWillingnesstoPay(NISperMonth)

83

102

67

104

136

102

Small

Medium

Large


81

79

93

97

Medium

Large


PipedWater


43


41

thanthereportedmaximumwillingnesstopay.Theseresultscorrespondtoaconsiderableamountofhouseholdsreportingdissatisfactionwithpipedwatercosts:39percentofhouseholdsinGazaand1out4householdsintheWestBankaredissatisfiedorverydissatisfiedwiththecostofpipedwater.

62. Alsointhesolidwastesector,paymentsarehigherintheWestBankthaninGazaandinmu-nicipalitiesthaninVCs,andtendtoexceedhouseholds’maximumwillingnesstopay.Comparingmax-imumandactualwillingnesstopayforsolidwastecollectionservicesacrossPalestinianregions,equallystrikingdifferencesareobserved:intheWestBank,theaverageamountspent(37NIS) ismorethantwotimeshigherthaninGaza(14NIS).WithintheWestBank,bothmaximumandactualwillingnesstopayisthehighestinthecentralWestBank(37and22NIS,respectively),andthelowestinthenorthWestBank(17and15NIS).ComparingmunicipalitiesandVCs,citizensinmunicipalitiesarebothwillingtoandcurrentlyspendmore(19and24NIS)thancitizensinVCs(16and21NIS).Similarlytothewatersector,householdsreporthigheractualpaymentsthanmaximumwillingnesstopay,whichispotentiallyassociatedwith1out5householdsbeingdissatisfiedwitheachquality,reliability,andcostofwastecollectionservices.

FigureII-24:MaximumandActualWillingnesstoPay:SolidWasteCollection

63. ReportedpaymenttimelinessishigherinGazathanintheWestBank,andhigherforinternetthanforanyotherservice.AmongthehouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesthathaveaccesstopipedwater,electricity,solidwastecollectionservicesandinternet,foreachserviceatleast2outof3house-holdsreportpayingontimewithoutmajorproblems.InboththeWestBankandGaza,paymenttimeli-nessisthelowestforpipedwater(68percentand80percent,respectively)andthehighestforinternet(82percentand89percent,respectively).Inthesolidwasteandelectricitysector,1outof4householdsintheWestBankreportstoatleastsometimesfacedifficultiesinpayingservicefeesontime,comparedtojust1outof7householdsinGaza.

8

20

22

15

14

27

37

17

Gaza

SouthWestBank

CentralWestBank

NorthWestBank

ActualPayment(NISperMonth)

MaximumWillingnesstoPay(NISperMonth)

17

19

21

23

33

22

Small

Medium

Large


17

1618

24

Medium

Large


SolidWasteCollection


44


42

FigureII-25:TimelyPaymentwithoutMajorProblems

64. Householdwealthandsatisfactionwithbothservicequalityandreliability,andLGUrespon-sivenessarekeydriversforcitizenlikelihoodtopayontimeforservices.FigureII-26showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofseveralcovariatesontheprobabilitythathouseholdsreporttopayforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionontime,whencontrollingforgeographicalat-tributes.31Householdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionoftheWestBankandGaza,onaveragehave0.57timesand0.64timessmalleroddstopayontimeforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollectionservices,respectively.

FigureII-26:LikelihoodofTimelyPayment:PipedWaterandSolidWasteCollectionServices

31Estimatesarefromlogitregressionsofanindicatorfortimelypaymentfor1)PipedWaterand2)SolidWasteCollection,indicatorsforhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percent,aresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,andagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,theLGUperformancescoreforpipedwaterandsolidwastecollection,respectively,andforGaza,andthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.

94%

57%

98%

38%

98%

96%

99%

70%

WestBank

Gaza

Electricity

PipedWater

Internet


0.57**

1.14

1.73***

1.0

0.64**

1.19

1.76**

1.02**

Bottom40% SatisfactionwithQualityandReliability

AgreethatLGUisveryresponsive

1pointhigherLGUperformance

PipedWater SolidWasteCollection

Higher

Equal

Lower


45


43

Moreover,paymenttimelinessisstronglyassociatedwithcitizens’perceptionofLGUresponsiveness:householdsthataresatisfiedwiththeresponsivenessoftheirmunicipalityorVCtoconcernsandcom-plaints,onaveragehave1.73timesand1.76timeslargeroddstoreporttopayontimeforpipedwaterandwastecollectionservices.BothsatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityandtheLGUperformancescoreforsolidwastecollectioncorrespondtostatisticallysignificantlyhigherlikelihoodsoftimelypay-mentsinthesolidwastesector.


46

III. Drivers of Service Delivery Performance


44

III. Drivers of Service Delivery Performance

3.1 The LGPA Performance Index

65. TheLGPAPerformanceIndexusestenindicatorstomeasureoverallLGUperformanceinfoursectors.ThekeyobjectiveoftheLGPAperformanceindexistoconductcomparisonsoflocalgovern-mentperformanceacrossallLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,inordertogainbetterinsightsintothemaindriversofservicedeliveryandhowtocloseexistinggapsinLGUperformance.TheaimoftheIndexistoprovideatoolforbothpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartnerstoidentifyandtargetinterventionsinVCsandmunicipalities.Threedimensionsareusedtoconstructacomprehensivemeasure:method-ologically,theLGUperformanceismodeledasaCobb-Douglas-stylefunction,takingintoaccountcitizensatisfactionwithbothservicequalityandreliability.TheperformanceoutcomesattheLGUlevelareweightedbytheshareofcitizenswithserviceaccess,therebyrewardingLGUswithhigheraccessrates,whilepenalizingLGUs,inwhichonlysmallsharesofcitizensareprovidedaccesstothecoreservices.32

66. PerformanceoutcomesdiffersignificantlyacrossPalestinianLGUs.FigureIII-1illustratesthattheLGUPerformanceScoresrangefrom0to88.LGUsinGazaperformsignificantlylowerthanLGUsintheWestBank.WithintheWestBank,LGUsinthecentralWestBankoutperformLGUsinthenorthandsouth.ComparingdifferencesbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs,municipalitiesperformbetter,alsowhenrulingoutdifferencesinLGUsize.ThefollowingsectionsreviewinmoredetailwhatdrivesPalestinianLocalGovernmentPerformance.

FigureIII-1:LGUPerformanceIndex:HighandLowPerformers

67. LargedifferencesinLGUperformanceacrossregionsandbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCsex-ist.ThelowestperformingVCisMsafirYattaintheWestBank,wherecitizenlackaccesstoallofthefourkeyservices;thehighestperformingmunicipalityisSalfit,wherethevastmajorityofcitizenshasaccesstoallfourkeyservicesandissatisfiedwithbothservicequalityandreliability.Chapter3aimsto

32 TheLGUPerformanceindexforLGUicanbewrittenasLGUPerformanceScorei=Accessi(Qualityi

1/2

xReliabilityi

1/2

),whereAccessreferstotheshareofcitizensinLGUithathasserviceaccess,andqualityandreliabilitytotheshareofhouseholdsthatissatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,respectively.Thesub-indexforlocalroadsisbasedontheaccessrateonly.

0

79

4

82

10

50

84

10

85

13

88

0

20

40

60

80

100

LowPerformers Mean HighPerformers


48


45

identifythedriversofthesubstantialvariationinLGUperformance,byconductingaregression-basedassessment of key LGU characteristics starting with geography and administrative setup (WestBank/Gaza,urban/rural,remoteness)(Chapter3.2).

68. Economiesofscale,householdwealth,andpopulationdensitydrivebetterserviceoutcomesinlargerLGUsandmunicipalities.LargerLGUsperformsignificantlybetter,particularlywhencompar-ingVCsinthecentralWestBank.TheeffectisnotaspronouncedinGazaandformunicipalities.More-over,LGUswithhigherpopulationdensityhaveonaveragebetterperformanceratings.Finally,servicedeliveryoutcomesaredrivenbyastrongwealthgradientatthehouseholdlevel(Chapter3.3).

69. Mayorsandcitizenfrequentlyrefertothe impactofAreaCandrestrictionsonmovementwhenexplainingservicedeliveryoutcomesdeficits.TheresultsshowthathouseholdsinAreaCorcloseto the separationbarrierare less likely tohaveaccess tobasic services.Moreover, satisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityofcoreservicesisalsonotablylowerinAreaCandnearthebarrier.Finally,AreaCisassociatedwithlowerLGUPerformanceScores,evenwhencontrollingforimportantdriversofper-formance,suchasremotenessandLGUsize(Chapter3.4).

70. Jointserviceprovisioncanserveasatoolofimprovingservicedeliveryoutcomes,particularlyforsmallandremoteVCs.ExcessivefragmentationoflocalservicedeliveryisakeychallengeforpublicservicesintheWestBankandGaza:163VCs,correspondingtomorethanathirdoftheLGUsinthePalestinianterritories,haveapopulationof4,000orless,and45VCsbelow1,000even.AsVCshaveonaverage40percentlesspercapitaoperatingrevenuescomparedtomunicipalities,manylackthecapac-itythatwouldenablethemtoserveasaccountableandfinanciallysustainablelocalgovernments.ToaffrontLGUfragmentation,jointadministrativestructureintheformofJSCs,bothamongseveralsmallVCsandwithmunicipalities,haveincreasinglybecomeaviablesolutionformeetingexistingdevelop-mentneedsandimprovingservicedelivery.WhilethenumberofactiveandfunctioningJSCsisstilllim-ited,overallJSCmembershipseemstobenefitindividualLGUs.Forexample,membershipinaJSCforplanning and development corresponds to strong performance gains, particularly for VCs. Formorespecifiedservices,institutionalcapacityandprofessionalmanagementofindividualJSCsbecomemoreimportant,howevermembershipcansignificantlydriveservicedeliveryperformance.Forexample,inthewater sector, JSCmembershipdoesnotguarantee satisfactory servicedeliveryoutcomesacrossJSCs,butremarkableperformancegainscanbeobserved,e.g.,inJenin(Chapter3.5).

71. AsbudgetsareinsufficienttofulfillthefunctionsassignedtoLGUs,improvingcollectioneffi-ciencyisofmajorimportancetoimprovepublicservicedelivery.FiscalsustainabilityisshowntobeakeydriverofLGUperformance,criticallyaffectingtheabilityofLGUstoprovideservices.Overall,percapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformanceandarobustrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperformanceexists,disproportionallyconstrainingsmallerLGUsandVCsduetotheir limitedrevenuebaseand institutionalcapacity.Giventhatthe largestshareofLGUrevenues,abouthalfofmunicipalities’revenuesandtwothirdsofVCs’revenues,comefromtheenter-prisebudgetprimarilymadeupbybillspaidforpublicutilityservices includingwaterandelectricity,assessingandimprovingcollectionefficiencyisacrucialsteptowardsmoresustainableLGUfinancing(Chapter3.6).33

72. Low satisfaction with LGU responsiveness and limited levels of political engagement arestronglyassociatedwithlowerperformanceoutcomes.ThisleavesroomforimprovementinLGUre-sponsivenesstocitizens’complaintsandconcerns.Intheliteratureoncitizenengagement,governmentresponsivenessisoftennamedthekeydeterminantforcitizens’participatorybehaviorandbelievedtobeapre-conditionforencouragingresponsiblecitizenry,regainingtrustingovernment,andenhancing

33WorldBank.2016.PublicExpenditureReview–Palestinianterritories.


49


46

politicalparticipation.AthirdofthehouseholdsinthePalestinianterritoriesdonotbelievethatitslocalgovernment is very responsive to citizen concerns and complaints. As a consequence, equally highsharesofcitizensdonotbelievethatlocalelectionscanpositivelyimpactservicedeliveryoutcomesandindicatedthattheydonotplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections.GiventhatLGUresponsivenessandcitizenparticipationindicatorsarestronglyassociatedwithbetterLGUperformance,addressingthedisinterestofmajorsharesofthePalestinianpopulationinparticipatingintheirlocalpoliticalsystemisakeyfactorforimprovingservicedelivery(Chapter3.7).

3.2 Geography and Administrative Set-up

73. AlargeperformancegapbetweentheWestBankandGaza,andacrossregionsintheWestBankexists.LGUsintheWestBankonaveragehavea19-pointhigherperformancescorethanLGUsinGaza,evenwhenaccountingforperformancedifferencesattributabletopopulationsizeandLGUtype.34Thesizeoftheremainingperformancegapisstriking,particularlygiventhataccessratesforpipedsew-agearesignificantlyhigherinGazathanintheWestBank.AlsowhencomparingperformanceoutcomesacrossregionsintheWestBank,whilecontrollingforbothLGUsizeandstatus(municipalitiesandVCs),ampleperformancedifferencesbecomevisible:LGUsinthenorthWestBankhavea4-pointlowerper-formancescorethanLGUs inthecentralWestBank,andtheperformancegapbetweenLGUs inthecentralandsouthWestBankamountsto13points.

FigureIII-2:DifferencesinLGUPerformanceacrossRegionsandLGUTypes

74. MunicipalitiesperformbetterthanVCs,alsowhenrulingoutdifferencesinLGUsize.HoldingLGUsizefixed,municipalitiesonaveragehavea5-pointhigherLGUperformancescorethanVCs,whencontrollingforgeographicaldifferencesinLGUperformancebetweenGazaandthenorth,central,andsouthWestBank.Itisimportanttopointoutthatinthegivenanalyticalframework,thisperformance

34EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthe,thelogofLGUpopulation(basedonPCBS2016projections)andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.

13*

4*

5*

-19***

Central(vs.southWestBank)

Central(vs.northWestBank)

Municipalities(vs.VCs)

Gaza(vs.WestBank)


50


47

differencegoesbeyondapuresizeeffect,underliningthatamorein-depthanalysisiscrucialtodeter-minethefactorsthatdrivetheperformancegapbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs.

75. RemoteLGUsperformsignificantlylower.While1outof5PalestinianLGUsiswithina5kmradiusofitsgovernoratecapital,andmorethanhalfare10kmorcloser,thedistancebetweenthemostremoteVCsanditsgovernoratecapitalsamounttomorethan30km.UsingthegeographicalspreadofLGUsrelativetotheirgovernorateasremotenessproxyrevealsastrongcorrelationwithservicedeliveryoutcomes: the20percentmost remoteLGUsonaverageperform11points lower than the least20percent.35Theeffectisstatisticallymoresignificantandmorepronouncedinmunicipalities(18points)thaninVCs(10points).

FigureIII-3:Remoteness-DistancetoGovernorateCenterandLGUPerformance

76. Thecorrelationbetweenbuilt-upLGUareaandperformanceispositivebutmoderate.Usingbuilt-upLGUareashareasproxyallowsforananalysisoftherelationshipbetweenthedegreeofurban-izationandservicedeliveryoutcomes.AcrossthePalestinianterritories,theshareofLGUbuilt-uparearangesfrom0.2percentintheleasturbanizedVC,MarjalGhazalinJericho,tomorethan99percentinAdDohaintheWestBank.36

FigureIII-4:Remoteness-Built-UpAreaandLGUPerformance

ThesecondproxyforremotenessindicatesthatastatisticallysignificantnegativerelationshipbetweenLGU

35EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthedistancebetweentheLGUandGovernoratecenter,thelogofpopulationandindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.36Thebuilt-upareaclassificationfollowstheGeoMOLGdefinitionandincludesallbuildingsinLGUs.Insomeinstances,smallun-populatedareasthatareenclosedbybuilt-upareasareincluded.

Leastremotequintile(vs.mostremotequintile)

+10**

+18***

+11***Overall

Municipalities

VCs

Mostbuilt-upQuintile(vs.leastbuilt-upquintile)

+3

+15***

+6*Overall

Municipalities

VCs


51


48

remotenessandperformanceoutcomesexists.37A10percentagepointhighershareofLGUareathatiscoveredbybuilt-upconstructionscorrespondstoa5.7-pointshigherperformancescore.Similartothepopulationdensityanddistancetogovernoratecapitalproxies,theeffectisstrongerandstatisticallysignificantonlyamongmunicipalities.

3.3 Population Size, Density, and Wealth

76. LargerLGUsperformsignificantlybetter,particularlywhencomparingVCsinthecentralWestBank.AcrossLGUs in theWestBankandGaza,a10percent increase inLGUpopulationonaveragecorrespondstoa20-pointhigherLGUperformancescore,whencontrollingforregionaldifferencesinLGUperformancebetweenGazaandthenorth,central,andsouthWestBank,andbetweenmunicipal-itiesandVCs.38TheresultssuggestthatthemarginaleffectofLGUsizeonperformanceoutcomesinthefourcoresectorsishigherintheWestBankthaninGaza,andstrongeramongmunicipalitiesthanVCs.

FigureIII-5:LGUPopulationandPerformance

77. Populationdensityisstronglyassociatedwithperformanceoutcomes.FigureIII-6showstheresultsfromregressionsassessingtherelationshipbetweenLGUperformanceandremoteness,proxiedby population density,when holding population size and geographical attributes fixed.39PopulationdensityvariessubstantiallyacrossPalestinianLGUs, ranging fromless than4 in thesmallVCMarjalGhazalintheJerichoGovernorate,tomorethan11,000peoplepersquarekminGazaCity.Inmorethan75percentofLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,theaveragepopulationpersquarekmislessthan1,000,andin34municipalitiesandVCs,itisbelow100.Thesewidegapsareseverelyaffectingservicedeliveryoutcomes,aspopulationdensityandLGUperformancearestronglycorrelated:themostpopulated20percentofLGUsonaverageperform6.2pointshigherthanthe leastpopulated20percentofLGUs.Assessingdifferences in theeffectbymunicipalitiesandVCs, theperformancedifference is strongeracrossmunicipalities(20points)thenVCs(7points),andstatisticallymoresignificantformunicipalities.Thisisduetothe40timeshigherstandarddeviationinpopulation,andmorethan5timeshigherstand-arddeviation inpopulationdensityacrossmunicipalities.Overallonaverage,a1percent increase inpopulationdensitycorrespondstoa3.3-pointshigherperformancescore.

37EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreontheshareofbuilt-upLGU,thelogofpopulationandindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.38EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthelogofLGUpopulation(Basedon2016populationprojectionsbythePCBS),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.39Estimatesare fromOLS regressionsof theLGUPerformanceScoreon the logofpeopleper squarekilometer LGUarea,controllingforthelogofpopulationandincludingindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.

10%Increaseinpopulation

+8

+27*

+17

+20

+20*Overall

WestBank

Gaza

Municipalities

VCs

The second proxy for remoteness indicates that a statistically significant negative relationship between LGU remoteness and performance outcomes exists.37 A 10 percentage point higher share of LGU area that is covered by built-up constructions corresponds to a 5.7-points higher performance score. Simi-lar to the population density and distance to governorate capital proxies, the effect is stronger and statistically significant only among municipalities.


52


49

FigureIII-6:PopulationDensityandPerformance

78. AstrongpositiverelationshipbetweenhouseholdwealthandLGUperformanceexists.FigureIII-7showstheresultsofregressionsmeasuringtheassociationbetweentheshareofhouseholdsthatbelongtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistributionandLGUperformance,whencontrollingforLGUsizeandregionaleffects.40ThequintileofLGUswiththelowestshareofthebottom40percenthouseholds,onaveragehasa12-pointshigherperformancescore,comparedtothetopquintile.Onaverage,aLGUwitha1percenthighershareofbottom40percenthouseholdshasa2.4-pointslowerperformancescore.ThewealthgradientexistsinboththeWestBankandGazabutisstatisticallysignif-icantintheWestBankonly.Theeffectislargelydrivenbyanurban-ruralgapinwealthlevels:theshareofbottom40percenthouseholdsisnotablylargerinVCsthaninmunicipalities.

FigureIII-7:HouseholdWealthandLGUPerformance

40EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreon1)theshareofhouseholdsbelongingtothebottom40percentofthewealthdistribution,controllingforthelogofpopulationandincludingindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.

Mostdenselypopulatedquintile(vs.leastdenselypopulatedquintile)

+7*

+20***

+21

+5

+6*Overall

WestBank

Gaza

Municipalities

VCs

Quintilewithlowestshareofpoorhouseholds(vs.quintilewithhighestshare)

+14***

+6

+12***Overall

Municipalities

VCs


53


50

3.4 Area C and Separation Barrier

79. AreaCprovidesanumberofbarrierstotheprovisionofservicesforthePalestiniancitizensliv-ingintheWestBank.Sixty-onepercentoftheWestBank,AreaC, isundercomplete Israelimilitaryad-ministration and authority. Any construction ormaintenancework intheseareasrequiresapermitandapprovalfromtheICA,whichisextremelydiffi-cult,oftenimpossible,toobtain.41TheIsraelicontrolofAreaCandtheinabilitytocarryoutlegalconstruc-tiontherehavedirectimpactsonserviceprovision.Palestinians living in Area C, numbering approxi-mately279,00042, have less access to services, andpoorerqualityforthoseavailable.Theyrelyonout-dated, deteriorated infrastructure and, whengranted, the limited number of additions and up-grades,whicharewhollyinsufficienttoaddressPal-estinian’sneeds.AccordingtothelatestWestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic43,householdsintheWestBankunconnectedtowaterare largely inAreaC,wheremovementandaccessrestrictionspre-ventnetworkconnections.Itisestimated,thatover100,000AreaCresidentsdonothavewaternetworkaccess.

80. ServiceprovisioninAreasAandBoftheWestBankisalsohighlyconstrainedbyAreaCre-strictions.Theremaining39percentoftheWestBankisspatiallydividedintoanarchipelagoofurbanandperi-urbanlandpocketsterritoriallydisconnectedfromoneanotherbyAreaC.IntegratedservicenetworksacrossLGUsaredifficulttoestablishduetotheinabilitytophysicallyconnectinfrastructureacrossAreaC.Localcouncilsandlineministriesareunableimproveormaintainservicenetworks,orinstallneededinfrastructureinareasaffectedbyAreaC.ThisincludeslandswithinLGUscategorizedasAreaCandAreaClandsbetweenanddividingLGUs.(SeeBoxIII-1)Typicalurbandevelopmentneedsandbestpracticesbecomeuntenable, forexample: (i) theestablishmentofaccessandringroadstoconnectLGUs,easetraffic,facilitatesolidwastecollection;(ii)installationofwaterandsewagepipesinlinewiththephysicalnaturalenvironment(e.g.alongslopes); (iii)upgradeand/orrepairof faultyorbrokennetworklinesaffectingtheentirenetworkandqualityofserviceprovision;and(iv)theestab-lishmentofandconnectionstoservicetreatmentplants.Theseparationbarrierexacerbatesthesitua-tionbycreatingadditionalphysicalbarriers(e.g.concretewall,doublefencing,ditches)betweenLGUsseveringnaturalandhistoricalconnectionroutes.LGUsandlineministriesarepreventedfrombuildingoneconomiesofscaletoimproveservicedeliveryinareasheavilypermeatedbyAreaC.

81. ThePA,lineministries,andLGUsalsoloseoutfinanciallyduetoAreaC.Underthe1995interimagreement,theICAisexpectedtocollectrevenuesandtaxesinAreaCandremitthemtothePA,in-cludingpropertytax, incometax,andVATfromindividualsandbusinessesoperatinginAreaC.44Alt-houghtheICAcontinuescollectingthesetaxesfromPalestiniansintheseareas,itdoesnotremitthem

41UNOCHA.2009.RestrictingSpace:ThePlanningRegimeAppliedbyIsraelinAreaCoftheWestBank.42UNOCHA.2013.IntheSpotlight:AreaCVulnerabilityProfile.TheVulnerabilityProfileProject(VPP).43WorldBank.2017.WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiagnostic.44WorldBank.2016.EconomicMonitoringReporttotheAdHocLiaisonCommittee.

FigureIII-8:AreaCandSeparationBarrier

AreaA&B

SeparationBarrier

AreaC


54


51

tothePA.PropertytaxinparticularrepresentsoneoffewtaxesandrevenuessharedwithLGUs,andAreaCdeprivesthemofthepotentialincreasedsourceofrevenue,whichissorelyneeded.ThesituationofAreaCalsodiscouragesprivatesectorinvestmentinpublicinfrastructureprojectsandserviceprovi-sionPPPs,suchassolarpanelprojects,largescaleroadprojects,andservicetreatmentsplants.A2015PPPassessmentfoundthattherestrictionsonaccess,controlovernaturalresources,landmanagement,andpermittingparticularlyinAreaCposesignificantchallengestothedevelopmentandimplementa-tionofinfrastructurePPPs.45LGUsandlineministriesasaresultmissoutfromserviceprovisionalter-nativeswhichwouldeasethefinancialburdenonthem.

BoxIII-1:RawabiCityDevelopmentConstraintsfromAreaC46

82. HouseholdslivinginAreaCorclosetotheseparationbarrierarelesslikelytohaveaccesstobasicservices.FigureIII-10showtheresultsofregressionsmeasuringthelikelihoodofserviceaccessandsatisfactionofhouseholdsthatareimpactedbytheIsraelirestrictions,proxiedbyproximitytothewallandadummyforAreaC.47Whencomparingthelikelihoodofserviceaccessforhouseholdsthatlivewithina1kmradiusoftheseparationbarrier,themodelsdonotyieldstatisticallysignificantcoeffi-cients. However, when narrowing the distance, significant differences in the water sector emerge:households that livewithina500moreven250mdistanceareonaverage justhalfas likely tohaveaccesstopipedwater,comparedtohouseholdsthatlivedonotliveasclosetothebarrier.ThiseffectisstatisticallysignificantforboththeentireWestBanksample,andthesub-sampleofLGUsthatareinter-sectedbythebarrier.WhilethecoefficientsfortheAreaCindicatorsuggestthatonaverage,householdslivinginAreaCarelesslikelytohaveaccesstoallofthefourkeyservices,onlytheindicatorforsolidwastecollectionyieldsastatisticallysignificantresult:householdsthatliveinAreaCareonlyathirdaslikelytobecoveredbywastecollectionservice.

45IFC/PPIAF.2015.WestBankandGaza-AssessingthePotentialforPublic-PrivatePartnerships.46Adaptedandupdatedfromthereport:WorldBank.2013.AreaCandTheFutureofthePalestinianEconomy.47EstimatesarefromseparatelogitregressionsofanindicatorforhouseholdsA)withserviceaccessandB)thataresatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability,onindicatorsforLGUsthatare1a)1km,1b)500m,1c)250morclosertothewall,and2)inAreaC,theLGUperformanceindexfortherespectivesector,andindicatorsforbottom40percenthouseholds,andthenorthandsouthWestBank.ThesampleislimitedtohouseholdsfromtheWestBankandstandarderrorsclusteredbyGovernorate.

Rawabiisanew,plannedcitynorth-westofRamallah,andthelargestrealestateinvestmentevermadeinthePalestinianterritories.ItwasbuiltalmostentirelyinAreaA(95%),how-ever,thedevelopmentofthecityfacedanumberofconstraintstoestablishingservicecon-nectionsrelatedtoAreaC.Theproject’sinvestorsalongwiththePAandtheinternationalcommunityspentmuchpoliticalcapitaltoobtainatemporarypermitfromtheICAforthemainaccessroadtothesouthofthecity,whichrunsfor3.8kmthroughAreaC.Thepermitmustberenewedeveryyear,andthetemporarinessofthepermitcreatesuncertaintyoverthefutureaccesstothecity.Otherutilityservicesarealsoaffected, includingwaterandwastewatertreatment.Thewaterconnectionwasdrasticallydelayedandincreaseddevel-opmentcostssignificantly.Partofthe9kmstretchconnectingRawabitotheexistingpipedsystem(inthevillageofAboud)liesinAreaC.RawabiappliedforapermitthroughtheJointWaterCommittee,butwaitedsixyearstoreceiveapproval,andtheopeningofthecitywasdelayedfortwoyears.Also,themostefficientsolutionforthewastewatertreatmentforthecitywouldbearegionalwastewatertreatmentplantservicing18villagesaroundthearea.Thisplantwouldallowtheexploitationofeconomiesofscale,whicharekeyforthistypeofutility.However,thesitewheretheplantshouldbelocatedisinAreaC,whichwouldrequirepermitfromtheICA.


55


52

FigureIII-9:AreaCandSeparationBarrier:LikelihoodofServiceAccess

83. SatisfactionwithqualityandreliabilityofcoreservicesisnotablylowerinhouseholdslivinginAreaCorclosetothebarrier.Similartothemodelsforserviceaccess,theeffectofproximitytotheseparationbarrierisnotsignificantforhouseholdsliving1kmorclosertothewall.Amonghouseholdsthatlivewithina500mradius,however,thelikelihoodofsatisfactionwiththequalityandreliabilityofpipedsewageandroadsis38percentand28percentlower,respectively.Reducingtherangeto250m,themodelsyieldsignificantresultsforbothsolidwastecollectionandlocalroads:householdsthatlive250morclosertothewall,onaverageare28percent less likelytobesatisfiedwiththequalityandreliabilityofsolidwastecollectionservices,and41percentlesslikelytobesatisfiedwithlocalroads.AssessingtheimpactofAreaC,themodelssuggestthathouseholdsinAreaCarealsolesslikelytobesatisfiedwithservicequalityandreliability.However,onlythecoefficientfortheroadssectorisstatis-ticallysignificant:householdsinAreaCare45percentlesslikelytobesatisfiedwithlocalroads.

FigureIII-10:AreaCandtheSeparationBarrier:LikelihoodofServiceSatisfaction

0.81

0.53* 0.53***0.66

1.040.90

0.80 0.79

1.07 1.07

0.69

0.35***

1.000.89

1.00

0.62**

1,000m 500m 250m

Distancetoseparationbarrier AreaC


Higher

Equal

Lower

0.951.06

0.790.91

0.91

0.64***0.73 0.76

0.95 0.910.73*

0.89

0.830.71*

0.57*** 0.64*

1,000m 500m 250mDistancetoseparationbarrier AreaC


Higher

Equal

Lower


56


53

84. Servicedeliveryoutcomesaresignificantly lower inLGUswithhighersharesofhouseholdslivinginAreaC.FigureIII-11showstheresultsofregressionsassessingtheimpactofAreaConLGUperformance.48Comparingthe20percentofLGUswiththehighestshareofhouseholdsthatliveinAreaCwiththe20percentwiththelowestshare,includingLGUsthatarenotpartofAreaC,theregressionresultsdonotyieldstatisticallysignificantperformancedifferences.However,whenlimitingthesampletoLGUsthatatleastpartlybelongtoAreaC,theregressionsindicatethatthequintileofLGUswiththehighestshareofAreaChouseholdsonaverageperform11.1-pointslower.

FigureIII-11:ShareofHouseholdsinAreaCandLGUPerformance

85. LGUperformanceislowerinLGUswithhighersharesofbuilt-upareathatbelongstoAreaC.MeasuringtheimpactofAreaCwiththeshareofbuilt-upLGUareathatispartofAreaC,notabledif-ferencesinLGUperformanceareobserved.Theresultssuggestthathighersharesofbuilt-upLGUAreathatispartofAreaCcorrespondtolowerperformanceoutcomes.However,onlywhencomparingLGUswithashareofAreaChouseholdshigherthan70percentwithLGUswithasharebelow70percent,theregressionsyieldastatisticallysignificantperformancedifferenceof8.1points.

FigureIII-12:ShareofBuilt-upLGUareainAreaCandLGUPerformance

86. Mayorsseeservicedeliveryfurthercomplicatedbytheexternalgovernancestructure,espe-ciallyforthewatersector.Manymayorsreportreceivingwaterdirectlyfromthenationalwatercom-panyofIsrael,Mekorot.Forexample,themayorofSalimreportsthatwaterfromMekorot“isdeliveredtousthroughapipethatfeedsthreevillages,Salim,Uzmout,andDeiral-Huteb.TheIsraeliscontroltheamountofwaterweconsume….wesufferespeciallyinsummer….therearehouseholdsinSalimthatdonotreceivewaterfor3-4daysaweek.”Inaddition,maintenanceischallenginginGazaduetothe10-

48EstimatesarefromregressionsoftheLGUperformanceindexon1)theLGUquintilesfortheshareofAreaChouseholds,and2)on1c)250morclosertothewall,and2)dummiesforLGUswithsharesofbuilt-upLGUareathatishigherthana)50percent,b)60percent,c)70percent,d)80percent,ande)90percent,indicatorsforthenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs,thelogofLGUpopulation,andthelogofthedistancebetweenaLGU´scenteranditsgovernoratecapital.

-6.5

-8.6

-8.1*

-5.8

-2.6

>90%

>80%

>70%

>60%

>50%

QuintilewithhighestshareofAreaChouseholds(vs.lowest)

-11.1**

-1.4 AllLGUs

AreaCLGUs


57


54

year-longIsraeliblockade,whichseverelylimitstheavailabilityofequipmentandneededpartsinthestrip.AstheGazaCityDirectorexplained:“Wehave75waterwellswhich lack[…]spareparts.”TheMayorofKhanYunisalsomentionedthat“thereare2,500watermetersthatarebrokendownandneedreplacement[…]however,theimportrestrictionsforGazamakeithardtoobtainthesepartsandotherequipmentneeded.”


58


55

3.5 Joint Service Councils Capacity

87. JSCsprovideapromisingmeansforaddressingLGUfragmentationandimprovingservicede-liveryoutcomes,particularlyinsmallandremoteVCs.The1997LGAestablishedtheoptionforLGUstojoinforcesinplanningandserviceprovisionundertheumbrellaofaJSC,aimedatscalingupaccess,quality,andreliabilityoflocalpublicservices.Since1997,morethan80JSCshavebeencreated.Broadly,therearethreetypesofJSCs,eitherprovidingasingleservice,multipleservices,orthosebeingestab-lishedforplanninganddevelopment.AJointServicesProvisionAssessmentcarriedoutbytheBankin2015identifiedthatoutofthe82existingJSCsintheWestBankandthe10JSCsinGaza,onlyaround55areactive.MostoftheactiveJSCs,i.e.,32intotal,arecategorizedasPlanningandDevelopmentJSCs.16JSCswereestablishedforsolidwastemanagement,andsevenJSCsprovidewatersupplyandsanita-tionservices.ArespondentfromthecityofKhanYunisspokeenthusiasticallyabouttheimportanceofJSCsandtheirpositiveimpactonservicedelivery:“IseetheexistenceofJSCsassomethingimportantanduseful…forexample,[…]someservicesarebetterifwedealwiththemjointlysuchaswastecollectionwhichneedshugeinfrastructures,trucks,machines,andtransferstations.”

88. Membership ina JSCcanhavesignificant impactonperformance,particularly forVCs.Fig-ureIII-13showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageimpactofmembershipinaJSCforplanninganddevelopmentonLGUPerformanceScores,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.49ComparingoutcomesbetweenJSC-membersandnon-membersacrosstheWestBankandGaza,themodelyieldsstronglysignificantresults,suggestingthatJSC-membersonaveragehavea3.96-pointshigherperformancescore.TheperformancegainishigherinGaza,whereLGUsonaverageper-form13.2-pointshigherwhenbeingaJSC-member,thanfortheWestBank,whereLGUsseeaverageperformancegainsof3.37points.Moreover,theaverageincreaseinperformanceformemberLGUsishigheracrossVCs(5.21)thanmunicipalities(4.06),andsignificantforVCsonly.

FigureIII-13:JointServiceCouncilsI:MembershipinJSCforPlanning&Development

89. However,duringinterviewswithmayors,muchcriticismwasdirectedatJSCs.Forexample,theMayorofTamouncharacterizedhiscouncilexperiencewiththreeseparateJSCs–water,solidwaste,andplanninganddevelopment–aslosingcontroloverrevenuegenerationandservicedelivery,whilestillbeingaccountabletocitizens:“WearemembersofthreeJSCs;oneforwater,anotheroneforsolidwaste,aswellasaJSCforPlanningandDevelopmentwhichisinactive…beforewejoinedtheSolidWasteJSC,weusedtogeneraterevenueforourtown…butnowthesolidwasteservicecausesadeficit.Ourmunicipalityisagainstthesecouncils…”AdirectorfromKhanYuniswassimilarlycriticalandsaid:“The

49EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonanindicatorforLGUsthatarememberofaJSCforplanninganddevelopment,thelogofLGUpopulation(basedonPCBSprojectionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.Resultsfromthesecondandthirdmodelusethesameset-upbutarelimitedtothesub-samplesof1)municipalitiesand2)VCs.

+3.96**

+3.37*

+13.2*

+4.06

+5.21**

Overall

WestBank

Gaza

Municipalities

VCs


59


56

SolidWasteJSCisaburdenbecausewestillhavetoprovidebins,trucksandworkers…[also]joiningthecouncilwasnotamatterofchoice…asamunicipalitywehadtobecomeamember…however,averagepeopledonotknowaboutit.”

90. Withincreasingdegreesofspecialization,thetechnicalandinstitutionalcapacityofJSCsdrivesservicedeliveryoutcomes.Inthewatersector,JSC-membershipdoesnotguaranteesatisfactoryservicedeliveryoutcomes.Figure III-14showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverage impactofmembershipinaJSCforPipedWater/WasteWaterManagementonLGUPerformanceScoresinthewaterandwastewatersector,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.50ComparingoutcomesbetweenJSC-membersandnon-membersacrosstheWestBankandGaza,themodeldoesnotyieldstatisticallysignificantperformancedifferencesinthepipedwatersector.However,whenlim-itingthesampletotheJeninGovernorate,wheresomeLGUsbelongtoaJSCandothersdonot,JSCmembershipcorrespondstoaverystrongandstatisticallyhighlysignificantperformancegaininpipedwateroutcomes.Inthewastewatersectorincontrast,JSCmembershipisassociatedwithsignificantlylowerperformancescores,whencomparingallPalestinianLGUs.InJenin,JSCmembersperformslightlylowerthannon-members,theperformancedifferenceishoweverstatisticallynotsignificant.

FigureIII-14:JointServiceCouncilsII:MembershipinJSCforWaterandWasteWaterManagement

91. In the solid waste sector, the effect of JSC-membership on performance outcomes variesacrossregionsintheWestBank.FigureIII-15showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageimpactofmembershipinaJSCforSolidWasteManagementonLGUPerformanceScoresinsolidwastecollection,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.51Similartothenegativeresultsof

50EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScorefor1)PipedWaterand2)PipedSewage,onanindicatorforLGUsthatarememberofaJSCforwaterandwastewatermanagement,thelogofLGUPopulation(basedonPCBSprojec-tionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.TheoverallresultsusetheentiresampleofLGUs,whiletheregressionforJeninusesasamplethatislimitedtoLGUsinJeninGovernorate.51EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreforsolidwastecollection,onanindicatorforLGUsthatarememberofaJSCforsolidwastecollection,thelogofLGUPopulation(basedonPCBSprojectionsfortheyear2016),and

PipedWater

+30.82***

+4.38

Jenin

Overall

PipedSewage

-2.26

-6.26

Jenin

Overall


60


57

thewastewatersector,servicedeliveryoutcomesofJSC-membersaresignificantlyworsethaninnon-memberLGUs.FocusingondifferencesinperformancelevelsbetweenSalfit,wherevirtuallyallLGUsbelongtothesameJSC,andQalqilya,wherenosuchassociationexists,JSCmembershipcorrespondstoastrongbutnotstatisticallysignificantperformancegaininsolidwastecollectionperformancescores.WhencomparingBethlehemandHebron incontrast,meanperformance levelsof JSC-membersandnon-membersarealmostidentical.

FigureIII-15:JointServiceCouncilsIII:MembershipinJSCforSolidWaste

3.6 Fiscal Capacity

92. RevenuesourcesforLGUsarelimitedandpublicbudgetsfallshortoftheirpotentialduetoineffectivecollectionoffeesandtaxes.ThemainsourcesofrevenueforLGUsarelocallycollectedrev-enuescomprisedof: (i)userfees,suchaspaymentsforelectricity,water,solidwastecollection,andwhereapplicable,publicmarketsandslaughterhouses;(ii)localfees,suchasbuildingpermitsandfeesforsigns;and(iii)taxes.Theeconomicallymostsignificantrevenuesources,suchasthepropertytax,professionalpermitfees,andtransportationfeesarecollectedandadministeredcentrallybythePA.Theserevenuesaresubjecttohighdeductionstooffsetmunicipalarrearsforelectricityandwaterfees,partlyowedtoIsrael,lacktransparencyinthecalculation,andaretransferredinanad-hocandopaquemanner,whichposesakeyconstrainttoLGUbudgetaryplanning.

93. FinancialsustainabilityoflocalserviceprovisionisacriticalissuethataffectsLGUsabilitytoprovide services in an accountable and efficientmanner, disproportionally constrainingVCs giventheirlimitedsize,revenuebase,andinstitutionalcapacity.VCsandmunicipalitiessharemostofthelocallycollectedrevenueassignments.Nevertheless,pronouncedhorizontaldisparitiesamongLGUsandparticularlybetweenmunicipalitiesandVCsexist,largelybecausethePropertyTaxisnotleviedinVCs.Asaresult,VCshaveonaverage40percentlesspercapitaoperatingrevenuescomparedtomunicipal-

indicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.ThefirstregressionmodelusestheentiresampleofLGUs,thesampleofthesecondmodelislimitedtoSalfitandQalqilyaGovernorates,andthethirdtoBethlehemandHebronGovernorates.

Salfit/Qalqilya


+4.44

-1.9 Overall

Salfit/Qalqilya


61


58

ities.In2012forexample,percapitaoperatingrevenueswereNIS63forVCsandNIS165formunicipal-ities.52WhileVCsreceiveahigherper-capitashareoftransferfundingduetoreallocationofTranspor-tationFees,thesefundsdonotfullycompensateforthelargertotalpercapitarevenuesmunicipalitiesreceive.Overall,VCslackastableandpredictablefinancingsourcethatwouldallowthemtomeetex-istingdevelopmentandcapitalinvestmentrequirements.Whilemunicipalitieshaveaccesstofundspro-videdbytheMDLF,nosystematicfundingmechanismexiststofinanceinvestmentsinVCs.Thisleavesafundinggapforthemajorityof266villagesandmarginalizedcommunities.

94. PercapitarevenuesarestronglyassociatedwithhigherLGUperformance.FigureIII-16showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageeffectofLGUpercapitaoperatingrevenuesonLGUPerformanceScores,controllingforbothLGUsizeandgeographicalattributes.53Themodelsyieldhighlystatisticallysignificantcoefficients,emphasizingthatLGUfinancingisakeydriverforservicedeliveryoutcomes:a1percentincreaseinpercapitaoperatingrevenuesonaveragecorrespondstoa4.5-pointshigherperformancescore.Theeffectismorepronouncedamongmunicipalities,wherea1percentin-creaseinpercapitarevenuesisassociatedwithanonaverage6.5-pointhigherperformancescore.

FigureIII-16:LGUFinanceI:PerCapitaOperatingBudgetRevenues

95. Arobust,andevenstrongerrelationshipbetweenpercapitaexpendituresandLGUperfor-manceexists.FigureIII-17presentsregressionresults,estimatingtheaverageimpactofLGUpercapitaoperatingexpendituresonLGUPerformanceScores,controllingforLGUsizeandgeographicalattrib-utes.54Theexpendituremodelyieldssimilarresultsastherevenuemodel,suggestingthatbothreve-nuesandexpendituresdriveservicedeliveryoutcomes:theaverageeffectofa1percentincreaseinpercapitaexpendituresisaperformancescoreincreaseof5.2points.Again,theeffectisnotablylarger,andonlystatisticallysignificantinmunicipalities.

52WorldBank.2016.PublicExpenditureReview–PalestinianTerritories.53EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthelogofpercapitalLGUoperatingbudgetrevenues,thelogofLGUPopulation(projectionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.54EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonthelogofpercapitalLGUoperatingbudgetexpendi-tures,thelogofLGUPopulation(projectionsfortheyear2016),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.

+3

+7**

+5***Overall

Municipalities

VCs

1%IncreaseinLGUrevenues


62


59

FigureIII-17:LGUFinanceII:PerCapitaOperatingBudgetExpenditures

96. Financial sustainability isakeydriverofLGUperformance.Goingbeyondoperatingbudgetexpendituresandrevenues,FigureIII-18showstheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheroleoffiscalsustainability,proxiedbyindicatorsforsatisfactorycollectionefficiencyandownrevenuesourcesfromtheMDP-II, andabasic surplus inbothoperational andenterprisebudgets, formunicipalityperfor-mance,whenholdingbothpopulationsizeandgeographicalattributesfixed.55Bothmodelsyieldposi-tive, and statistically significant coefficients:municipalitieswith satisfactory collectionefficiencyandownrevenuesources,onaveragehavea5.6higherperformancescore,andmunicipalitieswithasurplusinoperationalandenterprisebudgetsperformonaverage5.4pointshigher.

FigureIII-18:LGUFinanceIII:FiscalSustainability

3.7 Governance and Accountability

97. Assessingthedriversofcitizens’participatorypatternsandenhancinglocalgovernmentre-sponsiveness is crucial to increaseaccountabilityand improve servicedeliveryoutcomes.Growingempiricalevidencesuggeststhatcitizeninteractionswithlocalgovernmentsspurtheireffortsinachiev-ing improveddevelopment results, suchassustainablepublic financialmanagement, social inclusionandempowerment,andeffectivepublicservicedelivery.56Citizeninvolvementcancomeintheformsofparticipationinlocalgovernanceandinvolvementindecision-making,information-exchangeregard-ingserviceprovision,orthroughgrievanceredressal.

55EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreonindicatorsfor1)SatisfactoryCollectionEfficiencyand2)SurplusinOperatingBudgetandEnterpriseFund,asdefinedintheMDP-II,thelogofLGUPopulation(2016projections),andindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs.56WorldBank.2014.StrategicFrameworkforMainstreamingCitizenEngagementinWorldBankGroupOperations.

+3

+9***

+5***Overall

Municipalities

VCs

1%IncreaseinLGUexpenditures

+5*

+6*

SurplusinOperatingBudgetandEnterprise

Fund

SatisfactoryCollectionEfficiency


63


60

98. LessthanathirdofPalestiniancitizensagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizencon-cernsandcomplaints.Governmentresponsivenesshasbeenfoundtobeakeyfactorforcitizens’par-ticipatorybehaviorandbelievedtobeakeydriverforencouragingresponsiblecitizenry,regainingtrustingovernment,andenhancingpoliticalparticipation.InthePalestinianterritories,overallsatisfactionwiththeresponsivenessofLGUsislow:theassessmentfoundthatlessthanathirdofthehouseholdsagreewiththestatementthattheirmunicipalityorVCisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcom-plaints.WhilethenumberisslightlylowerintheWestBank(30percent)thaninGaza(37percent),itvariessubstantiallyacrossgovernorates:inTubas,only1outof10householdsagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,whileinTulkarmandQalqilyaalmosthalfthehouseholdsconsidertheirLGUtobeveryresponsive.ComparingsatisfactionwithresponsivenessacrossLGUtypesintheWestBank,theshareofhouseholdsreportingtoagreeishigherinmunicipalities(31percent)thaninVCs(24percent).

FigureIII-19:LGUResponsiveness

99. Higher LGU responsiveness corresponds tobetterperformanceoutcomes.Figure III-20andFigureIII-21showtheresultsfromregressionsmeasuringtheaverageimpactoftwoproxiesforLGUresponsiveness when controlling for both LGU size and geographical attributes. 57 The first modelmeasurestheeffectoftheshareofhouseholdsthathaveusedaCSC;andthesecondmodeltheshareofhouseholdsagreeingwiththestatementthattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints.Bothmodelsyieldstatisticallysignificantandpositivecoefficients fortheresponsivenessproxies,suggestingapositiverelationshipbetweenLGUresponsivenessandservicedeliveryoutcomesattheLGUlevel.TheaverageperformanceofthequintileofLGUswiththehighestshareofhouseholdsreportingthattheirLGUisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaintsonaverageperform16.4pointshigher.Correspondingly,LGUsinthequintilewiththehighestshareofcitizenswhousedCSCs,includingOSSes,onaveragehavea5.39higherperformancescore.

57EstimatesarefromOLSregressionsoftheLGUPerformanceScoreona)thelogoftheshareofhouseholdsthatusedacitizenservicecenter,andb)thelogoftheshareofhouseholdsthatagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,includingindicatorsforGaza,thenorthandsouthWestBank,andVCs,andthelogofpopulation.

30%

37%

31%

24%

35%

27%

35%

39%

35%

36%

34%

37%

WestBank

Gaza

MunicipalitiesWestBank

VillageCouncilsWestBank

AgreeorStronglyAgree PartiallyAgree DisagreeorStronglyDisagree

“MymunicipalityorVillageCouncilisveryresponsivetocitizenconcernsandcomplaints”


64


61

FigureIII-20:UsageofCitizenServiceCentersandPerformance

FigureIII-21:LGUResponsivenessandPerformance

100. Almost3outof4Palestinianhouseholdsthinksthatvotinginmunicipalelectionscanhaveapositive impacton localservicedelivery.Household trust in theroleofelections inservicedeliverydifferssignificantlyacrossthePalestinianterritories.FigureIII-22showsthatwhileinGaza,82percentofthehouseholdsbelieveinsucharelationship,almostathirdofthehouseholdsintheWestBankdonotthinkthatvotingandserviceoutcomesareinterrelated.Trustintheroleofvotingisslightlyhigherinmunicipalities(69percent)thaninVCs(66percent),andintheCentralWestBank(75percent)thanintheNorth(63percent)andSouthWestBank(71percent).

+5.39*

LGUquintilewithhighestshareofhouseholdsthatusedcitizen

servicecenter(vs.lowestquintile)

+16.35***

LGUquintilewithhighestshareofhouseholdsagreeingthatLGUis

veryresponsive(vs.lowestquintile)


65


62

FigureIII-22:TrustintheRoleofElectionsinImprovingServiceDelivery

101. AlmosttwothirdsofPalestiniancitizensreporttoplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections.ThewillingnessofhouseholdstovoteinthenextmunicipalelectionsdifferssignificantlybetweentheWestBankandGaza(FigureIII-23).Atthetimeofthesurvey,inGaza,75percentofhouseholdsreportedtoplantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections,comparedtoonly56percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBank.TheresultfortheWestBankisveryclosetotheactualturnoutnumbersobservedbothinthelatestmunicipalelectionsinMay2017(53.4percent)and2012(52.15percent).Acrossmunicipali-tiesandVCs in theWestBank, theshareofhouseholds thatplannedtovote in the latestmunicipalelectionsissimilarat56and57percent,respectively.

FigureIII-23:ParticipationinFutureElections

102. CitizentrustintheimpactofvotingonservicedeliveryoutcomesandwillingnesstovoteinfutureelectionsarestronglyassociatedwithsatisfactionofLGUresponsiveness.FigureIII-24andFig-ureIII-25indicatethatcitizenswhoaresatisfiedwithLGUresponsivenessonaveragereportmoreoftenthatvotinghasanimpactonservicedelivery.AmongthehouseholdswhostronglyagreethattheirLGUisveryresponsive,86percentbelievethatvotinghasanimpactonpublicservices;andamongthosewhostronglydisagree,only59percentthinkthattheelectionsandservicesareconnected.Moreover,amongcitizenswhobelievethatvotinginmunicipalelectionsinfluencesservicedeliveryoutcomes,80percentplantovoteinthenextelection,comparedtojust28percentamongthosewhothinkvotingandpublicservicesarenotrelated.Similarly,amonghouseholdsthatstronglyagreethattheirLGUisresponsivetotheirconcernsandcomplaints,9outof10plantovoteinthenextmunicipalelections.

57%

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Plantovote Donotplantovote

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aJSCforsolidwastecollectionisactive,only1out4householdsreportedsolidwastecollectionservicesbyaJSC.

104. MayorsinlargercitiesintheWestBankemphasizetheimportanceofexistingfeedbackmech-anisms.AstheMayorofRamallahexplained:“WehaveadivisionforcomplaintsatourCitizenServicesCenter.Eachcitizencanfileawrittencomplaint,andweaddressitwithinaknowntimeframethatde-pendsonthenatureofthecomplaint…wearecommittedtoexamineeachcomplaintandletthecitizensknowaboutthedecision…”Inthesamecontext,theCityManagerofNablususesaprogramtofollowuphoweachdepartmentofthemunicipalitydealswithcomplaintsreceivedbyphone.“Theprogramtellsmehowmanycomplaintseachdivisionreceivesandhowmanyofthemhavebeendealtwithbytherelevantdivision…onceInoticethereisadelayfromoneofthedivisionsIcallthesupervisorsthereandurgethemtospeeduptheprocess…”MayorsalsoemphasizedthatcitizensinlargeWBcitiescanfiletheircomplaintselectronicallythroughmunicipalwebsitesandFacebookpages.

105. Incomparison,duetotheabsenceofCSCsinGaza,municipalitiesdependonthetraditionalQulemAl-Jomhoursystem,“Pen-of-the-Public”,todealwithcitizencomplaints.QulemAl-Jomhourisadivisionincityhallsorawindowassignedtoreceivecitizenwrittencomplaintsandtoreferthemtorelevantdepartments.Forexample,accordingtotheCityDirectorofKhanYunis,“AnindividualcanfileacomplaintthroughQulemAl-Jomhour…thenitgoestotherelevantdivisiontobedealtwith…attheendwesendatextmessagetocitizensupdatingthemabouttheircomplaints.”Inthesamecontext,DirectorsatRafahmunicipalitysaidthatQulemAl-Jomhourinthatcityisbeing“computerized”and“soonpeoplewillbeabletowritetheircomplaintsfromhome.”

106. In LGUs that have a OSS, only 16 percent of households know about their existence, illustrating that citizens’ knowledge of available feedback instruments is very limited. Comparing LGUs in the West Bank in which a OSS exists, striking results about citizens’ information emerge. Only16 percent of surveyed households report knowing that a CSC, including OSS, is available in theirmunicipality, 37 percent report that they did not knowwhether a CSC exists, and 46 percent evenreport that they believe that no CSC is available. Knowledge about availability of a CSC is slightlyhigher in largemunicipalities,whereat least1out5households reports thatanCSCexists, than inmediumandsmallmunicipalities,whereonlyabout15percentofhouseholdsreportavailabilityofanCSC.

FigureIII-26:KnowledgeaboutExistenceofOne-Stop-Shops

“Doesyourmunicipality/VChaveaCitizenServiceCenter/One-Stop-Shopavailable?”

Sample:Municipalities,whereOne-Stop-Shopisavailable

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AmongthehouseholdswhoaredissatisfiedwithLGUresponsivenesshowever,onlyslightlymorethanhalfreporttheyplantoparticipateinthenextmunicipalelection.

FigureIII-24:LGUResponsivenessandTrustinRoleofElectionsforServiceDelivery

FigureIII-25:LGUResponsivenessandFutureVotingBehavior

103. ThemajorityofhouseholdsintheWestBankandGazaarewell-informedandsatisfiedwiththeirlevelofknowledgeonlocalserviceprovision,howevertheknowledgeaboutmodesofservicedeliveryislow.Foreachofthefourservices–pipedwater,pipedsewage,wastecollection,andelec-tricity–only1outof10householdsreportedtheneedtoacquireinformationregardingaccess,mainte-nance,servicequalityorpriceduringthelast12months.Theoutletsusedbycitizenstoseekinformationdifferbyservice.Forinformationregardingtheelectricgridconnection,lessthanhalfoftherespondents(48percent)reportedthattheywouldcontactthemunicipality/VC,while55percentwouldcontactapublicutilitycompany.Inturn,forpipedwater,pipedsewage,andsolidwastecollection,thevastma-jorityofhouseholdsreceiveinformationfromthemunicipalityorVC(90percent,97percent,and98percent,respectively).Interestingly,ofthehouseholdsthatarecoveredbyanactiveJSCforwaterandwastewater,only1outof3reportedthatpipedwaterisprovidedbyaJSC.Accordingly,inLGUswhere

86%

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Canvotinginmunicipalelectionshaveapositiveimpactonservicedelivery?

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107. Usageoffeedback/complaintinstrumentsacrossthePalestinianterritoriesisverylow,whilelevelsofsatisfactionaremoderate.Only16percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankand8percentofhouseholdsinGazareporttohaveusedaCSCincludingOSS,themunicipality’sorVC´swebsite,afeed-backsystemoftheLGUorserviceprovider,oraservicebooklettoaddressaserviceissue.6percentofthehouseholdsintheWestBankreporttohaveusedafeedbacksystemoraLGU´swebsite,comparedto3percentand5percentinGaza,respectively.Whileonly4percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankhaveusedaservicecenter,includingOSSs,andjust2percentaservicebooklet,nohouseholdinGazareportstohaveusedaservicecenter,and lessthan1percentaservicebooklettoaddressaserviceissue.ComparingsatisfactionwithfeedbackinstrumentsintheWestBank,2outof3householdsthatusedservicebooklets,awebsite,orCSCweresatisfiedwiththerespectiveinstrumenttoresolveserviceproblems,whileonly40percentreportsatisfactionwithLGUandserviceproviderfeedbacksystems.InGaza,two-thirdsofthehouseholdsweresatisfiedwithresolvingaserviceissuethroughacomplaintontheirLGU´swebsite,whilelessthanhalfofhouseholdsweresatisfiedwithservicebookletsandfeedbacksystems.

108. Themajorityofcitizenswhoparticipated inqualitativeFGDsexpressedoverall satisfactionwithavailablemechanismstoresolveproblemswithpublicservices.However,thedegreeofsatisfac-tionamongcitizensisaffectedbyhoweffectivelylocalcouncilsaddresssubmittedcomplaints.CitizensinlargerWestBankLGUsexpressedhigherlevelsofsatisfactionwithcomplaintmechanismsandpro-cesses,especiallywhenfeedbacktimeframesaremadepublic.Also,thequalitativeanalysisshowsthatthelevelofsatisfactionishigherinLGUswhereneighborhoodcommitteesareavailableaschannelsforcitizenstofiletheircomplaints,especiallyinGaza.Electedneighborhoodcommitteestendtodealwithcomplaintsmoreeffectivelythanappointedones,accordingtorespondents.Villagesandsmalltownsareinclinedtoadoptlessinstitutionalizedcomplaintmechanisms.Theymostlyusean“open-door”pol-icyandencouragedirectcontactwithmayorsandcouncilmembersandstaff.However,evengoodcom-plaintsmechanismscannotaddressallissueswhenresourcesarelimited.Asexpressedbyonemayor,itdependsonthe“thenatureofthecomplaint,andtheavailabilityofresourcesdeterminehowwedealwithit.”

FigureIII-27:UsageandSatisfactionwithFeedbackInstrumentsacrossSectors

109. ThevastmajorityofcitizenswouldratherseektheirLGUdirectlytofileacomplaintinsteadofusingafeedbackorcomplaintsystemorCSC. Inthesituationofaproblemwiththeelectricgridconnection,48percentofrespondentswouldcontactthemunicipalityorVCoftheirLGU;howeverfar

2%

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WestBank Gaza

Instrumentusedtoaddressaserviceissue Satisfactionwithinstrumentused

67%

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46%

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morehouseholdswoulddosoforpipedwater,pipedsewage,orwastecollectionservices(79percent,79percent,and81percent,respectively).Forelectricity-relatedproblems,athirdoftherespondentswouldsubmitacomplaintataCSCorthroughafeedback/complaintsystemforproblems,butonlyaminornumber incaseofproblemswithpipedwater,pipedsewage,andwastecollectionservices(6percent,7percent,and5percent,respectively).Onaverageabout10percentofhouseholdsreportthattheywouldnotfileacomplaintatallincaseofaserviceissue,potentiallyreflectingdissatisfactionwiththeresponsivenessofLGUsandserviceproviders.

FigureIII-28:ChannelsforCitizens’FeedbackandComplaints

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Incaseofanyserviceproblem,howwouldyousubmitacomplaint?

SolidWasteCollection PipedWaterPipedSewageElectricity


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IV. Conclusion and Recommendations


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IV. Conclusion and Recommendations

4.1 Prioritize the Improvement of the Quality and Reliability of Services

110. Palestinianlocalgovernmentshavealmostachieveduniversalcoverageintermsofaccesstobasicservices.AccesstobasicservicesisremarkablyhighinthePalestinianterritories,althoughsatis-factionratesvarywidelyacrossLGUsandsectorsandthebottom40percentenjoyoveralllowerqualityofservices.However,householdincomeisnotamaindeterminantofservicedeliveryoutcomesandnogendergapexists.AllthoseareverypositiveachievementsunderextremelydifficultcircumstancesinahighlychallengingenvironmentoffragilityandconflictinthePalestinianterritories.Improvingthequal-ityandreliabilityofbasicserviceprovisionmustnowmovetothecenterofattentionforpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartners.

111. Increasingaccesstoimproveddrinkingwatershouldbegiventhehighestpriority,particularlyinGaza.Withalmosttheentirepopulation inGazadependentonpotablewaterdeliveredbytankertrucks,solvingtheGazawatercrisiswillremainthegreatestchallengeforlocalservicedeliveryintheyearstocome.ImprovementsinLGUperformancewillnotsolvethecrisis,whichgoeswellbeyondlocalgovernmentissues.IncreasingaccesstodrinkingwaterinGazawillrequirecriticalactionsfromthePal-estinianAuthority,theGovernmentofIsrael,andtheinternationalcommunitytoincreasebulkwatersupplytotheGazaStrip;reducetechnicalandfinanciallossesinamoribundwaterdistributionnetwork;treatandpromotethereuseofwastewater;andincreaselocaldesalinationcapacity, includingfromprivatewaterpurifiers,toaddresstheshort-termneedsofagrowingpopulation.

112. ImprovingwaterqualityremainsakeypriorityacrosstheWestBankaswell.AmorestrategicapproachisneededincoordinationwiththeMinistryofLocalGovernmentandthePalestinianWaterAuthoritytoconsolidatehighlyfragmentedwaterserviceproviders.AlthoughtheinstitutionalstructureofthatapproachhasbeenagreedonandadoptedbythePalestinianAuthority,implementationpro-gressislaggingbehindandwillnotacceleratewithoutparallellocalgovernmentsectorreform.Asitua-tioninwhichmorethan260localwaterdepartmentsoperatetosupplydrinkingwaterinawater-scarceenvironmentwithlargetechnicalandcommerciallossesissimplynotviable.Itaffectsthefinancialsus-tainabilityofoneofthekeypublicservicesectors,causeswatershortagesandisadraintothePalestin-ianeconomy.ThePalestinianAuthorityandPalestinianLGUsneedtomovedecisivelyintoestablishingregionalwaterandsanitationutilities.CurrentfinancialincentivesbywhichLGUsretainwateruserfeestocross-subsidizetheirgeneralexpenditureneedtobereplacedwithalternativefundingsources,in-cludingconditionalgrantsinexchangeforimprovedfinancialdiscipline.

113. LGUsmust strive toconvergequalityand reliability standards forbasic services.While thelocalgovernmentmandateisbroaderthanbasicserviceprovision,citizensatisfactionrateswillnotin-creaseunlesslocalgovernmentsdeliverontheirkeytasksofsupplyingreliabledrinkingwaterandsan-itationservices,collectthegarbagefromhouseholds,andensureawellmaintainedlocalroadnetwork.PrevailingvariationsinbasicservicedeliveryoutcomesaffecttheoveralllivingstandardsofPalestinians.However,lowsatisfactionrateswithLGUresponsivenesshashadanadverseimpactonthewillingnesstopayforpublicservicesamongcitizens,whichiscrucialtoaddressingthePalestinianAuthority’sseverefiscalcrisis.Forexample,thequalityandsatisfactionlevelofsolidwastecollectioncontinuestovarysignificantly.LGUsfullycontrolthisbasicserviceandcangenerallyimprovegarbagecollectionserviceswithoutincurringsignificantadditionalcapitalexpenditures,e.g.,forcollectionequipment,byoptimiz-ingserviceoperations.Establishingfeedbackmechanismsandaddressingcitizens’complaints,e.g.,on


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routesandcollectionschedules,canbeasimplebuteffectivewaytoimprovesatisfactionrates.Overall,goodgovernanceandprofessionalmanagementwillbecriticaltomakingLGUsmoreresponsivetotheneedsofcitizens,andtheywillalsohelpmakeLGUsmorereliablepartners forprivatebusinessandpromotinglocaldevelopment.Adependablesupplyofbasicpublicservicesisnotonlyakeydeterminantforimprovinglivingstandardsbutalsoapre-conditionformoreprivate-sectordrivengrowththatreliesonastableandpredictablesupplyofservices.WhilefactorssuchasaccesstoAreaCandtheseparationbarrierareoutofthecontrolofthePalestinianAuthority,thereareanumberofimportantpoliciesthatthePalestinianAuthoritycanimplementtoimproveservicedeliveryperformanceacrossPalestinianlo-calgovernments.Bothcentralandlocalauthoritiesshouldnotlosesightofactionsthatcanbetaken,eveninthechallengingframeworkofmovementandaccessrestrictionsofthePalestinianterritories.Someofthemostimportantinterventionsaresummarizedbelow.

4.2 Reform the Local Government Financing System as a Pre-condition for Success

114. Asacriticalfirststep,theMinistryofLocalGovernmentmustreviewandreviseLGUrevenueandexpenditureassignments.TheLocalGovernmentActof1997doesnotdistinguishbetweendele-gatedresponsibilitiesandownresponsibilities.Inthecaseofdelegatedresponsibilities,thePAwouldultimatelyberesponsiblefortheregulationandfinancingofthosefunctionsbuttheywouldbeimple-mentedbyLGUs.However,forownresponsibilities,LGUswouldgenerallyberesponsiblefortheser-vices,includingtheraisingofsufficientrevenues.TheabsenceofconditionalgrantsfromthePalestinianAuthoritytoLGUsunderthecurrentsystemofintergovernmentalfinanceindicatesthattheLocalGov-ernmentActwasnotintendedtointroducedelegatedresponsibilities.Furthermore,theactdoesnotdistinguishbetweenmandatoryfunctions,i.e.,servicesthatLGUsmustprovideandvoluntaryfunctions,i.e.,thosethatmaybeprovidediffundsareavailableandtheservicedeemedconvenientbythelocalcouncil.However,thecurrentrevenueassignmentsarenotevensufficienttodeliveroncorefunctions.ThesearemajorshortcomingsthatneedtobejointlyreviewedbytheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningandtheMinistryofLocalGovernment.

115. PalestinianLGUsarelargelydependentonservicefeesandchargestocovertheiroperationalexpenditures.Whilepopulationsizeandgeographiclocationmatter,theirimpactonLGUperformanceismore limited than local fiscal capacity.AlthoughPalestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsareresponsibleforprovidingcriticalpublicservices,theyhavenotbeenassignedsufficientrevenuesources.TheLocalGovernmentActassigns27functionalresponsibilitiestoLGUs,butthosefunctionalassign-mentsarenotmatchedwithappropriaterevenuesources.Althoughtheactassigns16revenuesourcestomunicipalities,LGUsdependheavilyonuserfeestofinanceoperatingexpenditures,nottomentioncriticalcapital investments.Onaverage,chargesandservice feesaccount for50–70percentof totalrevenues,mostly frompublicutility services suchaselectricityandwater,butalso fromcharges forbuildingpermits,solidwastecollection,signboards,andcemeteryfees,amongothers.

116. Addressingverticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesiscriticaltoimprovinglocalservicedeliv-eryperformance.LGUsaresupposedtoreceiverevenuefrompropertytaxes,professionallicensefees,educationtaxes,andtransportationfees,buttherevenuebasevariesdramaticallyacrossLGUs,leadingtoconsiderablehorizontalimbalances.Noregularandpredictableintergovernmentalfiscaltransferex-iststocovergenerallocalexpendituresandfundbasiccapitalinvestments.

117. WhilethepropertytaxispotentiallyasignificantrevenuesourceforLGUs,itisonlycollectedinmunicipalitiesandnotvillages,and theMinistryofFinanceandPlanning retains10percent for


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administeringthetax.Inpractice,propertytaxhastraditionallybeencollectedonlyinaround30mu-nicipalities,althoughthisnumberhasbeenexpandingmorerecentlyandhasnowreached70munici-palitiesintotal.However,muchofthetaxrevenuesgetfullyorpartiallyinterceptedbytheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningtocompensateforthearrearsaccumulated.Referredtoas“netlending,”thesearrearsareusuallyrelatedtoelectricityorlessoftentowatercharges.

118. Changingthefinancialincentivestructureforserviceprovisionwillneedtobeatthecoreofthereformagenda.Duetochronicunderfunding,LGUshavedevelopedapracticeofdivertingrevenuesfrom service fees tomeet their expenditures needs. Cross-subsidies andpayment arrears arewide-spreadandcommonpracticeacrossmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils.Currentincentivesarestrong:datafortheyears2011–13showthattotalrevenuespercapitaforvillagecouncilsinchargeofelectricitydistributioncanbeuptofourtimeshigherthanthosewithoutthatresponsibility.VillageCouncilswithelectricitydistribution functionswereable to spendover twiceasmuch inper capitaoperatinganddevelopment expenditures than thosewithout the responsibility for each year during the period of2011–13.Formunicipalities, there isadifferenceofalmost100percentbetween the twogroupsofmunicipalitiesintermsoftotalrevenuepercapitaforeachyearduringtheperiodof2011-13.Despitetherecentseparationofelectricitydistributionfromlocalgovernments,LGUscontinuetoreceivedivi-dendsfromelectricityrevenuesthattheyrequestfromdistributioncompaniesintheirroleasshare-holders.Incentivesandcurrentpracticesof“netlending”aresimilarinthewatersector.Thosefinancialincentivesneedtobereplacedwithalternativerevenuesources.

119. Breakingthisviciouscirclewillrequiredecisiveactionatthelocalandnationallevel.Keypri-oritiesinclude:(i)increaselocalrevenuecollection;(ii)improvetransparencyofpaymentflows,includ-inginteragencyarrears;(iii)sanctionentitieswhichdivertfundsfornon-essentialorunproductiveuse;and(iv)providefinancialsupporttothoseLGUswithoutthefiscalcapacitytoensurebasicservicepro-vision.Someprogresshasbeenmadetoaddresstheseunderlyingissues,butmoreneedstobedone.TheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram,supportedbyseveralDevelopmentPartners,providesaperfor-mance-basedinvestmentgranttomunicipalitiesallocatedthroughatransparentandpredictablemech-anism, subject toamunicipality implementingkey reformssuchas increasing revenuecollection forlocalservicesandimprovingtransparencyinbudgetingandreporting,amongother.WithsupportfromtheLocalGovernanceandServicesImprovementProgram,reformstotherevenue-sharingmechanismofthetransportationfeeareunderwaytomakeitmoretransparent,predictable,andregular.Inparallel,theMinistryofFinanceandPlanninghas improvedtransparency inreportingtheannualamountsofpropertytaxandtransportationfeetransferredtolocalauthorities.However,muchlessprogresshasbeenmade inestablishingaregular fiscal transfer fromthePalestinianAuthorityto localauthoritiesbeyondthedonor-fundedMunicipalDevelopmentProgram.Accordingly,progressalsohasbeenverylimitedinexpandinganddecentralizingpropertytaxcollectioninmunicipalities;andintroducingaddi-tionalownsourcerevenuesforLGUs.

120. Establishafiscaltransfermechanismthateffectivelyaddresses imbalances.Buildingontheexistingrevenuesharingsystemforthetransportationfees,moreneedstobedonetoreduceverticalimbalances.Forexample,thefullamountofthetransportationfeerevenuesshouldbeassignedtolocalgovernmentsbasedonastable-over-timeformulaforthedistributionofthefunds,suchasthatpilotedundertheLocalGovernanceandServices ImprovementProgram. Inaddition, largehorizontal imbal-anceswillrequireintroducingequalizationgrantsacrossbothmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsbasedonasubstantialpoolofannuallystableandpredictablefunds,forexample,asapercentageshareoftotalcentraltaxcollections.Further,thePAneedstointroduceasystemofconditionalgrantsbeyondthedonor-fundedMunicipalDevelopmentProgramtofunddelegatedresponsibilitiesandprovideanincentiveforLGUstocomplementandimplementthePalestinianAuthority´ssectoralobjectivesatthelocallevel.AchievingthisambitiousobjectivewillrequireclosercollaborationacrossDevelopmentPart-nersandawillingnesstomovefromfundingbasedon individualprojectstomore localbudget-and


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program-basedfinancing.

121. ThemainfunctionalresponsibilitiesofLGUsmustbeprofoundlyrefocused.Thecorporatiza-tionofutilityservices,suchaselectricityandwatersupply,shouldbeapriorityoverthemediumtermtoimprovethefinancialsustainabilityandperformanceofservicedelivery.OtherlocalservicesassignedtoLGUswillneedtoberevisedandupdatedfollowingseveralbasicguidelines,suchas:(i)introducingadifferentiationinfunctionalassignmentsbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs;(ii)clearlydifferentiatingbe-tweenobligatoryandvoluntaryservicesandbetweendelegatedandownservices;and(iii)clarifyingforeachcaseofdelegatedandownserviceswhoisresponsibleforthevariousaspectsofconcurrentre-sponsibilitiessuchasregulation,financing,andactualservicedelivery.

122. Provideadditionalrevenuesources,andenhancetheefficiencyofcollection.LGUslacksuffi-cientown-taxandnontaxrevenuestoprovidethepublicservicestheyhavebeenassigned.IncreasedfinancingofLGUsshouldcomeinlargepartfromown-revenuesourcesinadditiontoconditionalandunconditionaltransfers.Increasingtransparencyandimprovingservicedeliverywillbekeytoincreasingthewillingnesstopayamongcitizens.Inaddition,inordertoimproveLGUrevenues,moreattentionshouldbegiventotheefficiencywithwhichtaxesarecollected.Thepropertytaxislikelythemostsig-nificantpotentialrevenuesourceforLGUs,andthereismuchroomtoincreaseitby,forexample,ap-plyingittoallmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils,butalsorevampingandsimplifyingthecurrentvalua-tionmethodology.Globalexperiencedemonstratesthatpropertytaxdecentralizationcanhelpincreaserevenuesfromthatsource.Afirststepcouldbetodecentralizecollectiontolargemunicipalitieswiththehighestpotentialyieldwhilekeepingvalueassessmentscentralized.Theprofessionaltaxshouldbemodernizedtoincreaseitscoverage,unifyitsadministration,andreviseitsrates.LGUsarebestplacedtoadministerandcollecttheprofessionaltaxbecausetheyhaveinformationadvantagesovercentralauthorities.Finally,thePalestinianAuthorityshouldexplorebettermentlevies, i.e.,one-timechargesontheincreasedvalueofpropertiesassociatedwithurbanimprovements;assignthelandandpropertytransfertaxcurrentlyraisedbythePalestinianLandAuthoritytoLGUs;andconsiderintroducingalocalflat-rate“piggyback”personalincometaxtobepaidtothelocalgovernmentwherethetaxpayerkeepsresidence.

4.3 Strengthen LGU Accountability and Responsiveness to Increase Citizens’ Willingness to Pay

123. Absentaregularfiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernment,improvinglocalfiscalcapacitywillrequireenhancingbothrevenuecollectionandexpenditureefficiency.AccordingtotheLGPAfind-ings,householdsinthebottom40percentarelesslikelytopayforservicesthanhigher-incomehouse-holds.GiventhedeterioratingeconomicconditionsofPalestinianhouseholds,overallwillingnesstopayisunlikelytoincreasesubstantiallyinthenearfuture.MoreresponsiveLGUsareinabetterpositiontocollectmorerevenuesfromserviceusers.

124. Threedeterminantsaffecttheabilityoflocalcouncilstocollectfeesfromcitizensforprovidedservices.First,highlevelsofunemployment,especiallyinGazaandinthepoorestWestBankareas,posereal challenges topoorhouseholds inpaying their fees.Second, local councilsdonothaveeffectiveinstrumentstoencourageornudgeunwillingcitizenstopay.VeryfewLGUsapplypro-poorpaymentmodalitiesthroughpaymentplansorallowvulnerablecitizenstopayreducedamounts.BoxIV-1pro-videsanoverviewofbestpracticesthatallowedsomeLGUstoenhancecollectionefficiency.Thethirddeterminant is the lack timelinessof fiscal transfers to local councils.The lackof support from localcouncilstoincreasethewillingnessofcitizenstopayhinderseffortstoincreasecitizencommitmentsto


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routesandcollectionschedules,canbeasimplebuteffectivewaytoimprovesatisfactionrates.Overall,goodgovernanceandprofessionalmanagementwillbecriticaltomakingLGUsmoreresponsivetotheneedsofcitizens,andtheywillalsohelpmakeLGUsmorereliablepartners forprivatebusinessandpromotinglocaldevelopment.Adependablesupplyofbasicpublicservicesisnotonlyakeydeterminantforimprovinglivingstandardsbutalsoapre-conditionformoreprivate-sectordrivengrowththatreliesonastableandpredictablesupplyofservices.WhilefactorssuchasaccesstoAreaCandtheseparationbarrierareoutofthecontrolofthePalestinianAuthority,thereareanumberofimportantpoliciesthatthePalestinianAuthoritycanimplementtoimproveservicedeliveryperformanceacrossPalestinianlo-calgovernments.Bothcentralandlocalauthoritiesshouldnotlosesightofactionsthatcanbetaken,eveninthechallengingframeworkofmovementandaccessrestrictionsofthePalestinianterritories.Someofthemostimportantinterventionsaresummarizedbelow.

4.2 Reform the Local Government Financing System as a Pre-condition for Success

114. Asacriticalfirststep,theMinistryofLocalGovernmentmustreviewandreviseLGUrevenueandexpenditureassignments.TheLocalGovernmentActof1997doesnotdistinguishbetweendele-gatedresponsibilitiesandownresponsibilities.Inthecaseofdelegatedresponsibilities,thePAwouldultimatelyberesponsiblefortheregulationandfinancingofthosefunctionsbuttheywouldbeimple-mentedbyLGUs.However,forownresponsibilities,LGUswouldgenerallyberesponsiblefortheser-vices,includingtheraisingofsufficientrevenues.TheabsenceofconditionalgrantsfromthePalestinianAuthoritytoLGUsunderthecurrentsystemofintergovernmentalfinanceindicatesthattheLocalGov-ernmentActwasnotintendedtointroducedelegatedresponsibilities.Furthermore,theactdoesnotdistinguishbetweenmandatoryfunctions,i.e.,servicesthatLGUsmustprovideandvoluntaryfunctions,i.e.,thosethatmaybeprovidediffundsareavailableandtheservicedeemedconvenientbythelocalcouncil.However,thecurrentrevenueassignmentsarenotevensufficienttodeliveroncorefunctions.ThesearemajorshortcomingsthatneedtobejointlyreviewedbytheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningandtheMinistryofLocalGovernment.

115. PalestinianLGUsarelargelydependentonservicefeesandchargestocovertheiroperationalexpenditures.Whilepopulationsizeandgeographiclocationmatter,theirimpactonLGUperformanceismore limited than local fiscal capacity.AlthoughPalestinianmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncilsareresponsibleforprovidingcriticalpublicservices,theyhavenotbeenassignedsufficientrevenuesources.TheLocalGovernmentActassigns27functionalresponsibilitiestoLGUs,butthosefunctionalassign-mentsarenotmatchedwithappropriaterevenuesources.Althoughtheactassigns16revenuesourcestomunicipalities,LGUsdependheavilyonuserfeestofinanceoperatingexpenditures,nottomentioncriticalcapital investments.Onaverage,chargesandservice feesaccount for50–70percentof totalrevenues,mostly frompublicutility services suchaselectricityandwater,butalso fromcharges forbuildingpermits,solidwastecollection,signboards,andcemeteryfees,amongothers.

116. Addressingverticalandhorizontalfiscalimbalancesiscriticaltoimprovinglocalservicedeliv-eryperformance.LGUsaresupposedtoreceiverevenuefrompropertytaxes,professionallicensefees,educationtaxes,andtransportationfees,buttherevenuebasevariesdramaticallyacrossLGUs,leadingtoconsiderablehorizontalimbalances.Noregularandpredictableintergovernmentalfiscaltransferex-iststocovergenerallocalexpendituresandfundbasiccapitalinvestments.

117. WhilethepropertytaxispotentiallyasignificantrevenuesourceforLGUs,itisonlycollectedinmunicipalitiesandnotvillages,and theMinistryofFinanceandPlanning retains10percent for


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program-basedfinancing.

121. ThemainfunctionalresponsibilitiesofLGUsmustbeprofoundlyrefocused.Thecorporatiza-tionofutilityservices,suchaselectricityandwatersupply,shouldbeapriorityoverthemediumtermtoimprovethefinancialsustainabilityandperformanceofservicedelivery.OtherlocalservicesassignedtoLGUswillneedtoberevisedandupdatedfollowingseveralbasicguidelines,suchas:(i)introducingadifferentiationinfunctionalassignmentsbetweenmunicipalitiesandVCs;(ii)clearlydifferentiatingbe-tweenobligatoryandvoluntaryservicesandbetweendelegatedandownservices;and(iii)clarifyingforeachcaseofdelegatedandownserviceswhoisresponsibleforthevariousaspectsofconcurrentre-sponsibilitiessuchasregulation,financing,andactualservicedelivery.

122. Provideadditionalrevenuesources,andenhancetheefficiencyofcollection.LGUslacksuffi-cientown-taxandnontaxrevenuestoprovidethepublicservicestheyhavebeenassigned.IncreasedfinancingofLGUsshouldcomeinlargepartfromown-revenuesourcesinadditiontoconditionalandunconditionaltransfers.Increasingtransparencyandimprovingservicedeliverywillbekeytoincreasingthewillingnesstopayamongcitizens.Inaddition,inordertoimproveLGUrevenues,moreattentionshouldbegiventotheefficiencywithwhichtaxesarecollected.Thepropertytaxislikelythemostsig-nificantpotentialrevenuesourceforLGUs,andthereismuchroomtoincreaseitby,forexample,ap-plyingittoallmunicipalitiesandvillagecouncils,butalsorevampingandsimplifyingthecurrentvalua-tionmethodology.Globalexperiencedemonstratesthatpropertytaxdecentralizationcanhelpincreaserevenuesfromthatsource.Afirststepcouldbetodecentralizecollectiontolargemunicipalitieswiththehighestpotentialyieldwhilekeepingvalueassessmentscentralized.Theprofessionaltaxshouldbemodernizedtoincreaseitscoverage,unifyitsadministration,andreviseitsrates.LGUsarebestplacedtoadministerandcollecttheprofessionaltaxbecausetheyhaveinformationadvantagesovercentralauthorities.Finally,thePalestinianAuthorityshouldexplorebettermentlevies, i.e.,one-timechargesontheincreasedvalueofpropertiesassociatedwithurbanimprovements;assignthelandandpropertytransfertaxcurrentlyraisedbythePalestinianLandAuthoritytoLGUs;andconsiderintroducingalocalflat-rate“piggyback”personalincometaxtobepaidtothelocalgovernmentwherethetaxpayerkeepsresidence.

4.3 Strengthen LGU Accountability and Responsiveness to Increase Citizens’ Willingness to Pay

123. Absentaregularfiscaltransferfromthecentralgovernment,improvinglocalfiscalcapacitywillrequireenhancingbothrevenuecollectionandexpenditureefficiency.AccordingtotheLGPAfind-ings,householdsinthebottom40percentarelesslikelytopayforservicesthanhigher-incomehouse-holds.GiventhedeterioratingeconomicconditionsofPalestinianhouseholds,overallwillingnesstopayisunlikelytoincreasesubstantiallyinthenearfuture.MoreresponsiveLGUsareinabetterpositiontocollectmorerevenuesfromserviceusers.

124. Threedeterminantsaffecttheabilityoflocalcouncilstocollectfeesfromcitizensforprovidedservices.First,highlevelsofunemployment,especiallyinGazaandinthepoorestWestBankareas,posereal challenges topoorhouseholds inpaying their fees.Second, local councilsdonothaveeffectiveinstrumentstoencourageornudgeunwillingcitizenstopay.VeryfewLGUsapplypro-poorpaymentmodalitiesthroughpaymentplansorallowvulnerablecitizenstopayreducedamounts.BoxIV-1pro-videsanoverviewofbestpracticesthatallowedsomeLGUstoenhancecollectionefficiency.Thethirddeterminant is the lack timelinessof fiscal transfers to local councils.The lackof support from localcouncilstoincreasethewillingnessofcitizenstopayhinderseffortstoincreasecitizencommitmentsto


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payforservices(e.g.,supportenforcementorcourts).Notably,notonlyindividualusers,butalsogov-ernmentalauthoritiesandinstitutions,donotpayfortheservicestheyreceivefromLGUs.Forexample,thedeputymayorofNablusreportsthat“accumulativedebtwhichcitizensowethemunicipalityisaboutNIS310million,whilePalestinianAuthorityinstitutionslocatedinNablusoweNIS60million.”SimilararrearswerereportedinmunicipalitiesinGaza.

125. Responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentsarecriticaltobetterperformanceandtoin-creasingthewillingnesstopayamongcitizens.Inparalleltorevisingtheintergovernmentalfiscalar-chitecture,particularemphasismustbegiventostrengthening localgovernanceandcitizenengage-ment.RegardlessofthesizeandlocationofaLGUortheinstitutionalarrangementforserviceprovision,theLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentrevealsconsistentlybetterperformanceforresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovernments.ThereisalargeandgrowingnumberofLGUsthathaveachievedhigher levels of service delivery performance through strengthening citizen engagement, improvingtransparency andaccountability, andenhancing local revenues.Rather thandiverting attention intonominaldebatesabouttheoptimalsizeofLGUs,moreattentionshouldbegiventosupportingeffectivegovernancearrangementsthatengagecitizensatallstagesofdevelopmentplanning,investmentprior-itization,andfeedbackonservicedeliveryperformance.


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BoxIV-1:HowdoSomeLGUsIncreaseRevenueCollectionEfficiency?

1

Duringthequalitativedatacollectionprocess,mayorsandcouncilmemberswereaskedabouttestedinnovationstoincreaseservicefeecollectionfromresidents.Theirinputissummarizedbelow.

i. Prepaidsystemsarethemosteffectivewayofincreasingcollectionrates,buttillposechallenges.Resultsfromthehouseholdsurveyaswellasthequalitativere-searchsuggestthatprepaidsystemscanhelptackletheproblemofalowlevelofwillingnesstopayforservices.Householdsusingaprepaidmeterforpipedwaterareonaverage2.85timesmorelikelytopay.Householdsusingaprepaidmeterforelectricityare20timesmorelikelytopayand1.39timesmorelikelytopayontime.Thereisalsoageneralagreementamongmayorsthattheprepaidapproachtoser-vicedeliveryishighlyeffectiveatensuringpayment.InthewordsoftheBeitKahilMayor,“payinginadvance…islikebuyingfromastore—ifyoudonotpayforit,youcannotgetit.”However,imposingaprepaidsystemisdifficultduetothecostofinstallingnewequipment.TheBeitKahilcouncil“decidedtoinstallprepaidwatermeters…itturnedoutthattheequipmentfor1,185householdsweneedforourtowncostsUSD160,000.MoLGwaswillingtoprovideUSD100,000butwecannotcovertheremainder[ofUSD60,000]…althoughweneedtheupgradeurgently.”Inaddition,imposingprepaymentforcoreservicessuchaswatercanprovokesocialbacklashformayorsandcouncils,aswasthecaseforBaniZeidalGarbiy,whereanongovernmentalorganizationgotinvolvedtopreventtheintroductionofprepaidmeters,arguingthat“waterisabasichumanrightandshouldnotbecutofffrompeoplebecausetheycannotaffordit,”accordingtothemayor.

FigureIV-1:Pre-paidMetersandCitizens’WillingnesstoPay

ii. Linking payments for different services can increase efficiency. For example,whenpayingforelectricity,citizensofSalimandBeitKahilautomaticallyhavetoalsopayforwastecollectionservices.AccordingtoacitizenfromBeitKahil,“with-outconnectingotherservicestoprepaidelectricitysupply…manypeoplewillnotpayforwastecollectionorschoolfees.”ThemayorofBeitKahilexplains:“becauseelectricityisaprepaidservicethecollectionrateis100percent.Connectingwaste


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2

collectionfeesallowsthecounciltoplanwithrevenuewithcertainty,whichwedependonheavilytopaysalariesandto improvesomeofourservices.”OthermunicipalitiessuchasBethlehemaretryingtodothesame.

iii. Discountsforpayingtotalannualfeesatonetimemobilizespaymentsandpro-videsmorestablerevenues.ManyLGUsintheWestBankandGazaoffersub-stantialreductionsinservicefeesifacitizenpaysthefullannualamountatonetime,suchasforwastecollectionorpropertytaxes.ThedeputymayorofBeth-lehemdescribesthemethodadoptedbyhismunicipality:“Peoplereceive20per-cent discountwhen they pay the fullannual amount in January,15 percent inFebruary,10percentinMarch,and5percentinApril.”Eventhoughthemethoddoesnotensurethatallcitizenspayforservices,itreducespaymentdelaysandmakeslocalgovernmentunit(LGU)revenuestreamsmorepredictable.Accord-ing to themayorof Khan Yunis: “In thepastweused tohave awrongpolicy,rewardingpeoplewhodidnotpaybyofferingdiscountstoencourage themtopay…however,nowweadoptedareversepolicyofencouragingthosewhoarecommittedandpaytheirfeesontime….”

iv. Socialpressurecanbeaneffectivemethodinsmallerandmid-sizeLGUs.Askedhowserviceprovidersshouldreactincasehouseholdsdonotpayforpipedwa-ter,solidwastecollectionservices,orelectricity,only1in20householdsintheWestBankandGazasuggestdisconnectingthehousehold,whilealmosthalfofthehouseholdssuggestasthemostviableoptionvisitingthehouseholdtoun-derstandtheproblemsit isfacing.Suchformsofsocialpressureareespeciallyusedinvillagesandsmallertownstoencouragelate-payerstosettletheirdebtsto local councils.Themayorof Salimdescribeshowhepersonallyhelped theelectricityutilitycollectfeesfromcitizensinthevillagebygoingfromhousetohouse.“Thecompanydidwanttotellthepoliceandweusedsocialpressuretosolvethisissue…wesolved50percentofit…wewentfromhousetohousewiththem.”Somevillagecouncilsorganizevisitstononpayinghouseholds totry to“understandtheirfinancialsituationandfindsomesolutionsaccordingly.”Simi-larly,thecityengineerofHebronreportsthat“wepreferfamilyinfluencemorethanresortingtothelaworpolice.Wegotoanareaoraneighborhoodandtalktoasocialor tribalfigure…whouseshispersonnelandfamilyconnectionstosolvetheissue.”

v. Offeringpaymentplanstosettledelayedpayments.AlargeshareofPalestinianhouseholds suggest that a service provider should offer a payment plan if ahouseholdisnotpayingforpipedwater(44percent),solidwastecollection(39percent),orelectricity(46percent).Infact,mostLGUstrytoreachsettlementsorsignpaymentplanswithhouseholdsthathaveoverduepayments.AccordingtotheGazaCitydirector,“wedevelopapaymentplanforpeoplewhocannotaffordpaying[but]wedonotapplyageneral-decreaseoffees…[becauseotherhouseholdswouldalsostoppaying].However,we resort tocourttodealwiththosewhodonotwanttopay.”Similarly,themayorofGazasaysthat“ifacitizenhasacumulativedebt,weask[thehousehold]topaythenextbillandpayapartofthedebt,suchasanadditional50NIS,everytimethefuturebillsarepaid.”


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3

And the Mayor of Ramallah notes: “Our municipality sent official letters tohouseholdsinformingthemofthedebttheyhavetopayandencouragingthemtocometoreachasettlementwiththemunicipality.Asettlementdoesnotin-cludeanydiscountbutisonlybasedonascheduledrepaymentapproach.”

FigureIV-2:Non-payment:HowShouldServiceProvidersRespond?

vi. CertificatesofclearanceareleveragedbyLGUstoencouragecitizenstopayservicefees.Amongthemosteffectiveapproachestonudgecitizensintopayingforservicesare"certificatesofclearance.Theselettersverifythatnofeesandtaxes are overdue. Local councils use the certificates as a pre-condition forprovidingcitizenswithofficiallettersandotherservices.

vii. Otherinnovations,suchasdecentralizedpaymentlocations,canhaveaposi-tiveimpactontheefficiencyoffeecollection.Providingcitizenswiththeoptionofmakingpaymentsatadecentralized location, suchasaCSC,OSS,or localshop,canincreasefee-collectionrates.ThecitymanagerofNablusisconsider-ingissuing"VIP"cardstorewardcitizenswhopayontime.“Thiscardwouldberenewedannuallyandallowsitsholdertoreceive‘fastertreatment’whentheyapproachthemunicipalityoroneofitsoffices…asarewardfortheircommit-ments.”

viii. Resorting tocourt. In someLGUs, especially in largecities suchasGazaCity(withapopulationof700,000),localcouncilssometimesresorttocourtasalastoptiontoforcepeopletopayfortheservicestheyreceive.However,itremainsunclearhoweffectivesuchanapproachis,particularlygiventhatdelayedandnon-paymentsareoftendrivenbyunemploymentandpoverty.Inaddition,lessthan4percentofhouseholdsintheWestBankandGazabelievethatserviceprovidersshouldtakecasesofhouseholdsnotpayingfortheservicestheyre-ceivetocourt.


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4.4 Consolidate and Professionalize Service Delivery

126. Aclearpolicyformoreprofessionalandcorporatizedservicedeliverymustbedeveloped.JointServiceCouncilsplayacriticalroleinconsolidatingservicedeliverybecausetheycangraduallyassumeserviceoperationfunctionsfromsmallandmostlyweakLGUs,providetheneededscale,anddevelopintothenucleusofafutureregionalpublicutility.However,JSCsdonotbythemselvesguaranteebetterservicedeliveryperformanceiftheyarenotmatchedwithmoreprofessionalmanagementandstrongaccountabilitymechanismsintermsofserviceusersaswellasthelocalauthoritiestheyrepresent.Largevariationsintheperformanceofsingle-andmultipleserviceJSCssuggestanurgentneedtoestablishaclearactionplanincoordinationwiththeresponsiblelineagencies,particularlythePalestinianWaterAuthority,toseparateandprofessionalizeserviceoperations,withclearlyassignedrevenuestreamsandmeasurableperformancestandardstooperateasindependentutilities.Overall,Palestinianpolicymak-ersshouldaimat integratingvillagesandmunicipalities intomoredenselypopulatedurbanareastoachievebetterperformanceoutcomes.Publicutilitiescanbeaneffectivemeansofregionalintegration.

127. CorporatizingpublicserviceutilitieswillrequireclearingLGUarrearsandstrengtheningthegovernancestructureforserviceprovision.Afirstcriticalsteptodisentanglefinancialflows,understandexpenditureefficiency,andeventuallysolvethenetlendingissueistoestablishseparatecostaccountsforutilityservices,particularlywaterandwastewaterandsolidwastemanagement.Theestablishmentofdistributioncompaniesintheenergysectorhasbeenadecisivepushintherightdirectiontoring-fenceandcommercializeelectricitydistributionfunctions,althoughrevenuescontinueflowingbackintheformofdividends.However,currentbudgetingandreportingpracticesdonotallowforconsistentandtransparenttrackingoffinancialflows;andoverallpaymentdisciplineislow.Inadditiontoseparat-ingaccountsandapplyingfunctionalbudgetclassificationtoimproveLGUbudgetingandreporting,ex-istingandwell-performingsingle-service JSCsshouldbetransformed intomore independententitieswiththegoalofbecomingutilitiesoverthemediumterm.Withanewbylawonjoint-serviceprovision,theMinistryofLocalGovernmenthasstartedadoptingamoreutility-drivenapproachtogoverningJSCs.However, implementationhasbeen slow, and there is no consensus yeton the trajectory that JSCsshouldaspiretobetweenthespectrumof“umbrella-LGU”to“commercialserviceoperator.”TheMoLGneedstodefineaclearpolicydirectivewithcross-PAbuy-in.

128. JSCsshouldbeheldtohigherstandards,buttheywillrequireadditionalsupport.MostoftheJSCssufferfromaweakfinancingstructureandhavelittleownrevenues.Feecollectionisweakandthetariffschargedrarelycoveroperatingcosts,letalonecapitalreplacementanddepreciation.Overall,bill-ingandaccountingsystemsneedanoverhaul.OnlyhalfoftheJSCsassessedbytheWorldBankwereablepresentabudgetthathadbeenapprovedbytheGeneralAssembly.AnnualJSCaccountsrarelyundergoanexternalaudit,especiallyPlanningandDevelopmentJSCs.Introducingmorerigidauditingrequirementsisanimportantsteptowardimprovingtransparencyandaccountability.Strongerclientorientationandcitizenfeedbackwillrequireestablishingcomplaintmechanisms,mostofwhicharecur-rentlyweakornonexistent.Mostimportantly,JSCsshouldbegivenmoreindependence,andtheirbot-tom-upaccountabilitylinkstothememberLGUsandserviceusersstrengthened,ratherthantop-downtotheMoLG,whichcurrentlyreviewsandapprovesJSCbudgets,hassignificantleewayintheallocationofdevelopmentfunds,andisconsideringestablishingadirectbudgetlinetofinanceJSCs.Inparallel,specifictechnicalcapacityandinstitutionalstrengtheningtosupportbetterperformingJSCsareneededtohelpthosethataretransformingintoprofessionalanddedicatedserviceoperators.Astrongerrolefortheprivatesectorneedstobeconsidered,drawingonrecentpositiveexperiences,forexampleintheHigherJSCforSolidWasteManagementinthesouthernWestBank.


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4.5 Increase Density and Connectivity, and Support the Marginalized that the PA Cannot Reach

129. PoliciestosupportincreaseddensitywillhaveanimpactonLGUperformanceandthecostofservicedelivery.Globalevidencesuggestsastrongcorrelationbetweenincreaseddensityandexpendi-tureefficiency,whichhasbeenconfirmedbytheLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentfindings.Percapitacostofservicedeliveryincreaseswithdecliningdensity,giventhatthenumberofhouseholdsservedismuchlowerinlessdenselypopulatedareas.Thishasadirectimpactonthecapitalandoper-atingcostofinfrastructurenetworksandserviceprovision,suchasthewaterandsewagepipemeters,andoperatinghoursforsolidwastecollectiontrucksthathavetocoveralargeserviceareawithfewusers.ThepoliciesofthePalestinianAuthoritycanhelpinfacilitatingdenserdevelopmentincitiesandmunicipalities,includingbutnotlimitedto:adjustingcurrentfloor-to-arearatiosforbuildingpermits,whichcurrentlycurtailnewdevelopmentstoeight-storybuildings;introducingvacantlandfeestopro-videanincentiveforbringingidlelandbacktomarket;andotherzoningregulationstoallowfordenser,mixed-useddevelopments.

130. Reducingthecostof remotenessand improvingconnectivitycanalso improveLGUperfor-mance.PalestinianLGUsareconstrainedbytheterritorialfragmentationimposedasaresultofAreaCrestrictions,severelylimitingtheextenttowhichinvestmentsintheregionalroadsnetworkcanimproveconnectivityandaccessforremotecommunities.Selectedimprovementsinthetransportationnetworkandbettertrafficmanagement,particularlyinlargerurbanagglomerations,maycontributetothere-ductioninthecostofremotenessandimproveconnectivity.However,thedirectimpactofthePalestin-ianAuthority'spoliciesandinvestmentdecisionsisrathermarginalduetotheconstraintsinthePales-tinianterritories,andaddressingissuesofremotenesstoimproveLGUperformancewillrequireactionsbytheIsraeliCivilAdministration(ICA).Nevertheless,basedonselectpositiveexamples,thePalestinianAuthority,incoordinationwithDevelopmentPartners,shouldconsidermakingspecificproposalstotheICAforexpandingcriticalaccessroadsordevelopingotherpracticalsolutionstobetterserveremotecommunities.Since2012,around113masterplanshavebeenpreparedtosupportcapitalinvestmentandservicedeliveryimprovementsin77LGUswithPalestiniancommunitieslivinginAreaC.However,todate,onlyfiveoftheplanshavebeenapprovedbytheICA.Theothermasterplansthatweresubmit-tedforapprovalarestillawaitingadecision,81ofthemhavebeenpendingformorethan18months.

131. Complementaryandtargetedpoliciestosupportcitizensinmarginalizedcommunitiesmustbedeveloped.LocalgovernmentsectorsupportalonewillnotsufficetoaddressthelargedifferencesinlivingstandardsacrossPalestine,particularlyunderthecurrentregimeofmovementrestrictions.AsignificantgroupofLGUshavereceivedsubstantialexternalsupport,butremainatlowlevelsofservicedeliveryoutcomes,includingmarginalizedLGUswithhighratesofpovertyand/orthatareheavilyaf-fectedbytheprevailingmovementandaccessrestrictions.Socialprotectionpolicies,suchascashtrans-fersorothertargetedinterventionstodirectlyreachthepoorarecriticalgiventhestrongcorrelationbetweenincreasinghouseholdwealthandbetterLGUperformance.Localgovernmentsupportcannotfullysubstitutecorefunctionsthataretheresponsibilityofthecentralgovernment.


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4.6 Benchmarking for Improving Local Government Performance

132. Finally,theMinistryofLocalGovernmentshouldinstitutionalizeperformancebenchmarkingandmakeitanintegralinstrumentforevidenced-basedpolicymaking.TheLocalGovernmentPerfor-manceAssessmenthasdevelopedaninstrumentthatcanbereplicatedinthefuturetotrackperfor-mancetrendsandimprovements,assessefficacyofpolicymeasures,andregularlyevaluatedonorsup-port.FollowingthesuccessfulexampleofbenchmarkingundertheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram,theMinistryofFinanceandPlanningandtheMoLGshouldconsiderlinkingcapitalgrantallocationstoclearperformancetargetsinLGUs.Regularnationalbenchmarkingoflocalservicedeliveryperformancecan serveas thebasis fora conditional grant transferprogram, linkinggrantallocation to theclear,sector-specificpolicyobjectivesofthePalestinianAuthority,e.g.,intheenergyandwatersector.Fur-thermore,thedataofLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentcanassistinmeasuringexpenditureefficiencytobetterunderstandtheuseofscarcepublicresourcesatthelocallevel.TheMinistryofLocalGovernmenthasalreadyestablishedaneffectivegeospatialdepartmentthathasdevelopedanonlinelocalgovernmentinformationsystem.Inaddition,theMunicipalDevelopmentandLendingFundhasuniqueexperienceinmanagingaperformance-basedgrantmechanismandprovidingtargetedcapacity-buildingsupporttomunicipalities.ThesearetremendousassetsthatPalestinianlocalgovernmentscanrelyonastheystrivetocontinueimprovingperformanceforthebenefitoftheircitizens.

133. Thedatacollectedforthisanalysiscanhavewidespreaduseinongoingorplanneddevelop-mentprograms.TheyprovidethePalestinianAuthorityandDevelopmentPartnerswithauniqueop-portunitytocomplementthesupply-sidedatathattheMunicipalDevelopmentLendingFundcollectsfrommunicipalitiesfortheMunicipalDevelopmentProgram’sperformancerankingwithdemand-sideinformationonservicedeliveryoutcomes.Particularly,dataonLGUresponsivenessandcitizensatisfac-tioncanstrengthenthecurrentassessmentof localaccountability,providingamorecomprehensivewaytoassessLGUperformanceinthiscriticalfocusarea.TherecentlylaunchedUSAID-financed“Com-munitiesThrive”ProgramwilluseLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentfortheirbaselineassess-mentandimpactmonitoringovertheprogram'slifetime.Furthermore,theMinistryofLocalGovern-mentshouldusetheLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmenttomonitorservicedeliveryimprove-mentsintheprogramvillagessupportedbytheLocalGovernanceandServicesImprovementProgram.

134. Citizenscorecards.Atthelocallevel,theLocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessmentallowsforabroaderapplicationofcitizenscorecards.EachLGUcouldbeprovidedwithascorethatcouldbemadepubliclyavailabletohelpcitizenandcommunity-basedorganizationsunderstandtherelativepositionoftheirLGUcomparedwithotherlocalauthorities.Substantialglobalexperienceexistsdemonstratingthe positive impact of strengthening citizen engagement at the local level, spurring innovation andknowledgeexchangeamongLGUs,providingadditionalincentivesforimprovement,andtrackingpro-gressovertime.


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References

Araj,Bader.2017.“QualitativeResearchReportFocusGroupDiscussionsandKeyInformantInterviews.”WestBankandGaza:LocalGovernmentPerformanceAssessment.WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.BritishMandateofPalestine.1942.“JerusalemDistrictOutlineRegionalPlanningSchemeRJ/5.”BritishMandatePalestine.BritishMandateofPalestine.1945.“SamariaDistrictRegionalOutlinePlanningSchemeS15.”BritishMandatePalestine.IFC/PPIAF (International Finance Corporation/Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility). 2015.“West Bank andGaza - Assessing the Potential for Public-Private Partnerships.”World BankGroup.WashingtonD.C.MDLF(MunicipalDevelopmentLendingFund).2016.“AnnualReport2016.”Ramallah.Niksic,Orhan,andNurNasserEddin.2016.“PublicExpenditureReview-Palestinianterritories.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.Niksic,Orhan,NurNasserEddin,andMassimilianoCali.2013.“WestBankandGaza-AreaCandtheFutureofPalestinianEconomy.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.PalestinianNationalAuthority.1994.“Town,VillageandBuildingPlanningLaw,No.79,1966.”Ramallah.PalestinianNationalAuthority.1997.“LocalAuthoritiesLaw,1997.”Ramallah.PalestinianNationalAuthority.2014.“WaterLaw,2014.”Ramallah.PalestinianNationalAuthority.2016. “PalestinianNationalPolicyAgenda2017-2022PuttingCitizensFirst.”Ramallah.PalestinianCentralBureauof Statistics,Various years. PopulationsProjections (database).Ramallah,http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/803/default.aspxUNOCHA(UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs).2009.“RestrictingSpace:ThePlanningRegimeAppliedbyIsraelinAreaCoftheWestBank.”UnitedNations.NewYork.UNOCHA(UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs).2013.“IntheSpotlight:AreaCVulnerabilityProfile.”UnitedNations.NewYork.WHO/UNICEF(WorldHealthOrganization/UnitedNationsChildren'sFund).Variousyears.JointMoni-toringProgramme(JMP)forWaterSupplyandSanitation.Geneva,https://www.wssinfo.org/WorldBank.Variousyears.WorldDevelopment Indicators (database).WashingtonD.C.,http://data-bank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicatorsWorldBank.2007.“WestBankandGazaTransportSectorStrategyNote.”WorldBankGroup.Washing-tonD.C.


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WorldBank.2014.“StrategicFrameworkforMainstreamingCitizenEngagementinWorldBankGroupOperations.”Washington,DC.WorldBank.2015.“JointServicesCouncilAssessmentintheWestBankandGaza.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.WorldBank.2016.“EconomicMonitoringReporttotheAdHocLiaisonCommittee:mainreport.”WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C. WorldBank.2017.“TowardWaterSecurityforPalestinians,WestBankandGazaWASHPovertyDiag-nostic”.WorldBankGroup.WashingtonD.C.


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Annex

Annex 1: Methodology of Household Survey

BackgroundandObjectiveAsexistingmunicipaldataisverylimitedinitsscopeandonlycoversminimalinputsintoservicedelivery,ahouseholdsurveycoveringmorethan380PalestinianLGUSwasconducted.ThemaingoaloftheLGPAsurveyistoestablishthequantitativebasisforanalyzingperformanceofPalestinianlocalgovernmentsandabaselineforfuturebenchmarkingtotargetinvestmentandpolicyinterventions.Thehouseholdsurveydata for thefirst timeallowsforanassessmentonthe ‘demandside’ofservicedeliveryout-comes,suchasaccess,qualityandreliability,responsiveness,andwillingnesstopayforservicesman-datedtomunicipalitiesandVCs.DataCollectionThequantitativedatacollectionfortheLGPAwasconductedbyAlphaInternationalforPolling,ResearchandInformatics,aPalestinianenterprisethatoperatesthroughouttheWestBankandGaza.ThedatacollectionwasconductedbetweenAugust15,2016andFebruary9,2017,usingTabletAssistedPersonalInterviewing(TAPI),andconsistedoftwoparts:

1) HouseholdSurvey(longinterview)

Thehouseholdsurveydatafocusesonaccesstopublicservices,qualityandreliabilityofservicedelivery,andcitizens’participationandwillingnesstopay,whichallowsforanin-depthanalysisofthedriversofLGUperformanceinservicedelivery.Thesurveymodulesincludeaservicedeliveryassessmentofthefollowing sectors: (i) water supply; (ii) waste water; (iii) electricity; (iv) solid waste collection; (v)education; (vi)public transport; (vii)healthcare;and (viii) local roads. Inaddition, themodulesalsocollecteddataon(ix)householddemographicsandsocio-economics;(x)citizenparticipation;and(xi)willingnesstopay.

2) ServiceDeliveryPoll(shortinterview)

Theservicedeliverypollisusedtocollectacoresetofservicedeliveryoutcomeindicatorsduringarapidface-to-facepollingassessmentforallmunicipalitiesandVCs.Thepollingdatacomplementsthemorecomprehensivehouseholdsurvey.SamplingThe survey sample is representative for the entire population. The household sample of N=11,970householdsisdesignedtoberepresentativeattheGovernorateandtheLGUlevel.Thesampleispopu-lationweightedandbasedonaremotesensingsamplingframework.ThetotalavailablesampleincludesN=9,562longinterviewsandanadditionalN=2,408shortinterviews.


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Annex 2: Methodology Qualitative Analysis

FocusGroupsandStakeholderInterviewswereconductedin8majorcitiesandin10small&medium-sizeLGUsinboththeWestBankandGaza.Theselectionwasconductedbasedon:

• Size(PCBSpopulationdata)

• LGUtype(municipality/villagecouncil)

• Modeofservicedelivery(individualvs.jointservicecouncil)

• Incomelevel(MDLFData)

• Performanceinservicedelivery(LGPAhouseholdsurveyresults)

AparticularfocusofthequalitativeanalysiswastoidentifythedriversofLGUperformance,particu-larly(i)theeffectivenessofJointServiceCouncils,(ii)theroleofinstitutionalcapacity,and(iii)theim-pactofimprovementintransparencyandaccountability.

FigureA2-1:MunicipalitiesandVCsSelectionforQualitativeAnalysis


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Annex 3: Methodology LGPA Performance Index

ThekeyobjectiveoftheLGPAperformanceindexistoconductcomparisonsoflocalgovernmentper-formanceacrossallLGUsintheWestBankandGaza,inordertogainbetterinsightsintothemaindriversofservicedeliveryandhowtocloseexistinggapsinLGUperformance.TheaimoftheIndexistoprovideatoolforbothpolicymakersandDevelopmentPartnerstoidentifyandtargetinterventionsinVCsandmunicipalities.Threedimensionsareusedforeachofthefourcoresectorstoconstructacomprehen-sivemeasure:methodologically,fortheservicespipedwater,pipedsewage,andsolidwastecollectionservice,LGUperformanceismodeledasaCobb-Douglas-stylefunction,takingintoaccountcitizensat-isfactionwithbothservicequalityandreliability,

FigureA3-1:MethodologyLGPAPerformanceIndex

,whereAccessreferstothepercentshareofcitizensinLGUithathasaccesstoservices,QualitytothepercentshareofcitizensinLGUithatissatisfiedwithqualityofservices,andReliabilitytothepercentshareofcitizensinLGUithatissatisfiedwithreliabilityofservices.Forroads,theLGUperformancescoreisdefinedastheshareofcitizensinLGUithatarelocatedatapavedroad.

TheoverallLGUperformanceindexscoreisthenobtainedbycalculatingtheaverageofthefourindi-vidualservicescores,normalizedtoarangeof0to100.Byweightingthesatisfactionoutcomeswiththeshareofcitizenswithaccesstothecoreservices,theindexrewardsLGUswithhigheraccessrates,whilepenalizingLGUs, inwhichonlysmallsharesofcitizensareprovidedaccesstothecoreservices.Asaresult,onlythoseLGUsreachhighscoresthat(i)achievestrongscoresinmultipledimensionsand(ii)provideservicesforasignificantshareofcitizens.


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Annex 4: Regression Results

Service Access

Sample: West Bank

Piped Water

Piped Sewage

Solid Waste Collection

Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Female Household Head 1.288 0.998 0.975 1.081

(0.499) (0.245) (0.190) (0.115)

Village Council 0.795 0.642** 0.593* 1.222***

(0.172) (0.109) (0.147) (0.062)

Regions (Reference: North)

- Central West Bank 3.057 1.025 0.174** 1.185

(1.928) (0.280) (0.097) (0.120)

- South West Bank 0.981 0.555* 0.183*** 1.000

(0.372) (0.148) (0.089) (0.078)

Bottom 40% Household 0.529*** 0.741 0.686** 0.844

(0.084) (0.135) (0.094) (0.074)

LGPA Performance Index 1.043*** 1.087*** 1.048*** 1.078***

For Sector (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)

Pseudo R-squared 0.192 0.674 0.223 0.119

Number of Observations 9,048 9,028 9,050 9,052

Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 1: Likelihood of Service Access - West Bank (Figure II-17 & Figure II-18)


88


84

Service Access

Sample: Gaza

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Female Household head 1.865* 0.793 1.410 1.087 (0.551) (0.286) (0.342) (0.231)

Bottom 40% Household 0.805 0.967 1.005 0.778 (0.166) (0.263) (0.143) (0.105)

Performance Index 1.039** 1.091*** 1.058*** 1.041**

For Sector (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002)

Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.340 0.136 0.031


Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to Gaza. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 2: Likelihood of Service Access - Gaza (Figure II-17 & Figure II-18)


89


85

Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability

Sample: West Bank

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Female Household head 1.143 1.352 1.023 1.258 (0.090) (0.497) (0.127) (0.231)

Village Council 1.021 1.289 1.023 0.638** (0.048) (0.268) (0.050) (0.096)


- Central West Bank 1.132 1.251 1.160** 1.436(0.116) (0.335) (0.064) (0.344)

- South West Bank 1.157 1.731*** 1.081 1.558 (0.168) (0.241) (0.050) (0.450)

Bottom 40% 0.987 1.127 1.283* 1.019 (0.115) (0.449) (0.136) (0.090)

Performance Index 1.051*** 1.009* 1.049*** 1.032***

For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008)

Pseudo R-squared 0.212 0.013 0.120 0.029



Table A4 - 3: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - West Bank (Figure II-19 & Figure II-20)


90


86

Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability

Sample: Gaza

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Female Household head 0.964 1.417* 0.488 1.008 (0.136) (0.230) (0.249) (0.416)

Bottom 40% Household 1.042 0.626 1.145 1.379 (0.141) (0.184) (0.305) (0.431)

Performance Index 1.042*** 0.997 1.027*** 1.032**

For Sector (0.007) (0.014) (0.002) (0.012)

Pseudo R-squared 0.069 0.010 0.035 0.018

Number of Observations 1,227 861 1,064 1,140

Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gov-ernorate in parentheses. Sample is limited to Gaza. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 4: Likelihood of Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability - Gaza (Figure II-19 & Figure II-20)


91


87

Likelihood of Payment Piped Water


(1) (2)

Bottom 40% Household 0.460* 0.373*** (0.157) (0.076)

Village Council 0.705 2.571 (0.269) (1.302)

Regions (Reference: Central)

- North West Bank 0.931 3.629 (0.998) (2.754)

- South West Bank 0.370 1.391 (0.312) (1.032)

- Gaza 0.0310*** 0.0424***

(0.026) (0.024)

Satisfaction with Quality and Relia-bility

1.362* 1.396 (0.196) (0.266)

Agrees that LGU Is very Responsive 1.238 1.001

(0.205) (0.178)

Performance Index 0.994 0.985

For Sector (0.006) (0.010)

Pseudo R-squared 0.266 0.421

Number of Observations 6,572 5,550

Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Governorate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 5: Likelihood of Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services (Figure II-22)


92


88

Likelihood of Timely Payment Piped Water


(1) (2)

Bottom 40% 0.567*** 0.635** (0.045) (0.088)

Village Council 0.789 1.037 (0.161) (0.223)


- North West Bank 0.932 1.683 (0.372) (0.779)

- South West Bank 0.439*** 0.641 (0.088) (0.155)

- Gaza 1.245 1.314

(0.324) (0.245)

Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability 1.140 1.186

(0.231) (0.111)

Agrees that LGU Is very Responsive 1.728*** 1.758** (0.226) (0.341)

Performance Index 1.004 1.019**

For Sector (0.005) (0.006)



Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Governorate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 6: Likelihood of Timely Payment: Piped Water and Solid Waste Collection Services (Figure II-26)


93


89

Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: 1,000 m Distance to

Separation Barrier

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m)

0.806 1.038 1.065 0.998

(0.319) (0.227) (0.323) (0.137)

Village Council 0.795 0.702* 0.620 1.230*** (0.160) (0.119) (0.172) (0.058)


- Central West Bank 3.328* 1.155 0.206* 1.190*(1.942) (0.340) (0.128) (0.102)

- South West Bank 1.020 0.615* 0.214** 0.986 (0.404) (0.144) (0.106) (0.076)

Bottom 40% Household 0.536*** 0.817 0.751** 0.849 (0.072) (0.154) (0.076) (0.072)

Performance Index 1.045*** 1.086*** 1.047*** 1.080***

For Sector (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)

Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.665 0.205 0.129



Table A4 - 7: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) (Figure III-9)


94


90

Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: 500 m Distance to

Separation Barrier

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Distance to Separation Barrier (500m)

0.532* 0.900 1.071 0.891

(0.164) (0.174) (0.314) (0.080)

Village Council 0.796 0.696* 0.617 1.228*** (0.174) (0.116) (0.166) (0.056)


- Central West Bank 3.406* 1.195 0.207** 1.203*(1.921) (0.389) (0.126) (0.098)

- South West Bank 1.018 0.612* 0.214** 0.982 (0.397) (0.140) (0.106) (0.071)



For Sector (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)

Pseudo R-squared 0.202 0.665 0.205 0.130


Table A4 - 8: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) (Figure III-9)

Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001


95


91

Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: 250m Distance to

Separation Barrier

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)


0.529** 0.796 0.692 0.997

(0.103) (0.295) (0.195) (0.183)

Village Council 0.788 0.697* 0.609 1.230*** (0.177) (0.116) (0.159) (0.055)


- Central West Bank 3.315* 1.191 0.212** 1.190(1.925) (0.372) (0.127) (0.107)

- South West Bank 1.016 0.613* 0.213** 0.986 (0.395) (0.141) (0.106) (0.071)



For Sector (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)

Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.665 0.205 0.129



Table A4 - 9: Likelihood of Service Access: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) (Figure III-9)


96


92

Likelihood of Service Ac-cess: Area C

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Area C Household 0.692 0.792 0.348*** 0.611** (0.194) (0.621) (0.078) (0.100)

Village Council 0.806 0.701* 0.610* 1.251*** (0.173) (0.120) (0.148) (0.062)


- Central WB 3.306* 1.196 0.240* 1.223* (1.893) (0.356) (0.138) (0.097)

- South West Bank 1.030 0.618* 0.227** 1.002 (0.398) (0.142) (0.111) (0.071)

Bottom 40% Household 0.541*** 0.821 0.768* 0.853 (0.075) (0.166) (0.083) (0.074)


For Sector (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005)

Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.665 0.221 0.132



Table A4 - 10: Likelihood of Service Access: Area C (Figure III-9)


97


93

Likelihood of Service Sat-isfaction: 1,000m to Sep-

aration Barrier

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m)

0.947 0.908 0.954 0.828

(0.087) (0.136) (0.037) (0.133)

Village Council 1.030 1.338 1.001 0.648** (0.048) (0.217) (0.042) (0.094)


- Central West Bank 1.058 1.042 1.214*** 1.405(0.079) (0.186) (0.054) (0.329)

- South West Bank 1.141 1.467** 1.073 1.463 (0.152) (0.197) (0.046) (0.417)

Bottom 40% Household 0.978 0.991 1.254* 1.037 (0.081) (0.294) (0.127) (0.091)

Performance Index 1.051*** 1.013** 1.048*** 1.031***

For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007)

Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.012 0.121 0.028



Table A4 - 11: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (1,000m) (Figure III-10)


98


94

Likelihood of Service Sat-isfaction: 500m to Sepa-

ration Barrier

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)


1.060 0.638*** 0.907 0.708*

(0.112) (0.075) (0.059) (0.108)

Village Council 1.034 1.309 1.001 0.649** (0.049) (0.207) (0.043) (0.094)



- South West Bank 1.142 1.451** 1.073 1.471 (0.156) (0.203) (0.045) (0.423)



For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008)

Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.015 0.121 0.028



Table A4 - 12: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (500m) (Figure III-10)


99


95

Likelihood of Service Satis-faction: 250m to Separa-

tion Barrier

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)


0.788 0.726 0.729* 0.573***

(0.100) (0.142) (0.095) (0.059)

Village Council 1.030 1.352* 1.001 0.651** (0.048) (0.199) (0.042) (0.096)



- South West Bank 1.143 1.479** 1.075 1.483 (0.153) (0.193) (0.043) (0.428)



For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008)

Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.012 0.121 0.028



Table A4 - 13: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Distance to Separation Barrier (250m) (Figure III-10)


100


96

Likelihood of Service Satis-faction: Area C

Piped Water

Piped Sewage


Local Roads

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Area C Household 0.904 0.765 0.889 0.631* (0.107) (0.432) (0.057) (0.123)

Village Council 1.036 1.354* 1.004 0.654** (0.047) (0.203) (0.043) (0.096)



- South West Bank 1.148 1.501** 1.081 1.501 (0.156) (0.194) (0.045) (0.438)



For Sector (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 1.031***

Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.013 0.121 0.030



Table A4 - 14: Likelihood of Service Satisfaction: Area C (Figure III-10)


101


97

Likelihood of Payment Piped Water

Electricity

(1) (2)

Bottom 40% Household 0.414*** 0.320** (0.093) (0.116)

Village Council 0.0336*** 0.739 (0.025) (0.208)


- North West Bank 0.502 0.556 (0.447) (0.552)

- South West Bank 0.324 0.882 (0.241) (0.714)

- Gaza 0.0336*** 0.164

(0.025) (0.340)

Pre-Paid Meter 2.847** 19.71*** (0.960) (16.703)

Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability 1.369* 1.623 (0.212) (0.518)

Performance Index for 0.996 1.007

Sector (0.006) (0.022)



Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 15: Likelihood of Payment - Pre-Paid Meters and Citizen Willingness to Pay (Figure IV-1)


102


98

Likelihood of Timely Payment Piped Water

Electricity

(1) (2)

Bottom 40% Household 0.561*** 0.575*** (0.040) (0.054)

Village Council 1.791 0.861 (0.636) (0.225)


- North West Bank 1.105 1.579 (0.460) (0.758)

- South West Bank 0.496*** 0.589* (0.086) (0.152)

- Gaza 1.791 12.77***

(0.636) (9.332)

Pre-Paid Meter 1.233 1.394*

(0.142) (0.222)

Satisfaction with Quality and Reliability 1.190 1.242

(0.277) (0.187)

Performance Index 1.004 1.020*

For Sector (0.005) (0.008)



Notes: Coefficients are exponentiated and represent Odd Ratios; Standard errors clustered by Gover-norate in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 16: Likelihood of Timely Payment - Pre-Paid Meters and Citizen Willingness to Pay (Figure IV-1)


103


99

LGU Performance Index Total

Sample Total Mu-nicipalities

WB Munici-palities

Gaza Munic-ipalities

Village Councils

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU Population 1.958* 2.701 3.428* 1.664 0.783

(0.962) (1.374) (1.617) (2.337) (1.387)

Village Council -5.043*

(2.074)


- North West Bank -4.465** -3.000 -3.083 -5.517**

(1.646) (2.616) (2.597) (2.082)

- South West Bank -12.64*** -9.037** -9.588** -15.38***

(2.052) (2.960) (3.012) (2.730)

- Gaza -18.69***

(3.856)

Adj R-Squared 0.146 0.129 0.056 -0.024 0.110

Number of Observations 380 139 116 23 241

Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 17: Differences in LGU Performance across Regions and LGU Types (Figure III-2)


104


100


Sample

(1)

Total Munici-palities

(2)

WB Munici-palities

(3)

Gaza Munici-palities

(4)

Village Councils

(5)

Log LGU Population 1.210 0.0270 -0.617 1.712 0.350

(0.952) (1.632) (1.705) (3.669) (1.356)


(2.058)

Distance to Gov. Center (Reference: 1st Quintile):

- 2nd Quintile -4.898 -11.32* -15.76*** -2.458 -4.425

(2.492) (4.442) (4.491) (10.019) (3.174)

- 3rd Quintile -4.958* -9.433* -13.07** 6.574 -3.460

(2.476) (4.430) (4.550) (11.234) (3.090)

- 4th Quintile -6.285** -12.13** -15.05*** -5.005

(2.345) (4.137) (4.237) (2.968)

- 5th Quintile -10.90*** -17.68*** -20.55*** -9.709**

(2.482) (4.074) (4.184) (2.977)


- Central West Bank 5.278** 3.162 2.884 7.041***

(1.639) (2.502) (2.519) (2.084)

- South West Bank -7.659*** -4.695 -4.336-

9.289***

(1.907) (2.542) (2.451) (2.531)

- Gaza -16.09*** -16.66***

(3.861) (4.419)

Adj. R-Squared 0.183 0.239 0.239 -0.101 0.135



Table A4 - 18: Remoteness - Distance to Governorate Center and LGU Performance (Figure III-3)


105


101


Sample Total Munici-

palities WB Munici-

palities Gaza Munici-

palities Village

Councils

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU Population 1.648 1.814 1.053 3.879 0.916

(0.974) (1.594) (1.764) (3.003) (1.423)


(2.041)

Built-up Area Share: (Reference: 1st Quintile)

- 2nd Quintile 1.793 2.439 1.299 3.464

(2.378) (3.232) (3.143) (2.992)

- 3rd Quintile -0.654 -0.960 -2.254 -18.36** -2.544

(2.219) (2.773) (2.722) (6.363) (3.360)

- 4th Quintile -2.793 5.033 4.901 -26.17* -3.210

(2.180) (4.064) (4.170) (11.149) (2.962)

- 5th Quintile 5.668* 8.079 14.90*** -32.82** 2.431

(2.750) (4.678) (4.213) (9.404) (3.232)


- Central West Bank 4.628** 2.760 2.200 4.864*

(1.617) (2.485) (2.474) (2.079)

- South West Bank -8.401*** -6.864* -6.916* -9.826***

(2.000) (3.295) (3.203) (2.623)

- Gaza -17.59*** -18.45***

(4.367) (5.372)

Adj. R-Squared 0.167 0.143 0.149 0.049 0.124



Table A4 - 19: Remoteness - Built-Up Area and LGU Performance (Figure III-4)


106


102


Sample Total Mu-nicipalities

WB Munici-palities


Village Councils

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU population 1.110 0.733 1.575 -1.790 0.0822

(1.016) (1.458) (1.759) (2.857) (1.450)


(2.084)

Population Density: (Reference: 1st Quintile)

- 2nd Quintile 2.589 -3.364 -3.002 4.515

(2.489) (4.355) (4.366) (2.859)

- 3rd Quintile -0.690 -1.065 -1.000 -0.0379

(2.292) (3.578) (3.593) (2.821)

- 4th Quintile 3.447 -1.416 -0.514 7.349*

(2.346) (3.079) (3.037) (2.964)

- 5th Quintile 6.174* 7.167* 5.925 19.05 1.843

(2.693) (3.346) (3.406) (9.840) (3.595)


- Central West Bank 4.793** 2.165 2.527 6.846**

(1.685) (2.737) (2.740) (2.097)

- South West Bank -8.683*** -7.874* -7.849* -9.459***

(2.069) (3.033) (3.067) (2.671)

- Gaza -15.95*** -17.21***

(3.946) (4.443)

Adj. R-Squared 0.157 0.167 0.073 0.137 0.128



Table A4 - 20: Population Density and Performance (Figure III-6)


107


103

LGU Performance Index Total Sam-

ple Total Munici-

palities WB Munici-

palities Gaza Municipal-

ities Village

Councils

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU Population 1.201 2.427 3.057 1.089 -0.658

(0.934) (1.302) (1.650) (2.106) (1.373)


(2.060)

Share of bottom 40% HHs: (Reference: 1st Quintile)

- 2nd Quintile -3.963 -6.499* -5.162 -14.28 -0.702

(2.191) (3.116) (3.280) (9.210) (3.080)

- 3rd Quintile -3.988 -3.895 -3.231 -6.867 -3.364

(2.103) (3.138) (3.474) (7.890) (2.875)

- 4th Quintile -7.911*** -7.911* -4.462 -22.41 -7.565*

(2.312) (3.730) (3.764) (10.672) (3.003)

- 5th Quintile -11.78*** -6.449 -6.631 -8.597 -12.75***

(2.493) (4.633) (4.311) (17.766) (3.032)


- North West Bank -3.387* -1.270 -2.041 -4.331*

(1.668) (2.888) (2.842) (2.062)

- South West Bank -9.058*** -7.146* -7.915* -11.04***

(2.150) (3.144) (3.254) (2.814)

- Gaza -15.78*** -15.55***

(3.728) (4.371)

Adj. R-Squared 0.195 0.144 0.050 0.040 0.182



Table A4 - 21: Household Wealth and LGU Performance (Figure III-7)


108


104

LGU Performance Index WB LGUs Area C LGUs

(1) (2)

Log LGU Population 0.0778 -1.031

(1.093) (2.004)

Village Council -5.153* -5.922

(2.109) (3.237)

Log Distance to Gov. Center -5.388*** -6.821***

(1.306) (1.490)

Share of Area C households: (Reference: 1st Quintile)

- 2nd Quintile -1.121

(3.079)

- 3rd Quintile 3.778 -0.778

(2.253) (2.487)

- 4th Quintile 3.210 -2.038

(1.804) (2.899)

- 5th Quintile -1.391 -11.07**

(2.012) (4.154)


- Central West Bank 5.309** 4.998*

(1.641) (2.259)

- South West Bank -7.363*** -6.345*

(1.930) (2.751)

Adj. R-Squared 0.170 0.276

Number of Observations 346 166 Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 22: Share of Households in Area C and LGU Performance (Figure III-11)


109


105

LGU Performance Index WB LGUs WB LGUs WB LGUs WB LGUs WB LGUs

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU Population 0.0634 -0.353 -0.612 -0.501 -0.172

(1.157) (1.104) (1.087) (1.072) (1.128)

Village Council 0.0634 -0.353 -0.612 -0.501 -0.172

(1.157) (1.104) (1.087) (1.072) (1.128)

Log Distance to Gov Center -5.416*** -5.467*** -5.429*** -5.280*** -5.309***

(1.301) (1.282) (1.269) (1.269) (1.274)

Share of Built-Up Area Belonging to Area C

- more than 50% -2.639

(2.690)

- more than 60% -5.757

(3.043)

- more than 70% -8.047*

(3.625)

- more than 80% -8.549

(4.837)

- more than 90% -6.523

(4.834)


- Central West Bank 5.644*** 5.546*** 5.679*** 5.716*** 5.775***

(1.631) (1.618) (1.608) (1.617) (1.621)

- South West Bank -7.301*** -7.008*** -6.828*** -6.951*** -7.079***

(1.957) (1.929) (1.913) (1.893) (1.861)

Adj. R-Squared 0.165 0.173 0.179 0.176 0.169


Notes: Coefficients are estimates from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is limited to the West Bank. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A4 - 23: Share of Built-up LGU area in Area C and LGU Performance (Figure III-12)


110


106

LGU Performance Index Total Sam-

ple Total Munic-

ipalities WB Munici-

palities Gaza Mu-

nicipalities Village

Councils

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU Population 2.095* 3.130* 3.760* 2.342 0.421

(0.958) (1.347) (1.622) (2.167) (1.360)


(2.059)

JSC for Planning & Dev. 3.962** 4.109 2.341 13.20* 5.202**

(1.470) (2.240) (2.402) (6.058) (1.974)


- North West Bank -4.731** -3.305 -3.266 -6.001**

(1.662) (2.577) (2.576) (2.153)

- South West Bank -13.06*** -8.466** -9.329** -16.99***

(2.090) (3.039) (3.068) (2.927)

- Gaza -19.12*** -18.15***

(3.720) (4.397)

Adj. R-Squared 0.161 0.143 0.055 0.120 0.133



Table A4 - 24: Joint Service Councils I: Membership in JSC for Planning & Development (Figure III-13)


111


107

LGU Performance Index

(Piped Water)

Total Sam-ple

Total Mu-nicipalities

WB Munici-palities


Village Councils

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU Population -2.964 -3.545 -2.942 -3.903 -2.375

(1.947) (2.245) (3.401) (2.647) (3.129)

Village Council -6.708

(4.673)

JSC for Water and Waste Water

4.389 1.638 -2.925 16.23* 5.535

(5.071) (6.703) (8.206) (6.194) (7.592)


- North West Bank -2.068 4.873 5.785 -5.165

(3.815) (6.452) (6.481) (4.666)

- South West Bank -13.25** -11.53 -12.12 -13.78*

(4.630) (7.147) (7.362) (6.128)

- Gaza -16.95** -12.70*

(5.220) (6.188)

Adj. R-Squared 0.034 0.088 0.050 0.162 0.008



Table A4 - 25: Joint Service Councils II: Membership in JSC for Water and Waste Water Management (Figure III-14)


112


108


(Piped Sewage)

Total Sample

Total Munici-palities

WB Munici-palities


Village Councils

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log LGU Population 6.377*** 10.97*** 14.14*** 5.483 2.205*

(1.464) (2.866) (3.375) (3.986) (1.102)

Village Council 1.430

(3.252)

JSC for Water and Waste Water

-6.256 -10.63 -2.698 -39.47*** 0.0636(4.050) (6.481) (7.031) (10.088) (4.913)


- North West Bank 2.812 -0.480 -2.546 3.407

(2.564) (5.373) (5.296) (2.755)

- South West Bank -0.710 -5.158 -7.321 -1.477

(2.841) (7.065) (7.254) (2.307)

- Gaza 24.19*** 17.92

(7.269) (9.352)

Adj. R-Squared 0.192 0.226 0.134 0.235 0.009



Table A4 - 26: Joint Service Councils II: Membership in JSC for Water and Waste Water Management (Figure III-14)


113


109

LGU Performance Index Jenin

Piped Water

Jenin

Piped Sewage

(1) (2)

Log LGU Population -7.966 2.548

(5.389) (1.973)

Village Council -14.92 2.334

(12.275) (2.000)

JSC for Water and Waste Water (Jenin)

30.82*** -2.269(7.415) (1.552)


Number of Observations 59 59


Table A4 - 27: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste (Figure III-15)


114


110


(Solid Waste Collection)

Total Sample Salfit, Qalqiliya

(1) (2)

Log LGU Population 2.735 -3.747

(1.492) (5.822)

Village Council -10.81** -2.687

(3.392) (11.365)

JSC for Solid Waste Coll. -1.903 4.436 (5.213) (7.722)


- North West Bank -12.55***

(3.248)

- South West Bank -19.57***

(3.833)

- Gaza -27.85***

(5.781)

Adj. R-Squared 0.128 -0.067



Table A4 - 28: Joint Service Councils III: Membership in JSC for Solid Waste (Figure III-15)


115


111

LGU Performance Index West Bank WB Municipal-

ities WB Village

Councils

(1) (2) (3)

Log LGU Population 0.995 0.862 0.0189

(1.303) (1.934) (1.911)


(2.287)

Log per Capita Operating Budget Revenues

4.510* 6.485** 3.148

(1.879) (2.157) (2.608)

Regions (Reference: Cen-tral)

- North West Bank -2.531 -0.912 -3.696

(1.723) (3.034) (2.170)

- South West Bank -9.279*** -6.150 -12.14**

(2.443) (3.463) (3.644)

Adj R-Squared 0.146 0.141 0.082

Number of Observations 274 110 164


Table A4 - 29: LGU Finance I: Per Capita Operating Budget Revenues (Figure III-16)


116


112

LGU Performance Index West Bank WB Municipal-

ities WB Village

Councils

(1) (2) (3)

Log LGU Population 1.552 0.404 0.790

(1.263) (1.785) (1.887)


(2.383)

Log per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures

5.157*** 8.977*** 2.887

(1.513) (2.262) (1.964)

Regions (Reference: Cen-tral)

- North West Bank -5.267** -4.996 -5.226*

(1.720) (2.674) (2.274)

- South West Bank -9.954*** -7.103* -12.11***

(2.234) (2.951) (3.503)

Adj R-Squared 0.157 0.195 0.078

Number of Observations 274 110 164


Table A4 - 30: LGU Finance II: Per Capita Operating Budget Expenditures (Figure III-17)


117


113

LGU Performance Index Total Sample Total Sample

(1) (2)

Log LGU Population 2.913* 2.562*

(1.196) (1.283)

Satisfactory Collection Efficiency (MDP-II) 5.494*

(2.689)

Surplus in Operating Budget & Enterprise Fund (MDP-II)

5.444*

(2.377)


- North West Bank -1.961 -2.398

(2.695) (2.708)

- South West Bank -9.138** -8.023*

(3.097) (3.250)

- Gaza -17.12*** -16.74***

(4.526) (4.391)



Table A4 - 31: LGU Finance III: Fiscal Sustainability (Figure III-18)



118


114

LGU Performance Index Usage of Citizen Service Centers

(1)

LGU Respon-siveness

(2)

Log LGU Population 1.641 2.138 (1.296) (1.164)

Village Council -5.507* -4.813*(2.261) (2.090)

Share of Households that Used Citizen

Service Center (Reference: 1st to 3rd Quin-tile)

- 4th Quintile 0.364 (2.450)

- 5th Quintile 5.388* (2.594)

Share of Households Agreeing that LGU is very Responsive (Reference: 1st Quintile)

- 2nd Quintile 3.330 (2.891)

- 3rd Quintile 7.115** (2.630)

- 4th Quintile 12.41*** (2.647)

- 5th Quintile 16.23*** (2.742)


- North West Bank -4.582* -5.804**(2.093) (1.906)

- South West Bank -9.408*** -10.32***(2.556) (2.700)

- Gaza -16.36*** -20.56***(4.708) (3.819)




Table A4 - 32: Usage of Citizen Service Centers, LGU Responsiveness, and Performance (Figure III-20 & Figure III-21)


119


115

Annex 5: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

# LGU Name Date Focus Group Discussion

Key Informant In-terviews

1 Kufer Kadoum December 28, 2016 1 2

2 Dier-al Assel Al-Fouqa December 29, 2016 1 2

3 Rafah December 29, 2016 1 2

4 Khan Yunis December 31, 2016 1 2

5 An Nuseirat January 3, 2017 1 2

6 Jabalya January 9, 2017 1 2

7 Gaza City January 12, 2017 1 2

8 Salim January 15, 201 1 2

9 Irtas January 22, 2017 1 2

10 Tamoun January 23, 2017 1 2

11 Beit Kahil January 27, 2017 1 2

12 Bani Zeid al Garbiy January 29, 2017 1 2

13 Hebron February 1, 2017 1 2

14 Bethlehem February 2, 2017 1 2

15 Beit Sahour February 3, 2017 1 2

16 Ramallah February 4, 2017 1 2

17 Nablus February 5, 2017 1 2

Table A5-1: Overview Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions


120


116

Annex 6: Key Informant Interviews and Focus Groups Discussions Referenced

Key Informants Interviews (KKIs)

# Quote Date Location #Paragraph #Page 1 [water from Mekorot] “is delivered to us

through a pipe that feeds three villages, Salim, Uzmout, and Deir al-Huteb. The Israelis control the amount of water we consume….we suffer especially in sum-mer….there are households in Salim that do not receive water for 3-4 days a week.”

January 15, 2017

Salim 86 53

2 [there is a] “difficulty of operating some water wells due to power outages.”

January 12, 2017

Gaza City 37 23

3 “We have 75 water wells which lack […] spare parts.”

January 12, 2017

Gaza City 86 54

4 “there are 2,500 water meters that are broken down and need replacement […] however, the import restrictions for Gaza make it hard to obtain these parts and other equipment needed.”

December 31, 2016

Khan Younis

86 54

5 “I see the existence of JSCs as something important and useful…for example, […] some services are better if we deal with them jointly such as waste collection which needs huge infrastructures, trucks, machines, and transfer stations.”

December 31, 2016

Khan Younis

87 55

6 “We are members of three JSCs; one for water, another one for solid waste, as well as a JSC for Planning and Develop-ment which is inactive…before we joined the Solid Waste JSC, we used to gener-ate revenue for our town… but now the solid waste service causes a deficit. Our municipality is against these councils…”

January 23, 2017

Tamoun 89 55

7 “The Solid Waste JSC is a burden because we still have to provide bins, trucks and workers…[also] joining the council was not a matter of choice…as a municipality we had to become a member…however, average people do not know about it.”

December 31, 2016

Khan Younis

89 56

8 “We have a division for complaints at our Citizen Services Center. Each citizen can file a written complaint, and we ad-dress it within a known timeframe that depends on the nature of the com-plaint…we are committed to examine

February 4, 2017

Ramallah 104 64

Table A6 - 1: Key Informant Interviews Referenced


121


117

each complaint and let the citizens know about the decision…”

9 The program tells me how many com-plaints each division receives and how many of them have been dealt with by the relevant division…once I notice there is a delay from one of the divisions I call the supervisors there and urge them to speed up the process…”

February 5, 2017

Nablus 104 64

10 “the nature of the complaint, and the availability of resources determine how we deal with it.”

January 23, 2017

Tamoun 108 65

11 “accumulative debt which citizens owe the municipality are about NIS 310 mil-lion, while PA institutions located in Na-blus owe NIS 60 million.”

February 5, 2017

Nablus 124 70

12 “paying in advance…is like buying from a store - if you do not pay for it cannot get it.”

January 27, 2017

Beit Kahil Box IV-1/ i 72

13 [council] “decided to install pre-paid wa-ter meters…it turned out that the equip-ment for 1,185 households we need for our town costs USD 160,000. MoLG was willing to provide USD 100,000 but we cannot cover the remainder [USD 60,000]…although we need the upgrade urgently.”

January 27, 2017

Beit Kahil Box IV-1/ i 72

14 “water is a basic human rights and should not be cut off from people be-cause they cannot afford it”

January 29, 2017

Bani Zeid al Garbiy

Box IV-1/i 72

15 “because electricity is a pre-paid service the collection rate is 100 percent. Con-necting waste collection fees allows the council to plan with revenue with cer-tainty, which we depend on heavily to pay salaries and to improve some of our services.”

January 27, 2017

Beit Kahil Box IV-1/ii 72

16 “People receive 20 percent discount when they pay the full annual amount in January, 15 percent in February, 10 per-cent in March, and 5 percent in April.”

February 2, 2017

Bethlehem Box IV-1/iii 73

17 “In the past we used to have a wrong pol-icy, rewarding people who did not pay by offering discounts to encourage them to pay…however, now we adopted a reverse policy of encouraging those who are committed and pay their fees on time…”.

December 31, 2016

Khan Younis

Box IV-1/iii 73


122


118

18 “The company did want to tell the police and we used social pressure to solve this issue […] we solved 50 percent of it […] we went from house to house with them.”

January 15, 2017

Salim Box IV-1/iv 73

19 “we prefer family influence more than resorting to the law or police. We go to an area or a neighborhood and talk to a social or tribal figure - […] who in uses his personnel and family connections to solve the issue.”

February 1, 2017

Hebron Box IV-1/iv 73

20 “we develop a payment plan for people who cannot afford paying […but] we do not apply a general-decrease of fees […] because other households would also stop paying]. However, we resort to court to deal with those who do not want to pay.”

January 12, 2017

Gaza City Box IV-1/v 73

21 “if a citizen has a cumulative debt we ask [the household] to pay the next bill and pay a part of the debt, such as an additional 50 NIS, every time the future bills are paid.”

January 12, 2017

Gaza City Box IV-1/v 73

22 “our municipality sent official letters to households informing them of the debt they have to pay and encouraging them to come to reach a settlement with the municipality. A settlement does not in-clude any discount but is only based on a scheduled re-payment approach.”

February 4, 2017

Ramallah Box IV-1/v 73


123


119

Focus Group Discussions (FDGs)

# Quote Date Location #Para-graph

#Page

1 [we] “do not receive water and electric-ity at the same time”

January 12, 2017

Gaza City 37 7 (38)

2 “the lack of coordination between ‘wa-ter supply schedule’ and the ‘provision of electricity schedule.’”

January 12, 2017

Gaza City 37 7 (38)

3 “People need electricity to operate their water pumps and store water in tanks located on their roofs. However, they cannot do this when they have water without having electricity. Sometimes, people stay up at night waiting for elec-tricity to be able to fill their tanks…”

January 3, 2017

An Nusei-rat (Gaza)

37 7 (38)

4 “without connecting other services to pre-paid electricity supply […] many people will not pay for waste collection or school fees”.

January 27, 2017

Beit Kahil Box 6/ii 59

Table A6 - 2: Focus Group Discussions Referenced


124


120

Annex 7: LGU Performance Ranking

Performance Rank

Performance Score LGU Name Governorate Municipality/VC

1 89 Salfit Salfit Municipality

2 85 Anabta Tulkarm Municipality

3 85 Zeita Tulkarm Municipality

4 84 Iktaba Tulkarm VC

5 82 Shuyukh al Arrub Hebron VC

6 80 Ramallah Ramallah Municipality

7 80 Al Bireh Ramallah Municipality

8 79 Qalqiliya Qalqilya Municipality

9 77 Sarra Nablus VC

10 77 Dura al Qar Ramallah VC

11 77 Deir Sharaf Nablus VC

12 76 Tulkarm Tulkarm Municipality

13 75 Jilijliya Ramallah VC

14 74 Shabtin Ramallah VC

15 74 Habla Qalqilya Municipality

16 74 Anata Jerusalem Municipality

17 74 Ar Ram Jerusalem Municipality

18 73 Nablus Nablus Municipality

19 73 Beit Jala Bethlehem Municipality

20 73 Kafr Malik Ramallah VC

21 72 Beit Iba Nablus VC

22 72 At Tira Ramallah VC

23 72 Hebron Al Khalil Hebron Municipality

24 72 Al Walaja Bethlehem VC

25 72 Bir Nabala Jerusalem Municipality

Table A7 - 1: LGU Performance Ranking


125


121

26 71 Bani Zeid al Garbiya Ramallah Municipality

27 71 Kafr al Labad Tulkarm Municipality

28 71 Qaryut Nablus VC

29 71 Ad Doha Bethlehem Municipality

30 70 Bethlehem Bethlehem Municipality

31 70 Rammun Ramallah VC

32 70 Kifl Haris Salfit Municipality

33 70 Mas Ha Salfit VC

34 70 Baqa ash Sharqiya Tulkarm Municipality

35 69 Bala Tulkarm Municipality

36 69 Beit Surik Jerusalem Municipality

37 69 Al Janiya Ramallah VC

38 69 Falamya Qalqilya VC

39 69 Alfondoq Qalqilya VC

40 69 Nisf Jbayel Nablus VC

41 68 Saffarin Tulkarm VC

42 68 Hajja Qalqilya VC

43 68 Sir Jenin VC

44 68 Jericho Ariha Jericho Municipality

45 68 Zawata Nablus VC

46 67 Illar Tulkarm Municipality

47 67 Attil Tulkarm Municipality

48 67 Odala Nablus VC

49 67 An Naqura Nablus VC

50 67 Ein Qiniya Ramallah VC

51 67 At Tuwani Hebron VC

52 67 Budrus Ramallah VC

53 66 Beit Anan Jerusalem Municipality

54 66 Azmut Nablus VC


126


122

55 66 Almaghazi Deir al Balah Municipality

56 66 Farun Tulkarm VC

57 66 Abud Ramallah VC

58 66 Biet Sakaria Bethlehem VC

59 66 Deir Qaddis Ramallah VC

60 66 Beit Amin Qalqilya VC

61 65 Um Al-Naser North Gaza Municipality

62 65 Osarin Nablus VC

63 65 Ein Siniya Ramallah VC

64 65 Almusaddar Deir al Balah Municipality

65 65 An Nabi Elyas Qalqilya VC

66 65 Deir Ballut Salfit Municipality

67 64 Jibiya Ramallah VC

68 64 At Tayba Jenin VC

69 64 Tura Jenin VC

70 64 Deir al Hatab Nablus VC

71 64 Beit Ur al Fauqa Ramallah VC

72 64 As Sawahira ash Sharqiya Jerusalem Municipality

73 63 Deir Istiya Salfit Municipality

74 63 Marda Salfit VC

75 63 Sarta Salfit VC

76 63 Beit Liqya Ramallah Municipality

77 63 Beit Lid Tulkarm Municipality

78 63 Abu Dis Jerusalem Municipality

79 63 Al Kafreiat Tulkarm Municipality

80 63 Deir al Ghusun Tulkarm Municipality

81 62 Nilin Ramallah Municipality

82 62 Al Khas Bethlehem VC


127


123

83 62 Ein Arik Ramallah VC

84 62 Biddya Salfit Municipality

85 62 Kharbatha al Misbah Ramallah VC

86 62 Sabastiya Nablus Municipality

87 62 Beit Sahur Bethlehem Municipality

88 61 Qatanna Jerusalem Municipality

89 61 Kafr Qallil Nablus VC

90 61 Beit Hanoon North Gaza Municipality

91 61 Nuba Hebron Municipality

92 61 Al Midya Ramallah VC

93 61 Majdal Bani Fadil Nablus VC

94 61 Ras Karkar Ramallah VC

95 61 Dar Salah Bethlehem VC

96 60 Al Riyad/Nazlat Zeid Jenin VC

97 60 Rujeib Nablus VC

98 60 Battir Bethlehem Municipality

99 60 Al Qubeiba Jerusalem VC

100 60 Ramin Tulkarm VC

101 60 Beit Sira Ramallah VC

102 60 Kafr Ein Ramallah VC

103 60 Beit Fajjar Bethlehem Municipality

104 59 Rantis Ramallah VC

105 59 Beit Wazan Nablus VC

106 59 Haris Salfit VC

107 59 Kafr Laqif Qalqilya VC

108 59 Gaza Gaza Municipality

109 59 Kafr Rai Jenin Municipality

110 58 Yasuf Salfit VC

111 58 Kharbatha Bani Harith Ramallah VC


128


124

112 58 Az Zawiya Salfit Municipality

113 58 Az Zubeidat Jericho VC

114 58 Ajjul Ramallah VC

115 58 Beit Duqqu Jerusalem VC

116 58 Bir Zeit Ramallah Municipality

117 58 Al Lubban al Gharbi Ramallah VC

118 58 Al Ettihad Ramallah Municipality

119 58 Farkha Salfit VC

120 57 Halhul Hebron Municipality

121 57 Elezaria Jerusalem Municipality

122 57 Jalood Nablus VC

123 57 Kharas Hebron Municipality

124 57 Azzun Qalqilya Municipality

125 57 Deir Ghazala Jenin VC

126 57 Bilin Ramallah VC

127 57 Al Judeira Jerusalem VC

128 57 Huwwara Nablus Municipality

129 57 Beita Nablus Municipality

130 57 Aqraba Nablus Municipality

131 57 Seida Tulkarm VC

132 57 Beit Imrin Nablus VC

133 56 Kafr Aqab Jerusalem Municipality

134 56 Wadi Fukin Bethlehem VC

135 56 Beituniya Ramallah Municipality

136 56 Burham Ramallah VC

137 56 Kardala Tubas VC

138 56 Zatara Bethlehem Municipality

139 56 Jabalya North Gaza Municipality

140 56 Al Bureij Deir al Balah Municipality


129


125

141 56 Beit Hasan Nablus VC

142 56 Qarawat Bani Hassan Salfit Municipality

143 55 Jannatah Bed Flouh Bethlehem Municipality

144 55 Tubas Tubas Municipality

145 55 Azzun Atma Qalqilya VC

146 55 Shufa Tulkarm VC

147 55 Al Kfeer Jenin VC

148 55 Beitin Ramallah VC

149 55 Deir Ibzi Ramallah VC

150 55 Jammain Nablus Municipality

151 55 Talfit Nablus VC

152 55 An Nassariya Nablus VC

153 54 Al Azb Al Gharby Qalqilya VC

154 54 Qusra Nablus Municipality

155 54 Ras Atiya Qalqilya VC

156 54 Nahhalin Bethlehem VC

157 54 Tarqumiya Hebron Municipality

158 54 An Nazla ash Sharqiya Tulkarm VC

159 54 Jinsafut Qalqilya VC

160 54 Baqat al Hatab Qalqilya VC

161 54 Jurish Nablus VC

162 53 Urif Nablus VC

163 53 Kafr Thulth Qalqilya Municipality

164 53 Hizma Jerusalem Municipality

165 53 Qalandiya Jerusalem VC

166 53 Al Minya Bethlehem VC

167 53 Beit Tamir Bethlehem VC

168 53 Biddu Jerusalem Municipality

169 53 Al Jarushiya Tulkarm VC


130


126

170 53 Al Badhan Nablus VC

171 53 Turmusayya Ramallah Municipality

172 53 Al Jalama Jenin VC

173 52 Sinjil Ramallah Municipality

174 52 Silwad Ramallah Municipality

175 52 Deir as Sudan Ramallah VC

176 52 Ein el Beida Tubas VC

177 52 Shuqba Ramallah VC

178 52 Sair Hebron Municipality

179 52 Deir Dibwan Ramallah Municipality

180 52 Husan Bethlehem VC

181 52 Awarta Nablus VC

182 52 Madama Nablus VC

183 51 Taffuh Hebron Municipality

184 51 Yabad Jenin Municipality

185 51 Jit Qalqilya VC

186 51 Immatin Qalqilya VC

187 51 Al Mazraa ash Sharqiya Ramallah Municipality

188 51 Mithlon Jenin Municipality

189 51 Anza Jenin VC

190 51 Jayyus Qalqilya Municipality

191 50 Deir al Balah Deir al Balah Municipality

192 50 Al Zaytouneh Ramallah Municipality

193 50 At Tayba Ramallah Municipality

194 50 Madinat Ezahra Gaza Municipality

195 50 Al Asaesah Jenin VC

196 50 Sanniriya Qalqilya VC

197 50 Beit Ur at Tahta Ramallah VC


131


127

198 50 Qusin Nablus VC

199 50 Ash Shuyukh Hebron Municipality

200 50 Abwein Ramallah Municipality

201 49 Arrana Jenin VC

202 49 Tammun Tubas Municipality

203 49 Deir Jarir Ramallah VC

204 49 Ein Yabrud Ramallah VC

205 49 Dura Hebron Municipality

206 49 As Sawiya Nablus VC

207 49 Beit Ula Hebron Municipality

208 49 Qaffin Tulkarm Municipality

209 49 Al Khadr Bethlehem Municipality

210 49 Al Nowaaima Jericho VC

211 49 Tuqu Bethlehem Municipality

212 49 Qarawat Bani Zeid Ramallah VC

213 48 An Nuseirat Deir al Balah Municipality

214 48 Beit Lahiya North Gaza Municipality

215 48 Bani Naim Hebron Municipality

216 48 Al Jaba Bethlehem VC

217 48 Ejnasnia Nablus VC

218 48 Anin Jenin VC

219 48 Khuzaa Khan Yunis Municipality

220 48 Zeita Jammain Nablus VC

221 47 Burin Nablus VC

222 47 Rafah Rafah Municipality

223 47 Kisan Bethlehem VC

224 47 Umm Salamuna Bethlehem VC

225 47 Salim Nablus VC

226 47 Beit Kahil Hebron VC


132


128

227 47 Beit Ummar Hebron Municipality

228 46 Tell Nablus VC

229 46 Marah Maalla Bethlehem VC

230 46 Burqa Ramallah VC

231 46 Beit Dajan Nablus VC

232 46 Qabatiya Jenin Municipality

233 46 Ein Shibli Nablus VC

234 46 Hindaza and Braidah Bethlehem VC

235 46 Iskaka Salfit VC

236 45 Al Araqa Jenin VC

237 45 Az Zababida Jenin Municipality

238 45 Duma Nablus VC

239 45 Aqqaba Tubas Municipality

240 45 Al Yamun Jenin Municipality

241 45 Jenin Jenin Municipality

242 45 Atuf Tubas VC

243 45 Idhna Hebron Municipality

244 45 Al Jadida Jenin VC

245 45 Jaba Jerusalem VC

246 45 Al Lubban ash Sharqiya Nablus VC

247 45 Silat adh Dhahr Jenin Municipality

248 45 Mikhmas Jerusalem VC

249 44 Jurat ash Shama Bethlehem VC

250 44 Al Hashimiya Jenin VC

251 44 Al Majd Hebron VC

252 44 Al Mughayyir Jenin VC

253 44 Yasid Nablus VC

254 44 Kobar Ramallah VC


133


129

255 44 Saffa Ramallah VC

256 44 Thahr Al Abed Jenin VC

257 44 Rafat Salfit VC

258 44 Khirbet Abu Falah Ramallah VC

259 44 Yabrud Ramallah VC

260 43 Asira ash Shamaliya Nablus Municipality

261 43 Surda o Abu Qash Ramallah Municipality

262 42 Surif Hebron Municipality

263 42 Atara Ramallah Municipality

264 42 Rafat Jerusalem VC

265 42 Burqa Nablus VC

266 42 Bir al Basha Jenin VC

267 42 Hitta Hebron VC

268 41 Asira al Qibliya Nablus VC

269 41 Misliya Jenin VC

270 41 Deir Nidham Ramallah VC

271 41 Ajja Jenin Municipality

272 41 Yatma Nablus VC

273 41 Al Mughayyir Ramallah VC

274 41 Kafr ad Dik Salfit Municipality

275 41 Al Ubeidiya Bethlehem Municipality

276 41 Al Burj Biet Marsim Hebron VC

277 41 Khallet al Haddad Bethlehem VC

278 41 Al Ramah Jenin VC

279 40 Bani Suheila Khan Yunis Municipality

280 40 Fahma Jenin VC

281 40 Sanour Jenin VC

282 40 Bani Zeid ash Sharqiya Ramallah Municipality

283 40 Arraba Jenin Municipality


134


130

284 40 Kafr Qud Jenin VC

285 40 Al Masara Bethlehem VC

286 40 Kafr Qaddum Qalqilya VC

287 40 Kafr Nima Ramallah VC

288 40 As Samu Hebron Municipality

289 39 Zububa Jenin VC

290 39 Az Zawayda Deir al Balah Municipality

291 39 Bardala Tubas VC

292 39 Karma Hebron VC

293 39 Al Aouja Jericho Municipality

294 39 Yatta Hebron Municipality

295 38 Bizzariya Nablus VC

296 38 Kafr Dan Jenin Municipality

297 38 Deir Abu Mashal Ramallah VC

298 38 Rummana Jenin VC

299 38 Al Fandaqumiya Jenin VC

300 38 Khan Yunis Khan Yunis Municipality

301 38 Qibya Ramallah VC

302 38 Marah Rabah Bethlehem VC

303 37 Wadi al Fara Tubas VC

304 37 An Nabi Salih Ramallah VC

305 37 Birqin Jenin Municipality

306 37 Qira Salfit VC

307 37 Adh Dhahiriya Hebron Municipality

308 37 Beit Furik Nablus Municipality

309 36 Tayasir Tubas VC

310 36 Em Al Khair Hebron VC

311 36 Silat al Harithiya Jenin Municipality

312 36 Absan al Kabira Khan Yunis Municipality


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131

313 36 Fahma al Jadida Jenin VC

314 35 Talluza Nablus VC

315 35 Qabalan Nablus Municipality

316 34 Ash Shawawra Bethlehem VC

317 34 Aqqaba Tubas VC

318 34 Raba Jenin VC

319 34 Tiinnik Jenin VC

320 34 Wadi Rahhal Bethlehem VC

321 34 Marj Naja Jericho VC

322 34 Deir al Asal al Fauqa Hebron VC

323 34 Marj al Ghazal Jericho VC

324 34 Fasayil Jericho VC

325 33 Imreish Abda Hebron VC

326 33 Khursa Hebron VC

327 33 Arabbuna Jenin VC

328 32 Sikka Tawwas Hebron VC

329 32 Al Aqrabaniya Nablus VC

330 32 Sireec Jenin VC

331 32 Einabus Nablus VC

332 32 Wadi an Nis Bethlehem VC

333 31 Al Qarara Khan Yunis Municipality

334 31 Jifna Ramallah VC

335 31 Deir Abu Daif Jenin VC

336 31 Bruqin Salfit Municipality

337 31 Ar Rihiya Hebron VC

338 31 Jaba Jenin Municipality

339 31 Jalqamus Jenin VC

340 31 Arab ar Rashayida Bethlehem VC

341 30 Hadab al Fawwar Hebron VC


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132

342 29 Furush Beit Dajan Nablus VC

343 29 Imneizil Hebron VC

343 29 Kharbat Al-deir Hebron VC

343 29 Beit Qad ash Shamali Jenin VC

346 28 Artas Bethlehem VC

347 28 Al Karmil Hebron Municipality

348 27 Al Rayan Jenin VC

349 26 Ar Ramadin Hebron VC

350 26 Al Fukhkhari Khan Yunis Municipality

351 26 Absan as Saghira Khan Yunis Municipality

352 26 Al Attara Jenin VC

353 25 Al Naser Rafah Municipality

354 25 Jalbun Jenin VC

354 25 Al Najada Al Kaabna Hebron VC

354 25 Al Zwaydieen Hebron VC

357 25 Al Yasreiah Hebron Municipality

358 24 As Sura Hebron VC

359 24 Az Zawiya Jenin VC

360 24 Beit Qad al Janubi Jenin VC

361 23 Abu al Asja Abu al Ghozlan Hebron VC

362 23 Khallet al Maiyya Hebron VC

363 22 Faqqua Jenin VC

364 22 Kufeirit Jenin VC

365 22 Beit Amra Hebron VC

366 21 Al Hathalin Khshm Al Daraj Hebron VC

366 21 Aba ash Sharqiya Jenin VC

368 21 Al Jiftlik Jericho VC

369 20 Ash Shuhada Jenin VC


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133

370 19 Deir al Asal at Tahta Hebron VC

371 19 Mirka Jenin VC

372 19 Biet Al Roush Alfouqa Hebron VC

373 17 Beit ar Rush at Tahta Hebron VC

374 16 Wadi as Salqa Deir al Balah Municipality

375 14 Zibda Al Jadida Jenin VC

376 13 Umm at Tut Jenin VC

377 10 Deir Razih Tarrama Hebron VC

378 10 Shokat as Sufi Rafah Municipality

379 4 Almaleh Tubas VC

380 0 Msafir Yatta Hebron VC


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144

Annex 8: LGU Revenue Assignment, Management Responsibility, and Final Destination of Funds

Whosetsthebase

Whosetstherate

Whocollects

Whoretains/howmuch(%)

PropertyTax(O) MoFPforWestBank,Municipali-tiesforGaza

MoFPforWestBank,Municipali-tiesforGaza

MoFPforWestBank,Municipali-tiesforGaza

MoFP-10%(WestBank)

Municipalities–90%(WestBank)

Municipalities–100%(Gaza)

ButMoFPinterceptsrevenuesformunicipalarrears

ProfessionPermitFees(O) MoFP MoFP MoFP MoFP-10%

Municipalities–90%


CraftandIndustrialFees(O)

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

TransportationTax(O) MinistryofTransport(MoT)

MoT MoTanden-tersamountsinSingleTreasuryAc-count

Thedistributionformulachangesfromyeartoyearaccordingtothedecisionofthe"TransportationTaxDistributionCommittee"attheMoLG.Thepercentageoffundsallocatedaccordingtopop-ulationrangedbetween55-75%ofthetotalappropriatedfundsfrom2008to2013.


Educationtax(7%taxlev-iedonpropertytaxbase)(O)

MoFP MoFP Municipali-ties

EarmarkedtoSchoolsmainte-nance

SolidWasteCollectionFee(O)

Municipali-tiesorJointServiceCoun-cil



MunicipalitiesorJointServiceCouncil

Officialdocumentprepara-tionfee(O)

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

BuildingLicenseFee(O) Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

TableA8-1:LGURevenueAssignment(intheLGA),ManagementResponsibilityandFinalDestina-tionoftheFunds


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145

Signboardfees(O) Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

Fines(municipalcourt,transportation)(O)

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

Ceilingtax(O) VC VC VC VC

Personaltax(O) VC VC VC VC

ElectricityFee(E) PA PA UtilitiesorMunicipali-ties

UtilitiesorMunicipalities

WaterFee(E) PWA PWA UtilitiesorMunicipali-ties

UtilitiesorMunicipalities

WasteWaterFee(E) Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

SlaughterhousesFee(E) Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

VegetableMarketsFee(E) Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

PublicParkingFee(E) Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

Otherfees(O)includingbuildingpermitfee;waterandelectricityconnectionfees;wastewaterandsew-ageconnectionfee;gar-bagecollectionfee;signboardfees;cemeteryfees;andsomefarmingfeesforroads

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipali-ties

Municipalities

Source:UpdatedfromWB(2014A).“O”standsforOperatingRevenueand“E”forEnterpriseRevenue


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Assignment

1.Townplanning

2.Streetconstruction,rehabs,paving,androads

3.Rainwaterdrainagesystem*

4.Streetnamesandnumbering

5.Sidewalks

6.Streetlighting

7.Publictransportstandsandterminals

8.Watersupply

9.Electricitysupply

10.Sewersystem

11.Wastewatertreatment

12.Publiclavatories

13.Solidwastecollectionanddisposal

14.Solidwastetreatment

15.Fruitandvegetablemarkets

16.Publicparks

17.Socialassistanceprograms**

18.Sportsfacilities

19.Libraries

20.Museumsandculture

21.Regulation,controlandmonitoring***

22.Cemeteries

23.Schools

24.Healthcenters

TableA8-2:ExpenditureAssignmentsAccordingtoLocalGovernmentLaw


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25.Slaughterhouses

26.Firefighting

27.Transitmanagement(trafficlights,signs,meters,andothers)

28.Other(thelawexplicitlyallowsforotherfunctions)

(Art.15oftheLGAof1997)

*Thesefunctionsarenotexplicitinthelaw;however,theyareunderstoodtobepartoftheexpendi-tureresponsibilitiesofthelocalcouncils.

**Suchasshelterforthehomeless,fooddonations,andotherlocalsocialprograms.

***Regulation,controlandmonitoringof:publichealthstandards,slaughterhouses,foodsafety,res-taurants,hotels,andpublicfacilities,weightandscalescontrol,craftandindustryhazards,clinicandhealthcenterstandards,streetvendorsandstands,publictransportation.


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The data collection, analysis, and production of this report was supported by the Representative Of-fice of Denmark, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the World Bank. Co-financing was provided through the Palestinian Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund (PID MDTF) and the Palestinian Recovery and Development Program Trust Fund (PRDP) managed by the World Bank. The PID MDTF is currently being supported with contributions from: Croatia; Den-mark; Finland; France; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; and Sweden. The PRDP is financed by: Australia; France; Japan; Kuwait; and Norway. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the contributing donors.

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