the people's liberation army of china: its raison d'etre, current state and trajectory
TRANSCRIPT
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A
PEOPLESLIBERATIONARMYOF CHINA:
Itsraison dtre,
current statetrajectoryand
THE
9.4VOLUME
PAPEROCCASIONAL
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With the growing presence and inuence of the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as an economic
heavyweight and polit ical leader in the regional and
global arenas, Filipino academics and policymakers
are beginning to cultivate a keen interest in the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) as Chinas hard
instrument of national power. Since its inception in
1927, the PLA has arguably become a stabilizing
force for China after its so-called Century of
Humiliation; the PLA has played the pivotal roles ofliberating the country from Western and Japanese
imperialism and of perpetuating the one-party rule
of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However,
the growing tension over the territorial and maritime
disputes in the South China Sea and East China
Sea in recent years lead one to question whether or
not the PLA, with its rapidly expanding regional and
global footprint, is going to be a destabilizing force to
the international liberal order. This strategic research
paper sheds light on the PLAits raison dtre,
current state and trajectoryto gain a balanced
perspective on the said military organization and
help Filipino academics and policymakers criticallyassess whether continuously tilting towards the
US (and allies) and balancing against China is
the best way forward for the Philippines.
* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
PEOPLESLIBERATIONARMY OF CHINA:
Itsraison dtre,current state
trajectoryand
THE
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THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
The guard of honor of the Ch inese People's L iberation Army's Three Services
participates in a rehearsal for the military parade in commemoration of the70th anniversary of end of World War II in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.
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A Close Examination of thePeoples Liberation Army
The PLA is the armed forces of China which is under the
direct control of the ruling CPC.1 The PLA is tasked to
help advance the so-called six (6) core national interests,
namely: (a) state sovereignty; (b) national security; (c)
territorial integrity; (d) national reunication; (e) Chinaspolitical system established by the Constitution and
overall social stability; and (f) basic safeguards for
ensuring sustainable economic and social development.2
Given these core interests, one may conclude that China
through the PLA hopes to achieve the following strategic
objectives: (a) maintaining a stable political and security
environment conducive to continued economic growth;
(b) securing trade routes transiting the region; (c) gaining
access to regional energy resources (i.e. oil and natural
gas) and raw materials; and (d) gaining inuence
to defeat perceived attempts at strategic
encirclement or containment.
Founded in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province on 1 August
1927, the PLA is currently the largest military in the world,
with a total troop membership of around 2.3 million as of
June 2015.3 In contrast to the militaries of other countries
in the world such as the US whose allegiance lies in the
State and the Constitution, the PLA is beholden to the
Party which, under the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political
ideological framework, is the sole representative of
the people. Hence, the PLA within the Chinese
party-state system is the military wing of the CPC
and the guarantor of its one-party rule.4
A. Armed Forces Division
In Chinese military parlance, the so-called PLA force providers are the
PLA Army (PLAA), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF),
and the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLA SAF). The Paramilitary and
reserve forces are also included as force providers.5 Based on the2006 National Defense White Paper, PLA forces have undergone
drastic downsizing since mid-1980s.6 The PLAAs share in the total
force structure went down from 77% in 1985 to 69% in 2014. 7
Conversely, PLAN grew from 8.6% in 1985 to 10% in 2014, the
PLAAF from 12% to 17%, and the PLA SAF from 2% to 4%.8
FIGURE 1. ACTIVE AND RESERVE PERSONNEL BY SERVICEIN THE PLA IN 2014
Source: CHINESE S TRATEGY AND MILITARY POWER IN 2014, P.163
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Distribution of the armed forces throughout t he Chinese mainland
Source: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The PLA is composed of 2,285,000 active troops and 510,000 reserve forces, which far surpasses US military
troop numbers.9 According to the 2013 Defense White Paper, PLAN accounts for 235,000 troops and the
PLAAF for 398,000 troops.10 The PLAAs mobile operational units comprise 850,000 troops of an estimated
total of 1.6 million PLAA troops. The PLA SAF accounts for about 100,000 personnel.11 Interesting ly, Chinas
paramilitary forces, such as the Peoples Armed Police (PAP), has a total strength of 660,000 sta as well as the
militia.12 Since its activation in 1983, the PAP was primarily tasked to address internal security challenges, such
as natural disasters and ethnic and social unrest,especially in the restive regions of Xinjiang and Tibet.13
B. Organizational Structureand Command Chain
Distributed into seven (7) military regions, the P
as force employers, namely: Shenyang, Beiji
Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu.14
overseen by four (4) general departments, nam
General Sta Headquarters, the General Politic
the General Logistics Department, and the Ge
Department.15 The PLAN, PLAAF and PLA SA
have separate headquarters.16
FIGURE 2. THE PLAS STRUCTURE AND COM
Source: UNDERSTANDING CHINAS POLITICLA SYSTEM, MARCH
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Under the Chinese command chain, the CMC plays a crucial roleit
exerts direct organizational control over the PLA. The CMC oversees
military and defense aairs and is a high-prole party body, through
which the CCP exerts control over the PLA since the 1930s.17 The
Ministry of National Defence is subordinated to the State Council and
is outside the PLAs direct command structure. It serves as a liaison
oce with foreign militaries. Meanwhile, the PAP being an auxiliaryforce to the PLA and law enforcement body is subject to a dierent,
dual command structure18it is both under the supervision of the
CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.
On 26 November 2015, Chinese President Xi Xinping announced
the comprehensive reorganization and overhaul of the current
military administration structure and command system of the PLA.19
According to Beijing-based military expert Song Zhongping, the new
military structure will unburden the theater commands of personnel
management and administrative responsibilities and allow them to
focus mainly on war-ghting.20 Said overhaul comes as a
response to growing geopolitical tensions vis--vis the
globalization of its security and developmental interests.21
Under the new structure, the CMC will now administer both the PLA
and the PAP, while the battle zone commands will focus on combat
operations.22 Said reform will institutionalize a three-tier CMC-battle
zone commands-troops command system and an administration
system that runs from CMC through dierent services down to the
troops.23 Furthermore, the armed forces will be more professionally
and eectively managed by int roducing modern management
techniques, reducing its troops by 300,000, and downsizing its
administrative and non-combatant personnel.24 Lastly, to ensure
party loyalty and curb corruption, a new discipline inspection
commission will be established within the CMC to conduct regular
disciplinary inspections to CMC departments and zone commands.25
PLAs Seven Old Military Regions
Source: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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The new theater commands are generally
patterned after former area commands,
with a more enhanced command and
logistics support functions.26
The ve(5) new theater commands will be the
following: Eastern Theater Command (to
be headed by commander Liu Yuejun
and political commissar Zheng Weiping);
Southern Theater Command (commander
Wang Jiaocheng and political commissar
Wei Liang); Western Theater Command
(Zhao Zongqi and political commissar
Zhu Fuxi); Northern Theater Command
(commander Song Puxuan and political
commissar Chu Yimin); and Central
Theater Command (commander Han
Weiguo and political commissar YinFanglong).27Said theater commands
will be run by the joint battle command
system and be responsible for addressing
the security threats within their respective
strategic scopes, maintaining peace,
containing or winning wars, and
safeguarding the countrys overall national
security and military strategies.28Source: The STRAITS TIMES
PLAs Five New Theater Commands
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C. Defense Budget
The Chinese defense budget has been on a
constant, upward trajectory.29 Between 1998 and
2007, military expenditure went up by almost 16%
on average, year on year.30 This is comparable to
the surge in the annual state expenditure by about
18%, and the PRCs average annual GDP growth of
roughly 12%.31 In 2014, PLA defense budget was
registered at US$132 billion, which was a 12.2%
increase over the preceding year. On March 4,
2015, China announced that it would further raise
its defense budget by approximately 10%.32 While
this raise is lower than the previous years 12.2%
increase, the budget nonetheless reects the fth
consecutive year with a double digit increase in
ocial military spending.33 This would then
translate to roughly $US145 billion.34
The PLAs defense budget composition is as follows:
personnel expenses, mainly including pay, food
and clothing of military and non-military personnel;costs for maintenance of activities, mainly including
military training, construction and maintenance
of facilities and running expenses; and costs for
equipment, including research and experimentation,
procurement, maintenance, transportation and
storage.35 These expenditures include militia and
reserve requirements.36 A large amount of spending
is devoted to fund activities associated with social
welfare, mainly pensions for some of the retired
ocers, schools and kindergartens for children of
military personnel, training personnel competent
for both military and civilian services, supporting
national economic construction, and participation inemergency rescues and disaster relief eorts.37
Summary of Military Budget of the Peoples Liberation Army 38
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D. Doctrine and Strategy
Chinas national objectives and strategic interests
serve as the bases for its military doctrine and
strategy. Dubbed as Active Defense/Active Oshore
Defense,39 the objective of the PLA is to ght local
wars under high-tech conditions.40 Said objective
requires smaller, more specialized rapid-reactionforces, possession of a limited oensive and
force projection capability, and the option
of preemptive military action.41
For the PLAN, in particular, the Active Defense/
Active Oshore Defense strategy entails an
evolutionary shift from its Static Coastal Defense
role to Active Oshore Defense. Through this
shift, Chinese naval assets are employed for both
tactical and strategic purposes in asserting control
of coastal economic regions and maritime interests,
and for optimizing the Navys operations for national
defense. Said Chinese maritime strategy is crediteddirectly or indirectly to General Liu Huaqing, PLAN
head from 1982 to 1987 and CMC vice chairman
from 1988 to 1997.42 He advocated for the
expansion of PLAN navys operations from coastal
defense to oshore active defense.43
At the heart of the Active Oshore Defense
doctrine is the so-called Two-Island Chain or
Leap East strategy which denes the geostrategic
theaters in East Asia that the PLA aspires to control:
This rst island chain area encompasses the
Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan; the western
East China Sea; and the South China Sea,
extending deep into Southeast Asia. It addresses
many of Chinas maritime national i nterests: the
concentration of economic investment along
the coast, oshore territorial claims, oceanic
resources, and coastal defense. It is ambitious
in scope, extending from approximately 200 to
700 nm from the mainland, to include Taiwan and
the South China Sea land features claimed by
Beijing as sovereign territory. The second island
chain bounds Lius second strategic maritime
area: a north-south line from the Kuriles through
Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines,and Indonesia. This is a much more ambitious
goal than that implied by the rst island chain,
since it encompasses
approximately 1,800
including most of the
Asian SLOCs. The thi
maritime strategy pos
force built around airc
the middle of the 21st
imply a PLAN many t
capable than Chinas
however, global naval
in a eet of ballistic m
capable of launchingmissiles (ICBMs) and
cruise missiles.44
Chinas Two-Island Chain or Leap East Strategy
Source: BBC.CO.UK
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E. Force Modernization Goals and Trends
The modernization of the PLA was kick-started in
the late 1970s and had three major goals: First,
under the political leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the
military sought to clarify its relationship with the civilian
branch of government.45 The PLA gradually returned
to its pre-Cultural Revolution relationship with the
CPC and became disengaged from civilian politics.46
Deng reasserted civilian control over the military by
undertaking the following measures: (a) appointment
of his supporters to key military leadership positions;
(b) reduction of the scope of the PLAs domestic
nonmilitary role; and (c) revitalization of the
party political structure and ideological
control system within the PLA.47
Second, modernization required the reform of military
organization, doctrine, education and training, and
personnel policies to improve combat eectiveness in
combined-arms warfare.48
To achieve organizationalreforms, the Chinese government created the CMC,
reduced and streamlined the PLA forces, civilianized
many of the PLA unit s, reorganized military regions,
formed group armies, and enacted the new Military
Service Law in 1984.49 Doctrine, strategy, and tactics
were revised under the rubric of peoples war based
on the contemporary security environment, which
envisaged a forward defense at selected locations
near Chinas borders, to prevent attack on Chinese
cities and industrial sites, and emphasized operations
using combined-arms tactics.50 Furthermore, reforms
in education and training gave strong emphasis on
improving the military skills and raising the educationlevels of ocers and troops and conducting combined
arms operations.51 New personnel policies fostered the
upgrading in the quality of PLA recruits and
ocer candidates, thereby improving their conditions
of service, changing promotion practices to
stress professional competence, and
providing new uniforms and insignia.52
The third goal of military modernization was the radical
transformation of the whole defense establishment
into a system capable of i ndependently maintaining
a modern military force.53 As military expenditures
remained relatively constant, reforms focused on
the reorganization of the defense research-and-
development and industrial base to better integrate
civilian and military science and industry more closely.54
Foreign technology was used selectively in the
upgrading of weapons.55 Defense industry reforms also
transformed the Chinese defense economy from being
import-driven to export-driven, thereby allowing its full
entry into the international arms market and paving
the way for the increased production of civilian goods
by local defense industries.56
The scope of PLA localeconomic engagements was reduced, but the military
continued to participate in infrastructure development
projects and initiated a reintegration program to provide
demobilized soldiers with technical skills deemed
benecial in the civilian economy.57
The latest Chinas Military Strategy dated May
2015 is a pertinent document that sheds light on the
PLAs modernization trends based on the countrys
framing of the national security situation. From
the Chinese perspective, the US rebalancing and
Japans normalization, both fostered by the shift in
the economic and strategic center of gravity towardsthe Asia-Pacic, are some of the latest security
developments to pose a direct threat to Beijings
Comparison of PLAs old and new force struct
Source: South China Morning Post
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Image Credit: xinhua
sovereignty and territorial integrity.58 These developments transpire against the
backdrop of Chinas growing economic and strategic interests abroad
in accordance with its New Silk Road Strategy.59 As a response to
the changing security situation, the PLA seeks to implement the
military strategic guideline of active defense.60
The South China Morning Post recently published an infographic thatencapsulates the present as well as possible future force structure and troop
strength of the PLA based on the latest military strategy. The PLA will then
undergo professionalization through internal rebalancing of it s major service
branches, with the navy and air force assuming equal status as that of the
army.61 Meanwhile, a national guard will replace the Peoples Armed Police.62
President Xi arms the envisioned force restructuring: During the 02 September
2015 PLA military parade in commemoration of 70 years of end of World War II,
he announced that he would reduce the countrys military personnel by 300,000
until 2017, thereby shrinking the military forces to roughly 2,000,000 personnel.63
This is an integral part of the accelerated modernization of the PLA which
would shift spending from the traditional land forces to more advanced
sea and air forces.64 Said shift would require fewer but higher-skilledmilitary personnel and pave way for the development of more
technologically sophisticated oensive/defensive capabilities.65
Similarly, Yang Yujun, spokesperson for Chinas Ministry of National Defense,
explained that through the cut of troops number, Chinas military will further
adjust and optimize its scale and structure, make its troops more capable and
its structure more scientic, and construct a modern military force system with
Chinese characteristics.66 He further remarked that cutting the number of
troops is conducive to pooling resources, speeding up the pace
and improving the quality of informatization construction.67
As of writing, the latest development within the PLA is President Xis assumption
of the new title, Commander in Chief of the joint battle command center of the
PLA.68 According to You Ji, overseer of the Department of Government and Public Ad
University of Macau, the new title symbolizes that Xi will exert a more direct role in the
control of the joint battle command systems with the aim of strengthening inter-servic
coordination and raising the prospects of mili tary victory.69
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Dressed in combat fatigues, Ch
military officers in the Central Military Cthe newest and highest
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2015 PLA Capabilities and Trajectories
Source: US Department of Defense 2015 Annual Report to Congress70
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Critical Analysis
Overall, the PLA under Xi is undergoing radical
force restructuring, transforming from an army-
centric to a navy/air force-centric military with
a greater qualitative edge at an unprecedented
pace. This restructuring can be explained byrecent developments in Chinas domestic, regional
and global strategic and economic landscapes.
Domestically, the relatively stable internal security
situation, the civilianization of law enforcement
agencies and the looming cost of maintaining huge
personnel disincentivize the PLAs sustainment of
massive ground forces. Regionally, the perception of
containment by the US and its network of security
allies in the Asia-Pacic regionthe Philippines
includednecessitates the PLA to strengthen its
naval and aerial capabilities for better deterrence
and force projection. Globally, the internationalization
of its developmental interests as shown in One Belt-
One Road Initiative (OBOR) creates the imperative
for the PLA to develop more advanced capabilities
to protect Chinas sea lanes of communications
(SLOCs) and transcontinental roads and railways.
It is highly unlikely, however, that the PLA will be
able to proceed smoothly with it s radical force
restructuring in the coming years. Internally, the
ongoing anti-corruption campaign of Xi in the military
is opening up a Pandoras box that could create
more instability within Chinas defense and security
establishment. The arrest last year of Xu Caihou,former general of the PLA and vice-chairman of
the CMC, amid allegations of accepting bribes for
promotion as well as the punishment of more than
200 ocers of lieutenant-colonel rank and above
since 201371 has not only sent a strong message
against other military personnel who are embroiled
in various corruption activities. Over and above, the
arrest has raised the question on what constitutesthe threshold for labeling certain activities as corrupt
and how loyalty to Xi could factor in into
the determination of that threshold. Nevertheless,
once Xi overplays his scare tactics, the PLA may
soon nd itself deeply polarized as the beneciaries
of the old military command structure may
opt to band together to protect their
vested interests and reputations.
Externally, the convergence of territorial and
maritime disputes between China and its
neighboring ASEAN countries, on the one hand,
and the growing concern of extra-regional powers,
namely the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia
to preserve freedom of navigation, on the other
hand, is further raising the risk calculus for the
PLAalong with China maritime coast guardto
achieve uncontested supremacy over Chinas near
seas. In the foreseeable future, the PLA will
then have to contend with three (3) major
challenges in line with Chinas bid for regional
supremacyand global presence:
(a) On the legal front, the much-anticipated United
Nations (UN) arbitral tribunal ruling expectedfor May 201672 is highly likely to undermine the
principle of 9-dashed li
of ownership over the e
well as raise Chinas re
compliance.
(b) On the political fron
Abe (Japan),73 reappoTrong (Vietnam),74 and
(Taiwan)75 raises the
convergence of the
policies which, in turn, w
security pacts with the
(c) On the military fro
its allies, Japan and
likely to up the ante on
operations (FONOPS)76
commons.
Tightening Grip within tAlliance: Is this the Bes
The massive withdrawal o
forces from Subic Bay nav
in 1992 brought the Philip
position within the US-led
been sheltered by the US
and dragged into low-leve
operations from within thr
the Armed Forces of the P
lagged behind vis--vis its
region in fully developing i
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Im
defense capabilities. This has rendered Manila highly
vulnerable against gradual Chinese assertion of
sovereignty over West Philippine Sea which began
with the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995
and intensied with the seizure of Scarborough
Shoal in 2012 as well as island construction
in Spratlys from 2014 up to present.
With the growing militarization of the West
Philippine Sea, the AFP is currently fast-tracking
its modernization program to achieve minimum
credible defense posture vis--vis the PLA which is
tantamount to an eective force present inside the
Philippines and its exclusive economic zone with
exhibited competence to defend the country and
protect its national interests if the need arises.77
As a US treaty ally, however, such modernization
program may be viewed as a bid to better augment
the Allied Forces in preserving the current US-
dominated regional security architecture.
Amidst the brewing great power rivalry, what then
are the advantages and disadvantages for the
Philippines next administration in adopting Benigno
Aquino III administrations balance-of-power
logic by tilting towards the US (and allies)
and balancing against China?
In continuing the Aquino administrations policy, the
Philippines will become better integrated with the
US as well as Japan, South Korea and Australia
within the American security umbrella. In this regard,
the Philippines will be able to increase its overall
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deterrence capability as it simultaneously pursues
internal and external balancing: Internally, as the
AFP is undertaking force restructuring and strategic
reorientation from internal security towards territorial
defense, closer military ties with the US (and
allies) will allow Manila greater preferential access
to Western armaments, capital, technology andinteroperability training to accelerate its capability
upgrade programs and possibly pump prime its
defense manufacturing industry. Externally, the
enhancement of formal alliance with Washington
and informal military alliances with Tokyo, Canberra
and Seoul will signicantly raise the risk calculus
for the PLA to assert full sovereignty over the West
Philippine Sea and disrupt freedom of navigation
and overight which is the shared interest
among all members of the alliance.
Over time, the Philippine national interest to
defend its territories in the disputed waters and USnational interest to defend freedom of navigation
and overight would see greater convergence. The
ongoing militarization of Chinas articial islands in
the Kalayaan Island Groupconstruction of network
of airstrips, deep-water ports and other military-
capable infrastructureis necessitating the US
Seventh Fleet to raise the quantity of its naval and
aerial assets as well as increase the frequency of
its patrol activities of in West Philippine Sea. This is
providing a stronger impetus for Japan and Australia
to take a more proactive stance in jointly supporting
the US in protecting the sea lanes of communication
(SLOCS). In the short- and medium-term, the
formation of a triangulated defense of SLOCS
(de facto US-Japan-Australia alliance) will provide
a rm layer of external deterrence for the
Philippines while the latter is boosting itscoast guard and naval capabilities.
On the other hand, putting all eggs in Washingtons
basket risks diminishing Manilas foreign policy
exibility in exploring alternative avenues for long-
term political resolution of the territorial and maritime
disputes in West Philippine Sea. By invoking greater
US as well as Japanese and Australian milit ary
presence in the contested seas, the Philippines
could contribute to China hardening its antagonistic
stance toward the Philippines at a time when
Chinas foreign policy thrust is otherwise that of
improving relations with its neighbors. By furtherdrawing the US (and allies) into the equation, Manila
may narrow the space for China to be able to
exercise pragmatismwhich it showed when it
agreed to pull out the Haiyang Shiyou-981
oil rig last year after erce stando
and mass protests in Vietnam.
In the long-term, however, the prevalence of such
defense posturing by the US, Japanese and
Australian armed forces vis--vis the PLA could
render the resolution or s
maritime disputes betwee
China much more dicult
China rejects external inte
what it perceives as bilate
disputes, the Philippines
re-explore critical areas osocio-cultural cooperatio
mutual trust and conden
Gloria Arroyo and Hu Jint
could also narrow the win
greater military-to-military
the AFP and PLA, especi
assistance and disaster re
(HADRO), peacekeeping
and internal security oper
Continued deterioration o
bilateral relations could w
institutions and frameworChina and the ASEAN Re
The Philippine governme
this further contribute to a
prospect for the formation
arrangement that include
new regional security arch
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Conclusion
The Peoples Liberation Army has gone a long way from being a
small ragtag guerrilla force in Nanchang into the Communist Party
of Chinas colossal modern armed forces, promoting the security
and developmental interests of the worlds nascent economic
and political power, the Peoples Republic of China. The PLAsgrowing regional and global footprint is, in eect, altering threat
perceptions, the regional balance of military power, and risk
calculi in the greater geopolitical game. For this reason, it is
imperative for the Philippines to transcend the amorphous China
threat metanarrative that has dominated the political-security
discourse in the Philippines and objectively re-examine
what the PLA is, why it exists and where it is headed.
By comprehensively reviewing the multifaceted aspects of the PLA
as a military organization (i.e. organization, chain of command,
budget, doctrine and strategy, and modernization goals and
trends), one may conclude that the PLA is the new indispensable
factor in the Philippines security equation. The PLA deservesserious attention in national security policy formulation and
military strategy-making. Finally, an unadulterated picture of the
PLA as Chinas hard power instrument in pursuing its objectives
should lead key stakeholders in the Philippine government and
academia to the naked realization that adherence to the Aquino
administrations balancing strategy will have positive and negative
consequences well within and beyond the military realm.
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Endnotes:
1 Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Re-public of India, White Paper: Chinas Peaceful Development,2011, Chinese Government.
2 Ibid.3 Grieger, Gisela, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service, 29 June2015, accessed 26 October 2015, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/564375/EPRS_BRI(2015)564375_EN.pdf.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Chinese Strategy and Military Power in 2014, op. cit.,p. 162.9 The Military Balance, International Institute of Stra-tegic Studies, 2013, p. 287, cited in Chinese Strategy andMilitary Power in 2014, op. cit, p. 159.10 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.11 D.J. Blasko, The 2013 Defense White Paper in Per-
spective, China Brief, Vol. XIII, issue 9, 25 April 2013, pp.6-10.12 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 J.C Mulvenon and N.D. Yang, The Peoples Liber-alization Army as Organization, RAND National SecurityResearch Division, 2002, pp. 45-121.18 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.19 Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural re-form, Xinhuanet, 26 November 2015, accessed 09 Feb-ruary 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm.20 Teo Cheng Wee, Military rezoning shows Chinas
focus is on winning wars, The Straits Times, 03 February2016, accessed 09 February 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/military-rezoning-shows-chinas-focus-is-on-winning-wars.21 Ibid.22 Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural reform,
Xinhuanet.
23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Chinas military regrouped into ve PLA theatercommands, Xinhuanet, 01 February 2016, accessed 09February 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.30 Ibid.31 Ibid.
32 Chinas Defense Budget, GlobalSecurity,org, ac-cessed 27 October 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm.33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 Ibid.38 Ibid.39 Bernard Cole, The PLA Navy and Active Defense,Global Security.org, accessed 06 May 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/pla-china_transition_11_ch07.htm.40 Ibid.41 Ibid.42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.45 China Military Organization, The Library of CongressCountry Studies and CIA World Factbook in Photius.com,accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.photius.com/countries/china/economy/china_economy_military_organi-zatio~7400.html.
46 Ibid.47 Ibid.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.52 Ibid.53 Ibid.54 Ibid.55 Ibid.56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.58 Chinas Military Strategy, Ministry of National De-fense: The Peoples Republic of China, May 2015, accessed27 October 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/White-Papers/.59 Ibid.60 Ibid.61 How China will rebuild its Peoples Liberation Army,South China Morning Post, 02 September 2015, accessed27 October 2015, http://www.scmp.com/infographics/article/1854629/infographic-how-china-will-rebuild-its-peo-ples-liberation-army?comment-sort=recommended.62 Ibid.63 Edward Wong, Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, Chi-na Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military ParadeShowing Its Might, The New York Times, 02 September2015, accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html?_r=0.
64 Ibid.65 Ibid.66 Shannon Tiez300, 000 Troops, Tcessed 27 October the-real-reason-chin67
Ibid.68 Austin Ramzya New Title: Comm21 April 2016, accescom/2016/04/22/wmander.html?_r=0,69 Ibid.70 US Departmegress: Military and Peoples Republic o71 Charles Clovecorruption purge, F28 October 2015, h2eb8-11e5-91ac-a572 Patricia Lourdpines vs China decisDecember 2015, acphilstar.com/headlin
issue-philippines-vs73 Shinzo Abe reNews, 24 Decembehttp://www.bbc.com74 Mike Ives, VGuard Leader a New27 January 2016, acnytimes.com/2016/party-nguyen-phu-t75 Tsai Ing-wen BBC News, 17 Januhttp://www.bbc.com76 Dan de Lucewarship to challengeicy, 26 October 201foreignpolicy.com/2challenge-chinas-fa77 Bong Lozadature, Inquirer.net, 2http://newsinfo.inqdefense-posture.
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Mark Davis M. Pablois a Research Analyst at the ADR Institute. He graduated CumLaude from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2012 with abachelors degree in Political Science and Philosophy. Prior tojoining the ADR Institute, Mr. Pablo specialized in Stra tegic Studies.He began his career as a Defence Researcher/Analyst in theOfce for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management (OSSSM),the think tank of the General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the
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