the obscurity of internal reasons - university of …finlay/oir.pdfstephen finlay the obscurity of...

volume9,no.7 month2009

The Obscurity

of Internal Reasons

Stephen FinlayUniversity of Southern California

© 2009 StephenFinlay <www.philosophersimprint.org/009007/>

Since its publication in1979,BernardWilliams’ “InternalandExternal Reasons”1 has been one of themost influential andwidelydiscussedpapers in ethics. I suggest here that thepa-

per’sargumenthasneverthelessbeenuniversallymisunderstood.2Onthe standard interpretations,hisargument—whichhesubsequentlyelaborated and defended in further discussions—is perplexinglyweak. In thefirst section I sketch themainvariantsof theStandard(or,moreprovocatively, “Supposed”)Argument, and catalog thenu-merousflawsthatothershaveobservedinthem.Thebadnessoftheargumentitselfmightnotbeaconclusivereasonagainstascribingiteventoagreatphilosopher,buttherearemanyotherexegeticalprob-lemsforthisreading,includingthatWilliamshimselfseemedblithelyawareofanduntroubledbymanyoftheseflaws.

In the second section I propose a different interpretationofWil-liamsasofferinganAlternative(ormoreprovocatively,the“Actual”)Argument,whichisimmunetotheseeminglyfatalobjectionstotheStandard Argument and better supported by the text and charity.3 Onthis interpretation,Williamsoffers justoneconsistentargument,whichuniteshiscentralconcernswith(i)the“explanatorydimension”ofreasonsstatements,(ii)theirconceptualcontent,and(iii)thecon-nectionbetweenreasonsanddeliberation.Whilehisargumentisnor-mallythoughttobebasedonthecommonclaimthatreasonsmustbecapableofmotivating,Iarguethatitratherbeginsfromasubstantiveandinterestinganalysisoftheconceptofanormativereason:thattobelieve thatR is foryoua reason foraction just is tobelieve thatR

1. Henceforth“IER”.Allreferencesbypagenumberalonearetothe1981reprintof thispaper.Obscurityevensurroundsthedateof itsoriginalpublication.Althoughalmostuniversallycitedasfrom1980,itactuallyappearedin1979.Williams’ownsourcenoteinhisMoral Luck(1981)seemstobetheoriginoftheerror.

2. AlanThomas(2002)isapossibleexception.Thomasadvancesanaccountsharingsomeofthefeaturesofmine,buthissketchisbriefandhedoesn’targueforhisinterpretationindetail.

3. Readersuninterested inmypainstakingexaminationof theproblemswiththestandardreadingareable toskipstraight to thesecondsection formyproposedalternative.

ImprintPhilosophers’

stephenfinlay The Obscurity of Internal Reasons

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.9,no.7(july2009)

φbyacceptingR.Specifying theseconditions identifies therelevantsenseofpossibility.FortheargumenttobevalidbothS1andS2mustinvolvethesamesenseofpossibility.Theargument’ssuccessrequiresasensethatisweakenoughforS1tobeplausible,butstrongenoughforS2tobeplausible.Forexample,considerthestrongsenseofpos-sibilityprovidedbytheconditionthatAhasexactlyhisactualmotiva-tionalset:

S1*.RisareasonforAtoφonlyif,underconditionsofhavinghisactualmotivationalset,AwouldbemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

S2*.AwouldbemotivatedtoφbybelievingRunderconditionsofhavingA’sactualmotivationalsetonlyifthereissome-thinginA’sactualmotivationalsetthatcouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR.

OnthisreadingS2*isweakenoughtoseemplausible,butevenWil-liams thinksS1* is implausibly strong.Heallows, forexample, thatwecanhavereasons thatdonotmotivateusonlybecausewehavenotsufficientlyexercisedimaginationinwaysthatwouldleadtonewmotivations.4

In IER, Williams describes the relevant conditions as involving“rationality”(“Theinternalreasonsconceptionisconcernedwiththeagent’srationality”,p.103).Thisremainsambiguous,however,becausetheconceptofrationalityisvagueandcontested.TofixterminologyIwilluse‘rationality’onlyinaverybroadsense,asmeaningthe disposi-tions of thought that agents ought ideally to have.Williamshasoftenbeenreadasintendingasenseofpossibilitydefinedintermsofroughlythissenseofrationality;i. e.,S1claimsthatRisareasonforAtoφonlyifA

4. Somepassagessuggestareadingtowardtheotherendofthespectrum;“Ifsomethingcanbeareasonforaction,thenitcouldbesomeone’sreasonforactingonaparticularoccasion”(p.106).Thiscouldbereadasofferingtheweakconditionthattherebesomewayofbeinganagent,realizedbysomeactualindividual,suchthatifAwaslikethat,hewouldbemotivatedtoφbyacceptanceofR.Interpretedthisway(S1)isquiteplausible.ButS2nowpre-posterouslyclaimsthatthemotivationalpossibilitiesforanyagentarecon-strainedbytheactualmotivationalsetofA.

isacertainkindofexplanationofaction,anexplanationofwhyyouwouldactifyouweretodeliberatesoundly.

1. The Standard (or Supposed) Argument

According to orthodoxy,Williams’ argument has approximately thefollowingschematicform:

ForallR, A, φ;

S1. RisareasonforAtoφonlyifAcanbemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

S2. A can bemotivated toφ by believingR only if there issomethinginA’smotivationalsetthatcouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

S3. IfRisanexternalreasonforAtoφ,thenthereisnothinginA’smotivationalsetthatcouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφ bybelievingR;

S4. Thereforetherearenoexternalreasons.

On close inspection this argument is puzzling and ambiguous, andraises at least two interpretive questions: (i)What is the intendedsenseofthepossibilityofA’sbeingmotivated,whichlinkspremisesS1andS2?(ii)WhatexactlydoesWilliamsmeanbyanagent’s“motiva-tionalset”,whichlinkspremisesS2andS3?BecauseS3isfunctionallyadefinitionof“externalreasons”,thisquestionalsoconcernsthepre-cisetargetofWilliams’skepticism.

Each of these issues allows two significantly different readings,whichcombinetoyieldfourdifferentversionsoftheStandardArgu-ment.InthissectionIsketchthesereadings,criticallydiscussthefourversionsoftheStandardArgument,anddiscusstheinterpretiveprob-lemsfacingthem.AlthoughsomeinterpretationsresemblingtheStan-dardArgumentmayeludethisnet,theseproblemsmotivateanddirectthesearchforamorefaithfulreconstructionofWilliams’argument.

(i)ClaimingthatA canbemotivatedtoφbyacceptingRisequiva-lent toclaimingthatA would under certain conditionsbemotivatedto



A rivalreadingtakesWilliamsathisword,allowingmotivationalsetstoextendaswidelyaspossible,includinganythinginanagent’spsychologicalstatethatisrelevanttowhathecanbemotivatedtodo.Theessentialissueistheplaceofdispositions;aretheyinorout?Onthebroadestinterpretation,themotivationalsetincludesmeredispo-sitionstobemotivatedtoact,togetherwiththedesire-likeelements.7 Callthisamaximally inclusive setreadingoftheargument.

These two rival interpretations of the motivational set combinewith the tworival interpretationsof thesenseofpossibility toyieldfourdifferentversionsoftheStandardArgument,asfollows:

Caseshavebeenmadeforattributingeachofthesefourversionsoftheargument,SA,SB,SC,andSD,toIER.Ishallnowexamineeachinturn,observingitsflaws.IthenshowthatthereareseriousexegeticalobstaclestoreadinganyoftheseintoWilliams’paper.

Version SA: the rational instrumentalist argument 8

SA1.RisareasonforAtoφonlyifAwould,ifideallyrational,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

7. Thedistinctionbetweendispositional desiresanddispositionstohavedesirescomplicatestheissue.AnenhancedHumeansetcanincludetheformer(ac-commodatingWilliams’inclusionof“dispositionsofevaluation”),butnotthelatter (seeMillgram 1996: 208–9).Dispositional analyses of desire compli-catemattersfurther(Smith1994;Joyce2001:111;seediscussioninWallace1990:359–60).ProponentsoftheseanalyseswilldenyadistinctionbetweenenhancedHumeanandmaximallyinclusiveversions,anddeflatetheformerintothelatter.

8. E. g.,Cohon1986:553and1993:272;Hooker1987;Wallace1990:376;Smith1995;Velleman1996;Millgram1996:210–11;Joyce2001:132;Shafer-Landau2003:172;Setiya2004:268–9;Pettit&Smith2006:145;Brunero2007:24.

Sense of Possibility Motivational Set

rational possibility

deliberative possibility

extended Humean set

maximally inclusive set

no externalreasons

SA

SB

SC

SD

wouldbemotivatedtoφbybelievingR if he was ideally rational.Manyphilosophersconsider this claima “platitude”,5evenmanywhoWil-liamswouldapparentlyconsiderdefendersof“externalreasons”.Icallthisarational possibilityreadingoftheargument.

There isevidence thatby ‘rationality’Williamsmeanssomethingnarrower,however,andhenceintendsadifferentsenseofpossibility.Heisconcernedwithwhatwouldmotivatetheactualagentifheweretodeliberate“rationally”,andequates“rationaldeliberation”withfully imaginative and valid thought proceeding from a belief-set purged of errors.Foreconomy I call this sounddeliberation,asWilliamsdoes.His fo-cusonsounddeliberationcanbeandhasbeenseenassimplyresult-ingfromhissubstantiveviewofwhatrationality inthebroadsenseamountsto,butthereissomebasisfortakinghisconcernwithsounddeliberation tobe independentof theplatitudeabout rationality.S1wouldthenconnectanagent’sreasonswithwhathecanbemotivatedtodobysounddeliberationfromhisactualmotivationalset.Icallthisadeliberative possibilityreading.

(ii)ThesecondinterpretivequestionconcernsWilliams’notionofa“motivationalset”,whichasIobservedalsoconcernswhathemeansby“externalreasons”andhencethetruetargetofhisskepticism.Whatpsychologicalelementsarepossiblemembersofa“motivationalset”?Althoughhesometimesuses‘desire’asatermofartforanymember,heexplicitlydisavowsthe“sub-Humeanmodel”whichclaimsthatallactionsaremotivatedbydesiresproper,andheprofessesamore“lib-eral”view.Justhowliberalhisviewmightbeiscontroversial.OnonecommoninterpretationitremainsessentiallyHumean;themanydif-ferentelements thatcancompriseamotivationalsetmaynotallbe“desires” strictly speaking,but arealldesire-like,beingpro-attitudesseekingsatisfactionoftheirrepresentationalcontents.Manycommen-tatorsthereforeascribea“desire-based”theoryofreasonstoWilliamsdespitehisdisclaimers.6Call this an extended Humean set readingoftheargument.

5. e. g.Nagel1970;Darwall1983;Korsgaard1986;Wallace1999.

6. Wallace 1990: 375n, 376 and 1999: 218;Cohon 1986, 1993;Millgram 1996;Shafer-Landau2003:172–5.



writes,“hastakensomethinglikeHume’sargument[thatallrationalmotivationmustultimatelyspringfromsomenonrationalsource]tohavethiskindof independent force,andhassoargued inhisessay‘InternalandExternalReasons’”(1986:8).But,Korsgaardobjects,this“motivationalskepticism”aboutpracticalreasonactuallypresupposes“content skepticism”—that reason by itself has nothing to say aboutwhatmotives tohave. It assumes anarrow,procedural viewof ratio-nality,asmerelydiscoveringvariousrelationsandmattersoffact;aswe’ve observed,Williams equates “rationality” with sound delibera-tion.Theproceduralviewofrationalityyieldsinturntheinstrumental-istviewofpracticalrationality,asreasoningtothemeanstosatisfyingpre-existingdesires.

Itisquestion-begging,however,toargueagainstexternalreasonsfromanassumptionofaproceduralorinstrumentalistconceptionofrationality.Giventheplatitudethatanagent isrationalonly ifhe isdisposed tobemotivatedbyhis reasons, someonewhoaccepts theexistenceofexternalreasonswillbelievethatanagentisnotrationalunlessheisdisposedtobemotivatedbytheseexternalreasons,andwill favor a substantive rather than a procedural account of rational-ity: thatbeing rationalentailshavingcertainelements (dispositions,desires,etc.)inone’smotivationalset.JohnMcDowellthusobjectstoWilliamsthatbecomingrational(or,asheprefers,virtuous)11mightbeaprocessofconversionratherthanofsoundreasoning(1995),andEli-jahMillgramsuggeststhatitmightrequirehavingcertainexperiences(1996:202).Williamsisthuswidelyaccusedofbegging the question re-garding the nature of rationality.12

11. Somecommentators reject theplatitude linking responsiveness to reasonswith“rationality”,preferringtolinkitwithvirtue,butherewecanignorethisdistinction.ThesecriticsareoftenwillingtograntWilliamsaproceduralviewof“rationality”(McDowell1995;Millgram1996;Shafer-Landau2003;Setiya2004,2007),butaccordinglytheygivetheplatitudeawiderreading:anagentisonlyvirtuous(a“correctdeliberator”)ifheismotivatedbyhisreasons,andwhatitistobevirtuousdoesn’tdependonone’sactualmotivationalset.So-bel(2001a)ratherdefendsWilliams’argumentonthewiderreading.

12. Korsgaard 1986;Hooker 1987;Wallace 1990;Cohon1993:272;Parfit 1997:116;Pettit&Smith2006:151–2.

SA2.Awould,ifideallyrational,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingRonlyifAhasadesire-likestatethatcouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SA3.IfRisanexternalreasonforAtoφ,thenAdoesnothaveadesire-likestatethatcouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SA4.Thereforetherearenoexternalreasons.

Thismost common interpretation combines the rational possibilityandenhancedHumeansetreadings.TheargumentbeginsfromtheplatitudeSA1thatreasonsmustmotivateanagentinsofarasheisra-tional. SA2 then introduces a thesis aboutwhat it is to be rational:thatthemotivationsoftherational Aareconstrainedbythedesire-likestatesoftheactual A.9

But should we accept this thesis about rationality? Perhaps ifA wererational,hewouldhavesomedesirethatheactuallylacks,whichwouldbringhim to bemotivated toφ. PerhapsA isn’t rational pre-ciselybecausehelackssuchanelementinhismotivationalset,likeaconcernforothers,anaversiontopain,oradesiretoactonhisrea-sons.10IndeedWilliamshimselfgrantsthatifAwererational,hismoti-vationalsetmayincludeelementsthatitactuallylacks.Butherestrictstheseelements tomotivations that canbederived fromA’sexistingmotivations.

Williamswould thenbeassumingaparticular conceptionof thenatureandpowersofpracticalrationality:the“Humean”orinstrumen-talist view that practical reason cannot by itself produce or entail amotive,butmerelyfacilitatesflowofmotivationalforcefrompre-ex-istingdesires,channelingitfromoneobjecttoanother.“Atleastonecontemporary philosopher, Bernard Williams”, Christine Korsgaard

9. Theclaim isnot that themotivationsofany rationalversionofAmustberestrictedbyA’sactualdesires,onlythatintheclosestworldinwhichA isrationalA’smotivationsarerestrictedbyA’sactualdesires.Rationalityby itself doesn’trequireonetohaveorlackanyparticularmotivationalelement.

10. Korsgaard1986;Smith1995:118;Velleman1996:696–7;Parfit1997:101.



pableofbeingmotivatedbytheconclusionsoftheopera-tionsofpurepractical reasonas such.Something inusmustmakeuscapableofbeingmotivatedbythem,andthissomethingwillbepartofthesubjectivemotivationalset.(1986:21;also24)

Williams’onlyrealdisagreementwithKorsgaardwouldthenbeoveranissueexternaltohisinternalreasonsthesis:whetherrationalityin-volves substantive rather thanmerely procedural requirements. ButthisversionallowsthatifKorsgaardisrightaboutthat,thenKantianreasonsareinternal.Indeed,Williamslaterwritesthat“inthisrespect,Ihavenobasicdisagreementwith[her]excellentpaper”(1995a:44n;also2001:94,97n4).

Whilethisversion’scharacterizationofrationalityinSB2mayhavewider appeal than instrumentalism, it is no less question-beggingagainstexternalreasons15 —astheexternalreasonsthesisisidentifiedbySB3.Theexternalreasonstheoristisherethe(somewhatrarer)per-sonwhothinksthatagentsneednothaveanydispositiontobemoti-vatedbytheirreasons.GiventhatSB1isaplatitude,ifweareunsurewhetherallreasonsareinternalweshouldalsobeunsurewhethertheideallyrationalagent’smotivationsareconstrainedbythedispositionsof theactualagent.Therefore itseemsthatwewouldonlyfindSB2compellingifwehadalreadycometotheconclusionthattherearenoexternalreasons(SB4).

Version SC: the Humean motivation argument 16

SC1.RisareasonforAtoφonlyifAwould,ifhedeliberatedsoundly,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SC2.Awould,ifhedeliberatedsoundly,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingRonlyifAhasadesire-likestatethatcouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

15. Shafer-Landau2003:179.

16. See,e. g.,Cohon1986and1993:266;Hollis1989:173;Parfit1997:112;Sobel2001a;Joyce2001:110;Heuer2004:46;Setiya2007:102.

Version SB: the modest internalist argument 13

SB1.RisareasonforAtoφonlyifAwould,ifideallyrational,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SB2.Awould,ifideallyrational,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingRonlyifAhasatleastsomedispositiontobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SB3.IfRisanexternalreasonforAtoφ,thenAdoesnothaveevenadispositiontobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SB4.Thereforetherearenoexternalreasons.

Thissecondversioncombinestherationalpossibilityandmaximallyinclusive set readings. SB1 is the sameplatitude as before, connect-ing reasons and rationalmotivation, but SB2 eschews the question-begginginstrumentalisttheoryofrationalityforamuchweakerclaimlinkingtherationalpossibilityofmotivationbyRwithA’shavingsomedispositiontobemotivatedbyR.Thisistheweakestofthefourver-sionsoftheStandardArgument,anditiscompatiblewithneo-KantianviewslikeKorsgaard’swhichclaimthatpureReasoncanmotivatebyitselfandwithoutdesire.14HenceKorsgaardwrites, inendorsementofSB2,

Ifoneacceptstheinternalismrequirement,itfollowsthatpurepractical reasonwill exist if andonly ifweare ca-

13. Cohon1986:555n;Parfit1997:118–9;Scanlon1998:369.

14. Itisstillstrongerthansomeversionsof“internalism”aboutreasons,whichclaimmerelythatRcanbeareasonforAtoφonlyifAwould,ifhewereide-allyrational,haveadispositiontobemotivatedbyRtoφ—i. e.,tyingreasonsonlytotherationalagent’smaximallyinclusivemotivationalset(e. g.Smith1995: 117). Hooker (1987) suggests this is a possible interpretation ofWil-liams’internalistpremise.Cohon(1993:285–6n4)suggeststhatWilliamsismistakentoclaimagreementwithKorsgaard,becausesheacceptsonlytheweakerinternalism.ButKorsgaarddoesn’tbelievethatanythingcouldbeareasonforAtoactifAlackedthecapacitytoreason,andthiscapacityquali-fiesformembershipinthemaximallyinclusiveset(Cf.Velleman1996:697n).ThismisreadingofKorsgaardispresumablyduetotheambiguityof‘rationalagent’,bywhichshesometimesmeansanagentmerelywitharationalfaculty.



would apparently be the “explanatory dimension” of reasons state-ments—thatwecanexplainagents’actionsbycitingtheirreasonsforacting(and,therefore,thattheirreasonsmusthavesomeconnectiontowhatmotivates them).But this isan inadequaterationale for thepremise.Wemightbeabletoexplainanagent’sactionsbyappealtohisreasonsevenifagentsoccasionallycan’tbemotivatedbysomeoftheirreasons:perhapsweassumethepresenceofacontingentdesireto act onone’s reasons that is sometimes silenced, for example.Orwemightdenythatitisessentialtonormative reasons,asopposedto“motivating”or“explanatory”reasons,thattheybeexplanatoryofde-liberativelypossibleactions.18

VersionSCfacesamoreseriousprobleminSC2.Thispremisear-ticulatestheneo-Humeantheoryofmotivation,thatallmotivationde-rives fromdesire-likepsychological states.This theory’sproponentsoftentreatitasana prioritruth.Butmotivationisacausalprocessand(asHumehimselfinsists)causalrelationscanpresumablybeknownonlyempirically.19AsJayWallacewrites,

Oneisinitiallytemptedtorespondonbehalfoftheexter-nalistwithareminderthattherearenoa priori constraintsoncausal relations. If thequestion is,howcould reflec-tion by itself produce a newmotivation to action?, theanswermightsimplybethatthereisnogeneralreasontosupposethatitcouldnot.(1999:220–21)

Theneo-Humeantheoryhasnotbeenempiricallyconfirmed.Perhapsthebelief that R,orthebelief that R is a reason to φ,mightthemselvesbesufficientsourcesofmotivationforAtoφ.20Inthatcase,RcouldmeetthedefinitionofexternalreasonsinSC3whileSC2isfalse.Thatisto18. Forthedistinction,seeNagel1970;Smith1994.Itishowevervexed:seeDar-

wall1983;Parfit1997:114n;Dancy2000;Finlay2006,2007.

19. Causalconnectionscanbeaprioriwhenthecauseandeffectareinterdefined.Ihavemyselfarguedforanapriorilinkbetweendesireandmotivation(Fin-lay2007;seealsoMele2003:53;Smith1994;Wallace1990:359–61).Butanargumentisnecessary,andWilliamsdoesn’tprovideone.

20.Nagel1970;Darwall1983;Wallace1990:365–6,376–8and1999:228;Cohon

SC3.IfRisanexternalreasonforAtoφ,thenAdoesnothaveadesire-likestatethatcouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφ bybelievingR;

SC4.Thereforetherearenoexternalreasons.

This version combines the deliberative possibility and enhancedHumeansetreadings.Williams’argumentthenwouldn’tbeginwiththeplatitudeconnectingreasonswithrationality,butratherwiththeweakerclaim(SC1)thatRisareasonforanagenttoφonlyifbeingmotivated toφ bybelievingR isdeliberatively possible forhim.SC2appliesaneo-Humean theoryofmotivation:believingRwouldmo-tivateA post-deliberationonly if therewassomedesire-likeelementpresentinA’spre-deliberationmotivationalsetthatwouldbringAtobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR.BySC3,externalreasonsdon’tmeetthiscondition:“For,ex hypothesi,thereisnomotivationfortheagenttodeliberatefrom,toreachthisnewmotivation”(p.109).Ergotherearenoexternalreasons,i. e.,noreasonsthathavenomotivationalconnec-tionswiththeagent’sexistingdesires.

Afirstproblemhereisthatwhenwereplacetherationalpossibilityinthepreviousversionswithmeredeliberativepossibility,wetradeareadingofS1whichiswidelyconsideredtohavetheindubitabilityofaplatitudeforareading(SC1)whichseemsunmotivatedanduncom-pelling.Itisawidespreadandcommonsenseview,forexample,thattheexistenceofanagent’smoralandprudentialreasonsdon’tdependonwhathecanbemotivatedtodomerelybysounddeliberation.SowhyacceptthatRcouldbeareasonforAonlyifhewouldbemoti-vatedbyRaftersounddeliberation?Severalcommentatorsarguethatwecanevenhavedesire-basedreasonsthatsounddeliberationcouldnotpossiblybringustobemotivatedby.17Williams’rationaleforSC1

17. Cohon 1993; Millgram 1996; Johnson 1999; Sobel 2001b; Shafer-Landau2003:186.Thesearedesire-basedreasonsthatanagenthasbecauseofhisincapacitytoconductsounddeliberation. Ifsuchreasonsexist itcouldnotbethecasethatsounddeliberationcouldbringustobemotivatedbythem,becauseifwewereabletocarryoutthatsounddeliberationthenthereasonswouldnothaveexisted.



This fourth and final version of the Standard Argument combinesthe deliberative possibility andmaximally inclusive set readings. Ittherefore shares the first premise of SC, which we observed to beunmotivatedanduncompelling.Butratherthantheproblematicneo-Humeantheoryofmotivation,SD2claimstheextremelyweakthesisthat an agent can bemotivated toφ by believingR through sounddeliberationonlyifhehassomedispositioninvirtueofwhichhemightbemotivatedtoφbybelievingR.Itthereforeavoidsthechargeofas-sumingafaultytheoryofmotivation;indeedSD2seemstriviallytrue,andWilliamswrites, “certainly—and nobody denies this—what heactuallydoeshastobeexplainedbyhis[motivationalset]”(1989:39).IfthebeliefthatR(orthatRisareasontoφ)issufficienttomotivateAtoφthroughsounddeliberation,thenRisinfactaninternalreasonforAtoφ;

[T]his agent, with this belief, appears to be one aboutwhom,now,an internal reasonstatementcouldtrulybemade: he is onewith an appropriatemotivation in his[motivationalset].Amanwhodoesbelievethatconsid-erationsoffamilyhonourconstitutereasonsforactionisamanwithacertaindispositiontoaction….(p.107)

Therefore, inMillgram’s words, “would-be external reason explana-tionsturnout,whentheyaresuccessful,tobeinternalreasonexplana-tions”(1996:198).24

LikeSB,thisargumentappearstobegthequestionagainstexternalreasons.Itprovidesthesamedefinitionofan“externalreason”(SB3),assomethingbywhichtheagenthasnodispositiontobemotivated.ButsinceSD2istrivial(andWilliamsapparentlythinksthat“nobodydeniesit”),SD1iseffectivelyjusttheclaimthatRisareasonforAonlyifhehasadispositiontobemotivatedbyit.Inotherwords,thefirstpremiseSD1—whichseemsunmotivatedanduncompelling—essen-tiallyclaimsthatthereareno“externalreasons”,therebybeggingthe

24.AlsoMillgram1996:207–8;Shafer-Landau2003:179;Brunero2007:29.

say,thebeliefthatR,whichisnotintheagent’smotivationalsetpriortodeliberation,mightbeasufficientcauseofmotivationtoφ.There-fore,contraSC2,A canbemotivatedthroughdeliberationbycomingtobelieveR even though,prior todeliberation,hismotivational setcontainsnothing thatplaysa role inproducing thatmotivation.De-liberation produces the motivation simply by producing the belief.Williamsisthereforecommonlyaccusedofdogmaticallyassumingafaultytheoryofmotivation.21

Even if the neo-Humean theory ofmotivation is true, SCwouldstillseemtobefallacious.Grantingthatdesireisanecessarysourceofanymotivation,itdoesn’tfollowthatAcouldbemotivatedthroughdeliberationonlybyvirtueofsomedesirehehadpriortodeliberating.Theprocessofdeliberatingitselfcouldstimulatenew,nonderivativedesires,whichcouldthenmotivateAtoφ.22

Version SD: the incoherence argument 23

SD1.RisareasonforAtoφonlyifAwould,ifhedeliberatedsoundly,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SD2.Awould,ifhedeliberatedsoundly,bemotivatedtoφbybelievingRonlyifAhasatleastadispositiontobemoti-vatedtoφbybelievingR;

SD3.IfRisanexternalreasonforAtoφ,thenAdoesnothaveevenadispositiontobemotivatedtoφbybelievingR;

SD4.Thereforetherearenoexternalreasons.

1993:270;Velleman1996:699;Parfit1997:105;Dancy2000;Shafer-Landau2003.

21. Cohon1986:549–50;Wallace1990,1999;Shafer-Landau2003;Parfit1997:112,115;Setiya2007:102.

22. ThispointismadeinNagel1970,Darwall1983,andpressedagainstWilliamsinWallace1990:376;Cohon1993:271;Smith1995:115;Parfit1997:105–6;Shafer-Landau2003:175.

23.Millgram1996:198.



crucialterminthisconnection”(1995:192;alsosee2001:93).Somecommentators interpret thisratherasaretraction,26butthis is inten-sionwithwhatWilliamssaysnext;“ButIwantstilltopressthepointthat Imadeoriginally, that… it is important that [thereasonsstate-ment]… should say something special aboutA, andnotmerely in-vokeinconnectionwithhimsomegeneralnormativejudgment.”ThissuggestsWilliams never intended to base his argument on a claimabout howagentsought to be. Further evidence is his emphasis, inIER,onthenecessary“explanatorydimension”ofreasonsstatements;heclaimsthatRcanbeareasonforAtoφonlyifRcouldfigureinanexplanationofwhy theactual Awouldφ, andnot ratherwhysomeidealizedcounterpartofAwouldφ.

RationalpossibilityreadingsarealsointensionwithWilliams’re-peatedclaimsthat“thereisanessentialindeterminacyinwhatcanbecountedarationaldeliberativeprocess” (p.110;also1989:38;2001:92).He suggests that thisplacesan “onusofproof”on theexternalreasonstheoristratherthanonhim,butasRachelCohonpointsout(1986:555),weneedasubstantiveideaofwhatcountsasrationalde-liberationbeforewecanassessanyversionofthepremiseS2,whichclaimsthatthepossibleoutputsofrationaldeliberationarelimitedbytheagent’smotivationalset.27

Theother two interpretations, theHumeanmotivation (SC) andincoherence(SD)versions,involvedeliberativepossibilityreadingsofS1andS2.Thesealsohaveproblems,despitethestrengthofthecaseagainst the rival, rational possibility readings. First,Williams recog-nizeswaysinwhichcomingtobelieveanexternalreasonsstatementmightmotivateanagent,buthediscountsthemasirrelevant,becausethey are improper ways of becomingmotivated (p. 108–9). This issurelyanormativeratherthanapurelyexplanatoryconstraint,whichmayseemintensionwithdeliberativepossibilityreadings.28

26.Setiya2004:269.

27. AlsoKorsgaard1986:23;Hollis1989:174.

28.Hisnotionofsounddeliberationinvolvessomeidealization,however,soper-hapsthisobjectionisnotsoworrisome.ButifthebasicrationaleforWilliams’

questioninthemostblatantway.HenceRussShafer-Landauobjectsthat“whetherhavingareasonentailsthepossibilityofbeingmotivat-edupon[sound]deliberationispreciselywhatisatissue”(2003:179).25

SofarIhavesketchedfourversionsoftheStandardargumentthatcan andhavebeen attributed toWilliams, and I havedetailedhowweak(question-beggingoruncompelling)eachisknowntobe.TheseobservationsdonotyetamounttoadecisivecaseagainstreadingWil-liamsinanyoftheseways.Soletusturntotheexegeticalissue:whichoftheseversionscanplausiblybereadintothetext?Weshallseethattherearesignificantobstaclestoanyoftheinterpretations,andindeedtorationalordeliberativepossibility readings,enhancedHumeanor maximally inclusive set readings.Theseobstacles fall into threecat-egories.(1)Violationsofcharity:weshouldn’tadoptreadingsthatat-tributeparticularlycrazy,naïve,orobviouslyfalseviewstoWilliamsifwecanavoidit;(2)Inconsistency:weshouldavoidreadingsonwhichhisclaimsareincompatibleorcontradictory;(3)Author’sauthority:asI’veobserved,Williamslateroffersdefensesandclarificationsofhisarguments in IER,andelsewhereexploressomeof thesame issues.These should not be discounted lightly.While some commentatorssuggestthatWilliamsmayormusthavechangedhismindaboutpartsofhisoriginalargument,weshouldnotethatheneverexpressesanyreservationsabouttheargumentoroffersany(exceptterminological)retractions.Instead,heseemstodefendhisoriginalargumentagainstthecriticism.

Therationalinstrumentalist(SA)andmodestinternalist(SB)ver-sionshaveincommontheplatitudinousrationalpossibilityreadingofpremisesS1andS2.Charityaside,theproblemwithreadingWilliamsthiswayisthathelaterexplicitlyrepudiatesthisinterpretation,agree-ingwithMcDowellthat“itwasamistaketopickout‘irrational’asa

25. Shafer-Landauwrites“rationaldeliberation”here,andcallsthis“rationalpos-sibility”.However,heseemstomeanratherwhatIamcalling“deliberativepossibility”, since he restricts it to motivation through sound deliberation,andcontrastsitwiththepossibilityofbeingmotivatedifsubstantivelyrational(2003:173–4).



significantly,thereisevidencethathedidknowbetter.(WeshallseethatplausiblyIERispartlyaresponsetoNagel).

(ii)This reading is forced todisregardordownplayWilliams’ex-plicitrejectionofa“sub-Humean”,instrumentalistmodelinfavorofa“liberal”view(p.104;also2001:92).HenceMillgramadmitsthe“au-thor’slikelysurpriseathavingthelabel[of‘instrumentalist’]adheretohisowncarefullynuancedviews”(1996:213).

(iii) He explicitly considers and grants suggestions about howagentscanbemotivatedthat lookprima facie incompatiblewiththisreading:(a)thatabeliefmaybyitselfmotivateAtoφ(p.107);(b)thatexerciseofimaginationcangeneratenew,underiveddesiresandmo-tivations(p.105);(c)thatifanagenthasadispositiontobemotivatedtoφbysomebelief,thenthisdispositionisinhismotivationalset,andhehasaninternalreasontoφ(p.107;also1989:37).

(iv)Inlaterwritings,heclearlyrejectsaHumeanreadingofS2.Heexpresses“basicagreement”withKorsgaard’sclaimthatifallagentshave a faculty of practical reason which when properly exercisedwouldleadthemtobemotivatedbysomeR,thenRisaninternalrea-sonforeverybody,andheattributestoKanttheviewthatthereareonlyinternalreasons(1985:223–4).32Hefurtherclaimsthat“nobody denies”thatwhatanagent“actuallydoeshastobeexplainedbyhis[motivationalset]”(1989:39)—althoughhecan’thavebeenunawareofthegrowingphilosophicaloppositiontotheneo-Humeantheoryofmotivation.

This all adds up to strong evidence against the enhanced Hu-meansetreadingsSAandSC,andmightbethoughtastrongcasebyeliminationfortheweaker,maximallyinclusivesetreadings,i. e.,themodest internalist (SB)or incoherence(SD)versions.Unfortunately,amaximallyinclusivesetreadingalsofacessomeseriousexegeticaldifficulties,leadingJayWallacetowritethat“itisdifficulttoreconcilewiththetext…whichconnects…withtheHumeanapproach”(1990:375n).Afirstproblemisthataswe’vealreadynoted,SBandSDare

32.Wallace(1990:375n)suggeststhatthisrepresentsachangeinview.

Asecondproblemcomesfromtheapparentlyunmotivatedandun-compellingcharacterofS1onthesereadings.HenceMillgramholdsthataninstrumentalistaccountofrationality—anSAreading—“istheextra ingredient thatmakes internalismabout reasons a reasonablyheldposition”,andclaimsthatthisisa“controllingexegeticalconsider-ation,onewhichunderwritesaninstrumentalistreadingatambiguousmoments inWilliams’writing” (1996: 213).29Charityweighsagainstattributing toWilliams an argument based on a premise as uncom-pellingasSC1andSD1appear tobe.Somecommentatorsoffer theuncharitableexplanationthatWilliamssimplyoverlookedthedistinc-tionbetweennormative andexplanatory reasons,whichNagelhadalreadydrawn in 1970.30But this seemsunlikely,asWilliamswarnsagainsttheideathat“theinternalreasonconceptionisonlyconcernedwithexplanation,andnotatallwiththeagent’srationality”(p.103),anddiscussesthedistinctioninhislaterrevisitationsoftheargument(1989:39;2001:93).ItisthereforepuzzlingwhyWilliamswouldhavebuilthisargumentonaversionofS1involvingmerelythedeliberativepossibilityofmotivation.

The choice between the rival interpretations of themotivationalsetpresentsmoreseriousdifficulties.Mostcommentatorsfavoranen-hancedHumeanset readingof theargument,SAorSC.31Therearenumerousproblemshere:

(i)Williamsoughttohaveknownbetterthantoassume—withoutargument—that actual or rational motivation requires antecedentdesire-likestates.Besidethedogmatismoftheview,Nagel’s influen-tialcaseagainstit(1970)hadappearednineyearsearlier—apointonwhichWilliams is admonishedbyPettit&Smith (2006: 152).More

internalismisthe“explanatorydimension”,thenitissomethingofapuzzlewhythereisidealizationinhisaccountatall.

29.AlsoShafer-Landau2003:179;Skorupski2007:76–9.

30.Parfit1997:113;Shafer-Landau2003:178.

31. MillgramcorrectlypointsoutthatWilliams’examplesofdeliberationofteninvolvethesatisfactionofelementsinthemotivationalset(1996:212),butthisiscompatiblewiththeirmerelybeingparadigms.



Williams’ argument.HenceDerek Parfit rejectsmaximally inclusivesetreadings,writing,36

Williamswouldnot,Ibelieve,givethisreply[thatifwecametobemotivated,wemusthavehadadispositiontobemotivated]. Itwouldachievenothing.NoExternalistwouldmindconcedingthat,ifourdeliberationleadsustomakesomedecision,wemusthavebeensuchthatourde-liberationmightleadustomakethisdecision.(1997:119)

Tosummarize:(1)therationalpossibilityreadingsSAandSBconflictwithWilliams’explicitstatementsaboutthesenseandroleof“ratio-nality” inhis argument.But (2) thedeliberativepossibility readingsSCandSDseemweakerandlessplausiblearguments,sincetheirin-terpretationofS1seemsunmotivatedanduncompelling.(3)Theen-hancedHumeansetreadingsSAandSCconflictwithWilliams’manyexplicitclaimssupportingamaximallyinclusiveaccountofamotiva-tionalset,andwouldhavehimembracingeitheraquestion-beggingaccountofrationality(SA),orafaultytheoryofmotivation(SC).(4)ButthemaximallyinclusivesetreadingsSBandSDareincompatiblewithWilliams’ account of deliberation as proceeding from existingmotivations,andwithWilliams’ownunderstandingofwhatisatissuebetweenhimselfandhisopponents.Everyreadingisthereforeatleastdoublyproblematic.

Oneway of trying to dealwith someof the inconsistencies andinterpretiveproblemsistosuggestthatWilliamsoffersmorethanoneof thesearguments.37Millgram interpretshimasgiving roughly theincoherenceargumentSD(“fromexplanation”)onpp.102–7,andtherationalinstrumentalistargumentSA(“fromdeliberation”)onp.109(1996:197–8).Thisproposalfacesseveralproblems.Williamshimselfdoesn’tdistinguishbetweenanargumentfromexplanationandanar-gumentfromdeliberation,andhisdiscussionsofexplanationandde-

36.AlsoCohon1986:555n;Wallace1999:221;Setiya2004:269.

37. AlsoParfit1997:112;Skorupski2007:87.

blatantlyquestion-begging,whichisanobstacletoreadingWilliamscharitablyinthisway.

Second,Williams’ characterization of deliberation as proceedingfromelementsinthemotivationalsetpresentsaproblem.ThisseemstopresupposesomebroadlyHumeanaccountofthemotivationalset,andtoexcludemeredispositions.Wedonotdeliberatefromourdispo-sitionstobemotivated,tocorrespondingmotivation.33

AthirddifficultyisWilliams’apparentviewofhisargument’sdia-lecticalsignificance.TheseversionsshareaninterpretationofS3thateffectivelydefinesexternalreasonsasreasonsthattheagenthasnodispositiontobemotivatedby.Somecommentatorshavethusunder-stoodWilliams’basicpointagainst“externalreasonstheorists”tobethatagentscannothavereasonsthatarepowerlesstomotivatethem.34 ButthisisapparentlynotwhatWilliamsthinksisatissuebetweenhisopponentsandhimself.Unlikeother“internalists”suchasKorsgaardandStephenDarwall,Williams assumes (at least in IER) that exter-nalreasonstheoristsagreethatitis—andmaybeeventhatithastobe—possibleforanagenttobemotivatedbyanexternalreason.Hewrites, “whathas tohold forexternal reasonsstatements tobe true…isthatthenewmotivationcouldbeinsomewayrationallyarrivedat,grantedtheearliermotivations”(p.109),and“theexternalreasonstheoristessentiallywants, that theagent shouldacquire themotiva-tionbecausehecomestobelievethereasonstatement”(p.108–9;seealso1989:39;1995:189).Thatexternalreasonsbeliefscanmotivateis,infact,apointthathe“grants”tohisopponents(p.107).35Thisisaseriousobstacletoamaximallyinclusivesetreading,SBorSD,of

33.Millgram1996:208–9;Parfit1997:115;Scanlon1998:367–9.

34. Parfit1997:100;Scanlon1998:369;Joyce2001:108;Shafer-Landau2003:179.

35. MightWilliams’thoughtbethattheexternalreasonstheoristcanpostulatetheexistenceofadispositiontobemotivatedbythebeliefthatRisareason,intheabsenceofanydispositiontobemotivatedbythebeliefthatR?Thiswouldn’trescuethereading,however,ashealsowritesthat“theexternalrea-sonsstatementwillhavetobetakenas…entailingtheclaimthatiftheagentrationallydeliberated,then…hewouldcometobemotivatedtoφ”(p.109).



couldtrulybemade:heisonewithanappropriatemotivationinhis[motivationalset]”(p.107).OnSBandSDthiswouldbetheconclu-sionoftheStandardArgument;that(asMillgramputsit)“would-beexternalreasonexplanationsturnout,whentheyaresuccessful,tobeinternalreasonexplanations”(1996:198).Buthedoesn’tcontinueasifhehadjustprovenhiscase,insteadraisingthequestionaboutconcep-tualcontent:“Nowitdoesnotfollowfromthisthatthereisnothinginexternalreasonsstatements.Whatdoesfollowisthattheircontentisnotgoingtoberevealedbyconsideringmerelythestateofonewhobelievessuchastatement…”(pp.107–8).

Thismoveisapparentlyrepeatedapagelater.HearticulatesagainanobjectiontotheStandardargument(eitherthefaulty theory of moti-vationorthequestion-begging account of rationalityobjection):

Itmightbesaidthattheforceofanexternalreasonstate-mentcanbeexplainedinthefollowingway….[A]ratio-nalagentispreciselyonewhohasageneraldispositioninhis[motivationalset]todowhat(hebelieves)thereisreasonforhimtodo.Sowhenhecomestobelievethatthere is reason forhimtoφ,he ismotivated toφ,eventhough,before,heneitherhadamotivetoφ,noranymo-tiverelatedtoφ-inginoneofthewaysconsideredintheaccountofdeliberation.(p.109)

Thistimehedoesn’tsuggestthatadispositionofthiskindwoulden-tailthattheagenthadaninternalreason.Instead,heimmediatelyis-sues the conceptual content challenge, towhichhe suggests an an-swer:“Whatisitthatonecomestobelievewhenhecomestobelievethatthereisreasonforhimtoφ,ifitisnottheproposition…thatifhedeliberatedrationally,hewouldbemotivatedtoactappropriately?”But,hegoesontoconclude,inthatcasetherepresumablyarenoex-ternalreasons.

Thisseemsawoefully ineffectualresponsetotheobjection.First,Williamsproposesacontentforexternalreasonsclaimsthatisseem-inglypluckedoutofthinair,withoutargument.Itismysteriouswhy

liberationareintertwinedthroughoutIER.Heintroduceshisaccountofdeliberationasearlyasp. 102,andhe is still talkingaboutexpla-nationonp.109.Further,thesetwoargumentsinvolveincompatibleinterpretationsofthenotionofa“motivationalset”;SAinvolvesanen-hancedHumeansetreading,andSDamaximallyinclusivesetreading.Williamswould thennotonlybeoffering twoweakarguments,butofferingargumentsthatrequireincompatibleinterpretationsoftheirsharedterms.OthercommentatorsaccordinglysuggestthatWilliamsequivocates,slidingbetweendifferentsensesof‘motivationalset’and‘possibilityofmotivation’.38Stillothersclaimthathisargumentchang-esovertime.39

One final exegetical puzzle needs our attention: Williams’ chal-lengetoexternalreasonstheoriststoidentifytheconceptual contentofanexternalreasonsclaim,onpp.108–110.Ashelaterputsit,

Whatisitthattheagentcomestobelievewhenhecomestobelievehehasareasontoφ?Ifhebecomespersuadedofthissupposedexternaltruth…whatisitthathehascometobelieve?Thisquestionposesachallengetotheexternalisttheorist.(1989:39)

ThefourversionsoftheStandardArgumentconsideredaboveturnonclaimsmerelyaboutthenecessaryconditionsforhavingareason,notonwhatreasonsclaimsmean,andsothischallengeisgenerallyidenti-fiedasadistinctargument.Millgramdescribesitas“oneofWilliams’subsidiaryarguments”(1996:201).Butitishardtofitthis“conceptualcontentargument”intothedialecticofIERinanycharitableway.

Williamspressestheconceptualchallengetoexternalreasonsonp.108,afterconsideringwhatisapparentlythefaulty theory of motivation objection,thatanagentmightbemotivatedmerelybyhisbeliefthathehasanexternal reason.He thenwrites, “this agent,with thisbe-lief,appearstobeoneaboutwhom,now,aninternalreasonstatement

38.Cohon1986:552;Scanlon1998:367–9;Shafer-Landau2003:178–9.

39.Wallace1990:375n;Setiya2004:269.



thisseemstocommitastrawmanfallacy,sincetheexternalreasonstheorist isapparentlyfreetorejectWilliams’proposedanalysis,and(ii)itseemsviciouslycircular.Whycouldn’titbetruethatrationalorsounddeliberationwouldmotivatetheagent“whatevermotivationsheoriginallyhad” (p. 109)?Presumablyhe ishere appealing to therestrictionstheStandardArgumentplacesonpossiblemotivation.Butaswe’ve seen,Williams seems to raise this “subsidiary” conceptualcontentargumentasa response toobjections to theStandardArgu-ment calling into question precisely these restrictions. They cannotthereforebeusedinturntosupporttheconceptualcontentargument.

Matterslooknobetterifwerathersuppose,assomehave,thattheconceptualcontentargumentisintendedasanentirelyseparateargu-mentagainstexternalreasons.Theargumentwouldstillsufferfromtheotherflawswe’venoted,andWilliamswouldthenbecommittinganelementarydialecticalsin,reactingtoaseriousobjectiontoaprem-iseofhismainargument,notbydefendingit,butbyofferinganen-tirelydifferentargumenttosupporttheconclusion.

Insum,ifWilliamsintendedtoadvanceoneormoreoftheversionsoftheStandardArgument,thenhisargumentsseemweakandhispo-sitionseemsconfusedand inconsistent.Further, sincehecontinuedto standbehindhis argument(s)over thenext twenty-plusyears inthefaceofalltheseobjectionsandproblems,hewouldhavetohavebeenintransigentlyobtuse.ManycommentatorsconfessuncertaintyaboutwhatWilliams reallymeant, and thedifficultyof interpretinghisargumentsisoftenremarked.42Thismightbeattributedtotheun-commonlymuddledandunclearnatureofhiswritinginIER,butwemightratherwonderwhetherthesecommentatorsholdmistakenpre-conceptionsabouttheintendedargument,andarestrugglingtocramthetextintoamouldforeigntoitsdesign.Williamshimselflaterob-servedthat“anumberofdiscussionshas[sic]ledmetothinkthereissomethingaboutthisview,orthewaysIhavesofarfoundtoexpressit,thateasilyleadstomisunderstanding”(1989:35).ToascribeWilliams

42.Wallace1990:375,377;Millgram1996:199,214;Velleman1996:700n;Parfit1997:116n;Pettit&Smith2006:142;Brunero2007:29.

theywouldhavetomeanthat,tobepotentiallymotivating.40Foranyplausibleanalysisofexternalreasonsbeliefsthereisapossibledispo-sitiontobemotivatedbybeliefsofthatkind(andanarguabletheorythatrationalityentailssuchadisposition).HenceWallaceresponds,

Externalists would agree that the basal desire they ap-pealtocannotfixthecontentforourbeliefsaboutwhatwehavereasontodo.But theywould insist that this isnot the roleassigned to thatdesire. Its job isnot tofixthe content of our reasons, but to explain how beliefsaboutourreasonscangenerateacorrespondingmotive.(1999:228n)

To Williams’ rhetorical question about what else such statementsmightmean,hisopponentmightserenelysuggestwhatevercontentshelikes,orlikemanytoday,simplydenythepossibilityofinforma-tiveanalysisofreasons-beliefs.41TheexternalreasonstheoristmightevenacceptWilliams’suggestedanalysis,becauseitisn’tobviousthatanagentcouldn’tbedisposedtobemotivatedtoφbybelievingthathewouldbemotivatedtoφifheweretodeliberaterationally.MichaelSmith(1994)suggeststhataverysimilardispositionisessentialtobe-ingrational,forexample.

WhythenwouldWilliamshavethoughtthatthisconceptualcon-tent challengehadany forceagainst theobjections to theStandardArgument?There is some indication thathispoint isnot that thesebeliefscouldnotmotivate,butratherthattheycouldnotbetrue:“Wewereaskinghowanytruepropositioncouldhavethatcontent;itcan-nothelp,inansweringthat,toappealtoasupposeddesirewhichisactivatedbyabeliefwhichhasthatverycontent”(pp.109–110).But(i)

40.FolkeTersmanobservedtomethatifWilliamsisconcernedwithwhatexter-nalreasonsbeliefsmustmeaninordertobe necessarily motivating for rational agents,thenhemightreasonablysupposethatonlythiscontentcouldfitthebill.However,Williamswouldstillbeleapingtoaninsufficientlyarguedcon-clusion,andassumingaquestion-beggingaccountofthenatureofrationality.

41. Cohon1986:553;Wallace1990:377;Millgram1996:207;Parfit1997:109–10,120–1.



believethatRisareasonforactionis nothing other thantobelieveitisaspecialkindofexplanationofaction.

Williams’ focuson the conceptual contentof reasons statementsdoesnotbeginwiththeappearanceofthesupposed“conceptualcon-tentargument”onpp.108–9;rather it isubiquitousthroughoutIER andalsohislaterrevisitationsofhisargument(“Whatisittheagentcomes tobelievewhenhecomes tobelieve thathehasareasontoφ?” [1989: 39]).Hebegins in IERby contrasting twodifferent “inter-pretations”or“senses”ofreasonsstatements(p.101).Interpretingthe“explanatorydimension”asafeatureofthemeaningofreasonsstate-mentsisthereforereasonable.Bycontrast,noversionoftheStandardArgument requires any claims about the meaning of reasons state-ments;S1merelyoffersanecessaryconditionforR’sbeingareason.Williams’conceptualfocuswouldthereforebegratuitousonthestan-dardreadings.

WhatWilliams explicitly says about the “explanatory dimension”does not decisively support this conceptual interpretation over amoreorthodox reading.Thebest evidence for the conceptual inter-pretationisthatitmakesthemostsenseofWilliams’entireargumentandotherclaims,asIshallshow.Wecanmotivatethisinterpretationindependentlyby considering thehistorical context,however.MostdiscussionsofreasonspriortothepublicationofIERin1979didnotdrawsharplythenowcommondistinctionbetween“normative”and“motivating”(or“explanatory”)reasons,andadominantviewwasthatasingleconceptofareasonforactionsomehowfilledbothroles.Don-aldDavidson’sinfluentialpaper“Actions,ReasonsandCauses”(1963)argued that the concept of “reasons” that justify an action just is acertainconceptof“reasons”thatcausallyexplainit;ajustificationissimplyarationalizingexplanationintermsoftheagent’sdesiresandbeliefs.What couldweplausiblymeanby a “reason”other than anexplanation?

Readthroughthis lens,Williams’ juxtaposingofexplanationandjustificationstronglysuggestsDavidsonianinfluence.Thisiscorrobo-ratedbyhisfinalpublishedcommentsontheargument,whichappeal

a versionof theStandardArgumentwould thereforebe grosslyun-charitableifthereisanyexegeticallydefensibleorpreferablereadingonwhichhisargumentisstronger.

2. The Alternative (or Actual) Argument

ThereisanalternativewayofreadingWilliams’argument,onewhich(Iwillargue)iscompatiblewithvirtuallyeverythinginIERandsub-sequenttexts,andwhichisn’tvulnerabletoanyoftheobjectionsandexegetical difficulties catalogued above.On this interpretation,Wil-liams offers just one consistent argument, which unites his centralconcernswith (i) the explanatory dimension of reasons statements,(ii)theirconceptualcontent,and(iii)theconnectionbetweenreasonsanddeliberation.

Williams’concernwithexplanationisuncontroversiallypivotalforhisargument;43onp.102hewrites,

[T]hisexplanatorydimensionisveryimportant,andweshallcomebacktoitmorethanonce.Iftherearereasonsforaction,itmustbethatpeoplesometimesactforthosereasons,andiftheydo,theirreasonsmustfigureinsomecorrectexplanationoftheiraction.

Commentatorshaveassumedheisheremerelyassertingthecommonthesisthatforaconsiderationtobeareasonforanagent,itmusthavethecapacitytomotivatethatagent(whetherthisisrationalordelib-erativepossibility),44andhencethatwecancitefactsaboutreasonsaspartof anexplanationof agents’ actions.Korsgaardwrites thatWil-liams’point is“thatunlessreasonsaremotives, theycannotpromptorexplainactions”(1986:11).MyhypothesisisthatWilliamsholdsamuchmoreradicalandinterestingview:thattheveryconceptualcon-tentof“areasonforaction”involvestheconceptofanexplanation.To

43. In1989hetellsusthat“thefirst[fundamentalmotivationoftheinternalistaccount]istheinterrelationofexplanatoryandnormativereasons”(p.38).

44. Nagel1970;Korsgaard1986;Wallace1999;Darwall1983.



normativereasons,thosearethereasonsforwhichtheyact.Therea-sonsforwhichtheyactjustareacertainkindofexplanationoftheiractions.However,sometimesagentsactfor“reasons”thataren’tnor-mative,becausetheydon’tjustifyaction,beingbasedonfalsebeliefs.Andsometimesagentsfailtoactfortheirnormativereasons,becausetheyareunawareofthem.Sonormativereasonsaren’tsimplyexpla-nationsofaction,becausehavingoneneitherentailsnorisentailedbyacting.However,thereisastraightforwardsolutiontohand:thesecaseswherethereisalackofentailmentbetweenreasonsandactionsarecasesinwhichtheagentmistakenlyactsorfailstoactduetofalse belief orignorance.Theplausiblesolution,therefore,isthatthenotionof a normative reason is roughly the notion of an explanation of an agent’s action under the condition of the absence of false belief or ignorance (i. e., “sounddeliberation”).TheconceptofanormativereasonforA toφistheconceptofanexplanationforwhyAwouldhaveφ-ed(or,moreprecisely,wouldhavebeensomewhatmotivated toφ)48 if theflawsinhisbelief-sethadnotpreventedit.49Tosaythatthefactthatthis glass contains ginisareasonforAtodrinkfromit,forexample,istosaythatitexplainswhyAwoulddrinkfromitundertheconditionofsounddeliberation.ThefirstpremiseofWilliams’argumentisthere-forethat‘RisareasonforAtoφ’meansthatR is an explanation of why A would be motivated to φ if he deliberated soundly.50

48.Williamsoftenobservestheproblemthatwecanhavedefeatedreasons,onwhichweoughtnottoact.Hissolutionisthattheseexplainwhywewouldhavemotivationthatisoutweighed.Ishallignorethiscomplication.

49. Parfit(1997:110n)suggeststhatWilliamslaterdisownsanysuchconceptualthesiswhenhewrites,“Icertainlydidnotwanttosaythat[tobelievethatAhasareasontoφ]Awouldhavetocometobelieve the statement [that ifA deliberated correctly, hewouldbemotivated toφ] throughdeliberation.Thatwouldbeaveryimplausibleidea”(1995:188,emphasisinoriginal).Butthe context suggests a different interpretation. Williams is responding toMcDowell’sobjectionthatcomingtoengagein“correctdeliberation”mightrequireconversion rather thandeliberation.Williamswould thenbedeny-inghewasclaimingthatbeliefsaboutreasonsconcern“correctdeliberation”,whatever that might mean,butratherconcernsomethingspecificheintendedby“correctdeliberation”(Cf.Skorupski2006:79n).

50.“OnmyviewastatementaboutA’s reasons ispartlyastatementaboutA’s

explicitlytoDavidson’sconceptofarationalizingexplanation(2001:93).45HisinitialconcerninIERisthat,inthecaseinwhichanagentdrinkspetrolbecausehe falselybelieves it tobegin, “it is justveryodd to say thathehas a reason todrink this stuff”, despite the factthat“wenotonlyhaveanexplanationofhisdoingso(areasonwhyhedidit),butwehavesuchanexplanationwhichisofthereason-for-action form” (p. 102).Herehe’s observing a problem for theDavid-soniananalysis,whichwouldhaveus“ignoretheintuition”thatsay-ingsuchathingisodd.Williamsobjectsthatthis“looksinthewrongdirection,by implying…that the internal reasonconception isonly concernedwithexplanation,andnotat allwiththeagent’srationality”(p.102–3,myemphases).TheadverbsI’veemphasizedheresuggesttheconcessiontoDavidsonthattheconceptofinternalreasonsisin partaboutexplanation.Whenheturnstoaddressexternalreasons,hewrites,“inconsideringwhatanexternalreasonstatementmightmean, wehavetorememberthedimensionofpossibleexplanation”(p.106,myemphasis).

Williamsseekstoaccommodatethisnormativedimensionofrea-sons statementsnot bydifferentiatingbetween reasons that explainandreasonsthat justify,46butbydistinguishinganormativizedkindofexplanation:anexplanationnotofwhyanactionactuallywasper-formedbutofwhyitwouldbeperformedundercertainconditions,theconditionsofsound deliberation.47 Introducingthiscondition,helaterwrites,“isalreadyenoughforthenotiontobenormative”(1989:36).Wemight reconstructhis reasoningas follows.Whenagentsact for

45. Also,in2001,hewritesabout“whatcanrationalizeor render intelligiblevari-ouskindsofaction”(p.94).

46. “Itmustbeamistakesimplytoseparateexplanatoryandnormativereasons”(1989: 39); “Somewritersmake a distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘ex-planatory’reasons,butthisdoesnotseemtometobehelpful,becausenor-mativeandexplanatoryconsiderationsarecloselyinvolvedwitheachother”(2001:93).Forsimilarscruples,seeDarwall1983;Parfit1997;Dancy2000;Finlay2006.

47. This is supported by Williams’ later characterizations of second-personalreasonsstatements,whichhetranslatesassaying,“IfIwereyou,Iwouldφ”(1989:36;1995:215).



hasareasontoφisjusttotellhimthatthereisanexplanationwhyhewouldφundersomeconditionC,thenwecouldonlyexpecttherea-sonsclaimtoinfluenceAinfavorofφ-ingifwethoughtthatheactu-allyvaluesCasaconditionformakingdecisions.WewouldnotplaceanamoralistunderanypressuretodotheRightThing,forexample,bytellinghermerelythatthereisanexplanationwhyshewoulddotheRightThingifonlyshecaredaboutmorality.TotellherthatshehasareasontodotheRightThing,however,doesseemdesignedtoapplypressure,soitmustinvokeaconditionCthateventheamoralistisas-sumedtovalue.Additionally,wecanobservethatsinceonlyappealsto this conditionandnotothersare sufficient tomotivateagents ingeneral,theyaretherebyuniquelyqualifiedtobeexplanations(andhence“reasons”)forwhyagentsactuallyact.

Williams’argumentdependsonafurtherconditiononsomething’sbeingnotmerelyareasonwhy Amightφ,butalsoareasonfor Atoφ.Hewritesthat“whatwecancorrectlyascribetohiminathird-person-alinternalreasonsstatementisalsowhathecanascribetohimselfasaresultofdeliberation”(p.103),and“internalreasonsstatementscanbediscoveredindeliberativereasoning”(p.104).AreasonforAtoφmustthereforebeanexplanationofwhyAwouldφifhedeliberatedsound-lythatAhimselfcoulddiscoverthroughdeliberation;i. e.,itmustbeanexplanation for Aofwhyhewouldφ.Plausibly,ifby‘areason’wemeanan explanation, thenby ‘a reason forA’wewouldmeanan ex-planation for A; i. e., something that couldbe explanatory to A. (Theexpression,‘A hasareason’,whichWilliamscontrastswith‘Thereisareason’,isalsosuggestivehereofA’shavinganexplanation).52

Williams therefore thinks that at least some deliberation takestheformofreasoningtoaconclusionaboutwhatonehasreasontodo.Givenhisconceptualpremise,thisistothinkthattodeliberateissometimestoreasontowardanexplanationofwhatonewoulddoif

52. “Forittobethecasethatheactuallyhassuchareason,however, itseemsthattherelevanceoftheunknownfacttohisactionshastobefairlycloseandimmediate;otherwiseonemerelysaysthatAwouldhaveareasontoφifheknewthefact”(p.103).

Whyanalyzenormativereasonsintermsoftheseidealizingcondi-tionsandnotothersmorefavorabletoexternalreasons,likethepos-sessionofmoralorprudentialdesires?Thischoicemaylooknolessquestion-beggingthansomeversionsoftheStandardArgument,butWilliamsoffersajustificationinhislaterdiscussions.Heinsists(againstMcDowell’sversionofthisobjection)thatastatementofreasonsforA mustbedistinctivelyabouttheactualA,andnotaboutsomeidealizedcounterpartofA(1995:189–94).Butisn’tmovingtotheconditionofsounddeliberationitselfamovetoanidealizedcounterpartofA?Wil-liamsexplains,“Thegroundsformakingthisgeneralpointaboutfactandreasoning,asdistinctfromprudentialandmoralconsiderations,are quite simple: any rational deliberative agent has in his [motiva-tionalset]ageneralinterestinbeingfactuallyandrationallycorrectlyinformed”(1989:37;also2001:92).Ithinkthisshouldbetakenasaclaimmoredistinctly aboutdeliberation thanabout rationality: anyagent, insofarashedeliberates, canbeassumed tovalue thecondi-tionsofsounddeliberation.51Williamsbuildstheseconditionsintotheanalysisbecausetheyareconditionsfordecision-makingthatdeliber-atingagentsassuchcanbeassumedtovalue.Butwhyisn’tthisjustasquestion-beggingagainstexternalreasons?

Theanswerliesinthespecialroleand“force”thatWilliamsthinksdistinguishesreasonsstatementsfromotherkindsofnormativestate-ments(p.110;1989:39–40;1995:191–2).Wemakeclaimsabout“rea-sons”inthefirstinstanceforthepurposeofinfluencing,motivating,orguidingagents.Williamsthinksthisisalsotheessentialpurposeofexternalreasonsclaims;inhisexampleOwenWingrave’sfamilymakeanexternalreasonclaiminorderto“urgeonhimthenecessityandimportanceofhisjoiningthearmy”(p.106),andWilliamsarguesthatexternalreasonsclaimsultimatelyamounttobluff,orrusesforgettingagentstodowhatthespeakerwants(p.111).ButiftellingA thathe

psychology”(1995:191).

51. Similarclaimsaremade inSmith1994andJoyce2001.Note thatWilliamsallowsforrarecaseswhenanagenthasaspecialinterestinnotbeingfullyinformed.



conclusionthatonehasreasontoφbecauseφ-ingwouldbethemostconvenient…wayofsatisfyingsomeelementinS”;“thinkinghowthesatisfactionofelementsinScanbecombined”;“wherethereissomeirresolubleconflictamongtheelementsofS,consideringwhichoneattachesmostweight to”; “decidingwhatwouldmake for an enter-tainingevening,grantedthatonewantsentertainment”.Thisviewofthemotivationalsetascomprisingthematerialforpracticalthoughtstands incontrast to themore familiar internalistconceptionofmo-tivesasforcesoperatinginthebackground.56IfWilliamswereofferingsomeversionof the StandardArgument thiswouldbe an anomaly,but it is the natural theory of deliberation to embrace on this alter-nativereading. Justashemaintains,Williamsthusdoesnotassumeaninstrumentalisttheoryofpracticalreason.Heratheremphasizesamodelthatisevidential.

Somestrikingevidenceforthismodelofdeliberationisinthefol-lowingpassage;

[A]nunknownelementinS, D,willprovideareasonforAtoφonlyifφ-ingisrationallyrelatedtoD;thatistosay,roughly,aprojecttoφcouldbetheanswertoadelibera-tive question formed in part by D.IfDisunknowntoAbe-causeitisintheunconscious,itmaywellnotsatisfythiscondition….(p.103,myemphasis)

HereWilliamssuggeststhatsomeelementDinanagent’smotivation-alsetmightnotgroundanyinternalreasonsiftheagentisunawareofit.ThisisnotbecauseD,sinceit isunconscious,couldnotbeeffica-ciousasamotive;he immediatelyallowsthat “ofcourse itmaypro-videthereasonwhyheφ’s,thatis,mayexplainorhelptoexplainhisφ-ing”.Dmaybethereasonwhy A φ’s,butitwouldnotbethereasonfor whichheφ’s.Thispassageshowsthatcontra somestandardread-ings,Williamsisnotconcernedwiththemerepossibilityofexplaininganagent’sbehaviourorofanagent’sbeingmotivated.Restrictingan

56.CompareWallace1999:223.

onedeliberatedsoundly.(Thiscouldn’texhaustthepossiblekindsofdeliberation,orelsethischaracterizationofdeliberationwouldbevac-uous.Fortunately,Williamsneversuggeststhatitdoes).53Thismodelofdeliberationdiffersstrikingly fromHumeaninstrumentalism;Wil-liamswritesthat“themerediscoverythatsomecourseofactionisthecausalmeanstoanendisnotinitselfapieceofpracticalreasoning,”whereas“aclearexampleofpracticalreasoningisthatleadingtotheconclusionthat one has reason toφbecauseφ-ingwouldbethemostconvenient,economical,pleasantetc.wayofsatisfyingsomeelementin[one’smotivationalset]”.Ifthisisright,thenWilliams’viewofdelib-erationturnsouttobesurprisinglyclosetothatof“cognitivists”aboutpractical reason like David Velleman and Kieran Setiya, whomorerecentlychampiontheideathatdeliberationaimsatactinginaself-comprehensibleway.54

Thismodeloftheconclusionofdeliberationpredictsacertainkindofviewofitspremises.Thematerialsforthisdeliberationwouldhavetotaketheformofevidencefortheexplanatoryconclusion:evidencethat theoutcomeofsounddeliberationwouldbe toφ,andwhy. In-deed,Williamsprovidesexactlysuchamodelofdeliberation:theele-ments inanagent’smotivationalset(‘S’)appear inthe“foreground”,asthecontentoftheagent’sreasoning.55Hewrites,“AmemberofS, D, willnotgiveAareasonforφ-ingif…A’sbelief in the relevance of φ-ing to the satisfaction of Disfalse”(p.103,myemphasis).Thisforegroundroleforelementsofthemotivationalset isapparent inWilliams’ex-amplesofpracticalreasoning:“aclearexample…isthatleadingtothe

53. SeealsoPettit&Smith(2006:144–5).However,theysuggestthatWilliams’rejectionofexternalreasonsisbasedontheotherkindsofdeliberation(in-strumentaldeliberation,intheirview),whereasIthinkitisratherthiskindofdeliberation—thekindhediscusses—thatispivotalfortheargument.

54. Velleman 1996: 720–4; Setiya 2007: 42. Unlike the “cognitivists”, however,Williams does not claim that the beliefs inwhich practical reasoning con-cludesareintentions.

55. ThissuggestsanexplanationforWilliams’talkof“subjective”motivationalsets—a seemingly redundant qualifier. (What could an “objective motiva-tionalset”be?)Perhapshemeansthemotivationalsetthatanagentbelieves himselftohave.(However,thissitsuneasilywiththequotefromp.103.)



reason forwhichA φ’s andhence the explanationofA’sφ-ing. But“noexternalreasonstatementcouldby itselfofferanexplanation”,Wil-liamsobserves,since“theycanbetrueindependentlyoftheagent’smotivations”, and “nothing can explain an agent’s… actions exceptsomethingthatmotivateshimsotoact”.Thisisnotyetanobjectiontoexternalreasons,however;itmerelymeansthatinadditiontoanexternal reason statement, “something else is needed… to explainaction,somepsychologicallink”.Thispsychologicallink,heishappytoallow,“wouldseemtobebelief”;“A’sbelievinganexternalreasonstatementabouthimselfmayhelptoexplainhisaction”(p.107).

HiscaseagainstexternalreasonsturnsonwhatitisthatAcomestobelievewhenheacceptsa“specific” reasonsclaim(p.107).Wecandis-tinguishthreedifferentbeliefsthatAmighthave:(B1)thenonnormative beliefthatR (e. g.,thatthis glass contains gin);(B2)thespecific normative beliefthatR is a reason for A to φ;and(B3)thegeneral normativebeliefthatthere is a reason for A to φ.Williamshasargued,you’llrecall,thatinorderforRtobeareasonfor A, Ahastobeabletorecognizeitasareasonthroughdeliberation.RcanbeareasonforAtoφ,therefore,only ifA cancome tohave thespecificnormativebeliefB2 throughdeliberation.ThisisabeliefthatmustbeabletomotivateAifitistobepossiblethatRcouldbethereasonfor which A φ’s,asopposedtoamerereasonwhy A φ’s.

Williamsraisesnoobjectiontothesuggestionthatactionscanbeexplainedbyappeal tobeliefs. Indeedhewrites, “Theclaimis…so plausible, that this agent,with this belief, appears to be one aboutwhom,now,aninternal reasonstatementcouldtrulybemade”(p.107).Thisisnot,however,supposedtobeinitselfaproblemforexternalreasons(“itdoesn’tfollowfromthisthatthereisnothinginexternalreasonsstatements”,p.107–8).A’sexternalreasonwouldbeR,whilehisinternalreasonwouldbethat R is an external reason for him to φ,byvirtueofhisdispositiontobemotivatedbybeliefsof thatkind.Thesignificanceofthisforexternalreasonsstatements,Williamstellsus,is“thattheircontentisnotgoingtoberevealedbyconsideringmerelythe state of onewhobelieves such a statement, nor how that stateexplains action” (p. 108).Williams’ point here is that itwouldbe a

agent’sreasonsbyhisepistemicaccesstohismotivationalsetwouldbepeculiarandunmotivatedifWilliams’guidingthoughtwassimplythatreasonsmusthavethecapacitytomotivate.Ontheotherhand,thisepistemicrestrictionisnaturalifanagent’sreasonsareonlythoseconsiderationsthatcanbeexplanatoryofhisactionsto him.57

Aftersketchingthispictureoftheconceptofareasonandthena-tureofdeliberation,Williamsturnsonpp.106–9tothepossibilityof“external” reasons. His question concerns “what an external reasonstatementmightmean”(p.106).(Hedoesnotask,Howcouldexternalreasonsmotivate?)WemustfirstgetclearonwhatWilliamsmeansbycallingareasonsstatement“external”ratherthan“internal”.“Inter-nalreasons”arecommonlyinterpretedasreasonsforwhichanagenthasamotivethatcouldleadhimtoactonthatreason,and“externalreasons”areinterpretedasreasonsforwhichanagentlacksanysuchmotive.58ThisisnotwhatWilliamssays,however.Aninternalreasonstatement is indeed one that is “falsified by the absence” of such amotive(p.102),butexternalreasonsstatementsmerely“can betrueindependently”ofsuchamotive(p.107,myemphasis;alsoseep.101;1989:35).Internalreasonsarethusconceptuallydependentontheex-istenceofarelevantmotive,whileexternalreasonsarenot.Butthisallowsthatanagentcouldhaveamotiveforactingonanexternalrea-son.59Williamsisthereforenotbeggingthequestionagainstexternalreasons,whenheassumesinIERthatifsomethingisareasonforA thenitmustbepossibleforAsometimestobemotivatedbyit.

Williams’casestarts(p.106)withanappealtothe“dimensionofpossibleexplanation”;ifRisareasonforAtoφ,thenitcouldbethe

57.Williams’ argument is therefore immune to another objection (Millgram1996:201–4;Shafer-Landau2003:180;Cohon1993:271;Johnson1999;Sobel2001b),thathiscaseagainstexternalreasonsiscompromisedbecauseevensomeinternalreasonsmaybeincapableofmotivatingA—reasonsthatonlyexist invirtueofA’s inability todeliberate soundly (seenote 17).Williamswoulddenythatthesearegenuinelyinternalreasons,despitetheirconnec-tiontotheagent’smotivationalset:“Forittobethecasethathehasareasontoφ…therelevanceoftheunknownfacttohisactionshastobefairlycloseandimmediate”(p.103).

58.ForexampleBrunero2007:24.

59.AlsoseeVelleman1996:696n;Parfit1997:100.



Fromtheserequirements,Williamsdrawshisconclusionthat“allexternalreasonsstatementsare false”,because“ex hypothesi, there isnomotivationfortheagenttodeliberatefrom,toreachthisnewmo-tivation”.Givenhisevidentialmodelofdeliberatingtoreasonsbeliefs,whathemeansisthattherearenofactsabouttheagent’smotivationalsetthatwarranthisinferringthefactthathehasan(external)reason,i. e.,thatthereisanexplanationwhyhewouldbemotivatedtoφbydeliberating soundly,whatever hismotivational set. This interpreta-tion takesWilliams at his wordwhen he rejects the “sub-Humean”modelandprofessesliberalismaboutthemotivationalset.Forthisar-gumentisstrongestifweincludedispositionsandmotivatingbeliefsinthemotivationalset.HispointisthatifanagentcannotdiscerninhispsychologyevenadispositiontobemotivatedtoφbyR,thenhecannotproperlyconcludethatRisanexplanationforwhyhewouldφ ifhedeliberatedsoundly,andhenceareasonforhimtoφ.Instrumen-talreasoningfromone’smeredispositionsmaybeanabsurdity,butevidentialreasoningfromthemisnot.62

RecallthatWilliamsdoesnotdenythatanagentcouldhavesome-thinginhismotivationalsetthatwouldleadhimtobemotivatedbyanexternal reason;heclaimsmerely thatexternal reasonsare inde-pendentofanysuchitem.Anexternalreasonsstatementistherefore

accounted for.He isofferinga translationof thegeneral reasons statement(“there is areason…”)ratherthanthespecificstatement(“Risareason…”).Thiswouldmeanthere is an explanation why A would be motivated to φ if he delib-erated soundly.(i)Becauseitomitstheexplanation,thiseffectivelysaysmerelythatAwouldbemotivatedtoφifhedeliberatedsoundly.(ii)EverytimeWil-liamsoffers such a translation,hequalifies it as “roughly equivalent” toormerelyentailedbythereasonsstatement.(iii)Thisentailmentisallheneedsforhisargument.However, this formulationis infelicitous.Anexplanationofactiononthebasisof“whatevermotivationsheoriginallyhad”couldstillbean internalexplanation, if any reasonsaregrounded inanymotivationwhatsoever(Schroeder2007).Anexternalexplanationwouldratherbeinde-pendentofanymotivationsheoriginallyhad.

62.WecannowalsoappreciatewhyWilliamsclaimsthattheindeterminacyofwhatcountsasarationalprocessandasamemberofone’smotivationalsetfavorstheinternalistovertheexternalist(p.110;also1989:38and2001:92).Thepoint is thatweneednotplaceany formal constraintsonwhat couldcountasanexplanationofanaction,exceptthatithastoappealtotheagent’spsychologicalmakeup.

mistaketothinkthatthepossibilityofexternalreasonscanbeprovenjustbyestablishingthatexternalreasonsbeliefscanmotivate.60Theexternal reasons theorist ratherneeds to show that theagentcouldcome tobelievesomething thatwouldgenuinelybea trueexternalreasonsstatement.

The case comes together on pp. 108–9. ForR to be a reason for which A acts, “coming tobelieve itmust… involveacquiringanewmotivation”.Williamswritesthathis“basicpoint”isthatthedefenderofexternalreasons“mustconceivein a special waytheconnexionbe-tweenacquiringamotivationandcomingtobelievethereasonstate-ment”.Hereheconcedesthatthemotivationmightcomeaboutinanumberofdifferentways.Buttheexternalreasonstheoristneedstwoconditionstobemet:(1)“theagentshouldacquirethemotivationbe-causehecomestobelievethereasonsstatement”(p.108–9;alsosee1995: 188n)—otherwiseR isn’t the reason forwhich the agent acts;and(2)thismustoccur“because…heisconsideringthematteraright”,i. e.,deliberating“correctly”.IsuggestWilliamsheremeansjustthatR isareasonforAonlyifA’sbeliefthatitisareasonforhimistrueandwarranted.ItisatthispointthatWilliamsmakeshispeculiarlyabruptclaimaboutwhatexternalreasonsstatementsmustmean.Onthepres-entreading,however,thisclaimisneitherpeculiarnorabrupt.Grant-inghispremiseabouttheconceptualcontentof“areasonforaction”,itindeedfollowsthat“theexternalreasonsstatementitselfwillhavetobetakenasroughlyequivalentto,oratleastasentailing,theclaimthatiftheagentrationallydeliberated,then,whatevermotivationsheoriginallyhad,hewouldcometobemotivated toφ” (p. 109).Moreprecisely,sincetobelievethatRisareasonforAtoφistobelievethatRisanexplanationofwhyAwouldφifheweretodeliberatesoundly,whattheagentmustcomecorrectlytobelieveisthatRisanexplana-tiontohim,independentlyofanythinginhispresentmotivationalset,ofwhyhewouldbemotivatedtoφifhedeliberatedsoundly.61

60.Indeed,thisiswhatmany“externalists”(inWilliams’sense)seemtohaveas-sumed.SeeNagel1970;Darwall1983.ManycommentatorsmakeexactlythismoveasaresponsetoWilliams.

61. Admittedly, Williams does not mention explanation here. This is easily



somethingthatentailstheproposition,thatifhedeliber-atedrationally,hewouldbemotivatedtoactappropriate-ly?We were asking how any true proposition could have that content; itcannothelp,inansweringthat,toappealtoasupposeddesirewhichisactivatedbyabeliefwhichhasthatverycontent.(p.109–10,myemphasis)

Inotherwords,theproblemwiththereplyisthatitisMunchhausean,suggestingthatexternalreasonscanliftthemselvesoutoftheswampbytheirownhair.Thefactthattheagentwouldbemotivated,once he had concluded thatRisanexternalreasontoφ,cannotbeanywarrantforhisdrawingthatconclusioninthefirstplace.Fortheagentcouldwithequalwarranthaveconcludedofanythingthatitwasanexternalreasonforhimtoφ.ThereforeRcannotrightlybeconsideredanex-planationtohimofwhyhewouldφifhedeliberatedsoundly.

Whatexactly isWilliams’ target, if thisAlternative interpretationiscorrect?Thereareatleasttwokindsofso-called“externalreasonstheorists”whoarenotintendedtargets:(i)thoseclaimingthatagentscan have reasons that don’t depend upon their actual desires (Wil-liamsagrees),and(ii)thoseclaimingthatanagentcanhavereasonsthatcannotmotivatehim,evenifhecomestorecognizethemasrea-sons.(WilliamsjustassumesinIERthatthisisfalseasaconceptualmatter,and thathisopponentsconcur).Sowho is the target?64Theviewthatisrefuted,ifWilliams’argumentsucceeds,isthatanagentcan correctly recognize something to be a reason for him indepen-dentlyofanypsychological informationabouthimself, aviewmostprominentlyespousedpriortoIERbyThomasNagelinhisPossibility of Altruism(1970),andsoonafterdefendedbyStephenDarwallinhisImpartial Reason(1983).65, 66

64.Williams’paperidentifiesnoneandprovidesnobibliography.

65. Indeed Nagel suggests we can learn psychological facts about ourselvesthrough recognizingwhatour reasons are; see alsoKorsgaard 1986,Parfit1997:102.Thisisafundamentalcontrast.

66.Itisworthobservingthatevenmany“Humean”accountsofreasonssuchasMarkSchroeder’s(2007)countas“external”onthisinterpretation.

anexplanationofanagent’spossibleactionthatisindependentofanyfactsaboutthatagent’sactualmotivationalset.But,Williamsobjects,therecanbenosuchthing.Ashelaterwrites,“Whenthereasonisanexplanationofhisaction,thenofcourseitwillbe,insomeform,inhis[motivationalset],becausecertainly—andnobodydeniesthis—whatheactuallydoeshastobeexplainedbyhis[motivationalset]”(1989:39).

Bytheirconceptualindependencefromtheagent’sdesiresanddis-positions,externalreasonsstatementsthusexcludesomethingessen-tialforanyevidencethattheagentwouldbemotivatedthroughsounddeliberationtoφ.63Thereforetherecanbenoevidencethatwoulden-ableA todraw the sound inference thatRwould, independentlyofhismotivationalset,explainhisbeingmotivatedtoφifhedeliberatedsoundly,since“if[theexternalreasonstatement]wastrueatall,itwastruewhen [A]wasnotmotivated” (p. 107). It follows that althoughexternalreasonsbeliefsmightbeabletomotivate,therestillcannotbeanyexternalreasons,becausetheconditionthatthisbeliefmustbetrueandwarrantedcannotpossiblybemet.

Williamsendshisargumentbyconsideringareply:mightn’tanex-ternalreasonbeabona fideexplanationinvirtueofadispositiontore-spondtobeliefsaboutreasons?Then,“whenhecomestobelievethatthereisreasonforhimtoφ,heismotivatedtoφ,eventhough,before,heneitherhadamotivetoφ,noranymotiverelatedtoφ-inginoneofthewaysconsideredintheaccountofdeliberation”(p.109).WecannowseethatWilliams’rejoinderisentirelytothepoint;

[T]his reply … reapplies the desire and belief model(roughlyspeaking)ofexplanation…butusingadesireandbeliefthe content of which are in question. Whatisitthatonecomestobelievewhenhecomestobelievethatthereis a reason for him toφ, if it is not the proposition, or

63.Heuer (2004) argues against “Humeans” (amongwhom she includesWil-liams)thatneitherdesiresnordispositionsarethemselvessignificantexpla-nationsofactions.Buttheargumentreconstructedhererequiresmerelythatidentifyingadispositionisanecessaryconditiononexplanation.



thought that the defenders of external reasons had overlooked thequestionofwhatwemeanbya‘reasonforaction’andthattheywouldbehard-pressedtorejecthismodifiedDavidsoniananalysis.(Hencehis challenge to the externalist to saywhat else reasons statementscouldmean).HeseemstoconcurwithAlanThomas(2002:137)thattheanalyticconnectionbetweennormativeandexplanatoryreasons“canhardlybedefendedatall”,because“itistrueaprioriandself-ev-ident to rational reflection”.Most importantly,on this interpretation“externalreasonstheorists”can(and,Williamsassumes,do)agreethatexternalreasonscanmotivateandthereforeexplainaction.Henceheis especially concerned to address thosewhomistakenly think thattheconceptuallinkfromreasonstoexplanationisconsistentwiththeexistenceofexternalreasonsinvirtueofthepossibilityofbeingmo-tivatedbyexternal reasonsbeliefs.Hetakespains toshowthat thisstrategyisincoherentandthereforefutile.

AlthoughIhavearguedthatthisAlternativeArgumentisnotvul-nerabletoanyofthecommentators’mainobjections,mypurposehasnotbeentodefendit,andthisconceptualpremiseispresumablyitsweakestpoint.Evengrantingthattheconceptofa“reason”justistheconceptofanexplanation, itdoesn’t followthatanormativereasonforactionisanykindofexplanationof an agent’s acting.Toregistermyownview,itmaybeanexplanationratherofwhytoact,orwhyact-ingsowouldbe insomerespectgood (Finlay2006).But thecorrectanalysisof ‘areasonforaction’remainsamatterofcontroversy,andtheviewIamattributingtoWilliamsseemsalegitimatecontender.Astherestofthisargumentseemsimmuneatleasttotheobjectionsthathavepreviouslybeenraisedagainsthim,Williams’skepticismabout“externalreasons”woulddeserveafreshlook.

Onexaminationofthetextualevidence,andinlightofexegeticalconstraintsofcharity,consistency,andauthor’sauthority,itthereforeseemsdifficulttoresisttheconclusionthattheAlternativeArgument,and not any version of the Standard Argument, isWilliams’ actual argument. The readermay be incredulous.How could it have hap-penedthatsuchacentralarticleintheethicalliteraturehasbeenso

If this reconstruction is correct, then remarkably not one of thecentralobjections to theargumentof IERcanvassed in thefirst sec-tionhitsitsmark.Williamsisnotconflating“normative”and“explana-tory”reasonsbut(ashetellsus)ratheranalyzingtheformernotionintermsofthelatternotion.Heisnotbeggingthequestionaboutthenatureofrationalitybut(ashetellsus)basinghisargumentonanin-dependentfoundation.However,hisstartingpremiseisnotthereforeunmotivatedand(totally)uncompelling;heoffersacarefulrationalegroundedinaviewoftheconceptualcontentofa“reasonforaction”that at the timewaswidelyaccepted.He isnotassumingan instru-mentalistmodelof rationaldeliberationbut (ashe tells us) is offer-inganalternative,evidentialmodel.Heisnotdogmaticallyassumingafaultyneo-Humeantheoryofmotivation;rather(ashetellsus)hisargumentappealsmerelytoourdispositionsandmaximallyinclusivemotivationalsets.Heisnotbeggingthequestionagainsthisexternal-istopponentswhenheassumes thatanagent’s reasonsarecapableofmotivatinghim,because (ashe tellsus) the “externalists”hehasinmindarewithhimonthispoint.Hisargumentagainsttheirposi-tionisnottrivial,because(ashetellsus)externalreasonsbeliefscould motivateagentsandtherebyplayaroleinexplainingtheiractions.Hedoesnotturntoaseparate,“conceptualcontent”argumenttosupporthiscasewhenhismainargumentfails,pluckingaquestion-begginganalysisoutofnowhereandobtuselymissingthepoint;rather(ashetellsus)hisentireargumentmakesaconceptualpoint,andtheanaly-sishesuggestsisentailedbytheconceptualpremisehedefendsatthebeginningofIER.Hedoesnotequivocateover‘possiblemotivation’or‘motivationalset’.Finally,hedoesnotretractanyofhisoriginalclaimsorshifthispositioninhislaterdiscussions(ashetellsus),andheisnotstubbornlyclingingtoathoroughlydiscreditedargument.

OnemighthoweverworrythattheAlternativeArgumentalsobegsthequestionagainstexternalreasonsinitsconceptualpremise,thattobelieveRisareasonforAtoφistobelieveRisakindofexplana-tionforwhyAwouldφ.Asanallegedconceptualtruth,itisastrongerclaimthananycounterpartonanorthodoxreading.IbelieveWilliams



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