The New Dimensions of

International Security: The Islamic State and terrorism

Gabriely de Macedo Moutinho Igor Gomes da Silva

Júlia Vieira Garcia Rebeca Mansur Vieira

The most powerful military in the world cannot invade, kill or capture a network or destroy every loose weapon on the planet. The best response to this network of terror is to build a network of our

own - a network of like-minded countries and organizations that pools resources, information,

ideas, and power. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

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1. Introduction The United Nations Security Council was founded in 1945 in

accordance with the UN Charter, following the events of World War II. The organization was charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its activities and powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions and the authorization of military actions through resolutions in order to perform the regulation in security matters. With the appearance of the Islamic State - ISIS (Da’esh), the 1

committee is facing another menace against world peace, giving the difficulty to contain and control its ongoing spread around the globe (UNSC, 2016). The article focuses on the emergence of the terrorist group known as the Islamic State (ISIS or Da’esh) and how its actions negatively affect the structures of peace taking place in the international society (COCKBURN, 2015). Although terrorism is characterized as one of the great threats of the contemporary world, the article argues that ISIS emerges as a new force in the international scenario, setting a new type of menace and highlighting the phenomenon of the new dimensions of international security and terrorism. Unlike other terrorist factions, ISIS has particularities that differ from other groups, such as its ideology, goals, organizational structure and political interests (LISTER, 2015). The fusion of the religion of Wahhabism and the Jihadist movement with the organizational capacities of Islamist groups led to the creation of a new trend, which was called “the Islamic awakening”. In this way, the intention to create a “Caliphate” (recognized as a sovereign state in world politics) and spread its ideology widely, transforming it into a global and

Due to standardization and writing issues, the term ISIS will be used to refer to the Islamic State of Iraq 1

and Syria. However, we may find in the specialized literature other denominations, such as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or Da’esh (its Arabic acronym).!507 Relacionais e Interdependentes

massed project, represents a new condition at the domestic and international levels (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015). The first section of the article will trace the historical background and origins of the group, as well as its symbiotic relation with religious and ideological roots , forming the Salafi-Jihadism . In addition, the section will 2 3

also cover the organizational structure of the group, considering its political order, hierarchical model and the inner bases that build the formation of the “Caliphate”. The second section will provide an outlook of the actions and dynamics of ISIS, concentrating on its behavior and objectives towards the Arab World and the expansion of the “Caliphate” through other territories. Moreover, the section will contemplate the relationship between ISIS and the Western World, focusing on the mass attacks in Paris in 2015. The last part of the section will trace a framework of the instruments and mechanisms developed to combat terrorism through the years and their effectiveness against ISIS. Likewise, the article will contextualize techniques to combat and prevent terrorism in line with the UN’s Global Counter Terrorism Strategy pillars. The last section of the article will provide a regional analysis of the conflict, like the effects over the local governments, the preoccupation with human rights, the protection of vulnerable groups and the effects over local regions, especially, Iraq and Syria. In accordance with the emergence of ISIS

The Jihad Salafism proposes five defining characteristics: “The doctrine of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ establishes 2

lines of loyalty and disavowal; takfir delineates Islam against everything else and protects it against insidious corruption from within; tawhid and hakimiyya explain what legitimate authority should look like and who it should serve; and jihad prescribes the method for this particular revolution”. In: MAHER, Shiraz. Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea. 2016. p. 8-20.

Salafi-Jihadism is a broad and complex religious ideology. It draws from the religion as whole – both 3

conceptually and politically – combining a diverse set of ideas into a potent soteriological program. This millenarian project believes in progress through regression, where the perfect life is realized by reviving the Islam of its first three generations. Id., 2016, p.208. !508 Relacionais e Interdependentes

and its threats against the maintenance of international peace and security, it is necessary to create and improve measures to combat and prevent terrorism within the scope of the UNSC. It is necessary to connect the threat posed by ISIS within the tools developed by the UN in the face of the global strategy against terrorism, proposing the effective implementation of resolutions.

2. Islamic State (ISIS) – Origins and Historical Background The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS began as a group called

Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad (JTJ), founded in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, focused on affecting the current regime in Jordan. It emerged in a moment of multiple social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. Despite its high visibility, the group remains cryptic in certain ways and the few verifiable facts known about its leadership and structure are related to the actions and decisions of the members or intelligence operations for the collection of sensitive information (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015).

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as the leader of JTJ, had the opportunity to meet Osama Bin Laden (former leader of Al-Qaeda) in 1999. The reunion between the leaders of the organizations caused several ideological divergences in how to lead and operationalize the cause raised by the movements. Osama Bin Laden believed that, as a leader, he did not need to stay in the front line of the combat and, when the United States of America invaded Iraq in 2003, Zarqawi became prominent in the insurgency, establishing the differences in carrying the ideological views. Zarqawi was known for his successes in battle, his ferocity and his hatred, a symbol in the fight against the western civilization (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015; MCCANTS, 2015).

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During his leadership, JTJ was responsible for a series of attacks, such as the attack on the UN compound in Baghdad, in August 2003, which killed 22 people. Many scholars attribute the radicalization of the group to US military operations, especially the one called: Operation Iraqi Freedom, performed in 2003 (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015). According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report: “...the US military operations (...) radicalized Iraqi Sunnis, who viewed foreign occupation as a justification for self-defense in the form of ‘jihad’ ” (NTREPID CORPORATION, 2016).

In May 2004, Zarqawi began to record beheadings in Baghdad, and was known for personally carrying out the assassination of hostages. By this time, JTJ had already built their own network and became formally connected to Al-Qaeda in October 2004. Zarqawi performed the Bay´ah – “the oath of fealty” to Bin Laden and JTJ changed its name to Al-Qaeda of the Two Rivers or commonly known as Al-Qaeda of Iraq (AQI). Although, they were formally subordinated to Al-Qaeda, their actions on the Iraqi Insurgency were partially autonomous and around April 2005, AQI had become a foreign fighter’s magnet, attracting several sympathizers towards its principles and values (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015; AL-BALADHURI, 2009).

In 2006, Zarqawi had submitted many smaller local Iraq jihadi factions under his control in subordination of the central Al-Qaeda. He was focused on developing the infrastructure necessary to enforce the Sharia Law. Nevertheless, Zarqawi died in 2006, due to an American air strike attack. Following the events after the death of Zarqawi, Abu Ayyub Al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, respectively, led AQI, changing, in 2006, its name to Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The great objective of ISI, in the leadership of Abu Ayyub Al-Mari and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was to create a Sharia-enforced

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state, bringing to light its view of the ancient Islam scriptures (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015).

Their main objective was to gain territories, starting on the desert region of Anbar, where people were extremely discontent with the Sunni population. However, as their attempt to install the Sharia Law was too brutal, people started to oppose the radical practices and the group itself. Supported by American forces, tribal militias called Sahwat al-Anbar (Anbar Awakening) or Abna al-Iraq (Sons of Iraq) pushed ISI out of Fallujah and the rest of Anbar in a bloody fight and from 2007 to the beginning of 2009, ISI had its power greatly diminished by the US military surge. The tribal militias were promised to join the Iraqi army in the uprising against ISI, however the promise was not fulfilled, and the local groups, instead, targeted as a threat to the government of the Shiite Prime Minister Nouri Al Malik and the Shiite majority. Most of the groups, subsequently, joined the Islamic State (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015).

In 2010, a tank shell killed Abu Ayyub Al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. After the death of both former leaders, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over the command of ISI and started a campaign to regain power, known as the “Breaking down the Walls” campaign, which consisted in freeing imprisoned members on Iraq. He was also able to recover some of the group's popularity and expand into Syria´s Civil War in 2013, in another attempt to develop the group's strength. At this moment, the group formally changed their name to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Baghdadi´s decision to expand into Syria generated a conflict between him and Al-Qaeda’s official affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Al-Nusra. Baghdadi made several assaults to take over Nusra, nonetheless, as none of

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them worked, the groups split permanently, and Al-Qaeda formally started to repudiate ISIS (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015).

During late 2013 and 2014, ISIS gained power in Syria, and in January 2014, they claimed control over Raqqa, where they were able to seize total authority, after ousting all other rebel groups. Raqqa was named capital of ISIS emirates, an important symbolic move. In 2014, they took parts of Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar, an important and strategical province in Iraq. In June 2014, ISIS captured Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, and on June 29th, 2014, the first day of the holy month of Ramadan, ISIS announced the restoration of the “Caliphate”. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared the “Caliph Ibrahim” and demanded loyalty from all Muslims around the world. In this year, the self-declared “Caliphate” had control of many territories and was responsible for changes in the division of several local regions. Regions from north of Aleppo to south of Baghdad, including the cities of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq were living under the group´s rules (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015; BARRET, 2014).

3. Ideology and Religion Differently from other political groups, ISIS is inconceivable apart

from its ideology. It is possible to separate the group’s ideology in two levels: the first one is the school of Islamic political thought to which the group belongs. This school is a movement known as Jihadi-Salafism or jihadism for short. The leaders of the group explicitly adhere to this movement, as they often call their members and supporters “al- Salafiyya, al-Jihadiayya”. Jihadism is a Sunni rooted ideological movement based on literal and minority interpretations of the Islamic scriptures, such as Quran and Hadith. If jihadism were to be placed on a political spectrum, al-Qaeda would be its left and the

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ISIS its right. In principle, both groups adhere to Jihadi-Salafism theology, but ISIS does so with greater severity and extremism (SALTMAN, 2014; BARRET, 2014).

Many authors separate Jihadi-Salafism in two areas: the ideological and the narrative. The ideological part, the less flexible, is based on the historical past and in the scriptures and covers the religious and political beliefs. The narrative part, more flexible and adaptable, covers the application of those beliefs. In general, when a group’s ideology is Jihadi-Salafism we can notice both areas in its attitudes and practices (SALTMAN, 2014).

It is important to emphasize that Jihadi-Salafism has two components. Salafism is a theological movement in Sunni Islam that wants to purify the Islamic faith and the return of the pure form of Islam, as the prophet once practiced it. Salafism focuses on eliminating idolatry (shirk) and affirming God’s Oneness (tawhid). The Salafists see themselves as the true Muslims and their doctrine allows them to declare heretics (takfir) those who do not respect their strictly established definitions of the scriptures (SALTMAN, 2014; MAHER, 2016).

Salafism comes from Wahhabism, a movement founded in the Arabian Peninsula by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, which wants to impose its version of the Muslim faith across Arabia. Wahhabism´s jihad involves destructions of tombs and shrines, enforcement of its rituals and “cleaning” the Islam from Shi´ism. All of these practices have great influence on ISIS, that is, in their holy war. Jihadism can be seen in two different perspectives: the first one, the basis to Al-Qaeda’s jihad and which can be seen in ISIS’s actions, is the defensive jihad. This perspective claims that the jihad must be made in order to prevent and to protect themselves from the oppression of western countries and other groups that are not in accord with their ideology. The

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second perspective is the offensive jihad, which propounds a movement in order to uproot itself from the globe and from western cultures. In this case, the actions made by the group are not to protect themselves, but to be proponents against values and principles that are not compatible with the Sharia (BUNZEL, 2005).

ISIS’s adaptation of this severe version of Jihadi-Salafism is attributed to Zarqawi. In the last 20 years, its Salafi dimension has increasingly dominated the group’s jihadism. ISIS is known for implementing the Sharia as it was practiced in medieval Arabia in the regions they have under control. The group also considers all different interpretations of Islam as bidah (innovations) and hence non-Islamic (SALTMAN, 2014; THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015). As said by an ISIS unknown representative in 2015: “Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling” (NACOS, 2016. pg. 28).

Another movement that shares ancestors with Salafism, contributed to the emergence of the Jihadi School in the 20th century and has great influence on the acts of the ISIS, is the Muslim Brotherhood. It was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, pursuing its goal to gain power in order to influence the society to capture the state. The Brotherhood is an exclusively Sunni movement, created as a response to the rise of western imperialism, but it is not extremely hostile to other Islamic sects. They believe that the restoration of the caliphate is the ideal system to govern the Islamic World (BUNZEL, 2005; BARRET, 2014). The second level of the group’s ideology is related to the group´s hardline orientations within this school. This level is the one that makes the differences between ISIS and Al-Qaeda more noticeable. The doctrines of ISIS’s Jihadi-Salafism specify the group´s hardline. For starters, ISIS

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punctuates that all Muslims must be associated exclusively with fellow “true” Muslims, and disassociate with anyone not fitting in the definition of true Muslims. ISIS considers that the “true” Muslims are the ones that adhere to the Jihadi-Salafism interpretation of Islam. They also understand that anyone that is not capable of living under God´s law is a heretic or a nonbeliever. The laws are the ones written in the scriptures, and its literal interpretations. In addition, the last major doctrine specifies that all Shia Muslims are apostates and so deserve to die (SALTMAN, 2014; THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015).

4. Organizational Structure The recent leader of ISIS and the self-declared caliph is Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi. He claims to be a descendant of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson and calls on Muslims to obey his instructions as long as he follows the “commands of God” (AL JAZEERA, 2014).

Baghdadi appointed a cadre of advisors, ministers and military commanders to help administer military operations and the “Caliphate”. The organization is structured into a sophisticated hierarchy of commanders, in which each has a specific responsibility, salary and delegated powers. Whilst al-Baghdadi's predecessors reportedly kept a more centralized management, the new jihadist leader has assigned deputies to help run the organization, containing almost all governing elements, therefore being capable to administer its own state (SHERLOCK, 2014). 4

Treasury, transport, security and prisoners all have their own ministry and there is a minister in charge of looking after the needs of foreign jihadi

A flash drive was seized from the house of a member of the Islamic State, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, 4

al-Baghdadi's military chief of staff for Iraqi territory, who was killed in the military raid performed by the Iraqi military, had information that revealed the organizational structure of the group, according to Ruth Sherlock in Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the new ‘caliphate’ is run.!515 Relacionais e Interdependentes

soldiers, while a specialized ‘war office’ manages war logistics and technicalities. Baghdadi has been willing to delegate responsibility and rely on the skills of his subordinates. Many of his cabinet and other higher-level commanders served as high-ranking officers in Saddam Hussein’s military and many others have high-level technical expertise. In addition, in the lower parts of the hierarchy, each province has its own governor responsible for the administration of the region and specialist cells act with relative autonomy under general direction from senior leaders.

Concerning ISIS’s military operations, it mobilizes and uses tactics frequent in small armies. This mobility enables fighters to achieve a local numerical advantage over their adversaries and surprise them. They have no bases, command and control centers, or fixed installations, which makes it difficult to attack. Its leaders also have enough experience in combat against American armies. Because the Islamic State intends to govern the territory they control, they, therefore, provide services for the Muslim population, while using an iron fist policy against anyone daring to disagree with the “Caliphate”. Such is the reason for the considerable energy spent on building institutions and infrastructure of statehood in addition to their military campaigns (KAM, 2014).

The terrorist group runs healthcare, education and public order, imposing taxes as an instrument of coercion. Some civilians believe that the false caliphate is more efficient in providing these services and salaries to certain professionals than the government. This is done in order to build a state, while gaining reluctant acceptance of the governed, at least to a certain extent. It also operates courts and police forces based on Sharia Law, for example, gender segregation is enforced and women must wear the burqa in public (BOHN, 2014). The “Caliphate” also establishes order through public

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beheadings and mandatory mosque attendance by showing extreme violence and propaganda as a value of fear. In areas with Shiite Muslims or religious minorities, like Yazidis, the Sunni extremists conduct campaigns of plunder and executions (AMOS, 2014).

The propaganda of fear is a tactic commonly used by ISIS and it is well known for releasing gruesome videos of it carrying out mass and individual killings. This tactic is reproduced in their online strategy, utilizing social media effectively. The sophisticated messaging is an integral part of ISIS’S operations and can be noticed in its English magazine, Dabiq. It is quite costly to maintain territorial domain, weapons stocks, and propaganda, but the ISIS is the richest terror organization in the world, functioning much like a criminal syndicate. Its income is primarily from the smuggling of oil - due to its control over oil ports and production in Syrian territory, supplemented by extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, and taxes on the area it controls. Other resources that the organization controls are agricultural goods and water. Coupled with hydroelectric power stations, these resources provide further funding for ISIS (BENDER; MACIAS, 2014).

5. Islamic State behavior, financial and main objectives Terrorist and insurgent groups, both of which may be termed “militant

groups” are economic actors and have a fundamental need to mobilize resources. However, there has been relatively little research about the economic and financial decision-making of such groups based on actual financial records (BAHNEY, 2010). It turns out that the group's methods of financing are very different from other prominent terrorist organizations, and much more difficult for the United States and other countries to shut down. Unlike many terrorist groups, which finance themselves mainly through

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wealthy donors, the ISIS has used its control over a territory that is roughly the size of the U.K, where millions of people develop diversified revenue channels that make it more resilient to U.S. offensives (SWANSON, 2015). David Cohen, the Treasury Department's Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of U.S., described ISIS as "probably the best-funded terrorist organization we have confronted" — deep pockets that have allowed the group to carry out deadly campaigns in Iraq, Syria and other countries (SWANSON, 2015). Estimates of the precise amount that ISIS earns from these activities tend to vary a lot and fluctuate over time, but what is certain is that the group is heavily diversified — meaning that if one funding source is shut down, the group can turn to others to generate revenue. Its main methods of generating money appear to be the sale of oil and antiquities, as well as taxation and extortion. The group's financial resources have grown quickly as it has captured more territory and resources. According to a 2015 study by the Financial Action Task Force, ISIS's four primary sources of revenue are as followed: proceeds from the occupation of territory (including control of banks, oil and gas reservoirs, taxation, extortion, and robbery of economic assets); kidnapping for ransom; material support provided by foreign fighters and fundraising through modern communication networks. The benefits of facilitation networks for terrorist and insurgent groups are clear: without such support networks such groups cannot function. They are essential elements of any groups' efforts to finance and resource their expensive activities. It is not the cost of any individual attack, but rather the larger infrastructure costs that drive up insurgent expenses. A Senior Intelligence Officer from the US Defense Intelligence Agency explained in 2005:

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We believe terrorist and insurgent expenses are moderate

and pose little significant restraints to armed groups in Iraq. In particular, arms and munitions costs are minimal—leaving us to judge that the bulk of the money likely

goes toward international and local travel, food and lodging of fighters and families of dead fighters, bribery and pay-offs of governmental officials, families and clans; and possibly into the personal coffers of critical middle-

men and prominent terrorist or insurgent leaders (TABARANI, 2011. pg. 254).

The group cannot be defeated without cutting off its funds. That is why the coalition says it aims to attack the sources of its revenue as well as stopping the group from advancing militarily. America and its allies have carried out air strikes on ISIS-controlled oil refineries in Syria. America and Britain, which have a strict policy against paying ransoms for hostages, are pressuring European countries to stop paying up (something they deny doing). Several countries have applied sanctions against ISIS leaders as well as those known to raise funds for the group. However, officials are keen to emphasize it will be a long fight. For now, ISIS still seems to be able to pay for everything it needs (THE ECONOMIST, 2015). Considering all of its economic organization, what does ISIS plan to aim for? In his sermon delivered in Mosul in the summer of 2014, the only time he has appeared in public as ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said it was an obligation to establish the “Caliphate” and therefore to recognize him as “caliph”. "This is a duty upon the Muslims — a duty that has been lost for centuries. The Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it." Baghdadi declared. ISIS has long sought to increase its power by

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consolidating and expanding its quasi-state in Syria and Iraq. At its height in 2014, large parts of Iraq and Syria were under the group’s control.

Much of the ISIS’s day-to-day terrorism is linked to its war effort, with enemies like Iraq’s Shiite population enduring the most of many of the group’s attacks. The U.S.-led coalition and their local allies have reversed the ISIS’s military expansion, shrinking the territory under its control. In so doing, they have caused massive financial problems for the group, decreased the number of foreign fighters and weakened its appeal in general. ISIS has sought to expand into “provinces” throughout the Muslim world, following al-Qaida’s use of “affiliates” in the past. This expansion spreads the risk of civil wars to new areas and increases the ferocity of existing ones. Furthermore, ISIS exerts tremendous influence even outside areas where it controls territory, agitating regional politics in general. Its terrorist attacks in nearby Lebanon, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are revenge for the policies of enemy governments (or the powerful sub-state group, Lebanese Hezbollah, which is an important ally of the Assad regime). In addition, they are attempts to foment sectarianism and otherwise shape regional politics to reflect the ISIS’s worldview and strategy. ISIS’s high-profile violence also inspires extremist voices, creates fears of instability, and injects divisive issues such as sectarianism into a region already highly divided. This agitation increases the risk of civil wars and political violence and degrades politics in general (BYMAN, 2010).

6. ISIS, terrorism and Western World relations: Paris Attacks Since September 11, what have been the relations between the Western

World and terrorism? What can we evoke from this symbolically crafted different worldviews? The events orchestrated against the United States in 2001 had opened a new configuration concerning the international security, a

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new era marked by extreme antithetic ideologies (INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE, 2015). The genesis of the conflict integrates a wider scope of variables and is far more remote and complex than the attacks perpetrated in The World Trade Center. However, New York was the birthplace of the new dimension of international terrorism, the stage where the conflict of ideas between the so-called “liberal democracies” and the Jihad Terrorism turned into a symbiotic relation, from discourse to violence, besides its non-monolithic nature (SNOW; BYRD, 2007). The rise of ISIS represents this framework of opposite ideologies, specially, characterized by the transformation of discourse into war, where violence expresses a political message or a form of political resistance (CRENSHAW, 1981). The Western World, with its forged utterance of democracy and freedom, and ISIS, with a movement in Islamic political thought known as Jihadi-Salafism (an extremist view with minority interpretations of the Islamic scriptures) (WIKTOROWICZ, 2005). These ideological-political opposed thoughts reflect typical forms of dualities, freedom-authoritarianism and democracy-jihad terrorism, which gained status of war and cultural conflict, constructing the western world as also an exporter of violence and hate towards the Islam. We must assert that the Islamic world does not agree with terrorism, whose actions are carried out by extremist minorities like ISIS (FUNK; SAID, 2004).

Regarding the contradictions and interpretations of whom is the true responsible for this clash of civilizations, it is impossible to deny that the relations between the western world and terrorism, specifically those with the Islamic State, have been created with extreme violence, intolerance and blood (NEUMAYER; PLUMPER, 2009). ISIS transforms this worldview into war, its fundamentalism into extreme violence, a rational political choice that

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becomes political violence to express its values for a purposeful activity (CRENSHAW, 1981). The values of the Jihadism are constructed in basis of constraints of civil liberties, deterioration of human rights and the pursuance of its principles through violence and war (WIKTOROWICZ, 2005).

The representation of the extremism phenomenon and the strict antagonistic nexus are evidenced by the attacks in Paris. Thereby, the attacks constitute a real “laboratory” to examine the configuration of the new pace of international terrorism in accordance with the practices of ISIS. The attacks in Paris were a series of terrorist attacks that occurred on the night of November 13th, 2015 in Paris and Saint-Denis, France. The attacks consisted of mass shootings, suicide bombings, explosions and use of hostages. In all, there were three separate explosions and six mass shootings, including bombings near the Stade de France in the suburb north of Saint-Denis. The most deadly attack was at the Bataclan Theater, where terrorists shot several people and held hostages until the early hours of November 14th (BBC, 2015a).

The Paris attacks have shown a new phase in the ISIS’s action and call into question the strategy of Western countries against the terrorist faction. We now see a new form of operation of ISIS. The attacks towards citizens in Paris are the mirror of the war between the Islamic State and the Western World. ISIS’S strategy goes beyond the Middle East, establishing its rule of terror in a global scale, where nobody is safe. They proclaim the Western countries as enemies of the Islam and impose its values and principles through force and violence. The expansion of the “Caliphate” over other regions indicates a shift in the methods (modus operandi) perpetrated by ISIS, yet its global plan of control remains the same (SANDERSON, 2015).

The attacks in Paris were specifically well planned and sophisticated, indicating a shift in the instruments in the war with the West. Nonetheless,

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since the coalition formed by the US against the “Caliphate” entered in force, several leaders of the group called for followers and sympathizers to strike back the anti-ISIS coalition and the enemies of the west. The ISIS expansion project is evident and the attacks in Paris indicate that the war zone left in the Middle East was just the beginning, making room for further coordinated attacks based on a sophisticated infrastructure (SANDERSON, 2015). Therefore, the conflict that encompasses the countries of the West and ISIS is part of something long discussed. Amid ideologies, religion, political and economic interests, the blood trail is a component of the war that continues, whether in the Middle East or in Paris. Furthermore, we must take into account that there is the possibility of more conflicts, since military operations in the Middle East and problems with integration of Islamic community in the country help to explain concentration of attacks (YEO, 2015).

7. International Response and Actions against the Islamic State The hate-oriented relationship established between the Western

civilization and terrorism might be seen just as an opposition of ideologies that do not want to be suppressed and left to dust, but, in fact, it represents more than that. The discourse that celebrates culture also masks political and economic interests. In this manner, the future of populations and innocent people have been gambled away to nourish terrorism and ISIS, which blinds itself to endure the “culture and tradition” that subverts the actual teachings of the Islam religion and to lead horrifying attacks around the world (UNSC, 2015a). Thus, what has been done to stop terrorism and ISIS? What is the responsiveness of the International System to mitigate the advance of ISIS and terrorism as a whole? Are the instruments effective? (MCINNIS, 2016; UNSC, 2015b).

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Primarily, a wide range of mechanisms has been developed through the years, providing a substantial and normative framework of multilateral instruments against terrorism. The objectives of counter-terrorism vary from its target and from its level of action. The first great instrument for combating terrorism is the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy , a cooperation system 5

created to enforce national, regional and international apparatus that provides a full framework of institutionalized assistance to enlighten measures and actions to counter terrorism and ISIS as a whole (UNGA, 2012).

Moreover, the Security Council, throughout its resolutions, created the Counter Terrorism Committee to combat terrorism, maintain international peace and security and fight against threats caused by terrorist, working as the central institution against terrorism (UNSC, 2001; OUDRAAT, 2003). As a branch of the committee, the Executive Directorate was created to form policies and formalized decisions to conduct the actions of member states. The UN General Assembly established the Counter-Terrorism Task Force, as well as the UN Counter Terrorism Center, to provide assistance to member states for combating terrorism in the national level. Thereby, in terms of multilateral responsiveness to combat terrorism, the UN provides us with a unique apparatus to enhance the fight in such matter (UNITED NATIONS, 2016). Notwithstanding, how are these instruments able to face ISIS? The methods of counter terrorism include military actions, sharing information/technology and non-military approaches, constructing a cooperation system that still has its problems. The military actions, composed primarily by airstrikes, are still the most used instruments to counter back the advance of

This global effort generates four pillars of action to counter terrorism: (i) addressing the conditions 5

conducive to the spread of terrorism; (ii) preventing and combatting terrorism; (iii) building States’ capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations and (iv) ensuring Human Rights and the rule of law (UNGA, 2006).!524 Relacionais e Interdependentes

ISIS. In addition, military support to allies and “troops on soil” are also part of the warlike apparatus (PECHT, 2016). A military coalition led by the United States promoted more than 8,000 airstrikes, supporting military operations and campaigns of training. Measures to mitigate the flow of foreign fighters , as 6

well as measures to cut funding have already been taken by countries and endorsed by the Security Council (MCINNIS, 2016; UNITED NATIONS, 2015). We now see some progress; the maneuvers and cooperation of governments and the UN have decreased the finances and funds of the group (UNITED NATIONS, 2015). Operations to retake Mosul and Raqqa (territories once strongly controlled by ISIS force) are being conducted and anti-ISIS forces have mitigated the group’s foreign recruitments numbers (SMITH, 2015; MILLS, 2016).

Following the events composed by sophisticated attacks and the war still in course, it is necessary to state that ISIS is not a common terrorist group. The nature of the group varies in proportion, objectives and political interests. The recruitment of foreign fighters, its financial operational net, its influence over the Middle East and the global expansion project, for instance, show that its strategy is not merely the maintenance of the current dimensions of the “Caliphate”, but also the dominance over others (CRONIN, 2015; SMITH, 2015).

Its ideology and propaganda gather various followers around the globe in a politically and psychologically attractive mass process. In this manner, ISIS holds more than 30,000 fighters, keeps territories in Syria and Iraq,

“Expressing grave concern over the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, namely 6

individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or perpetration of, or participation in, terrorists acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict, and resolving to address this threat.” In: Resolution 2178: Addressing the growing issue of foreign terrorist fighters UNSC (2014).

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ensures sophisticated military competences, and confronts military forces directly, a self-proclaimed pseudo state led by a trained army (CRONIN, 2015). Moreover, the methods used by ISIS have shown us a more wicked side of its way of action, characterizing the atrocities and cruelty as a crystalized state of mind (YADLIN, 2016). The effectiveness of the counter terrorist’s responses set an important instrument to impose barriers on the growing expression of terror. In terms of normative and strategic analyses, the plan works perfectly; however, the appearance of new terrorist factions such as ISIS exposes the cracks of this practical counterinsurgency system. The conventional military toolbox is not effective as we thought and restraint must be the best way of action in a long-term period (POSEN, 2015).

Bombings, airstrikes and other warlike proceedings just damage ISIS in terms of numbers, but further damage the Middle East, leaving a social fracture, along with the death of more civilians and “surprise attacks” against other countries, in a war that has no date to finish. There are no winners in this war, just corpses left behind. Therefore, this is not enough and simple use of force and cohesive methods proved to be poor. The core of the problem still goes on, proving that the war against terror was more than a matter of material nature, but also of political and social cooperation (PECHT, 2016).

8. Effects to local governments One of the main conditions for ISIS to be able to control a certain city

or region is for the host country to have weak governmental institutions and infrastructure. The foreign military interventions and the civil wars caused by the Arab Spring in the Middle East and the North of Africa supplied the terrorist group with an advantage. Therefore, the terrorist group takes over the

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legitimate revenue collection operations of the governments it has usurped. Moreover, it has used the ever-present threat of violence to extract as much as it can from the people, businesses and property it controls. The organization is able to take and control strategic cities and regions - areas with oil ports, seaports, hydroelectric power stations, and agricultural fields- therefore destabilizing the country’s economy and strengthening the “Caliphate’s” income. Because ISIS weakens its host country’s economy and infrastructure, the official government lacks enough resources to combat the extremists. The two main States that have been combating ISIS’s domain in its own territory are Syria and Iraq. In these countries, the group exacts tolls and traffic tickets; rent for government buildings; utility bills for water and electricity; taxes on income, crops and cattle; and even fines for smoking or wearing the wrong clothes (ROSENBERG; KULISH; MYERS, 2015). 7

The Islamic State has long sought to increase its power by consolidating and expanding its “Caliphate” in Syria and Iraq. At its height in 2014, large parts of Iraq and Syria were under the group’s control. ISIS conquered territory directly through conventional military operations and used guerrilla war and terrorism to weaken enemy governments and civilian morale and stretch their forces (BYMAN, 2016).

The jihadists exploited the chaos and divisions within both Syria and Iraq. ISIS grew out of what was al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was formed by Sunni militants after the US-led invasion in 2003 and became a major force in the country's sectarian insurgency. In 2011, the group joined the rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, where it found a safe haven and easy

Based on interviews with people living inside or recently escaped by from the territories controlled by the 7

Islamic State and Western and Middle Eastern official who track the group’s finances. In: ROSENBERG, Mathew; KULISH, Nicholas; MYERS. Steven Lee. Predatory Islamic State Wrings Money From Those It Rules. 2015.!527 Relacionais e Interdependentes

access to weapons. At the same time, it took advantage of the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, as well as widespread Sunni anger at the sectarian policies of the country's Shia-led government. In 2013, the group began seizing control of territory in Syria, permitting the change of its name to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The following year, it overran large swathes of northern and western Iraq, proclaimed the creation of a "Caliphate", and became the “Islamic State" (BBC, 2016).

Because of its expansionist ambitions, the terrorist group is also present in many other countries, mostly due to allegiances of several other jihadist groups, such as in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. ISIS has sought to expand into “provinces” throughout the Muslim world, following al-Qaeda’s use of “affiliates” in the past. Theses allegiances characterizes the ISIS as a conglomerate of factions, or in other words an umbrella organization of various jihadist groups, thus benefiting the main branch in expanding its influence.

Moreover, ISIS’s governance system makes life even more miserable for already suffering communities. Some of these provinces drew on small terrorist groups that used the Islamic State brand to expand. Others, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, were powerful groups already. In some instances, local commanders separated from an al-Qaeda affiliate use the ISIS name as an alibi to take over the region. Affiliates hold territory in five countries and have footholds in several more. ISIS is now believed to be operational in 18 countries across the world, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, according to evidence seen by the US National Counterterrorism Center. It also found signs of what it called "aspiring branches" in Mali, Egypt, Somalia, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines (BBC, 2016).

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ISIS agitates regional politics in general. Its terrorist attacks in nearby Lebanon, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are revenge for the policies of enemy governments. In addition, they are attempts to foment sectarianism and otherwise shape regional politics to reflect the ISIS’s worldview and strategy. ISIS’s high-profile violence also inspires extremist voices, creates fears of instability, and injects divisive issues such as sectarianism into a region already highly divided. This agitation increases the risk of civil wars and political violence and degrades politics in general.

9. Protection of vulnerable groups Civilians, including men, women and children, ethnic and religious

minorities who remain in ISIS-controlled areas live in fear. Victims and witnesses that fled consistently described being subjected to acts that terrorize and aim to silence the population. ISIS has systematically targeted sources of dissent, detaining and threatening activists, non-governmental organization workers and journalists with death. Where ISIS has occupied areas with diverse ethnic and religious communities, minorities have been forced to either assimilate or flee. The armed group has undertaken a policy of imposing discriminatory sanctions such as taxes or forced conversion – based on ethnic or religious identity – destroying religious sites and systematically expelling minority communities. Evidence shows a manifest pattern of violent acts directed against certain groups with the intent to curtail and control their presence within ISIS areas (UNITED NATIONS, 2016).

In areas under the armed group’s control, civilians have experienced a relentless assault on their basic freedoms. ISIS enforces its rules summarily, inflicting harsh penalties discriminating against those who transgress or refuse to accept their self-proclaimed rule. ISIS has obstructed the exercise of

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religious freedoms, the freedom of expression, assembly and association, which are guaranteed by international law. The group has systematically enforced its edicts through its Al-Hisbah morality police to conduct constant surveillance within local communities. Children have been asked to inform on their parents’ compliance with ISIS rules. Civilians who fled described a rapid imposition of strict social instructions followed by brutal enforcement. ISIS has attacked social and cultural practices – including weddings, musical events and traditional ceremonies – deemed incompatible with their self-proclaimed beliefs in both urban and rural areas, demonstrating their intent to eradicate these aspects of Syrian culture (UNITED NATIONS, 2016).

The UN has estimated that in August 2014, ISIS fighters killed or abducted thousands of Yezidi men, women, and children when the group took control of the town of Sinjar (Shingal) and Yezidi villages around Mount Sinjar, 120 kilometers west of Mosul. In interviews with Human Rights Watch, women and girls described how they were separated from men and then divided by age group or by marital status. They were moved to Syria or multiple times between locations in Iraq and Syria, such as prisons or schools used as detention centers, and kept in the slave market of Raqqa, where some women were then resold as sex and/or domestic “slaves” between ISIS members (WHEELER, 2016a).

Hussein Alqadi, who heads the office of kidnap affairs under the KRG prime minister’s office, said that about 1,000 women and girls have 8

escaped ISIS, but he estimates that 1,800 may remain with the armed group. ISIS has issued statements acknowledging that ISIS captured Yezidi women and girls as “spoils of war,” and sought to justify the sexual violence. These

Kurdistan Regional Government. 8

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statements are further evidence of a widespread practice and a systematic ISIS policy. These acts constitute war crimes, and may be crimes against humanity. Removing children from the community and forcibly converting large groups of children and women may be evidence of genocide against the Yezidi people (WHEELER, 2016b).

Concerning Sunni women and girls, they have reported severe restrictions on their clothing and freedom of movement in ISIS-controlled areas. They said they were only allowed to leave their houses dressed in full-face veil (niqab) and accompanied by a close male relative. Beatings, fines on male family members or both, isolating women from family, friends, and public life, enforce these rules. Families living under ISIS also face intensified suffering from escalating food prices and cash shortages, especially since Iraq’s government stopped sending civil service salaries to ISIS-controlled areas in mid-2015. They also live in fear of airstrikes by the United States-led coalition and Iraqi government forces (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2016).

Besides all the problems already reported that women face, there are still those that refer to health. Many healthcare personnel fled ahead of the ISIS takeover of the Hawija area, access to health care diminished for the entire civilian population, most of those interviewed said women and girls faced further barriers because of restrictions imposed by ISIS (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2016). Humanitarian actors supporting the population’s access to food have been unable to reach the nearly 600,000 people in ISIS-controlled Dayr Az-Zawr and Ar-Raqqah governorates since May and July 2014, respectively. In Al-Hasakah governorate, ISIS obstructed the importation of medicine by doctors and medical personnel. One interviewee said that, in April 2014, “once ISIS took over, people who left ISIS areas to get medicine risked being arrested by ISIS.” Doctors and nurses described fleeing

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due to the restrictions on their professional activities imposed by ISIS. By preventing the supply of humanitarian aid, the group reinforces the dependence of civilians on the services it controls (UNITED NATIONS, 2016).

ISIS carries out large-scale victimization through the systematic imposition of harsh restrictions on basic rights and freedoms indicating an underlying policy. The brutal nature and overall scale of abuses is intended to reinforce the group’s absolute monopoly on political and social life to enforce compliance among communities under their control. Imposition of severe measures disguised as religious edicts has formed part of the attack against the civilian population, in addition to the perpetration of armed violence against civilians, mistreatment of persons taking no active part in hostilities, and violence against identified communities (UNITED NATIONS, 2016).

10. Middle East framework: Effects under local regions The extensiveness of ISIS over the Middle East and its methods of

control over the local populations generated several conflicts along the regions and extreme consequences for the “way of living” and the former political order (LAUB, 2016). The ongoing tension creates a scenario of destructions and domination, a war zone where the conquest is the real domain and the Sharia Law is the last word. ISIS’s ideology provokes an aura of governance based on authoritarianism, sectarianism and terror. A local perspective of the growing dominance of ISIS is, for instance, a great beginning for understanding its global strategy of governance (THE CLARION PROJECT, 2015).

Mosul and Raqqa are two of the cities invaded by ISIS and evidence the core of the growing conflict in a crumbling Middle East. The expansion of

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the Islamic State over Iraq initiated in June 2014 with the conquest of Mosul, leading to a battle with no precedents that could be the most severe and bloodiest humanitarian disaster in the Middle East (PARKER; COLES; SALMA, 2014). Several groups now control Mosul, including Iraqi military troops, Kurdish forces and a coalition formed by a Western campaign, besides the ISIS territories (RITZEN, 2016). In 2014, ISIS insurgents have reached the control of Mosul, during an advance that lasted four days. ISIS combatants seized police stations, military bases, civil buildings and headquarters, leaving a trail of blood and terror in the streets of Mosul. Corpses of police officers and civilians were found everywhere along the city and two years later the battle is still one of the main concerns for Iraq’s government (SALHY; ARANGO, 2014). The launching of a military operation organized by the Iraqi government began the battle for the retaking of Mosul, a battlefield that still affects the remnant population of about 6,000. Military campaigns on ground and air strikes form the main method of defense against combatants of the ISIS. However, despite significant gains from the resumption of the city and defeat of the main jihadist forces, several terrorists are still dispersed in other rural areas, as well as moving to other nearby locations and other controlled territories and might carry other attacks out of Syria and Iraq (LAUB, 2016). About this manner, Cordesman argues:

It is natural for most reporting and military analyses to focus on every major development in the daily fighting against ISIS, but the fight to liberate Mosul and Raqqa is only one part of a much longer and more complicated

struggle that may be well go on for years. While some in the White House staff do talk of “victory” in Mosul- and even Raqqa-before President Obama leaves office,

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virtually no one actually involved in shaping U.S and Iraq

strategy believes this is possible. The main body of ISIS forces in Mosul may be defeated, but this will only be a prelude to what will be a different and much longer fight

(CORDESMAN, 2016. pg.1).

It is necessary to note that the consequences during the conflict are alarming; however, the protection of the inhabitants of Mosul will also be a great challenge. The city they knew no longer exists; it became a cemetery of war. In that way, rebuilding from the ashes what was lost while dealing with a war that has no end, with the constant fear of a new attack, is now the great project of the citizens of Mosul, in a battle that still destroys the Middle East. The still weak Iraqi institutions, due to the 2003 American invasion and poor management, have emerged another profound challenge of reconstruction and governance (CEASEFIRE, 2016). It is impossible to speak of the disasters arising from Mosul and not connect them to the events in Syria. The situation in Syria is even worse. The country is in a civil war that lasts more than five years, allowing the advance of the ISIS amid an unprecedented crisis. The city of Raqqa could be considered the capital of the ISIS, whose actions determined a new type of political and economic organization and established the extreme control over the population. Raqqa has been controlled by the ISIS, and together with Mosul represents the power symbol of the extremists (CARIS; REYNOLDS. 2014). The US government perpetrated several military coalitions in order to retake the city of Raqqa, undermining the power of ISIS. Cordesman argues that:

It is equally clear that the fight against ISIS in Mosul and Iraq cannot be separated from the fight against ISIS in

Raqqa and Syria. The long border between Syria and Iraq

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is almost impossible to secure against infiltrators, and

there are many routes relatively easy to use to smuggle in arms and even heavy weapons. The greater the freedom ISIS has in operating out of Syria, the greater the

challenge to liberating Mosul and the rest of Iraq, as well as to any effort to create a Syrian rebel presence that will not be tied to other extremist movements, and that can check or contains the pro-Assad forces. (CORDESMAN,

2016. pg.1).

In spite of the improvements made in Mosul and Raqqa, the situation in the Middle East is far away from being good. ISIS still controls several cities and spaces along the territory, establishing the fundaments of the Sharia Law towards the remaining civil population. Under the Sharia Law, ISIS is able to create a complex environment, combining itself as a terrorist organization guided by an ideological religious movement that pursues the ambition of becoming a sharia-state based, not only to control the Middle East, but also the rest of the world (BBC, 2015b). Life under ISIS and the Sharia Law has become a “living hell” for the local populations. The transgression of the Sharia Law leads to series of brutal and published events in a way to perform and impose a type of indoctrination, conducting a demonstration of power and rule of terror. Life in the local regions has drastically changed and civilians, principally women, children, and other minority groups (ethnic and religious ones), are targets of threatening and deadly activities. Under the Sharia Law, ISIS has prohibited the exercise of religious freedom and freedom of expression, leading to constant surveillance and strict-brutal social enforcement. The list of violent acts includes corporal punishments (lashings and amputations) as well as

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psychological torture leading to death (by decapitation), all of them imposed during public events (THE UNITED NATIONS, 2014). ISIS has transformed the entire social, political and humanitarian practices in the controlled territories. The group has perpetrated murder, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery and tortures to systematically impose its brutal activities, not just to vanish or erase the cities under control, but also to extinguish the memory of the inhabitants and engage its self-proclaimed law against civil liberties and human rights (UNITED NATIONS, 2014).

11. Conclusion Since its establishment, ISIS has acted toward a common purpose. The

level of organization, character of its ranks and membership, and long-term vision indicate a cohesive and coordinated group. The military operations carried out by ISIS have been motivated by the group’s desire to seize natural resources in northeastern Syria and to subdue the civilian population living in areas under its control.

ISIS has perpetrated murder and other inhumane acts, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery and violence, forced displacement, enforced disappearance and torture. These acts have been committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqah, Al-Hasakah and Dayr Az-Zawr governorates. This attack has emerged from April 2013 to the present day and is manifested through the coordinated campaign of spreading terror among the civilian population. The terror inflicted on the civilian population is clearly evidenced by witness and victim accounts. The abuses and crimes committed led to the intended submission of the civilian population. This terror was inflicted through a systematic imposition of restrictions on basic rights and freedoms and through

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the widespread commission of international humanitarian law violations and war crimes, including sentencing and executions without due process, killing, mutilation, rape, sexual violence, forced pregnancy, torture, cruel treatment, the use and recruitment of children, and outrages upon personal dignity (UNITED NATIONS, 2016).

The international community should reach a sustainable solution to the ongoing-armed conflict in Syria to an inclusive process, recognizing that the lack of a political process has allowed extremism to foster; the international community and the Syrian Government cannot further delay it. Besides, they need to adopt stronger remedial and preventative actions in Security Council resolutions, focusing on the suppression of war crimes and combating current climate of impunity benefiting ISIS. Peace, however, will hardly be reached anytime soon and growing number of displaced people and constant violations of Human Rights keep knocking in our door. Proposals of peace will remain weak until a broad perspective of the crisis is considered.

ISIS holds the imminent fulfillment of prophecy as a matter of dogma at least tells us the mettle of our opponent. It is ready to cheer its own near-obliteration, and to remain confident, even when surrounded, that it will receive divine succor if it stays true to the Prophetic model. Ideological tools may convince some potential converts that the group’s message is false, and military tools can limit its horrors. Nevertheless, for an organization as impervious as ISIS, considering persuasion, few measures short of these will matter, and the war may be a long one, even if it does not last until the end of time.

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