the need for trust in communications networks carlos solari bell labs, security solutions may 2007

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The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

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Page 1: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

The Need ForTrust in Communications

Networks

Carlos Solari

Bell Labs, Security Solutions

May 2007

Page 2: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

2 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

TopicsWe Are Not Winning the Security Challenge

Convergence – All Media IP – Will Bring New Challenges

Rethink the Approach: Design - Build Trusted Communications Networks

An Opportunity: Design In Now or Retrofit Later

Page 3: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

3 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

Lots of Data Telling Us…The Current Approach is Not Working:

Faster, Stealthier Exploits

Mths

Dys

Wks

2003 2004 2005

Avg. exploit in 2005 5.8 days.

Sources: CERT/CC, Symantec, NVD, OSVD

DDOS on the Rise

SPAM: 8 in 10 emails

Page 4: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

4 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

The Challenge: Difficult, Multi-Dimensional, and In Flux

Point Prod’s

Point Roles

Security un-manageable and no single situation awareness

Weak Links

Prevalent

Inconsistent security applied to network components – un-trusted pieces make…Lack of

Universal Standard

That addresses security in a comprehensive way – so very difficult to integrate security

Data Control & Integrity

Data exchange requires better security controls

Sophisticated Cyber

Crime

From phishing and spyware to DDOS and Network Penetration Attacks

Reacting to infinite possible sources Ex: polymorphism

Blacklist Defenses IneffectiveIncreasing Network

Complexity

Increasing Network

Complexity

Increased vulnerabilityEx: firewall VOIP sessions

Exploitation

Window Zero-Day

Threat occur faster than we can detect and respond before it impacts business

Data Flooding

SPAM – SPIT – SPASMS tough to separate wanted info

Data Leakage

More personal data is online – uncertain protection

Page 5: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

5 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

Convergence – Many Benefits, Many Risks

•Consume RF b/w

•Battery drain

•Identity theft

•“SPIT”

•Scams

•Deperimiterization

•Data theft

•Scams

•Compromised system

integrity

Intersection of threats…beyond the reach of the law…

•Content theft

•Compromised privacy

•Scams

Page 6: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

6 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

We Have a Window of Opportunity

Design Trusted Communications Networks

Now

Page 7: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

7 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

It Will Take A Multi-Disciplined Approach

Network

&

Data

IntegratedSecurity

Eco-System

Defenses

Design

End-to-End

Security

System

(Standards)

Hardening

Imbed

IntegrityAttestatio

n

Page 8: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

8 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

Design-Build Secure Systems & Services

ISO 2700X and X.805/ISO 18028 Standards-based approach Security as a systematic, rigorous

process Applied to all network elements -

system In the Product Development Lifecycle

System

(Standards)

Hardening

ISO 2700X Provides the “what”

X.805 & ISO 18028-2…provides the “how” details

Page 9: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

9 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

Trust Can Be Required…

“My company can only do business with ISO 2700X certified businesses…”

“Are you certified?”

Page 10: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

10 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

System Hardening – Standards Based

Bell labs Security Framework – Instantiated in ITU/T X.805, ISO 18028

Infrastructure Services Applications

End User

Control / Signaling

Management

Layers

Planes

MODULE 1 MODULE 4 MODULE 7

MODULE 2 MODULE 5 MODULE 8

MODULE 3 MODULE 6 MODULE 9

Access Control

Authentication

Non-Repudiation

Data Confidentiality

Comms Security

Data Integrity Privacy

Availability

Th

e X

.80

5 S

ecu

rity S

tan

dard

Th

e X

.80

5 S

ecu

rity

Sta

nd

ard

Page 11: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

11 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

ISO/IEC 27001 enhanced by ITU-T X.805 / ISO 18028-2

Security Policy

Organizing Information Security

Human Resources Security

Asset Mgmt

Physical &Environment Security

Access Control

Communications & Ops Mgmt

Information Systems Acquisition,Development & Maintenance

Information Security Incident Management

Business Continuity Management

Compliance

ISO/IEC 27001:2005 Controls

Specify acceptable use policy for equipment.Sub-controls: Access control, Authentication, Non-repudiation

Restrict access to privileged information / applications to ensure service continuity.Sub-Controls: Authentication, Access Control, Non-repudiation

Harden network element or system before deployment.Sub-Controls: Access control, Availability

Maintain security of stored information.

Sub-Controls: Access control, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-repudiation

Page 12: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

12 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

Employee Database

Enterprise Data Center

Module 6: Management Plane of Services LayerDesktop and Laptop Support

Help Desk

Module 9: Management Plane of Infrastructure Layer

Network Operations• File System Maint.• System Updates• Patch Mgmt., etc.

Corporate IT

Employee Information is accessed for:• Network Service Management• Network Infrastructure Management

Bell Labs Security Framework Dimensions Provide ISO/IEC 27001 Control A.10.9.2 ISMS Implementation and Operation Details

ISO/IEC 27001 Controls and X.805 Applied to the Real-World

Data Integrity -Use IPSec AH

Communications Security -Use VPNs

Data Confidentiality - Use IPsec ESP

Data Integrity -Protect files w/ checksums

Data Confidentiality -Encrypt files

Access Control - Use file system ACLs

Page 13: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

13 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

Opportunity…Deliver Secure Systems & Services

ISO 2700X and X.805/ISO 18028 Security as a systematic, rigorous

process Applied to all network elements From device to system, to

infrastructure Standards-based

System

(Standards)

Hardening

Imbed

IntegrityAttestatio

n

Integrity Attestation Apply integrity metrics

Measure at point of Creation, Delivery and in Operation

Access policy based on “integrity score”

Perform in “real-time’

Page 14: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

14 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

The Issue of “Integrity Drift”

TimeTime

Co

nfid

en

ceC

on

fide

nce

IT system confidence degrades from boot timeIT system confidence degrades from boot time

100%

Applications are installedApplications are installedPatches are appliedPatches are applied

Change and routine maintenanceChange and routine maintenanceReformatting and rebuilding from scratchReformatting and rebuilding from scratch

The big unknown…when will it fail, what is the cause, what was

lost?

(by permission from SignaCert)

Page 15: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

15 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

What if We Could Measure the Integrity…Report it, and Act on It?

TimeTime

Co

nfid

en

ceC

on

fide

nce

Confidence is constantly maintainedConfidence is constantly maintained

100%

System and Device-level System and Device-level Confidence and Trust Measured Confidence and Trust Measured

and Enforcedand Enforced

Restoring to a known and trusted Restoring to a known and trusted state is easystate is easy

(by permission from SignaCert)

Page 16: The Need For Trust in Communications Networks Carlos Solari Bell Labs, Security Solutions May 2007

16 | Engineering Society | May 2006 All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, #####

Summary We actually have the know-how to improve the state of

security

It is needed more than ever – especially as systems get more complex and we have greater dependency on these systems

By applying the ISO 2700X with X.805/ISO-18028 standards and Integrity Measurements, we can:

Baseline the state of security

Have a consistent way to measure it

Consistent application

Completeness

Repeatable

Scales to size and complexity of present and future networks