MoreAdvancePraiseforTheMythoftheStrongLeader

“The best analysis of the nature of true leadership I have read. Turning hisconsiderableeruditiononRussiaandcommunismto thevaguely-discussedbutseldom qualitatively defined question of political leadership, Professor Browndismantles the myth that power equals strength and that strength guaranteespositive outcomes. Genuine leadership, he cogently argues, redefines nationaldirections and social agendas and transforms entire political systems as themeanstomovenationsforward.History,experience,andwisdomunderwritehiscase.”

—GaryHart,FormerUnitedStatesSenator

“A magnificent achievement, The Myth of the Strong Leader combines boldconceptual analysiswith vivid descriptions of leaders ranging fromStalin andHitler toRoosevelt andChurchill, fromMaoZedong andFidelCastro toLBJandNelsonMandela.ArchieBrownexaminesthetypesofpowerandleadershipamassedbysuchdiverse figuresasLenin,Ataturk,deGaulle,Gorbachev,andMargaretThatcher.Thisisabookwhichwillbereadwithsheerpleasurebythegeneralreaderforitsrivetinginsightsandbystudentsthroughouttheworldasalucidandwittyguidetodistinctivekindsofpoliticalleadership.”

—Wm.RogerLouis,UniversityofTexas,PastPresidentoftheAmericanHistoricalAssociation

“Thisbookbadlyneededtobewritten,andonlyArchieBrown—withhisuniquebreadth of scholarly knowledge combinedwith a finger-tip feel for real-worldpolitics—couldpossiblyhavewrittenit. It turnsout that therearefewerstrongleaders in the world than is often supposed and that many of them, far frombeingdesirable,arepositivelydangerous.Perhapsthebestpoliticalsystemsarethosethatareeffectively‘leader-proofed.’”

—AnthonyKing,ProfessorofGovernmentattheUniversityofEssexandco-authorofTheBlundersofOurGovernments

“Fornearlyahalfcentury,ArchieBrownhasbeenoneofourmostperceptive

observersofworldleadersandtheircontexts,fromMikhailGorbachev’sSovietUnion to Margaret Thatcher’s Britain and beyond. His message is that ourvirtues are in fact our vices. Being decisive, staying the course, and having aclear vision are lauded as the core requirements of good leadership—yet theyhave just as oftenblinded those in authority to the folly of their own choices.EstablishedleadersaswellasaspiringonesshouldheedthelessonsinBrown’stimelybook.”

—CharlesKing,ProfessorofInternationalAffairsandGovernment,GeorgetownUniversity

“This is a real triumph of scholarship and intellect—and brilliantly written.ArchieBrowndemonstrateshowdangerousisthemythofthestrongleaderandhepinpointsthedisserviceitdoestosociety.Thebookisawesomeinthedepthofitsanalysisandinprovidingtrulyindispensableinsights.”

—LiliaShevtsova,Chair,RussianDomesticPoliticsandPoliticalInstitutionsProgramattheCarnegieMoscowCenter

THEMYTHOFTHESTRONG

LEADER

ALSOBYARCHIEBROWN:

TheRiseandFallofCommunism

SevenYearsthatChangedtheWorld

TheDemiseofMarxism-LeninisminRussia

TheGorbachevFactor

Copyright©2014byArchieBrownPublishedbyBasicBooks,AMemberofthePerseusBooksGroupFirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2014byTheBodleyHeadRandomHouse,20VauxhallBridgeRoad,LondonSWIV2SA

All rights reserved.No part of this bookmay be reproduced in anymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermissionexceptinthecaseofbriefquotationsembodiedincriticalarticlesandreviews.Forinformation,addressBasicBooks,250West57thStreet,15thFloor,NewYork,NY10107.

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LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2014931301ISBN978-0-465-08097-7(e-book)

10987654321

ContentsPreface

Introduction

1 PuttingLeadersinContext

2 DemocraticLeadership:Myths,Powers,Styles

3 RedefiningLeadership

4 TransformationalPoliticalLeadership

5 RevolutionsandRevolutionaryLeadership

6 TotalitarianandAuthoritarianLeadership

7 ForeignPolicyIllusionsof‘StrongLeaders’

8 WhatKindofLeadershipisDesirable?

Acknowledgements

NotesandSources

Index

Preface

This is an argumentative book and one of the main contentions is alreadysuggestedby the title.Thecentralmisconception,whichIsetout toexpose, isthenotionthatstrongleadersintheconventionalsenseofleaderswhogettheirway,dominatetheircolleagues,andconcentratedecision-makingintheirhands,arethemostsuccessfulandadmirable.Whilesomeleaderswhocomeintothatcategory emerge more positively than negatively, in general huge poweramassedbyanindividualleaderpavesthewayforimportanterrorsatbestanddisasterandmassivebloodshedatworst.Althoughthebookalsoexaminesmanyotheraspectsofpoliticalleadership,whatIcallthemythofthestrongleaderisacentral thread which unifies the discussion of democratic, revolutionary,authoritarianandtotalitarianleaders.Thoseinthefirstofthesecategoriescandofar lessdamage,preciselybecause thereareconstraintsupon theirpower fromoutsidegovernment.Itis,nevertheless,anillusion–andoneasdangerousasitiswidespread–thatincontemporarydemocraciesthemorealeaderdominateshisorherpoliticalpartyandCabinet,thegreatertheleader.Amorecollegialstyleofleadershipistoooftencharacterizedasaweakness,theadvantagesofamorecollectivepoliticalleadershiptoocommonlyoverlooked.

Theevidenceisdrawnfrommanydifferentdemocracies–withGreatBritainand theUnited States bulking large – and from a variety of authoritarian andtotalitariansystems.WhenIturntosuchdictatorialregimes,Communistleaders,aswellasHitlerandMussolini,getspecialattention.Thescopeismuchbroader,though, than the countries and leaders already mentioned. The chapter onrevolutionsinauthoritariansystemsrangesfromMexicototheMiddleEast.Inits historical reach, the book aims to cover thewhole of the twentieth century

and what has happened thus far in the twenty-first. Notwithstanding thenecessaryelementofselectivity,theconclusionsIcometoareintendedtobeofsomegeneralvalidity.Thebook’sargumentsareaddressed toanycitizenwhothinks about howwe are governed.Myhope is that theymayhave an impactalsoonpoliticiansthemselvesandonthosewhowriteaboutpolitics.

Duringthewriting,andespeciallyinthelonger-termgestation,ofthisbook,I have drawn not only on political memoirs, archives, newspapers and othermass media, and on the work of historians, political scientists and socialpsychologists, but also on many of my own meetings with politicians fromdifferentcountries.Thesehaveincludedadhocconsultationbyprimeministersand secretaries of state for foreign affairs from different political parties inBritain,participation in the1980s inpolicyseminars inBritainand theUnitedStates, taking part in twenty-first-century conferences with former heads ofgovernment,andmeetingswithsenior figureswithin rulingCommunistparties(usually,butinthecaseofsomeCommunistreformersnotonly,aftertheyhadleftorhadbeenremovedfromoffice).

Thebook is aproductofmore than fiftyyearsof studyofpolitics, andofresearchandlecturingonthesubjectindifferentpartsofNorthAmerica,EuropeandAsia.GreatBritainapart, thecountry inwhichIhavespentmost timehasbeentheUnitedStateswhereIhavelearnedmuchduringteachingandresearchspells as a Visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale, the University ofConnecticut,ColumbiaUniversity (NewYork) and theUniversity ofTexas atAustin, as well as during a Visiting Fellowship at the Kellogg Institute forInternational Studies of theUniversity ofNotreDame (Indiana). I have spentalmostasmuchtimeinRussia,inboththeSovietandthepost-Sovietperiods.Ifirst arrived inMoscow on aBritishCouncil exchange scholarship in January1966.Thatthree-monthvisitwasfollowedbyanacademicyearinMoscowStateUniversity in 1967–68, also under the auspices of the British Council. I havemadesomefortyvisitstoRussiasincethen.

Political leadership is an important subject andone I havebeen concernedwithforaverylongtime.Oneofmyearliestarticlesforanacademicjournal–in the 1960s – was on the powers, and especially the constraints upon thosepowers,oftheBritishprimeminister.1Itdrewnotonlyonlibraryresearchbutalsoonmyinterviewswithseniorpoliticians–inthatcaseprominentmembersand former members of the Cabinet from both of the major British politicalparties.As long ago as 1980 I taught a graduate course in theDepartment ofPoliticalScienceatYalewhichcomparedchiefexecutives,especiallyAmerican

and French presidents, British prime ministers and leaders of the CommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion.

My interest in studying the powers – and their limitations – of democraticleaders was already aroused when I was a student at the London School ofEconomics. Indeed,when Iwas being interviewed for an undergraduate placethere, the chair of the admissions committee,ReginaldBassett (a specialist onBritish politics), recommended the reading of politicians’memoirs. I followedthat advice, and in the years since then have acquired a large collection ofpolitical autobiography (as well as biography) from different countries. Theirpurchaseduringmystudentdayswasgreatlyfacilitatedbythefactthatsomanymemoirs by politicians were remaindered and could be bought for next tonothing.Theselective recollectionsand reminiscencesofpoliticianshave theirlimitations, but they can also be revealing, and not always in ways that theirauthorsintended.

Anengagementwith leadershippoliticswas furtherprovokedwhen, inmyfirst teachingpost atGlasgowUniversity, a departmental colleagueduring the1964–65 academic yearwas JohnMackintosh (later aMember of Parliament)who had recently published his influential book, The British Cabinet. It wasbecause I disagreed with Mackintosh’s – and Richard Crossman’s – centralthesis that the British political system could best be described as ‘primeministerialgovernment’ thatIcametowrite thelongresponsetowhichIhavealreadyreferred.Thatolddebate–onwhethertheUKhasprimeministerialorCabinet government – is not, however, what concerns me in this book. I aminterestedinwhetherdemocraticleadersmoregenerallyareaspowerfulastheyareoftenassumed tobeandwhether, forexample, it is leaderswhodetermineelectoraloutcomes.Iamstillmoreconcernedwithquestioningthetendencytoassumethatoneperson,theheadofthegovernment,isentitledtohavethelastandmostdecisivewordonallimportantissues.Someleaders,morethanothers,havebeeneagertofosterthisviewandtoactasifitweretrue.Iarguethatthisisneither sensible, in terms of effective government and judicious politicaloutcomes,nornormativelydesirableinademocracy.

There are numerous books on political leadership, and many more onleadershipinthebusinessworld.Thefocusinthisworkisverymuchonpartyand government leaders, although some of the argument has a bearing onleadershipmorebroadly.Leadershipstylesmatter inallorganizations.Even inone as hierarchical as theCatholicChurch, the defects of government by onemanhavebeenvoiced–andfromtheverytopofthathierarchy.Inaninteresting

self-criticism, and statement of intent, Pope Francis observed in a recentinterview that when he was appointed the superior of a Jesuit province inArgentina ‘at the “crazy” young age of 36’, his leadership style had been tooautocratic. It was, he said, ‘my authoritarian way of making decisions thatcreatedproblems’,givingthemisleadingimpressionthathewasa‘right-winger’oreven‘ultraconservative’.Now,saidthePope,heprefersamoreconsultativestyle.Hehad,accordingly,appointedanadvisorygroupofeightcardinals,astepurgedonhimbythecardinalsattheconclavewhichelectedhimtothepapacy.They had been demanding reform of the Vatican bureaucracy. Therefore, heintendshismeetingswiththeeighttobe‘areal,notceremonial,consultation’.2

Anunusualfeatureofthepagesthatfollowisthattheypayalmostasmuchattentiontototalitarianandauthoritarianregimesastodemocracies.Sincethereare nearly as many people in the world today living under some form ofdictatorship as under democratic rule, that is appropriate.Real autocratic rule,moreover,putsindifferentandusefulperspectivethetalkfromtimetotimeof‘an imperial presidency’ in the United States or of ‘prime ministerialgovernment’inBritain,CanadaorAustralia.Aleaderwhocomestopowerinanauthoritarian system has not only the possibility of wreaking havoc andimposing suffering within his own country on a scale that could not beperpetratedbyeven theworstdemocratic leaderbutalso,with rare individualsandinconducivecircumstances,agreaterchanceofmakingqualitativechangefor the better. Some leaders, it goes without saying, are much moreconsequentialthanothers.And,asIshallargue,thosewhodeservethegreatestrespectarefrequentlynotthemostdomineering.Goodleadershiprequiresmanyattributes,whoserelativeimportancevariesaccordingtotime,placeandcontext.It should never be confused with the overmighty power of overweeningindividuals.

Introduction

In democracies there is quite broad agreement that a ‘strong leader’ is a goodthing.1Althoughthetermisopentomorethanoneinterpretation,itisgenerallytaken to mean a leader who concentrates a lot of power in his or her hands,dominatesbothawideswathofpublicpolicyandthepoliticalpartytowhichheor shebelongs, and takes thebigdecisions.The idea that themorepoweroneindividual leaderwields, themorewe shouldbe impressedby that leader is, Ishallargue,anillusion,whetherwearetalkingaboutdemocracies,authoritarianregimes or the hybrid regimeswhich fall in between. Effective government isnecessary everywhere.Butprocessmatters.Whencorners are cutbecauseoneleader issureheknowsbest,problemsfollow,andtheycanbeonadisastrousscale. Due process means involving all the senior politicians with relevantdepartmental responsibilities in the decision-making process. It also naturallymeans that the government’s actions should be in conformitywith the rule oflaw, and the government democratically accountable to parliament and thepeople.

No one ever says, ‘What we need is a weak leader.’ Strength is to beadmired, weakness to be deplored or pitied. Yet the facile weak–strongdichotomy isavery limitedandunhelpfulwayofassessing individual leaders.Therearemanyqualitiesdesirableinapoliticalleaderthatshouldmattermorethanthecriterionofstrength,onebettersuitedtojudgingweightliftersorlong-distance runners. These include integrity, intelligence, articulateness,collegiality,shrewdjudgement,aquestioningmind,willingnesstoseekdisparateviews,ability toabsorbinformation,flexibility,goodmemory,courage,vision,empathy and boundless energy. Although incomplete, that is already a

formidable list.We should hardly expectmost leaders to embodyall of thosequalities.Theyarenotsupermenorsuperwomen–andtheyshouldneverforgetit, even though it would be a requirement too far to add modesty to thisinventoryofleadershipdesiderata.

Yet,forallitslimitations,thestrong–weakthemehasbecomeaconstantindiscussions of leadership in democracies, not least in Great Britain.When hewas Leader of the Opposition, Tony Blair liked to portray the British primeminister, John Major, who had inherited a divided parliamentary party, as‘weak’.ContrastinghimselfwithMajor,Blairsaid:‘Ileadmyparty.Hefollowshis.’2 David Cameron, as prime minister, adopted similar tactics with EdMiliband from theoutsetofhisLabour leadership,hoping tomake the ‘weak’epithet stick.3 Miliband was able to retaliate when a large rebellion ofConservativebackbenchersinJuly2012blockedanattempttomaketheHouseofLords amainly elected, rather than appointed, legislative chamber.He saidthatCameronhad‘lostcontrolofhisparty’andthatthebackbenchers’defianceof the party whips showed that the prime minister was ‘weak’.4 Since theneffortsoftheoneleadertodepicttheotherasweakandhimselfasstronghaveresurfacedwithboringregularity.Suchattemptstoportraythepersonwhoheadsarivalpartyasa‘weakleader’havebecomecommoninanumberofcountries.InCanada,forexample,shortlyafterStéphaneDionwaselectedLeaderof theLiberal Party in 2006, the Conservatives launched a sustained campaign todefinehimasweak.5(AmongCommonwealthcountrieswhichhaveadoptedthe‘Westminstermodel’,includingGreatBritainwhereitoriginated,itisCanadianprimeministers who appear to be the most dominant over their parties, eventhoughtheytendtobe‘pragmatic,non-charismaticandevendull’.6)Itisevidentthat politicians believe that if they can pin the ‘weak’ label on their principalopponent, this will work to their advantage with voters. How leaders areperceivedis,indeed,ofsomeelectoralsignificance,butitisagreatexaggerationtosuggestthatthisisthebasisonwhich‘electionsarenowwonandlost’.7

Farmoredesirablethanthemodelofpoliticalleaderasmasteriscollectiveleadership.Placinggreatpowerinthehandsofonepersonisinappropriateinademocracy, and itwould be an unusually lacklustre government inwhich justoneindividualwasbestqualified,asdistinctfromsometimesfeelingentitled,tohavethelastwordoneverything.Inthecaseofauthoritarianregimes,oligarchicleadership is usually a lesser evilwhen comparedwith the dictatorship of one

man.Moreover,strongindividualleadershipmeansdifferentthingsindifferentcontexts.It isnotonlylessappropriatethaniswidelybelieved, it isoftenverydifferent fromwhat itclaims tobe.Leadersarealso followers,andwhile theymaytakeprideinstandinguptoonegroup,even(insomecasesespecially)theirownpoliticalparty,theymaybekowtowingtoanother.Inotherwords,therecanbeawidegulfbetween the imageof the strong leaderwhichmanypoliticianshavelikedtoprojectandthemorecomplexreality.Ifoneelementofthemythofthe strong leader is theuseof strength as the criterionofdesirable leadership,another is that – in a democracy – the leader’s advertised strength is often anartificeorillusion.

In countries making a transition from highly authoritarian rule either todemocracyortoavarietyofintermediatehybridregimes,theideaofthestrongleadercantakeastillmoredangerousformthaninafullyfledgeddemocracy.Asurvey conducted in thirteen countries of post-Communist Europe in 2007investigatedreactionstothestatementthat‘itwouldbeworthwhiletosupportaleaderwhocouldsolvetheproblemsfacing[thatparticularcountry]todayevenif he overthrew democracy’.8 In eight of the countries more than a third ofrespondents supported these ‘strong leader’ and anti-democratic sentiments.Agreementwith the statementwas above 40 per cent inHungary,Russia andLatviaandreachedover50percentinBulgariaandUkraine.Acceptanceofthepropositionwaslowest–inotherwords,supportfordemocracywashighestandscepticism about the strong leader as saviourmostwidespread – in theCzechRepublic(16percent)andSlovakia(15.3percent).Itisprobablynotaccidentalthat,asCzechoslovakia, thesecountrieshadrathermoreexperienceofgenuinedemocracy in the twentieth century, especially between the twoWorldWars,thananyoftheothercountriessurveyed.However,oneofthefewotherstatesinwhich less than a quarter of the population preferred the strong leader todemocracywasBelarus(24.6percent),which,aspartoftheSovietUnion,hadscarcelyanyexperienceofdemocracy.Moreover,initspost-Sovietexistence,ithasbeenthemostauthoritariancountryinEurope.Inthisparticularcase,itmaybe the actual, continuing and unpleasant experience of autocracy – that ofAlexanderLukashenkawhohasruledthecountryincreasinglydictatoriallysince1994 –which has inoculated citizens against the idea that the answer to theirproblemswasastrongleader.*

There are occasions – inwar and crises –when inspirational leadership isneeded. It is sometimespined for even in periodswhen amoreprosaic leaderwouldsuffice.Moreoftenthannot,inspirationalleadershipisdescribed,loosely,

as charismatic.Originally, charismameant a god-given talent.As the conceptwasdevelopedbyMaxWeber,thecharismaticwasa‘naturalleader’,onewithspecial,evensupernatural,giftswhoseleadershipdidnotdependinanywayoninstitutionsoronholdingoffice.Thecharismatic leaderwas seenasaprophetand hero and he was followed as an act of faith. For Weber the concept ofcharisma was ‘value-neutral’.9 Charismatic leaders may, indeed, do eitherappalling harm or great good. If we take two examples from later in thetwentiethcenturythanWeber’slifetime(thegreatGermansocialtheoristdiedin1920),theycanbeanAdolfHitleroraMartinLutherKing.Whileawarinessofcharismaticleadershipisjustified,forfollowersshouldnotsuspendtheircriticalfaculties, how such leaders are ultimately assessed depends, in large part, onhowwejudgethecausesthattheirinspirationalspeechesandexampleserve.

Moreover, the idea that charisma is a special quality a leader is bornwithneeds to be severely qualified. To a large extent, it is followers who bestowcharismaon leaders,when thatpersonseems toembody thequalities theyarelookingfor.10DuringagooddealofhispoliticalcareerWinstonChurchillwasasmuchderidedashewasadmired.Inthe1930shewaswidelyconsideredtobeafailurewhohadnot liveduptoearlypromise.His inspirationalpresenceandmemorablespeechesduringtheSecondWorldWarwouldappeartoqualifyhimforthestatusofcharismaticleader.Moreimportantthanwhetherornothefittedthe hazy criteria of ‘charismatic’, though, was the fact that he was the rightleaderintherightplaceattherighttime.Yethissuccessbetween1940and1945washeavilydependentonthespecificpoliticalcontext–agrimandglobalwarin which Churchill embodied the spirit of resistance to which a majority ofBritish citizens aspired. No sooner was the war over than the party whichChurchill ledwascomprehensivelydefeated in the1945generalelection.Thatillustrates the important point that democratic parliamentary elections are notprimarily contests between leaders. We do not have survey data on thecomparativepopularityofChurchillandtheLabourPartyleaderClementAttleeatthattime,butitislikelythatintheimmediateaftermathofthewarChurchillwould have been ahead in such a personality contest. Nevertheless, his‘charisma’ was insecure. From being supremely ‘one of us’ during the war,Churchillwas becoming again, in the eyes of at least half the nation, ‘one ofthem’.

Charismatic leadershipcanbewonand lost,and isnotgenerallya lifetimeendowment. It is often dangerous, and frequently overrated. More useful

categoriesof leadership,Isuggest,are theredefiningandthe transformational.Eachofthemisthesubjectofachapterinthisbook.Redefiningleadership,asIusetheterm,meansstretchingthelimitsofthepossibleinpoliticsandradicallyaltering the political agenda. It can be exercised by the leadership of politicalparties,collectivelyaswellasindividually.Partieswhichaspiretowinelectionsgenerallyfeelaneedtoseekthe‘centreground’.However,redefiningleaders,whetherasindividualsorcollectively,seektomovethecentreintheirdirection.They aim to alter people’s thinking on what is feasible and desirable. Theyredefinewhatis thepoliticalcentre,ratherthansimplyaccepttheconventionalview of the middle ground at any particular time, then placing themselvessquarelywithin it. FranklinD.Roosevelt,with theNewDeal, andLyndonB.Johnsonwith his ‘Great Society’ reforms and civil rights legislation, providedtwentieth-centuryAmerican examples of redefining administrations. InBritainMargaretThatcherranksasaredefiningleader.Shecitedhermentor,SirKeithJoseph, complaining that ‘post-war politics had become a “socialist ratchet”’,with successiveLabour governments ‘moving the country a little further left’.Evenif‘theToriesstoodpat’,their‘accommodationistpolitics’meantthattheyhadconnivedinmovingthecentreofpoliticalgravityleftwards.11TheLabourgovernmentsheadedbyTonyBlairfrom1997to2007andGordonBrownfrom2007 to 2010 occupied the new centre (as redefined by Thatcher) in acomparable way to that in which the Conservative governments of HaroldMacmillan and Edward Heath (so Thatcher complained) had occupied theprevious middle ground which had been shifted leftwards by the redefiningLabourgovernmentof1945–1951,headedbyClementAttlee.

Transformational leaders are the rare people who make a still biggerdifference.ByatransformationalleaderImeanonewhoplaysadecisiveroleinchangingtheeconomicsystemorpoliticalsystemofhisorhercountryorwho,evenmoreremarkably,playsacrucialpartinchangingtheinternationalsystem.Thatissettingthebarhigh,butitenablesustomakeadistinctionbetweenevenseriouslyreformingandredefiningleaders,ontheonehand,andthosewhoplayan indispensable role in effecting systemic transformation, on the other. Thepoliticalcontextisallimportant.Atransformationalleaderisextremelyrareinademocracy for the simple reason that democracies do not normally undergosudden transformations. Change tends to be sufficiently gradual that no oneleader can be seen to have played a definitive part in systemic change.Fundamentalchange–forbetterorworse–tendstooccurmorerapidlywithinauthoritarianregimes.Itcanbeseenmostclearlyinthecourseoftransitiontoor

fromauthoritarian rule.When, however,we speakof transformational leaders,thefocusisonsystemicchangethatisforthebetter.

Thereis,then,anormativeelementintheuseoftheterm.Transformationalleadersaredistinguishedinthisbookfromrevolutionaryleaders(thesubjectofChapter5),eventhoughthey,too,changethesystemafterattainingpower.Theydoso,however,relyingonduress.VladimirLenininRussia,JosefBrozTitoinYugoslavia,MaoZedong inChina,FidelCastro inCuba,andHoChiMinh inVietnamplayeddecisiverolesintheachievementoffundamentalchangeofboththeeconomicandthepoliticalsystemsoftheircountries.So,inthatsense,theywere also transformational leaders, but revolution, as commonly understood,involves the violent overthrow of state structures and more often than notinauguratesnewformsofauthoritarianrule.Revolutionaryleadersare,therefore,to be distinguished from those who play a decisive role in transforming thepolitical or economic system of their country without resort either to violentseizureofpowerortothephysicalcoercionoftheiropponents.

The notion that there is, or should be, one leader who stands head andshoulders above his or her colleagues and dominates the political process iscommonenough indemocracies.Asadescriptionof the realityof the leader’spower, it is oftenmisleading, and as an aspiration it ismisguided.AsBritishprime minister from 1997 to 2007, Tony Blair aspired to dominance of thepolicy process and undoubtedly set the tone of the government.However, hislasting impact is easy to exaggerate. A number of themajor policy decisionstaken by the government had little to do with the prime minister. Its mostsignificant legacy was constitutional reform, much of which resulted frompolicies Blair inherited and for which he lacked enthusiasm. This packageincluded Scottish and Welsh devolution, power-sharing in Northern Ireland,HouseofLordsreform,HumanRightslegislationandaFreedomofInformationAct.12Inhismemoirs,Blairdescribesthelast-namedlegislationas‘imbecility’,adding:‘WherewasSirHumphreywhenIneededhim?’13Oftheconstitutionalchange,onlythenegotiatedsharingofpowerinNorthernIrelandwasanareainwhich Blair played a leading role – although others, too, were decisivelyimportant there – and theNorthern Ireland settlementmay be regarded as hismostsignalachievement.

ThatBlair’sdominanceasprimeministerwaslessthanhewishedwasborneoutbythenatureofhisuneasy–andoftenfarfrompeaceful–co-existencewithanauthoritativeandassertiveChancelloroftheExchequer.Itwasthatminister,

GordonBrown,whowasthedominantfigureinthecruciallyimportantareaofeconomicpolicy.Blairand thoseclosest tohimwereeager topromoteBritishmembership of the common European currency, but Brown prevented this byinsistinguponfive testswhichhad tobesuccessfullymetbeforeBritaincouldsignuptotheeuro.Theyweredeliberatelydesignedeithernot tobemetor,atleast,togivethechancellorthesolerighttodeterminewhethertheyhadbeen.14AlistairDarling,aCabinetministerthroughouttheyearsofLabourgovernmentbetween 1997 and 2010 (and Chancellor of the Exchequer in the governmentheadedbyGordonBrownduringthelastthreeofthoseyears)hasconfirmedthateconomicpolicyduringtheBlairpremiershipwaslargelyinthehandsofBrown,and that the one economic issue on which Blair ‘expended a great deal ofenergy, including exceptional Cabinet consultation’ was that of the singlecurrency,‘tryingtogetustojoin’.15Inthisendeavour,ofcourse,Blairfailed.Darling is not alone in expressing relief that the Chancellor prevailed in thatcontestwiththePrimeMinister.

Relations between Blair and Brown deteriorated to the point at which theprimeministerandhisclosestadvisershadgreatdifficulty in findingoutwhatthe chancellor was going to put in the annual Budget. Blair’s principal aide,JonathanPowell,notes thatBrown‘sawoff’ two10DowningStreeteconomicadvisers ‘by starving themof information and forbiddingTreasury officials tomeet them’.16InkeyareasofeconomicpolicyBlair,evereager toproject theimage of the strong leader, actually had less influence than had many of hispredecessors in their time. Foreign policywas anothermatter.HereBlairwasmuch more dominant, especially on relations with the United States and onMiddleEasternpolicy.Timeandagaininhismemoirs,BlairemphasizesthatthedecisiontotakeBritainintowarinIraqin2003washis,thatasprimeministerhewas entitled to take it, and that, even if people disagreedwith themilitaryintervention, they ‘sympathised with the fact that the leader had to take thedecision’(italicsadded).17

Thepush forone leader asultimatedecision-maker is stillmoreprevalent,and more frequently pernicious in its consequences, within authoritarian andtotalitarian regimes. They, of course, place far more power in the hands ofleaders than ispoliticallypossible inademocracy.Theremaybesomechecksfrom within the executive on what the authoritarian leader can do, butlegislatures provide, at best, a façade, judges are subservient to the politicalleadership,andthemassmediaarecontrolledandcensoredwithvaryingdegrees

of severity. It goes without saying that there is no accountability of the topleadershipofanauthoritarianor totalitarianregimeto thecitizenryasawhole.Eveninthesecases,though,itmakesadifference(aswillbearguedinChapter6) whether authoritarian power is wielded individually or collectively. In atotalitarian system,oneman (andall suchsystemshavebeenmale-dominated)holds preponderant, and frequently overwhelming, power. Authoritarianregimes, in contrast, can be either autocracies or oligarchies. Some, in otherwords, are ruled by a single dictator and others have a more collectiveleadership. The more collective it is, the more points of access there are forprivileged groups to lobbymembers of the top leadership team. The freer thedeliberationandargumentinacollectiveleadership,thelesslikelyaretheworstextremesofpolicy.Eveninanauthoritarianregimewithacollectiveleadership,such as the SovietUnion in the second half of the 1980s, the personality andvaluesofthetopleadercanmakeavastdifference,asMikhailGorbachevdidinthe Soviet case. The potential impact of the leader is greater than that of hiscounterpart in a democracy, in light of themore numerous constraints on theabilityofademocraticleadertoimposehisorherwill.

INDIVIDUALANDCOLLECTIVELEADERSHIP

‘Strong’ leadership is, then, generally taken to signify an individualconcentratingpowerinhisorherownhandsandwieldingitdecisively.Yetthemorepower and authority is accumulated in just one leader’s hands, themorethat leader comes to believe in his or her unrivalled judgement andindispensability.Themoredecisionsaretakenbyoneindividualleader,thelesstimethatpersonhasforthinkingaboutthepolicyandweighinguptheevidencein each case. Since there are only twenty-four hours in the day of even thestrongest leader, that person’s aides find themselves (often to their greatsatisfaction) takingdecisions in thenameof the leader.That is justonereasonwhy theallureof ‘strong leadership’beingexercisedbya singlepersonat thetopofthepoliticalhierarchyshouldberesisted.

In democracies collective leadership is exercised by political parties.Although parties often get a bad name, and their membership has greatlydeclinedinmostcountriesoverthepasthalf-century,theyremainindispensableto the working of democracy, offering some policy coherence, significant

political choice and a measure of accountability.18 If, as is widely believed,electoratesvoteprimarilyforaparticularleaderratherthanforapoliticalpartyorpolicies,thentheremaybenothingsoverywrongwiththetopleader’saidesexercising greater influence than senior members of the governing party.However,ashasalreadybeentoucheduponandwillbedemonstratedinChapter2,itisatbestahugeoversimplificationandusuallymisleadingtoseevotesinademocraticgeneralelectionasbeingmainlyfororagainstanindividualleader.

When a leader of a democratic party, knowing full well that it will bepoliticallyembarrassingtoremovehimorher,says,ineffect,‘eitherbackmeorsackme’,thatleaderisnormallyassertingaclaimtosuperiorjudgement.19Yet,theideathatoneandthesamepersonshouldbebestequippedtoadjudicateinallareasofpolicy isanoddbelief tohold inademocracy.The formerBritishprime minister Tony Blair has written that ‘a strong leader needs loyalsupporters’ and added: ‘If you think the leadership iswrongor fundamentallymisguided, then change leaders, but don’t have a leader and not support theirleadership.’20Blair’schiefofstaffJonathanPowellhasdevotedanentirebooktoelaboratingthewaysinwhichapoliticalleadercanandshouldmaximizehispowerinrelationtohiscolleaguesandhispoliticalparty.21Themoretheleaderissetapartfromotherelectedpoliticians,thegreatertheindependentinfluenceofhisorhernon-electedadvisers–suchasPowell.Indeed,thelatter’spersonalrole in themakingofministerialappointmentsemerges fromhismemoir-cum-handbookasremarkablyextensive,althoughheiscommittedtotheideaofthe‘strongleader’andatpainstoportrayBlairinthatlight.ViewingMachiavelli’smaximsforaprinceoperatingwithinanauthoritarianpoliticalsystemasnolessapplicable, with suitable updating, to a democracy, Powell writes: ‘Each timeweak prime ministers succeed strong ones they invariably announce they arereintroducingCabinetgovernment,but all they reallymean is that theydonothavethepowertoleadtheirgovernmenteffectivelybythemselves.’22

Few people todaywould admit to agreeingwith ThomasCarlyle that ‘thehistoryofwhatmanhasaccomplishedinthisworld’is‘atbottomtheHistoryoftheGreatMenwhohaveworkedhere’.23AndthatisnotonlybecauseCarlyleforgotaboutthegreatwomen.Yet,theeagernessofpoliticiansandjournaliststofocustheirhopesandexpectationsonjustonepersonwithinagovernmenthasechoes of Carlyle’s deeply flawed conception of history. The extent towhichboththe‘politicalclass’andbroaderpublicopinioninmanycountriesacceptthe

idea of the elevation of one leader far above others within a democraticgovernmentispuzzling.Theexpectationstheygeneratetherebymeanthatheadsof government may acquire still greater political authority than that alreadygrantedbythepowersoftheofficetheyhold.Changingperceptionsofwhatisacceptablebehaviourbyapresidentorprimeministercanredefinethepowersoftheofficeintheabsenceofanyovertconstitutionalchange.

This has occurred even in the United States where the Constitution isveneratedtoauniquedegree.Article1ofthatConstitutiongivestheAmericanCongress thepower todeclarewar.Thepresident,ascommander-in-chief,canrespondwithforceifandwhentheUnitedStatesisinvaded,butotherwise,iftheConstitutionisstrictlyadheredto,hehasthepowertoconductwaronlyafterithasbeenauthorizedbyCongress.24LouisFisher,whoworkedforCongressforfourdecadesasaseniorspecialistontheseparationofpowers,hasbeenthemostnotableandconsistentcriticofthedriftofwar-wagingpowersfromCongresstothepresidency.*He seesHarryTruman,Lyndon Johnson,RonaldReaganandGeorge W. Bush as presidents who exceeded their constitutional powers bywaging war before they had congressional approval. The VietnamWar, from1964 to 1975, and the twenty-first-century wars in Afghanistan and Iraq areamongthecasesinpoint.Congress,Fishercontends,hasbeenfartoosupineincedinganextra-constitutionalpowertothepresident,infailingtoassertitsownprerogatives,andincriticalscrutinyofoperationsinvolvingtheUSmilitary.Heargues that both Republicans and Democrats ‘need to rethink the merits ofpresidentialwars’andthatlegislators‘mustbeprepared,andwilling,tousetheamplepowersattheirdisposal’.25

However,foreignpolicy,includingmajorissuesofwarandpeace,isanareainwhichheadsofgovernmentgenerally–notonlyintheUnitedStates–haveplayed an enhanced role from the middle decades of the twentieth centuryonwards. One development which greatly contributed to this, and had a bigimpactonpoliticalleadership,hasbeentheunprecedentedincreaseinthespeedofcommunications.Ofhuge importancewas theestablishmentof internationaltelephonelinks.Thefirsttransatlantictelephoneconversationdidnottakeplaceuntil1915anditwasthelate1920sbeforearegularintercontinentalservicewasestablished.Air transport has impinged evenmore strongly on the conduct offoreign policy. When British prime minister Neville Chamberlain flew toMunich forhis ill-fatedmeetingwithAdolfHitler in1938, such travel for thespecific purpose of one head of governmentmeeting anotherwas still a fairly

unusual undertaking.Chamberlain’s predecessor, StanleyBaldwin, never onceboardedaplane.Baldwinwas,though,thelastUKprimeministertoeschewairtransport.During theSecondWorldWar therewere importantmeetingsof theleadersof theAlliedoppositiontoHitler inCasablanca,TehranandYalta,andjustaftervictoryoverNaziGermanyhadbeensecured,atPotsdam.Inthepost-warera‘summit talks’betweenpotentialadversariesandface-to-facemeetingswithforeignallieshavebecomecommonplace.Onceitwastechnicallyeasierforheads of government tomeetmore often in person, an increase in diplomacyconductedatthehighestpoliticallevelmeantthatnotonlyparliamentsbutalsoambassadors and even foreign ministers found their own international policyrolessomewhatdowngraded.

Technological developments that made possible instant communicationbetween top leaders have, then, profoundly affected the way business isconducted between governments internationally.The internet has added a vastnew dimension to the stream of instant information being thrust at nationalpoliticians,andespeciallytheirleaders.Cumulatively,thesedevelopmentshavetended to reduce the role of legislatures in war-related policy and have alsomeant that even a head of government who might wish to leave diplomacyalmost entirely to the foreignministry is not able to do so. Nevertheless, theincrease in the speed of communication is an inadequate reason for focusingdiplomacyandespeciallydecisionsinvolvingwarorpeaceinthepersonoftheheadofgovernment,whetherthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesorthepremierina European country. It takes time to assemble a military force and there is astrong element of special pleading on the part of chief executives when theargumentismadethatthepeculiardangersofthecontemporaryworld,togetherwith theneedforspeedyaction,meanthat theyareuniquelyentitled todecideon military action. In the American context, Fisher has argued, too muchemphasishasbeenplacedonspeedandtoomuchtrustinthejudgementofthepresident. If,hehaswritten,‘thecurrentrisk tonationalsecurity isgreat,so istheriskofpresidentialmiscalculationandaggrandizement–allthemorereasonfor insisting that military decisions be thoroughly examined and approved byCongress. Contemporary presidential judgements need more, not less,scrutiny’.26

Mostunusually,PresidentBarackObamasought congressional approval inSeptember 2013 for an attack on selected Syrian targets following the Assadregime’suseofchemicalweaponsinitscivilwar.Thishadlittle,however,todowith interpretations of the American constitution andmore with a concern to

seek domestic legitimacy and shared responsibility for a military interventionabout which there was widespread public scepticism, following theembroilmentsinIraqandAfghanistan.Theprecedentofseekingthelegislature’sapproval had already been set byBritishPrimeMinisterDavidCameron.TheHouse of Commons, in an almost unheard-of rebuff of the government on amajorforeignpolicyissue,refusedtobackmilitaryaction,thusrulingoutBritishparticipation in any military strike against Syrian targets. The referral of thedecision toCongress stimulatedwiderdebateon the issue in theUnitedStatesand it became far from clear that theWhiteHousewould prevail.Apart frommembersofbothhouses,andfrombothparties(butespeciallytheDemocrats),who feared thatUSmilitary strikes onSyriamightmake a bad situation evenworse,therewereRepublicanseagertoinflictadefeatonObama,whatevertheissue.

SecretaryofStateJohnKerry,speakingatapressconferenceinLondonon9September, said that the only way President Bashar al-Assad could avoidmilitarystrikes,wastoturnoverhisentirestockofchemicalweaponswithinthenextweek (‘Buthe isn’tgoing todo it.And it can’tbedoneobviously’).Theremarks were, however, seized upon by Kerry’s Russian counterpart, ForeignMinister Sergey Lavrov, who promptly announced an initiative to persuadeAssad to give up all his chemical weapons. Russia was the country with thegreatest influence over Syria and President Vladimir Putin had been in theforefront of opponents of the proposed American military action. Obamaresponded willingly, suspending the proposed missile strike and, accordingly,thecongressionalvote.InauguratingaprocessofdisarmingSyriaofitschemicalweapons under international supervision, following agreements hammered outbetweenKerryandLavrov,had twobeneficialeffects for theUSpresident (inadditiontobeingsomethingofadiplomaticcoupforRussia).ItmeantavoidingapotentiallydamagingrejectionbyCongressofabigpresidentialforeignpolicydecision and, more importantly, raised the possibility of attaining the limitedgoal of removing Syria’s chemical weaponswithout the wholly unpredictableconsequencesofunilateralmilitary intervention.Thisoutcomewas in itself anunintended result of the referral of the issue to Congress, but that decisionprovidedmoretimeforreflectionand,ultimately,negotiation.Itdidnotendthecivilwarinwhichtheoverwhelmingmajorityofpeoplewhoperishedhadbeenkilled by non-chemical weapons. By leading, however, to US–Russiancooperation on the issue, it brought the prospect of a negotiated end to theconflict at least somewhat closer thanmilitary strikes,with inevitable civilian

casualties,waslikelytohavedone.27

TheTrumanExample

HarryTruman is among thepresidents criticized for sending troops intobattlewithout congressional approval, andofbeing, indeed, thepresidentwho set inmotiontheexecutivepower’sclaimtobetheinitiatorofwarwiththedecisionin1950todeploytroopsinKorea.28Crucially,however,thiswasnotunilateralismonthepartoftheUnitedStates.TrumanhadclearUnitedNationsauthorizationfor the military action. American troops were the main contingent within abroaderUNforcesenttodefendnon-CommunistSouthKoreafromattackbytheCommunistNorthinamissionthatbenefitedfromitsinternationallegitimacy.29Trumanwas,moreover,thekindofleaderveryreadytodrawuponthecollectivewisdom within the broader leadership. It goes without saying that mostpoliticianswhoattainhighoffice,especiallythehighest,areambitiousandenjoywielding power and authority. Yet some of the partial exceptions to thatgeneralizationareamongthemosteffectiveheadsofgovernment.Trumanwasoneofthem.Hewasneitheraredefiningnor,stillless,atransformationalleader,buthewasasuccessfulone.If thedesirefor‘strongleadership’onthepartofone individual is the pursuit of a false god, that is not to decry the need forleadership.Itcan,andoftenmust,comefromthechiefexecutive,butitcanandshouldcomealsofromothermembersofademocraticallyelectedgovernment.

Trumanwasareluctantvice-presidentoftheUnitedStatesandsubsequentlya reluctant president. Brought to the highest office by the death of FranklinRooseveltin1945,heisapresidentwhosereputationhasgrownovertheyears,and he headed an administration that laid solid foundations for the post-warorderinbothAmericaandEurope.30Beingfarfromoverbearing,Trumanwaspreparedtocedegreatauthorityinforeignpolicytohissuccessivesecretariesofstate,GeneralGeorgeMarshallandDeanAcheson.Hehadbegunhispresidencydistrustingthedepartmenttheyheaded,observinginhisdiarythat‘thestriped-pantsboys’or ‘smartboys’ in ‘theStateDepartment, asusual, are against thebestinterestsoftheUS’.31Inthisrespect,TrumanwaslikeMargaretThatcherwho – as her foreign policy adviser, Sir Percy Cradock, remarked – saw theBritish Foreign Office as ‘defeatists, even collaborators’, sharing the viewCradockattributedtohercloseCabinetallyNormanTebbitthattheywere‘the

ministry that looked after foreigners, in the same way that the Ministry ofAgriculturelookedafterfarmers’.32Truman’sviewchanged,however,inawayin which Mrs Thatcher’s did not. While the American president’s right todetermine foreign policy (war powers apart) is much more constitutionallyentrenched than that of a prime minister in a parliamentary system, TrumantreatedMarshallandAchesonwithgreatrespect,doingnothingtodetractfromtheirauthority.

In his famous study of presidential power, Richard E. Neustadt began bystressingthelimitsonthepowerofanAmericanpresident,anditwasTruman’sperceptionofthisonwhichheespeciallydrew.Trumansaid:‘Isitherealldaytryingtopersuadepeopletodothethingstheyoughttohavesenseenoughtodowithoutmypersuadingthem.. .That’sallthepowersofthePresidentamountto.’33 Speaking in 1952 just before General Eisenhower was elected to thepresidency, Truman observed that Eisenhower would be sitting at his desk,saying:‘Dothis!Dothat!Andnothingwillhappen.PoorIke–itwon’tbeabitliketheArmy.’34(Italicsinoriginal.)*Whilecollegialinhisstyle,Trumanwas,nonetheless, prepared to exert his authority when senior subordinates becameintractable. He was not afraid to dismiss popular figures, even when theirremovalwasliabletodamagehimintheeyesofpublicopinion.Whenin1946Secretary ofCommerceHenryWallace began to pursuewhat amounted to anindependentforeignpolicy–lesscriticalof theSovietUnionandmorecriticalof Britain – Truman fired him, albeit after some initial vacillation betweensupportingWallaceorhis secretaryof state at the time, JamesF.Byrnes. Inaletter to his mother and sister, Truman wrote: ‘Charlie Ross [the President’spresssecretary]saidI’dshownI’dratherberightthanPresidentandItoldhimI’dratherbeanythingthanPresident.’35Trumanwasequallyundauntedin1951when he recalledGeneral DouglasMacArthur from his command inAsia forairing his discordant views on foreign policy in amannerwhich the presidentregarded as ‘rank insubordination’. MacArthur had been speaking inincreasinglyapocalyptical termsin1950andearly1951abouthowtheKoreanWarcouldonlybewonbytakingthefightintoChinaandwiththepossibleuseofnuclearweapons.Heinsistedthat‘ifwelosethewartoCommunisminAsiathefallofEuropeisinevitable’.36

ThedismissalofMacArthur,Trumanrecordedinhisdiary,produced‘quiteanexplosion’;and‘telegramsandlettersofabusebythedozens’.37Themailbag

sooncontainednot‘dozens’,butsomeeightythousandcommunicationsonthesubject of MacArthur’s firing, with a substantial majority in favour of thegeneral.TelegramstoCongressweretentooneonthesideofMacArthur.Eventhe (far more representative) Gallup Poll showed 69 per cent support forMacArthur against 29 per cent who approved of Truman’s decision.38 Theattacks on Truman in the Senate were venomous. SenatorWilliam Jenner ofIndianadeclared that secretSoviet agentswere running thegovernmentof theUnited States, and Richard Nixon – at that time also a senator – interpretedMacArthur’s dismissal as appeasement of Communism. Senator JosephMcCarthy–whoseattempts to findCommunists ineverygovernmentalcloset,not to mention within the military and Hollywood, gave rise to the term‘McCarthyism’ – said that Trumanmust have been drunk when hemade thedecisionandthat‘thesonofabitchoughttobeimpeached’.39

The political system of the United States is such that choosing and, onoccasion, changingCabinetmembers; taking responsibility for themost seniormilitaryappointments,andmakingforeignpolicyrankasthepresident’sareasofgreatest power. But it was characteristic of Truman’s style that the mostoutstanding foreign policy achievement of his presidency is known as theMarshallPlan,not theTrumanPlan.40ThecountriesofWesternEurope,boththoseon the sideof thevictors in theSecondWorldWar and those thatweredefeated,hadbeendevastatedeconomicallybytheconflict.Therewasafearthatdemocratic governmentwould be undermined by economic collapse at a timewhentheSovietUnionhadoverseenthecreationofanumberofclientstatesinthe Eastern half of the continent. The policy of economic bolstering ofdemocracy,puttogetherbySecretaryofStateMarshall,withthestrongbackingofTrumanand thehelpofAcheson(at that timeMarshall’s right-handman intheStateDepartment),wasdecisivelyimportantforEuropeanrecuperationandrevival.InthewordsoftheBritishforeignsecretaryatthetime,ErnestBevin,itwas‘likealifelinetosinkingmen’.41

LEADERSHIPANDPOWER

It is said that all political careers end in failure – an exaggeration but onecontaining a grain of truth. Many hitherto successful political lives end withelectoral defeat, but for a leader to lose an election, after some years in

government,isnormalinademocracy.Havingledapartytodefeatatthepolls,a politician will often voluntarily relinquish its leadership. In the UK, forexample, Sir Alec Douglas-Home resigned after the Conservatives lost theBritish general election of 1964. Neil Kinnock did so, having never heldgovernmental office and after leading theLabourParty todefeat both in1987and in 1992.GordonBrown resigned following the election of 2010when noparty won an overall majority but the Conservatives did much better thanLabour.Failureofamoreprofoundkindiswhenaleaderisforcedoutbyhisorher governmental or party colleagues. It tends to be the fate of overweeningleaderswho try to concentratepower in their hands and treat colleagueshigh-handedly. Among British prime ministers, David Lloyd George, NevilleChamberlain,MargaretThatcherandTonyBlairallleftoffice,intheirownviewprematurely, through failure to retain sufficient support from theirownside inparliament.

There remains, nevertheless, a widespread assumption that placing greaterpower and authority in the hands of one individual leader isworth doing in ademocracy.42 That is despite the evidence (some of which will be found inChapters 2 and 7 of this book) that both their countries and such leadersthemselvespayapriceforitintheend.Thisisnotforamomenttodenythatinpoliticalrealitysomeindividualleaders–andinademocracy,notonlythetopleader–canmakeanenormousdifference,eitherforbetterorforworse.Evenifeventuallyoustedbyherorhisownpartycolleagues,suchaleadermayhaveabigimpactonpublicpolicyandhercountrywhileinoffice.MargaretThatcher’sprime ministership in Britain from 1979 until 1990 is an obvious example.Thatcher may be regarded as one of a minority of party leaders and primeministerswithindemocracieswhoradically redefined the termsof thepoliticaldebate, but whose style of leadership, nevertheless, led to hubris and herdownfall.

There is no need, then, to endorse the ‘Great Man’ or ‘Great Woman’conceptionofhistorytobeaware thatsome leadersmattergreatly.Economistsand economic historians are often to be found among those who go to theoppositeextremefromthe‘GreatMan’notionandembracetheviewthathistoryis made by impersonal forces. It would be foolish to deny the importance offundamentalshiftsinthewayhumanbeingsacquirethemeansofsubsistence,oftechnologicalchange,orofthesignificanceofaseriesofinternationaleconomiccrisesinrecentyearswhichcameasasurprisetoleaders–and,forthatmatter,tomosteconomists.Politicalleadershavealsoappearedcomparativelyhelpless

in the face of globalization as industry has moved from one country andcontinent to another and left some of the world’s most advanced economiesneedingmajor structural adaptation.Yet, itwould be absurd to claim that thepoliciesofgovernmentsorofinternationalinstitutionscanmakenodifferencetothewaytechnologicalchangeismanagedorfinancialturmoildealtwith.Thesephenomena do require leadership, but collegial and collective leadership.However,wheneconomicdepressionoccurs,thishasoftenmerelystrengthenedthemythofthestrongleader–abeliefthatastrong,andpreferablycharismatic,individualwillprovidetheanswertotheseandotherseriousproblems.TheruleofBenitoMussolini in inter-war Italy and, stillmore, the rise inpopularityofAdolf Hitler in the Great Depression election in Germany of 1930, and hissubsequentascenttopower,aresombreillustrationsofthistendency.43

Most of the leaders Iwrite about in this book havewielded governmentalpower.Whentheterm‘strongleader’isusedofpoliticians,itisapartyleader,premierorpresidentwhoisbeingtalkedabout.Theimageprojectedisofaheadofgovernmentsurroundedbyadviserswhowillprovide informationandmakesuggestions, but who will ultimately defer to the top leader. Too muchdeference,however,makesforbadpolicy.Aleaderneedscolleaguesofpoliticalstature who will stand their ground and not hesitate to disagree with thejudgement of the person who formally or informally presides over theirdeliberations.Thiswillseldomamounttoaleaderbeingovertlyoverruledbythecabinet or shadow cabinet, for a democratic leader, aware that his or hercolleagues remain unconvinced, will generally draw appropriate conclusions.Onlyleadersofautocratictemperament,toosureofthesuperiorityoftheirownjudgement, will attempt to railroad a policy through against the wishes of amajority of their colleagues. Since heads of government usually have somediscretion in deciding whether to promote or demote cabinet colleagues, theycan,however,moreoftenthannotrelyonthecomplianceofmanyofthelatterwho hope to earn points for conformity with the leader’s wishes. That is asignificant instrument of power, but it has its limits. A leader who loses theconfidenceofalargeproportionofseniorcolleaguescanhardlysurvivewithinademocraticpoliticalparty.

Thedifferencebetweenaccountableordespotic,honestorcorrupt,effectiveor inefficient government has a huge impact on the lives and well-being ofordinarypeople.Sowhatthepoliticianswhoheadthesegovernmentsdo–andhowtheyareheldresponsiblefortheiractionsandstyleofrule–isclearlyworthourcloseattention.Institutionalpoweraddsenormouslytothepotentialimpact

ofaleader.Yetitisworthkeepinginmindthathavingyourhandsonleversofpower is not the same as leadership in its purest form. The most authenticpolitical leadershipis tobeseenwhenlargenumbersofpeopleareinspiredbysomeonewhohasneitherpowernorpatronagetodisposeof,butwhosemessagestrikesachordwith them.Such leadershipcanbeprovidedbyanemergentorrisingpoliticalparty,byagroup,orbyanindividual.Itisthereadinessofothersto embrace the message and take part in a movement that defines theeffectivenessof suchpolitical leadership.The leaderof the Indian struggle forindependence fromBritish imperial rule,MahatmaGandhi, and theAmericancivil rights leader, Martin Luther King, were outstanding twentieth-centuryexamples.Bothchosethepathofnon-violence(KinghimselfwasinfluencedbyGandhi) and showed the world that it was not to be confused with non-resistance.

Thetwenty-firstcenturyhasseennomoreremarkableexampleofleadership–orofcourage– than thatofferedbyMalalaYousafzai,aschoolgirl fromtheSwatvalleyofPakistanwhobecameaninternationallyrenownedcampaignerforgirls’education.ShewasshotintheheadbytheTalibaninOctober2012inanattempttokillherwhichcameveryclosetosucceeding.Thiswasintendednotonlytoputanendtoherpersonalcampaignbutalsotofrightenoffotherfemalepupils fromdaring toattendschool.Fromtheageofeleven,MalalaYousafzaiwaschampioningeducationforgirls.ShewroteablogfortheBBCUrduservicewhich described her struggle to attend classes in the face of Talibanobscurantismand itshostility to female education.Aged fifteenwhen shewasshot (injuries which led to multiple operations, first in Pakistan and then inBritain,tosaveherlife),shebecametheyoungestpersonevertobenominatedfor the Nobel Peace Prize.44 On her sixteenth birthday, 12 July 2013, sheaddressed theUnitedNations inNewYork,with theSecretaryGeneral of theUN,BanKi-moon,presiding.45Bythistimemorethanfourmillionpeoplehadsigneda‘standwithMalala’petitionthatcalledforeducationforthefifty-sevenmillionchildrenaroundtheworld(girlsahighproportionofthem)whoarenotabletogotoschool.46This,itisworthreiterating,isleadershipofapurerformthanthatexercisedbyheadsofgovernmentwithjobsandfavourstodispense.

Notall leadership thatattractsspontaneousfollowers is,needless tosay,ofcomparable moral worth. That provided by Benito Mussolini in ItalyimmediatelyaftertheFirstWorldWarandbyAdolfHitlerinGermanyfromthe1920stotheearly1930swaseffectiveenoughinattractingdisciples.Thesewere

yearswhenMussoliniandHitlerdidnotyethaveinstrumentsofstatepowerattheir disposal. This was, therefore, leadership in amore unalloyed sense thantheir subsequent rule, howevermorally reprehensible in the eyes of posterity.Mussolini and Hitler are among those who have been widely, andunderstandably,regardedascharismaticleadersonthestrengthoftheiroratoryand ability to attract a spontaneous following. They also made the transitionfromoneformofleadershiptotheother–fromthatwhichpeoplewereinspiredto followwhen they still had a choice to leadership backed by coercive statepower.

There aremany other examples of individuals whomoved on from beingleaders who had to rely on force of argument and example to establish theirleadership topositionsof statepower.NelsonMandela’s journey from leadingopponent of white minority rule in apartheid South Africa, via a scarcelyimaginabletwenty-sevenyearsofimprisonment,totheSouthAfricanpresidencywasamongthemost inspiringexamplesof leadershipof the twentiethcentury.LechWał sa’strajectoryfromstrikeleaderintheGdanskshipyardstoleaderofa massive unofficial trade union, Solidarity, in Communist Poland to thepresidencyinpost-CommunistPolandisanothernotableinstanceofspontaneouspolitical leadership turning, in due course, into the formal authority andaccoutrementsofthehighestofficeofstate.

ChoosingLeadersinDemocracies

Manyheadsofgovernment,however,havenotattractedvastfollowingsbeforebecomingaleaderofapartyandsubsequentlyagovernment–sometimeshardlyany at all outside their immediate entourage. They have been selected for avarietyof reasonsandbyavarietyofmeans. Innon-democratic regimes, theyhave quite often chosen themselves, as in the case of amilitary coup.Withinparliamentary democracies – including, until recently, Australia – the choicemayberestricted toaselectorateconsistingonlyofmembersof thepartywhohave seats in the legislature. Inmany countries, the choice is made bywiderconstituencies,includingthepartymembershipasawhole.(Thismay,asintheUK, involve parliamentarians’ votes being weighted much more heavily thanthatof the individualpartymember,since theMPswillgenerallyhaveamoreintimate knowledge of the rival candidates.) The leaders chosen should notassumethattheyhavebeenpickedbecauseofqualitiessospecialthatcolleaguesand party members have delegated responsibility to them for taking the big

decisions.Yet,fromthewaysomeofthem,anumberoftheircolleagues,andthemassmediaalikediscusspolitics, it often seemsas if just suchanassumptionhasbeenmade.

Theideathatleadersofapoliticalpartyorheadsofagovernmenthavebeenchosenbecausetheyhavealreadydemonstratedsuchremarkableleadershipthatpeople are eager to follow them is,with fewexceptions, far-fetched.Within apartywhichissharplydividedonpolicy,thechoicemayalightonsomeonewhoisseenasaunifieror,alternatively,asarepresentativeofthemajoritystandpointin thebattleof ideas.Often, thevotegoes to thepersonwho isviewedas themostarticulateandpersuasiveadvocateof theparty’s line.Sometimes,but farfromalways,thepartymembersvoteforthepersonwho,opinionpollssuggest,ismostpopularwiththewiderelectorate.Aleadermayalsobechosenbecausehe or she is deemed to be inclusive in political style and good at coalition-building,whetherwithinhisorherpoliticalparty(forseriouspartiesareneverhomogeneous)orwithinthelegislature.Ifwetaketheexampleoftwoespeciallynotablewomen leaders, the last point has been as clearly true of theGermanchancellorAngelaMerkel as itwas spectacularly untrue of the formerBritishprimeministerMargaretThatcher.Inaparliamentarysystem,itisamajorplusfor a leadership candidate to be an effective performer on the floor of thelegislature. This strengthens the morale of the parliamentary party and feedsthrough to the electorate in media reports. In all democracies it has becomeincreasinglyimportantoverthepasthalf-centuryforaleadertocomeoverwellon television. None of that means that such politicians are, or need be,charismatic.

Mostprimeministers inparliamentary systemscome to that office, havingpreviouslyheldministerialposts.Theyhavealready,therefore,someexperienceof governing at the national level. TonyBlair in 1997 andDavidCameron in2010weretwoBritishexceptionstothatgeneralrule,asaresultoftheirrelativeyouth and the lengthy periods their parties had been out of power. Americanpresidents, much more often, have not previously held office in the federalgovernmentbeforebeingthrustintothehighestpostofallwithintheexecutive.AseatintheSenateprovidesverylimitedexperienceofcoordinatingpolicyandnone of controlling a vast bureaucracy. A state governorship is a poorapprenticeshipfortheforeignpolicyrolethatanAmericanpresidentisexpectedtoplay.Presidentialcandidatesdo,though,testsomeoftheirleadershipskillsonthe campaign trail. Their ability to communicate effectively and to make anemotionalconnectionwithawiderpubliccomesunderscrutinyinthedrawn-out

system of primary elections and then in the presidential campaign itself. Theentire process is extremely long in comparisonwith other countries. Both theextraordinarylengthoftimecandidateshavetospendtraversingthecountryandthecostofrunning,whichisgreaterthaninanyotherdemocracy,putsoffmanyable potential candidates. Large-scale personal wealth or good connections tocorporate and rich individual donors have been in danger of becomingprerequisites of entering the race as a serious contender, thus depriving thecountryofleadersfromoutsideacharmedcircle.

Nevertheless, the twomost recentDemocratic presidents, Bill Clinton andBarackObama, did not come from privileged family backgrounds. They bothwent toeliteuniversities,but throughscholarshipsand loansandasa resultoftheirownabilitiesandendeavours.Whilestrivingforthepartynominationandaspresidentialcandidates,theystillhadtoraisevastsumsofmoney.Obama,inparticular,succeededinattractingawidearrayofsmallandmoderatedonations,aswellaslargeonesfromwealthyindividualsofliberalviews,thusreducinghisdependence on corporate interests. The long and arduous process of gaining,first,thepartynominationandthenthepresidencyisalso,insignificantways,aschool of leadership.AsObamaput it in an interviewduring his first term aspresident:

Idothinkthattwoyearsofcampaigningundersomeprettyhigh-pressuresituationsinaperversewaydoesprepareyouforthepressuresinvolvedintheoffice,becauseyou’reusedtobeingonthehigh-wire,you’reusedtopeoplescrutinizingyou,you’reusedto–insomeways–alotoffolksdependingonyou.Thisisjustatadifferentlevel.It’snotpolitics,itsgovernance,sothere’sanaddedweightthere.But...therewasnotamomentwhenIsuddenlysaid,Whoa,whathaveIgottenmyselfinto?47

*

Too frequently all leadership is reduced to a dichotomy, although the pairsthemselvescomeinmanyvariants.48‘Charismaticleaders’aresetagainst‘mereoffice-holders’, ‘innovators’ compared with ‘bureaucrats’, ‘real leaders’contrastedwith‘managers’,while‘transformingleaders’aredistinguishedfrom‘transactional leaders’.49Then there are ‘great leaders’ and ‘ordinary leaders’,‘good’or ‘bad’, and,of course, ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ leaders.Suchaneither-ordistinctioninvariablyentailsvastoversimplification.InthisbookIfocusontheinadequacy of the ‘strong’–‘weak’ dichotomy in particular and highlight thedangersofbelievingthatstrengthanddominationarewhatweshouldlookfor,andexpecttofind,inaparagonofaleader.Therearealotofdifferentwaysof

exercising effective political leadership as well as different ways of failing.Manyofthefailuresofleaderswhoareconfidenttheyknowbest,andbrooknodisagreement,havebeenmonumental.

Inpayingparticularattention to redefining, transformational, revolutionary,authoritarianand totalitarian leaders, Iamfocusingoncategoriesof leadershipand exercise of power which have had an especially significant impact onpeople’s lives.Yet theyarefarfromoccupyingtheentirespectrumofpoliticalleadership. There are, as we have seen, remarkable leaders who never heldgovernmental office. And there are presidents, of whom Truman was one, aswellasprimeministers(someofwhomfigureinthechaptersthatfollow)whowere effective enough heads of government, although they did not introduceradical change.Andsometimes, ashasalreadybeen toucheduponandwillbefurtherexplored,themostsignificantofagovernment’sachievementshavelesstodowiththepersonatitsheadthanwithothermembersofthetopleadershipteam.Toomuchisexpectedoftheindividualsatthetopofthehierarchyandtoomuchattributed to them.That isespeciallyso inademocracywhere thereare,quite properly, many constraints on the top leader, even though an excessivefocusonthepersonoccupyingthehighestrungoftheladderhasbecomealltoocommon. Political leadership is multifaceted. It must be seen in differentcontexts and fromdifferentperspectives.That iswhat the chapter that followssetsouttodo.

*Attheotherendofthescale,theveryhighproportionofpeoplereadyinBulgariaandUkrainetoembraceastrongleader,evenifthatpersonweretooverthrowdemocracy,mayreflectextremedissatisfactionwiththe quality ofwhat has passed for democracy in these countries. In theBulgarian case it is likely to beassociatedwiththemanifestpublicanger(includingsit-insinparliament)aboutthelevelofcorruption.*AgainsttheFisherviewpoint,twogeneralobjectionsmaybemade.ThefirstisthatCongressasawholeremainsoneofthemostpowerfullegislaturesintheworld.Asaresultoftheseparationofpowers,itcanfrustratetheexecutive–admittedly,especiallyindomesticpolicy–morethancanthegreatmajorityofitscounterparts elsewhere. The second objection is that the presidency has a greaterdemocratic legitimacythanhastheSenate(asdistinctfromtheHouseofRepresentatives).Amongpowerfulsecondchambers,theSenateisexceptionallyunrepresentativeofthepopulationofthecountryasawhole.(TheBritishHouseofLords, formerly a hereditary chamber and now a predominantly appointed body, clearly has still lesspopular legitimacy.However, it is a revising and advisory chamber, no longer possessing the power ofveto.)EqualrepresentationofeverystateintheUSSenatemeansthatavoteforasenatorinWyominghasalmostseventytimesmoreweightthanthatforasenatorinthevastlymorepopulousCalifornia.SeeAlfredStepan and Juan J. Linz, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and theQuality ofDemocracy in theUnitedStates’,PerspectivesonPolitics,Vol.9,No.4,2011,pp.841-856,esp.844and846.Moreover,theSenatehasgreatinfluenceonfederalappointments(muchmorethanhastheHouseofRepresentatives),andmoreimpactonthefillingofgovernmentpoststhanhavemostlegislatureselsewhere.Thisincludesfederalappointmentstoseniorforeignanddefencepolicypositions.

*Eisenhowerwas,however,betterpreparedforgovernmentbyconsentthananothermilitaryman-turned-politician,theDukeofWellington.FollowinghisfirstCabinetmeetingasBritishprimeministerin1828,hesaid: ‘Anextraordinaryaffair. Igave them theirordersand theywanted to stayanddiscuss them.’PeterHennessy,Cabinet (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), p. 121, notes that the storywas told in after-lunchspeechesbyPeterWalker,SecretaryofStateforEnergyinthegovernmentheadedatthattimebyMargaretThatcher. After a pause,Walker would add: ‘I’m so glad that we don’t have PrimeMinisters like thattoday.’

1

PuttingLeadersinContext

Someoftheattributesdesirableinamodernleader(suggestedonthefirstpageoftheIntroduction)haveprovedvaluableinpoliticalleadershipthroughouttheages–intelligence,goodmemory,courage,flexibilityandstamina,amongthem.Butleadershipmustbeplacedincontextifitistobebetterunderstood.Inthischapter I’ll look at four different, but interconnected, frames of reference forthinking about leadership – the historical, cultural, psychological andinstitutional.Leadershipishighlycontextualandwhatisappropriateorpossiblein one situation may be inappropriate or unattainable in another. Leadershipstyles differ inwar and peace and in a crisis as comparedwith calmer times.Within a democracy the opportunities open to a head of government are verydifferentwhentheleader’spoliticalpartyhasalargemajorityinthelegislature,a knife-edgemajority, or nomajority at all.What is conventionally hailed asstrong leadership isnot identicalwithgood leadership, and the latter isnot anabstract attribute but an appropriate response in a distinctive setting – in aparticulartimeandplace.

The times,moreover, are different in different places. This truthwaswellunderstood by a number of eighteenth-century scholars when they began toreflect seriouslyon thedevelopmentofhumansociety.Enlightenment thinkersin Scotland and in France first elaborated in the 1750s a four-stage theory ofdevelopmentwhich theybelievedwent a longway to explaining the laws andinstitutionsateachphase.1Althoughexcessivelyschematicintheirapproach–humandevelopmenthasbeenmuchlessunilinearthantheiranalysessuggested2–thesethinkersofferedmanypertinentinsights.Itwasatheoryofdevelopment

whichsummedupexistingknowledgeandallowedforexceptionsateachofthestages.3 Its most original exponent, Adam Smith, was a far from dogmaticthinker – one, indeed, who took a delight in finding exceptions to his everyrule.4*

THEEVOLUTIONOFGOVERNMENTANDOFTHINKINGABOUTLEADERSHIP

Concerned to study ‘the progress of government’, Enlightenment thinkersattempted,amongother things, toaccountbothfor theemergenceofchieftainsand monarchs and for the subsequent nature of leadership and followership.While intenton imposingapatternonhistory, theydrewonawidevarietyofsources,rangingfromtheOldTestamenttotheliteratureofancientGreeceandRome(especiallytheRomanhistorianTacitus),andmovingontotheaccountsoftravellerswhohadacquiredfamiliaritywithhunter-gatherersocietiesoftheirown time. Native American tribes were accorded particular attention. Someeighteenth-century writers suggested that leadership in the earliest stage ofdevelopment of primitive societies went to the strongest or tallestman in thetribe.Andotherthingsbeingequal(acrucialqualification),higherthanaverageheighthascontinuedtobeahelpfulattributeforthewould-beleader.†

Duringthefirstphaseofsocialdevelopment–thatofsubsistencebasedonhuntinganimalsandlivingon‘thespontaneousfruitsoftheearth’–therewas,AdamSmithobserved,littlethatdeservedthenameofgovernment.5‘Intheageofhunters,’he said, ‘therecanbevery littlegovernmentofanysort,butwhatthereiswillbeofthedemocraticalkind.’Smithrecognizedthatleadershipwasnotthesameaspower.Thus,insuchverydifferentsettingsasgroupsofhunter-gatherersandmembersofacluborassemblyineighteenth-centuryBritain,therewouldbesomepeopleofgreaterweightthanothers,buttheirinfluencewouldbedue to‘theirsuperiorwisdom,valour,orsuch likequalifications’and itwouldbeuptotheothermembersofthegrouptochoosewhetherornottobeguidedbythem.Thus,leadership,asdistinctfrompower,wastobeobservedwhereallthememberswere ‘onanequal footing’,yetwhere therewas ‘generally somepersonwhosecounselismorefollowed’thanthatofothers.6Thisisleadershipinitspurestform,definedassomeoneotherpeoplewishtobeguidedbyandtofollow.

Itwastheacquisitionofpropertythatledtoaneedforgovernment,7andinthe second stage of development, that of shepherds, people began to acquireproperty in the form of animals. In the third stage they became husbandmen,cultivating the soil andgradually becomingowners of property in the formofland.8The fourth phase of development forAdamSmithwas the commercialstage,atwhichpeoplebegantoengageinmercantileactivity.(Heneverusedtheterm ‘capitalism’. That was a mid-nineteenth-century coinage.) Smith’ssomewhat younger near-contemporary, the French nobleman and governmentadministrator Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, who developed a rather similartheoryofstagesofdevelopment,surmisedthatwhen‘quarrelsfirsttookplaceinnations,amanwhowassuperiorinstrength,invalour,orinprudencepersuadedandthenforcedtheverypeoplewhomhewasdefendingtoobeyhim’.9

ForDavidHume,nothingwas‘moresurprisingtothosewhoconsiderhumanaffairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many aregovernedbythefew’.10Hebelieveditprobablethattheascendancyofonemanoveragreatmanybeganduring‘astateofwar;wherethesuperiorityofcourageand of genius discovers itself most visibly, where unanimity and concert aremost requisite, andwhere the pernicious effects of disorder aremost sensiblyfelt’.11 Moreover, Hume surmised that ‘if the chieftain possessed as muchequityasprudenceandvalour’,hewouldbecome‘evenduringpeace,thearbiterof all differences, and could gradually, by a mixture of force and consent,establishhisauthority’.12

AdamSmithdevotedstillmoreattentiontotheproblemofhowsomepeoplegainedascendancyoverothersandofhowbothleadershipandpowerdevelopedalongsidethegrowthofdifferentiationinsocialrank.InTheWealthofNations,henotedfourways inwhichauthorityandsubordinationcameabout. Initially,personalqualifications,includingstrengthandagility,wereimportant.However,‘thequalitiesofthebody,unlesssupportedbythoseofthemind,cangivelittleauthority inanyperiodof society’.13Thesecondsourceofauthoritywasage.‘Amongnationsofhunters,suchas thenative tribesofNorthAmerica,’Smithwrote, ‘age is the sole foundation of rank and precedency.’14 But age alsocounts for much in ‘the most opulent and civilized nations’, regulating rankamong people who are in other respects equal, so that a title, for example,descendstotheeldestmember(oreldestmale)ofthefamily.Thethirdsourceofauthoritywas‘superiorityoffortune’.Richeswereanadvantageforaleaderat

every stage of society, but perhaps especially in the second phase ofdevelopment–theearliestwhichpermittedgreatinequality.15‘ATartarchief’,Smithobserved,possessingherdsandflocks‘sufficient tomaintaina thousandmen’will,infact,ruleoverthem:

Thethousandmenwhomhethusmaintains,dependingentirelyuponhimfortheirsubsistence,mustbothobeyhisordersinwar,andsubmittohisjurisdictioninpeace.Heisnecessarilyboththeirgeneralandtheirjudge,andhischieftainshipisthenecessaryeffectofthesuperiorityofhisfortune.16

In the commercial stage of development, a man could have a much greaterfortuneandyetbeabletocommandnotmorethanadozenpeople,sinceapartfrom family servants, no onewould depend on him formaterial support.Yet,Smithobserves,the‘authorityoffortune’is‘verygreateveninanopulentandcivilizedsociety’.17Ineverystageofdevelopmentinwhichinequalityofwealthexisted,ithadcountedforstillmorethaneitherpersonalqualitiesorage.18Thefourth source of authority, which followed logically from the widedifferentiation of wealth, was ‘superiority of birth’.19 By this Smith did notmean‘oldfamilies’,aconceptheridicules,observing:

Allfamiliesareequallyancient;andtheancestorsoftheprince,thoughtheymaybebetterknown,cannotwellbemorenumerousthanthoseofthebeggar.Antiquityoffamilymeanseverywheretheantiquityeitherofwealth,orofthatgreatnesswhichiscommonlyeitherfoundeduponwealth,oraccompaniedbyit.20

Smith is highly sceptical of vast power being placed in the hands of anindividual,notingthattheapparentstabilitycreatedbyabsolutemonarchsisanillusion.Perverseandunreasonablebehaviourby rulersestablishes the rightofthepeopletooustthem,andanindividualrulerismorelikelytobeguiltyofthisthanamorecollectivegovernment.AsSmithputs it: ‘singlepersonsaremuchmoreliabletotheseabsurditiesthanlargeassemblies,sowefindthatrevolutionson this head are much more frequent in absolute monarchies than anywhereelse’.21TheTurks,Smithcontends,‘seldomhavethesamesultan(thoughtheyhavestillthesameabsolutegovernment)above6or8years’.22Addressinghisstudent audience at the University of Glasgow in March 1763, Smith adds:‘TherehavebeenmorerevolutionsinRussiathaninallEuropebesidesforsomeyearspast.Thefollyofsinglemenoftenincensesthepeopleandmakesitproperandrighttorebel.’23

Thepersonwhobecomesa ruler inaprimitivesociety–or ‘thechiefofa

rude tribe’, in the language of one of Smith’s pupils and later professorialcolleague,JohnMillar–earnssuchapositioninthefirstinstancebybecomingcommander of their forces.This leads, though, to an attachment to his personandadesire topromotehis interest.24Millar,whoadoptedandelaborated thefour-stagesframeworkofanalysis,followedSmithinarguingthatdifferentiationof wealth became significant already in the second stage ‘after mankind hadfallenupontheexpedientof tamingpasturingcattle’,andthishadimplicationsforsocialandpoliticalhierarchy:

The authority derived from wealth, is not only greater than that which arises from mere personalaccomplishments,butalsomorestableandpermanent.Extraordinaryendowments,eitherofmindorbody,canoperateonlyduring the lifeof thepossessor,andareseldomcontinuedforany lengthof time in thesame family.But amanusually transmitshis fortune tohisposterity, andalongwith it all themeansofcreatingdependencewhichhe enjoyed.Thus the son,who inherits the estate of his father, is enabled tomaintainthesamerank,atthesametimethathepreservesalltheinfluenceoftheformerproprietor,whichis daily augmented by the power of habit, and becomes more considerable from one generation toanother.25

This applied very forcefully in the case of chiefs. As a man became moreopulent,hewasthebetterabletosupporthisleadershipandinmanycasesmakeithereditary.Beingricherthanothers,hehad‘morepowertorewardandprotecthisfriends,andtopunishordepressthosewhohavebecometheobjectsofhisresentmentordispleasure’.26Thus,otherpeoplehadreasontocourthisfavour,leadingtoanincreaseintheimmediatefollowersofthe‘greatchief,orking’.27

Monarchy, usually hereditary, andunder a variety of names–kings, tsars,emperors, khans, chiefs, sultans, pharaohs, sheikhs, among others – became,indeed, the archetypal mode of political leadership across millennia andcontinents.28 There was huge variation among them in terms of despotism,arbitrariness, respect for law, and willingness to share some power.29 BeforeNapoleonBonapartecametopowerinFrance,monarchsinEuropeasawhole(althoughnolongerinGreatBritain)claimedthattheirrulewasbasedon‘divineright’.However,asS.E.Finerobserved:‘OnceNapoleonacceded,thishoaryoldpoliticalformulawasonthedefensive.ItnowappearedthatanyTom,Dick,orHarrymightcomeforwardandseizethestate,providedhehadtakensufficientpains to make it appear that he had done so as the result of a call from thePeople.’30

British‘Exceptionalism’

Limitedmonarchyandwidespreadcivilrightsandfreedomswererelativelyrarepriortothenineteenthcentury.ThemoststrikingexceptionwasEngland–andsubsequently Britain – which provided the classic case of very gradualtransformationofhereditaryrulefromabsolutepowertolimitedmonarchyand,bythetwentiethcentury,tosymbolicauthority.Ithasbeencalled‘democracyontheinstallmentplan’,althoughthosewhomadeconcessionsateachstagerarelyhadinmindagoaloffulldemocracy.Moreoftenthannot–asinthepassingoftheactsofparliamentwhichwidenedthesuffrageinnineteenth-centuryBritain–theybelievedthat this lateststepofreformwasasfarasonecouldgowhilestill preserving liberty and the rule of law.31 Britain, nonetheless, saw overseveralcenturiesagradual reduction in thepowerofmonarchsanda leisurelyriseinthepowerofparliamentandoftheaccountabilityofpoliticianstoaneverwiderpublic.

Yet gradualism was not a smooth and uninterrupted process. It was mostspectacularly interrupted in the middle of the seventeenth century. Civil warbetween 1642 and 1649 ended with the victory of parliamentary forces overthoseofthekingandinthebeheadingofCharlesI.Between1649and1660,theBritish statewas a republic. From1653 until 1658OliverCromwell ruled thecountry as Lord Protector, relying on his command of theNewModelArmy.The bickering that followed Cromwell’s death, however, led to the dominantgrouping within the army favouring recall of the monarchy (in the shape ofCharles II) – and a restoration of gradualism. But the short-lived ‘EnglishRevolution’ left an imprint on the monarchy. When James Boswell’s father,Lord Auchinleck, was challenged by Samuel Johnson to say what goodCromwellhadeverdone,heresponded(inScotsvernacular):‘Hegartkingskenthattheyhadalithintheirneck’(Hemadekingsawaretheyhadajointintheirneck).32

Parliamentary power was given a substantial fillip by the ‘GloriousRevolution’ of 1688. Charles II and especially his successor James II, havingattemptedtobypassanddowngradeparliament,succeededinsteadinputtinganendtotheStuartdynasty.ThebeliefthatJames,aRomanCatholic,wasbiasedinfavourofCatholics–andpossiblyattemptingtoreimposeRomanCatholicismas the country’s religion – was just one of a number of reasons for growingopposition tohim.WheninfluentialopponentsofJamesdecided topresent the

monarchy toJames’sProtestantdaughterMary,herDutchhusbandWilliamofOrange insisted that if she were Queen, he would be King, not merely theQueen’s consort. The ‘revolution’, although it was hardly that, was termed‘glorious’largelybecauseitwasbloodlessinEngland(althoughitwasfarfrombloodless in Ireland and Scotland). James II fled the country, andWilliam IIIandMarybecamehissuccessors.Thetrendtowardsgreaterparliamentarypowerandinthedirectionofenhancedgovernmentalindependencefromthemonarchycontinued during the short reign of QueenAnne –which saw the creation ofGreatBritainwiththeunionofEnglishandScottishparliamentsin1707–andunder her Hanoverian successors from 1712. By the twentieth century thegradual development of constitutional monarchy had come close to turningBritainintoa‘crownedrepublic’.

TheAmericanConstitutionanditsLegacy

The twomostmomentousbreakswithmonarchy in thehistoryofgovernmentwere the American Revolution and the French Revolution. The FoundingFathers of the United States who signed the Declaration of Independence of1776 and the framers of the American Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787disagreedonmanymatters,butwerevirtuallyunitedononecrucialissue–thatthe government of the United States must be republican, not monarchical oraristocratic.33They tookpains toenshrinea ruleof lawandprotectionfor thefreedoms of those who enjoyed the rights of citizenship. The AmericanConstitution,however,wasneitherdemocraticnorintendedtobebymostofitsframers.Itdidnotoutlawslaveryanditimplicitlydeniedthevotetomorethanhalfthepopulation–women,African-AmericansandNativeAmericans.*Italsodeliberately tried to insulate the presidency from both ‘popularmajorities andcongressionalrule’.34Itwasthegrowthofsupportforgreaterdemocracyonthepart of theAmerican people, not theConstitution,which gradually turned theelectoralcollege,setuptochooseapresidentindirectly,intoadefactopopularelection, albeit one that was imperfectly democratic. As Robert A. Dahl hasobserved:

...theelectoralcollegestillpreservedfeaturesthatopenlyviolatedbasicdemocraticprinciples:citizensofdifferentstateswouldbeunequallyrepresented,andacandidatewiththelargestnumberofpopularvotesmightlosethepresidencybecauseofafailuretowinamajorityintheelectoralcollege.Thatthisoutcomewasmorethanatheoreticalpossibilityhadalreadyoccurredthreetimesbeforeitwasdisplayedforallthe

worldtoseeintheelectionof2000.35

ThedesignersoftheConstitution,increatingapresidency,madethatpersontheembodimentofexecutivepower,whichheremains, inawayinwhichaprimeministerwithinaparliamentarysystemisnot,eventhoughsomeholdersofthatoffice aspire to it and their placemen may encourage it. The AmericanConstitution, however, is unambiguous. Article II, Section 1, begins with thesentence: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the UnitedStatesofAmerica’,andthefirstsentenceofSection2ofthesamearticlemakesthepresident thecommander-in-chiefof thearmedforces.Yet, toreiterate: theframersoftheConstitutionneverintendedthatthepresidentshouldbechosenbypopularelection.Theiraimwastoputthechoiceofpresidentintothehandsofmenof exceptionalwisdom, rather than let thegreatmassof thepeoplemakesuch amomentous decision. They also took pains to ensure that the presidentwould not be able to turn himself into a monarch in citizen’s clothing. ByenshriningaseparationofpowerswithintheConstitution,andbyplacingseriousconstraints on the president’s ability to determine policy, they guaranteed thatthe president (in contrastwithEngland’s first and last republican ruler,OliverCromwell)wouldnotacquiretheequivalentofkinglypowers.

TheparticipantsintheConventionwhichmetinPhiladelphiain1787cameupwith two innovations in thepracticeofgovernment–awrittenconstitutionandafederaldivisionofpowers.Thus, thepresident’spowerwas limitedbyacodificationof lawonthepoliticalsystemwhichsetout thepowersofvariousinstitutions. This document, the Constitution, became, in the words of deTocqueville,‘thefountofallauthority’withintherepublic.36Presidentialpowerwas limited also by the way the Constitution divided authority between thefederalgovernmentandthestates,witheachentitledtoautonomyin theirownseparate spheres.Thiswas qualitatively different frommere decentralization–thatcouldbe found in someothercountries– since itmeant that, inprinciple,neither could encroach on the jurisdiction of the other. As the first countryconsciouslyanddeliberately toembracebothconstitutionalismand federalism,the USA significantly influenced the adoption of those broad principleselsewhere, although the actual institutional arrangements outlined in theAmericanConstitutionremaineduniquetotheUnitedStates.

The constitution and the federal division of powers in theUSA put novellimitsonthepowerofchiefexecutives,asdidthespecialplaceaccordedtolawinthepracticeofAmericanpolitics,withtheruleoflawcomingcloseattimesto

the rule of lawyers. The ‘most legalistic constitution in the entire world’, asFinerdescribedit,37hasmeantthatdecisionsthatcouldquiteproperlybetakenby a popularly elected government anywhere else in the world have arousedlegal challenge in the United States. Thus, when President Barack Obamasucceededin2010ingettingacomprehensivehealthcarebillpassed,albeitonethatstilldidnotbringmedicalprovisionforthewholepopulationuptotheleveltaken for granted in other advanced democracies, the Supreme Court took itupon itself to consider the constitutionality of the Patient Protection andAffordableHealthCareAct.38Since thevotesofmostof themembersof theCourtcouldbepredictedonthebasisoftheirpoliticalandsocialpredilections,itwasonlythesurprisingdecisionoftheconservativeChiefJusticeJohnRobertswhich enabled the healthcare legislation to be deemed constitutional by fivevotes to four.39 Many of the Supreme Court’s decisions appear to be acontinuationofpoliticsbyothermeans.ThedistinguishedlegaltheoristRonaldDworkin even suggested that Roberts wished to uphold the act ‘for publicrelations reasons’ rather than on genuine legal grounds.40 Nevertheless, theSupremeCourtitwaswhichtooktheultimatedecision.Morethanacenturyanda half ago, de Tocqueville wrote: ‘There is hardly a political question in theUnitedStateswhichdoesnotsoonerorlaterturnintoajudicialone.’41

TheFrenchRevolution

Large though the international impactwasof theAmericanRevolution, thatoftheFrenchRevolutionwasstillgreater.42WhereastheAmericanshadassertedthe right to govern themselves, theFrench revolutionariesmade larger claims.They believed that theywere creating amodel for the rest of theworld – forEuropeinthefirstinstance.Eventwentieth-centuryrevolutionaries,suchastheRussian Bolsheviks, often themselves invoked comparisons with the FrenchRevolution and its aftermath– from identificationwith the Jacobins to fear ofBonapartism.43 The French Revolution was, in principle, democratic andegalitarian in a way in which the American Revolution was not. There was,however,an importantcontrastbetween theAmericanConstitutionand itsBillof Rights, on the one hand, and the FrenchRevolution and itsDeclaration ofHumanRights,ontheother,thatwasinthelongertermtotheadvantageoftheformer. The American rights were specific and legally enforcible, the French

rightsweregeneralanddeclarationsofintent.44Frenchmonarchicalrulehadbeeninefficientandoppressive,butnotmoreso

thaninmanyanotherEuropeancountry,andtherewasalreadymorefreedominFrance than in most of Europe. An essential added ingredient which inspiredmany of the revolutionaries was the ideology of popular sovereignty andequality, the ideas of the ‘radical Enlightenment’, which are part of theexplanationofwhytherevolutiontooktheformitdid.AmongthechangestheFrench Revolution inauguratedwere a transformation of the legal system, theremovaloffeudalprivileges,theendingofecclesiasticalauthority,proclamationoftheuniversalsuppressionofblackslavery,changingthelawsofmarriageandintroducingthepossibilityofdivorce,andemancipationofJews.45Thereisstilllively argument not only about the causes of the French Revolution but alsoaboutwhenitbeganandended,althoughthestormingoftheBastilleon14July1789hascome to symbolize thedestructionof theauthorityof theold regimeandtheforcibleassertionofpopularsovereignty.

Some of the political innovationswhich camewith the FrenchRevolutionhavehadalastingimpact–includingthenotionsof‘left’and‘right’inpolitics,based on the seating arrangements in France’s National Assembly and theconcept(orslogan)of‘liberty,equalityandfraternity’.Ofcontinuinginfluencealso has been the French revolutionary assertion of secular and anti-clericalvalues,goingbeyondanattempttoreplaceonereligion,orbranchofareligion,byanother.Whetherreligiousorsecularauthorityshouldbepoliticallysupremeisstillaliveleadershipissueinmanypartsoftheworldtoday,butnowhereincontemporary Europe are religious leaders able to dictate the policy ofgovernments. Notwithstanding a general hostility to religion, the FrenchRevolution was soon creating its own rituals and myths, and it subsequentlyemployed the use of terror on a scale that dampened an initial enthusiasmelsewhereinEuropefortheFrenchexampleandwentsomewaytodiscredittheideasithadembodied.Thatprocessofdisillusionmentcontinuedwhentheearlychaotic egalitarianism gave way to revivified hierarchy, military adventurismandanewautocracy.Thiswasespecially soafter thecollectiveexecutive, theDirectory, which had come to power in 1795, was overthrown in 1799 byNapoleonBonapartewhowentontoestablishhisdictatorialpower.Inareversalofmanyoftheidealsoftherevolution,NapoleonwascrownedemperorbythePopein1804.TheFrenchRevolutionwasthefirstseriousattempttorefoundastateonthebasisofradicalideasofequalityanddemocracy.Itwasnottobethe

lasttimethatarevolutiongalvanizedbysimilarbeliefswouldendinautocraticrulebyastrongman.

TheEvolutionofDemocracyandofDemocraticLeadership

In the course of the nineteenth century ever more social groups acquired afootholdinthepoliticalsysteminmuchofEuropeandinAmericaaseconomicstatusceasedtobeadeterminantoftherighttovote.EveninAmerica,however,propertyrequirementslongrestrictedtherighttovote,anduniversalmalewhitesuffrage took place at different times in different states. By the 1860s it waslargelycomplete.Non-whitemalesweredebarredfromvotinguntil1870whenthepassingoftheFifteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionenfranchisedthem–in principle. It came just five years after the Thirteenth Amendment hadabolished slavery. The Fifteenth Amendment was not, however, sufficient toprevent southern states putting obstacles in the way of black Americans’exerciseoftheirvotingrights.Eveninthelateryearsofthetwentiethcentury,anumberofstatesstillfoundwaysofrestrictingthevotingopportunitiesoftheirfellow citizens of African descent. The best response to the bigots was theelection of the son of a white American woman and black African father aspresident in2008and the re-electionofBarackObama in2012. In the firstofthese electionsObamawon a higher percentage ofwhite voters (43 per cent)thandidJohnKerry(41percent)in2004.46

In many countries of Europe the last third of the nineteenth century sawimportant extensions of the right to vote, as it was delinked from propertyownership. France had universal male suffrage from 1871 and Switzerlandfollowedsuitin1874.InBritaintheextensionofthesuffragewassogradualthatalmostaquarterofadultmenwerestillvotelessatatimewhentheywerebeingconscripted for service in the First World War. It was the lack of votes forwomen, however, which ensured that an absolute majority of the adultpopulation throughout Europe and America were disenfranchized prior to thetwentieth century. It is, therefore, hardly appropriate to call any EuropeancountryortheUnitedStatesofAmericademocraticearlierthanthelasthundredyears or so.That is notwithstanding the fact that some countries, not least theUnitedStatesandBritain,werenotable in thenineteenthcentury (and, indeed,wellbeforethen)fortheextentoftheirfreedomsandpoliticalpluralismandthe

existence (however flawed) of a rule of law. More generally, there was inEurope and America a gradual but uneven growth of government bypersuasion.47 At a time, however, when both women and African-Americanswere denied the vote in the nineteenth-century United States, Alexis deTocquevillewaspremature, albeit inmanyotherwaysprescient, incalling theremarkablebookhewroteinthe1830sDemocracyinAmerica.

Thedevelopmentofdemocracyinthetwentiethcentury,withtheadventoffemalesuffrage,hadimportantimplicationsforpoliticalleadership.Nottheleastof thesewas theentirelynewpossibilityof awomanbeingchosen toheadanelectedgovernment. Itwas as late as 1893 that the right of full adult suffragewas extended to women, and even then in one country only – New Zealand.WithinEurope,itwasfromScandinavia(characteristically)thattheleadcameinextending women’s rights, Finland and Norway being in 1907 pioneers ofwomen’ssuffrage.Inmostcountries,theUnitedStatesandBritainamongthem,womengotthevoteonlyaftertheFirstWorldWar.EnfranchisementofwomenintheUScamein1920withthepassingoftheNineteenthAmendment.Unliketheconstitutionalamendmentofhalfacenturyearlier,abolishingthecolourbartovoting,statesdidnotseektocircumventthisnewprovision.IntheUKvotesforwomencameintwostages–forthoseovertheageofthirtyin1918andforwomenaged twenty-oneorolder in1928.At long last, thatbrought them intoelectoralequalitywithmen.

The political advance of women has been an essential component ofdemocracy,butittooksometimeforvotesforwomentopavethewayfortheirelevation to positions of political leadership. Sirimavo Bandaranaike in 1960became theworld’s firstwoman primeminister. She acquired this position inCeylon(nowSriLanka),havingbeenpersuadedbytheSriLankaFreedomPartytobecometheirleader,followingtheassassinationofherhusbandwhohadbeenthe party’s founder.Centuries earlierwomen had, of course, at times held thehighestpoliticaloffice, but ashereditarymonarchs,withnonemore illustriousthan Elizabeth I in sixteenth-century England and Catherine II in eighteenth-centuryRussia.Untilthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,however,womenhad not headed governments as leaders of political parties which had wonpopular elections.Yet by 2013more than eightywomen had held the highestelected governmental office in a wide variety of countries, spanning everycontinentoftheworld.TheseincludedGoldaMeir,IsraeliPrimeMinisterfrom1969until1974;followedby(totakeonlysomeofthemorenotableEuropeanexamples) Margaret Thatcher in Britain in 1979; Gro Harlem Brundtland in

Norway in 1981; Angela Merkel as Chancellor of Germany in 2005; HelleThorning-Schmidt in Denmark (2011); and Norway’s second woman primeminister,ErnaSolberg,in2013.

Contrarytomostpeople’sexpectations,womenleadersemergedearlierandmore often in patriarchal Asian societies than in Europe or North America(where,althoughCanadahashadawomanpremier,theUnitedStatesawaitsitsfirstwomanpresident).IndiraGandhibecameIndianprimeministerasearlyas1966.However,inalltheAsiancases,therehasbeenafamilyconnectiontoanimportant male politician – father or husband. Thus, significant breakthroughthough thiswas, the emergence ofwomen leaders on theAsian continent canalso be seen as a new variation on the theme of hereditary rule and dynasticpolitics.Bandaranaiketooktheplaceofherslainhusband.MrsGandhiwastheonlychildof the firstprimeministerof independent India, Jawaharlal ‘Pandit’Nehru.CorazónAcquino,Presidentof thePhilippines from1986 to1992,wasthewidowofBenigno‘Ninoy’Acquino, themost respectedpoliticalopponentoftheauthoritarianandcorruptFerdinandMarcoswhopaidforhisoppositiontoMarcoswithhis life.BenazirBhutto,primeministerofPakistan from1988 to1990 and again from 1993 to 1996, was the country’s first woman head ofgovernment. Her father, Zulfikar, had been successively president and primeministerofPakistaninthe1970s.TheirdeathswereemblematicoftheviolenceandvolatilityofPakistanipolitics,withZulkifarhangedin1979fortheallegedpoliticalmurder of an opponent, andBenazir killed by a bombwhile shewaselection campaigning in December 2007. The first woman president of SouthKorea,ParkGeun-hye,wasdemocraticallyelectedinDecember2012andtookofficeinFebruary2013.SheisthedaughterofParkChung-hee,theauthoritarianpresident of South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s who was killed by hisintelligence chief in 1979. Even the remarkable Burmese opposition leader,AungSanSuuKyi,whoseleadershipofthedemocraticresistancetothemilitarydictatorshipledtolongyearsofhousearrest,owedherinitialprestigetobeingthedaughterofAungSan,theassassinatedleaderoftheBurmeseindependencestruggle.

The family connectionwas important also in the emergenceof the earliestwomen leaders in Latin America. Without ever holding the highest politicaloffice,EvitaPerón, the secondwife ofArgentina’s first post-WorldWarTwopresident,JuanPerón,becameinfluentialbothduringherlifeandafterherdeath.In particular, she was a significant influence on the achievement of femalesuffrage in Argentina in 1947. And it was Perón’s third wife, Isabel, who

becamethefirstwomanPresidentofArgentina,onherhusband’sdeathin1975.More recently, however, women leaders have been elected in Latin Americawithout needing any dynastic connection. Although Christina Fernández inArgentina conforms to the earlier pattern, having succeeded her late husband,Néstor Kirchner, neither Dilma Rousseff in Brazil nor Michelle Bachelet inChileneededanysuchfamilyconnection.Theycametoprominenceentirelyonthebasisoftheirowneffortsandabilitiesandtopowerasaresultoftheirhighstanding within their parties and countries. Bachelet, who belonged to theessentially social democratic Chilean Socialist Party, was President of Chilefrom 2006 to 2010, andRousseff, amember of theBrazilianWorkers’ Party,waselectedPresidentinsuccessiontoLuladaSilvainthelatteryear.Onethingthe twowomendidhave incommonis that theyhadbeenactiveopponentsofmilitary dictatorship and that both were subjected to persecution, includingtorture,whentheyweremilitantsresistingauthoritarianruleintheircountries.

CULTURALCONTEXT

Recent anthropological research has expanded our understanding of thedevelopmentofleadershipovertimeandindifferentsocieties.Ithasfleshedoutwith new evidence, and simultaneously modified, some of the ideas ofEnlightenmenttheoristsoutlinedearlierinthischapter.Itisclearerthaneverthatthere has been a wide variety of ways of reaching decisions in pre-moderncommunities.Therearemanyegalitarianhunter-gatherer societies inwhichnoone person has been designated as leader and others which have chiefs.48Moreover, since hunter-gathering has been themode of subsistence of humanbeingsduring99percentoftheirexistenceonearth,itisunsurprisingthatthereshouldhavebeenvariationatdifferenttimesandindifferentplacesinthewaysthese groups reached agreement and resolved disagreements.49 TheAmericanscholar JaredDiamond has noted that the size of the group is important. If itconsists of several hundred people, in which not only does everyone knoweveryone else but they also form a kinship group, they can get by without achief.Diamondwrites:

Tribesstillhaveaninformal,‘egalitarian’systemofgovernment.Informationanddecisionmakingarebothcommunal...Many[NewGuinean]highlandvillagesdohavesomeoneknownasthe‘big-man’,themostinfluentialmaninthevillage.But thatpositionisnotaformalofficetobefilledandcarriesonlylimitedpower.Thebig-manhasnoindependentdecision-makingauthority...andcandonomorethanattempttosway communal decisions. Big-men achieve that status by their own attributes; the position is not

inherited.50

Insomeinstances,however,big-mencouldovertimetransformthemselvesintochiefs andwhen they did so, the anthropologistMarshall Sahlins argued, theyused their leadership to subvert the egalitarian norms of the tribe, demandingeconomic dues and forcing people to produce more than was needed forsubsistence. Initially such chiefs were constrained by the belief that all themembersofthetribewerepartofanextendedfamily,butsomeoftheirnumberwent on to repudiate the ties of kinship and to engage in more ruthlessexploitation.51Thus,whatbeganasleadershipandpersuasionturnedintopowerandcoercion.Chiefdoms, asdistinct frombandsor tribeswithnoonegrantedsupreme authority, appear to have first arisen some 7,500 years ago.52Tribalassociations of people tended to develop into societies headed by chiefswhen‘thelocalpopulationwassufficientlylargeanddense’andtherewas‘potentialfor surplus foodproduction’.The larger thegroup, themoredifficult itwas toavoid the emergence of a leader who was in some, but not all, casesauthoritarian. Different pre-modern societies have had their own distinctivefeatures.53

PoliticallifeinAfricanstates,whichhavegenerallycomeunderindigenousrule only from the later decades of the twentieth century, frequently bears theimprint of earlier forms of social organization. When British colonies wereaccorded independent statehood (usually following political struggle) andpresentedwithaconstitutionbasedonthe‘Westminstermodel’,deeperculturaltraits often trumped formal institutions, and any similarity to Westminsterbecame increasingly difficult to discern. Thus,African leaders have tended tooperate‘throughhighlypersonalizedpatron-clientnetworks’thatareusually,butnotalways,basedonethnicandregionalgroupings.Withinthesenetworkstherearegenerally‘BigMen’whowielddisproportionate influenceand‘circumventtheformalrulesofthegame’.54ApersistentproblemofAfricanstateshasbeenthe fact thatboundaries thatarea legacyofcolonialconquest forciblybroughttogether peoples of different ethnic identities and religion who had little incommon.Oneofthemostchallengingtasksofpoliticalleadershipwastocreatea sense of national identity. Presidents JuliusNyerere inTanzania andNelsonMandela in South Africa were unusually successful in doing so.55 Goodinstitutionsclearlyareimportant,butmuchdependsonthequalityandintegrityof leadership. If leaders themselves circumvent the institutions and thus

underminetheirlegitimacy,thensoundstructureswillnotbeenough.Thus, leadershipmatters,but it isvisionaryand inclusive leadershipwhich

thepoorestandmostdividedsocietiesneed,notastrongman.Manyofthemostimpoverishedcountriesoftheworldareamongthemostethnicallydiverse.Thiscompounds the problem of making electoral competition work, for there is astrongtendencyforvoting(totheextentthattheelectionisreasonablyfree)tobe along lines of ethnic loyalty. The temptation is to conclude that what isneeded by the kind of ethnically diverse society inwhichmost of the bottombillion of the world’s poor live is ‘a strongman’.56 On the basis of longobservationofAfrican states andof statistical analysisof factors conducive tointer-communal violence, Paul Collier begs to differ. Noting the damage thatviolencedoestotheprospectsforeconomicgrowth,inadditiontoitsdevastatingimmediateeffectsonpeople’slives,Collierconcludesthat‘badasdemocracyis’in ethnically diverse failing states inhabited by the world’s poorest people,‘dictatorsareevenworse’.57

PoliticalCulture

My main concern in the present context is, however, with locating politicalleadershipwithinthepoliticalculturesofmodernsocieties.Afocusonpoliticalculture means attending to those aspects of culture which bear relevance topolitics. It also provides a link between history and politics, for deep-seatedcultures, as distinct from ephemeral attitudes, are a product of the historicalexperience of nations and groups (although less history as distilled byprofessional historians than history as popularly perceived). The concept ofpoliticalcultureand,stillmore,itsparentconceptofculturehavebeendefinedin a great many different ways.58 In essence, however, a political cultureembodieswhatpeopletakeforgrantedasappropriateorinappropriatebehaviouron thepartofgovernmentsandcitizens;people’sunderstandingsof themeansbywhichpoliticalchangemaybebroughtabout;theirperceptionsofthehistoryof their group or nation; and their values and fundamental political beliefs.59Students of values accept that they can alter over time, but contend that, as arule, they change only gradually.60 Fundamental political beliefs refer not towhether people support one or another political party, but to somethingmorebasic – whether, for example, they believe that all citizens have the right to

influencetheirleadersandhelpdeterminepoliticaloutcomesor,onthecontrary,they hold thatwhat happens in governmentmust be left in the hands of theirrulerswho,likethewindsandthewaves,arenot(andshouldnotbe)subjecttotheswayofordinarymortals.

Politicalcultures incomplex,modernsocietiesarenothomogeneous.Mostcountries are, in fact, ethnically diverse and contain also people of differentreligiousfaithsandofnone.Inthemoresuccessfulofthem,valueisattachedtowhatthey,nevertheless,haveincommon.Theyarecharacterizedalsobybroadagreement on theways inwhich political changemay be brought about, eventhough, in a democracy, the content and direction of the change will remainobjects of contention. It is always an oversimplification to speak about thepolitical culture of a particular nation.Nations and states contain a number ofsub-cultures.Insomecases,evenallegiancetoapoliticalpartycanbeasignifierofthis.MembersoftheCommunistPartyorofaconservativeCatholicpartyinFourth or Fifth Republic France belonged to very different sub-cultures. Yet,there are often some beliefs broadly accepted in one societywhich are by nomeanstakenforgrantedinanother.61Inonecountrytheremay,forexample,beawidespreadwillingness to accord a leader uninhibited power for the sake of‘order’ (seen as the supreme value), whereas in another the emphasis is onconstraining the power of the top leader and making him or her legally andpoliticallyaccountable.Historically,RussiahasbeenanexampleofthefirstandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaofthesecond.

Leaders,then,operatewithinpoliticalcultureswhicharenotimmutablebutwhich tend to change slowly. Suppression of freedom of the press by anAmerican president, Canadian primeminister or French presidentwouldmeetcultural as well as institutional resistance. Indeed, during his single term ofoffice as President of France, Nicholas Sarkozy came under strong domesticattack for an alleged willingness to use the security services to investigatecritical journalists.62 Italy has been a flawed democracy in the post-SecondWorldWarperiod,butademocracynevertheless.63Thus,therewassubstantialoppositionwithin the society to PrimeMinister SilvioBerlusconi’s use of hismediaempire tocurtailcriticismanddebate. InRussia, therehasneverbeenafullyfledgeddemocracy,althoughavigorouspoliticalpluralismemergedinthesecond half of the 1980s. Over the past two decades that has becomeprogressively attenuated. There was, though, a break with the passivity andconformismofthepreviousdecadein2011and2012whenriggedparliamentary

electionsbroughttensofthousandsofprotestersontothestreetsofMoscowand(inmuchsmallernumbers) inothercities.The twenty-first-centuryharassmentof opposition leaders, accompanied by state-enforced conformism of themassmedia, have, however, evoked protests from only a small minority of thepopulation. A democratic political culture grows out of lengthy democraticexperience,andsuchexperienceinRussiahasbeenbothincompleteandshort-lived.

Yetpoliticalcultureschangeovertimeinaninteractionbetweeninstitutionsand values. It is a two-way relationship. Long experience with democraticinstitutions helps to mould and consolidate democratic values. But there areinstanceswherethepredominantinfluenceisfromtheotherdirection.Theymayarisewhenanauthoritarianregimehasbeenimposedonacountryandthenewrulers promote an ideology which is at odds with well-established andwidespread beliefs within the society. A good example of this wasCzechoslovakia, which existed from 1918 until the end of 1992 (followingwhichtheCzechRepublicandSlovakRepublicbecameseparatestates).Itwasthemost democratic statewithin central Europe between the twoworldwars,andwasledformostofthattimebyitsmainfounder,ThomasMasaryk.Intheyears immediately after the Second World War that First Republic wasdenigrated by Communists and linked in many people’s minds with theunemploymentofthe1930sand,aboveall,withthecollapseoftherepublicinthefaceofNaziaggression.YetCzechs(morethandidSlovaks)perceivedtheirinter-wardemocracymuchmorepositivelyaftertwodecadesofCommunistrulethan they had done in the early post-war period.A 1946 survey askedCzechcitizens to saywhich period of Czech history they considered to be themostglorious. The First Republic (1918–1938) was named by only 8 per cent ofrespondentsandcamefifthfromthetopof‘glorious’periods.Whenthequestionwasrepeated in1968, theFirstRepublic topped the listwith thesupportof39percentofCzechs.64Bythe1960smanyCzechandSlovakCommunistswerethemselves re-evaluating the advantages of political pluralism, and also themoral and political stature of Masaryk, after their experience of Soviet-styleoppressiverule.

In the early post-war years there had been genuine enthusiasm inCzechoslovakia for ‘building socialism’. Yet bureaucratic authoritarian rule,accompanied by political police surveillance and repression,was notwhat themore idealistic of young Czech Communists had sought or expected. Thecontrast between the depressing reality and their ideals led over time to some

serious rethinking.Reformwas also stimulated byNikitaKhrushchev’s attackonStalininaclosedsessionoftheTwentiethCongressoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnioninMoscowin1956andthenagain,openly,attheTwenty-SecondCongress in 1961.What became known as thePragueSpringwas theculmination of a reform movement inside the Communist Party ofCzechoslovakia itself. However, in the more tolerant and rapidly changingatmosphere of 1968 the broader society was revitalized. Civic groupsrepresenting the non-Communist majority of the population sprang up. Theprocess – especially the political reforms endorsed by the Communist Partyleadership–soalarmedtheSovietPolitburothattheysenthalfamilliontroopsinAugustofthatyeartoputastoptoit.

The topparty leader,AlexanderDubček (aSlovakbynationality),wasnothimselfaradicalreformer,buthewasagoodlistenerwhopreferredpersuasionto coercion and tolerated critical discussion and a partial pluralization of thesystem. In the eyes of senior Soviet leaders, he became ‘the Number OneScoundrel’.65AlthoughDubček’srolewasthatoffacilitatorratherthandrivingforce, his succeeding the hardline Antonín Novotný as party leader at thebeginning of 1968 was of great importance. In a highly authoritarian, strictlyhierarchical political system, a change at the top of the hierarchy to a leaderpossessingnotonlyadifferentstylebutalsomorehumanevaluescouldmakeahuge difference. In general, themore power is concentrated in the office, thegreaterthepotentialsignificanceofthechangeofleaderoccupyingit.

Cultural influence,animportantfactofpolitical life,shouldneverbetakentomeanculturaldeterminism.Transnational influences, cuttingacrossnationalcultures,havebeenimportantforcenturiesandseldommoresothaninthelastdecades of the twentieth century and in the twenty-first when the means ofinstant communication between countries and continents are more numerousthan ever before. Within any modern state, moreover, there is a variety ofcultural traditions that can be drawn upon.Czechswere fortunate in having apast leaderwho embodied democratic values andwho could become a potentsymbol for those seekingchange.PhotographsofMasarykwerebeing soldonthe streets of Prague in 1968 (I bought one there myself in that year), thenbannedforthenexttwentyyears,onlytore-emergeinlate1989.Andthistime,whatbecameknownasthe‘VelvetRevolution’metnoresistancefromMoscow.

SomecountriesunderauthoritarianortotalitarianrulehavealessusablepastthanthatwhichCzechscoulddrawupon.Ithelpstohavehadpastexperienceofdemocracy and to have symbols of democracy and freedom to quarry.A less

propitiouspoliticalculturalinheritance,fromademocraticstandpoint,doesnot,however, mean that nations are destined to spend the rest of time underdictatorialrule.Farfromit.Everycountryintheworldtodaywhichisregardedas democratic was at one time governed by authoritarian warlords or by anabsolutemonarch.

Leaders can be especially important at times of transition fromauthoritarianism to democracy. The depth of their commitment to democraticvaluesisliable,inperiodsofpoliticalturmoil,tobedecisivelyimportantbothinsecuringsuchabreakthroughandinsustainingit.MikhailGorbachev,asIshallargue inChapter 4,was a transformational leader, but he and his allies in theSoviet Union had an uphill struggle. There were not only powerful vestedinterestsopposedtotheradicalchangeswhichthelastleaderoftheSovietUnioninitiated, but also important strands in Russian political culture that could bedrawnuponbyhisopponents.Theyhavebeenamongtheunderpinningsoftheruleofpost-SovietRussianleadersastheywhittledawaychecksonthepowerofthetopleadership,whichhademergedinthelastyearsoftheSovietUnion,andretained democratic forms while depriving them of most of their democraticsubstance.Therehasbeenarelapseintomodesofconformistthinkingwherebyitbecomesnaturalaswellasprudentnottochallengetheauthorityofthepowersthat be. In Russia a leader’s supposed ‘popularity’ is often an effect of ‘hisperceivedgriponpower’.Aninterviewwithawomanvoterintherun-uptothe1996presidentialelectionprovidedanaptillustrationofthis.Askedwhomshesupported,shenamedtheCommunistPartycandidate,GennadyZyuganov,butsaid shewould be voting forBorisYeltsin. To the questionwhy, she replied:‘WhenZyuganov ispresident, Iwillvote forhim.’Power isdeemed toconferauthority and, in turn, commands respect and allegiance.As IvanKrastev andStephen Holmes have observed, if Putin ever becomes ‘just one of severalgenuinelyplausiblecandidatesforthepostofpresident,hewouldnolongerbethe Putin for whom an opportunistically deferential electorate was eager tovote’.66

Survey research has provided much evidence of attachment to a traditionwhichlinkslegitimategovernmenttotheruleofastrongman.Intheyear2000the institute headed by Yuriy Levada (until his death in 2006 the respecteddoyenofRussianpublicopinionresearchers)polledfellowcitizensonwhichoftheirleadersinthetwentiethcenturytheyconsideredthemostoutstanding.Thetop fivewho emergedwere different personalities inmanyways, but the onething they had in common was hostility to democracy. They were, at best,

authoritarian and, at worst, totalitarian leaders. Josif Stalin came top withVladimir Lenin in second place. Third was Yuriy Andropov who headed theKGB for fifteen years and was leader of the Communist Party of the SovietUnionfrom1982untilhisdeathinearly1984.LeonidBrezhnev,Sovietleaderfrom1964until1982,occupiedthefourthslot,andinfifthplacecamethelasttsar,NicholasII,whowasoverthrownin1917.67

There have been other surveys, it is important to add, which suggest thatthereismoresupportfordemocraticprinciplesamongthepopulationofRussiathan is evincedby the political elite.Only aminority ofRussians believe thattheyarelivingunderdemocracy,butamajorityregarditasanappropriatewayto govern their country. Yet, in reporting these results, Timothy Colton andMichael McFaul note also the less encouraging findings that when Russianswereforcedtochoosebetweendemocracy,ontheonehand,andastrongstate,on the other, only 6 per cent preferred democracy.68 Consonant with such apreference, three surveys conducted in the Russian city of Yaroslavl in 1993,1996 and 2004 found over 80 per cent of respondents agreeing with thestatement that ‘talented, strong-willed leaders always achieve success in anyundertaking’,whilesomethree-quartersagreedthat‘afewstrongleaderscoulddomorefortheircountrythanalllawsanddiscussion’.69

Notonly,however,aretheredifferentsub-cultureswithinRussia,aswithinanymodernstate, thereareparticularlystrikinggenerationaldifferences.IntheLevadasurveyalreadycited,respondentswereallowedtonameonlyonepersonasthegreatestleaderoftheircountryinthetwentiethcentury.ThosewhochoseStalinandthosewhonamedGorbachevclearlybelongedtoverydifferentsub-cultures, given the chasm between the values and policies of these twomen.Gorbachev occupied sixth place in that survey, named by 7 per cent ofrespondents.Therewere,however,verysignificantdifferenceslinkedtoageandeducation.Stalin’ssupportwashighestamongthoseagedfifty-fiveandoverandlowest among the eighteen-to twenty-four-year-olds. Of the three levels ofeducationalattainment–higher,middleor‘lessthanmiddle’–Stalin’ssupportwaslowestamongthosewithhighereducation.WithGorbachevitwastheotherwayroundintermsofbotheducationallevelandagegroups.Hewasseenasthegreatest leader of the century by 14 per cent of respondents with highereducation, the same percentage from that highly educated section of thepopulationaschoseStalinasthegreatest.70Inasurveyconductedin2005therewere similar age-related differences in Russian attitudes to the unreformed

Soviet system.Askedwhether it would have been ‘better if everything in thecountry had remained as it was before 1985’ (the year Gorbachev becameleader),48percentagreedwiththatstatement.Whereas,however,66percentoftheover-fifty-fivesagreed,only24percentof theeighteen to twenty-fouragegroupacceptedthatproposition.71

Political cultures are historically conditioned, but we should neverunderestimate the impact of the history that people themselves actually livethrough. Yet, how they interpret that experience is likely to be heavilyinfluencedbythevaluesandbeliefstheyhaveimbibedinchildhoodandyouth.Studiesof theacquisitionofpoliticaloutlooks inestablisheddemocracieshaveshown that parental political partisanship ‘has a major effect on the flow ofpoliticalinformationtooffspring’.72Thesameisdoubtlesstruewithinsocietiesunder authoritarian rule. Especially in states where Communist regimes wereimposed from without, socialization within the family could be a decisivelyimportant counterweight to the state educational system and the official massmedia.In thecaseofPoland, the influenceofparents–and, linkedto this, theinfluenceof theCatholicChurch–wasgreater thanthatofaparty-statewhichnever overcame the obstacle to its legitimacy of having been imposed,essentially,bySovietforceofarms.AmightysecularleaderwasfarlesslikelyforPolesthanforRussianstobeseenastheanswertotheirproblems,stilllesstheirprayers.73

PSYCHOLOGICALDIMENSIONS

The pursuit of power and wealth is often seen as a game played by rationalactors in defence of their self-interest, especially by many contemporaryeconomistsand their fellow-travellersamongpoliticalscientists.Paradoxically,though,eventhemotivationformoney-making–exceptforthosesopoorthatitiscloselyrelatedtosurvival–oftenisnotprimarilyeconomic.InthewordsofDaniel Kahneman (a psychologist who was awarded the Nobel Prize inEconomics):‘Forthebillionairelookingfortheextrabillion,andindeedfortheparticipant in an experimental economics project looking for the extra dollar,money is a proxy for points on a scale of self-regard and achievement.’74Asusual, Adam Smith was wiser than those who interpret his theories as anunalloyeddefenceofeconomicself-interestandwhoviewthatasthegoverning

principle of society. Smithwaswell aware of the non-rational element in lifegenerally,includingthewaypeoplereacttomajorpoliticalevents.Henoted,forexample, that ‘all the innocentblood thatwasshed in thecivilwars,provokedless indignation than the death ofCharles I’.75 ‘A stranger to human nature,’Smith observed, ‘would be apt to imagine, that painmust bemore agonizing,and the convulsions of deathmore terrible to persons of higher rank, than tothose of meaner stations.’ He turns this reflection into a psychologicalexplanationforsocialandpoliticalhierarchy,onewhichcomplementshisideasabout the relationship of forms of government to the means of economicsubsistence.WritinginTheTheoryofMoralSentiments,Smithcontends:

Uponthisdispositionofmankind,togoalongwithallthepassionsoftherichandpowerful,isfoundedthedistinctionofranks,and theorderofsociety.Ourobsequiousness tooursuperiorsmorefrequentlyarisesfromouradmirationfortheadvantagesoftheirsituation,thanfromanyprivateexpectationsofbenefitfromtheirgood-will.Theirbenefitscanextendbuttoafew;buttheirfortunesinterestalmosteverybody.76

It is mainly the wise and virtuous – who form, Smith observes, ‘but a smallparty’ – who are ‘the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue’. Incontrast: ‘The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and,whatmayseemmoreextraordinary,most frequently thedisinterested admirersandworshippers,ofwealthandgreatness’(italicsadded).77

To that disposition to admire ‘wealth and greatness’ may be added atendency of many observers to take individual rulers – whether monarchs,presidentsorprimeministers–attheirownhighvalueofthemselves,sustained,asitis,byflatteryandthehopesofprefermentofsomeofthosearoundthem.Anumber of books on leadership donowpaymore attention than in the past tofollowers and their complex relationship with leaders.78 Timid and gulliblefollowers, it is postulated, get the bad leaders they deserve. Leaders rely on‘true-believer’followerswhowillrecruitotherfollowerstopromotetheirheroicimage and to spread their message. Therefore, ‘to the extent that leaders’reliance on followers is ignored, so the autonomy of the leader isexaggerated’.79

Obeisancetoauthorityfigurescanallow‘toxicleaders’inmanyprofessions–notonlypolitics–tosurviveinofficewhentheyshouldbedrivenfromit.JeanLipman-Blumen has noted a widespread tendency to ‘prefer toxic leaders tothosedisillusioning leaders,whowouldpressournoses to thedarkwindowoflife’.80Manyleaders,ofcourse,areneither‘toxic’norgloom-laden.Indeed,a

leader needs to be able to instil hope and provide reasons for optimism, evenwhile being honest about the scale of problems to be overcome. WinstonChurchillperformedthattaskparexcellenceasBritishwartimeprimeminister.AsAmericanpresident,JimmyCarteridentifiedmanyoftheproblemsfacingtheUnitedStates,butwasmuch less successful atboostingmorale.An intelligentandupright leader,Carterhas,nevertheless,beencharacterizedas ‘slightly toopious and nearly joyless’.81 He tried to do too much himself, and placedexcessive reliance on rationality, uncluttered by emotional appeal or politicalsentiment,tobeeffectiveinachievinghispolicygoals.WhileCarterwasstillinthe White House, one of his former aides identified as a problem of hisleadershipafailure‘toprojectavisionlargerthantheproblemheistacklingatthe moment’.82 Carter had a far more detailed grasp of the issues than hissuccessor, Ronald Reagan, but the latter’s sunny optimism went a long waytowardshelpinghimwinthe1980presidentialelection.ThereismuchevidencefromstudiesofAmericanpoliticsthat‘peoplevoteforthecandidatewhoelicitstherightfeelings,notthecandidatewhopresentsthebestarguments’.83

Leaders often give themselves credit for a particular success, even whenthereisnoevidencethattheyhavedoneanythinginparticular,orevenanythingat all, tobring it about.84As socialpsychologistsAlexanderHaslam,StephenReicher and Michael Platow put it: ‘There is no mystery as to why leadersthemselvesareattractedtotheideaofheroicleadership.First,itlegitimatestheirpositionbyproviding a rationale for claims that they, rather than anyone else,shouldholdthereinsofpower,...Seconditfreesthemfromtheconstraintsofgroup traditions, from any obligations to groupmembers . . . Third, it allowsleaders to reap all the benefits of success while often avoiding the pitfalls offailure.’85Pronounscanberevealing.Thus,themoreself-regardingofleaders’accountsoftheirexploitscanbesummarisedas‘Ilead,youblunder,wefail.’86Moregenerally,asKahnemanhasobserved:‘Weknowthatpeoplecanmaintainanunshakablefaithinanyproposition,howeverabsurd,whentheyaresustainedbyacommunityoflike-mindedbelievers.’87

Therecentattentionpaidtofollowersaswellasleadersiswelcome.Afocus,however,onlyontheonepersonatthetopofthehierarchyandonpeoplewhomay reasonably be described as his or her followers leaves out an importantcategory of leaders. Within a democratic government – and even in someauthoritarian regimes – there are people of substance within the leadership

groupwhoshouldnotberegardedas‘followers’of the top leader.Theymay,indeed,haveplayedasimportant–orsometimesevenmoreimportant–apartinsuchsuccessesas thegovernmentenjoysasdid theofficial leader.Thatwouldnotbenewstoseriousbiographersofsomeofthemajorfiguresingovernmentswhobecameneitherpresidentnorprimeminister.Yetitismuchlessdiscernibleinbooksthatseektogeneralizeaboutpoliticalleadership.

It is anaxiomof institutional analysis thatwithinbureaucracieswhereyoustanddependsonwhereyousit.88Anditistrueuptoapoint.Totakethemostobvious example, officials within a government’s Department of Health orDepartmentofEducation(stillmorethepoliticianinchargeofthedepartment)willgenerallyseeksubstantiallyincreasedbudgetsfortheirrespectivespheresofhealth or education. The primary preoccupation of a Treasury official, incontrast, will be to keep government spending within the bounds of financialprudence. Winston Churchill is not generally regarded as a politician whofavoured reducing military expenditure, but when he was Chancellor of theExchequer,hedemanded(in1925)deepcutsfromtheAdmiraltyandcalledforasmaller navy, although as First Lord of the Admiralty before the FirstWorldWar, he had successfully pressed for a huge increase in naval expenditure.89Moregenerally,whatisamajorconcernforonedepartmentmaybeamatteroflittleinterestorlowpriorityforanother.

One of the many suggestive findings, however, of social and politicalpsychology,whichcomplementswhatweknowaboutinstitutionalroles,isthatwhereyoustanddependsalsoonwhatyousee.90Misperceptionoffactsfeedsbackintovaluesandhelpstoshapeparticularviews.91Thus,inthe1990safifthof Americans thought that what the government spent most money on wasforeign aid – at a time when it took about 2 per cent of the budget.92 Thisstrengthenedhostilitytospendingmoneyforthatpurpose.Itiswellknownthatin their perceptions people tend to screen out information that is at oddswiththeir preexisting beliefs andwill find a variety of imaginativemeans to viewdecisions they have made as reasonable and justified, including those whichdisplay inconsistencybetween their actions andprofessedprinciples.93Peopleselectivelyprocessand interpret informationso that itdoesnotchallenge theirpreviousassumptionsinuncomfortableways.Perceptionsofpoliticalrealityare‘inextricablyintertwinedwithcitizen’spoliticalpreferencesandidentity’.Thus,studies of televised American presidential and vice-presidential debates found

that ‘people’sperceptionsofwho“won”’were ‘stronglycoloredby theirprioropinionsaboutthecandidates’.94*

Alargebodyofevidencetestifiestothefactthatemotionsmattergreatlyinpolitics.95To suchanextent thatweneed to add to theotherdeterminantsofpolitical stance: where you stand depends on what you feel. Rationality andpeople’sperceptionsoftheirinterestsarefarfrombeingirrelevanttothechoicestheymake in elections; butmaterial self-interest plays a lessmajor role for asignificantnumberofvotersthanmightbeexpected.Thereisaparticularlyrichbody of research on this in the context of American politics. The paradoxwhereby many people will cast their vote for a representative or leader ongrounds far removed from their immediate economic interests iswell summedup byDrewWesten, a clinical psychologist and political strategist: ‘Howgaypeopleexpresstheircommitmenttooneanotherdoesn’taffectthemarriagesof95percentofAmericans,whoaren’tlikelytostartdashingoffwiththeirfishingbuddies in droves if given the opportunity to tie the gay knot.Whether a fewdozen murderers a year get a life sentence or the chair doesn’t make muchdifference to the day-to-day experienceofmost of us.’96What is remarkable,Westensuggests,istheextenttowhichemotionalreactiononsuchsocialissuesinfluencesmanyAmerican votes. That is in spite of the fact thatwhat affectspeople’s everyday livesmuchmore is ‘who gets tax breaks andwho doesn’t;whether they can leave one job and begin anotherwithout fear of losing theirhealth insurance because of a preexisting condition; whether they can takematernityleavewithoutgettingfired’.97

INSTITUTIONSOFLEADERSHIP

I have alreadymade the point that leaders in the purest sense of the term arethosewhoattractfollowersandmakeanimpactonsocietyandpoliticswhilenotholding any vestige of state power.MahatmaGandhi during India’s quest forindependencefromBritain,NelsonMandelaintheSouthAfricananti-apartheidstruggleformajorityrule,andAungSanSuuKyiastheacknowledgedleaderofthe campaign for democracy in Burma are outstanding examples from thetwentiethand twenty-firstcenturies.98And leaderssuchas thesearesurelynoless deserving of the adjective ‘great’ thanmonarchs in earlier centuries whowere given that accoladeon account ofmilitary victories, however inadequate

‘great man’ (or great woman) narratives may be as exclusive, or general,explanationsofhistoricalchange.

Evenforthesethreeleaders,however,institutions–albeitnongovernmental– havemattered in the furtherance of their cause.Gandhi became head of theIndianNationalCongress,themaininstitutionofoppositiontoBritishrulelongbeforeitbecameagoverningpartyinindependentIndia.Mandelawasthemostrenowned figure in the leadership of the African National Congress, theorganization that led the struggle against institutionalized white supremacy inSouth Africa over many decades until, eventually, it had the opportunity offormingagovernment.AungSanSuuKyihasbeen the longstanding leaderofthe National League for Democracy, an organization that had to resort to anunderground existence for years on end under Burma’s oppressive militarydictatorship.Yettheseleadersneededneitherpatronagenorgovernmentalpowertobolstertheirmoralauthorityandpoliticalappeal.

Mostpoliticalleaderswhobecomerenownedatanationallevelintheirowncountriesarenotlikethat.Theirleadershipisverydependentontheofficetheyhold, most obviously as head of the government, whether President, PrimeMinisteror(inthecaseofGermany)Chancellor.Eventalentedpoliticianswithastrongpersonalitymayachievenotablesuccessinoneofficeandfindthemselvespowerlesstoinfluenceeventsinanother.Theinstitutionalsetting,anditsscopeorlimitations,moreoftenthannotdetermineswhattheycando.Someleaders,however, find ways of expanding their influence, even from relativelyunpromising offices. LyndonB. Johnson, asmajority leader of theUSSenatefrom 1955 (and before that minority leader), overcame the constraints of theseniority system (less flatteringly known as the ‘senility system’), wherebypromotiontocommitteechairsdependedonhowlongsomeonehadbeenintheSenate. Johnson, by mixing persuasion, inducements and sometimesintimidation, was able to fill slots on key committees and win votes as aruthlessly effective Senate leader. Indeed, he virtually reinvented legislativeleadership.Inthewordsofhisoutstandingbiographer,RobertA.Caro,hebentto his will an institution that had been ‘stubbornly unbendable’ and was ‘thegreatest Senate leader in America’s history’. He was ‘master of the Senate –masterofaninstitutionthathadneverbeforehadamaster,andthat...hasnothad one since’.99 Later, as US president, he became that rare thing – aredefining leader (discussed in Chapter 3). He left a much greater legislativelegacythanhispredecessor,JohnF.Kennedy.Inparticular,Johnsonwasabletoget civil rights legislation approved that went far beyond what Kennedy was

capable of persuading Congress to pass. Johnson’s achievement in theWhiteHousedependednotonlyonhis tacticalacumenandvirtuosocajolerybutalsoonacombinationofhisconsummateSenateknow-howandpresidentialpower.

Yet in between holding the Senate leadership,which he had turned into amajorpowerbase,and(asaresultofKennedy’sassassination)accedingto thepresidency, Johnson had been Kennedy’s vice-president. The charisma whichJohnson appeared to radiate as Senate Majority Leader, and which was toreappear in theearliestmonthsofhispresidency,wasobscured to thepointofnon-existenceintheearly1960swhenhewasvice-president.Inthatrolehewasfrozen out of the inner circle of most significant decision-makers. The latterincludedthepresident’sbrother,RobertKennedy,whosehatredofJohnsonwasheartilyreciprocated.Johnson’s leadership talentshadnochance toemerge,soseverelyweretheylimitedbytheofficeheheld.AnearlierTexanvice-president,John Nance Garner, had described the job as not worth ‘a bucket of warmpiss’.100Johnsonhimselfadded:

The vice-presidency is filled with trips around the world, chauffeurs, men saluting, people clapping,chairmanshipsofcouncils,butintheenditisnothing.Idetestedeveryminuteofit.101

AnAmerican vice-president can become a hugely influential figure – anotherleader,infact–butonlyifthepresidentchoosestoreposegreattrustinhim,asGeorge W. Bush did with Dick Cheney.102 For Johnson, in harness withKennedy, it was a very different story. While Johnson had been wrong inimagining thatmuch of the authority he had acquired in the Senatewould betransferabletothevice-presidency,hehadalsomadeanothercalculationwhichturned out to bemore realistic. Convinced that no candidate from a southernstate would be elected President during his lifetime (the last one, ZacharyTaylor,hadbeen in1848),henoted thatone in fivepresidentshadacceded tothat office on the death of the elected incumbent.When Kennedy, aiming tostrengthenhiselectoralchancesinthesouth,invitedtheTexantobehisrunning-mate,Johnson(whohadaspiredtothepresidencyfromanearlyage)reckonedthoseoddswereasgoodashewasnowlikelytoget.103

Institutions are both enabling and constraining. They help leaders to getpolicyimplemented.Theirrules,proceduresandcollectiveethos,however,limithisorherfreedomofaction.AnAmericanpresidenthasmorepowerwithintheexecutive than is normally the case for a prime minister in a parliamentarysystem.Johnson,likeFranklinDelanoRoosevelt,wasamongthosewhousedit

tothefull.Yet,incomparisonwithaprimeministerwhosepartyhasanoverallmajorityinparliament(asisusualinBritain,thecoalitiongovernmentformedin2010beingtheUK’sfirstsincetheSecondWorldWar), thepresident ismuchweaker vis-à-vis the other branches of government – the legislature and thejudiciary. Johnson’s vast Senate experience, allied to the vice-presidency,availed himnothing.Butwhen as president he called every senator in turn, itcountedforagreatdeal.Moreover,theUSpresidentisheadofstateaswellashead of government and, as a result, has traditionally been treatedwithmoredeferenceininterviewsandpressconferencesthanaBritishprimeminister,nottospeakofthewaythelattermaybescornedatquestion-timeintheHouseofCommons.TheespeciallystrictseparationofpowersintheUnitedStateshasaneffectonthewaythatpresidentialleadershipisexercised.Hencetheuseofthepresidency as a ‘bully pulpit’, appealing to the public over the heads of otherbranchesofthepoliticalsysteminthehopeofpersuadingvoterstoputpressureonCongress.FranklinD.RooseveltandRonaldReagan,intheirdifferentways,were effective practitioners ofwhat, as noted in the previous chapter,Trumanregardedasthepresident’smainpower–thepowertopersuade.

LeadersandPoliticalParties

In a democracy, a head of the executive who leads a political party has thebackingofitsorganizationandtheadvantageofitscampaigningsupport.Heorshehadbetter,however, takeaccountofopinionwithin theparty–and in theparliamentarypartyinthefirstinstance–iftherelationshipistoremainahappyone.Itisbecausebeingapartyleaderinademocracymeanspersuadingseniorparty colleagues and the broadermembership that a policy is desirable, ratherthansimplydecreeingit,thatthepartyroleisconstrainingaswellasenabling.Aparty leaderwhoespousespoliciesatoddswith thecorevaluesof thepartyorwithoverwhelmingpartyopiniononanyparticularissueiscourtingtrouble.ForthePresidentoftheUnitedStates,theconstraintsimposedbyhisownpartyaregenerally less than inparliamentarydemocracies,althoughtheyarenotabsent.Thus, President George H.W. Bush deemed it necessary to impose a lengthypause in the constructive and increasingly friendly relationship withGorbachev’s Soviet Unionwhich had been developing under his predecessor,RonaldReagan.BrentScowcroftandhisNationalSecurityCouncilstaffsetupaseries of policy reviews with the aim of showing that Bush’s foreign policywould not simply be a continuation of Reagan’s. Condoleezza Rice, who

managedtwoofthereviews,saidthatthepurposewas‘inthecaseofEuropeanandSovietpolicy,toslowdownwhatwaswidelyseenasRonaldReagan’stoo-close embrace of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988’. Only the subsequent ‘rapidcollapse of communism got our attention in time to overcome our inherentcaution’.104

In theviewof theAmericanambassador toMoscow, JackMatlock, itwasnot simply a matter of the wrong experts giving the wrong advice inWashington, but Bush’s need to shore up his political support where it wasweakest.WhereasReagan’sgoodstandingwithright-wingRepublicanshadlefthim more (though not entirely) immune from criticism from within his ownparty, Bush, asMatlock put it, felt a need ‘to reassure the right wing of theRepublican Party’ and ‘put on a show of toughness to insulate himself fromright-wing criticism’.105 While foreign policy issues do, in some cases, stilldivide the parties, they are less prominent than during the Cold War. ThegrowingsalienceofsocialissuesinAmericanpolitics–abortion,schoolprayer,gay marriage – has contributed to a weakening of party structures.106 Evenbefore those trends became pronounced, the American comedianWill Rogersremarked: ‘I do not belong to any organized political group – I’m aDemocrat.’107

Otherthanthroughimpeachment,Americanpresidentscannotberemovedinbetweenelections.Primeministers inparliamentarydemocracieshaveno suchguarantee.Iftheylosetheconfidenceoftheirparty,especiallytheparliamentaryparty, they can be replaced. Mobilizing a large enough group to challenge aleader is a simpler task if only the parliamentary party has a vote on theleadership, as distinct from an electoral college comprising awider electorate,including rank-and-file party members. Australia is a striking example of acountrywherethesedecisionshavebeenexclusivelyinthehandsofmembersofparliament and where there has been no shortage in modern times of partyleaders being forced out by their own party, even when that person is primeminister.108

The most recent instance was the replacement of Julia Gillard by KevinRuddasLaborleader,andhenceasprimeminister,inJune2013,thusreversingRudd’s ouster byGillard,whowas deputy leader at the time, just three yearsearlier.109Following his removal as party leader and primeminister in 2010,Ruddwent on to serve as foreignminister, but resigned that post in February

2012andprovokedaleadershipcontestinanattempttoregainthepremiership.He was comprehensively defeated by Gillard, even though Rudd was by thistime more popular in the country than was Australia’s first woman primeminister. Senior ministers attacked Rudd’s record and style as primeminister‘with a candour and vehemence’ which suggested that ‘the majority of hiscabinetdidnotwanthimasprimeministerunderanycircumstances’.110Stillnot accepting Julia Gillard’s leadership, Rudd and his supporters mountedanotherchallengejustoverayearlater.MinutesbeforethevotewastobetakeninMarch2013,however,Rudd‘announcedhewouldnotrun,sayinghedidnothavethenumbers’.111Healsosaidthatthiswouldbehislastattempttoregainthepartyleadership.Yet,amerethreemonthslater,convincedthathenowdidhave the numbers, Rudd renewed his challenge and won the party vote. AChinese-speakingformerdiplomat,Ruddisregardedas‘ferociouslybright’,buthis ‘autocratic leadership style’when hewas primeminister earlier led to hisbeing‘despisedbylargesectionsofhisownparty’.112

Aswasentirelypredictable,Labor’schangeofleadershipdidnotaffecttheoveralloutcomeof thegeneralelectionwhen it tookplace inSeptember2013.Immediately after his return to the primeministership in late June, Ruddwasahead not only of Gillard in the opinion polls but also of the Leader of theOpposition,TonyAbbott,althoughasapartyLaborstilltrailed,albeitwiththegap temporarily narrowed. By the time of the election in early September,Abbott’sratingswerehigherthanRudd’s,butinneithercasewasthepopularityor unpopularity of the leader decisive. The vote was against the Laborgovernment at a time when it had been weakened by the extent of its publicinfightingandwhenAustralia’ssustainedeconomicsuccesshadbeguntoshowsigns of fragility. The opposition Liberal Partywas able tomake themost ofthese issues, striking a chord alsowith its harder line on immigration.Rudd’sreturntothepremiershiphadprovedtobesingularlypointless,dividinghispartyonceagainandfailingtoimpressthecountry.Inthewakeoftheelectoraldefeat,heannouncedhisresignationaspartyleader.

Rudd’sproblemsduringhisfirststintaspremierwereforeshadowedbyhisannouncement that when in government he, and not members of theparliamentaryparty,wouldchoosemembersoftheCabinet.113*ThechangeinAustraliawascriticizedonthegroundsthatitturnedbothCabinetmembersandthose who aspired to governmental office into ‘sycophants’. An Australiansenatorobservedthat‘undertheoldsystem,everybodyownedthefrontbench.

Atthemoment,thefrontbenchiswhollyandsolelythepropertyoftheleader.’ACabinetministerwhoservedduringKevinRudd’sfirstpremiershipsaid:‘Inhis [Rudd’s] perfect world, he would have decided everything himself.’114More complex voting systems for choosing a new party leader providesomewhat greater protection for heads of government in many otherparliamentarydemocracies,buttheyputtheirfutureinjeopardyiftheylosethesupport of their parliamentary party. It is, therefore, unwise as well asundemocratic for a prime minister to wish to decide everything himself orherself.

It is because theydonotwish tobehemmed inby their senior colleaguesand, still less, by rank-and-file party members that some leaders, whosecommitmenttodemocraticnormsislessthanwholehearted,makeavirtueofnotjoining a political party. This is extremely rare in an established democracy.GeneralCharlesdeGaulle is theexceptionwhoproved the rule–notonlybybeing ‘above party’ but by ultimately enhancing, rather than undermining,Frenchdemocracy.Leadersprofessing tobeabovepartyaremore liable tobefound in countries emerging from authoritarian rule and their distancingthemselves frompartyhelps toensure that the transition fromauthoritarianismis,tosaytheleast,incomplete.BorisYeltsinandVladimirPutininRussiaeachmademuchof theboast that theywerepresident of thewholepeople andnotshackled or tainted by party membership. In so doing, they unknowingly, orknowingly, did a disservice to the development of democracy in post-SovietRussia.(Putinwas,foratime,thedesignatedleaderofthepro-Kremlinpoliticalparty, United Russia, but without actually joining it.) A president or primeministerinademocracyisnolessthenationalleader,actingintheinterestsofthepeopleasawholeasheorsheperceives them, forbelonging toapoliticalparty. It is not a chief executive’s party membership that is a threat to anemergingdemocracy,butweakorineffectivepoliticalparties.Andfortheheadof thegovernmentnot to be a party leader, or even a partymember, devaluespoliticalpartiesandhencedemocraticinstitution-building.

LeadersandFormsofGovernment

Institutionsclearlymakeadifferencetowhatleaderscandoandleaders’choiceshaveanimpactoninstitutions.Whatformofgovernment–whetherpresidential,parliamentary or semi-presidential – a country in transition from highly

authoritarianrulechoosesisofsomeconsequence.Thereisalargeliteratureontherelativemeritsofpresidentialandparliamentarysystemsforthedevelopmentofdemocracy.Thebulkof theevidence suggests thatparliamentarism ismoreconducive to theflourishingofdemocracy thaneitherapresidentialorasemi-presidentialsystem,thelatterbeingoneinwhichthehighestexecutivepowerisdividedbetweenapresidentandaprimeminister.115Semi-presidentialsystemsoccupy an increasingly important place in the constellation of governments.Morethanfiftycountrieshavesuchdualexecutives.116

Moreover, within these dual executive systems, there is an importantdistinction between the countries inwhich the primeminister and cabinet areresponsible only to the legislature and those in which the primeminister andcabinet are responsibleboth to the president and to parliament. It is the lattertype, in which the president is much the stronger partner, that is mainlyresponsible for the statistics that show semi-presidential regimes to be lessdemocraticthanparliamentarysystems.117Inasemi-presidentialsystemthatis,nevertheless, democratic there is the possibility of awkward ‘cohabitation’ – apresidentwhowaselectedatadifferenttimefromthelegislaturehavingtofinda way of working with a prime minister and a parliamentary majority of adifferent political persuasion. That can lead to tension that is potentiallydestabilizing for the system, although the French Fifth Republic has survivedsuchelectoraloutcomesremarkablysmoothly.

In Russia, in contrast, parliamentwas gradually reduced to a condition ofdocile deference and dependency during the presidency of Vladimir Putin.Earlier, the system generated serious conflict between the legislature and theexecutive, with Boris Yeltsin employing tanks and shells to quell the mostintransigent of his parliamentary opponents in 1993 – an extreme version of‘strongleadership’thatelicitedhardlyamurmurofcriticismfrommostWesterngovernments.Thiswas,infact,afatefulsteptowardsrestorationof‘strongman’government,takingRussiainamoreauthoritariandirection.ThechoiceofPutinasYeltsin’ssuccessorconsolidatedatrendthatwasalreadyunderway.118Thisalso raises the chicken-and-egg question about whether leaders and politicalelites in countries with a tradition of authoritarian rule opt for a stronglypresidentialized semi-presidentialism, leading to an excessive concentration ofpower in thehandsof the chief executive.Wehave tobe carefulnot tomakeinstitutional design explain too much. Indeed, the Russian tradition ofpersonalizedpowermeant thatwhenPutinceded thepresidency tohisprotégé

DmitriyMedvedev for aperiodof fouryears, because the constitutiondidnotallowhimmorethantwoconsecutiveterms,heremainedinpoliticalrealitythestrongerpartnerwhileholdingwhathadhithertobeen (andhasagainbecome)thelesspowerfulpostofprimeministerwithinthedualexecutive.119Putinwasthepatron,Medvedevtheclient,andeveryoneknewit.

*

Leaderseverywhereoperatewithinhistoricallyconditionedpoliticalcultures.Inthewaytheylead,theycannotrelyonreasonandargumentalone,butmustbeabletoappealtoemotion,sharinginthesenseofidentityoftheirpartyorgroup.Ingovernment,theminorityofleaderswhocometobereveredandwhoretaintheadmirationofposterity,arethosewhohavealsofosteredasenseofpurposewithintheircountryasawhole,whohaveprovidedgroundsfor trustandhaveofferedavisionthattranscendsday-to-daydecision-making.Thereare,though,many different styles of leadership within democracies and even withinauthoritarian regimes. The personality and beliefs of the leader matter – andsomeleadersmattermuchmorethanothers.Thatdoesnotmeanthat themorepowertheleaderaccumulatesinhisorherownhands,asdistinctfromthoseofgovernmental colleagues, the more outstanding is the person and the moreeffectivetheleadership.Itdoesnotimply,inotherwords(asIargueingreaterdetailinotherchapters),thattheoptimalmodelforaheadofgovernmentisthatoftheleaderasboss.

* Similarly, Smith’s defence of political and economic freedom had nothing in common with anindiscriminatedefenceofbusinessinterests.Onthecontrary,itwasSmithwhowrote:‘Peopleofthesametradeseldommeet together,even formerrimentanddiversion,but theconversationends inaconspiracyagainst thepublic,or insomecontrivance to raiseprices.’ (AdamSmith,AnInquiry into theNatureandCauses of theWealth of Nations, edited byR.H. Campbell andA.S. Skinner, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1976,Vol.1,p.145.)Fortwenty-first-centuryexamplesofthekindofphenomenonSmithhadinmind,weneed look no further than theworld of high finance and the cosy relationships involved in determiningremunerationofthoseatthetopoftheirhierarchies.†ThelastAmericanpresidenttobeelectedwhowasbelowtheheightoftheaverageAmericanmanwasWilliamMcKinleyat the endof thenineteenthcentury. (SeeTimHarford, ‘Sinceyouasked’,FinancialTimes,11May2013.)InAmericanpresidentialelectionssincethen,victoryhasgonetothetallerofthetwomaincandidatesapproximately60percentofthetime.ThepointaboutthesuccessfulcandidatebeingtallerthantheaveragemaleintheUnitedStatesoverthepast110yearsprobablyrelatesatleastasmuchtotherelativelyprivilegedsocialbackgroundofamajorityofpresidents(althoughwithsomenotableexceptions)ascomparedwithmostAmericans.Insofarasthegeneralizationthatheightmattershasanymeritatall,itrefers to leaderswho are chosenby awider group– a tribe, a political partyor an electorate.Themost

frequentlycitedcounter-examplesofleaderswhoaresmallinstatureareofauthoritarianrulers,andthusofno relevance to the issue of the electoral advantage of greater height. Famous small leaders include, forexample, Napoleon Bonaparte, Josif Stalin and Deng Xiaoping as well as hereditary monarchs such asQueenElizabethIandQueenVictoria.*JohnMillar,oneofthemoreradicalrepresentativesoftheScottishEnlightenmentandafierceopponentof slaverywherever it was to be found, did not feel the need to alter anyword of a paragraph he firstcommittedtoprintin1771whenhepublishedthethirdeditionofhisOriginoftheDistinctionofRanksin1779, threeyearsafter theAmericanDeclarationof Independence.Norwould theAmericanConstitutionsubsequentlydiminishtheforceofhisargumentaboutthegulfbetweenrhetoricandreality.Millarwrote:‘Itaffordsacuriousspectacletoobservethatthesamepeoplewhotalkinahighstrainofpoliticalliberty,andwhoconsider theprivilegeof imposing their own taxes asoneof the inalienable rightsofmankind,shouldmakenoscrupleofreducingagreatproportionoftheirfellow-creaturesintocircumstancesbywhichtheyarenotonlydeprivedofproperty,butalmostofeveryspeciesofright.Fortuneperhapsneverproducedasituationmorecalculatedtoridiculealiberalhypothesis,ortoshowhowlittletheconductofmenisatthebottomdirectedbyanyphilosophicalprinciples.’*Thereare,though,limitstothiswhenacandidate’sperformancefallswellshortofexpectations.InearlyOctober 2012, in the first of the three televised presidential debates of the campaign that year, BarackObama’s performance was unusually lacklustre. By a substantial majority, viewers thought that MittRomneyhaddonethebetterofthetwo.Romneyalsogotasignificantbounceinthepollstrackingvotingintentions.(FinancialTimes,6–7Octoberand8October.)Intheremainingtwodebates,withObamamorethanholdinghisownagainstRomney,perceptionsofwhoprevailedonceagaintendedstronglytoreflecttheviewer’spoliticalpredilections.*InBritainbothLabourandConservativeprimeministersselecttheirCabinetcolleagues,butinoppositiontheLabourShadowCabinetwasuntil2011electedby theparliamentaryparty.AyearafterEdMilibandsucceededGordonBrown,thischoicewasplacedinthehandsoftheleader.

2

DemocraticLeadership:Myths,Powers,Styles

Tony Blair gets no further than the second page of the introduction to hismemoirs before announcing: ‘I won three general elections.’1 He later adds:‘Political analysts and practising politicians love to speculate on this or thatvoting trend– andveryoften there ismuch truth in it – but there is always atendency to underplay the importance of the leader.’2 But is it a case of‘underplaying’ or of recognizing that some political leaders are not quite asimportant as they think they are? If leaders are perceived by themselves andotherstohaveplayedthedecisiveroleinthewinningofelections,thiswillhavean impact on the way the government operates. Leaders who believe thatelectionvictoriesaremoretheirpersonaltriumphsthanvictoriesfortheirpartiesare inclined to take this as an entitlement to concentratepower in their hands.ThesequotationsfromTonyBlair(whichcouldbemultipliedfromanswershehasgivenininterviews)raisetwoquestions.Thefirst,andmoreimportant,isageneral one: when people in parliamentary democracies cast their ballots, arethey voting primarily for (or against) particular party leaders? Presidentialsystems, in which the chief executive is directly elected by citizens, are aseparate case. The second question is more specific: how justified is Blair inusingthefirstpersonsingularwhenhereferstotheLabourParty’svictoriesintheBritishgeneralelectionsof1997,2001and2005?

Ofstillgreaterconcernthaneitherofthesequestionsistheissueofhowweassess democratic leaders once the elections are over. That raises different

questions.Isittruethatheadsofgovernmentsindemocracieshavebecomemoredominantovertime?Arecallsformorepowertobeplacedinthehandsoftheindividualwhoheads thegovernment justified?Or is theremore tobesaidforcollective leadership, in which at the national level authoritative figures in apolitical party are firmly in charge of government departments, but on majorissuesrequirethesupportofagroupoftheirseniorcolleagues,towhomtheyareaccountable (as well, of course, as being accountable to parliament and,ultimately,totheelectorate)?

LEADERSANDELECTIONOUTCOMES

The political scientist Anthony King has described the ‘near-universal belief’that leaders’ and candidates’ personalities are hugely important factors indetermining the outcomes of elections as ‘simply wrong’. That is not, Kingobserves, to deny that leaders’ personal characteristics count for something,simplythatitis‘notfornearlyasmuchasisgenerallysupposed’.Summingupastudy of modern elections in six countries, King concludes that ‘it is quiteunusual for leaders’ and candidates’ personalities and other personal traits todetermine election outcomes’.3 Among specialists who have made seriousstudiesof the role of leaders in thedeterminationof electoral outcomes– andtheir number has increased in the decade since King’s work was published –thereisnoconsensus.Someattributemoreelectoralsignificancetoleadersthandoothers.Theirworkcontainslittle,however,tojustifycertainpoliticalleaders’attributionofelectionvictoriesprimarilytothemselves.

Given that there has been a general decline in themembership of politicalpartiesindemocracies,andadeclinealsoinlong-termpartyallegiance,itmightbe supposed that the characteristics of the party leader will have becomeincreasinglyinfluential.Someevidencehas,indeed,beenadducedtosupportthepropositionthatleadershavebecomemoreimportantinthemindsofvoters,insubstantialpart as a resultof changeover thepasthalf-century in theway themassmediareportpolitics.4Quiteoftenanincreased‘personalization’hasbeenturned into a case for the ‘presidentialization’ of politicswithin parliamentarysystems.5Yet,whileagreater focuson the top leaderbypartiesand themassmediacanbeobservedinmanycountries,thisdoesnotmeanthatvotersareasobsessed with the top leader as are many politicians and most political

journalists.6 Not only is the idea that leaders everywhere have become moreimportantfortheoutcomeofelectionshighlyquestionable,buttheportrayalofprime ministers as increasingly ‘presidential’, and more autonomous in theperformanceoftheirduties,hasbeenoverdrawn.

A recent scholarlymonograph byLauriKarvonen on the ‘personalization’(as distinct from ‘presidentialization’) of politics brings together research onalmost all of theworld’smost stable parliamentary democracies. This Finnishpoliticalscientistfound‘noclearevidenceforthenotionthattheimportanceofpartyleaderevaluationsforpartychoicehasincreasedovertime’.Andcontrarytosomeearlierspeculationthatpeoplewithaweaksenseofpartyidentificationwouldsetmorestoreon thepersonalityof the leader, theevidencepointed theother way.7 It is party loyalists who havemore intense support for particularleaders,suggestingthatit isloyaltytothepartythatdeterminessupportforthecaptain of the team rather than the leader having great influence over theuncommitted.Anotherrecentstudyunderlinesthepointthatthe‘partylabelgetsapplied as a stereotype when voters are confronted by party leaders, anddetermines(toalargeextent)howleaderswillbeperceivedbyvoters’.8Thus,ifyou are alreadywell disposed to the ChristianDemocrats in Germany, to theLiberal Party in Australia, to the French Socialists or to the Labour Party inBritain,youwillbelikelyintherun-uptoanelectiontoapproveoftheleaderofthoseparties,whoeverheorshemaybe.

Afocuson leaders ishardlyanentirelynewphenomenon,especiallywhenthe people in question were particularly formidable. William Gladstone andBenjaminDisraeli, rivalpoliticiansof legendarystanding innineteenth-centuryBritain,areobviouscases inpoint. In thesecondhalfof the twentiethcentury,however, television added a new dimension to the personalization of politics.Theappearanceandperformanceoftheleader,asasignificantcomponentoftheparty image, became amore prominent feature of the electoral contest than itwas in the century’s earliest decades.As a source of information on the rivalcandidates,TVhas,however,almostcertainlypasseditspeak–especiallyinthemajority of democracies, which do not allow money to determine who getstelevisiontime.TheUnitedStates,withitspaidTVpoliticaladvertisements,isapartial exception here. Many people watching programmes far removed fromideological debate are not able entirely to escape frompolitical propaganda intheadvertisingbreaks,but,eventhen,onlyiftheyarewatchingliveratherthanrecorded TV. More generally, however, the vast increase in the number of

television channels has enabled those viewers who are not already politicallyengaged toavoidpoliticiansand theirdebates.Stillmore important–andheretheUSAisveryfarfrombeinganexception–hasbeentheriseoftheinternetand thehugearrayofalternatives topoliticaldiscussion that itoffers,whileatthe same time providing opportunities for political argument unrelated to theviewsandpersonalitiesofleaders.

Whilenoseriousanalystsuggeststhattheassessmentofleadersisirrelevantto voters’ choice, ‘this effect is dwarfed by such “usual suspects” as partyidentityandpreferences,aswellasbysocio-economicfactors’.9Overall,neitherthe personalities of leaders nor citizens’ evaluation of political leaders havebecome the main determinants of voter choice or of electoral outcomes.10 Astudyoftheimpactofleadersinninedifferentdemocraciesoverhalfacenturyofelectionsconcludedthattheleadercountedforsomethinginallofthem,but–unsurprisingly – more in presidential than in parliamentary systems. Inparticular,theimpactoftheleaderontheoutcomeofpresidentialelectionswasfound to be substantial in the United States.11 Yet, even in America, thesignificanceofthepersonalityofthepresidentialcandidatesandtheminutiaeofthe campaign, includingpresidentialdebates, canbeoverstated. Ifwe take theexamples of two highly articulate presidential candidates, with attractivepersonalities, who ran successful campaigns – John F. Kennedy in 1960 andBarackObamain2008–itistemptingtoattributetheelectoralvictoriestotheirmagnetism. On the basis of relevant survey research, Anthony King isdismissiveof theviewthatKennedy’snarrowvictoryoverRichardNixonwasdue ‘to his youth, charm, and elegance compared with Nixon’s five-o-clockshadow and generally shifty demeanor’. King observes that ‘Kennedy wonbecausehewastheDemocraticParty’scandidateinayearwhentheDemocratswere almost certainly going to regain the White House anyway, not leastbecause a substantial plurality of American voters were Democratic Partyidentifiers’.12

Obama also won in a propitious year for a Democratic contender for thepresidency. The outgoing Republican president was exceptionally unpopular.Onepollsterin2008quippedthatGeorgeW.Bush’s‘jobapprovalisalmostaspoor as that of King George III among the colonists 240 years ago’.13 In acountry where money matters much more in elections than in Europe – andwhere the sums involved are vastly greater – the Democrats, most unusually,outspent the Republicans. In their campaign advertisements, they successfully

portrayed John McCain, who wished to distance himself from the unpopularBush,asmoreofthesame.Whenthecampaignended,McCain,asamajorstudyofthe2008electionputit,was‘morelikelythanbeforetobeseenasMcSame,inpartbecause,abettedbythemedia,theDemocratsscrapedthemavericklabelfrom him and sutured the name and face of the Republican incumbent in itsplace’.14 The condition of the economy in late 2008, as the financial crisisbegan to manifest itself, also meant that this was not a good time to berepresenting the party which had occupied theWhite House for the previouseight years. The Wall Street Journal characterized the US economy’sperformance in the closing months of 2008 as the worst in a quarter of acentury.15ThatwasallthemoredamagingfortheRepublicans,sincetheeightyearswhenthelastDemocraticpresident,BillClinton,hadoccupiedtheWhiteHousewererecalledasatimeofeconomicbuoyancy.Obamawonconvincinglyin2008notwithstandingthefactthatinsurveyshescorednomorehighlythanMcCain in ‘leadershipqualities’or ‘trustworthiness’.Only inempathywashisratingsignificantlyhigherthanthatofhisRepublicanopponent.16

While the personality of the leader tends to count formore in presidentialthan in parliamentary systems, it is usually far from being the overwhelmingdeterminantofvoterchoice.Thus,a survey-basedstudyofFrenchpresidentialelections between 1965 and 1995 found only one out of six in which thecandidate’s personality had a very substantial impact on the outcome – theelection of General Charles de Gaulle in 1965 – as well as one in which itprobablyhadasubstantialimpact.Thiswasthenextpresidentialelection,thatof1969,whichresultedinthevictoryofGeorgesPompidou.Theelectionhadbeentriggered by the resignation of de Gaulle after he lost a referendum.17DiscussingdeGaulle’searlierelectoralvictory,RoyPiercenoted:‘Itrequiresalarge imbalance in perceptions of leadership attributes to attract people awayfrom a candidate whom they are predisposed to support on grounds ofestablished political orientations. Such an imbalance existed in France in1965.’18

Within parliamentary democracies with majoritarian (first-past-the-post)electoralsystems,theimpactofleadersissomewhatmoreofafactorinelectoralchoice than in countries that have proportional representation. PR makescoalitiongovernmentmoreprobable,andtheelectorateisfurtherremovedfromthedecisionastowhowillbeprimeminister.Thatwillhavetobeagreedamongthepartieswhoarebecomingcoalitionpartners.Thereisalsoamodestgeneral

tendency for the electoral effect of leaders to be greater when the policydifferences betweenparties are small.This leads two scholars to conclude: ‘Ifpartiesabdicate,leadersmaytakeover.However,ifpartypolarizationincreasesin the future, we would expect to see decreasing effects of party leaderpopularityonthevote.’19Thesameauthorsfindsomelong-termincreaseintheimpactofleadersonelectoraloutcomesintheUnitedStatesandSwedenandasmalldownwardtrendinCanada.Importantly,however,theircomparativestudydoesnotprovide‘anyclearconfirmationofthehypothesisthattheinfluenceofpartyleaders[onelections]isgenerallyontherise’.20

Leaders’InfluenceonElectoralOutcomesinBritain

Before we turn specifically to the assertion of former British prime ministerTonyBlairwithwhichthischapteropened–andhisroleinthedeterminationofvictories in theBritish general elections of 1997, 2001 and2005– it isworthputting it in the context of post-Second World War elections. (Prior to thatperiod, serious studies of elections, based on contemporary interviewing andsurveyresearch,didnotexist.)Inaveryclose-runelection,sinceevaluationsofleadersdocountforsomethinginvoters’minds,thecomparativestandingofthetwo main rival party leaders may at times be of decisive importance for thevictoryofonepartyratherthantheother.Butitisveryrareforthistooccur.Ifanypost-warBritishpartyleadermadejustthatdifferencebetweenvictoryanddefeatforhisparty,itwasHaroldWilson.ItisevenpossiblethatWilsondidthistwice,butonlybecausethegapbetweenthetwomainpoliticalpartieswasverycloseintheseelectionsandhispersonalascendancyovertheConservativePartyleadersthenwasparticularlywide.Thefirstoccasionwasin1964whenopinionpollsshowedHaroldWilson tobevastlypreferred toSirAlecDouglas-Home,and theother timewasFebruary1974whenWilsonhad a largepersonal leadoverEdwardHeath.Labourendedonly0.7percentaheadof theConservativeParty in the 1964 election and had a majority of just four seats. In February1974,thefirstoftwogeneralelectionsthatyear,Labourwere0.8percentahead,butdidnotachieveanoverallmajorityintheHouseofCommons.21*

Referringtothesecondofthetwogeneralelectionsof1974,thedirectorofaconservative think tank Policy Exchange wrote in 2012: ‘No sitting prime

minister has increased his or her share of the vote since 1974.’22 Wilson’spopularity no doubt played its part in thatOctober 1974 victorywhenLabourwoneighteenmoreseats than inFebruary,but itwashardlydecisive.Therealpoint here is that ‘prime minister’ is being used as if it were a synonym forpoliticalparty.Asaplainstatementoffactitiswrong.Ifwearetogonofurtherback than the 2010 general election, we find that the sitting prime minister,GordonBrown, increasedhis shareof thevotebymore than6percent in theonly election inwhichpeoplewere casting their ballots directly for or againsthim–thevotersinhisconstituencyofKirkcaldyandCowdenbeath.23Theuseof ‘prime minister’ as a substitute for ‘party’ is both misleading and anastonishinglywidespreadconfusion.

Itis,indeed,quitepossibleforapoliticalpartytowinageneralelectioneventhoughitsleaderislesspopularthanthepersonheadingtherivalparty.Thus,forexample, when the Conservative Party comfortably won the British generalelectionof1970, thepoll ratingsof their leaderEdwardHeathwere farbelowthose accorded their party, andHeathwas lesspopular than theLabour leader(andprimeministerfortheprevioussixyears),HaroldWilson.24AndwhentheConservativesstillmoreconvincinglywonthe1979election,MargaretThatchertrailed well behind the Labour leader and outgoing prime minister, JamesCallaghan, in popularity. The election took place on 3 May and in pollingconductedon28–30April,Callaghan’sleadoverMrsThatcherwasasmuchas24points.Hispersonalleadappearstohavedeclinedsomewhatinthelastfewdays, but he remained far ahead of Thatcher, while his party went down todefeat.25* Other parliamentary democracies offer similar examples, includingAustralia with its Westminster-type system. John Howard led the AustralianLiberalParty(itsnamenotwithstanding,theequivalentoftheConservativePartyinBritain)tofoursuccessiveelectionvictoriesbetween1996and2004.Intwoof these elections Howard’s principal opponent, Labor Party leaders PaulKeating in 1996 and Kim Beazley in 1998 scoredmore highly in surveys ofleadershipqualitiesthandidHoward.26

Sowhat of TonyBlair’s claim that he won three general elections? In aninterviewwith the editorof theFinancialTimes in2012,he said: ‘Sometimesthewaythemediatalks,you’dthinkthatI’dlostthreeelectionsratherthanwonthem . . .’27 In fact, ithasbeenmuchmorecommonfor journalistsandmanyothers unthinkingly to go along with Blair’s belief that these victories were,

above all, his than to question this repeated assertion. The extent to whichattributingelectoraloutcomestopartyleaders,notleastinthecaseofBlair,hasbecome commonplace but illusory has been brought out by the politicalscientists John Bartle and Ivor Crewe, the joint authors of a study of partyleadersandgeneralelections inBritain.Crewe (formerVice-Chancellorof theUniversityofEssexandnowMasterofUniversityCollege,Oxford)andBartlewrite: ‘We have experienced at first hand the stunned disbelief, bordering onhostility,ofanon-academicaudienceonbeingtoldthattheimpactofBlair’sand[John]Major’spersonalitiesonthe1997electionwasnegligible.’28

Althoughparty loyaltiesaremore fluid inBritainand inmostdemocraciesthan they were half a century ago, it is still the case that people vote for apoliticalparty.Inthegeneralelectionof1997themainoppositionpartyhadanoverwhelming advantage. It is very difficult in a genuine democracy for agoverning party to win four, never mind five, elections in a row. TheConservatives had, against the odds, won four, but ‘time for a change’sentimentsmilitatedstronglyagainst themwinninga fifth.Moreover, theyhadlosttheirreputationforeconomiccompetence,whichhadtraditionallybeenoneof theirperceivedstrengths.WhileMargaretThatcherwasstillprimeminister,theyhadjoinedin1990aEuropeaneconomicprojectthatwastobeaforerunnerof the common currency, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). On 16September1992,adaythatbecameknownasBlackWednesday,therewassucharunonthepoundsterlingthatthegovernmenthadtomakeanignominiousexitfromtheERMinordertodevaluethecurrency,havingfirsthikedinterestratesto a level that would have been devastating for the domestic economy. Theprimeminister at the time, JohnMajor,was later, quite correctly, to observe:‘On that day, a fifth consecutive Conservative election victory, which alwayslooked unlikely unless the oppositionwere to self-destruct, became remote, ifnotimpossible.’29

UntilhissuddendeathinMay1994,JohnSmithwasdestinedtobethenextBritishprimeminister.HehadservedinaLabourCabinetundertheleadershipof James Callaghan and was a formidable politician known for his wit andcommon sense. He was not likely to ‘self-destruct’, to use Major’s term.*However,PeterMandelson–whohadbeenclose toSmith’spredecessor,NeilKinnock, andwas to become still closer toTonyBlair, butwas kept at arm’slengthbySmith–isjustoneofthepoliticiansfromBlair’scircletosuggestthataLabourvictorywouldhavebeenlesslikelyunderSmith.Hecitesasevidence

thatattheendof1992,Smith’ssatisfactionratinginopinionpollshadfallen‘toplus 4’. He notes that at the same time Major’s ratings were ‘minus 30 percent’.30Therewas,inotherwords,agapbetweenthetwoleadersof34points.While thegulfbetweenBlair andMajorwas tobecomestillwider,no seriousstudy of the leadership effect in the 1997 election has indicated that LabourwouldhavehadlessthananoverwhelmingvictoryinBlair’sabsence.

Thelandslide–anoverallLabourmajorityof178–itselfowedmuchtoanelectoralsystemwhichtranslatesafairlymodestpercentageincreaseinpopularvotes into a disproportionately great advantage in seats. Labour’s share of thepopular votewas lower in 1997 than in all elections between 1945 and 1966,including those which Labour lost. The Conservatives, however, faredcatastrophically.Theyhadtheirlowestshareofthevoteofthecentury,aswellas their worst result since 1906 in terms of seats.31 They had become sounpopularthatanyLabourleaderwhodidnot‘self-destruct’wouldhaveledtheparty to an overall majority of well over a hundred seats in the House ofCommons.BartleandCrewecalculatethathadMajorandBlair‘beenevaluatedequally favourably, Labour’smajoritywould have been cut from11.9 to 11.0points,alteringtheoutcomeinjustfourseats’.32

Labour’ssecondsuccessiveelectionvictory–in2001–owedagreatdealtotheperceptionthattheyhad,incontrastwiththeirpredecessors,beenrunningtheeconomy competently. As the major study of this election noted, that ‘wascrucial as a determinant of voting choice’.33 It was loss of confidence in theConservatives’economiccompetencewhichcontributedgreatlytotheirelectoraldefeat in 1997, while doubts on this score about Labour had beendisadvantageoustotheminthepast.Thepersonwhowasrunningtheeconomyin the government led byBlairwas theChancellor of the Exchequer,GordonBrown. Treasury ministers in virtually all governments in any country areimportant, but it is generally agreed that Brown’s dominance over economicpolicywasmorethanusuallygreat.Nodoubtin2001,asin1997,Blairwasstillanelectoralasset,but it isno lessclear thathewasa far fromdecisiveone insecuringtheparty’selectoralvictory.

By2005theincreasingunpopularityofthewarinIraq,launchedtwoyearspreviously,meantthatBlairwasevenfurtherfrombeingthereasonforLabour’selectionvictory.Aswaswidelyknowntotheelectorate,BlairhadtakenaleadinbackingtheadministrationofGeorgeW.BushintheirdesiretoinitiatemilitaryactionagainstSaddamHussein’s Iraq,and incommittingBritish troops to this

warofchoice.Since,however,themainoppositionparty,theConservatives,hadalso given vociferous support to the invasion of Iraq, it was the LiberalDemocratswhowere ablemost effectively to tap into popular discontentwithLabour’sMiddleEastpolicy.Their shareof thevote increasedbyalmost fourpercentagepoints to22per cent and theirnumberofparliamentary seats fromfifty-two to sixty-two.34 This was far less dangerous to Labour than anyadditiontotheswingtotheConservativeswouldhavebeen.Neitherofthemainpolitical parties could generate much public enthusiasm. In their victory, theLabour Party received just over nine and a halfmillion votes,more than twomillion fewer than theyobtained in1992when,onahigher turnoutandunderNeilKinnock’sleadership,theylosttheelectiontotheConservatives.*Takenasawhole,theevidencesuggeststhatBlair’selectoralvaluewaslessthanhasbeenwidelyassumed.And,contrarytowhatappears tobehisownbelief, itdidnotmake the difference between victory and defeat in any of the three electionswhichtheLabourPartywonduringhisleadership.

HAVEDEMOCRATICLEADERSBECOMEMOREDOMINANTOVERTIME?

Inthecourseofthetwentiethcenturymostcentralgovernmentsindemocraciesacquiredmorepowers.Thedominanceofthecentralexecutive,totheextentthatithasoccurred,isnot,however,thesamethingasthedominationoftheheadofgovernmentwithintheexecutive,eventhoughthereissomelimitedevidencetosupporttheideathatdemocraticleadershavebecomemorepowerfulovertime.That applies most unambiguously to the role played by heads of governmentinternationally. They have, as was noted in Chapter 1, been thrust into theforefront of foreign policy-making as a result of the growth in the speed ofcommunications.Thathas facilitatedboth theeaseof interactionamongprimeministers and presidents and the expectation that this would take place.Wiseheadsofgovernmentpaygreatheedtotheexpertiseaccumulatedintheirforeignministries and work closely with the senior politician who heads it, for eventhosewhoseinteresthithertohasbeenmainlyindomesticpoliticscannotavoidtheinternationalstage.Mostofthemcomequitequicklytoenjoyit.AsHaroldMacmillan – theBritish primeministerwhose period of office coincidedwithDwightD.Eisenhower(inhislastyearsinthepresidency)andJohnF.KennedyintheUnitedStates,GeneralCharlesdeGaulleinFrance,NikitaKhrushchevin

theSovietUnion andChancellorKonradAdenauer inWestGermany–wrylyobserved, he was a ‘politician’ at home but a ‘statesman’ whenever he wentabroad.35(HarryTrumanputitdifferently,butnolessironically,whenhesaidthat‘astatesmanisadeadpolitician’.)36

TheConstraintsoftheAmericanPresidency

Oneofthereasonswhytheterm‘presidentialization’ismisleadingwhenusedtodescribetheroleofprimeministersinparliamentarydemocraciesisbecausethebest known presidency of all, that of the United States, is an office whichconstrainsitsleaderdomesticallymorethoroughlythandothelimitationsonthepowerofmostEuropeanpremiers.Thatresults,aboveall,fromthestrictnessoftheAmerican separation of powers. A different electoral cycle for presidencyandlegislaturemeansthatCongresscanbeunderthecontrolofadifferentpartyfromthatofthepresident,andtherearetimeswhen,withCongressrespondingtodifferentpressuresandlobbies,evenamajorityinthelegislaturebelongingtohisownpartyhasbeennoguaranteethatthepresidentwillgethisway.Inrecentyears,however,thesplitbetweenthepartyrepresentedintheWhiteHouseandthat controlling the House of Representatives has become a still greaterlimitation on presidential power than in the past. This results from a rise inunyieldingpartisanship,withfewermembersofCongressvotingindependently.

The autonomous political power of the US Supreme Court, willing onostensibly legal grounds to strike down presidential decisions or legislationwhich had the president’s backing, is also a greater judicial impediment thanmostprimeministershavetocontendwith.AndthoughtheAmericanpresidentis the embodiment of the central executive power in away inwhich a primeminister inaparliamentarydemocracy isnot, thesheersizeandcomplexityofthe federal government makes it difficult for the president to determinegovernmentpolicy.Indeed,ithasevenbeenarguedthat‘theWhiteHousestaffconstitutes the only organization in the federal government on which thepresident can put his personal imprint, and from which he can expectaccountability and loyalty’.37 As a former US government official turnedscholar, Harold Seidman, observed, even if an American president dislikesmembers of his cabinet, disagrees with them, and suspects their loyalty, ‘hecannot destroy their power without seriously undermining his own’. Seidmanadds:

Theoccupantofthe‘mostpowerfulofficeonearth’quicklylearnstheharshtruth.Hisexecutivepowerhasa very frail constitutional foundation – the power to appoint officers of the United States. Appointingauthority may be so hedged with qualifications as to limit severely his discretion. He can fire officersperforming administrative duties but here again his power is limited. Dismissal of a high official is ameasureoflastresortwhichcanbeutilizedonlyunderextremeprovocation.38

The limitations on the power of appointment were well illustrated by BillClinton’sdifficultyinappointinganAssistantAttorneyGeneralforCivilRightsin 1993. His first choice was Lani Guinier, a University of PennsylvaniaprofessorwhohadbeenoneofhisYaleLawSchoolclassmates.ItsoonbecameclearthattherewassufficientoppositiontoherfromwithintheSenatethathernominationwasunlikelytoberatifiedand,ratherthansufferadrawn-outdefeat,Clinton abandoned the effort. His next candidate for the same post, anotherAfrican-Americanlawyer,JohnPayton,alsoencounteredoppositionfromwithinCongress, and he himself withdrew from contention. ‘Eventually’, as Clintonnotes, henominatedDevalPatrick, ‘anotherbrilliantAfrican-American lawyerwithastrongcivil rightsbackground’and‘hedidafine job’.ButClintonwasleft to regret that he had lost the friendship of Guinier.39 More recently,President Barack Obama ran into trouble, trying to fill a much highergovernmentaloffice.HisfirstchoicetosucceedHillaryClintonasSecretaryofStatein2013wastheUSambassadortotheUnitedNations(andhislong-timeforeign policy adviser), Susan Rice. Fierce Republican opposition led thepresidentreluctantlytoagreetoherwithdrawinghercandidacy.40Andthesearejust a small sample of the limitations on what is regarded as one of thepresident’s main prerogatives, ‘the power to appoint officers of the UnitedStates’.

No one doubts that in the USA, if not quite to the same degree as inEuropeandemocracies,morepoweroverthepastcenturyhasaccruedtocentralgovernment collectively. However, if we look at the past hundred years andmore, it isagreatoversimplificationtoseethepowerof thechiefexecutiveinAmericafollowinganupwardcurveofincreasedpowerwithinthegovernment.TheodoreRooseveltwasamoredominantfigurethansuchinter-warpresidentsas Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover. Franklin D.Roosevelt, Hoover’s successor, brought about an upsurge in presidentialdominancethroughpoliticalskillandhispopularappeal.Itwashewhofirsttookadvantage of radio as a way of influencing public opinion with his highlyeffective‘firesidechats’.Roosevelthadasupremelyconfidentleadershipstyle,buttheinstantimpacthemadewasbasedalsoonconcreteactions,includingan

impressiveinauguraladdress,hiscallingCongressintoemergencysession,andhistacklingofthefinancialcrisis.Hewassensitivetopublicmoodsandadeptinthe timingof his initiatives.Hewas anunusually forceful president andmadedramaticuseofhispowerofveto.*Somuchso thatby theendofhis secondterm his vetoes amounted to ‘more than 30 per cent of all the measuresdisallowedbypresidentssince1792’.41ForatimetherewasanassumptionthatRoosevelt’s incumbencyheraldeda long-lasting increase in thepowerofwhatwastobedubbed‘themodernpresidency’.Theadventofithasgenerallybeendated to the late 1930s and FDR’s second term. It was at that very time,however, that Roosevelt overreached himself by trying to expand themembershipoftheSupremeCourtinordertochangethepoliticalbalancewithinit. Having won a landslide victory in 1936, Roosevelt appeared to be at theheightofhispowerswhenhetriedtoincreasethesizeoftheCourtinordertoadd justiceswhowould be supportive ofNewDeal policies.His bill not onlyfailed to pass, it also consolidated a coalition of opponents of Roosevelt’sdomesticagenda.AsaleadingspecialistontheAmericanpresidencyobserved:

SomemembersofCongresswhobrokewithFDRin1937neveragainwouldaccordhimthesamedegreeof loyalty theyhad inhis first term.Similarly, thedisputeproduceddivisionsamong reformersofmanytypes, undermining the bipartisan support for theNewDeal and confirming forRepublican progressivestheir suspicions that theNewDealerswere interested in self-aggrandizement andconcentratingpower inWashington.42

Truman, as already noted in Chapter 1, reposed greater trust in his cabinetsecretaries than had been characteristic of Roosevelt and was generally moresupportive of them. His successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was also a lessdominantpolicy-makerthanRooseveltandwasreadiertodevolveresponsibilitytohissubordinates,andtotrustthem,thanFDRhadbeen.Eisenhower’sSecondWorldWarcareer,whichhadinvolvedagooddealofdiplomacy,hadgivenhimincomparably better preparation for his international role than is affordedpresidents who move directly from state governorships to the White House.When, for example,his foreigncounterpartswereFrenchpresidentCharlesdeGaulle and British prime ministers Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden andHaroldMacmillan,ineachoneofthesecaseshewasdealingwithpeoplewhomhehadknownduring thewar.Yet,Eisenhower allowedhis secretary of state,JohnFosterDulles,greatleeway.MuchdislikedinWesternEurope,DulleswasdescribedbyChurchillas‘adull,unimaginative,uncomprehending, insensitiveman’and,morepithilyonanotheroccasion,as‘Dull,Duller,Dulles’.43

PresidentialPowersandLeadershipStyles–theAmericanCase

TheSupremeCourtcanbea realobstacle toapresident’sambitions,asHarryTruman found when, during the Korean War, the Court stopped him fromtemporarilynationalizingthesteelindustry,whichwasundergoingatthetimeamajorindustrialdispute.However,theSupremeCourtatitsbestcanonoccasionaddlustretoapresidency.ThiswassurelythecasewithDwightEisenhower.Hewished to avoid conflict over civil rights and reluctantly accepted, rather thanwelcomed, the Supreme Court’s landmark verdict in Brown v. the Board ofEducationofTopekain1954,whichdesegregatedschoolsandpresagedconflictbetweenthefederalgovernmentandsouthernstateswishingtomaintainseparateandunequaleducation.Thedrivingforcebehindfederalsupportforcivilrightswas Eisenhower’s attorney general, Herbert Brownell, and the most crucialjudgementswerethoseoftheSupremeCourt,headedbytheliberalRepublican,EarlWarren,whomEisenhowerhimselfhadnominated.Sofarascivilrights–those of black Americans, most specifically – were concerned, Eisenhower’srecent and sympathetic biographer, Jim Newton, observes that ‘Eisenhower’srecord in that area reflected a triumph of leadership style over personalconviction: he trusted Brownell to lead’. Thus, while Eisenhower ‘balkedoccasionally, the administration made progress despite Ike’s ownreservations’.44

AlthoughtheSupremeCourt’srulingbroughtaboutthebacklashinsouthernstateswhich Eisenhower had feared, hewas determined to uphold the federallaw. When a white supremacist mob tried to prevent black students fromattendingschool inLittleRock,Arkansas, themayor,WoodrowWilsonMann,appealedforfederaltroopsto‘restorepeaceandorder’.Deliberatelybypassingthe state government, themayorwasonly toowell aware that theywere fullysupporting the violent opposition to integration. The response of the federalgovernmentwasmuchmorereceptive.Inadditiontohiscommitmenttotheruleoflaw,EisenhowerwasacutelyconsciousofhowdamagingitwastoAmerica’sreputationinternationallytohavepicturesgoingroundtheworldofawhitemobbullyingblackpupilswhoweredoingnomorethanassertingtheirlegalrighttoattendschool.Thepresidentsentinfederaltroopsandtheirpresenceenabledthelaw to be implemented. As Eisenhower’s biographer notes: ‘The racists whowerebraveenoughtoconfrontdefencelesshighschoolstudentsshrankbackin

thefaceoftheU.S.Army.’45Althoughstylesofpresidential leadershipvary,andsomehavefoundmore

time for leisure pursuits than others, they have in common the fact that everyAmerican president comes under immense pressure. Throughout the twentiethcenturytheUnitedStateswasamajorpower,thenoneofthetwo‘superpowers’,andsubsequently,followingthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion,indisputablytheworld’s most politically influential and militarily powerful state. WhileAmericanpresidentshavealsoencountered–sometimes to theirsurprise– theveryreallimitationsontheirauthorityworldwide,itremainsthecasethattheirinternationalpolicydecisionstendtomattermorethandothoseoftheirforeigncontemporaries. They would all, no doubt, have felt able to sympathize withEisenhower when, following a serious heart attack, he expressed someexasperationwiththemedicalprofessioninalettertoafriend:‘“Iamtoavoidall situations that tend to bring about such reactions as irritation, frustration,anxiety, fear and, above all anger”, Ike wrote. “When doctors give me suchinstructions,Isaytothem,‘JustwhatdoyouthinkthePresidencyis?’”’46

Of the presidents who have held office since Franklin Roosevelt, perhapsonlyLyndonB.Johnsonhasexercisedasmuchpowerbothwithintheexecutiveand vis-à-vis the other branches of government as FDR, albeit over a muchshorter period and with far less popular acclaim.* One of Johnson’s majorbiographers describes him as ‘the most ardent presidential lawmaker of thetwentieth century’, outdoing even the hyper-activist Roosevelt.47 In foreignpolicy, too,LBJpersonally tookbigdecisions, thoughwithmuch lesspositiveoutcomesthanthoseofFDR.Johnson’sdomesticachievementswereultimatelyovershadowedbythegreatlossofAmericanlives–andfargreaterVietnameselosses–inanunnecessarywarwhichtheUnitedStateslost.AlthoughJohnsonconsideredAmerican involvement inVietnam tobeapoisonedchalicehehadinherited from Kennedy, he also believed that once the USA was committedthere,itcouldnotaffordtofail.48

Ronald Reagan’s presidency has been described as one of ‘extremedelegation’,whichworkedwellwhenhehadappointedhighlycompetentpeoplewithstrongpoliticalskills–GeorgeShultzasSecretaryofStatewasanotableexample – butwhich ‘turned into a disaster’ in the persons ofDonaldRegan,JohnPoindexterandOliverNorth.49Reagan’sbackgroundasa filmactorhadledtoscepticismabouthisqualificationsforthepresidency–althoughtheyhadbeen bolstered by his governorship of California – but his response, as his

secondtermofofficedrewtoaclose,wastosaythat‘therehavebeentimesinthisofficewhenI’vewonderedhowyoucoulddothejobifyouhadn’tbeenanactor’.50ItwasgenerallyagreedthatReaganconductedtheceremonialaspectsof the presidencywith aplomb.Hewas also an effective communicator in setspeeches,althoughmuchlesssoinopen-endedpressconferenceswhenhislackofdetailedknowledgewasaserioushandicap.Speakingin1984,Reagansaid:‘FDR,Kennedy,andTeddyRooseveltlovedtheOfficeofthePresidencyandthebullypulpititaffordedthem.AndsodoI.’51

Reaganfocusedonafewbigissuesthathefeltstronglyabout.Thesewere,most notably, cutting taxes, promoting his Strategic Defense Initiative, aidinganti-communist guerrillas inCentralAmerica, and fighting theColdWar bothrhetoricallyandthroughincreaseddefencespending,whilelookingforaSovietleaderwithwhomhecouldbeginadialogue. Inprinciple,hewas in favourofsmallgovernment, low taxesandbalancedbudgets.However,any idea thatheachieved this is wholly fanciful. The tax reductions benefited mainly thewealthy,andasashareofnationalincome,federalincometaxremainedsteadythroughout the 1980s. As for ‘small government’, there were more peopleemployed in the federal government by 1989 than there were in 1981. And,having poured scorn on the federal budget deficit left by the Carteradministration, Reagan bequeathed a vastly greater deficit to his successor,GeorgeH.W.Bush.52Onmostissues,Reaganwas‘exceptionallydetachedfromdetails’andevenhisclosestaidesfrequentlyhadtoguesswhathewantedthemto do.53 He was lucky in two respects. One was that the 1980s saw a sharpdecline in thepriceof oil,whichhelped theAmerican economyanddamagedthatoftheSovietUnion.TheotherwastheemergenceofMikhailGorbachevasSovietleaderearlyinReagan’ssecondterm.Duringhisfirstterm,relationswiththe Soviet adversary had gone from bad toworse andGorbachev’s fortuitouselevation,afterthedeathsofthreeagedSovietleadersinquicksuccession,hadnothingwhatsoevertodowithReagan’spolicies.

Nevertheless, just as Napoleon liked lucky generals, so millions ofAmericansdecidedtheylikedaluckypresident.Reaganalsomadesomeofhisown luck. He was unlucky to be shot in the 1981 assassination attempt –althoughfortunatethatthebulletnarrowlymissedhisheart.However,Reagan’s‘Honey, I forgot toduck’ tohiswife,andsaying to themedical staffwhenhewas wheeled into the operating theatre, ‘I hope you are all Republicans’,confirmed his sense of humour and enhanced his popularity. Reagan’s charm

and optimism, whichmany Americans appreciated, served himwell when heapprovedadealwhichon the faceof itwasduplicitousand latermoreor lessshrugged it off as an oversight.Admittedly, this ‘Iran andContras affair’ sawReagan’s approval ratings fall to 47 per cent, but thatwas not a bad level ofsupport in thecircumstances.Hefaredmuchbetter thanthecharmlessRichardNixondidwhen,withtheWatergatebreak-inandcover-up,hecommittedwhatcould be considered a somewhat lesser offence. Reagan, for his part, hadauthorizedsecretarmsdeliveriestoIraninthehopethatthiswouldleadtothefreeingofAmericanhostagesbeingheldinTehran.OliverNorthcameupwiththe‘neatidea’ofoverchargingtheIraniansandsiphoningtheprofitstosupporttheNicaraguanContras.54Theenterprisewasnotonlyagainstthelaw,butalsobotched.TheillegalarmswentnottoIranian‘moderates’buttohardlinerswhohadsupportedthetakingofAmericanhostagesinthefirstplace.55

Yet, this discreditable episode paled into insignificance compared with amajorachievement– thepartReaganplayed in theendingof theColdWar inthesecondhalfofthe1980s,onceaSovietleaderhadarrivedonthescenewithwhom,inMargaretThatcher’swords,itwaspossibleto‘dobusiness’.TheideathatReagancould takea friendly stroll alongside theGeneralSecretaryof theCommunist Party of the SovietUnion inRed Square or deliver a stirring andwell-receivedspeechtoMoscowStateUniversitystudents,standingunderneathaframedportraitofVladimirLenin,wouldhaveseemedpreposterousin1980.Yetthesethingshappenedinthesummerof1988.Inthefinalanalysis,Reagan’spopularity both during and since his presidency is further testimony to theimportanceforapoliticalleaderofbeingabletotapintoemotionsandfeelings,sincetheyoftencountformorethanthemostcogentarguments.

Ifonepossiblecriterionofasuccessfulpresidencyispopularityattheendoftwotermsofoffice,thenBillClintonqualifiesasthemostsuccessfulofthelasthalf-century.Itisnotawhollysatisfactorystandardofjudgement,forTruman’sup-and-downpollratingswereparticularlylowinhislasttwoyearsinoffice,yethis stock has risen with the passage of time.56 Clinton, for his part, was not‘strong’intheLBJsense,forhehadfarlessswayoverCongress.Formuchofthe time he faced an unremittingly hostile Republican majority, with NewtGingrich at its head. To win over the likes of Gingrich was impossible, butClinton also failed to forge good relations with the veteranDemocrat, DanielPatrickMoynihan, at a time whenMoynihan still chaired the Senate FinanceCommittee.57Inhisfirst term,Clinton’sHealthCareflagshiplegislation–the

detailedpreparationofwhichhadbeenentrusted tohiswife,Hillary–cameacropper.Clinton’sforeignpolicyrecordwasmixed,buthedidhavemuchmoresuccess in his second term in getting incremental domestic change throughCongress. And while safeguarding such programmes as Medicaid (whichprovided safeguards for thepoor,whereasMedicare,whichhe also supported,benefited mainly the middle class), he, nevertheless, was able to leave hissuccessorthegiftofabalancedbudget.

Especially from 1998, with the revelation of theMonica Lewinsky affair,Clintonwasbatteredbyunremittingattentiontohispersonallifefromthemassmedia,hisRepublicanopponentsandanobsessivelyhostileSpecialProsecutor(or‘specialpersecutor’),KennethStarr.Yet,heendedhissecondtermofofficewiththehighestpresidentialapprovalratingsat thecloseofapresidencysinceKennedy’satthetimeofhisassassination.58Clintoncombinedintelligenceandan impressive grasp of policy detailwith enormous skill as a campaigner andspeaker.Hewasabletoradiateoptimism.Hehadanempatheticandemotionalappeal,whichgoesquitealongwaytowardsexplainingnotonlythesurvivalofhispresidency(inthefaceofattemptstoimpeachhim)butalsoofhispopularitywhilehewasunderprurientandsustainedonslaughtfrompress, televisionandrampaging political opponents. His focus on the economy, and the sense ofeconomicwell-beingintheUnitedStatesinthe1990s,wasamajorbuttressofClinton’spopularity.YethispresidencyintheimmediateaftermathoftheendoftheColdWarwas alsooneofmissedopportunities.Hisbasically sympatheticbiographer, Joe Klein, concludes his appraisal with the back-handedcompliment: ‘He remains the most compelling politician of his generation,althoughthatisn’tsayingverymuch.’59

The constraints upon the American president, the variations in powerrelations fromonepresident to another, and theoversimplification involved inseeing a linear increase in presidential power within the system are not onlyimportant in themselves. They give grounds for caution about using‘presidentialization’asawayofdescribingaconjecturedincreaseinthepowerofprimeministers inparliamentarydemocracies.Another reasonwhy this isamisleading term to apply is that in themany dual-executive systems that nowexist,thereisawidevariationinthedistributionofpowerbetweenthepresidentandtheprimeminister.Insome,includingFrance,thepresidentisverymuchtheseniorpartnerindeterminingpolicy,althoughthatappliessignificantlymoretoforeign than to domestic policy. In other countries, includingGermany, Israel

andIreland,itisthechancellorintheGermancase,theprimeministerinIsrael,andtheTaoiseach(primeminister)intheIrishcasewhoistheundisputedheadof the government, while the president, as head of state, has high status butnegligiblepower.

PRIMEMINISTERIALPOWERSANDLEADERSHIPSTYLES–THEBRITISHCASE

Ifwe turn to the othermain case (besides theUnited States) explored in thischapter,namelytheUnitedKingdom,itisalsoanoversimplification,ifwelookat thepasthundredyears andmore, to see theheadof executive followinganupward curve of increased prime ministerial power. There have been a greatmanyzigzags. Ifwe take thepopularview that a strongprimeminister isonewhointervenesfrequentlyinavarietyofpolicyareas,imposeshisorherwilloncolleagues and takes many important decisions personally, then David LloydGeorge,notonlyduringtheFirstWorldWarbutalsoasheadofthegovernmentwhich followed it, was more powerful than any of the three prime ministers(ArthurBonar Law,RamsayMacDonald and StanleyBaldwin)who held thatoffice between his removal in 1922 and the elevation to the premiership ofNevilleChamberlainin1937.

WhenLloydGeorgewishedtocometoaneconomicandpoliticalsettlementwiththenewCommunistregimeinRussia,hetookwithhimLordSwinton,thenthe Secretary for Overseas Trade, rather than Lord Curzon who, as ForeignSecretary,mighthavebeenexpectedtoconductthenegotiationsandwhowas,attheveryleast,entitledtobepresent.Swintonrecognizedthis,andoncesaidtoLloyd George: ‘If you treated me as you do Curzon, I would quit. I cannotunderstand why Curzon does not resign.’ Lloyd George replied: ‘Oh, but hedoes,constantly.TherearetwomessengersintheForeignOffice:onehasaclubfoot,hecomeswith theresignation: theother isachampionrunner,healwayscatcheshimup.’60Curzonlikedofficetoomuchtorelinquishitvoluntarily.HisarrogancemeantthathewaslittlelikednotonlybyLloydGeorgebutalsobyhisConservative colleagues in the coalition government, so he contented himselfwithlettingoffsteamtoclosefriendsandtohiswife.WritingtoLadyCurzonaboutLloydGeorge,hecomplained:‘Iamgettingvery tiredof trying towork

withthatman.HewantshisForn.Sec.tobeavalet,almostadrudge...’61Lloyd George achieved his dominance with a mixture of guile and sheer

forceofpersonality.EveninaCabinetthatcontainedsomeoutstandingpeople,noneseemedtorivalthebrillianceoftheprimeminister.NevilleChamberlain,primeminister from 1937 to 1940, had none of Lloyd George’s sparkle, andwhereas Lloyd George never lived in fear of other strong personalities or ofbeingoutshone,ChamberlainkeptoutofhisCabinetablecritics.TherewasnoplaceforWinstonChurchill,LeoAmeryorHaroldMacmillanwhowouldhavechallenged his views. Churchill, as late as 1936, was still distrusted by mostConservativesbecauseofhis intemperatepositiononIndia,andhe lost furtherground within the House of Commons in that year with his championship ofEdwardVIIIduringtheabdicationcrisis.(ThefilmTheKing’sSpeechcouldnothavebeenfurtherremovedfromhistoricalrealitywhenitportrayedChurchillasan early ally of King George VI. The mutual esteem between the two mendevelopedonlyafterChurchillbecameprimeministerin1940.)62Chamberlainlost his Foreign Secretary when Anthony Eden did what Curzon had merelythreatenedtodoandresignedbecauseofthewayChamberlainwasconductingpersonaldiplomacy.‘Itwas,’saidSwinton,‘anincreasinglyimpossiblepositionfor a Foreign Secretary to be in, especially for one as sensitive about hisimportanceandprivatefeelingsofprideasEdenwas.’63Evenbeforehebecameprimeminister,however,Chamberlainhad regardedhimselfas thestrongmanof the government at a timewhen hewasChancellor of theExchequer underMacDonald andBaldwin andnominally number three after them.Thekindofprimeminister he intended to become is foreshadowed in his comment to hissister inMarch1935: ‘Asyouwill see IhavebecomeasortofActingP.M.–onlywithouttheactualpoweroftheP.M.Ihavetosay“Haveyouthought”or“Whatwouldyousay”whenitwouldbequickertosay“Thatiswhatyoumustdo”.’64

ChurchillandAttleeTheprincipaldifferencebetweenMrChurchillandacat,asMarkTwainmightsay,isthatacathasonlyninelives.Byallthelawsofmortality,MrChurchillshouldhaveperishedascoreoftimes,sometimesinlaughter,sometimesinanger,sometimesincontempt;butthefuneralhasalwaysbeenpremature,thegravealways empty. You may scotch him for a moment, but you cannot kill him, and we grow weary ofpronouncing his obsequies . . . His failures are monumental, but the energy of his mind and the sheerimpetusofhispersonalitymakehisfailuresmorebrilliantthanothermen’ssuccesses.65

So wrote the journalist and essayist, A.G. Gardiner – in a book published in1926. At that time Churchill was a senior member of the ConservativegovernmentledbyStanleyBaldwin.Churchillhadfirststoodforparliamentin1899,successfully in1900.AtfirstaConservative, in1904heswitchedto theLiberalParty,andby1910heldtheseniorCabinetpostofHomeSecretary.Hewasingovernmentformostoftheyearsbetweenthenand1922whentheLloydGeorge coalition government fell. Soon after that Churchill rejoined theConservative Party. By the time Gardiner wrote so perceptively about him,Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer. Throughout the 1930s he was atodds with the leadership of his party, and only with the start of the SecondWorldWar in 1939 did he rejoin the government. A major issue which hadcausedtheriftwasIndia.Withingovernmentandoutofit,ChurchillobjectedtoevententativestepstowardsIndianself-government,asubjectonwhichhefeltstrongly.Inthesecondhalfofthe1930s,healsobecameincreasinglycriticalofthegovernment’spolicyofmakingconcessionstoNaziGermany,inthehopeofavertingwar, andwas a strong critic of the 1938Munich agreement betweenHitler and Chamberlain, which led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.WhenGermanyinvadedPolandinSeptember1939andBritaindeclaredwaronGermany, the policy of appeasement had manifestly failed to prevent majorconflict.Churchill’swarningsweremorewidely seen as prescient andhewasinvitedbyChamberlaintojointheWarCabinet–asFirstLordoftheAdmiralty,aposthehadfirstheldin1911.

There was, nevertheless, an accidental element in Churchill’s becomingprime minister in May 1940. Chamberlain still commanded the support of asubstantial majority of ConservativeMPs but was thoroughly disliked by themainoppositionLabourParty.Insharpcontrastwithhispredecessor,Baldwin,hehad treated themwithdisdain.WhenasignificantminorityofConservativeMPscriticizedChamberlainandtheconductofthewarinaHouseofCommonsdebateon7and8May1940,theLabouroppositiontooktheopportunitytopressa vote. The governmentmajority dropped from 213 to 81 and Chamberlain’sposition was fatally weakened. It was clear that the government had to bereconstructed, and under someone else.However strange itmay appear today,had LordHalifax, Eden’s successor as Foreign Secretary,wished to be primeminister,thepostcouldhavebeenhis,notwithstandingtheseriousdisadvantageofhisbeingintheHouseofLords,nottheCommons.

It was not until 1965 that ConservativeMPs elected their leader, and theconstitutional convention (which still prevails) that themonarch asks a person

whocancountonthesupportofamajorityintheHouseofCommonstoformagovernmentleft,in1940,somediscretioninthehandsofKingGeorgeVI.Theking made clear his preference for Halifax who was also the choice ofChamberlain. All the indications are that Halifax was also favoured by mostConservativemembersofparliament.TheleadinghistorianoftheConservativeParty, Robert Blake, wrote: ‘By May 1940 there was a small minority ofConservative MPs who saw in Churchill the one hope of injecting purpose,energy,andoriginality into thewar,but therecanbe littledoubt that thepartywouldhave chosenHalifaxhad there been an election.But therewasnot; thequestionturnedonadvicetotheCrownratherthancountingofheads...’66

However, Labour made clear that they would not enter a coalitiongovernment led by Chamberlain, and, no less crucially, Halifaxmade it plainthathedidnotwantthepremiership.HerecognizedthatChurchill’stalentsweremore suited to the taskofmobilizinganation thanwerehisown.67ChurchillproceededtoformacoalitiongovernmentwithstrongLabourandsomeLiberalrepresentation.TheLabourleader,ClementAttlee,becamehisdeputy,chairingmeetings during Churchill’s not infrequent absences. Neville Chamberlainremained in theCabinet, andalso asLeaderof theConservativeParty,butbylatesummer1940hewasterminallyill.HeresignedfromtheCabinetinOctoberanddiedthefollowingmonth.OnlywithChamberlain’sdeparturewasChurchillable toaddthe leadershipofhisparty to theprimeministership.Onthis issue,Blakeobserves:‘TherewasnolackofhighmindedpersonstoadviseChurchillthat he would be better placed to unify the nation if he was not tied to theleadershipofaparty.Churchillhadmoresense.HehadseenthefateofLloydGeorge...Heatonceindicatedthathewouldaccepttheleadership,andbynowhisprestigemadehisunanimouselectionacertainty.’68

Churchill was the dominating figure in the government and in particularchargeof defence and foreignpolicy.Hehad invented for himself the post ofMinisterofDefence, toaccompanytheprimeministership, just incaseanyoneshouldbe indoubt aboutwhowas in chargeof that area.AWarCabinetwasformedwhich initially consisted of just fivemembers, threeConservative andtwo Labour. By 1945 its membership had increased to eight. Other ministersattendedwhentherewereimportantmattersarisingfromtheirdepartments.ThissmallerthanusualCabinetwassupplemented,ashadalreadybecomenormalinpeacetime, by a system of Cabinet committees. In the earlier days of hispremiershipChurchillreadCabinetdocumentsmoreassiduouslythanlaterinthe

war. His focus, his private secretary, John (Jock) Colville, noted, was on‘defence,foreignaffairsandpartypolitics’,muchlesson‘domesticproblemsorthehomefrontexceptwhenhewasarousedforsentimentalreasons’.69

WhilesomeaspectsofWinstonChurchill’swartimeprimeministershiparestill a matter for debate, there is no disputing the inspirational quality of hisleadershipduringthoseyears.InthewordsofthegreatAmericanbroadcastingjournalist, Ed Murrow, who was in London throughout the Blitz, Churchill‘mobilized the English language and sent it into battle’. It was not justChurchill’s eloquence and the manner of delivery which, in both hisparliamentaryspeechesandhisradiobroadcasts,weresogalvanizing,but,asthewriter Vita Sackville-West put it, ‘the whole massive backing of power andresolve behind them’.70 Moreover, aristocratic lineage notwithstanding,Churchill established during the five years of his wartime leadership a closerrapport with the British people, including those in bomb-devastated working-class areas of London and other cities, than did the more middle-classrepresentativesofhispartyingovernment.Healsohadthesense,inconsultationwith Attlee, to give highly visible Cabinet posts to two very able Labourpoliticiansofhumbleorigins,ErnestBevin,whowasMinisterofLabour fromtheoutsetofChurchill’sgovernment,andHerbertMorrisonwho,fromOctober1940,wasHomeSecretaryandMinisterofHomeSecurity.71

ThesetwoleadingfiguresintheLabourParty–whostronglydislikedeachother–weremoreinthepubliceyethanAttlee.Hisworkwasbehindthescenes(asacoordinator,chairmanofCabinetcommitteesandoftheWarCabinetitselfwhenChurchillwasilloraway)butallthreeofthemwereparticularlyimportantmembers of the coalition government. From the outset, Attlee was de factodeputy primeminister and from 1942 had that title officially. An outstandingadministrator, Sir JohnAnderson (ViscountWaverley), who late in his careerhad become an Independent MP, was also to become a key member of theCabinet.ThemostprominentConservativewithinthecoalitiongovernmentwasAnthonyEdenwho returned to the Foreign Secretaryship, fromwhich he hadresignedunderChamberlain, succeedingHalifax in late1940. In thecourseofthe war, he became the number-two figure within his party after Churchill.However, as the voice of his country at home and abroad, and in his detailedinvolvement with military operations, there is no doubt about Churchill’swartimedominance.

Churchill’s very preoccupation with military strategy and interaction with

themilitary high command andwith foreign leadersmeant, however, that thewhole of domestic policy was more influenced by Attlee and the Labourmembersof thecoalitiongovernment thanby theprimeminister.Among theirConservative colleagues within the government, R.A. (Rab) Butler played asignificant role, both as the architect of the 1944 Education Act and as animportant member of the Reconstruction Committee, established in 1943.Churchill’s interest in the domestic agenda was at best sporadic, and theobservationsofColvilleonthisaresupportedinarecentscholarlystudybyanauthor,RobertCrowcroft,whosefindingsarecolouredneitherbyadmirationofChurchillnorbyanyiotaofsympathyfortheBritishLabourParty.Absurdly,hedescribesAttleeas‘anEnglishStalin’who‘wouldhavethrivedintheByzantinepoliticsoftheSovietUnion’.72Yet,theevidenceCrowcroftadducesshowsthelimitations(muchmoreunderstandable,giventhecircumstances,thantheauthorallows) of Churchill’s control over the government. From 1943 the seniorLabourmembersoftheCabinetwereincreasinglyinchargeofplanningforpost-warreconstructionandwithlayingthefoundationsofthewelfarestate.Whenhedid get involved,Churchill had to concede a lot of ground.After oneCabinetmeetinginOctober1943,hecomplainedthathehadbeen‘jostledandbeatenupby the Deputy Prime Minister’.73 That hardly accords with the popularperceptionofChurchill andAttlee.Their personalities could not, indeed, havebeenmoredifferent.Onewasamongthemosttheatricalofpoliticians,theothertheleastflamboyant.

Attlee, while notably loyal to every institution to which he belonged –including,naturally, thecoalitiongovernment–wasneverapushover.Hewasalsoasticklerforprocedure.Atthebeginningof1945,hetypedwithtwofingersatwo-thousand-wordletterofprotesttoChurchill,doingsohimselfinorderthathiscriticismwouldremainstrictlybetweenthetwomenthemselves.ThiswasanunusuallylongletterfromAttlee,ofwhomitwasaptlysaidthathewouldneveruseonewordwhennonewoulddo.Heobservedthatitwas‘veryexceptional’for Churchill to have read Cabinet committee conclusions when these paperswent to the Cabinet. Consequently, half an hour or more would be wasted‘explainingwhatcouldhavebeengraspedbytwoorthreeminutesreadingofthedocument’.Moreover:‘Notinfrequentlyaphrasecatchesyoureyewhichgivesrise to a disquisition on an interesting point only slightly connected with thesubjectmatter.’But,saidAttlee,therewas‘somethingworse’.ChurchillpaidfartoomuchattentiontotwoministerswhowerenotmembersoftheWarCabinet,

Lord Beaverbrook and Brendan Bracken. (These were Churchill’s personalcronies.However,farfromspellingthatout,Attleedidnotevenrefertothembyname – only by their official titles, the Lord Privy Seal and the Minister ofInformation.) Attlee strongly asserted the supremacy of the Cabinet, writing:‘Thereisaseriousconstitutionalissuehere.Intheeyesofthecountryandunderour constitution the eightmembers of theWarCabinet take responsibility fordecisions.’74

Although Attlee had taken such pains to keep his missive confidential,Churchill read the letter over the telephone toBeaverbrookwho the followingdayunexpectedlydescribed it as ‘averygood letter’.According to theprivatesecretary, and excellent diarist, Colville, this was the ‘last straw’ forChurchill.75ClementineChurchill,theprimeminister’swife(whosejudgementonanumberofissueswasbetterthanthatofherhusband),hadalreadyreachedasimilar conclusion.She toldColville that she thoughtAttlee’s letterwas ‘bothtrueandwholesome’.Colville’sownresponseonthedaytheletterarrivedwastowriteinhisdiary:‘GreatlyasIloveandadmiretheP.M.Iamafraidthereismuch inwhatAttlee says, and I rather admire his courage in saying it.ManyConservativesandofficials...feelthesame.’76Churchillhadbeenoutragedbytheletter.Onfirstreadingit,he‘draftedandredrafted’,Colville’sdiaryrecords,‘asarcasticreply’,whichhedidnotsend.Hewentonatsomelengthabout‘asocialistconspiracy’and‘harpedonnothingbuttheinadequaterepresentationofTories in the Cabinet, in spite of their numerical weight in the House’. Hisprivate secretary’s diary entry noted that was ‘beside the point’.* By thefollowing day, however, Colville believed that Churchill, while still ‘sorelypiqued’,was‘notunmovedbyAttlee’sarguments’andbytheresponsetothemofMrsChurchill and,more surprisingly,Beaverbrook.77 In the end he sent aterse, formalbutnot impolite letter toAttlee inwhichhewrote: ‘YoumaybesureIshallalwaysendeavourtoprofitbyyourcounsels.’78

Churchill’sdominanceasprimeministerbetween1940and1945wasverygreat,sofaras theprosecutionof thewarwasconcerned,butnegligible in theentire field of domestic policy. During his only spell as a peacetime primeminister, he was still further from dominating the policy agenda. This wasunderstandable,giventhatmilitarymatterswerenolongerthetoppriority,andalso because of Churchill’s advanced age and, for a time, serious ill-health(includingastroke), later tobeextensivelyandindiscreetlydocumentedbyhis

physician,LordMoran.79R.A.Butler,whenIinterviewedhimin1966,saidthatwhenhewasChancelloroftheExchequerinthatgovernment,Churchill‘didnotinterfereatall’,excepttohope,forexample,that‘youwillbedoingsomethingforthepensioners’or‘Ihopeyouarenotgoingtoforgetthepoor’or‘Ihopeit’snot just going to bemore dividends for the rich’.80 In contrast with his vastknowledgeofforeignaffairsandespeciallydefence,Churchillwas, inButler’sview, ignorant of economic policy, but ‘hewas very tender-hearted’.81 (On arareoccasion,somewhatillustrativeofButler’slastpoint,ChurchilldidbypasstheChancelloronaneconomicissue,inthecompanyofWalterMonckton,theMinisterofLabour.Onemorning in1954Butlerwas summonedby theprimeministerand told: ‘WalterandIsettled therailstrike in theearlyhoursof thismorningontheirterms.Wedidnotthinkitnecessarytokeepyouup.’82)*

While Churchill’s personality could be overpowering, he remainedconvinced of the central importance of the Cabinet, while also upholding therightsandsubstantialautonomyofindividualministers.HeremarkedtoMoranin1953:‘Wehad110Cabinetmeetingsinthepastyear;whiletheSocialistshadonly 85 in a year – and that in a time of great political activity. I am a greatbelieverinbringingthingsbeforetheCabinet.IfaMinisterhasgotanythingonhismindandhehas thesense toget itarguedby theCabinethewillhave themachinebehindhim.’83Ministerswereallowedagreatdealoffreedomtogeton with their jobs, subject to their accountability to the Cabinet. Even inChurchill’sspecialdomainofforeignpolicy,AnthonyEden,thankstohislongexperienceandtoChurchill’srespectforhisjudgement,enjoyedmoreautonomythan might have been expected. Sometimes, though, Churchill felt he shouldhavebeenconsultedmorebyEden.‘Anthonytellsmenothing,’hecomplainedtoMoran in June 1954. ‘He keepsme out of foreign affairs, treats them as aprivatereserveofhisown.’84

In between Churchill’s wartime and peacetime premierships came theLabourgovernmentheadedbyClementAttlee.Themost impressiveofLabourprimeministerswasalsothemostself-effacing,andthefactthathisgovernmentsetthecourseofBritishforeignpolicyforthenexthalf-centuryhadmuchtodowith thepolitical skills and judgementof theForeignSecretary,ErnestBevin.That this first post-wargovernment also laiddown themain linesof domesticpolicy for a generation was a collective achievement, in which a number ofministersofdifferentpoliticaldispositionsplayedimportantroles,amongthem

Herbert Morrison, Stafford Cripps, Hugh Dalton and Aneurin Bevan. Theleader–followerdichotomydoesnotbegintodojusticetothisrelationship.Noneof these peoplewere followers ofAttlee. Indeed, the deputy leader,Morrison,wished to takehisplace.Daltonalsoactivelyconspired toremoveAttleefromthepartyleadershipandpremiership.Bevanwasthemostinspirationalpoliticianinthisgroup.HecamefromtheleftoftheLabourParty–unlikeAttleewhowasa party centrist – and had been a strong critic at times of Attlee’s moderateleadershipandofthecoalitiongovernmentduringthewar.Later,inopposition,he was again to be at odds with many of his colleagues and was theacknowledgedleaderofaleft-winggroupwithinthepartywhobecameknownas Bevanites. Furthermore, Ernest Bevin, who was loyal to Attlee, was not afollower of the primeminister, but a formidable leader in his own right whobetween the wars had built up the largest trade union in Europe. He hadbroadenedhishighstandingwithintheLabourmovementbyservingasahighlyeffective Minister of Labour in the wartime government. Of all the Labourministersinthecoalition,hewasWinstonChurchill’sfavourite–Attlee’s,too,forthatmatter.

Bevin,whogrewupinpovertyinWestofEnglandvillagesandleftschoolatthe ageof eleven,quicklywon the admirationofForeignOfficeofficialswhowere from a very different social background.Apart from his obvious ability,naturalassuranceandthe‘imaginativequalityofhismind’,onereasonforthis,writesBevin’sbiographer,AlanBullock,washistotalabsenceofsnobberyandlackof interest in‘placing’anyonesocially:‘Untroubledbyanysenseofclassdistinctionhe treatedeveryonehemet, from theKing to theofficedoorkeeper(bothequallyadmirersofBevin),inexactlythesamewayandalwaysashumanbeings.’85 Arthur Deakin, Bevin’s successor as leader of the Transport andGeneralWorkers’Union,saidofhim:‘Erniehadnomoreegothanheneededtogetwhere he did’, while theAmerican ambassador to London, LewDouglas,remarked:‘Hehadnoneed,likeEden,toshowthathewasinthetopclass:hewas,andknewit.’86BullockhimselfnotesthatwhileBevinobviouslyhadnoneofthe‘aristocraticprideoffamily’ofoneofhistwentieth-centurypredecessors,LordCurzon,‘heenjoyedaself-confidencewhichwaspositivelyimperial’87–and, it hardly needs adding, he was a much more formidable and successfulForeignSecretarythanCurzon.

Attlee’s strength as primeministerwas to enable a teamofministerswithhard-earned life experience to get on with the job and to preside over the

coordinationoftheirefforts.Theydidnotallgetonwitheachother,whetheronpolitical or personal grounds, but Attlee kept them together. As Bullockobserved:

Nopolitician evermade less effort to project his personality or court popularity; in place ofChurchill’sheroicstyle,hisspeechesweredry,matteroffactandoftenbanal.Hepreferredunderstatementtorhetoric,andhismosteffectiveweaponindebatewasagiftfordeflationwhichmorethanoncetookthewindoutofChurchill’ssails...Attlee’sunassumingmannerandlaconichabitofspeech,however,weredeceptive...Therewerehalf-a-dozenmenin theGovernmentwithmoreobvious talents thanhisown; itwasAttlee’sstrengthasPrimeMinisterthatheturnedthistohisadvantage.Unaffectedbyvanityandwithashrewdeyeforthestrengthsandweaknessesofhiscolleagues,heleftthemafreehandincarryingouttheirdifferentjobsandmadelittleornoattempttoimposehisownviewsondepartmentalpolicy.88

Aprimeministerinthetwentiethandtwenty-firstcenturieshasrarelybeenonlya first amongequals, althoughAttlee camecloser thanmost, providedweaddthat some governmentministerswere ‘more equal than others’.Attlee did nothesitatetodismissministersheregardedas‘notuptothejob’,butwould–andcould – not have dreamt of doing so with such senior colleagues as Bevin,Morrison,StaffordCripps,AneurinBevanor(later)HughGaitskell.BevinandCrippswereremovedbyillnessanddeath,andBevanwhenheresignedfromtheCabinet, along with HaroldWilson, after clashing with the Chancellor of theExchequer,Gaitskell.Attleewasill inhospitalat thetime.Hebelievedthathecould have found a compromise that would have kept both ministers in theCabinet had he, rather than the deputy leader of the Labour Party, HerbertMorrison,beenpresidingatthetime.89

AnextremelybriskandefficientchairmanoftheCabinetandofitsDefenceCommittee,Attleewasresponsivetoopinionwithintheparliamentarypartyandgovernment. Speaking in 1948, and referring to meetings of LabourMPs, hesaid: ‘They may not convince me that they are right, but I believe that thefoundationofdemocraticlibertyisawillingnesstobelievethatotherpeoplemayperhaps be wiser than oneself.’90 In the same speech, Attlee emphasized thecollectivenatureofgovernmentpolicy:

Itisthepracticeofouropponentsforobviousreasonstotrytodisruptourteam–andIamsorrytosaythatsomeofourownsupportersarealsoledaway–byascribingparticularpoliciestoparticularmembers:Thustheytalksometimesabout‘Cripps’seconomicpolicy’,or‘Dalton’sfinancialpolicy’,or‘Bevan’sdealingwith the doctors’, or ‘Bevin’s foreign policy’, as if there was no coordination in the Government.Neverthelessthereiscoordination.WhilsteveryMinisterisresponsibleforhisowndepartmentaldecisionsthecollectiveresponsibilitybothinhomeandforeignpolicyiswiththeCabinet.WesharetheblameorthecreditforeveryactionoftheGovernment.91

InBritishpoliticsitisnowmorecommon,althoughoftenstillmoremisleading,for government policies to be attributed to the primeminister as distinct fromindividualministers–aThatcher,Blair,Brownor(toalesserextent)Camerondecidingonthis,thatortheother.92Eveninthe1960s,asHaroldWilsonlatercomplained, theheadlineofaregionalnewspaperattacked‘Wilson’foralocalplanning decision in Lancashire.93 Themain exception in political discourse,and not perhaps accidentally, is when the policies in question have becomeextremely unpopular. Then they are designated as those of the departmentalminister.AcaseinpointisAndrewLansley,SecretaryofStateforHealthintheConservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government from 2010 until 2012.There was no shortage of references both from within the coalition and bycommentatorsto‘Lansley’shealthreforms’.94

TheMacmillanPremiership

In post-war Britain both Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill alloweddepartmental ministers and Cabinet committees to work out policy and onlyrarelycountermandedthem.AnthonyEden,whosucceededChurchillasheadofthegovernmentin1955andledtheConservativePartytovictoryinthegeneralelection of that year, was a fussy, interfering prime minister. He was verysensitivetocriticismandespeciallytoarticlesintheConservativepresscriticalofhisperformanceandthatofthegovernmentheled.R.A.Butlerhasrecorded,inhisironicstyle,thatEdenpaidhimthecomplimentofholdinghimresponsibleforConservativesuccessinthecountry,andso‘Iwasthereforeatthereceivingendofthoseinnumerabletelephonecalls,oneverydayoftheweekandateveryhour of the day, which characterized his conscientious but highly strungsupervision of our affairs.’95 Eden hadmoved Butler from the Treasury to anon-departmental Cabinet post with the title of Lord Privy Seal.* Eden wasespeciallypreoccupiedwithforeignpolicy,particularlytheSuezcrisis,whichisdiscussedinalaterchapter,andheintervenedlessineconomicpolicythandidhissuccessorHaroldMacmillan.

MacmillansucceededEdenasprimeministerinJanuary1957andheldthatofficeforalmostsevenyears–untilhisresignationinOctober1963.Hewastheson-in-lawofanEnglishduke,thegreat-grandsonofaScottishcrofter,andthegrandson of the founder of the Macmillan publishing company. (Daniel

Macmillan, the last of these, was the son of the crofter, and he himself leftschool at the age of ten.) For good measure, Macmillan’s mother (likeChurchill’s) was an American. Harold Macmillan mixed contentedly inaristocraticcircles.AsRabButlersaidofhim,hehad‘thesoftheartforandthestrong determination to help the underdog, and the social habit to associatehappily with the overdog’.96 Which of Macmillan’s diverse backgrounds hechose to emphasize depended on where and to whom he was speaking. InScotland the humble crofter was always well to the fore. On visits to hismother’s home state of Indiana, he projected himself as ‘one of their own, ahome-town boy descended from a simple, pioneer family’, although he mayhave struck his enthusiastic audiences as a rather implausible ‘Hoosier’.97Hecame to the prime ministership with a wealth of governmental experienceexceededonlybyhis rival for thepost,Butler.Macmillanhadbeenawartimeminister, representing the British government in North Africa. In theConservativegovernmentsledbyChurchillandEden,hehadbeen,successively,Minister of Housing, Secretary of State for Defence, Foreign Secretary andChancelloroftheExchequer.

As Prime Minister, Macmillan naturally played a major role in foreignpolicy,buthadstrongviewsalsoontheeconomy.Hisexpansionistimpulse,andwillingness to risk inflation rather than increased unemployment, led to theresignation in early 1958 of all of his Treasury ministers, headed by PeterThorneycroft. His next Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, was often at odds withMacmillanoneconomicpolicy,butwhenLloydobjectedtoapolicysupportedby the prime minister on the grounds of its cost, as he did on a number ofoccasions,makingclearthatheregardeditasresigningmatter,bothMacmillanand the spending ministers gave way.98 In an interview in 1966 (non-attributableatthetime),Lloydremarked:‘IfinJune1962IhadsaidIproposedto resign because the Prime Minister was not giving me adequate support,Macmillanmighthavefallen.’99Everloyal,LloyddidnotdothatandjustonemonthlaterhebecamethemostprominentnamewithinthethirdoftheCabinetsummarilydismissedbyMacmillaninhis‘nightofthelongknives’.Thatwasanattemptbytheprimeministertorefreshthegovernment’simageandimproveitsstandingafteraseriesofby-electionreverses.Itbackfired,andinthewordsofMacmillan’smost recent biographer, it showedhim ‘at hismost ruthless, and,ultimately, his most ineffectual’.100 Macmillan had cultivated an air ofunflappability which his sudden and sweeping use of his power of dismissal

undermined.Morethanonceinhisdiaries,Macmillanhimselfcommendsruthlessnessas

aworthwhileattributeofaleader.Thus,hewroteoftheIndianPrimeMinister,PanditNehru,that‘heisable,fullofcharm,cultivated,andruthless–allgreatqualitiesinaleader’.101Ruthlessness,ofcourse,meanssomethingdifferentforademocratic leader(Nehruincluded)fromwhat itconnotes inanauthoritarianregime.Nevertheless,Macmillan’sdismissalofathirdofhisCabinetinonefellswoopin1962didhimmuchmoreharmthangood.Ifillnessandtirednesshadnotcausedhisresignationin1963,itislikelythathewouldhavebeenreplacedaspartyleader(andprimeminister)beforethenextelection,forthe‘nightofthelongknives’ had increased the number of his opponents.Oneof theministerswho survived Macmillan’s cull, Reginal Bevins, wrote: ‘This was makingenemiesonagrandscale,enemiesofthosedismissed,enemiesoftheirfriendsinParliament,andshatteringconfidenceinthePartyat large.’Headded:‘OfonethingIwas thenconvinced:noConservativePrimeMinistercouldbehave likethat and survive. In July 1962 Harold Macmillan committed political suicidemore certainly than if he had himself resigned.’102 The backlash against hisdismissalofcolleaguesillustratedthelimitsofruthlessnessinademocracy.

ThatcherandBlair

No British prime ministers in the years since the Second World War haveaspired tomore control overwide areas of policy than didMargaret Thatcherand Tony Blair. Thatcher made the greater impact of the two. Her period ofofficewaslinkedtoforeignpolicysuccesses,mostnotablytheendoftheColdWar.ThepartsheplayedinEast–Westdiplomacywasgreaterthanthatofanyother post-war British prime minister. It was of real significance that shemaintainedcordial relationswithbothRonaldReaganandMikhailGorbachev,while never hesitating to argue with either one of them. Her foreign policyadviser,SirPercyCradock, tookadimviewofGorbachev’sbecomingforher‘somethingofanicon’,complainingthat‘sheactedasaconduitfromGorbachevto Reagan, selling him in Washington as a man to do business with, andoperating as an agent of influence in both directions’.103 Cradock himself,however, was slower than Thatcher to grasp the extent of the change in theSovietUnionafter1985andthescaleofGorbachev’sradicalism.Inreality,theconstructiveroleMargaretThatcherplayedinEast–Westrelationsinthe1980s

became her most notable foreign policy achievement. Her foreign policyinstincts were far from uniformly impressive. During the years of NelsonMandela’s incarcerationinRobbenIslandprison,shewasmoresympathetic totheSouthAfricanapartheidregimethantoMandela.Shehadasoftspotalsoforthe authoritarian Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet, partly in gratitude for hissupportduring theFalklandsWarof1982.Thatwar isgenerallyregardedasaforeign policy success, since it prevented the Falkland Islands passing toArgentinabyforce.AlthoughthesovereigntyoftheislandsisstillaliveissueinArgentina (known there as theMalvinas), the British military victory did theArgentinians a good turn at the time. A major reason for counting this as aforeignpolicyachievementisthatthesuccessoftheBritishforcesinrecapturingtheislandsledtothefallofArgentina’smilitarydictatorship,headedbyLeopoldGaltieri,andtherestorationofdemocracy.

Domestically,althoughThatcher’spolicieswereextremelydivisive,shewasaredefiningleader–onewhoredefinedtherulesofthepoliticalgame.(Assucha leader, she is discussed more fully in the next chapter.) The policies shevigorouslyespoused,enthusiasticallybackedduringmostofherpremiershipbyaclearmajoritywithinherownparty,brokewithmuchthathadbeentakenforgranted(includingthegreatpoweroftradeunionleaders)inthepost-warperiod.Whenapoliticalpartyiselectorallypopular,theleader’sseniorcolleaguesandbackbencherswilltoleratemorehigh-handednessfromtheirleaderthantheywillwhen the party is losing ground. That is partly because, like many politicalcommentators, they too readily believe that the leader plays a decisive role indeterminingelectionoutcomes.

The growing unpopularity by the end of the 1980s of Conservative Partypolicies–mostnotably,thecommunitycharge,or‘polltax’–madeiteasierforthosewhodislikedMargaretThatcher’sstyleofruletorebelagainstit.GeoffreyHowe,oneofthemostoutstandinglycapablemembersofthegovernmentledbyThatcher,finallylostpatiencewithherincreasingbeliefthatshealoneknewbestand, with his resignation speech in the House of Commons, precipitated herdownfallinNovember1990.MrsThatcher’sresponse,evenfollowingalengthyperiodofreflection,wastoobservethatHowewouldberememberednotforhisachievements but only for ‘this final act of bile and treachery’.104 FollowingHowe’s quietly devastating resignation speech, Thatcher was subsequentlyabandonedbyamajorityof theCabinet.She laterwrote that ‘aprimeministerwho knows that his or her Cabinet has withheld its support is fatally

weakened’.105Thatwasanunderstatement.Leaderswhoaredisdainfulofseniorcolleagues

or of their parties will in due course be ousted.Margaret Thatcher and TonyBlairarenotableexamplesofprimeministerswhocametobelieve themselvesindispensabletotheirpartyandcountryandtobeconvincedoftheirdestinytolead.TheydifferinasmuchasThatcher,unlikeBlair,didnottrytodefineherselfagainstherparty,althoughherdomineeringstyleinCabinetandinherrelationswith Cabinet ministers helped to ensure that when her leadership hung by athread in 1990, she lacked allies preciselywhere shemost needed them. ‘Mybiggest area of weakness’, she noted, ‘was among Cabinet ministers.’106Surveyinghercolleaguesandfindingmostofthemwanting,andanxiousabouther‘legacy’,shedecidedthatJohnMajorwasthepersonmostlikelyto‘secureand safeguard’ it, although she detected ‘a certain ambiguity’ even in hisstance.107

TonyBlairtookamuchmoredismissiveviewofhispartythanMrsThatcherdid of the Conservative Party. On his talks with the Liberal Democrat leaderPaddyAshdown (whom he hadwished to include in the Cabinet in 1997 butcouldnotbecauseof the sizeofLabour’svictory)Blairwroteof ‘ourcavalierattitudetoourparties’.108Blairhasnotedthatinorder‘tocircumvent’hisparty,‘whatIhaddonewasconstructanalliancebetweenmyselfand thepublic’,analliance that especially in the first three years of his leadership ‘was firm andunshakeable’.109 Blair’s patronizing attitude to the people who had elevatedhimtoapositionofauthorityandprivilege–thepartymemberswho,unliketheelectorateasawhole,hadvoteddirectlyforhim–comesoutmostclearlywhenhewrites that inapre-electionperiod‘thepartypeople,exiledforyears in theSiberiaofpartydrudgeryfarfromthecentreofgovernment,suddenlyre-emergeinthehallsoftheKremlinwithrenewedself-importance...’110

Reform of public services, with an increasing market and private sectorcomponent, was one of Blair’s priorities, along with foreign policy. He alsodevotedmuchtimetoseekingacompromiseresolutionoftheNorthernIrelandimpasse,andtherewasgeneral–andwell-merited–praiseforthepartheplayedin that process. On domestic ‘reform’, however, if the party disagreed withBlair’s views, it was the party that had to giveway, not the person they hadelected leader.AsBlairputs it: ‘Ididn’tchoose tohaverowswith theparty; Ichose to reform. But if the reform was resisted, then you couldn’t avoid the

row.’111 Like Margaret Thatcher, Blair worried about his ‘legacy’. As hisrelations with Gordon Brown during his final incomplete term of office wentfrombad toworse,Brown‘felt Iwas ruininghis inheritanceand I felthewasruiningmy legacy’.112From time to time,Blair thought of taking the risk ofremovinghismostformidablerivalwithinthegovernment,butwhenitcametothepoint,herefrained,beingawarethatitmightmerelyhastenhisownexitfrom10DowningStreet.ObservingalsothatBrown’s‘energy,intellectandpoliticalweightwereundeniable’,hebelievedthathispresencewas‘amassiveplus’forthegovernment,notwithstandingthetensionsbetweenthetwomen.ThelongerBlairwasinoffice,thesurerhebecameofhisownstatureandthesuperiorityofhisjudgement.‘Iftherewasaclash,’BlairwroteofhisrelationshipwithBrown,‘it was at least a clash of the titans.’113 He had become confident he couldrecognizeatitanwhenhelookedinthemirror.

During Blair’s prime ministership his chief of staff Jonathan Powell andpress secretary Alastair Campbell were, in a break with British tradition(discontinued by Brown and Cameron, his successors), given the authority toinstructcivilservants,apowerpreviouslyreservedforministers.Theyalsohadagreat deal of authority vis-à-visministers and (inCampbell’s case, especially)backbenchLabourMPs, since theywere so close toBlair.Lesser figures thanCampbellandPowellalso,however, acquiredanenormoussenseof theirownimportance fromworking in 10Downing Street. Just as in theUnited States,whereavastgrowth since theSecondWorldWar in the sizeof theExecutiveOfficeofthePresidencyhasledtocomplaintsfromthoseatthereceivingendof‘toomanypeopletryingtobitemewiththePresident’steeth’,soministersandMPshavefoundthemselvesbeingpatronizedorscoldedbypersonswhoassumethe authority of the prime minister. Tony Wright was a Labour MP muchrespected by fellow parliamentarians. When he became Chair of the PublicAdministrationCommitteeoftheHouseofCommons,heturnedwhathadbeenalittleregardedcommitteeintoabodywhichproducedhigh-qualityreportsthatwere taken unusually seriously. Before Wright acquired that position, whichgavehimagreaterindependencefromtheexecutive,hemadehisviewsknownon a variety of subjects, drawing on knowledge of political and constitutionalissuesacquiredduringhispreviouscareerasauniversity teacher.Ononesuchoccasion,amessageappearedonhispagerwhich read: ‘Theprimeminister ispissedoffwithyou.PhoneNo.10atonce.’114Wrightobserved later thathisoffencehadnodoubtbeen toexpressaview thatwas regardedas ‘unhelpful’.

However: ‘what really shocked and appalled me was that some No. 10apparatchikhadthoughtitappropriatetoputsuchcoarselanguageinthenameof the primeminister,who almost certainly knewnothing about it, and that itwasacceptable tocommunicatewithaMemberofParliament in thisway’.115The underlying problem was the assumption that the prime minister was ageneralwhostoodsofarabovehispartythatitwashisprerogativetodeterminepolicyandstrategy.Thus,evenseniorparliamentariansshouldjumptoattentionatthecommandofaDowningStreetlance-corporal.

*

A number of conclusions from the points elaborated in this chapter may bebriefly stated. Party leaders have some effectwhen people are thinking aboutvoting,butonlyveryrarelyaretheyofdecisiveimportanceinsecuringelectionvictories. It is also largely a myth that over time their electoral influence inWestern democracies has grown stronger.116 In office, presidents and primeministers have shared in an increase of power which has accrued to centralexecutives in modern states. However, other than in foreign policy, there areinsubstantial grounds for supposing that their personal power vis-à-vis theircolleagues has become significantly greater over the past hundred years,although some are more presumptuous than others in staking a claim todomination. There has been wide variety in the style of leadership from onepresidentandprimeministertoanotherandgreatoscillationsintheextentofthepower they have personally been able towield. The evidence, taken from theUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdominparticular,doesnotsuggestagraphormarked trend of ascending power on the part of democratic leaders. Finally,those prime ministers, such as Lloyd George, Neville Chamberlain, MargaretThatcher and Tony Blair, who aspire to equate headship of government in ademocracywithpersonalhegemony,payaseriouspoliticalprice–removalfromofficeasaresultofalienatingasufficientnumberoftheirowncolleaguesratherthanbythemoreusualformofrejectionatthehandsoftheelectorate.

*WilsonalsohappenstosharewiththeConservativePartyleaderthroughoutmostoftheinter-waryears,StanleyBaldwin, thedistinctionofbeing theonlyBritishprimeministerwithin the lasthundredyears toleave10DowningStreetatatimeunambiguouslyofhisownchoosing,neitherforcedoutbytheelectoratenor–withvaryingdegreesofgentle,ornotsogentle,pressure–easedoutbyhisownparty.*ThesizeofCallaghan’spopularityadvantageoverThatcherhasdonenothingtoinhibitjournalistsfrom

referringtothe1979electionasMrsThatcher’sroutofJamesCallaghan.*SirLeoPliatzkywasthemostseniorcivilservant–PermanentSecretary–at theDepartmentofTradewhen John Smith was Secretary of State for Trade in 1978–79 and the youngest member of JamesCallaghan’sLabourCabinet.InaconversationIhadwithPliatzkyatatimewhenSmithwasLeaderoftheOpposition,hesaid:‘JohnSmithwasaverygoodminister,andhe’llbeanevenbetterprimeminister.’*AseparateissueishowmuchtheemphasisonchangewithintheLabourParty,andtheuseoftheterm‘NewLabour’,ofwhichBlair,PeterMandelsonandGordonBrownwerethemainprogenitors,contributedtothescaleoftheelectoralvictoryin1997.Thecrudedichotomybetween‘NewLabour’and‘OldLabour’had some appeal for conservative newspaper proprietors, but it was oddly indiscriminating. Blair, inparticular, seemed to distance himself from his party’s history –with the term ‘Old Labour’ apparentlyembracing suchmajor Labour figures as ClementAttlee, Ernest Bevin,HughGaitskell, HaroldWilson,JamesCallaghanandDenisHealey,asiftheybelongedunderthesamelabelasTrotskyists,‘trendylefties’orsocialistfundamentalistswhohadbeenamongtheparty’smembersinthepastbutwhohadnoinfluenceon the policies of previous Labour governments. By 2005 any novelty value that the image of ‘NewLabour’mayhavepossessedhadwornoff.Morefundamentally,althoughBlairandsomeofhiscolleaguescontinuedtotalkabout‘OldLabour’and‘NewLabour’,nopartycalled‘NewLabour’everappearedontheballotpaperinageneralelection,andthesignificanceofthenotioncaneasilybeexaggerated.VoterscasttheirballotforthecandidatesoftheLabourParty,albeitby2005infarsmallernumbersthaninthepast.Inanyevent,thisattemptatrebrandingwasquietlyabandonedbyBlair’ssuccessorbutoneasLabourleader,EdMiliband.*WhenCongresspresents thepresidentwithabill tosign into law,hehas theoptionofvetoing it.Thepresidentialvetocan,however,beoverriddenifbothchambersofCongressvotebyatwo-thirdsmajoritytooverturn it. The very fact that the veto exists can lead to bargaining between the different branches ofgovernment in order to avoid a presidential veto. Use of the veto, however, carries risks, since muchdependsonwhosesidethepublictakes.Apresidentwhoispopularatthetime,asRooseveltwas,mayusethevetomoreprofuselythanonewhoisunpopular.* While Roosevelt had more followers than Johnson, he was scarcely less lacking in enemies. AConnecticutcountryclubissupposedtohavebannedmentionofhisnameasaprecautionagainstapoplexy.InKansasamandisappearedintohiscellar,announcingthathewouldnotcomeupuntilRooseveltwasoutofoffice,althoughbeforehehadachance to re-emerge,hiswifeseized theopportunity togooffwithatravellingsalesman.*OneofChurchill’smostmisguidedspeecheswashisfirstbroadcastinthegeneralelectioncampaignof1945 when, after five years of successful collaboration with Labour ministers in the war with NaziGermany,hesaidthat‘NoSocialistGovernmentconductingtheentirelifeandindustryofthecountrycouldaffordtoallowfree,sharp,orviolently-wordedexpressionsofpublicdiscontent.Theywouldhavetofallback on some form of Gestapo . . .’Mrs Churchill, when she read the speech in advance, advised herhusband to cut that passage out, but he preferred the advice of ‘party advisers who had excitedly beenreadingHayek’sTheRoad to Serfdom and that of LordBeaverbrook . . .’ (GeoffreyBest,Churchill: AStudy in Greatness, Penguin, London, 2002, p. 268.) Geoffrey Best describes this as an example ofChurchill’s‘impetuousliabilitytogooverthetopatthewrongmoment’andClementine‘asusualthemorecommonsensicalofthetwo’.Attlee’sresponse,inhisfirstbroadcastoftheelectioncampaignthefollowingday, was, as Roy Jenkins observes, ‘quietly devastating’. He said that the prime minister wanted ‘theelectorstounderstandhowgreatwasthedifferencebetweenWinstonChurchill,thegreatleaderinwarofaunitednation,andMrChurchill, thepartyLeaderoftheConservatives’.Churchillhadfeared,saidAttleeironically,that‘thosewhohadacceptedhisleadershipinwarmightbetemptedoutofgratitudetofollowhim further’, adding: ‘I thankhim for havingdisillusioned them so thoroughly.Thevoiceweheard lastnightwasthatofMrChurchill,butthemindwasthatofLordBeaverbrook.’(RoyJenkins,Churchill,PanMacmillan,London,2002,p.793.)

*R.A.ButlerhadbeenstronglyopposedtoChurchillbecomingprimeminister in1940andtriedhardtopersuade Halifax to allow his name to go forward. Later he became more appreciative of Churchill’sstrengths, while remaining far from uncritical. To put in fuller context the quotation above from myinterviewwithButler on 23September 1966, he said: ‘Churchill is someonewhose reputation has beengrosslyinflated,especiallywiththerecentspateofbooksofadulation.Ofcourse,hewasagreatleader.Hewas a great lion – I am a mouse in comparison – and he was absolutely straight. But he could beextraordinarily stupid. He knew practically nothing about economic policy. He scarcely understood themeaningof inflation.Buthewasvery tender-hearted.’ Inhismemoirs,ButlerwritesofChurchill tellinghim,afterhis1953Budget,that‘Ilikethespiritinwhichyouconductouraffairs’,andadds:‘Irecordwithstrongemotionthathoweverexasperatedonebecameattimes,awordofcommendationfromhimalwaysset one up cheerfully.’ (Lord Butler,The Art of the Possible: TheMemoirs of Lord Butler, K.G., C.H.,HamishHamilton,London,1971,p.165.)*Withkind intentions,Attleehadgiven that office toErnieBevinwhenhis healthhaddeteriorated toomuchforhimtocontinueasForeignSecretary.ItwasnotmuchappreciatedbyBevinwhosaidhewasnotalord,oraprivy,oraseal.

3

RedefiningLeadership

Not all political leaders who become heads of government make much of adifference.Thischapterisprimarilyaboutthoseleaderswithinademocracywhodo–redefiningleaderswhochallengepreviousassumptions,whoredefinewhatis thought tobepoliticallypossible,andwhointroduceradicalpolicychange.1Redefining leadership does not always come primarily from the head of thegovernment.Itisnotunusualforthemostimportantpolicyinnovationtobeverymuch a product of collective leadership.At other times there is an individualwithinthetopteam,otherthantheheadofgovernment,whoistheprimemover.However, presidents and primeministers have greater opportunities than theircolleagues to set the tone of government and to influence its priorities.Whenredefiningleadersemerge,moreoftenthannotthispersonis,indeed,theheadofthe executive. The political resources available to that leader are greater thanthoseaccruingtoanyothermemberofthetopteam.

AMERICANPRESIDENTSASREDEFININGLEADERS

The twentieth-century American presidents with the strongest claim to beregarded as redefining leaders were Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B.Johnson (although a case could also be made for Theodore Roosevelt).2 Theunusual legislativesuccessofFDRandLBJhasalreadybeen illustrated in thepreviouschapter.Bothwereformidableleadersinthesensethattheyusedtothe

fullthepowersoftheofficeofpresidentandweremorethanusuallydominantinthe policy process. Both of them during their presidencies radically changedpolicyaswellastheassumptionsaboutwhatwaspossiblewithintheAmericansystem.Successfuloutcomes,Iarguethroughoutthisbook,arerarelyassociatedwith the kind of leadership in which one person tries to dominate the entirepolicy-making process. Indeed, as we have seen, this is impossible in theAmerican system. Redefining presidents tend, therefore, to be those whomaximizetheuseofthepoliticalresourcestheydohave.IntheUnitedStatestheimpediments in the way of radical change in domestic policy are especiallyformidable.

FranklinD.Roosevelt

FranklinRooseveltdidnotattempt systemicchange,nordidhepresideoveraqualitatively new order. He does not, therefore, fit the criteria oftransformational leader, but he is a notable example of a redefining one.3Roosevelt’s imaginative response to economic depression in the 1930scontributedtoarevivalof theexistingeconomicandpoliticalsystemata timewhenitwasfallingintosomedisrepute,althoughtheUSAwasbynomeansonthevergeofrevolutionarychange.Thepowerofthepresidency,especiallyoverforeignpolicy,hadbeenconsolidatedbyhisolderrelative, theearly-twentieth-centurypresidentTheodoreRoosevelt.ItwascarriedmuchfurtherbyFDR.Oneimportant measure was the creation in 1939 of the Executive Office of thePresident, which, not without difficulty, he persuaded Congress to approve.HenryL.Stimson,Roosevelt’sSecretaryofStateforWar,confidedtohisdiaryhisdissatisfactionwithRooseveltwanting‘todoitallhimself’andhisirritationthat Roosevelt tolerated, or perhaps even encouraged, an atmosphere inWashington ‘full of acrimonious disputes over matters of jurisdiction’.4Roosevelt was reluctant to delegate power. Even his sympathetic biographer,JamesMacGregorBurns,describesRooseveltasa ‘primadonna’who‘hadnorelishforyieldingthespotlightforlong’.5Butplayingoffofficialsandfactionsagainstoneanotherwasamechanismforhoardingasmuchpowerashecouldinasysteminwhichauthoritywashighlyfragmented.

Rooseveltusedhispowers,notleasthispowerofpersuasion,togoodeffect.HedidhisbesttoprepareAmericanpublicopinionforpossibleinvolvementinawar against Nazi Germany at a time when Joseph Kennedy, the American

ambassador to London from 1938 to 1940 and father of the future Americanpresident,wassayingthat‘democracyinBritainwasfinished,andthatthesamefatemightwellawaittheUnitedStatesifshefoolishlyenteredthewar’.6Afterthe German invasion of Poland in 1939, Roosevelt persuaded Congress toremove the ban on exports of armaments, which, under theNeutrality Act of1937,hadpreventedtheUSfromsupplyinganyarmstoallies.7FollowingtheJapaneseattackontheAmericanfleetinPearlHarborinDecember1941,whichbrought the United States into the Second World War, Roosevelt, ascommander-in-chief, took charge of the American war effort in a waycomparable to Churchill’s wartime prime ministership in Britain – with thedifference that theUnitedStateswasby this timefar thestrongerof these twomajorpowers in thedemocraticcomponentof theanti-fascistalliancewith theSovietUnion.TwoWarPowersActsgaveRooseveltaremarkablyfreehandforanAmerican president, enabling him to establish a host of wartime agencies,including an Office of Censorship, and extensive control over the domesticeconomy. In one of his radio ‘fireside chats’ of 7 September 1942,Rooseveltlaidclaimtoadditionalregulatoryeconomicpowersandindicatedthathewouldnot tolerate inaction by Congress in conferring them, for ‘in the event thatCongressshouldfailtoact,andactadequately,Ishallaccepttheresponsibility,and Iwill act’.8The extraordinary powers he planned to exercisewould, saidRoosevelt, ‘automatically revert to the people after thewar’.Writing in 1946,theconstitutionalspecialistEdwardCorwinobservedthatthepresidentappearedto have been claiming ‘some peculiar relationship between himself and thepeople–adoctrinewithastrongfamilyresemblancetotheLeadershipprincipleagainstwhichthewarwassupposedlybeingfought’.9Many,thoughnotall,ofthepowersthatRooseveltaccumulatedduringthewarwere,however,explicitlydelegatedtohimbyCongress.

Unusuallypowerfulwarleaderthoughhewas,itwas,aboveall,hisdomesticpolicywhichmadeRooseveltaredefiningleader.Thatheheldasmanyas337pressconferencesduringhisfirstperiodofoffice,whichbeganin1933,and374inhis second term (1937–1941) reflected, as did his radio ‘fireside chats’, thehighpriorityheplacedoncommunicatingwiththeelectorateandwithrestoringpublicmorale.WithRoosevelt’sbacking,Congresspassedwithinthespaceofahundred days in 1933 a wide range of legislation aimed at overcoming theeconomic depression.Themeasures included theNational IndustrialRecoveryAct, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Federal Emergency Relief Act, the

TennesseeValleyAuthorityAct(TVA),theEmergencyFarmMortgageAct,theHome Owners’ Loan Act and the Railway Coordination Act. The TVA inparticular has been described as ‘Roosevelt’s most unalloyed example ofpresidentialleadership’.10Itbroughttogetherpublicandprivatebodies,linkingindustryandagriculture,forestryandfloodprevention,andprovidedanexampleof social and economic planning at the regional level. It was a policy whichRoosevelt‘authored,proposed,andoversawtopassage’.11

AlthoughanumberofthespecificNewDealmeasuresfellbythewaysideinsubsequent years, Roosevelt’s presidency, it has convincingly been argued,‘removed psychological and political obstacles to using government to protectpeople from the vicissitudes of the marketplace’.12 The New Deal was,however,acollectiveenterprise.MuchofitwasconceivedbypeopleotherthanRoosevelt,buthisbeliefsandpoliticalpopularityunderpinnedit.Itsprogrammesrequired legislation, which meant that in addition to their enactment byCongress,thesemeasuresweresubjecttocontinuingcongressionaloversightandinvestigation.Thatmighthavebeenenoughtoscupperthemhaditnotbeenforthe popularity both of the programmes and of the president. Rooseveltdeliberatelykepthimselfinthespotlightandtookfullpoliticaladvantageofthehighesteeminwhichhewasheldbymanyvoters(eventhoughhewasloathedbyothers).13

To get theNewDeal throughCongress,Roosevelt required the support ofSouthern Democrats who formed a solid bloc of votes and he took pains tocultivate and flatter them.Theywillinglywent alongwith policies that placedconstraints on business and the stock market, supported large-scale publicinfrastructure projects, backed the National Industrial Relations Act of 1935,which broadened the possibilities of unions to organize, and approved theRevenueActofthesameyear,whichraisedthesurtaxonincomesover$50,000from 59 to 75 per cent.14 The support of Northern Democrats and of liberalRepublicans would not alone have been enough to enact what were in theAmerican context such radical measures. Yet the same Southern DemocratsopposedeveryattempttoextendthecitizenshiprightsofblackAmericans.TheSouthremainedinRoosevelt’stimewhitesupremacist.Thus,attheheartoftheNewDeal,asIraKatznelsonhasputit,laya‘rottencompromise’.Rooseveltdidlittle to challenge the ‘rights’ of Southern states to treat African-Americansabominably. Yet, without the economicmeasures of the NewDeal, includingsomepoliticalsupportfortheadvanceoflabourunions,theconditionsofblack

Americanswouldhavebeenevenworse.Thesepolicies–especiallywhentakenin conjunction with the subsequent participation of black servicemen in theAmericanwareffort–createdpreconditions for thecivil rightsmovementandadvancesofthepost-warera.15

Among themost significant influences during Roosevelt’s presidencywashis politically active wife who was, in many respects, more radical than herhusband.EleanorRooseveltadmitted that ifherhusbandhadnotbeenrunningfor the presidency in 1932, shewould have voted for the Socialist candidate,NormanThomas.16Shediligently sought to improveopportunities forwomenand for African-Americans. She tried hard to get more women appointed topublic offices and was especially active in attempting to counter theinstitutionallyembeddedracismwhichpervadedAmericanpolitics.Herhusbandfelt too constrained by the need for the votes of SouthernDemocrats, both inpopular elections and in Congress, to offermuchmore than tepid support forcivil rights. Eleanor Roosevelt resigned from the Daughters of the AmericanRevolutionin1939whentheyrefusedtoallowthegreatblackAmericansingerMarianAndersontosinginConstitutionHall.ThatAmericansocietyasawholewas lessbigoted than thatorganizationwas suggestedbyaGalloppoll,whichshowed67percentapprovalofherdecision.17Yeteverysteptowardssecuringcivilrights–eventheanti-lynchinglegislationthatRooseveltsupportedduringhissecondterm–encounteredfierceoppositionintheSouth.ItwasapprovedintheHouseofRepresentativesbyalargemajority,butdidnotsurviveasix-weekfilibuster of late 1937 in the Senate at a time when that body had anoverwhelming Democratic majority.18 Very cautiously, however, Rooseveltbacked incremental improvements in the civil rights of black Americans, forwhomtheNewDealbroughtsomegainssociallyandeconomically.Bytheendofthe1930s,blackAmericansconstituted‘akeyelementoftheRooseveltvoteinnorthernstates’.19

InabroadcastinNovember1934,Rooseveltdeclaredthat‘wemustmakeita national principle that wewill not tolerate a large army of unemployed’.20Publicworkstoreduceunemploymentwereat theheartof theNewDeal.Yet,weshouldnotexaggerateRoosevelt’sroleasaninitiatorofthenewpolicy.Thepresident was at first very cool towards the idea of public works. That theybecame an important part of theNational IndustrialRecoveryAct, one of thenotable pieces of legislation in FDR’s first hundred days, in large measure

resultedfromthepressureandpersuasionofSecretaryofLaborFrancesPerkinsand of New York Senator Robert F. Wagner.21 Roosevelt’s successes withCongressweregreatestduringhisfirstthreeyearsaspresident–and,thenagain,inthespecialcircumstancesoftheSecondWorldWar.Inthesecondhalfofthe1930s he had greater difficultieswith the legislature.A conservative coalitiongraduallyformedthatwascapableofthwartinghim,andheincreasinglyresortedtotheuseofthepresidentialveto.22

LyndonB.Johnson

IfRooseveltwasacomplexpersonalitybutundoubtedlyaredefiningleaderandsuccessful president, Lyndon Baines Johnson was a man of still morecontradictionsandgreaterdeviousness.Moreover,Roosevelt’spresidencyendedonly with his death, Johnson’s in failure. The bitterness caused by theunsuccessful Vietnam War, in which the United States was enmeshed,eventually led Johnson not to seek a second term. Yet, what he achieveddomesticallywasremarkable.Itowedagooddealtothepoliticalenvironmentinwhich he entered the White House. The shock of the assassination of hispredecessorgaveafilliptocausesKennedyhadespousedbutonwhichhehadmade littleheadwaywithCongress–mostnotablycivil rights.Pressures frombelowwerestrong,particularlyfromblackAmericans,forwhomMartinLutherKing was an inspirational leader. They came also from a broader society,especiallyeducatedyouththatwasmorepoliticizedthaninthe1950s,partlyasaresultoftheVietnamWaranditsconcomitantmilitarydraft,butalsoinresponseto the leadership ofKing and other civil rights activists.On the opposite sidestoodmanyRepublicans and their allieson the civil rights issue, theSouthernDemocrats.NomoresympathetictothecausesJohnsonembracedwasthelong-servingDirectorof theFBI,J.EdgarHooverwhom,DeanAchesontoldHarryTruman, ‘you should trust as much as a rattlesnake with the silencer on itsrattle’.Whilepayingscantattentiontothemurderofpeacefulblackprotesters,HooverdidallinhispowertodiscreditthecivilrightsmovementbyspreadingrumoursofCommunistpenetrationofitsranks.King’sresponsewastosaythatit would be encouraging ‘if Mr Hoover and the FBI would be as diligent inapprehendingthoseresponsibleforbombingchurchesandkillinglittlechildren,as they are in seeking out alleged communist infiltration in the civil rightsmovement’.23

UnlikemanyothersouthernDemocrats,JohnsonhadsupportedtheSupremeCourt’s Brown v. the Board of Education decision, during the Eisenhoweradministration, which mandated the desegregation of schools. As president,Johnson’s supreme achievement was to get the most important civil rightslegislationpassed, overcoming sustainedSenate resistance.He also introducedMedicare – andMedicaid for the poor, which was to be administered by thestates – andwithin two years of accidentally ascending to the presidency, hislegislative accomplishments had put real substance into his rhetoric about theGreat Society and the War on Poverty. The lowest level of inequality everrecordedintheUnitedStateswasachievedin1968.24JohnsonhasagoodclaimtoberegardedasthegreatestAmericanlawmakerofthetwentiethcentury,evenif we consider his presidency on its own – unquestionably so, if his years asSenateMajorityLeaderareadded in.FocusingonJohnson’s first twoyears intheWhiteHouse,StephenGraubardhasobserved:‘AlthoughWilson,Roosevelt,and Truman established credible records that gave proof of their ability tocollaborate with Congress, to secure passage of the domestic legislation theyinsistedon,nonewasmasteroftheartsofpersuasioninthewayJohnsonprovedto be in 1964 and 1965.’25Howdid he do it?One of hismajor biographers,RandallWoods,notesthatthetelephonewasthe‘trueinstrumentoftheJohnsonlegislativewill’,adding:

Fromlate1963through1966,LyndonJohnsoninteractedwithsenatorsandrepresentativesonadailyandevenhourlybasis.HebecamepersonallyfamiliarwiththedetailsofthemorethanonethousandmajorbillsCongress considered during this period.Hismemory bankswere still full of information concerning thepersonalcharacteristicsofthevariouscongressionalandsenatorialdistrictsandthepersonalpeccadilloesofthosemenandwomenwhoservedthem.‘ThereisbutonewayforaPresidenttodealwiththeCongress’,Johnsonwould observe, ‘and that is continuously, incessantly, andwithout interruption . . .He’s got toknowthemevenbetterthantheyknowthemselves...’26

LBJ was living proof that the president’s greatest ‘power’ was ‘the power topersuade’. Nevertheless, his reputation was low among the highly educatedadvisers who surrounded Kennedy, and Johnson himself felt keenly theinadequacies of his education compared with ‘the Harvards’, as he calledthem.27His ruthlessness and lackof scruples, ashemadehispolitical ascent,havebeen thoroughlydocumented,not leastbyRobertCaro inhismagisterialmulti-volumebiography. In the summerof 1957 Johnson, asMajorityLeader,pushed through the Senate a Civil Rights Act which made only modestadvances, butwhich, nevertheless, extendedblackvoting rights andpaved the

wayforthemajorCivilRightsActsof1964and1965whenhewaspresident.ItwasagainstallexpectationsthatJohnsonusedhisinfluencein1957infavourofcivil rights, forhehadvotedovera twenty-yearperiodboth in theSenateandbefore that in theHouseofRepresentatives in thesamewayasotherSouthernDemocrats–againstimprovementinthecivilrightsofblackAmericans.28AnyothercourseofactionwouldhaveputanendtotheriseofaTexanpolitician.

EvenwhenJohnsonwaspursuingaliberalpolicy,hedisplayed,writesCaro,‘a pragmatism and ruthlessness striking even toWashington insiderswho hadthought themselvescalloused to thepragmatismofpolitics’.Hewas ‘deceitfulandproudof it’, ashe talked ‘first toa liberal, then toaconservative,walkedoverfirsttoasoutherngroupandthentoanorthern’,telling‘liberalsonething,conservatives the opposite, and asserting both positions with equal, andseemingly total, conviction’.29 But his deviousness went alongside ‘politicalgenius’.30ConsideringJohnson’scareerintheround,Caroisabletoconclude:‘AbrahamLincolnstruckoffthechainsofblackAmericans,butitwasLyndonJohnson who led them into voting booths, closed democracy’s sacred curtainbehind them,placed theirhandsupon the lever thatgave themaholdon theirowndestiny,made them, at last and forever, a true part ofAmerican politicallife.’31

Johnson had learned during the contest for the Democratic presidentialnomination in 1960 (which JohnF.Kennedy secured) that the state governorscould be effective in putting pressure on senators and representatives.Immediatelyafter the funeralofPresidentKennedy inNovember1963,beforethe governors had a chance to leave Washington, Johnson called them to ameeting inhisoffice.He told themthathehadspent twoandahalfhours theprevious day with Eisenhower, ‘the great President who led our forces tovictory’ who made him realize that no party has ‘a single mortgage onpatriotism’ and that, regardless of party, they should help him to save thecountry. He got more and more passionate as he spoke. They had to dosomething to stop the hate and tackle the injustice, inequality, poverty andunemployment ‘that exists in this land’. The best way to deal with theseproblems,Johnsonsaid:

istopassthetaxbillandgetsomemorejobsandgetsomemoreinvestmentsand,incidentally,getmorerevenueandtaxes,andpassthecivilrightsbillsothatwecansaytotheMexicaninCaliforniaortheNegroinMississippiortheOrientalontheWestCoastortheJohnsonsinJohnsonCitythatwearegoingtotreatyouallequallyandfairly,andyouaregoingtobejudgedonmeritandnotancestry,noronhowyouspell

yourname.32

Johnson had always been concerned with the fate of the poor, not least theinjusticessufferedbypoorblacks,buthehadbeenconcerned,aboveall,withhisown political advancement. Roy Wilkins of the National Association for theAdvancementofColoredPeople(NAACP)hadlongbeenambivalentabouthim.‘WithJohnson,’hesaid,‘youneverquiteknewifhewasouttoliftyourheartoryour wallet.’33 He finished up admiring him. When Johnson’s ambition andcompassionhadbeen inconflict, then itwascompassion thatcameoff secondbest. From themoment he became president, however, that conflict was overand, as Caro observes, the cause of social justice ‘moved forward under thedirectionofthismasterattransmutingsympathyintogovernmentalaction’.34

Of course, the contrast between Johnson’s domestic successes and hisforeignpolicy failurescouldnothavebeen starker.His inability tounderstandnationalismandCommunisminAsiawassharedbyhisimmediatepredecessorandalsobyhisadvisers,anditwasfearof‘losing’Vietnam(whichwasneverAmerica’stolose)thatbroughtabouthispoliticaldownfall.YetJohnsonwasaredefining leader. He changed the terms of political debate, not only makingAmericanpovertyasalientpoliticalissuebuttacklingitheadon,whileplayingadecisive role in ending the virtual disenfranchisement of black voters in anumber of southern American states. In his State of the Union address toCongress in January 1964, Johnson said that ‘many Americans live on theoutskirts of hope – some because of their poverty, and some because of theircolor,andalltoomanybecauseofboth’.Thetask,hesaid,wasto‘replacetheirdespair with opportunity’, adding: ‘This administration today, here and now,declaresunconditionalwaronpovertyinAmerica.’35AtthetimeofJohnson’sdeathin1973,theblackwriterRalphWaldoEllisonacknowledgedthatJohnsonhadbeenwidelydespisedbothbyconservativesandbymanyliberals.Hewould‘have to settle forbeing recognizedas thegreatestAmericanPresident for thepoor and for the Negroes’, which, Ellison added, was ‘a very great honorindeed’.36

RonaldReagan–RedefiningLeader?

TheUnitedStateshashadsomenotablepresidentssinceJohnson,butnonewhowasaredefiningleaderinthesenseinwhichbothRooseveltandJohnsonwere.

RonaldReagan is sometimes accordedgreat significance,but therehasbeenatendencytoexaggeratethedifferencehemade.Leadersandespeciallytheirmostenthusiasticsupportersarepronetoassumethatmomentouseventswhichoccurduring their time in power are attributable to them. Such arguments havefrequently been advanced on behalf of Reagan, but he did not make thingshappen in the way that Johnson did. Notwithstanding the importance of theUnitedStatesinworldpolitics,fundamentalchangecanoccurinternationally,asit did during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush the elder,without it being primarily a result of contemporaneous American policy. Theliberalizationof theSovietUnion,democratizationofEast-CentralEuropeandtheendof theColdWarwerevery largely the result of change inMoscow towhich Reagan and Bush were responsive but for which they were notresponsible. More specifically, the transformation of Soviet domestic andforeign policy in the second half of the 1980s owed little or nothing toWashingtonhardliners,triumphalistWesternaccountsnotwithstanding.

Domestically,neitherReagannor(stillmoreobviously)Bushcomesintothecategoryofaredefiningleader,althoughReagan,whilelessknowledgeablethanBush,wasmore successful in impartingadistinctive tone tohispresidencyaswell as, in further contrast with his successor, comfortably winning a secondterm.Therewas,asnotedinthepreviouschapter,alargegulfbetweenReagan’srhetoric and the realities of his presidency. His legislative achievements weremodest and ‘in spite of promises to shrink federal spending, the size ofgovernment and the deficit, all grew larger under Reagan’.37 The biggestdifferencehemadeinmovingtheUnitedStatesinamoreconservativedirectionwas almost certainly through judicial appointments –more than four hundredfederal judgeswithlifetimetenureandfourSupremeCourtappointments,withWilliam Rehnquist promoted to Chief Justice and Sandra Day O’Connor,AntoninScaliaandAnthonyKennedybecomingSupremeCourtjudges.38

BRITISHREDEFININGLEADERS

Within a democracy there can on occasion be a fine line between leaders andgovernmentswewouldwishtocallredefiningandthosenotmeetingthecriteria.Changes of government will almost invariably produce some difference:democratic leaders do not last long unless they have a political party behindthem,andpartiesofferpolicychoices.Yet, ifweturntotheBritishcase,there

havebeenjustthreegovernmentsinthetwentiethandtwenty-firstcenturieswithstrongclaimstoberegardedasredefining–theLiberalgovernmentof1905to1915 (when a wartime coalition was formed) and which was led by HerbertAsquith from 1908; the Labour government headed by Clement Attlee from1945 to 1951; and the Conservative government during Margaret Thatcher’spremiershipfrom1979to1990.Thatisnot,ofcourse,tosaythattherewasnosignificant policy innovation by other UK governments over the last century.TheConservativegovernmentledbyHaroldMacmillanbetween1957and1963,theLabourgovernmentof1964to1970duringtheprimeministershipofHaroldWilson,andtheLabourgovernmentheadedbyTonyBlairfrom1997until2007witnessedquitesubstantialchange–andweshallcometothemshortly.

ThePre-First-World-WarLiberalGovernment

DuringthefirstfourdecadesofthetwentiethcenturytheonlyredefiningBritishgovernment was that formed by the Liberal Party in December 1905 andconfirmedbythatparty’slandslidevictoryinthe1906election.Initsfirst twoyears it was headed by the cautious Henry Campbell-Bannerman, but it wasespeciallyafterhisillhealth(anddeathshortlythereafter)ledtohisreplacementasprimeministerbyAsquithin1908,thatmostofthefar-reachingchangetookplace. It includeda raft of legislationwhichconstituted thebuildingblocksofwhatwouldbecomeknownasthewelfarestate.Thedrivingforcebehindmuchof this legislation was David Lloyd George who succeeded Asquith asChancellor of the Exchequerwhen the latter became PrimeMinister.Old agepensionshadalreadybeenplannedbyAsquithwhenhewasChancellor,buttheywerecarriedintolawbyLloydGeorgein1908.

The governmentwas open to ideas from elsewhere. Pensions for the agedhad already been introduced in New Zealand, which Asquith described as alaboratoryforpoliticalandsocialexperimentsthatprovidedinstructionfor‘theoldercountriesof theworld’.39LloydGeorge’senthusiasmforunemploymentinsurancewassparkedbyavisittoGermanywheresomeoftheearliestwelfarestatemeasureshadbeenbroughtinbyBismarck.40TheNationalInsuranceActof1911 introducedcompulsoryhealthandunemployment insurance inBritain,paid for out of taxation of both employers and employees. Earlier (in 1909)WinstonChurchill, as President of theBoard ofTrade, had established labourexchanges to boost employment. He, too, had been influenced by German

experience. As the youngest Cabinetminister for a generation (hewas thirty-three at the time of his appointment in April 1908), he wrote to the primeminister, Asquith: ‘Germany with a harder climate and far less accumulatedwealthhasmanagedtoestablishtolerablebasicconditionsforherpeople.Sheisorganizednotonlyforwar,butforpeace.Weareorganizedfornothingexceptpartypolitics.’41

AmajorconstitutionalreformwasthereductioninthepoweroftheHouseofLords.Theupperhousewasnolongerallowedtoholdupfinanciallegislationorpermitted to delay any bill for more than two years. This was a fundamentalchangewhereby‘achamberofvetowasforcedtoreinventitselfasachamberofscrutiny’.42TheclashwiththeHouseofLordswastriggeredbyLloydGeorge’s‘People’s Budget’ of 1909. Among other measures, it raised income tax,increaseddeathdutiesonthelargerestates,imposedlandtaxes,andintroducedataxonpetrolandmotor-carlicencesatatimewhencarswereownedonlybytherich. The revenue was used partly to pay for substantially increased defenceexpenditure.AlthoughtheHouseofLordshadlongacceptedaconventionthatitdidnotblockaBudgetapprovedbytheHouseofCommons,theoverwhelmingConservativemajorityinthehereditarychamber,outragedbywhattheysawasanattackon the richandon landed interests, rejected this legislation.Feelingsranhigh.TheDukeofBeaufortsaidhewould‘liketoseeWinstonChurchillandLloyd George in the midst of twenty couples of dog hounds’. The Duke ofBuccleuchinformedasmallScottishfootballclubthatbecauseofthelandtaxhewould be cancelling his subscription to them of just over a pound a year.43AsquithcalledanelectionatwhichtheBudgetandtheneedtoreducethepowerof theLordsweremajor issues. Surprisingly, theLiberals lost over a hundredseatsinthatelectionofJanuary1910andbecamedependentforthecontinuationof their government on the support of Labour and IrishNationalistMPs. Theportrayalofthegovernmentasextremistevidentlyresonatedwithanelectorateinwhichmanymaleworkersandallwomenstilldidnothaveavote.

TradeUnion rights to raisemoney for political purposes, which had beenundermined by the judiciary,were extendedby the government in 1913.Nowworkerswhodidnotwishtocontributetothepoliticallevyhadtocontractout,rather than contract in.Domestic pressures on the governmentwere stillmoredecisive than foreign example. Much suffering that had previously beenaccepted as anunavoidableby-productof capitalismbegan tobe tackled fromfear of socialism and as a result of the demands of an increasingly organized

labourmovement.Tradeunionmembershipmorethandoubledinsizebetween1900and1913(tooverfourmillionmembers),andfrom1910theinfluenceofLabour Members of Parliament was greatly enhanced by the government’sdependenceontheirvotes.

What makes this Liberal government a redefining one was, above all, itslayingtheearlyfoundationsofthewelfarestate.Inthatenterprise,aswellasinitsattackonthehereditaryprivilegesoftheHouseofLords,itowedatleastasmuch to Lloyd George as to Asquith, the PrimeMinister. Asquith was not adomineeringprimeminister and themore importantof the changes introducedwere very much the achievement of the government collectively, in which,however, two members were of particular consequence. The Cabinet Asquithheaded benefited from the driving force provided by Lloyd George andChurchill, two magnetic personalities who have been described, notunreasonably, as ‘the twoBritish politicians of genius’ in the first half of thetwentiethcentury.44

ThePost-SecondWorldWarLabourGovernment

ThegovernmentledbyClementAttleefrom1945until1951wasanespeciallyclearcaseofredefiningleadership.Asthepreviouschapterhasalreadytouchedupon, itwas no less striking an example of that leadership being provided bysenior ministers collectively rather than by the prime minister individually,important though his contribution was in managing large egos and playing acalm,coordinatingrole.OftheLabourCabinetoftwenty(nineteenmenandonewoman) formed in 1945, none had been born in the twentieth century. Theyoungest,AneurinBevan,whohadbeen regarded as an incorrigible rebel andwhowasAttlee’ssurprisechoiceasMinisterofHealth,was forty-seven.Theyhadaccumulatedalotofexperienceindifferentwalksoflife,andanumberofthemhadtheadvantageofhavingservedinthewartimecoalitiongovernment–inthecasesofAttlee,ErnestBevin,HerbertMorrison,StaffordCrippsandHughDalton at a very high level. Attlee’s wartime role as deputy prime minister,chairingCabinet committees and theCabinetwhenChurchillwas absent, hadnot put him in the public eye asmuch as Bevin andMorrison, and the latteraspiredtotakeAttlee’splaceasLabourleaderandpotentialprimeministerwhenthewarended.

HaroldLaski,whoheld themainChair ofPolitical Science at theLondonSchool of Economics, happened to be Chairman of the National ExecutiveCommitteeoftheLabourPartyin1945(itwasanofficewhichrotated),andhetried both then and later to have Attlee replaced as Labour leader, since hebelievedhim tobe insufficiently socialist, excessively anti-Soviet, and lackingtheability‘toreachouttothemasses’.45*LaskiwrotetoAttleeduringthe1945electioncampaign to tell him thathis leadershipwas ‘agravehandicap toourhopesofvictory in the comingelection’ (inwhichLabourwas soon togain ahuge majority over all other parties, winning 183 more seats than theConservatives and their allies).46 For the most part, Attlee put up with theconstantstreamofcriticismpatiently.Asearlyas1941,afterLaskihadaccusedhimofbeingindangeroffollowinginthefootstepsofRamsayMacDonald(theLabour leader who was expelled from the party when he became head of apredominantlyConservativecoalitiongovernmentin1931),Attleereplied:‘IamsorrythatyousuggestthatIamvergingtowardsMacDonaldism.Asyouhavesowellpointedout,IhaveneitherthepersonalitynorthedistinctiontotemptmetothinkthatIshouldhaveanyvalueapartfromthepartywhichIserve.’47When,however,Laskiusedhisposition in1945 to speak in thenameof the recentlyelectedLabourgovernmentininterviewstoforeignnewspapers,Attleewrotetohim that ‘Foreign affairs are in the capable hands of Ernest Bevin’, that theForeign Secretary’s task was ‘quite sufficiently difficult’ without theembarrassmentofLaski’sirresponsiblestatements,andthat‘aperiodofsilenceonyourpartwouldbewelcome.’48

The Labour government did introduce a substantial number of socialistmeasures, nationalizing the Bank of England, the railways, long-distancetransport,theelectricityandgasindustries,thecoalmines,civilaviation,andtheiron and steel industries. These concerns remained in public ownership for atleast a generation after the defeat of theLabour government in 1951with theexception of the iron and steel enterprises, which were denationalized byChurchill’s Conservative government. Since the House of Lords had beendetermined to delay the Iron and SteelNationalizationBill, a new ParliamentActwaspassed,reducingtheir1911powersofdelayfromtwoyearstoone.49Thegovernmentpursuedegalitarianandredistributivepolicies.Britainhadbeendevastatedeconomicallybythewar,andasshortageswerestillsevere,foodandpetrolrationingcontinuedfortheremainderofthe1940s,withonlytherationingof clothes ending in 1949. Free milk for schoolchildren and other welfare

benefits, however, saw a steady improvement in the standard of health of allages as compared with the inter-war years.50 The National Insurance Act of1946 provided vastly extended benefits for the sick and unemployed and‘remainedabasisofthewelfarestateforthenextthirtyyearsormore’.51MostimportantofallwasthecreationoftheNationalHealthService,underBevan’sleadership – a service that was to become so popular that governments agenerationandmorelaterwhowishedtointroduceagreaterelementofprivatehealthprovisionhad todo soby stealth, after swearing fealty to theNHS.Asrecently as 2010, Attlee’s latest biographer contended: ‘The National HealthServiceremainstoday,withitscentralprincipleofhealthcarefreeatthepointofdelivery, almost entirely intact.’52 Its iconic status in post-war Britain wasreflectedwhenasubstantialpartoftheOpeningCeremonyofthe2012LondonOlympicGames,nodoubtpuzzlingforAmericanviewers,consistedofartistichomagetotheNationalHealthService.

MargaretThatcherasRedefiningLeader

Many of the principles established by the first post-war Labour governmentremained a basis for policy until the advent of the government headed byMargaret Thatcher. Britain’s first (and, thus far, only)woman primeminister,Mrs Thatcher undoubtedly ranks as a redefining leader. Her eleven years asprime minister from 1979 to 1990 constituted also the longest stint of anypremierinthetwentiethortwenty-firstcenturies.Shewashyper-activeinbothforeignanddomesticpolicy.Althoughshewasbynomeansdispleasedwiththetermthe‘ironlady’,firstconferredonherbySovietjournalists,inpracticeherforeignpolicywasmorenuancedthanherbelligerentimagesuggests.Itwasalsorather different in government from what it was before she became primeministerandfromwhatappearedinsomeofherretrospectiveobservationsaftershehadbeenforcedoutofthepremiership.

In office shewas influenced by able civil servant advisers in 10DowningStreet, by government colleagues, including successive Foreign Secretaries, aswell as by outside academic specialists, consulted on an ad hoc basis. (Alongwithherstrongconvictions,shehadaprodigiousappetiteforrelevantfactsandthecapacity toworkanexceptionally longday, sleeping foronly fourhoursanight.)Outofoffice,shehadlessexpertadviceandwasmorepronetolistentozealots. As prime minister, she became an early proponent of the idea that

Mikhail Gorbachev was a different kind of Soviet leader from any of hispredecessors. She was the most vigorous advocate among conservativepoliticians,whetherinEuropeorinNorthAmerica,oftheviewthathisreformswereoffar-reachingsignificance.Thatcher’spoliticalinstinctshadnotledhertosuppose that fundamental change could be initiated from within the upperechelons of a ruling Communist Party. Rather than rely purely on her gutfeelings, however, she listened to a broad spectrum of specialist opinion andreassessedsomeofherpreviousviewsontheprospectsforchangeintheSovietUnionandEasternEurope.53*

Contraryalsotoherbelligerentreputation,ThatchertookascepticalviewofAmericanmilitarystrikes inLebanonandLibya,saying: ‘Onceyoustart togoacrossborders,thenIdonotseeanendtoitandIupholdinternationallawveryfirmly.’54 Her willingness to use force to take back the Falkland Islands,following their seizure byArgentinian troops, should not obscure her extremereluctance to endorse military intervention where there had been no externalattackonBritainoronaBritishdependency.ShewasenragedbytheAmericaninvasionofGrenada inOctober1983 to reverse an internal coup.Thiswasanespecially sorepoint sinceGrenadawasa formerBritishcolonyand remainedpart of the Commonwealth. Thatcher, however, speaking on a BBC WorldServicephone-in,drewamuchbroaderconclusion,saying:

Wein...theWesterndemocraciesuseourforcetodefendourwayoflife...Wedonotuseittowalkintoindependentsovereignterritories . . . Ifyou’regoingtopronounceanewlawthatwhereverCommunismreignsagainstthewillofthepeople,eventhoughithappenedinternally,theretheUSAshallenter,thenwearegoingtohavereallyterriblewarsintheworld.55

Although Thatcher took a very dim view of the British Foreign andCommonwealth Office as an institution (making exceptions for several of itsdistinguished members who worked for her in 10 Downing Street as closeaides),onanumberofissuesherpolicieswerenotoutoflinewiththoseoftheFCOandofher last twoForeignSecretaries,SirGeoffreyHoweandDouglasHurd. Her views on dealing with the South African apartheid regime, theEuropean Union and the unification of Germany were among the majorexceptions.Onthoseissuessheliveduptoherultra-conservativestereotype,andonthemsheandtheForeignOfficewerefarapart.56

Itis,though,thedomesticpolicyoftheThatchergovernmentwhichmakesitoneofthethreeredefiningadministrationsoftwentieth-centuryBritain.Andinthiscase,unlikethatoftheAttleegovernment,itisentirelyreasonabletosingle

out the primeminister individually as a redefining leader.57On the economy,tradeunionsandthewelfarestate,Thatchercameto thepremiershipwithveryfirm viewswhich shewas determinedwould become government policy. ThecontrastbetweentheprogrammesoftheAttleeandThatchergovernmentscouldhardlybegreater.Moreover, thedifferencebetweenherCabinetmeetings andthose of Attlee was at least as striking. Unlike Attlee, Thatcher stated heropiniononissuesonwhichshehadastrongpointofview(andtheyweremany)at the outset, thus biasing the discussion in the direction of her convictions.ManyimportantissuesdidnotevencometotheCabinettable.Inthewordsofahighly criticalmember of her firstCabinet, IanGilmour: ‘Collective decision-making was severely truncated and with it, inevitably, collectiveresponsibility’.58

AtleasthalfthemembersofMrsThatcher’sfirstCabinetwerepeoplewhoseoutlookwasverydifferent fromherown–amongthem, theForeignSecretaryLord Carrington, Michael Heseltine, Jim Prior, Peter Walker and Gilmourhimself. At that timeGeoffrey Howe, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was aclose ally of the primeminister. Gradually, individual resignations and primeministerial reshuffles changed the composition of the higher echelons of thegovernment, but Thatcher succeeded in alienating even some of her earliersupporters.Howe’s resignation triggeredherdownfall in1990,but ithadbeenpreceded by the departure of other very senior ministers who were explicitlycriticalofThatcher’sstyleofrule.ThiswasnotablytrueofMichaelHeseltine’sresignationasSecretaryofStateforDefencein1986andofNigelLawson’sasChancellor of the Exchequer in 1989.59 Lawson, like Howe (but unlikeHeseltine),hadinitiallyseeneyetoeyewithThatcheroneconomicpolicy,buttheir views increasingly diverged, not least on Britain’s membership of theEuropeanmonetary system, the independenceof theBankofEngland, andontaxation.60

An important attributeofThatcherasprimeministerwas the thoroughnesswithwhichshedidherhomeworkandherinsistenceonbeingwellbriefed.Shewasnotmuchgiventoself-criticism,butherofficialbiographernotesthatinoldagetherewasnothingforwhichshewouldrebukeherselfmorethanthethoughtthat ‘I had not prepared thoroughly enough for something’.61 She had anexcellent memory and absorbed a great deal of information in the course ofmethodicalpreparation,whetheritwasforameetingwithGorbachevorforthe

more routine twice-weekly prime minister’s questions.62 Although she keptofficials on their toes and could even be feared in government departments –‘shesenttremorsthroughthewholeofWhitehall’63–shegleanedagreatdealfrom the civil service. In some ways, she preferred them to her Cabinetcolleagues, since, in addition to supplying the facts shewanted, they couldbemore relied upon to do her bidding. So much so, that Thatcher said to herprincipal private secretary Clive Whitmore: ‘Clive, I’d be able to run thisGovernment much better if I didn’t have ministers, only permanentsecretaries.’64

Although her style of government was to be her ultimate undoing – withpractically her entireCabinet telling her in 1990 that she could not survive asprimeminister–itmakesiteasiertoclassifyThatcherasaredefiningleaderandnot simply the head of a redefining government. There is surprisingly broadagreement, amongboth critics ofThatcher’s policies and those sympathetic tothem that shewas a leaderwho altered the terms of political debate, changedopiniononwhatwaspoliticallypossible,andintroducedradicalchange.65Shewas also a highly divisive leader who polarized opinion within England andbecameespeciallyunpopularinScotland.Sheultimatelylostthesupportofmostof her Cabinet colleagues (as a direct result of treating them much less thancollegially)andshelefttheConservativePartymoredividedthanithadbeenformany decades.One outcome of her foreign policy,which no onewould havedared topredictat thestartofherpremiership in1979, is thatshemademanymorefriendsinEasternEuropethanshedidinWesternEurope,andfinisheduppopular in Moscow, Prague and Warsaw and a bugbear in Bonn, Paris andBrussels.

Thatcher’s predecessor as Conservative Party leader (and prime ministerfrom 1970 to 1974), Edward Heath, had adopted a rather similar style ofdomineeringleadership,buttheonlymajormarkheleftwastoleadtheUnitedKingdom into theEuropeanCommunity (latercalled theEuropeanUnion).AsAnthony King has written: ‘Despite his frequent changes of policy direction,Heathundoubtedlyexercisedamorecomplete,morecontinuouscontroloverhisadministration than any other primeminister since 1945 . . . The fact that theTorieslostinFebruary1974–andthefactthat,apartfromBritain’sentryintotheEuropeanCommunity,almostthewholeofHeath’spolicylegacysoonlayinruins–doesnotmeanthatHeathwasnotadominantprimeminister.Itmerelymeansthatnotalldominantprimeministersaresuccessful.’66Itisworthadding

thatpriortobecomingprimeminister,Heathwas‘considered“weak”byalargesection of the population’.67His case illustrates three points. The first is thatbefore a leader has held the premiership, it is harder for that person to beperceivedas‘strong’.Thesecondisthatpopularopinionaboutwhetheraleaderisstrongorweak,inthesenseofbeingadominatingordomineeringdecision-maker, can be extraordinarily wide of the mark. The third is that there is noreasontosupposethat‘strength’ofaprimeminister’sleadership(inthesenseofdomineering relationship with Cabinet colleagues) leads to successfulgovernment.

WhiletheleadershipstylesofThatcherandHeathwerenotallthatfarapart,they differed significantly on important issues. Heath, who never forgaveThatcherfordisplacinghimasConservativeleader,didnotshareheradmirationforunfetteredcapitalism.OneoftheseniorfiguresintheThatchergovernmentarguedthat‘thetwokeyprinciples’forwhichtheAttleegovernmenthadstood,‘big interventionist government and the drive towards equality’, had remainedeffectivelyunchallengedformorethanageneration–until,infact,MrsThatcherentered10DowningStreet.68TheThatchergovernment removedmanyof theregulationsoncommercial institutions(includingbanks), freedcapitalmarkets,and acted on the belief, for which the primeminister was an evangelist, thattherewasno substitute formarket forces.Part andparcelof suchanapproachwasaprogrammeofprivatization,withtwo-thirdsofstateassetsbeingsoldoffwithin a decade. More traditional Tories disapproved of this. When HaroldMacmillanwas invitedbackto10DowningStreetat the timeof theFalklandsdisputetoadviseMrsThatcheron‘howtorunawar’,helookedaroundaroomwhichhadbeenpartlyemptiedtomakespaceforaneveningfunction.‘Where’sall the furniture?’ he wanted to know. ‘You’ve sold it all off, I suppose.’69Thatcherdefeatedaprolongedstrikebycoalminers(whoseunionsolidarityhadhelped earlier to bring down the Heath government) and drastically curtailedtradeunionpower.Sheallowedcouncilhouseoccupierstobuytheirpropertiesatfavourablepricesaspartofapolicyofencouraginggreaterhomeownershipandreducingthesizeofthepubliclyownedsector.

Moregenerally,theThatchergovernmentshiftedthepublic–privatebalancewithintheBritishstatesubstantiallyinthedirectionoftheprivate.Thisincludedbringing business experience into the civil service and introducing measureswhich reversed the egalitarian policies that had first been introduced by theAttlee government. Income tax rates paid by thewealthywere reduced, and a

newlocaltax,officiallycalledthecommunitychargebutuniversallyknownasthepolltax,wasbroughtin.Sinceitwasdesignedtotaketheplaceofataxonproperty (the rates), and was based instead on a head-count, its opponentsobjectedthatthesamesumwouldbepaidbyadukeandadustman.Itprovokedfierce opposition, and contributed to Mrs Thatcher’s growing unpopularityduring her later years in office.Her Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time,NigelLawson,believed that it hadbeen ‘a colossal errorof judgementonherparttoseektoturnaformoftaxationwhichhadbeennotoriousthroughouttheagesintotheflagshipofherGovernment’.Lawsonconcedes,nevertheless,thatwith this particular policy, despite ‘her profound personal commitment, sheobserved theproprietiesofCabinetgovernment throughout’.70TheChancelloropposed it vigorously, noting in an internalmemorandumofMay 1985 that a‘pensionercoupleinInnerLondoncouldfindthemselvespaying22percentoftheirnetincomeinpolltax,whereasabetteroffcoupleinthesuburbswouldpayonly 1 per cent’.71 However, Thatcher carried the Cabinet with her and themeasurewasapprovedin1986.ThetaxwasintroducedayearearlierinScotlandthaninEnglandandWales.ItprovedtobeagifttotheScottishNationalPartyas well as to Labour and added to the already high level of Scots’disenchantmentwiththeConservativeParty.72

SignificantlyInnovativeBritishGovernments

There are three other British governments in the period with which we areconcerned that, while falling short of providing redefining leadership, wereresponsible for especially noteworthy innovation – those led by HaroldMacmillan, Harold Wilson and Tony Blair. However, the most importantchanges brought about during the lifetime of the Labour governments led byWilsonandBlairwerenotprimarilythedoingofthesetwoprimeministers.

ThegovernmentheadedbyMacmillancametoterms,howeverhesitatingly,withdecolonization.ThissparkedoutragedirectedattheColonialSecretaryIainMacleod and, to a lesser extent, atMacmillan himself – both for his ‘windofchange’speechinSouthAfricaandforappointingtherelativelyliberalMacleodto the office responsible for colonial policy. The attacks came not only fromfringe organizations such as the League of Empire Loyalists but from asubstantialbodyofopinionontherightoftheConservativeParty.Ineconomicpolicy,therewaslessofasharpbreakwiththeChurchillandEdengovernments

in which Macmillan had served, latterly as Chancellor of the Exchequer.Macmillan himself took a dimviewofTreasury orthodoxy,wasKeynesian inhiseconomicphilosophy,andscepticalofsomeof theactivitiesof theCityofLondon,privatelyreferringtobankersas‘banksters’.73

Constitutionally, themost significant change brought in by theMacmillangovernmentwastheLifePeeragesActof1958.Thiscreatedanewcategoryofnon-hereditarypeerswhoweresubsequently to includepeoplewith impressiveachievementsindifferentwalksoflife,aswellasnotablepoliticianswhowere‘kickedupstairs’.ThelegislationgaveanewleaseoflifetotheHouseofLords,raisingthequalityofmanyofthedebates.TheLabourParty,itshouldbeadded,hadbeen innoparticularhurry toabolish thesecondchamber,havinghithertobeen reasonably content that its hereditary basis made it indefensible and nopossiblethreattothesupremacyoftheHouseofCommons.Inanothermeasureof long-term significance, the Conservative government headed byMacmillansetupin1961aprestigiouscommitteetoinvestigatetheconditionandfutureofhigher education in Britain under the chairmanship of the economist Lord(Lionel) Robbins. The government’s subsequent acceptance of the RobbinsReport, published in 1963, led to a great expansion in the number of Britishuniversities.74

Themost importantachievementof theLabourgovernments ledbyHaroldWilsoninthe1960swas–contrarytothestereotypeofConservativeandLabourgovernments – a substantial widening of personal freedoms.Wilson presidedoververyimportantsocialchange,includingaliberalizationofthedivorcelaws,the legalization of homosexual acts between consenting adult males (whichbroughtthelawformenintolinewiththatforwomen),theabolitionofthedeathpenaltyandthelegalization(subjecttocertainsafeguards)ofabortion.Inordertoincreasethelikelihoodofcriminalsbeingconvictedintrialsbyjury,theneedfor a unanimous verdict, which had existed in England since the fourteenthcentury, was ended.75 The right of the Lord Chamberlain to censor theatreproductionswasabolished.76ThisclusterofliberalizingmeasureswasthemostlastinglegacyoftheLabourgovernmentofthe1960s,anditsmainpromoteranddriving force was notWilson (who was socially rather conservative), but theHome Secretary, Roy Jenkins – another example of why we should stopspeakingofprimeministersasiftheyaresynonymouswithgovernments.

Of the legislationmentioned,onlyone item– thevote toabolish thedeathpenalty –was carriedwhile Jenkins’s Labour predecessor, Sir Frank Soskice,

wasHomeSecretary.77Thatbillwassponsoredby thebackbenchLabourMPSydney Silverman, and was the culmination of decades of parliamentaryendeavourbyhimtoendcapitalpunishment.78Alltheotherchanges(aswellastheabolitionofcapitalpunishment)hadbeenadvocatedbyJenkinsinabookhepublished in 1959. He had the ability and drive to push them through whenofferedtheHomeSecretaryshipbyWilsonwhoexpressedsurprisethatJenkinswanted that job.79Evenwhenabillwas introducedbyabackbencher,aswasthecasewithabortionlawreform–onwhichMembersofParliamenthadafreevote – the LiberalMPwho sponsored the bill, David Steel, benefited from a‘strongly favourableministerial speech’by Jenkins.80Neither thatbillnor theSexual Offences Act (which freed ‘homosexuals over twenty-one from therigoursofthecriminallaw’,andofwhichthebackbenchsponsorwastheLabourMPLeoAbse)wouldhavegotthroughthelegislativeprocessbutforthesupportofJenkinsasHomeSecretary.81

One other major initiative of that government was, however, very muchHaroldWilson’sidea.Heregardeditwithprideanditwastheachievementforwhichhemostwishedtoberemembered.ThiswasthefoundationoftheOpenUniversity, which made use of radio and television in teaching and aimed toextendhighereducationalopportunitiestomanywhohadmissedoutwhentheywere younger. The use of the broadcasting mass media was combined withinnovativeteachingmaterialsandpart-timepersonalinstructiontoenableadultsofallages,workingfromhome, tostudyat theirownpaceup todegree level.Wilson entrusted the taskof turning into concrete realitywhat hehad initiallycalled a ‘University of the Air’ to a politician who became by far the mostformidable‘juniorminister’inthegovernmentof1964–70.ThiswasJennieLee,whowonnumerousbattleswiththeTreasury(aswellaswithherownnominalimmediate superior, the Secretary of State for Education) through imperiouspoliticalwill,herstandingwithpartymembersnationally,andWilson’srespectfor her and for her late husband, Aneurin Bevan, the minister in the Attleegovernment who had introduced the National Health Service.82 In her dualcapacityofMinister for theArts andminister chargedwithbringing theOpenUniversityintobeing,JennieLeearousedtheenvyofcolleaguesofCabinetrank(whichshewasnot)withherabilitytoobtainvastlyincreasedfunding,evenindifficult times, because she could, whenever the need arose, call the primeministerandenlisthissupport.83

The Asquith, Attlee and Thatcher governments were redefining across abroadspectrumofpolicy.TheonlylastingimpactoftheLabourgovernmentledforadecadebyTonyBlair(continuingfalloutfromtheIraqwarapart)islikelytobetheconstitutionalchangewhichwasenacted.Butthatwasonascalewhichmade it not far short of redefining.House of Lords reformwas carriedmuchfurther,witharadicalreductioninthenumberofhereditarypeers–90percentof them removed in one fell swoop. A Human Rights Act, which has beendescribed by Vernon Bogdanor as ‘the cornerstone of the new Britishconstitution’,84andaFreedomofInformationActwereintroduced.AScottishparliamentandWelshassemblywerecreatedandtherewasbothexecutiveandlegislativedevolutiontoNorthernIrelandinapower-sharingagreementbetweenthe divided communities.Many people – including previous British and Irishprime ministers, successive Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, Blair’schiefofstaffJonathanPowell,SenatorGeorgeMitchellandevenPresidentBillClinton–hadbeen involved in the lastof theseachievements,butBlair’s rolewas recognized by the principal protagonists in Northern Ireland, and by theIrishRepublicpremierBertieAhern, tohavebeen important.Northern Irelandapart, constitutional reform (as was noted briefly in an earlier chapter) was aresult of policy Blair inherited and for which he showed little fervour. Later,indeed,heviewed theFreedomof InformationAct, inparticular, as amistakewhichbenefitedmainlyjournalistsandassomethingthatwouldinfutureinhibitpeople within government giving frank advice, for fear of early disclosure ofwhattheyhadsaid.85Devolutionofdecision-makingtoScotlandandWales,theHuman Rights Act and the Freedom of Information Act contributed in theirvariouswaysalsotoadiminutionofBlair’sownpowers.That,togetherwiththefactthattheywerenotpoliciesforwhichtheprimeministercouldtakepersonalcredit,meantthatthemostmomentousachievementsoftheLabourgovernmentduring the decade in which it was led by Blair were not trumpeted from 10DowningStreet.86

Theleadinghistorianoftwentieth-centuryBritishpolitics(andoftheLabourParty especially), Kenneth Morgan, has noted that only in respect ofconstitutionalreformwasthegovernmentledbyBlairbolderthanwasAsquith’sninetyyearsearlier.MorganappositelyobservesthatinthisareaofpolicyLord(Derry) Irvine’s influence was ‘of central importance’.87 One change ofconstitutional significance which Blair backed – Britain’s entry into theEuropeancommoncurrency(theeuro)–didnothappen,fortheprimeminister

was easily outmanoeuvred by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, GordonBrown.88In2000Blairasserted:‘Iwilldecidetheissueofmonetaryunion’,buthewasunabletodoso.89HewentsofarastoindicatetoBrownthathewouldretireearlier,tomakewayforhim,ifhewould‘takeamoresympatheticviewoftheeuro’,buttonoavail.90

IntheIntroductiontothisbook,Inotedthatredefiningleaders,individuallyorcollectively,seektomovethecentreinthedirectionoftheirpartyratherthansimplytryingtoplacethepartyinthecentregroundasdefinedbyothers.Blairchosethelattercourse.Itisfairtosaythatheand,toalesserextent,Brown,asChancellorforadecadeandasprimeministerfrom2007until2010,allowedagenuinelyredefiningleader,intheshapeofThatcher,toestablishdifferentlimitsof what was politically possible and desirable.91 There were, however,distinctionsbetween thepoliticalconvictionsofBlair,on theonehand,andofBrown,ontheother,whichweresomewhatobscuredby‘NewLabour’rhetoric.RobinCook,oneoftheleadingfiguresinthegovernmentledbyBlairuntilheresignedfromitinprotestagainsttheIraqwar,praisedBrown(withwhomhisrelations had in the past been frosty, to say the least) for taking ‘millions ofchildren and pensioners out of poverty’. But he told Blair, Brown and otherministersataChequersmeeting that ‘whenI talkproudlyofwhatwe’vedonefor the poor, inside I feel vaguely uneasy as if I’ve somehow gone offmessage’.92

Blair describes Brown in his memoirs as the more thoroughgoing ‘publicserviceguy’ofthetwoofthemandnoteshisconcernthatBrownwouldnot,ifhesucceededhim,carryonwithan‘authenticNewLabour’agenda.93Giventheextent towhichmanufacturing industry had left Britain’s shores, the financialsectorwas a very important source of tax revenues. Thatwas amajor reasonwhyLabourChancellors(BrownforthedecadewhenBlairwasprimeministerandAlistairDarling during the three years of Brown’s premiership) treated itgingerly.Nevertheless,the‘lighttouchregulation’oftheCityofLondonwasinthe tradition of the Thatcher government – or, at least, in the post-Thatchercentre ground. Until the financial crisis struck in 2008, revealing a host ofdubious practices, ‘the Conservative opposition was arguing for even lessregulation’.94

AlexSalmond–andthePossibleBreak-upofBritain

There isonecandidate for redefining leader in contemporaryBritishpolitics–theleaderoftheScottishNationalParty,AlexSalmond.If–anditisabigif–Scotland were to vote in a referendum for separate statehood, thus ending apoliticalunionwhichhasbeenremarkablystableandcomparativelysuccessfulfor over three hundred years, this would, indeed, constitute systemic change.Salmond, in such circumstances, could even be counted as a transformationalleader,althoughopinioninScotlandandintheUKasawholewoulddoubtlessremaindividedonwhether thiswasapositivedevelopment. Itwouldcertainlybeconsequential,andnotallofthoseconsequencesforeseeable.Althoughthereare a number of important reasons for the rise of the Scottish National Partyquiteapart fromthedebatingskill,personalityandpersuasivenessofSalmond,heisrecognizedbyhisadversariesaswellashissupporterstobeaformidablepolitician. It is also the case that a political partywhich is a latecomer on thepolitical scenedependsmore thando long-establishedpartieson theparticulartalentsofitsleadership,includingtheirabilitytoattractpublicandmassmediaattention.

Foundedin1934,butwithminimalrepresentationintheHouseofCommonsuntilthe1970s,theScottishNationalPartyhasbenefitedfromthecreationofaScottishparliament, forScotshavevoted for theSNP inmuch largernumbersfortheEdinburghparliamentthanfortheHouseofCommons.*Justeightyearsafter the first election for the Scottish parliament in 1999, the SNP, led bySalmond, formedaminorityadministration,andhavingdemonstrated that theycould govern (and were more than a one-man band), secured an absolutemajority four years later in the election of 2011.95 And that, moreover, in ahighly proportional electoral system, deliberately designed tomake it difficultforanyoneparty(notleasttheSNP)togainanoverallmajority.

ManyfactorsareinvolvedinanexplanationoftheScottishNationalists’rise.The international context is one.There has been a proliferation of new states,withseatsattheUnitedNations,inrecentdecades.TheendofCommunistruleintheSovietUnionandEasternEuropesawthere-establishmentofstatehoodofcountrieswhichhad formerlybeen independent and the creationofmanynewstates with far less continuity of national institutions or tradition of nationalconsciousness thanScotland.TheLabourParty, thestrongest inScotlandfrom

the end of the 1950s onwards, lost some of its popularity north of the borderduring the Blair years. Part of the new support the SNP gathered came fromvotersattractedtopoliciesthatwereclosertothoseoftheLabourPartypriortoits‘NewLabour’makeover.

Alex Salmond himself came originally from the left of his party, and theScottishNationalists were by this time far removed from the dayswhen theycould be dismissed as the ‘TartanTories’. The SNP benefited also after 2003fromtheunpopularityoftheIraqwar,ofwhichSalmond,aWestminsterMPatthetime,wasoneofthemosteffectivecritics.SalmondledtheSNPfrom1990to 2000 and then took a break from the leadership for four years. Its supportlessenedduringthatperiod.Havingearlierannouncedthathewas‘fedupwithgoinguplikearocketanddownlikeastick’,hepresidedovertheparty’smostspectacular rise when he resumed its leadership in 2004.96 Salmond hasdescribed himself as ‘a great fan ofHaroldWilson’, and, likeWilson, he hasbeenadeptat lacinginvectivewithhumourandattalkinghimselfoutoftrickysituations.97 Not the least of these has been jettisoning an earlier strongcommitment to the idea of the euro as Scotland’s post-independence currencyoncetheeuroranintoseveredifficultiesanditspopularityplummeted.Forcedtofall back on using the pound and accepting the ministrations of the Bank ofEnglandinahypotheticallyindependentScotland,Salmondconsoledhimselfbyreminding everyone that the Bank had been founded by a Scotsman. He hasexemplifiedthecontentionthatdetailedargumentsarelessdecisiveforpoliticalsuccessthanmakingemotionalcontactwiththeelectorate.98

REDEFININGLEADERSHIPINPOST-WARGERMANY

Post-warWest Germany and – from 1990 – the unified Germany have beensuccess stories, both economically and politically. The country has prosperedand thequalityof itsdemocracyhasbeenhigh, ashas thatof its leaders. It isreasonable to see a linkage between good leadership and democraticconsolidation, even if this connection is lessoverwhelminglyobvious than thelinkbetweenGermany’s‘strong’andcharismaticleadershipinthe1930sandthecountry’soppressivetotalitarianpoliticalsystemfrom1933until1945.Threeofthe post-war chancellors, Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl,

havepersuasive claims to be regarded as redefining leaders.The chancellor isnotheadofstateinGermany–thatistheroleofthepresidentwhoisapoliticalfigurehead.Aholderof thatofficecanprovidesignificantmoral leadership,asRichardvonWeizsäcker,inparticular,demonstratedinthe1980sand’90s.Butit is the chancellor who heads the government and wields more power thananyoneelse in thecountry.Heorshe– forGermany’s firstwomanchancellorAngelaMerkel,anothertalentedpoliticianandastuteleader,waselectedin2005– is not chosendirectly by the electorate but by theGermanparliament.Eachparty nominates its candidate for the Chancellorship in advance, and so thisknowledge is a significant consideration in voters’ choice. Party allegiance issufficientlystrong,however,thatthecandidateishardlyeverthedecisivefactor.A major study of post-war German elections found ‘the role of partyidentification’ to be ‘by far the most important single determinant of voterchoices’.99

Once in office, the chancellor has very substantial authority, although it isgreater (as is true of many other heads of government) in foreign than indomestic policy. The chancellor is granted the right to determine the broadguidelinesofpolicy–inawayinwhichtheBritishprimeministerisnot,evenifsomeholdersoftheofficeattempttoactasiftheywere–andisresponsibletothe legislature for government policy outcomes. Nevertheless, ministers inGermany enjoy quite a high degree of autonomy, which is constitutionallyenshrined. Even while operating within general lines laid down by thechancellor,theyareinfullchargeoftheirowndepartments,andthechancellorisnot constitutionally permitted to issue specific orders toministers. In cases ofconflictbetweenonedepartmentandanother, theCabinethasa role toplay inreconciling the differences, but the main political actor in the conciliatoryprocess is the chancellor.100 TheConstitution for a democraticGermany hadbeendrawnupbyrepresentativesofthevariouspartieswhocametogetherinaParliamentary Council in 1948. They were intent on creating institutions thatwould avoid not only the totalitarianism of the Third Reich but also theweaknessof theWeimarRepublic thathadpreceded it.101Thus, theymade itdifficulttodissolveparliamentandtooverthrowgovernmentsbetweenelections.That could only be done through a ‘constructive vote of no confidence’. Thismeant that a chancellor would be forced to resign only if a parliamentarymajorityhadagreedonthenameofhisorhersuccessor–quiteahighhurdle.

Twoof themainconstraintsupon thechancellor’spowers follow from the

natureoftheelectoralsystemandthefederalcharacterofGermangovernment.Germany’s systemofproportional representation rarelygivesanyonepoliticalpartyanoverallmajorityandsomostGermangovernmentssincetheendoftheSecondWorldWar have been coalitions. The chancellor, whether a ChristianDemocratoraSocialDemocrat,has,therefore,tododealswiththeotherpartyin the coalition – usually the Free Democrats, although, when the SocialDemocratsarethelargestparty,itcanbetheGreens.*

TheChristianDemocratsdidsowellintheSeptember2013generalelection,inwhichtheymadethemostofthepopularityofAngelaMerkel,thattheycameclosetowinninganoutrightmajority,butstillfellshortofit.AlthoughMerkeltherebywasassuredofathirdtermasChancellor,theelectoralsystempresentedher with a major problem. The Free Democrats failed to reach the quitedemanding 5 per cent threshold for parliamentary representation, thus leavingherlittleoptionbuta‘grandcoalition’withtheSocialDemocrats,towhichtheSPDrespondedwarily,since theChristianDemocratswouldbeverymuch theseniorpartner.AdealwasstruckbetweenthepartyleadershipsinlateNovemberandratifiedbytheSPDmembershipthefollowingmonth.

KonradAdenauer

Thetopleaderofapoliticalpartyobviouslyhasspecialopportunitiestosetthetoneforthepartyheorsheleads,andforthecountrywhenthatpersonbecomeschancellor.Thisappliedtoanexceptionaldegreetothefirstchancellorofpost-warGermany, theChristianDemocratKonradAdenauer,whose responsibilityfor re-establishingGerman democracy, followingmore than a decade ofNazirule,andinacountryinruins,wasprofound.Supportfordemocracywasshaky,to say the least, in the early post-war years. It was a timewhen ‘manyWestGermansstillassented to thestatement thatHitlerwouldhavebeenoneof thegreatest statesmen there had ever been, if only he had not lost the war’.102Adenauerwasalreadyseventy-threewhenhebecameChancelloroftheFederalRepublicofGermanyin1949.HehadbecomeMayorofCologneaslongagoas1917,anofficehehelduntil1933whenhewasremovedbytheNazis,becomingCologne’smayoragain,briefly, in1945,beforegoingon tobecomeChairmanoftheChristianDemocraticUnion.103

The recovery of theGerman economy, overwhichAdenauer presided andfrom which his popularity benefited, owed a great deal to his Economic

Minister, Ludwig Erhard, the architect of what was called the ‘economicmiracle’.AdenauerhimselfputtheideaoftheSocialMarketEconomyintotheChristian Democrats’ programme in 1949, and may have been influenced byRoman Catholic social teaching. The same is often – and wrongly – said ofErhard.Alongwithmost of the economistswho supported him,Erhardwas aProtestant and a politician who believed that sweeping away the bureaucraticcontrolsthathadbeenputinplacebytheNazisandwhichhadcontinuedundertheAlliedoccupierswoulditselfpromotesocialwelfare.Theresultantpolicyofthe government, however, combined private enterprise and competitionwith aconsensus-seekingapproachtoindustrialrelationsandwiththeconstructionofawelfare state (whose origins went back much further – to Bismarck’s socialinsurance legislationof the1880s).104Althoughhewas toserveaschancellorfrom 1963 to 1966 asAdenauer’s successor, Erhardwas less effective in thatrolethanhehadbeenasakeymemberofAdenauer’sadministration,helpingtolay economic foundations for democracy. Growing prosperity underpinnedsupportfordemocraticnorms,reversingthepatternofGermandemocracyafterthe First World War when economic failure, hyperinflation and subsequentunemploymenthadmuchtodowiththedemiseoftheWeimarRepublicandtheriseofHitler.

IfErhardhelpedtomakeAdenaueraredefiningleaderdomestically,itwasAdenauer himself who radically redefined West Germany’s foreign policy.GiventhedivisionofGermany,andthefactthattheUnitedStatesemergedfromthewar(andtheearlypost-waroccupationofGermany)asclearlythestrongestWestern power, Adenauer unsurprisingly established and maintained goodrelationswiththeAmericans.Moreover,hewelcomedtheircontinuedpresenceinEurope as a bulwark against possibleSoviet expansionism.Whatwasmoredistinctive and momentous, in the context of German history, was hisestablishmentofgoodrelationswithFrance–notleast,withGeneraldeGaulleafterhis return topower inParis in1958.Adenauerwas strongly in favourofEuropean economic and political cooperation, and supported a joint Europeanmilitary organization. He also, however, wished the Federal Republic ofGermany to have access to nuclear weapons, and in retirement he wasvehemently opposed to German acceptance of the nuclear non-proliferationtreaty, thesigningofwhichwasoneofWillyBrandt’s firstactsaschancellor.UnderAdenauer’s leadership,WestGermany joinedNATO in themid-1950s,andin1957wasafoundersignatoryof theTreatyofRome,whichcreatedtheEuropean Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union.

Adenauerwasabletoclaim:‘IamtheonlyGermanChancellorinhistorywhohaspreferred theunityofEurope tounityof theReich.’105Hehas alsobeendescribed as ‘the first German statesman who was able to overcome theunconscious tendency of his countrymen to believe that leaders could only betaken seriously if they wore uniforms’.106 Adenauer, however, stayed in theoffice of chancellor for far too long, and to diminishing effect. Like manyleaders,heincreasinglythoughtofhimselfasindispensableandcouldseenooneworthytotakehisplace.Whenhewasfinallypersuadedin1963toretirefromthemostpowerfulpoliticalpostinWestGermany,hewasagedeighty-seven.

WillyBrandt

TheconservativeCatholic,Adenauer,couldalsoberuthlessinthewayinwhichhefoughtelectoralbattles.WillyBrandtnotedthattheChancellorspent‘halfanelection campaignon the issue ofmybirth’ and the day after theBerlinWallwentup inAugust1961 referred tohimas ‘aliasFrahm’.107Brandt’smotherwasanunmarriedsalesgirlwhogavebirthtohimin1913.TheboygrewupasHerbertFrahm,takinghismother’sname,andnotknowingwhohisfatherwas.Both his mother and her father, who shared in his upbringing, were activemembersoftheSocialDemocraticParty,andtheyenrolledhiminthechildren’ssectionoftheparty’ssportsclub‘almostassoonasIcouldwalk’.108Hegrewup, and remained, a socialist of a social democratic kind, tempted by neitherCommunism nor fascism. In 1933, when anti-Nazi activity had becomeincreasingly dangerous, necessitating clandestine activity, he took the nameWillyBrandt.Hewasanactiveanti-NazibeforeandafterHitlercametopower,working mainly from other European countries, especially Norway, but alsospending a dangerous period back in Germany in the guise of a Norwegianstudent. Brandt escaped again to Norway in 1938, and after Nazi Germanyinvadedthecountryin1940,hemovedtoneutralSweden.AlthoughBrandthadbeenworkingnotforthedefeatofhishomelandbutforitsliberation,intheearlypost-waryearshewasregardedbymanyofhisfellowcountrymenasatraitor.He was still a Norwegian citizen when he returned to Germany in 1945. HerejoinedtheSPD,andregainedhisGermancitizenshipin1948.

Brandt’sriseinGermanpoliticswasquiterapid.HeprovednolessresoluteinstandinguptoCommunistthantoNazirepression.Hewasaleadingfigurein

thegovernmentofBerlinby1948–49whentheSovietblockadetookplace,andthe city survived thanksmainly to the allied airlift of foodandother supplies.When the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, Brandt had already been Mayor ofBerlinforfouryears,andhedidmorethananyonetomaintainthemoraleofthecity’s residents. During almost a decade as mayor of divided Berlin, hecontinued to provide inspirational leadership. It was his years as Chancellor,however,from1969to1974whichfirmlyestablishedhimasaredefiningleader.Hispolitical stylewasnotonlymorecollegial than thatofAdenauer,but alsorelaxed,conciliatoryand‘patientenoughtopermit thebuildingofanauthenticcabinet consensus’.109 Collegiality, however, was not incompatible with anoutstanding personal initiative on an issue of major international, as well asinter-German,importance–WestGermany’srelationswithEastGermanyand,moregenerally,withtheEasternpartoftheEuropeancontinent.ThisOstpolitikwas the major achievement of Brandt’s chancellorship. The policy led to anacceptance of Germany’s post-war borders in the east, an amelioration ofrelations between East and West Germany and recognition (withoutlegitimation)ofthestatusquothattheyhadbecometwoseparatestates.Humancontacts between the two Germanies became more frequent, and Brandt wasgreetedwith great enthusiasmby theEastGerman publicwhen he visited theGerman Democratic Republic (GDR) in March 1970. Taking advantage of aperiodofdétenteduringtheNixonpresidencybetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion,Brandt also became the firstWestGerman leader to establish aworkingrelationshipwithMoscow.*

There was serious opposition within Germany to Brandt’sOstpolitik, notonlyfromChristianDemocrats,butfromsomeoftheFreeDemocratswhowereincoalitionwithBrandt’sSPD.Anumberof themdefected from thecoalitionandatonepointBrandtsurvivedaparliamentaryvoteofnoconfidencebyonlytwovotes.110Brandt’sacceptancethatGermanywouldnotregainterritorythathad belonged to it before the war – Silesia and East Prussia – enraged hispoliticalopponentsaswellasinfluentialassociationsofexpellees.Moreover,itappeared tomany,both inGermanyandabroad, thatBrandtwasgivingupontheultimategoalofreunificationofEastandWestGermanyandgettinglittleornothinginreturn.Reasonableasthatobjectionsoundedatthetime,itcouldnothave been further from the truth. Hatred and fear of Germany, forunderstandablereasons,wasstillrifeinRussiainthemid-1960s.Ithadgreatlydissipatedbythemid-1970s.111Brandt’slifelonganti-fascismandhisanti-Nazi

activitiesduringtheSecondWorldWarearnedhimtherespectofEastGermans,of ordinary Russians, and even of the Soviet leadership, headed by LeonidBrezhnev.Brandtwasespeciallyhighlyregardedbythemostreformistmembersof the rulingpartiesofCommunistEurope.*Thatbecameparticularly relevantwith the arrival in 1985 as Soviet leader of Mikhail Gorbachev, whose ownpoliticalevolutionduring thesecondhalfof thatdecadewasverymuch in thedirection of social democracy.112 Gorbachev established excellent relationswith Brandt who by then was President of the Socialist International, theorganizationof socialdemocraticpartieswhichhad for longbeen regardedbyCommunistsasthemostdangerousoftheirenemies.113Mostfundamentally,itisinconceivablethattheKremlinleadershipwouldhavequietlyacceptedthefallof the Berlin Wall in 1989 and acquiesced in the unification of Germany in1990,hadGermanystillbeenseenasthekindofthreatitwasperceivedtobealittleovertwodecadesearlierbeforeBrandtbecameWestGermanleader.

ThepublicimageofBrandtmostvividlyrememberedisofhimonhiskneesin front of the Warsaw memorial dedicated to the Jewish ghetto and thecountlessPolishJewswhodiedatthehandsoftheNazis.OnthisvisittoPolandinDecember1970,theGermanchancellorhadnotplannedthatgesture.Ittookevenhisclosestcolleaguesbysurprise.Brandtlaterwrote:‘FromthebottomoftheabyssofGermanhistory,undertheburdenofmillionsofvictimsofmurder,Ididwhat humanbeings dowhen speech fails them.’114A journalist put it nolessaptlyatthetimewhenhewrotethat‘hewhodoesnotneedtokneelknelt,onbehalfofallwhodoneedtokneel,butdonot’.115

Domestically,Brandt’srecordbothinresistancetofascismandinthepost-war reconstruction of a divided country played an important part in theconsolidationofdemocracyinGermany.Buthiscontributioninternationallywasevenmoreredefining.Heputitfairlyhimself:

Circumstances,myoffice,andalso, Iamsure, theexperiencesofmyyouth,gavemeachance– firstasMayorofBerlin, thenasForeignMinisterandasFederalChancellor– to reconcile the ideaofGermanywith the ideaofpeace in themindsof largepartsof theworld.Afterall thathadhappened, thatwasnosmallmatter...116

There have been other Social Democratic leaders in post-war Germany apartfrom Willy Brandt who were impressive – above all, Helmut Schmidt, apoliticianwithacommandingpresencewhohadbeenMinisterofDefenceandMinisterofEconomicsandFinance inBrandt’sgovernmentbeforeserving for

eight successful years as chancellor (1974–1982). Schmidt’s historicalsignificance, however, hardlymatched that of Brandt. His personal biographywasverydifferent.Asarelativelyapoliticalyoungman,heservedasanofficerin the German army during the SecondWorldWar, andwon the Iron Cross,fighting on the Russian front. His sharp intellect, brusque manner and moreconventionalviewscontrastedwith the imagination,charmandpoliticaldaringof Brandt. Schmidt was a controversial figure in the early 1980s when hisreadiness toacceptAmericanPershingandcruisemissilesonGermansoilmetwith widespread protests. In terms of ability, though, he remains anotheroutstandingexampleofhowwell,byinternationalstandards,Germanyhasbeenservedbyitspost-warleaders.

HelmutKohl

TwothingsareremarkableaboutthechancellorshipofHelmutKohl.Oneisthelengthoftimeduringwhichheheldthatoffice–sixteenyears,from1982until1998–andtheotheristheskillandalacritywithwhichheseizedanopportunityto pursue the unification of Germany at a time when other leaders advisedcaution. Kohl was underestimated as a politician during much of his time inoffice, and he fell under a cloud following his retirement when evidenceemergedofpartyfundingscandalsinwhichhehadbeeninvolved.Healsohadtoovercomeaverybadstart inhis relationswithGorbachev,being far slowerthanMargaret Thatcher to spot the potential for change brought about by thenewRussian leader.As lateasOctober1986,ayearandahalf into theSovietperestroika, Kohl toldNewsweek that he did not consider Gorbachev to be aliberal but a ‘modern communist leader who understands public relations’,adding:‘Goebbels,whowasoneofthoseresponsibleforthecrimesintheHitlerera, was an expert in public relations, too.’117 The implied comparison withGoebbelsoffendedGorbachevandthosearoundhim,anditmeantthatKohlwaskeptwaiting–untiltheautumnof1988–forameetingwiththeSovietleader,evenafterhehadcometorealizehismistake.Hethenmadeupforlosttimeandwent on to establish surprisingly warm relations with Gorbachev. Since thefuture of a divided Germany still depended heavily on what happened inMoscow, this was politically wise. But the connection was personal andemotionalaswellasprudential.Whatmighthavefundamentallydividedthetwomenbrought themtogether– theirmemoriesofbeingchildren,growingupon

opposite sides of a war in which their countries were the major Europeanantagonists. The devastation and suffering on the victorious side was no lessthan in that of the vanquished, and the war left indelible marks on bothGorbachevandKohl.

At the beginning of 1989, unification still seemed a distant dream forGermans.Emboldened,however,bytheradicalchangesinMoscow,thepeoplesof Eastern Europe pushed aside their Communist rulers in the course of thatyear. Until then it had been assumed that, as in Hungary (1956) andCzechoslovakia (1968), Sovietmilitary forcewould be used to ensure that noEuropeancountrythatwaswithintheCommunistcampwouldbeallowedtoslipoutofit.Thiswastakentoapply,aboveall,totheGDR,theEastGermanstatewhere350,000Soviettroopswerestationed.Yet,whenmassivedemonstrationstookplaceinEastGermancitiesinOctoberandNovember,andwhentheBerlinWallwas suddenly opened – as a result of amisunderstanding of a Politburodecision to ease travel restrictions–on thenightof9November1989,Sovietsoldiers did not intervene.EastGerman citizenswhodemonstrated inOctoberhadchanted, ‘Weare thepeople.’After the fallof theWall, thisbecame, ‘Weareonepeople.’118

The popular desire for unification could not have been clearer, but manyleadingpoliticians,inGermanyaswellasintherestofEurope,thoughttheissuesodelicate that theprocesscouldonlybeagradualone.Kohl tookadifferentview. He believed, not without reason, that Gorbachev might be deposed byconservative Soviet Communists, alarmed by the domestic and internationalrepercussionsofhispolicies. In thatevent,aonce-in-a-lifetimeopportunityforreunification would have been missed. With strong American backing, KohlhammeredoutadealonreunificationwithGorbachev,ignoredtheobjectionsofMargaret Thatcher, and was ready to pay the price demanded by FrenchPresidentFrançoisMitterrandforsecuringhisagreementtoGermanunification.It involved acceptance of closer European unity and, most specifically,undertaking to give up the Deutschmark in order to join a new, commoncurrencytobecreatedforEUmembers–theeuro.Kohlhimselfwasmuchmorerelaxed about the idea of both economic and monetary union than was theBundesbank.

Before the commonEuropean currency could be created,Kohlworked formonetary union in Germany, offering a one-to-one exchange of the WestGermanDeutschmarkforEastGermanmarks,anattractiveoffertothoseontheEasternsideofthedivide,whosecurrencyhadbeenworthfarlessthanthaton

the black market. In the process, Kohl ignored expert advice that the EastGerman economy needed some years to be brought up to a comparable levelwith that of the West and that only then would a common currency makesense.119 Kohl’s focus was entirely on short-term attraction with a view topushingthroughunificationatthefastestpossiblespeed.ItwasimportantwithinGermany, for if unionhadnotgoneaheadquickly, andongenerous terms forcitizensof theGDR, therewouldhavebeena realpossibilityofbreakdownoforder inEastGermany. If thathad led tobloodshedand internal repression, itwould have posed very serious problems for Gorbachev and his allies in theSovietleadership.TherelationshipKohlhadestablishedwithGorbachevwasofhugeimportance.Inameetingon10February1990,theSovietleadercametoaprovisional agreement with Kohl that unification would go ahead, althoughmanydetailsstillhadtobeworkedout.PresidentGeorgeBushtheelderplayeda supportive role during the process, acting carefully so as not to undermineGorbachev.Hedidnot,however,sharesomeoftheapprehensionsofanumberofEuropeanleadersaboutthepotentialstrengthofareunitedGermany.120

Kohl’s seizing of the historic moment, and his skilful diplomacy in bothinter-Germanandinternationalrelations,broughtaspeedyreward.ThefirstwasanelectionvictoryinEastGermanywhentheChristian-Democrat-led‘AllianceforGermany’emergedasthemostsuccessfulcoalitionofparties,gettingalmosthalfofallvotes inMarch1990.The lastpartof theprocesswascompleted injusteightweeksofthesummerofthatyear–inthe2+4negotiations,inwhichthe representativesof the twoGermanies sat downwith thoseof the countriesthat had earlier constituted the four occupying powers: the Soviet Union, theUnited States, theUnitedKingdom and France. The Treaty onGermanUnitywassignedon31August1990.Nodoubt,Germanunificationwouldhavetakenplaceat somepoint, for theEastGermaneconomywascollapsing,andalmost350,000ofitscitizenshadleftthecountryinthecourseof1989.Publicopinion,which could now be freely expressed in the East, was clearly in favour ofnational unity.Yet, something that had seemed inconceivable just a fewyearsearlierwouldnothaveproceededsosmoothly,speedilyandpeacefullyhadanyoneofGorbachev,BushandKohlactedeithermorerashlyorwithsignificantlygreater caution. It would be goingmuch too far to say that therewould havebeen no unification without Kohl, but, in his absence it could hardly havehappened so quickly in 1990. As one student of inter-German relationsappositelyobserved,itwasHelmutKohlwhopushedreunificationthrough‘with

verve, determination and an invincible – somewould say finally disastrous –capacity to suppress economic and socialmisgivings in the cause of the finalpolitical goal’.121 For all the problems that were to come later, not least thevicissitudes of the euro, the partKohl played in the unification of his countrywhich had been divided for forty-five years gives him a strong claim to beregardedasaredefiningleader.

REDEFININGLEADERSINPERSPECTIVE

Thefocus in thischapterhasbeenonredefining leadership in just three,albeitmajor, democracies. Not many generalizations can be based on such a smallsample, although a close look atAmerican presidents suggests the conclusionthat it isverydifficult tobearedefiningleader(andalmost impossible tobeatransformational one) in twentieth-or twenty-first-century USA. Even thosepresidents who use to the full their political resources generally have lessleverage within the domestic context than have the German chancellor andBritishprimeminister.Ifweweretobringinadditionalredefiningleadersfromotherdemocracies,whetherpresidentialorparliamentary,theconstraintsontheoccupantoftheWhiteHousewoulddoubtlessstillbulklargeincomparison.122Redefining the limits of the possible, changing the way people think aboutpolitics, and introducing radical policy change is a very tall order for anyAmericanpresident.Acombinationofthestrictnessoftheseparationofpowers,the fact that Congress is by comparative standards an unusually stronglegislature, the willingness of the Supreme Court to pass judgement on theconstitutionalityofpresidentialactions,nottospeakoftheexistenceofpowerfulandlavishlyfundedlobbies,meanthattheAmericanpresident’sscopeforactionis far more limited than the prestige of this apparently ultra-powerful officewouldsuggest.

The widespread belief in a vast growth over time of presidential powerwithinthepoliticalsystemoftheUnitedStatesisanoversimplification.Itis,foronething,contradictedbythefindingthattherehasbeenahistoricdecreaseinthe rate of presidential vetoesof legislation asmeasured against congressionaloutput.123 Richard Rose has observed that in Washington ‘there is a simpleanswertotheinquiringjournalist’squestion:Who’sinchargehere?Thecorrectconstitutional answer is: No one.’124 The demanding nature of international

politics,inwhichmoreisexpectedoftheAmericanpresidentthanofotherheadsof government, severely restricts the time available for implementation of adomesticagenda,quiteapartfromtheconstitutionalandpoliticalconstraints.Ina nicely paradoxical phrase, Rose captures the practical limitations onpresidential response to the endless problems that come his way when hecharacterizes it as ‘influencing organized anarchy’.125A leading specialist onAmerican government, Hugh Heclo, sees the presidential use of the ‘bullypulpit’ (first associatedwith Theodore Roosevelt) as a diminishing asset. Thepresident’s capacity to rally public opinion has been reduced by ‘theproliferation of news sources, sites for contending political commentaries, andtheordinarycitizen’sinformationoverload’.126

Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that the only two clear examples ofredefining leaders tooccupy theWhiteHouse in the twentiethand twenty-firstcenturies ceased to be president almost seventy years ago in the one case andmore than four decades ago in the other. Presidential power, though, remainsvastlygreaterinforeignthanindomesticpolicy.This,indeed,isanareawherethepresident’spowerandinfluencehavegrownintheperiodthatbeganwiththeSecondWorldWar, and where he (or, one day, she) can make an enormousdifference.* In the international sphere, thepresidentwieldsmorepower,bothpolitically andmilitarily, than any other politician on earth.Yet, the limits ofpower are all too evident even here. While contenders for the AmericanpresidencymayannouncethattheMiddleEastorsomeotherpartoftheworldiscryingoutforAmericanleadership,thesoberrealityisthatamajorityofpeoplein the area concerned are often disinclined to follow. Moreover, the use ofAmerican military power has in major instances been followed by profoundunintended political consequences – from the Vietnam War to the wars inAfghanistan and Iraq. The hopes and expectations vested in the Americanpresident in the twenty-first century are so high and, in many respects,contradictorythattheyareimpossibleforanyholderofthatofficetomeet.127

Redefiningleadersarerarewithintheentireconstellationofpoliticalleaders,butexamplesofthemcouldbemultipliedifwemovebeyondthethreecountriesfrom which the illustrations in this chapter have been drawn. One specialcategoryofredefiningleadersconsistsofthosewho,astransitionalleaders,pavethe way for the transformation of the political or economic system of theircountries, opening up space for that fundamental change without going on toplaytheleadingroleinthetransformationthemselves.Thereformingleadercan,

in some cases, redefine the scope of legitimate political activity and stimulateeither more radical leadership or movement from below, and sometimes amixture of both, going beyond the intentions of the reformer. Not everytransformationalleaderis,however,immediatelyprecededbyaredefiningone.Even his kindest obituarist could hardly have called Konstantin Chernenko aredefiningleader.ThemainadvantageforMikhailGorbachevinfollowingthiscolourless apparatchik was in the immediate contrast he provided withChernenko,underwhomtheonlyslightpoliticalmovementwasbackwards.128

There are also quite different, and surprising, cases where leaders of aracially repressive or authoritarian regime have moved from being pillars ofresistance to change to paving the way for the new, and not simply byunwittingly provoking collapse. F.W. de Klerk in South Africa and ChiangChing-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, in Taiwan are examples of suchtransitionalleadership.AdolfoSuárezinSpaincouldbeseenasanother,butforthefactthatinSpain’stransitionfromauthoritarianismtodemocracy,thepartheplayed was so significant – overseeing the transition from a regime in whichthere were no pluralistic political institutions all the way to one in whichdemocracy,with free elections, prevailed – that he should be considered as atransformationalleader,andistreatedassuchinthenextchapter.

FernandoHenriqueCardoso

AstrikingexampleofaredefiningleaderwasFernandoHenriqueCardosowhoplayed a crucial part in the development and consolidation of democracy inBrazil, especially but not only after he became president in 1995. A socialscientist-turned-politician,heredefinedthelimitsofthepossibleinBrazil.Whenhe becameMinister of Finance in 1994,Brazil’s inflation ratewas running atover 3000per cent annually.When asked for his leadership philosophy in theface of this national disaster, Cardoso said: ‘I looked to exercise the art ofpoliticswhichconsistspreciselyincreatingconditionsinwhichonecanrealizeanobjectiveforwhichconditionsdonotyetexist.’129InoneyearCardosohadreducedthe inflationrate to less than10percentandhyperinflationhasnot insubsequentyears returned toBrazil.Thesecretofhissuccesswas todelay theimplementationofhisanti-inflationplanuntilhehadpersuadedthetradeunionsby cogent argument that wage earners (as distinct from the wealthy takingadvantage of high real interest rates) had most to gain if inflation were

controlled.ItisnotablethatLula,Cardoso’spresidentialsuccessorwhohadbeennotonlyatradeunionleaderbutalsoalong-termopponentofCardoso,praisedthisachievement,observing that the lessonhadbeen learned that low inflationwas beneficial for a society where the great majority of people live on theirwages.

WhenLula succeededCardosoaspresident in2003, thiswasBrazil’s firstdemocratic succession in forty-three years. Lula himself was followed by ademocraticallyelectedpresident,DilmaRousseff,in2011.Cardoso’sleadershipalteredperceptionsofthelimitsofwhatpoliticianscouldachieveinanumberofimportantways.Inadditiontosuccessfullycombatinghyperinflation,heshowedgreatdiplomaticskillinhisdealingswiththemilitaryandinsubordinatingthemtociviliancontrol.Throughdialogueandpersuasion,hewon thearmed forcesover to acceptance of democracy, including the creation of a Ministry ofDefence under civilian political leadership. Cardoso laid foundations wherebydemocraticelectoralsuccessionbecamethenewnormalityinBrazilianpolitics.Takenin theround,hisachievementswereanotableexampleofstretchingthelimitsoftheattainable.

F.W.deKlerk

SouthAfricahadapluralistpoliticalsystemwithrealcompetitionbetweenthepoliticalpartiesof thewhiteminority,but its racistbasismeant that itwas, inmanyrespects,aninternationalpariahstate,subjectalsotoapartiallyeffectiveeconomicandsportingboycott.Whattiltedthebalancewasanewinternationalcontext,brought aboutby thedramatic changewithin theSovietUnionand inSoviet foreign policy in the second half of the 1980s. The South AfricanapartheidregimehadlongjustifieditsexistencebyportrayingitselfasabastionagainstthespreadofCommunism,citingthestronginfluenceoftheCommunistPartyofSouthAfricawithin themainblackoppositionmovement, theAfricanNationalCongress.TheANC,foritspart,receivedeconomicaswellaspoliticalbacking from theSovietUnion, although it attractedmuchmoral support alsofromdemocraticgovernmentsandliberalopinioninWesterncountries.Whenaliberalization of theSovietUnion itself took place, leading tomuch improvedrelationsbetweenitandtheUnitedStatesandthecountriesofWesternEurope,the flimsy political pretext for apartheid appeared thinner than ever.Added tothis was the change in Soviet foreign policy away from support for armedstruggleandinfavourofpeacefulreconciliationofpoliticaldifferencesinSouth

Africa and elsewhere. Thus, the ANC, too, had reason to be responsive toserious overtures from the SouthAfrican government in the hope of reachingagreementonpeacefultransitiontomajorityrule.130

BythetimeF.W.deKlerksucceededP.W.BothaasSouthAfricanpresidentin1989,thechangeintheinternationalclimatehadbecomesogreatthatitwasclear to de Klerk that the moment had come for major domestic change.Embarking on a process of political reform, he took the risk of holding areferendumofwhitevotersonwhetherthisprocessshouldcontinue.Morethantwo-thirdsofthembackedthepolicy.Thekeyinterlocutor–andthepersonwhounquestionablywas the transformational leader in theSouthAfrican context –hadtobeNelsonMandela,whohadbeendemonizedintheAfrikanerpressfordecades, and who was in his twenty-eighth year of imprisonment. MandelahimselfhaswrittenthatnothingindeKlerk’spasthad‘seemedtohintataspiritof reform’, but hedecided that thenewpresidentwas ‘not an ideologuebut apragmatist’, and on the day he was sworn in wrote him a letter requesting ameeting.131NegotiationsbetweenMandela anddeKlerk tookplace,Mandelawasreleasedfromprison,thebanontheANC(andalsoontheCommunistPartyof South Africa) was lifted, and a new constitution, according equal politicalrightstoallcitizens,waspromulgatedin1993.Mandela,forhispart,hadagreedto renounce violentmeans for the achievement ofmajority rule, convincedbynowthatitwaspossibletoreachthatgoalpeacefully.Followingfreeelectionsin1994,inwhichtheANC-ledcoalitionofpartiesgainedmorethan60percentofthevotes,MandelabecameSouthAfrica’sfirstblackpresident.Giventheextentto which he personally had suffered at the hands of the oppressive apartheidregime, his magnanimity and inspirational leadership were decisive.Nevertheless,deKlerkearnedthetitleof‘enlightenedconservative’byseizingthemomentwhenanegotiatedsettlementhadbecomepossible. Itwasabreakwithpastpolicy,whichpavedthewayforrelativelypeacefulsystemicchangeina countrywheremany had assumed itwould takemuch longer and endmorebloodily.132

TheCaseofTaiwan

Astillmoresurprisingredefiningleader thandeKlerkwasChiangChing-kuo,first the head of the secret police and later prime minister in Taiwan (or theRepublicofChina,astheTaipeigovernmenttermsthatcountry).Hewastheson

ofanunremittinglyauthoritarianleader,ChiangKai-shek.TheelderChiangdiedin1975andthreeyearslaterChiangChing-kuomovedfromthepremiershiptothe presidency which his father had held. Throughout the period between thedemise of Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s own death in 1988, theyounger Chiang’s was by far the most authoritative voice in Taiwan as theregime gradually liberalized and moved towards pluralist democracy. Againtherewasahugelyimportantinternationalstimulus.FromthetimeChiangKai-sheksetuphisChinesegovernmentinexileinTaiwan,ithadbeenrecognizedbyonlyaminorityofcountriesintheworldandreliedveryheavilyonpoliticaland military support from the United States. The biggest single incentive toChiangChing-kuo’srethinkingwastheUnitedStatesannouncementin1978ofnormalizationofitsrelationswithmainlandChina.133

Rapprochement between the USA and the People’s Republic of China(mainland China where more than a billion people lived, compared withTaiwan’spopulationatthetimeofsometwentymillion)wasboundtoleadtoaweakeningofAmerica’stieswithTaiwan.TheprocessofimprovingAmerican–ChineserelationswasstartedbyPresidentNixon’svisit toBeijingin1972andtaken up again with some zest in the late 1970s by President Carter, whoseNationalSecurityAdviser,ZbigniewBrzezinski,wasespeciallykeentoplaytheChina card against the Soviet Union.134 Cultivation of mainland Chinacontinued under President Reagan. In early 1982 it was announced that theReagan administration would not sell the advanced FX fighter jet aircraft toTaiwan,soasnottojeopardizeSino-Americanrelations.135

Taiwan had been developing economically and educationally at animpressive rate already in Chaing Kai-shek’s time, but the younger Chiangrealized that this was not enough. If his country was to achieve greaterrecognition in theoutsideworld, earn renewed respect from theUnitedStates,and, ultimately perhaps become a model for mainland China itself (since thepartyheled,theKuomintang,favouredeventualunionwithChina,butasanon-Communist state), then movement towards democracy had to begin. Havingcome to believe that democracy would suit Taiwan’s interests better thandictatorship,ChiangChing-kuopushed throughaseriesof liberalizing reformsinthemid-1980s,andendeddynasticrulebysayingthatmembersoftheChiangfamily ‘could not and would not’ compete for the presidency in subsequentelections.Thereformsalsoendedmartiallawandlegalizedoppositionpoliticalparties.136 It took almost a decade for all this to reach fruition, and fully

democratic (although often turbulent) politics emerged only after Chiang’sdeath.Itwashe,however,whotookthedecisivestepstoredefinethenatureofthe political system and pave the way for genuinely competitive elections inwhichtheKuomintangwouldnotbeguaranteedvictory.

*

What these examples illustrate is that in the process of liberalizing anddemocratizinganundemocraticpolitical system, innovativepolitical leadershipfromwithin the old regime can be extraordinarily important.When there is achangeofopinions,beliefsandevengoalsofleaderswhoalreadyholdpositionsof institutional power, that can decisively facilitate democratization of anauthoritarian regime. If a leader in a democracy changes his or her opinionswhile holding office, this often does the politician concernedmore harm thangood,earningfiercecriticismforU-turns,intellectualflip-floppingandpoliticalinconsistency.Anauthoritarianleader,however,canusetheleversofpowerhecontrols to introduce liberalizing or even democratizing measures, althoughthesewill pose risks for the existingholders of bureaucratic power.The caseswith which this chapter has concluded underscore also the need always tounderstandleadershipinitspoliticalcontext.Whattheyhaveincommonisthattheyrefertoregimeswhichwerebecomingincreasinglyisolated,bothpoliticallyandeconomically,althoughthat in itselfdoesnotguaranteeredefiningchange.NorthKoreahasexperiencedeconomicfailureandinternationalcontemptoverdecades,andyettheregimesurvives.

Withindemocracies(asinauthoritarianregimes)redefiningleadershipistheexception rather than the rule. Sometimes it does come from leaderswho areverydominantwithintheirpoliticalparties–aThatcheroranAdenauer–butitcanjustasreadilycomefromaleadershipinwhichtheheadofthegovernmentis far less assertive and there are a number of authoritative ministers playingdecisivelyimportantroles,asinthecaseoftheAsquithandAttleegovernmentsintwentieth-centuryBritain.Americanpresidents,despitetheimmenseprestigeoftheiroffice,finditdifficulttodominatethepoliticalprocess,giventhenatureofthepoliticalsysteminwhichtheyoperate.

When they do dominate, as Franklin Roosevelt and, much more briefly,LyndonJohnsondid,thisdependslessontheiractualpowers(althoughvetoandpower of appointment matter) than on influence and authority. Roosevelt’ssuccesswasinpersuadingabroaderpublicoftheneedforlegislationwhichwas

radicallyinnovativeintheAmericancontextandofusingthatpublicopiniontohelp persuade Congress of the necessity of these measures. It depended also,however, on one of themessy compromises of politics – tacit concessions toSouthern Democrats that there would be no drastic federal interference withethnicsegregationintheSouth.Johnson’spersuasion,moredirectlyfocusedonCongress,drewonhisexcellentmemoryandintimateknowledgeofthetypeofargumentthatwouldcarryweightwitheachSenatororRepresentative.Inthesecases,asinotherinstancesofredefiningleadership,thecircumstancesinwhichthe leaders came to the highest office were decisively important. A crisis bydefinition poses problems but it also presents opportunities. Roosevelt’s NewDealwasaresponsetotheeconomicdepressionofthe1930s,andheexercisedhisgreatestpowerwhentheUnitedStateswasengagedinaglobalwar.Johnsoncame to the White House when his country had just suffered the trauma ofassassination of a young and popular president. He seized the moment topersuade Congress to pass legislation which redefined citizenship for manyhitherto deprived Americans and constituted at least as significant abreakthroughasRoosevelt’sNewDeal.

*Itisalmostanironlawthatintellectualswhospeakof‘themasses’areoutoftouchwithrealpeople.Thatwould, though, be unfair to Laski who was generous with his time and sympathetic attention, whetheraddressingSouthWalesminersandstayingintheirhomes,orwithhisstudents,towhomhewasendlesslyhelpful.SeeKingsleyMartin,HaroldLaski:ABiography(JonathanCape,London,newedition,1969),pp.xiv,95,127and250–251.Hewas,though,apoorjudgeofopinionbeyondtheranksofpartyactivistsandoftheintellectualcirclesinwhichhemoved.* Throughout the period when Margaret Thatcher’s prime ministership overlapped with MikhailGorbachev’sSovietleadership,shebenefitedalsofromhavingexcellentBritishambassadorstotheSovietUnion–SirBryanCartledge(whohadworkedwithThatcherearlierin10DowningStreet)from1985to1988andSirRodricBraithwaitefrom1988(to1992).ItookpartintwoseminarsontheSovietUnionandEasternEurope,heldatChequers, theweekend residenceofBritishprimeministers.TheywerepresidedoverbyMrsThatcherandattendedbyForeignSecretarySirGeoffreyHoweandotherseniormembersofthegovernment.Thefirstofthese,inSeptember1983,wasespeciallysignificant.InthewordsofSirPercyCradock(InPursuitofBritishInterests:ReflectionsonForeignPolicyunderMargaretThatcherandJohnMajor,JohnMurray,London,1997,p.18)whoveryshortlyafterthatseminarbecamethePrimeMinister’sForeignPolicyAdviser,it‘inauguratedamoreopenapproachtoEasternEuropeandledeventuallytothefirstmeetingwithGorbachev’.Especiallyat thatstageofherpremiership,MrsThatcher listened towhatoutside specialists had to say. At the 1983 Chequers seminar she interrupted her colleagues, especiallyGeoffreyHowe, frequently and the academics rarely. In theirmemoirs, bothThatcher andHowedevoteseveralpagestothisseminarwithdifferingaccountsofitsgenesis,andbothattachimportancetoit.Howenotes that ‘in discussion with the experts on the Soviet Union’ the prime minister was ‘unusuallyrestrained’.SeeGeoffreyHowe,ConflictofLoyalty(Macmillan,London,1994),pp.315–17;andMargaretThatcher, The Downing Street Years (HarperCollins, London, 1993), pp. 451–3. The second Chequersseminar on theSovietUnionwas held inFebruary 1987, as part of the preparation forThatcher’s high-

profile and successful visit to the Soviet Union the following month. In between, I was one of fouracademicsinvitedto10DowningStreetforaninformalbriefingmeetingwithThatcherandHoweontheeveofGorbachev’sfirstvisittoBritaininDecember1984,threemonthsbeforehebecameSovietleader.*TheSNPmighthaveseenanevengreaterupsurge in its support if thepromiseofadevolvedScottishparliamenthadbeenbrokenbytheUKgovernmentelectedin1997.FordecadestherehasbeenaveryclearScottishmajorityinfavourofmore‘HomeRule’andadevolvedparliament,whereassupportforseparatestatehoodforScotlandinopinionsurveyshasrarelyrisenaboveathirdoftheelectorate.*PoliticalpowerisalsolesscentralizedinGermanythaninEngland(EnglandasdistinctfromtheUnitedKingdom,forthereisnowsubstantialdevolutionofpowertoScotland,WalesandNorthernIreland).Thefederal components of Germany’s political system – the regional Länder – each have their ownConstitution,parliament,governmentandadministration.* None of that prevented the GDR intelligence service – in a decision requiring highest-level politicalapproval–fromplantinganEastGermanspy,GünterGuillaume,asasenioraide inBrandt’sentourage.Whenthisespionagewasdiscovered,Brandtresignedthechancellorship,onceagainsettinganhonourableexample. SeeMary Fulbrook,History ofGermany 1918–2000: TheDividedNation (Blackwell,Oxford,2002),pp.168–71.* Itwas in thecompanyof twodistinguishedHungarianhistoriansonVisitingFellowships, IvanBerendandGyörgyRánki,thatImetBrandtinOxford.BothweremembersoftheCommunistParty,astheyhadbeen from theiryouth,but serious reformerswhoworked for change fromwithin theHungarian system.Both were also of Jewish origin. Berend, as a teenager, spent the last year of the war in a Germanconcentrationcamp.IrememberthewarmthofBrandt’spersonalityduringtheconversation,butrecalljustasvividlyhowmoved,almosttotears,werethetwoHungarianscholarsinmeetinghim.*Idonotfollowthefashion,begunbyJosephNye,ofusingtheterms‘hardpower’and‘softpower’.Theymay be a useful shorthand for newspaper columnists and politicians, but the vocabulary of authority,leadership, influence, persuasion, prestige, political power, economic power andmilitary power remainsperfectly serviceable. Although these terms are also open to more than one interpretation, they aresomewhat more precise than the hard power–soft power dichotomy. Nye does not, of course, confinehimself to suchadivisionandhisworkcontainsmanycogentarguments,but it retainsa strongpaternalattachmenttohiscoinageof‘softpower’.

4

TransformationalPoliticalLeadership

Bya transformationalpolitical leader, Imeanonewhoplaysadecisiverole inintroducingsystemicchange,whetherofthepoliticaloreconomicsystemofhisor her country or (more rarely) of the international system. The word‘transformational’ generally has a positive connotation. It suggests profoundchange, but a fundamental reconstruction of the system into one that isqualitatively better than what has gone before. Largely for that reason, Idistinguish it from revolutionary leadership. Some revolutions againstoppressive rulersproduce regimes thatarean improvement incertain respects,andworse inothers, than their predecessors.They aregenerally characterized,however, by the use of force to overthrow the pre-existing regime and by thesubsequentuseofcoercivepowertoimposeandsustaintheirruleoverthewholepopulation.Howeveregalitariananddemocratictheirrevolutionaryrhetoricmaybe,theyalsohaveastrongtendencytocreatenotonlyauthoritarianregimesbutalsoacultofthestrongindividualleaderwithinthepost-revolutionarysystem.Leaders who play a decisive role in transforming the political or economicsystemoftheircountry,withoutresorteithertoviolentseizureofpowerortothephysical coercion of their opponents, are different from such revolutionaries.They are likely to domore lasting good and certainly less harm. It is rare, ofcourse,foralloftheaspirationsoftransformationalleaderstobefullyrealized.And the systemicchange they introducemayonlypartially survive the ruleoftheir successors. However, the gulf between the utopian rhetoric ofrevolutionariesandthesubsequentauthoritarianrealityisgenerallymuchwider.

Althoughthelistisnotintendedtobeexclusive,andthoughmentionwillbe

made of other leaders who have made significant contributions to promotingtransformative change, themajor focus of the chapter will be on five leadersfrom different countries –GeneralCharles deGaulle,Adolfo Suárez,MikhailGorbachev,DengXiaopingandNelsonMandela.OnlyFrancewasademocracyat the time when transformational change took place, but de Gaulle wasresponsibleforaprofoundswitchfromonekindofdemocraticpoliticalsystemto another.Within a democracy such transformative change is likely to occuronlywhen the existing system is in severe crisis. Change in Britain has beensufficientlygradual that therewasnoplacefora transformational leader in thetwentiethcentury (or in the twenty-first thus far). In theUnitedStates, the lastpresidentwith a strong claim to be regarded as a transformational leaderwasAbrahamLincoln,anditisnoaccidentthatnineteenth-centuryAmericawasindeepinternalcrisisatthetime.

CHARLESDEGAULLE

Usuallyleaderswhothinkofthemselvesasbeingabovepolitics,andwhoregardpoliticianswithdisdain,arebadfordemocracy.It isanoutlooktowhichsomemilitary men have been particularly prone. General Charles de Gaulle, too,believedthathehadahigherunderstandingandconceptionofFrancethanmerepoliticians,andhewasdisparagingofpoliticalparties.Yet, inspiteof fears tothecontrary,hestrengthenedFrenchdemocracy,ratherthanunderminingit,andplayedthedecisiveroleinreplacinganailingdemocraticpoliticalsystemwithamorerobustone.

DeGaullehadanindomitablebeliefinFrance’sgrandeur.Veryearlyinhismemoirshewritesofhis feeling that ‘France isnot reallyherselfunless in thefront rank’ and that ‘France cannot be France without greatness.’1 An armygeneralwhowasajuniorministerofdefenceatthetimeFrancesurrenderedtoNaziGermanyin1940,hesawMarshalPétain’scollaborationistgovernmentasa stain on his country’s honour. Departing for London, he immediately tookuponhimselftheroleofcommanderoftheFreeFrench.Hecametobeacceptedassuchby theallied leaders,especiallybyChurchill,although therelationshipbetween these two exceptional and strong-willed men was, to say the least,prickly.DeGaulleattributedthis,inlargepart,tothegreaterdistrustofhimfeltbyRooseveltandtoChurchill’sbelievingthat,underwartimeconditions,hehadto keep in step with the American president. The British prime minister, de

Gaullewrote,‘didnotmeantoadopttowardsFreeFranceanattitudethatwouldbe in conflict with theWhite House’. And, since ‘Roosevelt showed himselfdistrustfultowardsGeneraldeGaulle,Churchillwouldbereserved’.2

In spiteof stubbornnessonboth sides,withdeGaulle inmuch theweakerpositionbutdeterminednottoshowit,therewasalsomutualrespect.Churchill’sfirstencounterwithdeGaullewasinFranceatameetingwithleadingfiguresintheFrenchgovernmentjustthreedaysbeforeGermantroopsoccupiedParison14June1940.TheBritishprimeministerflewinsecret toasmallairstripnearOrleans. Marshal Pétain, Churchill noted, ‘had quite made up his mind thatpeace must be made’, for ‘France was being systematically destroyed’, andPétainbelieved it tobehisduty tosaveParisand the restof thecountry fromthat fate.3DeGaullemadeclearhowdifferentwashis conception.Hewas infavourofcarryingonguerrillawarfareagainst theGermanoccupying troops.*Already aged forty-nine, de Gaulle appeared youthful to Churchill who hadbecome prime minister one month earlier at the age of sixty-five. Churchillwrote of him: ‘Hewas young and energetic and hadmade a very favourableimpressiononme.’ChurchillhimselfsawdeGaulleasthepotentialleaderoftheFrenchstrugglefor liberation.4InLondon,deGaullehadtoworkhardtogainrecognition from the French Resistance that he was their leader in exile. Hisradiobroadcasts toFranceduring thewarhelpedtoconsolidate that leadershipanditwassymbolicallyconfirmedwhen,withtheliberationofFranceinAugust1944,heledthemarchofFreeFrenchtroopsintoParis.

De Gaulle’s great physical height was accompanied by an equally highconceptionofhimselfasamanofdestiny.Hewasnotonlyconvinced thathehadamomentousroletoplay,butalsosawhimselfasaperformer.DuringtheSecondWorldWar, he once said, he had become aware that ‘there existed inpeople’s spirits someonenameddeGaulle’, and ‘I knew that I shouldhave totakeaccountofthatman.. .Ibecamealmosthisprisoner.’Therefore:‘BeforeeveryspeechordecisionIquestionedmyself:isthisthewayinwhichthepeopleexpectdeGaulletoact?ThereweremanythingsIshouldliketohavedone,butthat I did not do because they would not have been what they expected ofGeneraldeGaulle.’5

Suchanelevatedsenseofdutyanddestinydidnotfitcomfortablywiththemessiness and compromises of everyday peacetime politics. De Gaulle,however, by the end of the war had established himself as a leader with anappealtoFrenchdemocratsfromdifferentpartsofthepoliticalspectrum.With

hisimpeccablewartimerecordandanti-Nazicredentials,hewasanaturalchoiceto head the French provisional government in the immediate aftermath of theSecondWorldWar.Eschewingateachstageofhiscareeranyattempttorulebyforce,deGaullechoseademocraticpath.In1946thatmeantresigningfromthepremiership and retiring to his home in the village of Colombey-les-deux-Eglises,fromwhere,nevertheless,hehopedthatbeforelonghewouldbecalledbacktoParistoleadthenation.Itwastobeanothertwelveyearsbeforethecallcame.

DeGaulle’smaincomplaintagainsttheconstitutionoftheFourthRepublicthathadbeencreated just after thewarwas that it didnotprovideapowerfulexecutive. Inparticular, it lacked thestrongpresidencywhichhecraved.MostFrenchdemocratswere extremelywaryof a powerful executive.Having livedunderauthoritarian ruleduring thewarandhavingseen thehavocwreakedbytotalitarianandauthoritariangovernmentselsewhereinEuropeovertheprevioustwo decades, they tended, too readily, to associate a strong executive withdespotism. In reality, there canbenodemocracywithout an authoritative– asdistinctfromauthoritarian–executive.

DeGaulle set out his critiqueof theFourthRepublic constitution in1946.Not all of it was well founded – in particular, his disparagement of politicalparties.ThereweretoomanyoftheminFranceatthattime,andtheyweretoodivided internally, but competing parties are an indispensable component of ademocracy. In his prediction of instability, as a result of an executiveinsufficiently powerful vis-à-vis parliament, de Gaulle was more prescient.During the thirteen years of the Fourth Republic (1945–1958) there were asmany as twenty-five governments and fifteen premiers, during a time whenBritainhadjustfourprimeministers.Governmentalcriseswerefrequent,andinthe lastyearof theFourthRepublic’sexistence,Francewasruledbycaretakergovernmentsforonedayoutofeveryfour.6Yet,itispossibletoexaggeratethefailures of those thirteen years. The French Communists were supported byaboutaquarteroftheelectorate,butthecountryremaineddemocratic.RelationswithGermany– a countrywhose forces had invadedFrance twice in the firsthalf of the twentieth century – had been repaired, and France had become afounder member of the European Economic Community. French industrialproductionexpandedfasterthandidthatoftheUnitedStatesandBritaininthe1950s, and France had an impressive social security system. Living standardshad risen quite rapidly.7 So the Fourth Republic was not without its

achievements.Yetthesystemandthecountrywere,by1958,incrisis.Governmentswere

fallingwithincreasingfrequency.Theystruggledtocometotermswithlossofempire, and, in particular, they found themselves incapable of resolving theAlgerianproblem.On theFrenchright, in thearmyand,stillmore,among theFrench settler population in Algeria, there was a determination that Algeriawould remain French (as it had been since 1830), whatever might happen tootherformercolonies.ThearmyhadenteredtheAlgerianwarina‘neveragain’mood, believing that thiswas the last place ‘where they could feel useful andrespected’andthat lossofAlgeriawouldbedisastrousforboththemandtheirhomeland.8 Already in 1956, France had 400,000 troops in Algeria, many ofthemconscripts,combatingtheFrontdeLibérationNationale(FLN),theradicalArab nationalist movement for Algerian independence. Tensions over thiscolonialwar poisonedFrench politics. EvenSocialist governmentsmaintainedtheattempttokeepAlgeriaFrench,whilecriticsofthewar–andoftheuseoftorture in its prosecution – were treated vindictively.9 Successive Frenchgovernmentswere caught between the incompatible demands ofAlgerians forindependenceandofthelargewhitesettlerpopulationinsistentthatAlgeriawasanintegralpartofFrance.Addedtothiswasthehighlyquestionableloyaltyofthe army, should any government in Parismake toomany concessions to theFLN.Indeed,aFrenchgovernmentwhichwasevensuspectedofbeingwillingtograntindependenceforAlgeriariskedbeingoverthrowninamilitarycoup.

ItwasnotanewuprisingofindigenousAlgeriansbutoftheFrenchsettlerswhichbroughtdevelopmentstocrisispointinMay1958.Itwastheywhosackedgovernmentoffices inAlgiers.Partly fromqualifiedsympathywith theFrenchsettlers,butmainlyinordertocontrolthesituation,thecommandingofficerofthe troops in Algiers, General Jacques Massu, set up a ‘committee of publicsafety’. On 15 May he ended a speech with the words, ‘Vive de Gaulle!’Increasingly, thearmy, the settlersandmanymembersof thepolitical class inParisbegantothinkofdeGaulleastheonepersonwhocouldget themoutoftheimpasse.TheassumptionwithinthearmyandamongthesettlerswasthathewouldbethemostformidabledefenderofAlgérieFrançaise.OnthesamedayasMassu’sspeech,deGaulleissuedabriefstatementinwhichhespokeaboutthedegredationofthestate,thealienationofthepeople,turmoilinthearmy,andof France being on a road to disaster thanks to the ‘regime of parties’. Heannounced his willingness ‘to assume the powers of the Republic’.10 Four

factorsfacilitatedhisreturn–hisstatusaswarherowhohadreturnedtoFrancein 1944 and restored the integrity of the French state on a democratic andrepublican basis; the memory of his dramatic and voluntary withdrawal fromFrench public life in 1946; the publication in the recent past of his severalvolumesofwarmemoirs,whichnotonlyheightenedpeople’sconsciousnessthatdeGaullewasstillwaitinginthewingsbutalsomadeagreatimpactwiththeirevocativelanguageandemotionalappeal;11and,aboveall,thefactthatby1958theauthorityoftheFrenchstatehadreachedalowebbandappearedtobeatriskofacoupd’état.12

BeforetheendofMaytheNationalAssemblyhadvotedtoaskdeGaulletoformagovernment.Hethenmovedquicklytowardsgettingthekindofpoliticalsystemhehadlongfavoured–oneinwhichtherewouldbeadualexecutiveofpresident and prime minister, but with the president very much the seniorpartner. The detailed new Constitution was drafted by de Gaulle’s loyalfollower,MichelDebré,whowastobecomethefirstprimeministeroftheFifthFrench Republic after de Gaulle had become its president. The constitutioncontainedmostofwhatdeGaullehadwanted,thoughitwasDebré,whosharedhisviews,whowas left tonegotiate it.13Eighty-fivepercentof theelectoratecame out to vote in a referendum on the constitution, held on 28 September1958,andofthatlargeturnout80percentvoted‘yes’.Thiswas,essentially,a‘yes’tothepersonofdeGaulle.14Thenewconstitutionmadeitmuchharderforthe legislature to make and unmake governments and the presidency wassubstantially strengthened, even though the primeminister retained significantpolicy-making powers. The president was particularly responsible for foreignanddefencepolicy,anddeGaullemadefulluseofhispowers,devotingespecialattentiontoEurope,tocolonialandFrenchCommunityquestionsand,aboveall,to Algeria, which, until 1962, was the most pressing issue on the politicalagenda.15DeGaullewouldalsointerveneinotherareaswhenhesowished,buthedidnot trytoexercisedetailedcontroloverday-to-daypolicy.Inparticular,economicpolicyandfinancialmatterswerelargelyleft tohissuccessiveprimeministersandfinanceministers.16

In order to avoid the recurrence of a multiplicity of political parties, thevoting system was radically changed, with various forms of proportionalrepresentationrejected.Thesystemadoptedwasatwo-roundelectoralprocessinwhichtherewasarun-offelectionaweekafterthefirstround,inwhichonlythe

leadingcandidates(usuallyjusttwoofthem)wereleftinthecontest.Thismadefor majorities in the National Assembly capable of sustaining a government,althoughdeputies remained as free as ever to criticize the executive.ThenewelectoralsystemworkedwellforthefreshlycreatedGaullistparty,theUnionforaNewRepublic(UNR)andmuchlesswellfortheCommunistParty.DeGaulledidnotallow thenewparty tousehisname,buthisapparentdistance from itwas no more than a careful contrivance.17 He was aware that without thesupportofamajorpartyhewouldover timeloseground.TheoneothermajorconstitutionalchangedesiredbydeGaulle,butforwhichhewascontenttowait,wasdirectelectionofthepresidentbytheelectorateratherthanthelegislature.Thisheobtainedbyreferendumin1962,aswellasagreementonaseven-yeartermofoffice.ThisclearlyenhancedtheindependentauthorityofthepresidencynotonlyfordeGaullebutforfutureincumbents,althoughthetermwasreducedtofiveyearsin2002.18

Most importantly, the institutions created at deGaulle’s behest have stoodthetestoftime.Thisformofdualexecutive–orsemi-presidentialism–hasbeenmuchcopiedbyothercountries,not least in formerCommunist states,buthasrarely produced as satisfactory a combination of effective governance anddemocraticaccountabilityasithasinFrance.TherehasbeenstablegovernmentduringthefiveandahalfdecadesoftheFifthRepublicanditsinstitutionshavegainedwidespreadacceptancewithinthecountry.ThatendorsementextendstotheSocialistandCommunistparties,althoughmanyoftheformerandallofthelatterwereopposed to thenewpolitical systemat the timeof its introduction.After he had become French President in the 1980s, François Mitterrandremarkedthat‘theinstitutionswerenotmadewithmeinmind,buttheysuitmeverywell’.19

General de Gaulle’s achievements did not lie only in far-reachinginstitutionalchange.Makingmasterlyuseofambiguityasapoliticaldevice,heresolved theAlgerian issue.When deGaulle told the settlers in 1958 ‘I haveunderstood you’, they took that to mean that he was committed to keepingAlgeriaFrench,yetwhathehad saidwasbothambiguousandnon-committal.DeGaullewas not strongly for or againstAlgerian unionwith France, but heaimed, above all, to end the war and the festering sore which the Algerianproblemhadbecome.Heskilfully‘exploitedthedivisionsofhisopponents,theloyalty of his own supporters (MichelDebré, the primeminister,was notablylukewarmaboutAlgerian independence) and thewar-weariness of a frustrated

French population’.20 De Gaulle’s position, and along with it French publicopinion, ever more obviously shifted further away from that of the Frenchsettlers and their military backers. In 1959 de Gaulle reminded the army thattheywerenotanautonomousbody:‘YouarethearmyofFrance.Youonlyexistbyher,becauseofher,andforher.Youareatherservice,andthatisyourraisond’être.’21Boththearmyandthesettlersrealizedthat,eveniftheyhadplayedacrucialrole inbringingdeGaulle topowerinMay1958,hisstandingwiththeFrenchpublichadinthemeantimebecomesoenhancedthatanewinsurrectionwouldhaveaslimmerchanceofsuccess.Nevertheless,therewasanarmyrevoltinAlgeriain1961,anddeGaulle,withsuperbaplomb,gotmostoftheFrenchpeopleonhisside,andtheinsurrectionfizzledout.AsVincentWrightnoted,deGaulle’stelevisionappealtothenation‘wasasmovingandasresoluteasitwaseffective, a rare combination of high drama and deep sincerity’.22 By 1962Algeriahadbecomeanindependentstate.DeGaullealsooversawthegrantingofindependencetotwelveotherFrenchoverseasterritories.

In many respects deeply conservative, de Gaulle was also, argues SudhirHazareesingh(theauthorofanilluminatingbookontheGaullianmythologyandlegacy), ‘moving in the direction of history’. The big questions on which hisjudgementwasvindicatedbyposteritywere theneed tocontinue thewarafter1940 and to unify the Resistance; his assessment of the weaknesses of theelectoralandparty systems in theFourthRepublic;hisdetermination tocreatethe new institutions which have worked well in the Fifth Republic; and hisacceptanceoftheneedfordecolonization.23NotonlydiddeGaullechangethepolitical system, Hazareesingh argues, but he also made an importantcontribution to changing the political culture of France, reconciling ‘theRightwiththeRepublicandtheLeftwiththenation’.Atthesametimehegavenewmeaning to older values – ‘heroism, sense of duty, the feeling of belonging,defiance of fate, and contempt for materialism’.24 The heroism is worthunderlining. Especially in the period up to the end of theAlgerianwar, therewererepeatedattemptstoassassinatedeGaulle.Hewasconstantlybeingwarnedby security advisers to reduce his contact with crowds. In any gathering hetowered above those around him and appeared to present all too vulnerable atarget. Yet de Gaulle rejected with disdain the warnings of danger andadmonitionsnottotakeunnecessaryrisks.25

Onforeignpolicy,deGaullerecognizedCommunistChinaandwascritical

oftheAmericanwarinVietnam,believing(onthebasisofFrenchexperience)that itwould end in failure.26Heplayed an important part inmaintaining thegood relations with West Germany already established by Fourth Republicpoliticians.HewithdrewFrancefromtheintegratedcommandsystemofNATOand, although resolutely anti-Communist, established better relations with theSovietUnion,havingassertedhis independencefromAmericanforeignpolicy.An animus against both theAmericans and theBritishwas easily discernible,and he twice vetoed Britain’s application to join the European Community(acceptedonlyduringthepresidencyofhissuccessor,GeorgesPompidou).Thedeeply divided and ambivalent attitudes of the British to joining EuropeaninstitutionsweresuchthatdeGaullereceivedmanylettersfromtheUKtellinghimtocarryonthegoodworkofkeepingBritainoutoftheCommonMarket.27DeGaullecouldbeadifficultpartnerforAmericanandBritishgovernments,butthere is no doubt that France’s international prestigewas enhanced during theyearsofhispresidency.

One of the more questionable elements of the constitution of the FifthRepublic was the introduction of the referendum, since referendums onparticular issues tend to become plebiscites on the government or personinitiatingthem.Theyarealsoopentoabuse.Inprinciple,thepresidentcouldnotinitiateareferendum;itwasthegovernmentandparliamentwhichhadtherighttodoso.Theywerealsonottobeheldonareformwhichwasinconflictwiththeconstitution.YetbothofthoseprovisionsweretobebreachedbydeGaulleand by later presidents.Referendumswere also a double-edged sword.To theextent that they amounted to a vote of confidence in the president and hisjudgement, theyhelpeddeGaulle inJanuary1961andApril1962onAlgeria-relatedquestionsandinOctober1962whentherewasareferendumonwhatwasclearly a constitutional issue – direct election of the president.28 However,socialunrest,includingviolentclashesbetweenpoliceanddemonstratorsonthestreetsofParis in1968, sawdeGaulle lose someofhisearlierauthority.ThiswasreflectedwhenhelostareferenduminApril1969onissuesofregionalismand the reorganization of the upper house of the legislature, the Senate.29Reacting as if this were, indeed, a withdrawal of confidence in him by theFrench public (although the referendum was lost quite narrowly), de GaulleimmediatelyresignedandretiredforthelasttimetoColombey.Hediedeighteenmonthslater,agedeighty.Intheyearssincethenhehascometobewidelyregarded,bothinhishomeland

andabroad,asthegreatestFrenchmanofthetwentiethcentury.

ADOLFOSUÁREZ

Six years before his death in 1975, the Spanish dictator, General FranciscoFranco, decided that, after he had gone, monarchy would be restored in thepersonofJuanCarlos.Thisdulyoccurred,andoneyearafterhisaccessiontothethrone,thekingappointedAdolfoSuárezasprimeministertoreplaceFranco’slast appointee in thatoffice,AdmiralCarerroBlanco.Thereweremany in themilitarywhohadnointentionofgivinguptheprivilegedplacewhichtheFrancodictatorship had accorded them, but the king, even though he was Franco’schoiceasheadofstate,selectedSuáreztoleadthegovernmentintheexpectationthat hewould take Spain on a democratic path. Suárez,whowas to be primeministerfrom1976untilhisresignationin1981,appearedtomanyobserversasanunlikelyagentofradicalchange.Hehadbeenahigh-levelbureaucratintheFranco regime, rising to be head of radio and television in the late 1960s andearly1970s.Yet,hewas toexceed theexpectationsofdemocratsbyplayingadecisiveroleinthetransition.

Suárez’sachievementmustbeputincontext.Hewasinpartrespondingtoastrong feelingwithin Spanish society that changewas necessary, although theleversofcoercivepowerwereinthehandsofthoseopposedtoadramaticbreakwiththepreviousregime.Ontheoneside, therewerepowerfulpressuresfrominterestsservedbyacontinuationofauthoritarianrule.Ontheotherside,therewerethedemandsforradicalchangecomingfromtheanti-FrancoistLeft,bothSocialistsandCommunists.ItwasSuárez’sconsensus-buildingstylethatwastobe decisively important in reconciling, to a remarkable degree, apparentlyirreconcilable differences. He did not achieve widespread popularity. In thatrespecthewasfaroutshoneby theSocialist leader,FelipeGonzález.30Itwas,though,aworkingrelationshipwiththeCommunistleader,SantiagoCarrillo,towhichSuárezgavepriority.CarrillowasaveteranoftheSpanishCivilWarwhohad recently earned some international renown as the head of one of the twomajor ‘Eurocommunist’ parties (the Italian Communist Party, led by EnricoBerlinguer,beingtheother).31YetSuárez’sdecisiontoseekthelegalizationoftheCommunistParty in1977wasunquestionably themostdangerousmomentfortheemergingdemocracy.Itcouldeasilyhaveledtoamilitarycoupd’étattoput a stop to the democratizing process. That threat was constant throughout

Suárez’s years in power, and it was a major achievement on his part that hestavedoffamajorcoupattemptuntilaslateas1981.

IfaFrancoistbureaucratmayberegardedasasurprisingagentofdemocraticchange,thesamewouldbenolesstrueofaCommunistleader.Yet,atanearlystageofthetransition,Carrillo(whodiedasrecentlyasSeptember2012at theageofninety-seven),turnedouttobeoneofSuárez’smostimportantpartnersinthenegotiationofanewpoliticalorder.Oncethedemocraticbreakthroughhadtakenplace,theSocialistsgainedfarmoresupportthantheCommunists,butatthe time of Franco’s death, the Communist Party, although still illegal, hadsignificantbackingwithinSpanish society.While the legalizationof thatpartyinfuriatedmanyinthehighcommandofthemilitary,itscontinuedsuppressioncould have had serious repercussions. A direct clash between the CommunistPartyandthenewgovernmentwouldhavegiventhemilitarytheexcusetoputabrakeonthedemocratizationprocess.

Thus,thelong-exiledCommunistleaderhadapivotalroletoplay.FollowinghisreturntoSpain,CarrillowasimprisonedinDecember1976,butSuárezhadconversationswithhimasearlyasFebruary1977.TheCommunist leaderwasresponsive to the prime minister’s overtures. Carrillo agreed to recognize themonarchy,theflagandtheunityoftheSpanishstate,thussomewhatassuagingconservative fears.32 To persuade the Communists to accept a constitutionalmonarchywasamajorachievementonSuárez’spart. It tookfar longerfor theSocialists to agree to this, for the basic division since the civil war had beenbetween Francoists and Republicans, with the unacceptability of a monarchytakenforgrantedontheleft.However,Suárezsawitasfundamentallyimportantto bring theCommunistswithin the system, andhis negotiationswithCarrilloachieved this. The senior officer corps did little to disguise their anger at theacceptance of the Communist Party as a legitimate participant in Spanishpolitical life,yet theywerepersuaded toswallowthisbitterpill.SuárezboldlyandpubliclyproclaimedhisbeliefthattheSpanishpeoplewerematureenough‘toassimilatetheirownpluralism’,thattocontinuemakingtheCommunistPartyillegalwouldmean repression,and thathedidnot think thepopulationshouldfeel‘obligedtoseeourjailsfullofpeopleforideologicalreasons’.33

Evenmore remarkable thanencompassing theCommunistPartywithin theneworderwasSuárez’ssuccessinpersuadingthecorporatistparliamentthathadbeenappointed(notelected)undertheFrancoregime,theCortes,toagreetoitsownabolition.IfSuárezhadsimplyannouncedthathewasclosingitdown,the

securityforceswouldsurelyhavearrestedhim.Instead,hesetaboutbuildingacoalition for change. In amajor speech to theCortes,hemadea forceful casethatiftheywantedtoavoidconflictandsubversioninSpain,theyshouldbeginto recognize the ‘pluralism of our society’ and that meant opening up theopportunityoflegalityforgroupsandpoliticalparties.Asheputit:‘Theaimsofpartiesarespecificandnottheleastofthemistoassumepower.So,iftheroadisnotopenedby the legalitywhich isbeingproposedby the state itself, therewillbeanapparentpeace,belowwhichwillgerminatesubversion.’Heplayedon his audience’s desire to avoid ‘subversion’ and said hewas sure that theywouldunderstandthatthere‘cannotbe,andwillnotbe,aconstitutionalvacuum,andstilllessavacuumoflegality’.34ThenightbeforetheCortesvotedontheLawonPoliticalReforminNovember1976, just fivemonthsafterSuárezhadbeen appointed prime minister, many observers remained uncertain of theoutcome. The vote, however, was 425 in favour and only fifty-nine against.Suárezhaddisplayedskilfulleadershipnotonlybyrecognizingandrespondingto demands from within the broader society but by winning support forconsensualsolutionsevenfromwithintheranksoftheoldelite.Toconsolidatethe new foundations, he put the Law on Political Reform to a nationalreferendum,obtaininganimpressive94percentapprovalforthelaw.

SuárezsucceededalsoinformingamoderateconservativealliancecalledtheUnionoftheDemocraticCentre,whichemergedin1977asthemostsuccessfulparty in what was Spain’s first general election since 1936. One effect ofdemocratization was to give hope, and new opportunities, to separatistmovements in the Basque country and Catalonia. It was, therefore, of realsignificance for the consolidation of Spanish statehood in its democratic formthat these first competitive elections were national, rather than regional.Nationalist and regional parties tend to perform better in regional elections intheir own territory than they do when the same citizens are voting for agovernmentoftheentirecountry.IntheSpanishcase,theyhavepolledbetween15 and 25 per cent higher in regional elections than in those at state-widelevel.35 Thus, the parties which benefited most from holding, in the firstinstance,freeelectionsforthecountry-widelegislaturewerethosewhoseappealwas to the whole of Spain. These were, most notably, Suárez’s centre-rightcoalition and the Socialist Party, led by González. In the earliest post-Francoyears, itwas important for thedevelopmentofdemocracy thatmoderate, non-nationalistpartiesemergedasthestrongest.

Nationalist and separatist movements continue to be a serious issue inSpanish politics in the second decade of the twenty-first century, but they nolongerpresentsuchathreattodemocraticgovernment.36Hadtheyappearedtoriskbreak-upofthestateintheimmediatepost-Francoyears,thiswould,inalllikelihood,haveprovokedareturntoauthoritarianrule.Themilitarywouldhaveformed the backbone of a regime whose coercive crushing of separatism(although that would have been only a short-term solution) would have beenaccompanied by suppression of the fledgling Spanish democracy.* Suárez, incontrast, took early steps to reassure moderate opinion in Catalonia and theBasquecountry,withparticularsuccessinCatalonia.TheBasqueNationalPartyandrepresentativesofCatalannationalismtookpartinnegotiationsin1977,andthe 1978 SpanishConstitution offered significant devolution of power to bothregions,withCatalanandBasquebecomingofficiallanguagesinbothterritories,alongsideCastilian(standardSpanish).

The first Suárez government was beset by severe economic and socialproblems in thewake of the 1973 oil crisis. The newly elected primeminsterinitially considered introducing an economic stabilization plan by executivedecision.Afterreflection,however,hedecidedthatitwouldbemorelegitimateandmoreeffectiveifhecouldgetagreementonaconsensual‘pact’insupportofpoliciesthatmeasureduptothescaleoftheproblems.The‘MoncloaPact’(thenameisthatoftheprimeminister’sresidence)iswidelyconsideredtobeoneofthemosteffectiveagreementsinthehistoryofdemocratictransitions.Facedbythethreatofwidespreadworkerunrest,Suárezunderstoodthathemustengageingive-and-takenegotiationswiththeCommunistandSocialistoppositionifthegovernmentwere to get union leaders to understand and tolerate painfulwagecontrol policies and anti-strike agreements for the first year of the democraticexperiment. He invited the leaders of every party with seats in the newparliament which had been generated by free elections in June 1977,Communistsincluded,toaseriesofprivatemeetingsinMoncloa.

OnlyaftertheseextensivenegotiationsandresultantagreementsdidSuárezbring theMoncloa Pact to both houses of parliament.With the parties havingalready made their difficult concessions, there was only one vote againstacceptanceofthepactintheLowerHouseandonlythreevotesagainst(andtwoabstentions) in the Upper House. The Pact which the unions and the majorpolitical parties had signed up to included, in return for moderating wagedemands to lower inflation and public debt, a range of political and socialreforms from guarantees for freedom of expression to the legalization of

contraception.Theagreementprepared theway for a fullerdemocratizationofSpanishsociety.37ThefruitsofSuárez’sinclusivepoliticalstylewereseenalsowhenSpainappliedin1977formembershipoftheEuropeanCommunity(astheEuropeanUnionwasthenknown).Thishadthesupportofalltheparliamentaryparties.InSpain,asinothercountriesmovingawayfromauthoritarianrule,EUmembershiphelpedtosolidifydemocraticrule(notwithstandingtensionscausedinmorerecentyearsbytheinternationaleconomiccrisisandtheproblemsofthecommoncurrency).

Recognizing the need for a new constitution which would underpin theemergingdemocraticorder,Suárezwasawareofthedangersofimposingitbyasimple majority. In a parliamentary speech in April 1978, he said that ‘theConstitution, as an expression of national concord, must be obtained byconsensus, for which it is necessary to take into account the diverse politicalforcesnowpresent’.38AlthoughtheCommunistshadalreadyconcededthatthemonarchwouldbeheadofstate,theSocialiststookmorepersuadingand,untillate in the day of drawing up the constitution,were insisting that the Spanishstate shouldbecome, andbedefined as, aRepublic.However, they eventuallyagreed to the idea of a constitutional monarchy in return for abolition of thedeathpenaltyandreductionofthevotingagetoeighteen.39InlargemeasureasaresultofSuárez’sleadership,Spainmadeanegotiatedtransitiontodemocracy.Thedraftconstitutionreceivedclosetounanimousassentintheparliamentandwasendorsedbyalmost90percentofthepopulation,theBasqueregionbeingtheonemajorexception.40

Inelectionsin1979,Suárez’sUnionoftheDemocraticCentrehadanarrowleadover theSocialistParty,butdidnothaveanoverallmajority.Throughouthis time inoffice,Suáreznever achievedpopular acclaim.Hewas too closelyassociatedwiththeFrancoregimetobeadmiredbythedemocraticleft,andfartoo liberal and conciliatory to anti-Francoist opinion for the taste of themostconservativeforces(includingmanyintheseniorofficercorps).TerroristattacksbytheBasqueextremistorganization,ETA,werebythebeginningofthe1980sthreateningthestabilityofthepoliticalsystem.Ineachsuccessiveyearsincethemid-1970stherehadbeenmoredeaths,includingthoseamongthearmedforces,whichfuelledmilitarydiscontentwiththeemergentdemocracy.Suárezwasveryconscious of an erosion of his own political authority and believed that if heattemptedtoholdontopowerforafullparliamentaryterm,thiswouldendangerdemocratization.MoreconcernedwiththefateofSpanishdemocracythanwith

prolonginghis time inoffice,he resignedfromthepremiership in lateJanuary1981.

Just a fewweeks later,on23February,when theCorteswas in session toconfirm the choice of his successor as premier, a military contingent, led byLieutenant-ColonelAntonioTejero, interrupted theparliamentarysession, firedseveral rounds, and ordered all the deputies to be silent. Almost all of themcrouchedon thefloor.Suárezwas in thesmallgroupwhodidnot.AlongwithSantiagoCarrillo,FelipeGonzálezandanotherleadingmemberoftheSocialistParty,hewasseparatedfromtheotherdeputiesanddestinedforimprisonmentifthe coup had been successfully implemented. The role played by King JuanCarloswaspivotalinmakingcertainthisdidnothappen.Tankshadgoneontothe streets in other cities at the same time as the military incursion into thecountry’s parliament. The king telephoned themain commanders and orderedthemtogettheirtanksandmenbacktotheirbarracks.

Thenextday,wearinghisuniformofCaptainGeneral, thehighestmilitaryrank, Juan Carlos appeared on television and announced that he would nottolerate this attempt to interrupt the democratic process.Although therewas asubstantialmajorityofSpanishpublicopinionopposed to the coup, theking’sstancewas hugely important in ensuring its collapse. Themilitaryweremuchmoreresponsivetocommandsfromthekingasheadofstatethantheyweretopoliticians or to public opinion. The coup failed and a number of the officersinvolvedinitwerearrestedandsubsequentlyimprisoned.Therevivedmonarchyhad not been a particularly popular institution. Such legitimacy as it wasaccordedwas–andremains–fragileandhighlydependentonthebehaviouroftheoccupantofthethrone.JuanCarlos,byappointingSuárezinthefirstplace,byacceptingthatSpainshouldbecomeademocracyandthathisrolewouldbethatofaconstitutionalmonarch,and,aboveall,byhisstanceatthetimeoftheFebruary1981coup,earnedrespect.AsJuanLinzandAlfredStepanobserved,JuanCarlos‘legitimatedthemonarchymorethanthemonarchylegitimatedtheking’.41

OfallthosewhohadacceptedtheFrancoregime,andprosperedunderit,itwas, however, Suárez who played the most decisive part in the speedytransformation of the Spanish political system from authoritarianism todemocracy.Thefactthathecamefromtheheartoftheoldestablishmentmeantthathewasable tocarryenoughof thatbodyofopinionwithhim,evenashelegalized hitherto banned political parties and wasted no time in holdinggenuinely democratic elections. He was by no stretch of the imagination a

charismatic leader. (Felipe González came closest to that description amongSpain’spost-Francopoliticians.)Norwashea‘strong’leaderinthesenseofonewho dominated all those around him. He sought consensus and his style wascollegial. Hemade concessions and compromises, but in pursuit of a goal hesteadfastlypursued–thatofdemocracy.Inthishewasastonishinglysuccessful.

MIKHAILGORBACHEV

Mikhail Gorbachevwas a leaderwhowas responsible for stillmore dramaticchangethanwhatoccurredunderSuárez.Foronething,hecametopowerinacountry thatwas, inmilitary terms at least, a ‘superpower’ andwhichhad fordecades ensured that Communist rule prevailed not only in the multinationalSovietstatebutalso throughoutmostofCentralandEasternEurope.SystemicchangeintheSovietUnionwould,accordingly,havemuchwiderrepercussionsthan fundamental change inSpain.*Yet, thereare importantparallelsbetweenthecasesofSuárezandGorbachev.Bothhadrisenthroughtheranksoftheoldregime,andmostSovietdissidents,aswellasforeignleaders,assumedthatanyreformsthatGorbachevmightundertakewouldbewithinfairlynarrowlimits.ItwastakenforgrantedthatGorbachevwouldnotdoanythingthatwouldriskthemonopolyofpowerof theCommunistPartyof theSovietUnionorundermineits internal hierarchical power structure. Equally, it was assumed, he wouldneverriskunderminingSoviethegemonyinEasternEurope.Therecouldbenoquestionof ‘losing’anyof thecountrieswhich the leadersof theSovietparty-state – not to speak of its military-industrial complex – regarded as theircountry’slegitimategeopoliticalgainsfromvictoryintheSecondWorldWar.

Gorbachev is a pre-eminent exampleof a political leaderwho individuallymade a profound difference, even though thereweremany good reasonswhychangeshouldbeembarkeduponintheSovietUnioninthesecondhalfofthe1980s.42There had been a long-termdecline in the rate of economic growth.Themilitary-industrialcomplexflourished,butattheexpenseoftherestoftheeconomy.Livingstandards,whilemuchhigher than inStalin’s time, remainedwell below those enjoyed in neighbouring Scandinavian countries and inWesternEurope.EvenoneofthesuccessesoftheCommunistperiod,theriseineducational standards – including a strong higher education sector containingmany well-qualified specialists in research institutes and universities –harbouredtheseedsofchangeandprovidedapotentialconstituencysupportive

ofradicalreform.Yet theSoviet systemwasone inwhich therewasa sophisticatedarrayof

rewardsforpoliticalconformismandahierarchyofsanctionsandpunishmentsfornonconformityanddissent.ForSovietpower-holders,inparticular,therisksofradicalreformappearedtofaroutweighthepotentialbenefits.Iftheirhighestprioritywas to keep intact both theCommunist system and the SovietUnion,theycouldplausiblyargueby1992–bywhichtimeneithertheonenortheotherexisted– that theircautionhadbeenfully justified.Whileatsomestage in thefuture,theSovietUnionwouldhavereachedacrisispoint,itremainedstableinthe mid-1980s, its underlying problems notwithstanding.* Even during thethirteendrearymonthswhenKonstantinChernenkowasgeneralsecretaryoftheCommunist Party – and, therefore, the country’s leader – therewas no publicunrest, only private grumbling.While the limitations of the Soviet commandeconomy (despite its successes inmilitary technology and space research anddevelopment)were among the stimuli to change, theSovietUnionwasnot incrisisin1985.Itwasradicalreformwhichproducedcrisis,ratherthancrisisthatdictated reform. The idea that the Soviet economy was in such a parlousconditionthatitforcedreformonGorbachevisamisleadingexplanationoftheprofound change which occurred. If the economic imperative was sooverwhelmingly strong, it does not explain why Gorbachev before long –certainly by the beginning of 1987 – was giving priority to political overeconomicreform.It isarguable thatpolitical reformwasrequired toovercomeentrenched bureaucratic opposition to the introduction of a market. However,Gorbachevpursuedliberalizinganddemocratizingchangeforitsownsake,andwaslatertoadmit:‘Intheheatofpoliticalbattleswelostsightoftheeconomy,andpeopleneverforgaveusfortheshortagesofeverydayitemsandthelinesforessentialgoods.’43

No less wide of the mark is the notion that the hardline rhetoric andincreased arms expenditure of the Reagan administration left the SovietleadershipwithnooptionbuttoconcededefeatintheColdWar.†Fromtheendofthewartothe1960stheUnitedStateshadenjoyedmilitarysuperiorityoverthe SovietUnion, but that did not produce amore conciliatory Soviet foreignpolicy. On the contrary, these were years of Soviet-backed Communistexpansion–andofthecrushingofboththeHungarianrevolutionandthePragueSpring. It was from the early 1970s that the Soviet Union acquired a roughmilitaryparitywiththeUSA,eachsidehavingenoughnuclearweapons,andthemeansoftheirdelivery,towipetheotheroffthefaceoftheearth.Althoughthe

possibletechnologicalspin-offsfrominvestmentinReagan’sfavouredStrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI)causedsomeSovietconcern,itwastalkedupbyleadingmembersof theSovietmilitary-industrialcomplexmainlyasadevice toavoidthe cuts in defence expenditure which Gorbachev was pursuing.44 Reaganhimself later conceded that ‘SDI might take decades to develop’ and that itwouldnotbe‘animpenetrableshield’,for‘nodefensecouldeverbeexpectedtobe one hundred per cent effective’.45 The SDI aspiration was unveiled byReagan to the world inMarch 1983 when Andropov was Soviet leader. Yet,under both Andropov’s and Chernenko’s leadership, the Soviet response tostepped-up military spending in the United States was to follow suit. It wasGorbachevwhochangedSovietforeignanddefencepolicy,notReaganorSDI.

GorbachevtookamorecriticalviewoftheconditionofSovietsocietyinthemid-1980s thandid anyofhis colleagues in the leadership.Hewas alsomoreconcerned than they were about the possibility of catastrophic nuclear waroccurring throughmiscalculation, accident or technicalmalfunction.However,inMarch1985,whenChernenkodied,GorbachevwastheonlyreformerinthePolitburoandtheonlyoneofthemseriouslyintentonendingtheColdWar.Theothermembers of the Politburo formed the selectoratewho nominated one oftheirnumber to theCentralCommittee tobegeneralsecretary,effectively thuschoosingthenextleaderoftheSovietUnion.HowdidGorbachevbecomethatpersonwithin twenty-fourhoursofChernenko’sdeath?Given thecompositionandconservatismoftheSoviettopleadershipteam,hewasobviouslynotchosenbecausehewasareformer.Hehadnotsharedhismoreradicalreformist ideaswith hisPolitburo colleagues, and several of themwere later to complain thattheyhadnoinklingthathewouldpursuethepolicieshedid.46HewasalsotheyoungestmemberofthePolitburo,intellectuallyitsmostagileandphysicallyitsmostrobust,ata timewhenthreeagedtopleadershaddiedwithinaperiodoflessthanthreeyears.AnnualstatefuneralshadbecomeanembarrassmenttotheSoviet state. Moreover, Gorbachev was already number two within theleadership. (Yuriy Andropov, in particular, had been impressed by hisintelligenceandenergyandhadextendedhis responsibilitiesduringhis fifteenmonths as Soviet leader.) Gorbachev was in a position to seize the initiativewhen Chernenko died in the early evening of 10March 1985. He called andchairedameetingofthePolitburowhichconvenedat11p.m.thatsameday,waseffectively ‘pre-selected’ as leader there and then, and by the followingafternoonwasgeneralsecretary.47

WhatisespeciallyimportantisthatGorbachev’sviewscontinuedtoevolveonce he became Soviet leader. In 1985 he believed not only that the SovietUnionneeded reformbutalso that thesystemwas, indeed,reformable.By thesummerof1988hehadcometotheconclusionthatreformwasinadequateandthat the system needed to be comprehensively transformed. His speech to theNineteenthConference of theSovietCommunist Party in that yearwas, as helaterwrote,nothinglessthananattempttomakea‘peaceful,smoothtransitionfromonepoliticalsystemtoanother’.48InthesamespeechGorbachevsaidthateverycountryshouldhavethefreedomtochooseitsownwayoflifeandsocialstructure, and that any attempt to impose these from without, especially bymilitarymeans,was‘fromthedangerousarmouryofpastyears’.49InthatJune1988 report, and again in a speech at the United Nations six months later,Gorbachev made clear that this was a universal principle, allowing noexceptions.ThatgaveagreenlighttothepeoplesofEasternEuropetotakehimat hisword the following year. HadGorbachev already believed in 1985 thatreformwasnotenoughandthatsystemicchangewasrequired,itwouldnothavebeen sufficient tobe as circumspect ashewas;hewouldhaveneeded tobe aconsummate actor to succeed in being chosen as general secretary. It was ofdecisive importance thatGorbachev’spoliticalgoals–notmerelymanyofhisspecific attitudes– changedwhileheheld themostpowerfulofficewithin thehighlyauthoritarianSovietsystem.50

The strictly hierarchical nature of the Communist Party, the politicalresources (including substantial power of appointment) concentrated in thegeneralsecretaryship,andthesuperiorauthorityof the topleader inrelationtothepartybureaucracy,thegovernmentmachine,theKGBandthearmedforcesmeant that the general secretary had a far greater chance of introducingfundamentalchange thanhadanyotherpoliticalactor.Nevertheless,noSovietleaderafterStalinhadthepoweroflifeanddeathoverhiscolleagues,andifhealienated them sufficiently, he could be overthrown, as Nikita Khrushchevdiscovered to his cost in 1964. To weaken the authority of institutions longaccustomed to wielding great power was extremely dangerous. Therefore,Gorbachev had to use the powers of his officewith immense political skill inordertointroduceradicalchangethatunderminedexistinginstitutionalinterests.Ashelaterwrote:‘Withoutpoliticalmanoeuvring,itwasnogoodeventothinkaboutmoving aside the powerful bureaucracy.’51One ofGorbachev’s closestreformistalliesduringthefirstfouryearsofperestroika,AleksandrYakovlev(to

whomhehadgivenacceleratedpromotion)put itmorestrongly: ‘Aconsistentradicalismintheearliestyearsofperestroikawouldhavedestroyedtheveryideaof all-embracing reform. A united revolt of the bureaucracies – party, state,repressiveandeconomic–wouldhavereturnedthecountrytotheworsttimesofStalinism.’ The political context, he added, was utterly different in the mid-1980sfromwhatitwaslatertobecome.52

Gorbachev,especiallyduringthefirstfewyearsofhisleadership,wasverycarefultogettheapprovalofthePolitburoforeachreformiststephewishedtotake.ThemeetingsbecamemuchlongerthantheywereinBrezhnev’stime,withmembers feeling free to contribute and to disagree with the party leader. Onmany occasions, documents which, under Gorbachev’s supervision, had beenprepared by his aides and brought to the Politburo, had to be amended, eventhoughGorbachevhadalreadyapproved them.Forexample,when thedraftofthespeechhewastomakeinNovember1987ontheseventiethanniversaryoftheBolshevikrevolutionwassubmittedtothePolitburoforitsapproval,severalmembers objected strongly to the statement within it that an ‘authoritarian-bureaucraticmodelofsocialism’hadbeenbuiltintheSovietUnion.Gorbachevcharacteristically responded bymaking a tactical retreat, saying that theword‘model’ should, perhaps, be replaced by ‘methods’ or ‘means’. At the samePolitburo meeting there were objections to the use of the phrase, ‘socialistpluralism’, with ‘pluralism’ being condemned as an alien concept.53Gorbachev’s flexibilitymeant that each document that became official policy,eventhoughsomeoftheformulationshehadjointlydevelopedwithhisadviserswere lost in the process, nevertheless broke new ground – and, crucially, thePolitburohadtakencollectiveresponsibilityfor it.Nomatterwhatdoubts theyharboured,theycouldnoteasilydisassociatethemselvesfromthefinalproduct.

Gorbachevneverhadamajorityof like-mindedpeople in thePolitburo. Incommonwithmanyotherheadsofgovernment, including those indemocraticcountries,hehadmoreleewayoverforeignpolicythanhehadinrelationtotheeconomy. He was able to replace the entire top foreign policy-making teamwithin a year of becoming general secretary.54 Promotion to the Politburo,however,couldonlybefromtheranksofpeoplewhowerealreadymembersoftheCentralCommittee.ThegeneralsecretaryhadmoreinfluencethananyotherSovietpoliticianon thosepromotions,but in thepost-Stalineradidnothaveacompletelyfreehand.ThePolitburocollectivelyco-optednewmembers.Oneoftheimportantreformseventuallyadoptedwasthecreationofastatepresidency

inMarch1990,towhichGorbachevwaselectedbythelegislature.*Especially in theperiodupuntilMarch1990,Gorbachevhadtohandle the

predominantly conservativemembership of the Politburowith finesse.One ofthem,VitaliyVorotnikov,describedhowhedidit.Gorbachev’sstyle,accordingto Vorotnikov (whose testimony is supported by that of several of hiscolleagues),was ‘democratic andcollegial’.Everyonewhowished to speak inthe Politburo was given the chance to do so, and Gorbachev would listencarefully to their arguments. If therewas significant disagreement,Gorbachevwouldsaythat‘weneedtothinkabitmoreaboutit,dosomemorework’.Hewould find a form of words that would reassure those who had expressedconcerns or would postpone a decision until a later meeting. But in the finalanalysis, Vorotnikov ruefully observes, Gorbachev would get his way,sometimesacceptingamiddlepositionwhichhewouldthenmoveawayfromatan opportunemoment.55Fromhis different standpoint,Yakovlev notes in hismemoirs thatGorbachev foundhimself in ‘a circle of peoplemucholder thanhimandmoreexperiencedinunderhandgameswhoatanymomentcouldreachan agreement to cast him aside’.56 He stresses the fact that Gorbachev waspowerful only up to the point at which he encroached on the interests of the‘mostpowerfulelitesandclansatthattime’.57

ThePowerofPersuasion

ThemoreGorbachevliberalizedtheSovietsystem, themoreheneededtorelyon his powers of persuasion rather than on the authority of the generalsecretaryship.VorotnikovadmitstohavingbeensweptalongforsometimebyGorbachev’s arguments. He often spoke in the Politburo, expressing doubtsabout Gorbachev’s reforms and argued against them not only orally butsometimesalsoinwriting.‘Butintheend,’hesays,‘Ioftenyieldedtothelogicof his [Gorbachev’s] conviction. That was also my fault.’58 He and hiscolleagueswere toolate inseeingthatGorbachevwasengagedinaprocessofdemocratization, moving power away from Communist Party officials, andreplacingMarxism-Leninismbycompetitiveelectionsasthesourceofpoliticallegitimacy. By embracing freedom of speech, Gorbachev at the same timesubstantially liberated publishing houses and the mass media and galvanizedSovietsociety,puttingconservativeCommunists,inparticular,onthedefensive.

The same point is made differently by Vorotnikov: ‘The train of pseudo-democracyhadgatheredsuchspeedthattostopitwasbeyondourpowers.’59

Gorbachevwasnot,intheconventionalsense,a‘strongleader’.Hewasnotoverbearing and was willing both to make tactical retreats and to absorbcriticism. In particular, he did not fit Russians’ traditional image of a strongleader.TheheadofSovietspaceresearch,RoaldSagdeev,hadopportunitiestoobserve Gorbachev in small group discussions in the early years ofperestroika.60 He noted that there were ‘only a few people who did not fallunderthespellofGorbachev’spersonalcharmandthemagnetismofhisverbaltalent’. Admiring his zeal as ‘a genuine bornmissionary’, Sagdeev remarked,however,onGorbachev’stendencytooverestimatewhathecouldachievewithhis formidable powers of persuasion. He had come to believe that ‘he couldpersuadeanyoneintheSovietUnionaboutanything’.61Yetwhatwasespeciallyimportant about Gorbachev’s leadership, Sagdeev adds, was precisely that heattempted to persuade his interlocutors, albeit in ‘a most impassioned andeloquentway’.That,saidSagdeev,was‘asignofgreatprogressinthepoliticalcultureofmycountry’,forthisapproach‘wasinsharpvariancetothetraditionthatbossesusuallyadopted’.Hitherto,theyhad‘nevertriedtochangepeople’sgenuineopinionsorbeliefs,butsimplyissuedaninstructionanddemandedthatitbefollowed’.62

ThatGorbachev’s style of leadershipwas at oddswith traditional Russianpoliticalculture,inthewaySagdeevsuggested,attractedthateminentscientist,but it was not of universal appeal in Soviet society. Gorbachev’s popularitydeclined quite steeply between the spring of 1989 and the end of the SovietUnioninDecember1991(althoughitwasaslateasMay1990,morethanfiveyearsafterhebecamegeneralsecretary, thatBorisYeltsinovertookhimasthemostpopularpoliticianinRussia).63Gorbachev’saideandadviseronpoliticalreform,GeorgiyShakhnazarov,arguedthathisauthoritywasunderminedfromthespringof1989whenhepresidedover thenew legislature, theCongressofPeople’sDeputies–andits innerbody, theSupremeSoviet–whichhadcomeintobeingasaresultofthefirstgenuinelycompetitivenationalelectionsinthehistory of theUSSR, held inMarch of that year.64Wishing to encourage thedevelopment of ‘a culture of parliamentarism’, Gorbachev spent whole dayschairing the legislature, in effect becoming its speaker as well as the head ofstateandleaderoftheCommunistParty.Well-wishers,saysShakhnazarov,told

Gorbachevthatbytakinguponhimselftheroleofspeaker,hewascontributingtothedeclineofhispersonalauthority:‘Whenmillionsofpeople,sittinginfrontof their television, witnessed some unknown young deputy engaging inargumentwiththeheadofstatewhopatientlyexplainedhimselfandeventookinhisstridepatentinsults’,theyconcludedthatnothinggoodlayinstoreforthecountry. ‘In Russia,’ said Shakhnazarov, ‘from time immemorial people haveadmiredandeven lovedsevererulers.’ Itwasdifficult for themtoacceptmildand tactful people as leaders.Howcould they expect such a leader to provideorderandsecurity,inexchangeforwhichtheywouldwillinglyservehim?65*

The personwhowas in charge ofmanagement of the Soviet economy formostoftheperestroikaperiodwasNikolayRyzhkov,ChairmanoftheCouncilofMinistersfrom1985to1990.AtfirstaconditionalallyofGorbachev,helaterbecame a stern critic. He deplored, in particular, Gorbachev’s pursuit ofdemocratization at the expense of what he saw as more pressing economicproblems.Infact,Ryzhkov’sowntechnocraticapproachtotheeconomywasamajor reasonwhymarketizing reformwasnotembracedearlier. In thepresentcontext, however, it isRyzhkov’s observation ofGorbachev’s leadership stylewhich matters most. By nature and character, Ryzhkov observed, Gorbachevwas incapableofbeingaMachiavellianprince, even though itwasanerror tobelievehimtobeindecisive.66But‘longbeforeournativeparliamentarygamesbegan’,saidRyzhkov,Gorbachev‘wasaleaderofaparliamentarytype’,adding:‘How hewas thus formed in a party-bureaucratic system, God alone knows.’Gorbachev,observedRyzhkov,hadbecomethatkindofaleaderinspiteofthefact that from his earliest youth he had risen, rung-by-rung, up the traditionalcareer ladder of Komsomol (Communist Youth League) and the CommunistParty.67 He had neither the temperament nor the desire to rule by makinghimselffeared,asMachiavelli taughtandStalinimbibed.†ThatdoesnotmeanthatGorbachevlackedambitiontolead.Onthecontrary.Inconversationwithaclosefriend,heremarked:‘FrommyearliestdaysIlikedtobealeaderamongmy peers – that was my nature. And this remained true when I joined theKomsomol . . . and laterwhen I joined the party – itwas awayof somehowrealizingmypotential.’68

Gorbachevwas,asalreadynoted,themostpopularpoliticianinthecountryfor the first fiveout of the almost sevenyears inwhichhewasSoviet leader.Thatowedagreatdealtohisopenness,toremovingthefearofwar(whichinacountry that lost twenty-seven million people during the Second World War

countedforagreatdeal),andtohispresidingovertheintroductionofahostofnew freedoms, including freedom of speech, religious freedom, and electionswithchoice.Whatwasespeciallyimportant–aweaknessforsomeobservers,astrengthintheeyesofothers–wastheextenttowhichhewaswillingtochangehismindwhenpresentedwithnewevidenceorpersuasivearguments.Muchofthechangewasstartlinglyobvious.OtherchangesinGorbachev’soutlookweredisguisedbysomelinguisticcontinuity.SomeofhisradicalcriticsdownplayedtheextentoftheevolutionofGorbachev’sthinkingbyseizingonhiscontinuingattachment to ‘perestroika’ and to ‘socialism’. They missed the fundamentalpoint that inthecourseofhisfirstfiveyearsintheKremlinwhathemeantbythosetermschangedutterly.‘Perestroika’hadbegunasaeuphemismforreformof the Soviet system at a time when the very word ‘reform’ was taboo. Itgradually came to stand for the root-and-branch transformation of the SovietsystemwhichGorbachevsought–asystemofpluralistdemocracyfoundedonaruleoflaw,nottheguaranteedruleoftheCommunistParty.Asfor‘socialism’,GorbachevmovedfrombeingaCommunistreformerin1985toasocialistofasocialdemocratictypebytheendofthatdecade–aqualitativechange.69

Bythespringof1990theSovietUnionnolongerhadaCommunistsystem,but one characterized by political pluralism, a burgeoning civil society, adevelopingruleoflawwhichwasreplacingarbitrariness,andrapidlyadvancingdemocratization. The political system, in short, had been transformed. For thefirstfouryearsofperestroika,thiswasverymucha‘revolutionfromabove’,onedependent onGorbachev’s tranquillizing the hardliners, even as he radicalizedthe political agenda, thus avoiding the kind of internal coup that would haveturned the clock backwards with a vengeance. There is a parallel here withSuárez.Gorbachev,too,managedtopostponethecoupbythehardlinersforsolong – until August 1991 in his case – that by the time it came, there wereinstitutions inplaceandenoughpeoplewhohadturnedfromobedientsubjectsintoactivecitizenssuccessfullytoresistit.Itwasespeciallyimportantthatjusttwo months earlier Boris Yeltsin had been elected President of Russia (asdistinct from theSovietUnion)byuniversal suffrage inacompetitiveelectionandhad,therefore,democraticlegitimacytodefytheputschistsatatimewhenGorbachevandhisfamilywereunderhousearrestintheirholidayhomeontheCrimeancoast.70

ByplayingtheprincipalroleinthetransformationofSovietforeignpolicy,Gorbachev had also been the key figure in changing the international system.

TheColdWarhadbegunwiththeSoviet takeoverofEasternEurope.ItendedwhenthecountriesofEastandCentralEuropebecame,onebyone,independentandnon-CommunistandGorbachevcalmlyacceptedthatoutcome.Sofarastheeconomicsystemisconcerned,Gorbachevinthecourseof1990–91acceptedtheprinciple of a market economy, but one of a social democratic type.Cooperativeswere legalized in 1988 andmanyof them rapidly became thinlydisguised private enterprises.Yet,Gorbachevwasmuch later in accepting themarketasthemainregulatoroftheeconomythanhewasinacceptingtheneedfor democracy. He was also faced by powerful bureaucratic opposition tomarketization.As a result, the economywas in limbowhen the SovietUnioncametoanend–nolongeracommandeconomybutnotyetamarketone.

Gorbachevhasbeenregardedbysomeasa‘weak’leader,orevenafailure,becausethecountryoverwhichhepresided–theSovietUnion–ceasedtoexistattheendof1991.Thestatecouldhavebeenheldtogetherformanymoreyearshad he not embarked on the liberalization and democratization of the SovietsystemandthetransformationofSovietforeignpolicy.Therelevanceofforeignpolicywas that when themost disaffected of Soviet nationalities – especiallyEstonians, Latvians and Lithuanians – saw the peoples of Eastern Europeacquiring independent statehood in 1989, this raised their aspirations fromseekinggreaterautonomywithinaSovietstatetodemandingfullindependence.Gorbachev consciously sought the dismantling of the Soviet system, but hesought to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet state. He was not, however,prepared to resort to the kind of sustained use of force thatwould have beenrequired to crush independence movements once expectations were aroused.Before his policies had generated the belief that national independence forSoviet union republics might be possible, the status quo could have beenmaintained by the pre-existing system of rewards and severe punishments.Gorbachev tried to keep a union together – in its ultimate proposed form notevenarenewedUSSR(UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics)butaUSS,aUnionof Sovereign States – through a process of negotiation, persuasion andcompromise. That was already several steps too far for many party and stateofficials, military leaders and the KGB. Gorbachev was accused by them ofbeingfartooconciliatorytoradicalsandnationalists,andtooreluctanttousethecoercivepowerathisdisposaltopreservetheSovietUnionintact.*

Hewas later toldbya leadingRussiannationalist thathedidnothave thehistoric right to allow either theWarsawPact or theSovietUnion itself to bedissolved. Ifhehadnotbeenprepared touse force toprevent these things,he

should have made way for a ‘more decisive patriot’.71 Yet, the fact that theSoviet Union was dissolved largely peacefully (in contrast with anothermultinational Communist state, Yugoslavia) was also in some ways anachievement on Gorbachev’s part. For him it was very much an unintendedconsequenceofsystemicchange,butheresistedrepeatedcallstodeclareastateofemergency,meaningmartiallaw,andputastoptothefissiparousprocesses.Mostfundamentally,itwasGorbachev’sliberalizationanddemocratizationthatmadepursuitofindependencemovementspossible.His‘guilt’inrelationtothebreak-upoftheSovietstatelayinreplacingfearbyfreedomsandinanaversiontosheddingblood.

IdeaswereimportantforGorbachevandforthedemiseofCommunism,justastheyhadbeeninitsrise.Butespeciallyinahighlyauthoritariansystem,ideas–iftheyaretobepoliticallyeffective–requireinstitutionalbearers.Itwasthecombinationof ideas thatwere radicallynew in theSoviet context, innovativeleadership,andpoliticalpower (ofageneral secretarywithadifferentmindsetfrom that of any of his predecessors) which was decisive in producingtransformative change in the Soviet Union – and, as a consequence,metamorphosis in that part of Europe whose sovereignty had been strictlylimitedbyanunreconstructedSovietleadershipoverthepreviousfourdecades.Aleksandr Yakovlev, who by the 1990s had become a far from uncriticaladmirerofGorbachev,said,nevertheless,in1995:‘IconsiderGorbachevtobethegreatest reformerof thecentury, themoresobecausehe tried todo this inRussia where from time immemorial the fate of reformers has beenunenviable.’72Itiscertainlydifficulttothinkofanyoneinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturywhohadalarger(andgenerallybeneficent)impactnotonlyonhisownmultinationalstatebutalsointernationally.Bytemperamentareformerratherthanrevolutionary,he,nevertheless,pursued(asheputit)‘revolutionarychangebyevolutionarymeans’.

DENGXIAOPING

Deng Xiaoping was a transformational leader of a very different kind fromGorbachev. Deng was the key political figure in the transformation of theChinese economic system, while Gorbachev transformed the Soviet politicalsystem.Ofanoldergeneration(hewasbornin1904,Gorbachevin1931),DengwasoneofthosewhomadetheChineserevolution,whereasGorbachevemerged

intoaCommunistorderthathadalreadybeenestablished.Bothmenwereborninvillagesfarfromthecapital,butDengXiaopingintoanestablishedlandlordfamily,Gorbachevinapeasanthousehold.BothDengandGorbachevplacedahigh value on education and on listening to well-informed specialists. UnlikeGorbachev(whounusuallyforaboyfromapeasantfamilystudiedinRussia’sleadinguniversity),theChineseleaderdidnothaveaccesstohighereducation.DengXiaopingspentthefirsthalfofthe1920sinFrance,wherehehadhopedtostudyaswellastowork,butspenthistimeasalow-paidworkerbeforemovingto office tasks on aCommunist journal, produced by youngChinesewho hadbecomeradicalizedduringtheirtimeinFrance.Deng’simmediatesuperiortherewasZhouEnlai,whowassixyearsolder–latertobecome,afterMaoZedong,the secondmost prominent member of the Communist government of China.BelievinginJanuary1926thathewasabouttobearrestedanddeportedforhispoliticalpropagandawork,DengescapedtotheSovietUnion.Therehestudiedfor a year at the Sun Yat-sen University, which had been established by theComintern to trainmembers both of theChineseCommunist Party and of theKuomintang, theChineseNationalistParty.Thefact thatactivistsof these twoparties were brought together under one roof led Deng to have as one of hisclassmates Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek. (During the yearswhenDengXiaopingwastheparamountleaderofChinaandChiangChing-kuohisequivalentinTaiwan,Dengtriedtomeetwithhim,butChiangrefused.)73

DengwasoneofthosewhotookpartinthefamousLongMarchwithMaoZedong in themid-1930s, as theCommunists retreated, under attack from theChineseNationalists, to a new base in Shaanxi province in north-west China.Only one in ten of the 80,000 men and 2,000 women who embarked on themarchreached theirdestination.74Althoughat times in lateryearshe incurredMaoZedong’swrath,Deng early on earnedMao’s respect for his intelligenceand organizational ability. Long before the Second World War Deng had,accordingly,establishedgoodpersonalrelationswithbothMaoandZhou.IntheChinese civil war, which ended with the Communists taking power in 1949,Dengwasapoliticalcommissarandtheeffectiveleaderofsomehalfamilliontroops in one of the decisive campaigns of the conflict.75 As early as 1956,Deng was appointed general secretary of the Communist Party. In mostCommunistcountries,thatwouldhavebeenthetopposition,butinChinaMaohadthetitleofChairmanofthepartyandtherewasnoquestioninghissupremeauthority.Nevertheless,Dengwasinchargeoftheday-to-dayadministrationof

the party and also amember of the StandingCommittee of the Politburo, theinnersanctumofthepartyleadership.76

Mao combined ruthless power-seeking, vindictiveness towards those whothwarted him, and encouragement of the cult of his personalitywith romanticrevolutionary ideas of surging ahead to some kind of full communism, in theprocessovertakingtheSovietUnion,whichhadstartedearlier,inthepursuitofthatwhollyfancifulgoal.Deng,althoughheneverwaveredinhisbelief in theabsolute power of the Communist Party and of strict hierarchy and disciplinewithinit(‘democraticcentralism’),wasmuchmoreofapragmatistthanMaoinhisapproach togovernmentalorganizationandeconomicmodernization.Thus,itwasnotdifficultforMaoZedong,inhislateryears,tosuspectthatDenghadserious reservations about the wisdom of his ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the‘CulturalRevolution’.BothoftheseMaoistinitiativesweredisasters.TheGreatLeap Forward – between 1958 and 1960 – saw the creation of enormous‘people’s communes’ in the countrysidewithmassmobilization turningout tobe a very poor substitute for the smaller agricultural cooperatives and forprofessionalexpertise.ThecalamitouslossoflifecausedbytheGreatLeapintocommunizationofChinesesocietyisdiscussedmorefullyinChapter6.

Whatever his private thoughts at the time, Deng Xiaoping loyally andruthlesslyhelpedtoimplementonMao’sbehalfthatpolicywhichledtomassivefamine.77During theCulturalRevolution in the secondhalf of the1960s andfirst half of the 1970s, Deng’s distaste wasmore immediately discernible forwhat was in effect an anti-intellectual, anti-educational and anti-culturalmobilizationofyoungradicalsagainstalmostallauthoritativeinstitutions,otherthan Mao’s inviolable supreme leadership. Deng himself became a target ofabuse and was condemned as a ‘capitalist roader’. He was exiled to thecountryside in 1969 andworked for a time as a fitter, a job that he had donesomefortyyearsearlierinaRenaultfactoryinFrance.Deng’selderson,tryingto escape fromRedGuard persecutors,was crippled for lifewhen he jumpedfromahighdormitorywindowofPekingUniversity.78

AlthoughMaofullyapprovedDeng’sremovalfromthepolitical leadershipandhisexile to thecountryside,hedidnotendorsedemands forhisexpulsionfrom the Communist Party. Had that occurred, it would hardly have beenpossible for Deng to make a political comeback. Mao, however, retained aresidual respect for Deng who had been his strongest supporter in factionalstruggles in the1930sandhadprovedhimself inwarandpeace.Dengandhis

family were allowed to return to Beijing in February 1973 and the followingmonthDengwas restored to theposthehadheldon theeveofhis expulsion,that ofVice Premier.79Nevertheless, hewas dismissed again in 1975.WhenDengmettheAmericanSecretaryofStateCyrusVancein1977,bywhichtimehewas back in high office, he recalled that they had lastmet just before hisdismissal two years earlier. Deng joked that if he was well knowninternationally, it was ‘because I have been three times up and three timesdown’.80AfterMao’sdeathin1976,Deng,whowashighlyrespectedbyagreatmany seniorpartyofficials (althoughhewasbitterlyopposedby the ‘GangofFour’ who had led the assault in the Cultural Revolution), quite rapidlyconsolidatedhispositionwithintheleadership.

Dengneverheld the toppost ofpartyChairman,nordidhe againbecomegeneral secretary of the party. Yet, by the end of the 1970s, he was morepowerfulthanMao’schosensuccessoraspartyChairman,HuaGuofeng.81Thiswas a rare case in a Communist systemwhere a leader’s individual authoritybecamemore important than his rankwithin the party.However, itwas not apersonalruleover theparty,butgovernancethroughit,anditreflectedDeng’shighstandingwithinfluentialpartyofficials.Hisdominancegrewashewasableto bring an increasing number of allies into key positions.By February 1980,therewasamajorityofDengsupportersinthePolitburo.By1981Denghimselfheld three posts – vice premier, vice chairman of the party, and, not least,Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Formally, he was not thecountry’sleader,butinformallyfromthelate1970sandthroughoutthe1980sheunquestionably was. Deng did nothing to create a cult of his personality. Incontrast with Mao, there was no question of students having to waste timememorizingquotationsfromhiswritings.82

Havingattainedapositionofascendancy,althoughnotofdictatorialpower,Deng proceeded to pursue economic policies that were to change utterly thecharacteroftheChineseeconomicsystem.Maoin1957haddescribedDengtoSovietleaderNikitaKhrushchevasa‘littleman’(Dengwasbarelyfivefeettall)whowas‘highlyintelligent’andhad‘agreatfutureaheadofhim’.83Maowasright,buthehardlyimaginedthatDeng’sgreatestlegacywouldbetodestroytheessentialsofMaoism.Dengdidnotencourage frontalattacksonMao, for thatwould mean ‘discrediting our Party and state’.84Mao, after all, was China’sLenin and Stalin rolled into one. He had led the Chinese party to victory in

revolution and had then been the country’s ruler for the greater part of itsexistenceas aCommunist state.DengXiaoping’spolicies,however,markedafundamental breakwithMaoism.Deng beganwith agricultural reform, and inthe early 1980s collectivization gave way to a return to peasant householdfarming, stimulatingadramatic improvement inagriculturalproductivity.Fourspecialeconomiczonesweresetupincoastalareasandgraduallyopeneduptoinward investment from international companies. Deng’s approach was‘consistent experimentation before widespread adoption of a particularpolicy’,85althoughwiththefirmintentofintroducingfar-reachingchangeintotheeconomyasawhole.

Thetransformationoftheeconomicsystemsincethelate1970shasenabledChinatoexperienceoneofthemostremarkableperiodsofeconomicgrowthinhuman history.86An economyof state, or public, ownership became amixedeconomywithasubstantialprivatesector.Acommandeconomywasgraduallyturnedintoanessentiallymarketeconomy,albeitoneinwhichtherewasacloserelationship between private enterprise and state institutions. Over time,although Deng was not personally implicated in this, cosy relationshipsdevelopedbetweenhighofficialsandbusinessenterprises(includingthosewithmultiple offshoots abroad), with many of the party-state cadres acquiringimmense wealth.87 The growth of corruption and of extreme inequality wereamong the results of the systemic changes in the economywhichDeng set intrain. They are also an Achilles heel of the system, for in the absence ofdemocratic accountability, popular anger about these outcomes is potentiallydangerousfortheregime.

Nevertheless,itisnotonlyanewcategoryofsuper-richwhohavebenefitedfromChinabecomingtheworkshopoftheworldandemergingasakeyplayerin the international economic system. Economic growth rates of 10 per centannually raised the standard of living of hundreds of millions of people.Urbanization has proceeded at a remarkable pace.Whereas 80 per cent of theChinesepopulation still lived in the countryside at the timeofMao’sdeath in1976,by2012almosthalfthepopulationof1.3billionpeoplelivedincities.88Amajorityoftheurbanpopulationarenowfactoryworkers,buttherehasalsobeen a huge growth of a well-to-do middle class. In spite of the extremelyunevendistributionoftherewardsforfasteconomicgrowth,thefruitsofDeng’sreforms have brought farmore concrete benefits to themany than didMao’spenuriousegalitarianism.

UnderDengandhissuccessorstherehasalsobeensomepoliticalrelaxation.His policies of encouraging young Chinese to study abroad and opening thecountry to foreign direct investment could not avoid bringing in a greaterknowledgeoftheoutsideworld,includingofotherpoliticalsystems.Thelimitsof the possible in political discussion have become broader than they wereduringmostof theMaoyears.Nevertheless,whileembracingsystemicchangeoftheeconomy,Dengfirmlyresistedqualitativechangeofthepoliticalsystem.HeremainedcommittedtothemonopolyofpoweroftheCommunistPartyandwas prepared to act ruthlessly against thosewho challenged it in the name ofdemocracy. Thus, when hundreds of demonstrators (as well as some merebystanders)weremassacredinthevicinityofTiananmenSquareon4June1989,ithadbeenDengmorethananyoneelsewhowasinsistentoncallinginthearmyandtankstoputanendtotheprotestsatwhatevercostinblood.89Thegeneralsecretary of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, who had earlier as premierimplementedDeng’seconomicreformswithskillandenthusiasm,opposedthisintroductionofmartiallawonthestreetsofBeijing.Asaresult,fromthattimeuntilhisdeathin2005,hewaskeptunderhousearrest.90

DengXiaopingandMikhailGorbachevremainthetwogreattransformersofCommunistsystems,buttheirachievementswereverydifferent.Howtheseareweighed against each other depends ultimately on the values of the assessor.Gorbachevplayedadecisiveroleinfacilitatingahostofpersonalfreedoms(ofspeech and publication, assembly, religion, communications, civil associationand travel) of several hundred million people – the population of the SovietUnionandEasternEurope.DengXiaopingplayedano less significantpart inraising thematerial living standards of evenmoremillions without accordingthem any of the above-mentioned freedoms other than that of foreign travel.China today is a hybrid, having a Communist political system and a non-Communist economic system. Although he preserved the former, Deng’scredentialsasatransformationalleaderarewellestablishedbythedecisiveroleheplayedinthetransitiontothelatter.Deng’slegacyis,indeed,morevisibleincontemporaryChina than isGorbachev’s incontemporaryRussia.China todayis,inmanyrespects,whatDengXiaopingmadeit.Ifitcontinuestocombinefasteconomic growth with relative political stability, the China which Dengbequeathed may be more influential in the twenty-first century than was theChinaofMaoZedonginthetwentieth.

NELSONMANDELA

TheendoftheapartheidregimeinSouthAfricahasalreadybeentoucheduponinthepreviouschapterinthecontextofviewingF.W.deKlerkasaredefiningleader.Aswe saw, the rapid transition tomajority rule inSouthAfrica in theearly 1990s owed much to the changes in the Soviet Union, especially thetransformationofSovietforeignpolicyandtheendoftheColdWar.Forwhitesupremacists to play up the spectre of Communism, which, they claimed, atransition to majority rule would mean for South Africa, had become moreimplausiblethaneverbytheendofthe1980s.F.W.deKlerkacknowledgedthis,althoughheputsthepointdifferently,writingthat,withoutthechangesinitiatedby Gorbachev, ‘our own transformation process in South Africa would havebeenmuchmoredifficultandmighthavebeendelayedbyseveralyears’.91

NelsonMandelahadlongbeenthemostinternationallyrecognizedopponentoftheapartheidregime.Thesonofaminorchief,hewasbornintheTranskeiterritoryofSouthAfricain1918.Mandelawasonlynineyearsofagewhenhisfather died, and Jongintaba Dalindyebo, the paramount chief of the Themupeople, to which Mandela belonged, took him into his own household andbecamehisguardian.Hisstyleofleadership,which(asMandelarecollectedit)wasmorecollectivethanindividual,hadasignificantimpactonSouthAfrica’sfuturepresident.Fromtime to timechiefsandheadmen,butalsomanyothers,frommilesaroundwouldbesummoned toameetingat theGreatPlacewheretheywouldbewelcomedbyJongintabawhowouldexplainwhyhehadcalledthemtogether.‘Fromthatpointon,’saysMandela,‘hewouldnotutteranotherword until the meeting was nearing its end.’92 Mandela, who as a boy satfascinatedthroughthesemeetings,describesthemthus:

Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been ahierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard: chief and subject, warrior andmedicineman,shopkeeperandfarmer,landownerandlabourer.Peoplespokewithoutinterruptionandthemeetings lasted formanyhours.The foundation of self-governmentwas that allmenwere free to voicetheiropinionsandwereequal in theirvalueascitizens. (Women, Iamafraid,weredeemedsecond-classcitizens.)93

Apart from the reference towomen’s subordination,Mandelamay, in his oldage, have had a somewhat gilded memory of the degree of democracy. Butperceptions and selective memory of personal experience can influence laterconduct more than an objective account by a dispassionate historian or

anthropologist. BothMandela’s experience of tribal culture and his anglicizededucationinSouthAfricanschoolsandcollegescontributeddistinctiveelementstohissenseofidentity.Henotesthattheregent(astheparamountchiefwasalsoknown)wasoftencriticized,sometimesvehemently,buthe‘simplylistened’andshowed‘noemotionatall’.Themeetingscontinueduntileitheraconsensuswasreached or all agreed to disagree, leaving a solution to the problem for asubsequentmeeting.Therewas,Mandelasays,noquestionofaminoritybeingcrushedbyamajority.Theregentwouldspeakonlyat theendof themeeting,summing up what had been said.Mandela adds: ‘As a leader, I have alwaysfollowedtheprinciplesIfirstsawdemonstratedbytheregentattheGreatPlace.I have always endeavoured to listen to what each and every person in adiscussionhadtosaybeforeventuringmyownopinion.’Often,headds,whathehimselfsubsequentlysaidrepresentednomorethan‘aconsensusofwhatIheardinthediscussion’.94

Mandela was educated at mission schools, and at the major highereducational institution forAfricans, theUniversityCollegeofFortHare (fromwhich he was expelled for organizing a strike), and subsequently at theUniversityofWitwatersrand.Distinguishedbyhisheight(hewasalmostastallas de Gaulle), Mandela soon acquired other features that set him apart. Hebecame one of the few black lawyers in SouthAfrica, and hewas politicallyactive from the early 1940s. Along with his friends and long-term leadingcolleagues in theAfricanNationalCongress (ANC),Walter Sisulu andOliverTambo,hefoundedtheANCYouthLeaguein1944.Thiswas,inmanyrespects,a radical offshoot of the moderate ANC. Initially, it espoused a racialnationalism, its members being suspicious of cooperation with whites, whichincludedwhiteCommunistswho had exercised some influence in theAfricanNationalCongress.Mandela in1949called for their expulsion from theANC.However, when the South African government introduced the Suppression ofCommunismAct in 1950, they drafted it sufficiently broadly that it could beusedtooutlawanyorganizationorindividualopposedtotheauthorities.95ThesharedthreatencouragedMandelatomakecommoncausewiththeCommunistsinthestruggleagainstwhiteminorityrule.AddressingaSouthAfricancourtin1964,MandeladistinguishedthegoalsoftheCommunistPartyfromthoseoftheANC.TheCommunists,hesaid,aimed to remove thecapitalistsandbring theworkingclass topower,whereas theANCsought toharmonizeclass interests.However,headded:

Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression are a luxury we cannot afford at thisstage.Whatismore,formanydecadescommunistsweretheonlypoliticalgroupinSouthAfricawhowerepreparedtotreatAfricansashumanbeingsandtheirequals;whowerepreparedtoeatwithus;talkwithus,livewithandworkwithus.Becauseofthis, therearemanyAfricanswho,today,tendtoequatefreedomwithcommunism.96

Mandelamadeclearhispositionwasdifferent.HestressedhisadmirationfortheBritishparliament,fortheseparationofpowersintheUnitedStates,andfortheindependenceofthejudiciaryinparticular.AgainsttheargumentthattheANChadbecomeaninstrumentoftheCommunistParty,hedrewthecomparisonofAmericanandBritishcooperationwiththeSovietUnioninthestruggleagainstNazi Germany during the SecondWorldWar, adding that only Hitler wouldhavedared‘tosuggestthatsuchcooperationturnedChurchillorRooseveltintocommunistsorcommunisttools’.97

MandelaandTamboin1952openedoneofthefirstlegalpracticestoberunbyblack lawyers.Throughout thatdecadeMandelawasfrequentlybannedandsometimes arrested. At one point when there was a warrant for his arrest, hemoved fromhouse tohouseandevaded thepolice for longenough tobecomeknownas the‘BlackPimpernel’.Whensixty-nineAfricanprotesterswereshotdead and many more wounded at Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, on 21March 1960, further outraging the black African majority as well as opinionabroad,theapartheidgovernmentdeclaredastateofemergencyandbannedtheAfrican National Congress.98 The ANC resolved to become an undergroundorganizationandformedafive-membercoordinatingcommittee,withMandelachosen as one of its members. He was allotted the task of explaining thesedecisionsinsecretmeetingswiththerankandfile.99MandelaspenttheeveningoftheSharpevillemassacre,discussingtheANCresponsetoit,inthecompanyofWalterSisulu at the homeof JoeSlovo, oneof theirwhite colleagueswhowasalsoaleadingfigureintheSouthAfricanCommunistParty.Theydecidedtocall for anationwideburningof thepasses thatblackAfricanswere legallyobliged tocarry.Mandelaburnedhispasson28March in frontof a speciallyinvitedgroupofjournalists.Twodayslaterhewasarrestedandhespentthenextfivemonthsinprison.100

From the time the organizationwent underground,Mandela began to looklike its future leader. The President of the ANC, Chief Albert Luthuli, waswidely respected abroad – in 1961 he became the first African to receive theNobelPeacePrize–buthewas regardedas toomoderateby theANC’smore

radicalmembers,partlybecauseofhiswillingnesstocooperatewithwhitesandpartlybecauseofhisstrongcommitment tonon-violence.Mandelawasoneofthosewho decided, followingSharpeville, that the continuing intransigence oftheregimeanditsviolenceagainsttheblackmajoritywouldhavetobemetwitharmedstruggle.HebecametheprincipalfounderofanoffshootfromtheANC,Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). It adopted a policy of economicsabotageratherthanofterrorismagainstpersonsonthegroundsthatthisofferedmorehopeoflaterreconciliation.Umkhonto,thejointcreationoftheANCandthe South African Communist Party, was headed byMandela who appointedSlovo as his chief of staff.101 During 1962 Mandela, wanted by the SouthAfricanpolice,slippedoutofthecountryandspenthalfayearvisitingdifferentAfricanleaderstogarnersupportfortheANCandthenewphaseofthestruggle.HealsohadmilitarytraininginEthiopiaandMorocco.102BeforegoingbacktoSouthAfrica,hevisitedLondonwherehehadmeetingswithOliverTambo,hisoldfriendandleaderofANCmembersinexile,withLabourandLiberalPartyleadersandwithChristianfundraisersfor theANC.103Shortlyafterhisreturnto South Africa,Mandela was arrested on 5 August 1962. He spent the nexttwenty-seven and a half years in prison, not being released until 11 February1990, nine days after the South African government’s ban on the ANC waslifted.

Originally,Mandelawassentencedtofiveyearsofimprisonment.However,whenevidencewasuncoveredofhisleadershipofUmkhonto,hewastriedagainin1964andnarrowlyescapedbeingsentencedtodeath,receivinginsteadalifeimprisonmentsentence.Mandelaendedhisfour-houraddresstothecourtonthatoccasionbysaying:

Duringmy lifetime Ihavededicatedmyself to this struggleof theAfricanpeople. Ihave fought againstwhitedomination,andIhavefoughtagainstblackdomination.Ihavecherishedtheidealofademocraticandfreesocietyinwhichallpersonslivetogetherinharmonyandwithequalopportunities.It isanidealwhichIhopetoliveforandtoachieve.Butifneedsbe,itisanidealforwhichIampreparedtodie.104

Many ofMandela’s years of imprisonmentwere spent in the extremely harshconditionsofRobben Island,although laterhewas transferred tomorenormalprisons, albeit isolated in separate sections. From 1985 the South Africangovernmentbeganmakingcontactwithhim,withPresidentP.W.Bothaofferinghim release fromprison if hewould renounce violence as a political strategy.Mandela,however,refusedsuchtermsanditcosthimalmostfivemoreyearsin

prison. He continued to show almost superhuman patience, having becomeincreasinglyconsciousbythe1980sthatonedayhewouldbereleased.Hewasdeterminedthatitwouldbeonhis,andtheANC’s,terms.

Mandela’s resilience, together with the growing pressures on the SouthAfrican government (including capital flight), meant that de Klerk and hisNationalParty(NP),bothbeforeMandela’sreleasein1990andintheperiodofnegotiationswhichfollowedit,wereabletogetonlyalittleofwhattheywanted–protectionofminorityrights,propertyrightsandagreementsonelectoralrules.Essentially, however, ‘theNP leadership could only bargain on how it wouldgive up power’.105Mandelawas electedPresident of theANC in 1991 at itsfirstnationalconferenceinSouthAfricasinceitsbanningin1960andin1993heanddeKlerkwerejointlyawardedtheNobelPeacePrize.EvenasPresidentof the ANC, and with the heroic status conferred upon him by his longimprisonment,duringwhichhehadbecomethemajorsymbolofopposition toapartheid,MandeladidnotalwaysgethiswayintheANC’spolicydiscussions.With South Africa’s first democratic election in the offing, he proposed, forexample,thatthevotingagebeloweredtofourteen,butheretreatedinthefaceof strong opposition from members of the ANC’s National ExecutiveCommittee.106 During those years Mandela was reflecting on the nature ofpoliticalleadership.Hewroteinanotebook:‘Theleader’sfirsttaskistocreateavision.Hissecondistocreateafollowingtohelphimimplementthevisionandto manage the process through effective teams. The people being led knowwhere they aregoingbecause the leaderhas communicated thevision and thefollowershaveboughtintothegoalhehadsetaswellastheprocessofgettingthere.’107

There was a tension between Mandela’s belief in principle in collectiveleadershipandhisheroicstatus.Againsttheodds,hewontherespectandevenaffectionofthemajorityofthewhiteSouthAfricanpopulationafterhebecamethecountry’sfirstblackpresident,democraticallyelectedin1994.Heresented,however,theshareofcreditfortheSouthAfricantransitiontodemocracywhichhadbeenaccordeddeKlerk.108Afterwhathehadbeenthrough,thatwasmorethan understandable.He chairedCabinetmeetings rather in themanner of theregentat theGreatPlace.According tooneof itsmembers,Mandela ‘listenedimpassively,takingineverythingandthenintervening’.109Hesometimestooka different line from the ANC. They, for example, had been critical of thefindings of theTruth andReconciliationCommission,whichMandela had set

up. His own response was to say that ‘they have not done a perfect but aremarkablejobandIapproveofeverythingtheydid’.110Mandeladevolvedthemaking of economic policy to others, especially his deputyThaboMbeki, butwas himself active in foreign policy, taking delight ‘in personal diplomacy,telephoningheadsofstateinblithedisregardofinternationaltimezones’.111

Mandela was devoted to the advancement of human rights, greater socio-economic equality, non-racialism and reconciliation among South Africa’sdifferentethnicgroups.Someoftheseaimswererealizedinpracticemorethanothers.Whatwasespecially remarkablewas theextent towhichMandelawonoveragreatmanyAfrikaners, embracingcultural symbols thathad in thepastbeen regarded as deeply alien by black SouthAfricans.An especially notableoccasion was when he appeared at the World Cup Rugby finals wearing aSpringbok jersey, winning the warm appreciation of the players and thewholehearted approval of the crowd. The task of building a harmoniousmultiracialsocietyandnewformsofnationalunity,especially inconditionsofcontinuinggreatinequality,wasnevergoingtobeotherthanarduous.Itishard,though,toimagineanyonemakingabetterormoregraciousstartthanMandela,especiallyinthelightofallthathadgonebeforeinthehistoryofthecountryandinhisownlife.Hehimselfplayedbythenewrulesofthedemocraticgameand,on a continentwhich has seen toomany ‘presidents for life’, he set aworthyexamplebystandingdownin1999afterjustonefive-yearterm.Hedied,agedninety-five, in December 2013. More than anyone else, Mandela had beeninstrumental in producing the transformation of the political system whichturned South Africa from a country of white minority rule, with the greatmajorityof thepopulationdisenfranchised, intoademocracy.Apartheidwouldhaveendedsometime,butwithoutMandelaitisveryunlikelythatthetransitiontodemocracycouldhavebeensorelativelypeacefulandultimatelyacceptedbythewhiteminoritywhohadlostpoliticalpower.

TRANSFORMATIONALANDINSPIRATIONALLEADERS

The criteria for counting someone as a transformational leader, set out at thebeginning of this chapter, are very demanding. The five examples consideredhere are of people who held the highest executive posts in their respectivecountries(inDengXiaoping’scase,defactoratherthandejure),anditwouldbe

difficulttomeetthecriteriawithoutdoingso.Itisextremelyrare,however,foraheadofgovernmenttomakethatdegreeofdifferenceandplayanindispensablepartinintroducingsystemicchange.Atransformationalleaderisnotthesameasan inspirational leader, although these are not, of course, mutually exclusivecategories.Itwouldbehardtothinkofamorepoliticallysignificantexampleofan inspirational leader than Mahatma Gandhi, though he never heldgovernmentaloffice.HenotonlyplayedacrucialpartintheIndianstruggleforindependence from Britain but his example of non-violent resistance was aninspiration to countless protest movements in different countries. Acontemporaryinspirationalleaderwhomightyetbecomealsoatransformationalleader is Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the democratic opposition to theBurmese military regime. If the modest liberalization of that regime were todevelopintosystemicchange,shewouldhaveplayedahugepartinbringingitabout and would surely be regarded as the founding mother of Burmesedemocracy.InSouthKoreaKimDaeJungwasaninspirationforthoseopposedto the authoritarian rule that prevailed until well into the 1980s.Having beenimprisonedandatone timesentenced todeath,Kimdidasmuchasanyone togive substance to thedevelopment of democracy inKorea andwas eventuallyelected to the presidency in 1998. During that time he freed many politicalprisoners and initiated a ‘sunshine policy’ towards North Korea, aimed atunfreezing the relations between the two parts of the peninsula, with somelimited but temporary success. Since the democratization processwas alreadyunderwayinSouthKoreabeforehecametopower,KimDaeJungwasnotquiteatransformationalleader,butacourageousandimportantfigure,nonetheless,inAsianpolitics.(HewasawardedtheNobelPeacePrizein2000.)

There are other leaders who may be considered both charismatic andpoliticallyimportantbutwhodidnotplaythedecisiveroleinsystemicchange.One such person is Boris Yeltsin who was sometimes, and quite wrongly,portrayed as ‘the father of Russian democracy’. Yeltsin had broken with theCommunist Party leadership in 1987 (although he remained amember of thepartyuntil1990)andwaswithoutinfluencewhenthemostimportantdecisions–not least, to move to contested elections – were taken by Gorbachev and hisinnercirclein1988.AmericanPresidentBillClintonsaiditpreyedonYeltsin’smind that he ‘got so little credit for starting a democracy’.112 There was,however, a good reason for that: he did not initiate the process ofdemocratizationandwasinnopositiontodoso.WhatYeltsindiddowithgreatinitial successwas tomove into political spacewhich theGorbachev reforms

hadcreated.The nearest Yeltsin came to being a transformational leader was in the

sphere of economic change. The idea of amarket economy had already beenacceptedinthelastyearsoftheSovietUnionandthecountryhadceasedtohaveanything that could be called a planned or command economy. However, anumberofpracticalstepstocreatingamarketweretakenduringYeltsin’syearsin power, starting with the very important freeing of most prices in January1992.Butwhatwasbuilt in the1990swas lessamarketeconomythan‘abadcase of predatory capitalism’, as the title of a book by the Swedish scholarStefan Hedlund puts it.113 Russia’s natural resources were handed over at afraction of their international market value in rigged auctions to people whowere ‘appointed billionaires’. Popular discontent with this, and with theextremesof inequalityandcorruptionwhichdeveloped,underminedsupport inRussiafordemocracy.YeltsininthelastyearsoftheSovietUnionhadacquireda large following. He had a commanding presence and an impulsive politicalstyle which fitted Russian notions of a ‘strong leader’. Long before the year2000,whenYeltsin handed power over toVladimir Putin,who promised himand his family immunity from prosecution, his early popularity had largelyevaporated,andhehaddonethecauseofdemocracymoreharmthangood.*114

AsomewhatstrongercandidatetobeconsideredasatransformationalleaderisLechWał sa.Inthe1970sheemergedasaleaderofPolishshipyardworkers,andin1980–81hewasaninspirationalandpoliticallyastuteleaderofSolidarity,theworkers’massmovement that rocked the foundations of the Polish party-state. There was a de facto political pluralism in Poland from the summer of1980untilDecember1981andavibrantcivil society,ofwhichSolidarityandtheCatholicChurch,overlappingbodieswithmanymillionsofmembers,werethe most visible and authoritative components. Had the Polish regime notsucceeded in introducingmartial law inDecember 1981, arrestingWał sa andotherleadingfiguresinSolidarity,andreducingthatmovementtoashadowofits former self, Wał sa would, indeed, have been a transformational leader.However,thetransitiontodemocracyinPolandcamenotatthebeginningofthe1980s – for a Communist order was re-established – but at the end of thatdecade, by which time external influences were decisively important. WhenSolidaritywaslegalizedagain–in1989–andwentontowinastunningvictoryin a national election, thePolishCommunist leadershipwas responding to thechanges in Moscow, the rising expectations of Polish society engendered by

thosechanges,andthedrawingtoanendoftheColdWar.Wał saremainedforatimeafocusofidentificationforPoles–andinlate1990waselectedpresident(after which his popularity began to decline) – but evenwithout him, Polandwouldveryrapidlyhavebecomenon-Communistandindependent.AllthatwasrequiredforthattohappenwasforPolestobelievethatif theycastasidetheirdomesticCommunistrulers,thiswouldnotleadtoSovietmilitaryintervention.*

The same point applies to Václav Havel and to Czechoslovakia’s ‘VelvetRevolution’oflate1989.Havelwasaleaderofgreatmoralauthority,sincehewas a distinguished writer who had chosen a life of harassment and frequentimprisonment rather than accept the rules of the game laid down by theconservativeCommunistregimeputinplaceafterthecrushingbySoviettanksofthePragueSpringof1968.TheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepopulationofCzechoslovakia,however,intheyearsbetween1969and1988,hadoptedforaquiet life. Having the dubious honour of being the last European country toexperienceaSovietinvasion(toreimposeCommunistorthodoxyandMoscow-approved leaders), they were extremely cautious about risking a repeatintervention. Before the invasion of August 1968, Communists were in aminorityinCzechoslovakia,butaverymuchlargerminoritythantheywereinPoland. Following the invasion, there were far fewer Communist believers ineithertheCzechlandsorSlovakiathanbefore.Peoplesimplyretreatedintotheirprivatelives.TherewasnoreasontodoubtthatCzechoslovakiawouldbecomenon-Communistveryquickly indeed ifandwhen itbecameclear that todosowouldnotleadtoforeigntroopsonthestreetsofPragueandBratislava.Itwasfortunatefor thepopulationof thecountry that theyhadsomeoneof themoralauthorityofHavel,eventhoughhewasnotanaturalpolitician,tocallonwhenthattimecame.Hewasanimpressiveleader,bothintheeloquentexpressionofhisideasandhiswillingnesstotaketheconsequencesofdisseminatingthem.Hewas not, however, a transformational leader, for in his absence Czechs andSlovakswould still havemade a rapid transition to democracy, once they hadobservedPoles andHungariansmovingundisturbed in that direction and evenEast Germans getting awaywithmass demonstrations against their unpopularregime.

*

Transformationalleadersplaythatrolenotonlybecauseofexceptionalpersonalqualities, fora leadersuchasHavelhad those, too,and therehavebeenmany

inspirational leaderswhohaveneverheldanykindofgovernmentaloffice.Ofthefivetransformationalleadersexaminedinthischapter,theleastexceptionalinpersonalattributeswasSuárezandthemostremarkable,intermsofenduranceofsufferingandmagnanimityinvictory,wasMandela.Indignityandcharisma,he is rivalledonlybydeGaulle.The twowhomade thebiggestdifferences tomost lives were Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping. In the one case, this wasthroughfacilitatingthedemocratizationofhalfofEurope;intheother,itwasbyraising the living standards of even more millions of people throughtransformingtheeconomyoftheworld’smostpopulousstate.Whattheyallhadincommonwasthattime,placeandcircumstanceputtheminapositionwherethey had just a chance, which they seized, tomake the decisive difference inchangingthesystem.

*DeGaulle’sunwillingnesstogoalongwithhisseniorgovernmentalcolleaguesandacceptdefeatwasonaparwith thespiritof theBritishprimeminister.At thatJune1940meeting inFrance,whichdeGaulleattended,Churchill(asreportedbyanotherparticipant,GeneralIsmay)said:‘IfitisthoughtbestforFranceinheragonythatherArmyshouldcapitulate,lettherebenohesitationonouraccount,becausewhateveryoumaydoweshallfightonforeverandeverandever.’(Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar:VolumeII:Their Finest Hour, Cassell, London, 1949, p. 138.) De Gaulle’s most interesting observations on hisrelationswithChurchillappearinthepassageinhismemoirswhenhereflectsupontheabruptremovalofthe PrimeMinister from 10Downing Street as a result of the 1945British general election. DeGaullevaluedthefactthat‘thisgreatpoliticianhadalwaysbeenconvincedthatFrancewasnecessarytothefreeworld; and this exceptional artist was certainly conscious of the dramatic character ofmymission’. Headmitted to envy of the fact thatChurchill had the resources of a state, ‘a unanimous people’, an intactterritory, ‘a tremendous Empire’ and ‘formidable armies’ at his disposal,whereas he, deGaulle, had toansweraloneforthedestinyofanation.‘Yet,’deGaulleconcludes,‘differentthoughtheconditionswereunderwhichChurchillandDeGaullehadhad toaccomplish their tasks, fierce though theirdisputeshadbeen, formore than fiveyears theyhadnonetheless sailed sideby side,guiding themselvesby the samestarsontheragingseaofhistory.’Aboveall,deGaulleacknowledgedthatwithoutChurchill,‘myeffortswould have been futile from the start, and that by lendingme a strong and willing hand when he did,Churchill hadvitally aided the causeofFrance’. (DeGaulle,TheCompleteWarMemoirsofCharlesdeGaulle,Carroll&Graf,NewYork,1998,pp.900–901.)* The Spanish scholar, Sonia Alonso, has noted the growing support in Catalonia in recent years forsecession,whilestressingthatthisisnotanargumentagainstthekindofdevolutionofpowerthathastakenplace (in theyears sincedemocracywas restored inSpain) to territorieswhere there isa strongsenseoflocalnationalidentity,sincetheexperienceof‘systematicallyignoringthegrievancesfromtheperiphery’and‘imposingacentralizedhomogeneousstate . . .guaranteedneither theterritorial integrityof thestatenor the survival of democracy’. (Sonia Alonso, Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle forPartisanCredibility.AComparisonofBelgium,Italy,Spain,andtheUnitedKingdom,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012,pp.247–248.)*Democratization in Spain and Portugalwas, however, a stimulus and encouragement to the spread ofdemocracyinLatinAmerica–whathasbeencalledtheThirdWaveofdemocratization.Whathappenedinthelate1980s,andwhichbeganintheSovietUnion,wasunconnectedwiththeearlierchangeinsouthernEuropeandLatinAmerica.ItconstitutedaFourthWaveofdemocratization.

*Afundamentallurkingproblemwasthenationalitiesissue.Amongthenon-RussiannationsoftheSovietUnion,andespeciallyinEstonia,LatviaandLithuania,therewasamajorityoftheindigenouspopulationwhowouldhavewelcomedindependentstatehood,hadthisbeenanoption.Priortotheperestroikayears,however,citizensofthoseBalticrepublicsknewthattoassertademandforindependenceledtonowherebuttheGulagor,inearlieryears,toexecution.†TheSovietleadershippriortoGorbachev’scomingtopowerreactedtothepoliciesofthefirsttermoftheReaganadministrationinthetraditionalmanner.TherewasnodissentfromtheviewoftheveteranSovietMinisterofDefence,DmitriyUstinov,whenhetoldaPolitburomeetinginMay1983:‘Everythingthatwearedoinginrelationtodefenceweshouldcontinuedoing.Allofthemissilesthatwe’veplannedshouldbedelivered . . .’ (ZasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSS,31maya1983goda,Hoover InstitutionArchives,Fond89,Reel1.1003,Opis42,File53.)Evenin1986theChairmanoftheKGBatthattime,ViktorChebrikov,insistedataPolitburomeeting that ‘theAmericansunderstandonlystrength’. (ZasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSS14oktyabrya1986goda,VolkogonovCollection,R9744,NationalSecurityArchive,Washington,DC.)*Accordingtothelawpassedatthattime,futureelectionsofthePresidentoftheUSSRweretobebythewholepeople.However, theSovietUnionhadceased toexistbeforeanysuchelectioncould takeplace.FromMarch1990onwards,Gorbachevgovernedmore through that stateoffice than through thegeneralsecretaryship and proceeded to bypass the Politburo even onmanymajor issues. Until 1990 the SovietUnionhadremainedaparty-state,andthePolitburohadthepowertofrustrateageneralsecretaryand,ifheoversteppedthemark,todeposehim.BythelasttwoyearsoftheSovietUnion’sexistence,powerhadbeentransferred from party to state institutions.When I had ameetingwith the deputy head of the Ideologydepartmentof theCentralCommittee in January1991,he said thathe thoughthehad just about enoughpowerlefttogetcoffeedeliveredtousinhisroom.ItwasonlyinthelasttwoyearsoftheSovietUnion’sexistence,whenpowerhadessentiallylefttheCentralCommitteebuilding,thataforeignnon-CommunistscholarcouldgainaccesstothatseculartempleoftheCommunistParty.*Russiawas,andremains,adiversecountry,andtheattitudesShakhnazarovattributedtothepopulationwere far fromuniversal.Nevertheless, therewere agreatmanyRussians forwhom the sight of a leaderreactingcalmlytopubliccriticismsignifiedweakness.† A Russian scholar, Dmitriy Furman, observed that people who would be regarded as monsters ineverydaylife,amongwhomhenumbersIvantheTerribleandPeterI,havetraditionallybeenregardedas‘great’inRussia,whereasthetsarwhoendedserfdom,AlexanderII,wasnot‘great’.Where,heasks,doesGorbachevfit into thatsystemofevaluation?Nowhereatall ishisanswer: ‘Inasystemofevaluation inwhichthegreatareIvantheTerrible,PeterandStalin,Gorbachevnotonlyis“notgreat”,heistheantithesisof greatness.’ (Dmitriy Furman, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 March 2011.) However, Furman goes on tocontendthatinasystemofevaluation‘normalforthecontemporarydevelopedworld,Gorbachevissimplyagreatrulerandpolitician,perhapstheverygreatestinRussianhistory’.*Itwas inorder toreverse theprocessofdisintegrationand, in thefirst instance,stopGorbachevandatleastfiveofthefifteenleadersofSovietrepublicsfromsigningatreatytoformanew,voluntaryandloosefederation in place ofwhat had been the Soviet Union, that theAugust coup of 1991 (which collapsedwithinafewdays)tookplace.*AstheRussianpoliticalanalystLiliaShevtsovahasobserved:‘ItisparadoxicalthatthedegenerationofYeltsin’s leadership strengthened demands, not for independent institutions as a means of avoiding arepetitionofthatleadership,butformorepowerful,authoritarianrule.’(LiliaShevtsova,Russia–LostinTransition:TheYeltsinandPutinLegacies,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,Washington,DC,2007,p.32.)* We now know from Soviet Politburo transcripts that an invasion of Poland was being seriouslyconsideredinAugust1980,butthatby1981theSovietleadershiphadturnedfirmlyagainstthis.TheywereinincreasingtroubleinAfghanistan,PolandwasthelargestoftheEastEuropeancountries,anditspeople

hadatraditionofstandinguptoinvaders.ThiswasalsoearlyintheReaganadministration’sfirsttermandan invasion of Poland would have raised East–West tensions dangerously. The Poles, however, wereunaware in 1981 that the Soviet leadership,whowere putting intense efforts into persuading the PolishCommunist leader Wojciech Jaruzelski to institute his own domestic crackdown, had decided againstinvasion. By 1989, with Gorbachev having already publicly declared that every country, including‘socialist’countries,hadtherighttochoosethekindofsystemtheirpeoplewanted,Polescouldbemuchmore confident that by removing their own Communist leaders they would not be paving the way forforeignintervention,thusmakingabadsituationworse.

5

RevolutionsandRevolutionaryLeadership

Transformationalleadersarenottheonlyoneswhoproducesystemicchange.Sodo revolutionary leaders, provided they are successful in carrying through therevolution.Comparedwith thosewho succeed, however, there aremanymorerevolutionaryleaderswhofailtodislodgethepowersthatbe.Inanauthoritarianregime, the reward for failure is execution or, at best, imprisonment. Inestablished democracies, revolutionaries have experienced only failure.Fortunately for them, however, the consequences of leading or belonging to arevolutionary party or movement, unless they have reached the point ofemploying violence, are generally nothing worse than marginalization. Theexplanationfor the failureof revolutionary leadersandrevolutionaryparties indemocracies is straightforward. The very fact that governments are heldresponsible for their decisions by an enfranchised citizenry places constraintsuponwhat theymaydo. It gives thema strong incentive topay someheed topeople’s views and interests, rather than bring them to a boiling point ofindignation.Mostcrucially,freeandhonestelectionsmeanthatgovernmentscanbe removed, and hopes for significant policy change maintained, without theneedforeitherviolentupheavalorsuddensystemicchange.AstheCzechwriter,LudvíkVaculík,observed ina speech inPrague in June1967 (which incurredthewrathoftheCommunistauthorities),therulesandnormsofdemocracyare‘a human inventionwhichmakes the job of ruling considerably harder’. Theyhaveobviousadvantagesfortheruled–thecitizensofthecountry–byenablingthem to hold governments accountable for their actions. As Vaculík noted,

however,theybestowbenefitsalsoonthoseinpower,sincewhenagovernmentfalls,democraticrules‘saveitsministersfrombeingshot’.1

Toexamine revolutionary leadershippresupposesclarityonwhatwemeanbyarevolution.Initsderivation,thetermpointstoacircularmovement,astheverb ‘to revolve’ suggests.And, in practice,more often than not, a revolutionreplacesoneformofauthoritarianrulebyanother.However, intheyearssincetheFrenchRevolution,thenotionhasacquiredaconnotationdifferentfromthatof government rotating in a full circle. For Samuel Huntington, revolution‘involves the rapidandviolentdestructionof existingpolitical institutions, themobilization of new groups into politics, and the creation of new politicalinstitutions’.2For JohnDunn, ‘Revolutionsarea formofmassive,violentandrapid social change.’3 Moreover, even when, as is generally the case,authoritarianrulefollowstheoverthrowofadespoticregimebyrevolution,itisno lessusualfor it tobea typeofauthoritarianismquitedistinct fromthepre-revolutionary order. There will be different political institutions, differentwinnersandloserswithinthesociety,and,inthecaseofCommunistrevolutions,adifferenteconomicsystem.

Someauthorsdonot includeviolenceasoneof thedefiningcharacteristicsofrevolution.4Whenitisexcluded,however,thenotionofrevolutionismadetocover too many disparate political phenomena. It is better to make a cleardistinctionbetweenrevolution,inthesenseinwhichthinkersasverydifferentinother respects asHuntington andDunn use the term, and such occurrences ascivil disobedience, passive resistance, state breakdown and coups d’état.Excludingcivilresistanceandnon-violentdemonstrations(evenwhentheyleadtothereplacementofoneregimebyanother)fromthedefinitionofrevolutionisnot todownplay theirsignificance,still less theirmerits.Onthecontrary,non-violent resistance to authoritarian regimes on the part of large numbers ofcitizens more often succeeds in overturning dictatorships than does violentresistance,andithasamuchbetterrecordinestablishingdemocracythereafter.5Itisusefulalsotodistinguishrevolutionfromsplitswithintherulingelite,withonefactionoverthrowingandoutlawinganother.Whenagroupwithinanelitereplacesanotherinapalacecoup,theythemselvesmaycallitarevolution(since‘revolution’retainsaromanticaura,whereas‘coupd’état’isalmostinvariablyapejorativeterm),butthatisstretchingtheconceptunhelpfully.

CHARACTERISTICSANDCONSEQUENCESOFREVOLUTION

What are the main characteristics of a revolution as distinct from peacefultransitionfromauthoritarianismtodemocracy?Thenatureof regimechange ismost distinctively revolutionary when it is characterized by: (1) large-scalepopular involvement; (2) the overthrow of existing institutions; (3) theestablishmentofanewlegitimizingideologyforthepost-revolutionaryregime,and (4) the use of violence before, during or immediately after the change ofregime.Itispossible,naturally(asistrueofotherpoliticalconcepts),todefinerevolution in different ways. Our starting point, however, remains thedesirabilityofmaintainingadistinctionbetweenpeacefulsystemicchangeandanegotiatedtransferofpower,ontheonehand,andviolentoverthrowofaregimebyasocialandpoliticalmovement,ontheother.

Therehavebeensomeattemptstostudyallknowncasesofrevolution(oftenmore broadly defined than here) and to delineate the social and politicalconditions inwhich they occur. Such efforts to find common features in, andparsimoniousexplanationsof, thecausesofrevolutionhavefailed,becausethecases are too diverse.6While it is possible to outline some of the social andpoliticalconditions thatareconducive torevolution– they includewar, rulers’loss of faith in their own legitimating beliefs, the development of higheducationallevelswithinaclosedpoliticalsystem,aheightenedsenseofrelativedeprivation, extreme inequality, the liberalization of a hitherto highlyauthoritarian regime, and rising expectations which state authorities lack thecapacitytomeet–wecanfindplentyofinstancesofthesephenomenaattimesand in places where revolution did not occur. There is, moreover, sufficientvariety in the causes and courses of different revolutions to limit the value ofattemptstofindfactorsthatwouldexplainthemall.

ThemostambitiousgeneralexplanationremainsthatofKarlMarx.Hesawthe source of revolutionary transformation in the ‘contradictions’ – meaninggrowingincompatibilities–betweeninstitutionalrelationshipsandthechangingmaterialforcesofproduction.7Statepowerwasthepowerofarulingclass,andclassconflictheregardedastheengineofhistoricalchange.Itwouldculminateinproletarian revolution tooverthrowcapitalismand thebourgeoisie.Betweencapitalismandcommunism therewouldbea ‘revolutionarydictatorshipof theproletariat’, but thatwould leadon to communism,which, in itshigherphase,

wouldtaketheformofaclassless,statelesssociety.8Thisdoctrinehasinspiredmany a revolutionary movement, some of which were successful inoverthrowingcapitalism,althoughnonecameclosetorealizingMarx’sdreamofa communist society. Although Marx played down the importance both ofleadersandofideas–classesratherthanindividualleaderswerewhatmatteredand ideologies were epiphenomena of socio-economic development, not ofautonomous significance – the international Communist movement in thetwentieth century, paradoxically but spectacularly, provided a refutation of hisdoctrine.IdeasmatteredagreatdealtosuchpeopleasLeninandMaoZedong,andtheseleadersinturnplayeddecisiverolesineffectingrevolutionarychangeand establishing Communist systems both within the largest country on earthandintheworld’smostpopulousstate.9

Not all revolutions are led by strong leaders. Some, indeed, are relativelyleaderless,althoughthatdoesnotlastforlongoncearevolutionhassucceededinoverthrowing the regime towhich it isopposed.What the leadersgetup toaftertherevolutionfiguresinsomecasesinthischapterandinothercasesinthenext,forit isstrikinghowoftenthoserevolutionaryleaderswhodomanagetooverturn an authoritarian regime go on to preside over one that is no lessauthoritarian,evenifdifferentlystructured.Sincepoliticalculturesarehardertochange overnight than political institutions, much may depend on the newleaderships’ political-cultural inheritance.A great deal depends also, however,on thevalues,politicalbeliefsandstyleof ruleof the top revolutionary leaderonce he (and it has been a male-dominated vocation) is ensconced ingovernmental office.Althoughno such leader starts offwith an entirelyblanksheet, hehas awider rangeof choicesopen tohim thanhas a leaderwithin aconsolidated democracy.Hemay, of course, be constrained by circumstances,both domestic and foreign, but is, by definition, far less constrained byinstitutionsandcustom.

THEMEXICANREVOLUTION

The revolutions in the twentieth centurywhich had the greatest global impactwere thosewhichbroughtCommunists topower.We shall come to them,andtheirleaders,laterinthechapter.TheRussianrevolutionsaside,therewerethreeother revolutions in the first quarter of the twentieth century of long-lastingsignificance–inMexico,ChinaandTurkey.TheMexicanrevolutionistheodd

oneout,notonlybecauseitwasmuchlesstheproductofanationalandculturalmovementthantheothertwobutalsobecausetherewasnooneleaderwhowasas distinctively significant in the revolutionary process aswas SunYat-sen inChinaor,stillmore,AtatürkinTurkey.

EricHobsbawmobservedthat‘itiswhentherelativelymodestexpectationsof everyday life look as if they cannot be achieved without revolutions, thatindividualsbecomerevolutionaries’.10Evenwherethisradicalizationoccurs,itdoesnotfollowthatarevolutionwillsucceed.TheMexicancase,though,isonewhere a deterioration in the already modest quality of life in the countrysideturnedmanypeasants into revolutionaries andwhere the revolution eventuallyprevailed.Itbeganin1910andinvolvedviolentstruggleoverthenextdecade.The authoritarian regime that provoked the popular uprisings was such thatreformist goals, it seemed, could be achieved only by revolutionarymethods.Theaimsincludedlandandlabourreform,accesstoeducation,andoppositiontoforeigneconomicdominationandexploitation.Thebulkofthefightingforcesofthe revolutionwere peasantswho had seen their standard of living fall in theimmediatelyprecedingyears.Therevolutionhadanumberofleaders,butratherthan forming a cohesive revolutionary movement, they were geographicallydispersed, politically heterogeneous, and during a decade of revolutionarywarandturmoiloftenengagedinfightingeachother.

The authoritarian ruler of Mexico at the time the revolution broke out in1910, Porfirio Diaz, had come to power in a coup (as had many of hisnineteenth-century predecessors). It was middle-class discontent with Diaz’sdictatorship that triggered themovement.Awealthy and idealistic landowner,Francisco Madero, fired the first shot. He demanded that Mexico’s 1857constitutionbeobserved,andheopposedDiazinthe1910presidentialelection.AfterDiaz hadwon a typically corrupt contest,Maderowas rewarded for hisaudacitybyaspellofimprisonment.Onhisrelease,insteadofreturningquietlytohisestates,hecalledinNovember1910fortheforcibleoverthrowoftheDiazregime. There was a ready response to this appeal, especially from the ruralpoor,someofthemindigenouspeopleswhohadbeendeprivedoftheirancestrallands,whilemostweremestizo(ofmixedethnicancestry).Theimmediategoalof the revolution, the removal of Diaz, was achieved when his adviserspersuadedhimtoresignin1911.

In a far freer election than that of the previous year,Madero was electedpresident.Thisdidnotputastoptotheviolence,forMaderowastooreformistfor the old regime and toomodest in the changes he introduced to satisfy the

forcesthathadbeenunleashedinruralareas.TheMaderopresidencywasendedbyamilitarycoup in1913andMaderohimselfwaskilled.Theharshmilitaryregimethatfolloweddidnot,however,halttherebellion.Localleaderswhohadbeenactiveintherevolutionarystrugglesince1911cametotheforeindifferentparts of the country, the most notable being Emiliano Zapata in the south ofMexico and Francisco (‘Pancho’) Villa in the north. Zapata had been amongthosedissatisfiedwithMadero,especiallyonaccountofhis failure instantly tohandbackconfiscatedlandtothepeasantry.BothZapataandVillawereskilledin guerrilla warfare and attracted armies of loyal followers. Their appeal waspopulist and egalitarian, although lacking national political ambitions andsophisticated ideological underpinning. While still fighting a guerrilla war,Zapatawas lured intoa trap in1919andshot.Villasurviveduntil1923, threeyearsaftertherevolutionarywarhadended,beforehe,too,wasassassinated.11

Therevolutionwasnotanimatedbyagreat idea in thewayinwhich threeother major revolutions of the first quarter of the century were. The Chineserevolutionofthesameperiodwasinspiredbytheideaofamodernizednation-state, the Turkish revolution spurred by concepts of Westernization andsecularization, and that of Russia in 1917 driven by the goal of overthrowingcapitalismaswellastheautocracyandbytheaspirationtobuildcommunism.InMexico itwas not somuch a vision of the future as a demand to restore pastrightsthathadbeenlostwhichturnedagriculturalworkersintorevolutionaries.The removal of local freedoms, the conversion of independent peasants intolandless labourers, and a growthof destitution in the countrysidewere stimulienoughforpeopletofight.TheMexicanrevolutionhad,then,relativelymodestgoals. Ithadnooneauthoritative leader, ‘nogreat intellectual fathers’,didnotclaimauniversalvalidity,andwasnotutopian.12

ItwasmuchlessanideologicalrevolutionthanthosewhichoccurredaroundthesametimeinChinaandTurkey,nottospeakofRussia.Ifitiscomparedwithone of the outstanding examples of radical change discussed in the previouschapter–thetransformationoftheSovietUnioninthesecondhalfofthe1980s–thecontrastisespeciallysharp.IntheSovietcase,therewas(asGorbachevputit) ‘revolutionary’ change by evolutionary and reformist means.13 Whathappened in Mexico was the obverse – reformist change by revolutionarymeans.14 Significant and concrete political and social innovation did, indeed,follow the decade of revolutionary turmoil and civil war when a post-revolutionaryregimewasestablishedin1920.Someofthechangewasnotwhat

the various revolutionary leaders intended. Their support had been local,regionalandpersonal.Theregimewhichwasestablishedwasmorecentralized,statist and bureaucratic. Nevertheless, the post-revolutionary governmentfacilitated agrarian reform and promoted secular education. New institutionswere created in the 1920s, among them an education ministry in 1921, thecentralBankofMexicoin1925,theNationalIrrigationCommissionin1926andthenewofficialpoliticalparty,thePNRin1929.15

Many of the old pre-revolutionary elite were ousted. The president whomadethemostsignificantmarkonMexicanpoliticsoftheearly1920s,ÁlvaroObregón, had been a supporter of the moderate reformer Madero and anopponentofZapataandVilla.Obregónwas,however,noslouchwhenitcametopopulistand radicalgestures.WhenheoccupiedMexicoCity in themiddleofthe revolutionary wars, at a time when the people were going hungry, hedistributedsomeoftheChurchwealthtothepoorandforcedrichmerchantstosweepthestreets.16BecomingpresidentinDecember1920,heputinplacenotonly educational and labour reform but anticlerical policies, which were,ultimately,andinthemostliteralsense,tobefatalforhim.Hisresponsetothedesire for greater national economic autonomy put him on a collision coursewiththeUnitedStates,whichrecognizedhisgovernmentonlyafterhepromisedin 1923 not to nationalizeAmerican oil companies.Obregónwas debarred bythenewrulesestablishedby the revolution fromseekinga secondconsecutivetermof office in the electionofDecember 1924, but returned to the fray fouryearslater.Hewasre-electedtothepresidency,butduringavictorycelebrationinMexicoCity hewas assassinated by aCatholic fanaticwho objected to hispoliciestowardstheChurch.

Thepointhasbeenmadealready that the leaderofacountry, immediatelyfollowingasuccessfulrevolution,generallyhasawideravailablerangeofpolicyoptionsthanhasapresidentorprimeministerwithinanestablisheddemocracy.Nevertheless,apost-revolutionaryleaderinMexicowasfarfromunconstrainedby factions,business interestsandsocial institutions,amongwhich theChurchloomedespeciallylarge.Butthesocialandeconomicpoliciespursuedwere,onthewhole,inlinewiththemainstrandsoftherevolutionarymovement.Nooneindividual leader made all the difference. Had another of the revolutionaryleadersemergedontop(PanchoVillacameclosetodoingso), theresult,AlanKnighthasargued, ‘wouldhavebeen– inbroad ideological terms–much thesame’.17

THECHINESEREVOLUTIONOF1911–12

TheChineserevolutionoflate1911andearly1912broughttoanendnotonlytheQingdynasty,whichhad lasted forwellover twoandahalfcenturies,butalso twothousandyearsof imperial rule.Chinabecamearepublic inFebruary1912whentheChinesecourtbowedtothestrengthof therevolutionaryforcesandannounced theabdicationof theboyemperor, the five-year-oldPuyi.Thisoutcome was a good illustration of de Tocqueville’s dictum that the mostdangerous time for an authoritarian regime is when it begins to reform itself.During the firstdecadeof the twentiethcenturysomesignificant reformswereintroduced. In 1905 the empress dowager Cixi sent a Chinese delegation toJapanand theUnitedStatesand to fiveEuropeancountries to studyhow theircountries were governed. Constitutional changes and also educational reformwere brought in, but the former did not noticeably reduce the power of theexisting elite or the latter significantly counteract the advantages that stillaccruedtowealthyfamilies.Moreover,thecourtandthegovernmentcontinuedtobedominatedbytheManchuminoritywhoformedtheQingdynasty,largelytotheexclusionoftheHanmajorityofChinese.Themostimportantreformwasthe creation of provincial assemblies in 1909 and a new tolerance of publicgatherings.18 From some of the most highly educated members of theseassembliescamecallsformorefar-reachingreform.

Aseriesofuprisingstookplaceinlate1911,ledbylocalarmycommanders.TherevoltsreflectedtheirangerattheextenttowhichChinahadfallenbehindJapan militarily and economically. They also made clear the anti-Qingnationalistsentimentsoftheseprovincialmilitaryleaders.ThebeliefthatChinabadlyneededtobemodernizedwasheldevenmorestronglybymanywithintheeducatedmiddle class, especially thosewho had studied abroad. Revolts tookplaceinoneregionafteranother,andbytheendoftheyeararepublichadbeendeclaredwith itsseatofgovernment in theoldsummercapital,Nanjing,whiletheimperialgovernmentremainedprecariouslyinplaceinBeijing.TheclosestapproximationChinahad toa ‘leaderof theopposition’wasSunYat-senwhofor many years, most of them spent abroad, had campaigned for an end toManchu rule and for the establishment of amodern republican government inChina. Sun was travelling in the United States when the Chinese revolutionbroke out and learned of the uprisings in his homeland from a newspaper inDenver. Rather than take the first boat back to China, Sunwent to Paris andLondon. His mission was to persuade European governments to preserve

neutralityastheconflictinChinaintensifiedandtowithholdfinancialassistanceto the imperial government. Arriving back in China on Christmas Day 1911,Sun’s status as the political and intellectual leader of the revolutionarymovement was underlined when he was chosen by delegates from sixteenprovincial assemblies, meeting in Nanjing, to be the country’s ‘provisionalpresident’.19

In November 1911 the Qing court had recalled to Beijing Yuan Shikai, acapable and ambitious military leader. Earlier he had antagonized the actingregent,PrinceChun,Puyi’sfather,andhadbeendismissedfromtheserviceofthecourt.ThedynastynowbelievedthatYuanwasthestrongmanbestequippedtowinthesupportoftherebelliousmilitarythroughoutthecountry–and,whereunabletodoso,tocrushthem.AppointedpremierinNovember1911,heformedacabinetcomposedmainlyofhisownfollowers.ThecourtwasdividedbetweenthosewhothoughtthegamewasupfortheManchudynastyandthosewhowerecounting on Yuan Shikai to preserve it. Yuan himself became increasinglyunwilling to share power with the imperial dynasty – or, subsequently, withanyoneelse.Anumberofassassinationsofroyalists,whichYuanwassuspectedofencouraging,aswellas thepresencenowofmoreHan troops thanManchuforces in Beijing, tilted the balance against thosewhowished to preserve theimperial throne. The abdication of the child emperor, and thus the end of thedynasty,wasannouncedon12February1912.20

SunYat-senhadalreadybeenchosenasprovisionalpresident,buthedidnothave forces at his disposal at all comparable with the number under thecommand ofYuan Shikai. Rather than prolong a period of ‘dual power’, Sunheld on to his ‘presidential’ status for only six weeks before persuading thedelegatestoaNationalCouncil,whichhadbeenconvenedinNanjing,tochooseYuanasthecountry’sprovisionalpresident.ForSun,however,the‘provisional’qualification was important. He was in favour of both post-revolutionaryconstitutionalgovernmentandthepartialdemocratizationofChina.ThedrawingupofadraftconstitutionwascompletedbyMarch1912andpreparationsmadefor parliamentary elections – both for aSenate to be chosenby the provincialassembliesandforadirectlyelectedHouseofRepresentativestobeformedonthebasisofonememberforevery800,000people.TheinfluenceofthepoliticalsystemoftheUnitedStateswasevident,sincetheSenatewastobenumericallythe smaller body with each Senator serving for a six-year term, whereas theHouseofRepresentativeswouldbemuch larger,with itsmembers serving for

onlyhalf as longbefore facing re-election.The electoral rules fell a longwayshortofembracingdemocracy.Womenweredisenfranchisedandtherewasalsoa significant property qualification. It was calculated that about forty millionmen,atthattimesome10percentofthepopulation,wouldbeabletovote.21

Theelectioncould,nevertheless,havebeenanimportantfirststeponaroadto democracy. It was, at least, less undemocratic than any election that hassubsequently been held onmainlandChina (as distinct fromTaiwan in recentdecades).SunYat-senhadconvertedhisRevolutionaryAllianceintoapoliticalparty,theKuomintang.TheKMT,asthisNationalistpartywasknown,wasledin the electoral contest by a talented young politician, Song Jiaoren. He hadserved under Sun Yat-sen within the Revolutionary Alliance while they werebothinexile.AlthoughalliedwithSun,Songwasnotanuncriticalfollower.Theyounger man and the older leader differed on constitutional issues. Songfavoured an essentially parliamentary system inwhichparliament and a primeministerwouldbefarmorepowerfulthanthepresidentwhowouldbeapurelyformalheadof state.Sun,however, aspired to return to thepresidencyhehadbriefly andprovisionallyheld, this timewith full constitutional legitimacy.Hehadnodesiretobeamerefigureheadafterthepartyhehadfoundedhadbecomeelectorallysuccessful.22

Thelastexpectationturnedouttobewellfoundedwhentheelectionresultswereannounced inJanuary1913.Fourpoliticalpartieshad takenpart,and theKMTemergedinbothhousesasbyfarthelargest,albeitjustshortofanoverallmajority.ItseemedevidentthattheKuomintangwouldhavethemajorsayinthecompositionofanewgovernmentandinthechoiceofpremier.TheexpectationwasthatthechoiceofthelatterwouldfalluponSongJiaoren,giventhathehadledthemostsuccessfulparty.However,whenhewasstandingontheplatformofShanghairailwaystationinMarch1913,abouttoboardatrainforBeijingandtalks with Yuan on the formation of a government, he was approached by agunmanandshot.Twodayslaterhediedinhospital.Itwasgenerallybelievedthat Yuan, who had no desire to share his recently acquired authority, wasbehindtheassassination.23

At any rate, Yuan lost little time in acquiring authoritarian power.Throughout 1913 the police, on his orders, harassed KMT members ofparliamentand theirsupporters,and inJanuary1914heformallydissolved theparliament,followingthisupinFebruarywith thedissolutionof theprovincialassemblies.In1915heevenmadeanattempttohavehimselfchosenasemperor

and thereby become the founder of a new dynasty. A hand-picked‘RepresentativeAssembly’unanimouslybeggedhimtoacceptthatoffice.This,however,alienatedsomeofhissupportinthecapital,andtherewerelarge-scaleprotests in the provinces, many of which proceeded to declare theirindependencefromBeijing.Yuandiedofnaturalcausesthefollowingyearandhisdeathwas followedby severalyearsofchaos inwhich regional ‘warlords’(some of whom had formerly been loyal to Yuan) held sway. With Chinadivided, its central governmentwasweak both administratively andmilitarily.Thisdidnothing tohelp its cause at theVersaillesPeaceConference in1919,followingtheFirstWorldWar.ThevictoriousAlliespaidlipservicetoChineseinterests but in the end treatedChina shabbily.Economic concessions that theGermanshadenjoyedbeforethewarweretransferredtotheJapanese,andJapanwasalsograntedtherighttostationtroopsintwoChineseprovinces.24

ProtestsinChinaagainsttheweaknessofitsowngovernmentinfaceoftheVersaillesvictors’high-handeddisregardforChinesesovereigntybeganwithademonstrationbysome3,000studentsinBeijingon4May1919.Thatparticularprotestendedwithsomeofthestudentsransackingandsettingfiretothehomeofagovernmentministerwhohad,intheirview,madehumiliatingconcessionsto Japan.Anotherprominentpoliticianwasbadlybeaten, aswere someof thestudents(oneofwhomdiedofhisinjuries)bythepolice.Thestudents’actionsgaveanameoflastingresonancetothemuchbroadercurrentofcriticalthoughtwhichwasalreadydiscernibleinChinesesociety.ItbecameknownastheMayFourthmovement.25Manyof its leading thinkerswereassociatedwithPekingUniversity.*

Just as the revolutionary events of 1911 unfoldedwithout any one personacquiringtheroleofleader(withtheveryimportantexceptionofSunYat-senonhis American and European political missions), the same applied to theMayFourth movement. Following Yuan’s death and the lapse into regionalwarlordism, the main national leader was a military man, Duan Qirui, whobecame premier in 1916. Although he had earlier been promoted by YuanShikhai and had served him loyally, he did not support Yuan’s bid to turnhimself into an emperor.26 In the face ofYuan Shikai’s severe crackdown in1913(DuanQiruiwasactingpremieratthetime),SunYat-senhadbeenforcedintoexileagain,returningtoChinaonlyafterYuan’sdeathin1916.Duringhislatestsojournabroad,heturnedtheKuomintangintoahierarchical,disciplinedpartywithapremiumplacedonpersonalloyaltytohim.Thenextrevolution,he

argued,wouldbemilitary in the first instance, and thatwouldbe followedby‘tutelage’oftheChinesepeople.Onlyafterthisprocesshadrunitscoursewouldthe population as a whole be ready for self-government under a republicanconstitution.27 Although Sun was no Communist, the Bolshevik Revolutionmade an impact onhim, as it did onother revolutionary activists inChina. Inlightof theshamefultreatmentChinahadreceivedatVersailles,andEuropeanpowers’ preoccupation with protecting their economic interests in China, Sunwaswilling to seekcooperationwith thenewSoviet leadership.They, in turn,whilenotbelievingthatChinawasripeforSoviet-style‘socialism’,werehappyto promote cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists led by Sun and thenewlyformedChineseCommunistParty.TheBolsheviks’desiretosupportanti-imperial, revolutionary forces inChinawas inharmonywithconsiderationsofrealpolitik,sinceafriendlyChinawouldbeausefulSovietallyvis-à-visJapan.IntheRusso-Japanesewarof1904-05,theJapanesehademergedvictorious,andthough thiscouldbeblamedon theweaknessof thepre-revolutionaryRussianregime,ithadleftitsmarkontheconsciousnessalsooftheBolsheviks.

From1920SunYat-senwassettingforthhiscentralideas,which,ashetriedto broaden the appeal of his political party, he called the Three People’sPrinciples. These were nationalism, democracy and ‘people’s livelihood’. Allthreeweresomewhatproblematicalorambiguous.Thefirstwastheclearest,forSundid,indeed,headaNationalistparty.FromhisreturntoChinain1916,hewas attempting to promote the unification of China and to bring an end towarlordism. The problem lay in the fact that, though there was a large Hanmajority in China, there were, as Sun acknowledged, other nationalities withrights aswell. Itwas alsonot entirely clearwhatSunmeantbydemocracy (itwas certainly not much practised within the Kuomintang). It is, moreover,arguablethatChinawasnotreadyforfullyfledgeddemocracyatthetime,andSun’ssupportforarestrictedfranchiseandaperiodof‘tutelage’oftheChinesepeople reflected that view. The third principle is sometimes translated as‘socialism’butmore literally as ‘people’s livelihood’. It reflectedSun’sdesirenotonly to raise the standardof livingbut also topromote someequalization,includinginthesizeoflandholdings.28During1921Sunwasgrantedthetitleof‘president’byremnantsoftheshort-livedBeijingparliament,butthiswasfarfromreceivingcountry-widerecognition.BasedforthemostpartinCanton,thecapitalcityofhisnativeprovince,Sunremained,inhislastyears,theundisputedleaderoftheNationalistparty,buthehadverylittlesupportfromthewarlords

amongwhom the countrywas divided. Soon after he took part in a ‘nationalreconstructionconference’inBeijinginNovember1924,Sundiscoveredthathehad terminal cancer, from which he died, at the age of fifty-nine, in March1925.29

SunYat-sen,whocame fromanunprivilegedpeasant family, had a strongsenseofhisabilitytoleadandapersonalitythatattractedadherents.Althoughheplayednopart in thebreakoutofrevolutionin1911andneverpresidedoveraunified Chinese state, he is, nevertheless, justly regarded as one of the mainfoundingfathersbothof therevolutionandof therepublicofChina. Itwashewhoinsistedthatrevolutionwastheappropriatewaytobringaboutchangeatatimewhen thereweremanywith a preference for a reformist constitutionalistcourse. With his higher education and his knowledge of English, he was aneffectiveinternationalrepresentativeoftheforcesinChinaseekinganendtotheQing dynasty and the creation of a modern republic. He was the principalfounder of theKuomintang, theNationalist political partywhich, under Sun’ssuccessor,ChiangKai-shek,wastodominateChinauntiltheCommunistscametopowerin1949.*Althoughnotasauthoritarianashissuccessor–and,indeed,anadvocateofdemocracyinprinciple–Sunwasareformingandmodernizing,but hardly democratic, leader. He remained somewhat aloof from the MayFourth political and intellectual current. In the words of a recent historian ofmodern China, ‘he generally disapproved of any movement he could notcontrol’.30ThatSunisstillregardedinhishomelandastheprincipalleaderofthefirstofthetwogreatChineserevolutionsofthetwentiethcenturyunderlinesthefactthatrevolutionaryleadershipdoesnotnecessarilymeanleadingachargeoverthebarricadesatthemomentaregimefalls,buttakesmanydifferentforms.

ATATÜRKANDTHETURKISHREVOLUTION

Bornin1881,MustafaKemal–betterknownasAtatürk(meaningfatheroftheTurks),atitleheofficiallyadoptedfrom1934–tookpart inthe‘YoungTurk’revolution of 1908 against the unconstitutional rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II.Although not yet the leader of the opposition to the sultanate, he alreadyharbouredtheambitiontoplay thatroleandto leadhiscountry.Asafarfromteetotalyoungarmyofficer,hetoldafriendinthecourseofonedrinkingsessionthat he would make him prime minister. ‘And what will you be?’ was his

friend’sresponse.‘Themanwhoappointsprimeministers,’repliedKemal.31Ina letter toawomanfriend in1918,hewrote: ‘If Ieveracquiregreatauthorityandpower, I think that Iwould introduceat a single stroke the transformationneeded in our social life . . . After spending so many years acquiring highereducation, enquiring into civilized social life and getting a taste for freedom,why should I descend to the level of common people? Rather, I should raisethemtomylevel.Theyshouldbecomelikeme,notIlikethem.’32Inthelightofsuchsentiments, it isunsurprisingthatTurkeyunderAtatürkdidnotbecomeademocracybut,rather,arelativelyenlightenedauthoritarianregime.

Atatürkhaddistinguishedhimself asa soldierduring theFirstWorldWar,whenTurkeyfoughtontheGermanside,andheledthecampaignintheyearsimmediately following against Allied control of Turkey and against Greekoccupation of part of the country.Throughout 1919 he gathered together bothnationalist army officers and various independent groups that had risenspontaneously to protest against the Allied occupation, and succeeded inconsolidating them intoamovementofnational resistance.33By1920hewaselectedheadofgovernmentbytheTurkishGrandNationalAssemblywhichhehad convened, and a newTurkish statewas proclaimed in January 1921 afterAtatürkhadarranged for theministersof thepreviousOttomangovernment tobe,ineffect,kidnapped.Althoughhewastoestablishfriendlyrelationswiththeleaders of the new Soviet state, Atatürk was nomore sympathetic to TurkishCommuniststhanhewastothetraditionalauthorities.AnumberofCommunistswereshotin1922withAtatürk’sacquiescence.34

Thiswasarevolutionnotonlybecauseitinvolvedtheviolentoverthrowofthepre-existing stateauthoritiesbut inasmuchas it alsoaltered the ideologicalfoundationofthestate.ItputanendtotheinstitutionsthathadprevailedwhenTurkeywasattheheartoftheOttomanempire.Boththetraditionalpoliticalandthereligiousauthorities–thesultanateandthecaliphate–werereplaced.(Therewasanelementofcontinuity,evenso.TheTurkishnationalists,whilebelievingthattheattempttosustainanempirehadbeenmisguidedandthatthesultanshadstoodin thewayofprogress,drewon theOttomanbureaucracyandespeciallythe army as linchpins of their new state.35) The sultanate was not instantlyabolished, but by the autumn of 1922 Atatürk, strengthened by the militaryvictoryovertheGreeks,wasmovingtogetridoftheremainingdomesticcurbsonhis authority.Hehad the support of thegovernmentof theGrandNationalAssemblyinAnkara,whichwieldedrealpower,whilethesultanstillheadedthe

remnants of the Ottoman government in Istanbul. Atatürk announced:‘Sovereignty and kingship are never decided by academic debate. They areseizedbyforce.TheOttomandynastyappropriatedbyforcethegovernmentoftheTurks,andreignedoverthemforsixcenturies.NowtheTurkishnationhaseffectively gained possession of its sovereignty.’He hoped that thiswould beagreed.If itwasnot, thefactswouldstillprevail‘butsomeheadsmayroll’.36Thesultanatewasdulyabolishedand thesultanhimselfwent intoexilebeforetheendof1922.ThefollowingyeartheRepublicofTurkeywasproclaimedandAtatürkbecameitsfirstpresident.

The religiousauthority– thecaliphate–wasallowed to survive for longerthan the sultanate.However, by 1924Atatürk argued that the religious leader,the caliph, was doing what the sultan had done – listening to critics of thegovernment and being in touchwith the representatives of foreign powers. InearlyMarchthepalaceofCaliphAbdülmecidwassurroundedbypoliceandthebuilding’stelephoneswerecutoff.Thecaliphdeemeditprudenttoannouncehisresignation,althoughherescindedthatstatementassoonashehadcrossedfromTurkeyintoBulgaria.Itdidhimnogood.HeneversetfootinTurkeyagainand,following his death in 1944, his descendants’ requests to have his remainsreturned to Turkey were rejected.37 The abolition of the caliphate, however,contributedtoadeteriorationinrelationsbetweenTurksandtheKurdishcitizensofthenewstate.Kurdsconstituted20percentofthepopulation,andputtinganend to the caliphate removed an important religious symbol that had beencommontobothTurksandKurds.38

Atatürk was both the intellectual and the military leader of the Turkishrevolution. Itwasone inwhich ideaswere important and the ideasofAtatürkaboveall.HewasverymuchaWesternizer,althoughtherewassometimesagapbetween ideals and behaviour. The rise of Kurdish nationalism – a newphenomenon – in the first quarter of the twentieth century posed a seriouschallenge to the idea of a Turkish nation-state. Promises of autonomy for theKurds,madebyAtatürkandotherTurkishnationalistsduringtheindependencestruggle,werenotkept,andKurdish rebellions in themid-1920swerebrutallysuppressed.39Moreover,Atatürk’srespectfordemocracyinprincipleledtonomore than half-hearted attempts to introduce it. They were aborted when itbecameclearthatthecreationofpartiesotherthanhisownPeople’sParty(laterthe Republican People’s Party) would lead to frustration of his wishes andreforms. In other respects, however, the Westernization was real. Atatürk’s

principalbiographer,AndrewMango,notesaseriesofdecisionsthat‘amountedto a cultural revolution’.40 Secular rule replaced religious hegemony and ofparticularimportancewasthesecularizationoftheeducationalsystem.Religiouscourts,whichhadadjudicatedonmarriageanddivorce,werecloseddown.Theban on alcohol, which Atatürk had conspicuously ignored even while it wasoperative,wasended.

The emancipation of women was greatly advanced, although Atatürkunilaterallydivorcedhisownwife ina traditionalmanner.Women in interwarTurkey acquired equal inheritance rights and new educational and careeropportunities.UnderAtatürk’srule,womenwerealsodiscouraged,althoughnotbanned, from wearing the veil.41 In foreign policy, Atatürk combinednationalism and anti-imperialism with a cautiously pragmatic neutrality. Therevolution which he led, and the secular norms which it established, outlivedhim.Followinghisdeathin1938,İsmetİnönü–whohadbeenforeignministerand subsequentlyprimeminister throughoutmostof theAtatürkera–becamepresidentandcarriedforwardthemodernizationprocess.HewentmuchfurtherthanAtatürkinonecrucialrespect,presidingoverthecountry’sdemocratization.Thefirstfreeelectionsinthehistoryoftherepublicwereheldin1950andwhenthe Republican People’s Party were defeated, İsmet accepted the result withgoodgrace.42

COMMUNISTREVOLUTIONSINEUROPE

TheRussianRevolutionsof1917

Fewcoulddoubtthatoneofthepivotaleventsofthetwentiethcenturywasthe‘Russian revolution’ of 1917. By the end of that year Communists had takenpowerinthelargestcountryontheplanet,andtheSovietstatethatemergedoverthefollowingyearswas tohavean immense impactonworldpoliticsover thenext seven decades, especially from the Second World War onwards. Therewere,though,twoquitedistinctrevolutionsinRussiain1917whichshouldnotbe conflated. They became known as the February andOctober revolutions –somewhatconfusingly,sinceaccordingtotheWesterncalendartheytookplacein March and November.43 The strikes and demonstrations that marked thebeginningofthefirstofRussia’s1917revolutionswerelaunchedon8March–

InternationalWomen’sDay.44Thattimingwasnotcoincidental,fortheprotestsbeganwith awalkout from the textilemills of Petrograd bywomenworkers,whodeliberatelychosethisparticulardatetomakepublictheirangeraboutthewarand theirownhardships.Events thenmovedquickly. It tookonlyanotherweekbeforethetsaristautocracyhadcollapsed.

The revolution came as a complete surprise to Vladimir Lenin who was,however,tobethemostinfluentialadvocateofasecondrevolutioninthesameyear and instrumental in ensuring that it would bring Communists – not acoalition of liberals and socialists or even a coalition of different types ofsocialist–topower.RightlyregardedastheprincipalfounderoftheSovietstate,Lenin was a sufficiently orthodox Marxist to believe in the inevitability ofsocialist revolution and enough of a revolutionary by temperament andconvictiontodevotehisentireadultlifetospeedingupthatprocess.Yetatthebeginning of 1917 Leninwas far from sanguine about the prospects for earlysuccess.InexileinSwitzerland,headdressedameetingofworkersinZurichinJanuary 1917 and said: ‘We of the older generation may not live to see thedecisivebattlesofthiscomingrevolution.’45AtthattimeLeninwasagedonlyforty-six.

RussiahadsufferedhugelossesintheFirstWorldWar,aconflictwhichhadbecome increasinglyunpopular, especially among thosewhobore thebruntofthe fighting– the ‘peasants inuniform’,asLenincalled them.TheBolsheviks(renamedCommunistPartyin1918)–thesectionoftheRussianrevolutionarymovementwhichLenin led – played little part in theFebruary revolution, fortheir leadingrankshadbeendepletedby imprisonmentandexile.46Therehadbeen growing opposition to the tsarist government on the part both of liberalsand of a range of socialist parties and factions. Although the Bolsheviks hadsignificantworker support in the capital city, Petrograd (as St Petersburgwasthencalled),theywerefarfrombeingthemostwidelyapprovedpoliticalpartynationally.Thepartywith the largest number ofmembers aswell as themostpopular–aswasshowninNovember1917inRussia’sfirstfullyfreeelection,whichturnedoutalsotobethecountry’slastdemocraticelectionformorethanseventy years – was the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) whose appeal wasprimarilytothepeasantry.47

Thedecisiveactionof the revolutions,however– thoseofbothMarchandNovember–tookplaceinPetrograd.Peasants,onlearningwhathadhappenedinthecapital,alsoassertedthemselvesandbeganredistributinglandtothosewho

worked on it. Bread shortages combined with war weariness to increase thegeneraldiscontentwiththetsaristregime.Ithadbeengatheringmomentumoverseveraldecades,but in thefirstquarterof1917reachedthepointofnoreturn.Mass walkouts from factories culminated in a general strike, which broughtPetrograd to a standstill. The Duma, a legislature with limited powers andrestrictedsuffragethathadbeensetupfollowinganearlierrevolutionin1905,attempted to mediate between the demonstrators and the government, but thetsar,NicholasII,didnotrespondtotheircallfortheformationofagovernmentthatcouldcommandtheDuma’sconfidence.48

TheFebruaryrevolutionwasabriefmomentofcooperationbetweenliberaland radical opponents of the tsarist autocracy.ASoviet ofWorkers’Deputies(‘soviet’ issimplytheRussianwordforcouncil)hadexistedbrieflyduringtherevolutionaryturmoilof1905anditwastoberesurrectedinPetrogradin1917.Conscious of the support this body could attract from within the army, itsmembers renamed it the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. On thefourthdayof the strikesanddemonstrationsagainst theold regime, thepolicemade many arrests and hundreds of people were killed or wounded whensoldiers fired on the crowds. But by the following day many regiments hadmutinied and in Petrograd alone sixty-five thousand troops had joined therebellion.49 Losing the support of the army left the old regime powerless. Amajority ofministers in the tsarist governmentwere arrested, andNicholas IIabdicatedon15March1917.Heandhiswife,togetherwiththeirfourdaughtersandhaemophiliacson,wereputunderhousearrest; theywouldbeshotby theBolsheviksintheUralscityofEkaterinburginJuly1918.

A provisional government was formed, composed mainly of liberals whowere critics of the incompetence as well as the authoritarianism of the oldregime. They sought to introduce constitutional government and to movetowards democratic elections for aConstituentAssembly.A socialist but anti-Communist member of that government, Aleksandr Kerensky had been,unusually,amemberofboththeDumaandthePetrogradsoviet.Hewastobejoined by other socialists – Mensheviks and SRs – in May, as the coalitiongovernmentwasbroadened.50Animpressiveorator,KerenskywassuccessivelyintheshortperiodbetweenMarchandNovemberministerof justice(inwhichcapacityhefreedallpoliticalprisoners),ministerofwar,and(fromJuly)primeminister.At this timeof turmoil, his biggest handicapwashis commitment tocontinue fighting the war alongside Russia’s allies. Lenin and the Bolsheviks

hadopposedthewarfromtheoutsetandwerepreparedtosignaseparatepeacewith Germany to get out of it. Indeed, Lenin’s desire to end Russia’sparticipationinthatwarledtheGermanHighCommandtofacilitatehisreturnfromSwitzerland toRussia.A sealed railwaycarriagewasprovided, inwhichLenin travelled through Germany, along with some of his comrades, to theFinland Station in Petrograd. He immediately set about undermining theprovisional government, calling on thosewhowelcomedhimnot to cooperatewithit.TheperiodbetweenthetwoRussianrevolutionsof1917becameknownasoneof ‘dualpower’,as thesoviets (especially thePetrogradsoviet)and theprovisionalgovernmenteachclaimedasuperiorauthority.

AmongtheslogansLeninhadcoinedonthejourneybacktoRussia,aspartofwhat he called hisAprilTheses,was that of ‘peace, land, and bread’.ThisbroadenedtheBolsheviks’appeal,andthecallforunilateralwithdrawalfromthewar and forcible redistribution of land distinguished the Bolshevik positionclearlyfromthatoftheprovisionalgovernment.Withtheaimofwrestingpowerfrom this new and precarious government, Lenin also included in his AprilThesestheslogan,‘Allpowertothesoviets!’Hewas,atthesametime,cautiousaboutthatoutcome.Inparticular,hedidnotwishsuchapowertransfertooccuruntiltheBolshevikshadamajorityinthePetrogradsoviet.Intheearlymonthsfollowing the February revolution, the executive committee of the Petrogradsovietwas dominated byMensheviks and SRs.51 Itwas not until the autumnthattheBolshevikshadamajorityinboththePetrogradandtheMoscowsoviets,andfromthatmomentLeninwasreadyforimmediateinsurrection.Therewas,however, far freerdiscussion in1917withinhisparty thanwas tobe the casethroughout almost thewhole of the Soviet period, and theCentralCommitteeinitially rejected Lenin’s argument that the time was ripe for the Bolshevikseizure of power because the working class was now firmly on the party’sside.52

IftheFebruaryrevolutionwasacombinationofspontaneousunrestandthewithdrawalofsupport for theautocracyon thepartofasubstantialpartof theelite,withnoonepersonorgroupoverwhelminglyresponsiblefortheoutcome,the same could not be said of the October revolution. Lenin, as the mostauthoritative of the Bolsheviks, played a more decisive role than any otherrevolutionary,butLeonTrotsky’sparticipationwasalsoofmajor significance.Trotsky had earlier kept his distance from both the Bolsheviks and theMensheviks,but in1917 joinedforceswithLenin.Hebelieved thatLeninhad

come round to his view of ‘permanent revolution’ by abandoning the moreacademicMarxist precept that a lengthyperiodof ‘bourgeois democratic’ rulewouldberequired,followingabourgeoisrevolution(which, in their terms, theFebruary revolution was).53 Trotsky matched both Lenin’s intellectual powerand his ingenuity as a revolutionary. Like Lenin, he also possessed enormousself-belief. (Trotsky was, however, to be outmanoeuvred in the intra-partypoliticsof the1920sbya less intellectually sophisticated,but craftier and stillmore ruthlessmember of the Bolsheviks’ ruling group, Josif Stalin.) Just likeLenin,Trotskyhadbeentakenbysurprisebythesuddennessofthecollapseofthe tsarist regime. Whereas Lenin had been in Switzerland in March 1917,Trotsky was in New York, as were two other leading Bolsheviks, NikolayBukharin,andtheonlywomanwhowastobecomeaprominentmemberofthefirstBolshevik government,AlexandraKollontai.Members of their partywhodidnotgo intoexilehadbeen roundedup in1914because theBolsheviksnotonlyopposedthewarwithGermany,butalsohopedforaGermanvictory.TheyarguedthatitwouldspeeduptherevolutionifRussiaweretobedefeated.54

TheBolsheviks suffereda setback in July1917whennewspapers reportedthatLeninwasaGermanagent.SinceLeninhad,indeed,usedGermanhelptogetback intoRussia fromSwitzerland, theaccusationwasdamaging,althoughin essence absurd. It coincided, however, with a move by some Bolsheviks,which Lenin had considered premature, to seize power,with twenty thousandsailors from the Kronstadt naval base joining workers in this demand. Theprovisionalgovernment,albeittemporarily,cameoutontop.Armedclashesleftsomefourhundredpeopledead.Lenin,endangeredbothbytheseeventsandbythe supposed German connection, went once again into exile, this time inFinland.Trotskywastemporarilyimprisoned,whileStalingainedinsignificanceby remaining the most senior of the Bolsheviks still to be in Russia and atlarge.55

Bytheautumnof1917 theBolshevikshadamajoritywithin thePetrogradsovietandTrotskyhadbeenchosenasitsleader.HeregardedthesovietasthemostappropriateinstrumentoftherevolutionwhichwouldbringtheBolsheviks(apartyhehadformallyjoinedonlyinAugust1917)topower.Lenin’ssloganof‘All power to the soviets’ had been coined primarily to undermine theprovisionalgovernmentratherthanbecausehesharedTrotsky’sfirmbeliefthatthesovietratherthantheBolshevikpartyshouldorganizetheseizureofthereinsofgovernment.Lenin’soverwhelmingconcernwastoensurethattheBolsheviks

wouldhavenothinglessthanfullpower.AttheFirstCongressofSoviets,heldin June 1917, when the Bolsheviks did not yet have a majority within thatnationalbodyandhadnotemergedvictoriousinanyelectionofconsequence,hemade this clear in an unexpected answer to a rhetorical question. One of thespeakershadasked,assumingthattheanswerinthenegativewastooobvioustoneedstating,whether in theprevailingconditionsofRussiaanypoliticalpartywas capable of taking power on its own. Lenin called out: ‘There is such aparty.’56 His political boldness was not entirely matched by his personalconduct in the run-up to theBolshevik revolution,which erred on the side ofcaution – perhaps because he was convinced of his indispensability once therevolution had succeeded. Even after the provisional government had releasedthe Bolsheviks arrested in July, Lenin remained in Finland for several moreweeks,whileurginghiscomradesinwritingthatthetimehadcomeforanarmeduprising.TheBolshevik leadershipweredividedabout thewisdomof this,butwhensomeofthempublishedtheirdisagreementwiththepolicyinnewspapers,italertedthegovernmenttothelikelihoodofanotherrevolutionaryinsurrection.Since the authorities had been forewarned, more of the Bolsheviks came tobelievethatitwouldbedangeroustopostponetheseizureofpower.57

TheMilitary-RevolutionaryCommittee of the Petrograd soviet, which hadbeencreatedtoorganizeresistancetoathreatinAugustofmilitarydictatorshipunderthecommandofGeneralLavrKornilov,becamethechoseninstrumentoftheBolshevik insurrection.Lenincameoutofhidingonlyon thenightof6–7November (or24–25October, according to theRussian calendar in1917).Onthe sixth, the forces deployed by the Military-Revolutionary Committee hadtakenoverstrategicpointsinthecapitalandon7November(theanniversaryofwhich was celebrated with great fanfare throughout the Soviet period), theyseizedtheWinterPalacewhereameetingoftheprovisionalgovernmentwasinprogress.Kerenskyescapedandlivedabroadfortherestofhislife.(HediedinNewYorkin1970attheageofninety-one.Stalinwaslatertoensurethatmanyoftherevolution’svictors–hisfellowBolshevikswhotookpartintheseizureofpower – lived far shorter lives than the premier they forcibly ousted inNovember1917.)

Trotsky had more to do than had Lenin with the actual organization andimplementation of the Bolshevik revolution, but it was Lenin who had moreinfluence than anyone else on the power structure and ideology of the newregime. Although sometimes regarded as no more than a coup, this was a

revolutionasdefinedearlierinthechapter.Itledtoachangeofboththepoliticaland the economic system, achieved through violent insurrection, and withsubstantial (albeit not majority) popular backing. And it led to a regime thatrested on a new ideological basis for its legitimacy. Soviets had spreadthroughout Russia during 1917 and a national congress had elected a centralexecutive committee to represent them. For ordinarymembers of soviets, thatbody appeared to be the obvious replacement for the provisional governmentuntilsuchtimeasagovernmentemergedfollowingtheelectionforaConstituentAssembly, to be held inNovember 1917. (The date of that election had beendecidedbeforetheBolshevikseizureofpower.)This,however,didnothappen.The Bolshevik leadership had other ideas. When the new government wasannounced,itwascalledtheCouncilofPeople’sCommissars(whichhadamorerevolutionaryringtoitthanCouncilofMinisters,themoreconventionalnameitwasgivenin1946),anditconsistedentirelyofBolsheviks.Leninbecameheadof the government, Trotsky the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs andStalinPeople’sCommissarforNationalities.

In theelectionfor theConstituentAssembly,non-Communistsocialistsdidmuch better than the party led by Lenin. As a leading historian of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union put it: ‘Half the country voted forsocialism but against bolshevism.’58 Such democratic niceties did not troubleLenin or Trotsky. When the Constituent Assembly held its first session anddefeatedtheBolsheviksinavote, theBolshevikdelegatesandtheleftwingofthe socialist revolutionaries withdrew from the Assembly. The following dayBolshevik Red Guards stopped the remaining delegates – the majority of theassembly’smembers– fromentering thebuilding,and thatwas theendof theConstituentAssembly.Lenin had opted for one-party authoritarian rule. SomeBolsheviksdidfavourabroadercoalitionandagreaterroleforthesoviets,buteventhoughsovietsweretoremainpartoftheconstitutionalform,aswellasthename, of what from 1922was called theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSRorSovietUnion),theseinstitutionsneverregainedthepowertheybrieflywieldedin1917.

Until1921theBolshevikswerefightingacivilwar,inwhichtheyultimatelyprevailed,againstopponentsoftheirrevolution.BothsidesactedruthlesslyandasearlyasDecember1917theBolshevikscreatedanAll-RussianExtraordinaryCommission for Fighting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, which becamebetter known as theCheka. In later incarnations itwas knownunder differentsetsofRussianinitials,amongthemtheOGPU,theNKVDandtheKGB.The

Bolshevik victory in the civil war owed much to superior leadership, that ofTrotsky(who inMarch1918becamewarcommissar)andofLeninasheadofthegovernmentandprincipalideologist.

Boththeeconomicandthepoliticalsystemswererapidlychanged.Industryand the banks were nationalized and, in place of the somewhat anarchicdemocracyof1917,therewaspoliticalrepressionnotonlyofthosewhowouldhavelikedareturntotsaristrulebutalsoofnon-Bolsheviksocialists.Leninwasreadytomaketactical retreats ineconomicpolicywhenconfrontedbypopularunrest, as he did with his New Economic Policy, launched in 1921, whichlegalized small-scale private manufacturing and private trade. He made clear,however, that this did not involve political tolerance of Mensheviks or othercritics.Leninsufferedastrokein1922and,followinggrowingincapacity,diedin January 1924. In the last two years of his lifemajor levers of powerweremoving from the government (the Council of People’s Commisars) to theCentralCommittee of the Party and the Secretariat that headed it. ItsGeneralSecretary fromApril 1922was Stalinwho had been chosenwith Lenin’s fullapproval.Bytheendofthe1920sStalinhadputanendtothepartialeconomicliberalization–themixedeconomythatprevailedthroughoutmostofthedecade– and proceeded with the compulsory collectivization of agriculture, whichcaused immense suffering, including famine.By the early 1930snot onlywasthe dictatorship of the Communist Party fully established, but it wasaccompaniedbyStalin’sdictatorshipoverthepartyaswellasovereveryotherinstitutionwithinthesociety.WhereasLeninhadnothesitatedtoemployterroror toorderexecutionswhendealingwithopponentsofBolshevism,Stalinhadno compunction about using the same methods against real and imaginedenemieswithintheBolshevikranks.Healsosought,andincreasinglygained,asupremeleadershiprolewithintheinternationalCommunistmovement.

CommunistRevolutionsinSouth-EasternEurope

A majority of Communist states in Europe either were essentially Sovietcreations–aswasthecasealsoofthefirstAsiancountrytoadoptaCommunistregime, Mongolia, in the 1920s – or were formed with important Sovietparticipation. The rise of Communism in Eastern Europe was very much aconsequenceof theSecondWorldWarandof the successof theSoviet army,

which played a far greater part than the armed forces of any other country indefeating Hitler’s Germany in the land war. The two countries where theCommunist seizureofpowerwasmost clearly an indigenous revolution ratherthan a Soviet imposition were in south-eastern Europe – Yugoslavia andAlbania, although Yugoslav Communists gave important assistance to theAlbanianCommunistParty,andseriousconsiderationwasgiventoamergerofthetwocountriesinaconfederationorevenfederalunion.InbothcountriestheCommunist Party used the major parts they played in the wartime resistancemovementasameansoffurtheringtheirrevolutionaryaims.Thiswastrue,toacertainextent,ofotherEastandCentralEuropeancountrieswhereCommunistswere active in the resistance – albeit only after Nazi Germany attacked theSovietUnioninJune1941–butnowhereelseinthecontinentdidCommunist-ledpartisansplaysuchalargewartimeroleasinYugoslavia.

JosipBroz,whobecamebetterknownasTito,analiasheadoptedin1934,fought in the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian army, was severelywounded in 1915, captured, and spent the next five years in Russia – as aprisoner until after the Bolshevik revolution.59 Tito returned towhatwas theKingdom of Yugoslavia as a Bolshevik sympathizer. He became an earlymember of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which had been founded shortlyaftertheendoftheFirstWorldWar.Titowasarrestedseveraltimesinthe1920sand was in jail from 1928 until 1934. On his release he was co-opted intomembershipof thePolitburoof theYugoslavCommunistParty.ThefollowingyearhewassummonedtoMoscowtoworkintheComintern,theorganizationofthe International Communist Movement. The Comintern was ultimately aninstrument of the Soviet Communist Party and of its dictatorial leader – the‘Stalintern’ as anAmerican formerCommunist dubbed it.60Nevertheless, theperson who headed the Comintern from 1935 until the dissolution of theorganization in 1943, the Bulgarian Communist Georgi Dimitrov, enjoyed adegreeofauthorityandinfluence.61ForaforeignCommunistthecalltoserveintheCominterncouldbeapathtohigherthings–ortothegrave.ManyEuropeanCommunists,based inMoscow,whowererefugeesfromfascistorotherright-wing authoritarian regimes, perished in Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s. Titosurvived largelybecausehewas lookeduponwithspecial favourbyDimitrov.ThechoiceofleaderofanundergroundCommunistpartywasessentiallymadeinMoscow,and in1937 thatpositionwasgranted toTitoandformalizedwiththetitleofgeneralsecretaryin1939.62

SomeonewhowaslatertobeathorninthesideoftheSovietleadershipthusowedhisinitialpre-eminenceamongYugoslavCommuniststothepatronageofMoscow.Hewenton,however, toestablishapersonalauthorityinYugoslaviathatwasnotdependentuponSoviet supportandwhich, indeed, later increasedwhenheincurredSovietwrath.Hisleadershipqualitiescametotheforeduringthewar years and, again, following the break inYugoslav–Soviet relations in1948.TheBritish armyofficer,BillDeakin (laterSirWilliamDeakin and thefirst Warden of St Antony’s College, Oxford), who was parachuted intoMontenegro in occupied Yugoslavia in 1943 to liaise with the YugoslavPartisans,noted thatTito’sauthoritydependedon ‘fewwordsorgestures’andthathegained‘aninstinctiveandtotalrespectfromthosearoundhim’.Deakinregardedhimas‘sureinjudgementanddeeplyself-controlled’.Hehadexpectedtomeetarigiddoctrinairewhowouldbeimpervioustoopendebate,butfoundhiminsteadtobe‘flexibleindiscussion,withasharpandhumorouswit,andawidecuriosity’.63

Milovan Djilas, at one time a close comrade-in-arms of Tito, became insubsequentyearsmorecriticalofTitothanwastheconservativeBritishsoldier-scholar, Deakin.64 Djilas belonged to the leadership group of the Yugoslavpartisans andwas an importantmemberof thepost-warYugoslavgovernmentuntilhebecameacriticofthesystem.HewasexpelledfromtheYugoslavpartyinJanuary1954aftercallingforitsdemocratization.SubsequentlyDjilasspentnine years in Yugoslav prisons after writing The New Class (the first of anumber of important books on Communism of which he was the author), inwhichheobserved that ‘so-called socialist ownership’hadbecome ‘adisguisefor the real ownership by the political bureaucracy’.65 In a later book – acritical, but nuanced, biography of Tito – Djilas wrote of Tito’s intellectuallimitations, of his vanity and his growing desire for luxury. Such aspersionsnotwithstanding, Djilas emphasized that both during and after the war, Titodisplayed ‘a glittering political talent’. He had a mastery of timing, whichenabledhimtochoosetherightmomentfor‘criticalcoursesofaction’.Healsohad‘astrongsenseofdanger,as instinctiveas it is rational;anunconquerablewill to live, to survive, and to endure; a shrewd and insatiable drive forpower’.66Tito’syearsasthedominatingfigureinpost-warYugoslaviauntilhisdeath in1980willbe touchedupon in thenext chapter. In thepresent contextwhat is important is how he and the Communists achieved power in the firstplace.

During thewarTitowas not only the leader of theCommunist-dominatedPartisan resistance movement to German and Italian invaders, he and hiscomrades were also engaged in civil war. The Partisans triumphed over bothCroatfascistsandSerbnationalists,andTitobecametheleaderofaprovisionalgovernment of Yugoslavia in 1944. Under pressure from Western allies, hereluctantly included three royalist members, but they were discarded – alongwith the monarchy itself – the following year. Yugoslavia, which had beendismemberedduringthewar,wasreconstitutedasaFederalPeople’sRepublic.Bytheendof1945theCommunistsinYugoslaviahadachievedamonopolyofpower which their counterparts in other East European countries took severalyears to attain. They won it first on the battlefield, subsequently dealingruthlessly with known collaborators with the occupying forces. They thenlegitimated their rule with an election in November 1945 in which the onlychoice was to be for or against the nominees of the Communist Party. Sincepowerwasalreadyintheirhands,andastheyhadgainedrealprestigeamongasubstantial part of the population for their role in the liberation ofYugoslaviafromtheinvaders,theymightwellhavesecuredvictoryinafreeelection.Intheevent, however, anti-Communists had no confidence that they could safelyregister negativevotes andTito’smovement secured amassive96per cent ofthevotescast.67ThecomingtopoweroftheCommunistswasacombinationofwar of liberation and of revolutionary struggle, with nothing left to chancethereafter.

Success on the battlefield and intimidation were not, however, the onlyreasonsforthesuccessoftheYugoslavCommunists.Alongwiththeattractivepromise of social justice, they appeared to offer the best prospect of bringingharmony in place of inter-ethnic conflict. TheCommunists had the advantagethattheywerethemostYugoslav(awordthatmeanssouthernSlavs)ofallthepoliticalparties,theonlyonewhichunitedthevariousnationalitieswhoduringthewar–aswellasearlierandmuchlater–wereengagedinbitterstrife.Titohimself transcended the national divide. His father was a Croat, hismother aSlovene,andhegrewupinaCroatianvillage.YetSerbsandMontenegrinsweredisproportionately well represented in the Partisan movement he led. (TheSerbianpopulationwasitselfdeeplydividedbetweensupportforthenationalistChetniks and for the Communist-led Partisans.) Different nationalities wererepresentedalsointheinnercoreofthepartyleadership.68

Acombinationofnationalresistancemovementagainstinvadingforcesand

revolutionary civil war was characteristic also of the coming to power ofAlbanian Communists. Within the resistance to the Axis powers, theCommunists in Albania acquired a position of clear dominance. Mussolini’sItaly invadedAlbania in 1939 and from the outsetEnverHoxha, the son of alandownerwhohadbecomeattractedtoCommunismwhilestudyinginFrance,wasactiveintheresistance.WhentheAlbanianCommunistPartywasfoundedin 1941,Hoxha became its leader.He retained that position until his death in1985.Bythenhehadbecomenotonlythelongest-lastingEastEuropeanpartyleaderbuthadbeenheadofgovernmentforlongerthananyothernon-hereditaryrulerinthetwentiethcentury.ThatowedmuchtohiscunningaswellastohisruthlessnessandtotheinstitutionswhichtheCommunistsputinplace.

TheAlbanianCommunistsreceivedmoredirectadvicefromtheirYugoslavthanSovietcounterpartsduring theSecondWorldWar,butHoxhaeven in thewaryearswaswarieroftheYugoslavembracethanweresomeofhiscolleagues.In 1944 the Communists overthrew the German-supporting government inTirana. As in Yugoslavia, they had proved capable of redirecting a nationalliberationstruggletorevolutionaryends.Hoxha,whoplayedthemostimportantrole in the takeover,wasbothwell readand intelligent (and theauthor in lateryearsofinterestingmemoirs).69HewasalsoavindictiveanddogmaticStalinist,remaininganadmirerofStalintotheendofhislife,longafterKhrushchevhaddrawn attention to at least some of Stalin’s mass murders. Before the war,Albania had been under the authoritarian rule of King Zog. Under HoxhaAlbania moved not just from one type of authoritarian rule to another but tototalitarianism. Hoxha went further than most Communist leaders in theelimination of all elements of civil society, with religious institutions and thepracticeofreligiontotallyoutlawed.

COMMUNISTREVOLUTIONSINASIA

TheChineseCommunists’CaptureofPower

ApartfromtheSovietpuppetregimeofMongolia,thefirstCommuniststateinAsia was China. It was also the earliest example of successful indigenousCommunist revolution on the Asian continent. When Communists came topowerinChina,thiswasfarmoreimportantforglobalpolitics,especiallyinthelong run, than what happened in south-eastern Europe, but there are some

parallelswiththeeventsintheBalkans.InChina,asinAlbaniaand,stillmore,inYugoslavia, awarofnational liberationwascombinedwitha revolutionarystruggle forCommunist power.During the SecondWorldWar,with Japaneseforces occupying China, there were separate Nationalist and Communistresistance armies. The Nationalists, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek,borethebruntofthestruggleandtheirlosseswereenormous.TheCommunistsfocused mainly on guerrilla attacks on the Japanese, and suffered less severecasualties. ForMaoZedong the highest prioritywas preparing for the comingstruggle with the Nationalists for the control of all of China. When the waragainstJapaneseaggressionbegan,theChineseCommunistscontrolledterritoryoccupiedbyonly fourmillionpeople.By the time it ended that hadgrown toterritories with more than ninety-five million inhabitants. During the sameperiod the Chinese Red Army had risen in size from one hundred thousandtroopstosomeninehundredthousand.70

MaohadbeentheacknowledgedleaderoftheChineseCommunistssincethe1930s.NeitherhenortheKuomintangleaderChiangKai-shekwereintheleastreceptivetoAmericanattemptstobrokeranagreementbetweenthemfollowingJapan’ssurrender.Asuperficialrapprochementinlate1945andearly1946soonbrokedown.71CivilwarcontinueduntilitendedinvictoryfortheCommunistsin1949.TheSovietleadership,likethatoftheUnitedStates,hadbeeninfavourof compromise.Stalin advised theChineseCommunistPartynot to attempt totakeoverthewholecountry.Inarareadmission(albeitnotinpublic)thathehadbeenwrong, Stalin said that ‘when thewar with Japan ended, we invited theChinesecomradestoagreeonameansofreachingamodusvivendiwithChiangKai-shek’.Theyconsentedat thetimebut‘didit theirownwaywhentheygothome: theymustered their forcesandstruck. Ithasbeenshown that theywereright,andwewerenot.’72TheCommunistshadanumberofadvantagesinthecontest for the support of the peasantry who constituted at that time theoverwhelmingmajorityof theChinesepopulation.Theyappealedsuccessfully,in particular, to the poorer peasants and to landless agricultural labourers.73They promised them land of their own, whereas the Nationalists were toodependentonlargelandownersandregionalpower-brokerstomatchtheminanysuch offers. The Kuomintang were also severely damaged by widespreadcorruptionandbyrampantinflationwhichthegovernmentutterlyfailedtobringundercontrol.Shopkeepersfoundthemselveschangingtheirpricesseveraltimesaday.And thiswas inacountry thathadsuffereddirepoverty throughout the

wholeofthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury.SomeofthosewhohadfoughtfortheKuomintanginthewaragainstJapan

were willing to fight for, and be fed by, the Communists who also did nothesitatetorecruitChineseauxiliarieswhohadfoughtontheJapaneseside.TheCommunistshadartillery,mostlyofJapaneseorigin,whichhadbeenhandedtothemby theirSovietallies.Theyalsohadasheadof theirPeople’sLiberationArmyacapablemilitaryman,ZhuDe,althoughMaoheadedtheRevolutionaryMilitary Committee and retained the highest political authority. His skilfulleadership at that stage of his career and ruthless determination to extendCommunistcontroltothewholeofChinaplayedamajorpartinthesuccessfulcaptureofpower.

Duringthefirst twoyearsofthecivilwarwhichbrokeout in1946ChiangKai-shek’sNationalistshadvastsuperiorityinbothnumbersandequipmentovertheCommunists, and in the first year, in particular, they had a lot ofmilitarysuccess.BetweenthenandthedefeatoftheKuomintangin1949,however,theCommunist leadership succeeded in inspiring the forces under their commandmore than theNationalist leaderswere able to do, and theymobilized greatersupport in thesociety.TheCommunistvictorywasbothmilitaryandpolitical.MaohadsignificantsuccessinshowingthattheNationalistscouldbechallengedon their own ground of fostering national pride. Although the Communists’accessiontopowermeant,inmanyrespects,abreakwithChinesetradition,theyevokedpatrioticaspirationanddesireforacleanbreakwiththehumiliationsofthe previous century and a half. On declaring the foundation of the People’sRepublicofChinaatthebeginningofOctober1949,MaosaidthattheChinesepeoplehad‘stoodup’.74

HoChiMinhandtheVietnameseCommunists’AscenttoPower

Communists in many countries had an influence in excess of their numbersbecause of the strength of their ideological belief and their hierarchical anddisciplined organization.Revolutionarymovements inAsia, however, had twoassets that were absent in Europe where so few Communist parties came topowerasaresultentirelyof theirownefforts.AsianCommunistswereable tocombine their revolutionary commitment to a new social and economic orderwiththatofnationalliberationfromcolonialrule,thusbroadeningtheirappeal.

Their other strength lay in their appeal to a largely uneducatedpeasantrywhoconstitutedoverwhelmingly the largest social class.A focus on the grievancesandaspirationsofpeasantsmeantplayingdowntheclassicalMarxistbeliefthattheindustrialworkingclasswouldbethesocialforcemakingforrevolutionarychange.BothMaoZedongandHoChiMinh,whowereofasimilarage(Howasborn in1890,Mao in1893) andwhobecameCommunists in the early1920s,emphasized the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. The name Ho ChiMinh,whichmeansHeWhoEnlightens,wasthelastinaseriesofpseudonyms(atleastfifty)whichHoadopted,inthiscasefromthetimeoftheSecondWorldWar.75*

Asayoungman,HospentanumberofyearsawayfromIndochina,workingin a variety of jobs.Hewas in theUnitedStates immediately before theFirstWorldWar,andlaterclaimedtohaveworkedasapastrychefinBoston.Healsospenttimeasaseaman,ajuniorchefinLondon’sCarltonHotel,andasaphotoretoucherinParis.HewasinLondonfrom1915to1917,butitwashissixyearsinFrance from the end of 1917 to 1923which turned him into aCommunist.InspiredbytheBolshevikrevolutionandradicalizedalsobytheVersaillesPeacesettlement, which he condemned for failing to apply President WoodrowWilson’sdoctrineofnationalself-determinationtothepeoplesofIndochina,hejoinedtheFrenchCommunistPartyin1920attheageofthirty.HospenttimeinboththeSovietUnionandChinainthe1920sand1930sandbecameanagentoftheComintern inAsia.He took theview,atoddswithconventionalMarxism,thatCommunismcould‘acclimatize itselfmoreeasily inAsia thaninEurope’,for in Asia there was a traditional sympathy for ‘the idea of community andsocial equality’.76 The Indian Communist, M.N. Roy, who was the mostprominent Asian to take part in the founding meeting of the Comintern inMoscow in 1919, was another who believed that the chances of CommunismtakingholdinAsiawerebetterthaninEuropeandthatAsianrevolutionswouldlead theway in theworldwideoverthrowof capitalism.The twomendidnot,however, get on. Ho was generally liked both within the internationalCommunistmovementandevenbyanti-Communistswithwhomhenegotiated,but Roy, who knew him in Moscow in the 1920s, disparaged him asunimpressive both intellectually and physically.77 Ho’s subsequent career,whichincludedlongtreksfromoneguerrillabasetoanother,suggeststhatRoywaswrongonbothcounts.Hobecame theprincipal founderand leaderof theVietnameseCommunistParty,establishedin1930.InOctoberofthesameyear,

onCominterninstructions,itchangeditsnametoIndochineseCommunistParty,sinceitwastoembrace,forsomeyears,CambodiaandLaosaswellasVietnam.

During the Second World War, the Vietnamese Communists created anationalliberationmovement,theVietminh,opposedtotheVichyregimewhichcollaborated with the Japanese occupiers. It was their wartime resistance rolewhich brought them to national prominence and gave thempopular influence.Although dominated by Ho and his party comrades, the Vietminh put theiremphasisonbuildingabroadcoalitionandontheattainmentofanindependentVietnam.78 They themselves were able to seize power in Hanoi in 1945,although the opportunity had been created by American action – the atomicbombsdroppedonHiroshimaandNagasakiinAugust1945,whichwererapidlyfollowed by the Japanese surrender. The Vietminh took over governmentbuildings in Hanoi in the same month and established what they called theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam, with Ho ChiMinh as its president. At thatpoint Ho was intent on maintaining an international as well as a domesticcoalitionofsupporters.AddressingacrowdofhalfamillionpeopleinHanoiinearly September 1945, he quoted from the American Declaration ofIndependence,clearlyhopingthattheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWarwouldbring more support for Vietnamese self-determination from the United Statesthan had occurred after the First World War, Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoricnotwithstanding.79

President Truman, however, gave a higher priority to having France as anally than tosupporting the independenceof theVietnamese.AlthoughGeneraldeGaullewouldlaterconcludethattheFrenchwarinIndochinawasunwinnableandthattheUnitedStateswouldfindtheirwarinVietnamtobeequallyforlorn,in1945heplayedthecardwhichwouldhavemosteffectinWashingtonwhenhewarnedthatiftheUSopposedtheFrenchattempttoregaintheircoloniesinIndochina, that would push France ‘into the Russian orbit’.80 Although theAmericangovernment remainedunenthusiasticabout theFrenchattempt to re-establish their colonial rule in Vietnam, this changed when the ChineseCommunists attained power in 1949. From then on, stopping the spread ofCommunisminAsiawasstillmoreofaprimeconcerninWashington.

Despite the fact that the Vietminh had succeeded in wearing down theFrench, the peace agreement of 1954 which formally ended the conflict,involved, toHoChiMinh’sgreatdisappointment, thepartitionof the country.BoththeChineseandSovietleaderships(whohadtakenuntil1950torecognize

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Chinese doing so before the SovietUnion followedsuit) favoured thiscompromise.Ho felt letdownby them.Heneeded, however, their political support and relied on the Soviet supply ofweapons.NorthVietnamwasnever,though,simplyaSovietclientstate,forHomanagedattimestoplayofftheChineseandRussiansagainstoneanotherandyettomaintaingoodrelationswiththeleadersofbothcountriesduringthemostacrimoniousyearsof theSino-Sovietdispute.WithNorthVietnam, in its turn,supplyingweaponrytotheirVietCongcomradesintheSouth,theUnitedStatesgovernment had reason to believe that the whole of Vietnam was liable tobecome Communist. Already under President Kennedy, American militaryadvisersweresenttoSouthVietnamtoassisttheforcesunderthecommandofthe anti-Communist and authoritarian President Ngo Dinh Diem. It was onlyduringtheJohnsonpresidencythatAmericancombattroops,inever-increasingnumbers, were dispatched to Vietnam. Ho did not live to see the AmericanwithdrawalfromVietnamandtheface-savingtreatythatwassignedinParisin1973 and provided a politically convenient pause before the unification ofVietnamunderCommunist rule in1975.By the time thewarendedfifty-eightthousandAmericanshadlosttheirlivesinvain,buttheVietnameselosseswerevastly greater.Around threemillion soldiers and civilians hadbeenkilled andthe country was devastated, not least by the use of Agent Orange, the toxiccompoundtheUnitedStatesforceshadusedtodefoliatetheforestswhichwerethehidingplaceof theVietCong.Longafter thewarended, thiswascausingmany birth defects and cancers in Vietnam.81 The victory of theVietnameserevolutionarieshadbeenattainedataveryhighprice.82

In Communist revolutions, as distinct from more spontaneous uprisings –such as the February/March revolution in Russia – leaders, ideas andorganization were invariably important. In some cases more than others, onepersonplayedamoresignificantrolethananyofhiscolleagues.ThatwastrueofHoChiMinhifwefocusonthelonghaul–thecreationanddevelopmentoftherevolutionarymovementinVietnam,thefoundationoftherepublicin1945,andtheguerrillawaragainsttheFrenchastheytriedtore-establishcontrolovertheirformercolonyandfailed.BythetimeAmericantroopsenteredVietnaminthe mid-1960s, Ho Chi Minh was hardly the most powerful decision-makerwithin the Vietnamese Communist leadership, although still much revered inNorthVietnam.His standing in the outsideworld,whichheunderstoodbetterthan his less-travelled comrades, remained an asset for the Vietnamese

Communists.Hohadhisupsanddownsduringthefirstquarterofacenturyoftheparty’sexistence,butby theearly1940sundoubtedlywieldedmorepowerwithinitthananyoneelse.Yet,hisstyleofrulewithinthehighestpartyechelonswasconsensual.HedidnottrytodominateinthemannerofStalin,MaoZedongorNorthKorea’sKimIlSung,butoperatedwithinamorecollectiveleadershipinwhich,ratherthanbrowbeatordictate,hereliedsubstantiallyonhispowersofpersuasion.83Hodeliberatelycultivatedanimageofsaintlinessandinthe1940sand1950swrotetwoself-congratulatory‘biographies’ofhimselfunderassumednames.84Nevertheless,hewasbynaturemoreofaconciliatorthananautocraticstrongmanandwasultimatelyamoresuccessfulCommunistleaderthanthoseinthelattercategory.

PolPotandtheKillingFieldsofCambodia

AftertheCambodianruler,PrinceSihanouk,hadbeenremovedinapalacecoupin 1970, a vicious civilwar between theKhmerRougeCommunists and anti-Communistforcesgotunderway,withtheVietnameseminorityinCambodiathegreatestsufferers.AmericanbombingofCambodia in theearly1970s,orderedbyPresidentNixon,wasdirectedattheKhmerRouge,andatthetrailsthroughthejunglesbywhichweaponsreachedVietnam,butitsconsequencesweremoreindiscriminate and counterproductive. The bombing ‘ensured that there wouldneverbeashortageofrecruits[fortheKhmerRouge]inacountrysidenowfilledwith hatred for the Americans’.85 Prince Sihanouk played his part, too.Outraged at having been ousted by General Lon Nol, he encouragedCambodians,inabroadcastfromBeijinginMarch1970,to‘gotothejungleandjoin the guerrillas’, thus giving a boost towhatwas at that time a very smallCommunistParty.86Evenbeforecomingtopower,theKhmerRougeprovidedaforetasteoftheirextremeruthlessnessinthecivilwar.AftercapturingOudong,at one time the royal capital, they massacred tens of thousands of people.87When they took the capital, Phnom Penh, in 1975, they set about trying toestablish a Communist regime like no other, in which cities were emptied,moneywasabolished,aswere schools, courtsandmarkets.Collectivizationofagriculturewas completed far faster than in any other state,with virtually thewholepopulationforcedtoworkontheland.Between1975and1979,whenaVietnamese invasionendedKhmerRougedictatorshipandreplaced itbymore

‘normal’ Communist rule, it is estimated that at least one in five of theCambodians, possibly even a quarter of the population, had died an untimelydeath.

TheprincipalleaderoftheKhmerRougewasPolPot,whoserealnamewasSalothSar.AsayoungmanhestudiedinFranceandbecameamemberoftheFrench Communist Party. On his return to Cambodia he worked as aschoolteacher. He was later influenced by Mao and by the Chinese CulturalRevolution.However,hiscombinationofutopianismandbloodthirstypursuitofclasswarfarexceededevenMao’sonbothcounts.Inhismercifullybriefperiodas thenumber-onepersonwithin theKhmerRougegovernment,hekepta lowpublicprofileand,unlikeMao,wasfarfrompromotingacultofhispersonality.PolPot(anamehetookin1976)appearedactuallytobelieveintheconstructionofsomekindofcommunism,builtonthebonesofthepeoplehishenchmenandacolytes killed, whether by having their throats cut (the fate of tens ofthousands),beatingtodeathwithspades,shooting,orthefaminethattheKhmerRouge policies induced. Among those arrestedwere close comrades who hadthoughtofthemselvesasfriendsoftheirleader.Theyweretorturedbeforebeingkilled.By1979,42percentofCambodianchildrenhadlostatleastoneparent.Throughoutallthis,PolPotappearstohaveretainedanunshakeablebeliefinhisowngenius.88Hebelievedthat‘hewouldbeenthronedhigherthanhisgloriousancestors – Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong’.89 After the Vietnamese hadinstalledagovernmentoftheirchoosinginPhnomPenh,PolPotandhisforcesretreated to junglecampson theborderofCambodiaandThailandandcarriedonaguerrillawarforanothereighteenyears.Remarkably,theycontinuedtoberecognizedasthegovernmentofCambodiabytheUnitedNations,thankstothecontinued support of China and of Western countries’ willingness to viewCambodiathroughthedistortinglensesof theColdWarinwhichtheprincipaladversarywasnotChinabuttheSovietUnion.PolPotdiedofnaturalcausesin1998,justamonthshortofhissixty-thirdbirthday.

KimIlSung’sAccessiontoPowerinNorthKorea

Kim Il Sung, in spite of the legends that were created for him by hispropagandistsandthefertilityofhisownmyth-making,wasputinplaceastheleaderofNorthKoreabyhisSovietsponsors.Hisearliermentors,however,had

been Chinese. In late 1929 and the first half of 1930 he was in prison undersuspicionofbelongingtoaleft-winggroup.HehadspentmuchofhisboyhoodinChina–inManchuria–anditwastheChineseCommunistPartyhejoinedin1931.AtthattimeaseparateKoreanpartydidnotexist.90Inthecourseofthe1930s,whenKoreawasunderJapaneserule,Kimtookpartinguerrillaactivityagainst the occupiers. In common with most other Communist revolutionaryleaders,Kimdidnotusethenamehewasgivenatbirth.KimIlSungwasanomde guerre, his original name beingKim Song Ju.He spent the years 1940 to1945intheSovietUnion,afacthesuppressedwhenhesetaboutembellishinghis imageas agreatnational liberator. ItwaswhenSoviet forces captured thenorthern part of the Korean peninsula, with the Americans in control of thesouth,thattheyputKim,whohadmadeagoodimpressionassomeoneofsharpintelligence,incharge.Nevertheless,KimwasnotthefirstchoiceoftheSovietauthoritiestobethetopleaderofthepartofKoreawhichtheyoccupied.Theyhadinmindsomeonewhowouldappearmoreindependent,ChoManSik,whohad led a non-violent reformist group. The problem, however, was that Choprovedinrealitytobetooindependentfortheirtaste.BeforelonghewasatoddswiththeSovietoccupyingforcesandwassubsequentlyarrested.91

Thesecond-choiceKim,havingalreadyinDecember1945becomechairmanof theNorthKoreanbranchof theKoreanCommunistParty,was installed thefollowing February, thanks to Soviet backing, as chairman of the InterimPeople’s Committee. This embryonic state authority took over 90 per cent ofindustry in the course of 1946 and launched a far-reaching land reform.92 InSeptember 1948, less than a month after the Republic of Korea had beenformallydeclaredtoexistinSeoul,aseparatestateinthenorthwasannouncedintheshapeoftheDemocraticPeople’sRepublicofKorea,withKimIlSungatitshead.ThiswaslessarevolutionthanaSovietimposition,althoughKim,withhispromisetofreeKoreafromforeigntutelage(withtheexception,atthattime,oftheSovietUnion)appearstohavehadmorepopularsupportthandidseveralof the Soviet-imposed leaderships in Eastern Europe. He also went on toestablish a regimewhich, followingStalin’s death, deviated substantially fromtheSovietmodel. Insteadofcopying theirpartial relaxationandcultural thaw,Kim’sNorthKoreacontinueditsdevelopmentasapeculiarCommunisthybrid,onethatwasbothsultanisticandtotalitarian.Thepersonalitycultofthe‘GreatLeader’,ashewasknown,exceededeventhoseofStalin,MaoZedongandtheRomanian Communist leader Nicolae Ceauşescu, improbable feat though that

was.

THECUBANREVOLUTION

Although Cuba, several years after Fidel Castro came to power, became aCommuniststate, therevolutionof1959wasnotaCommunistrevolution.TheCuban Communist Party had been dismissive of the middle-classrevolutionaries, led by Fidel and Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, who had forseveral years been fighting a guerrilla war from the thick forests andmountainous terrain of the Sierra Maestra against the country’s corruptauthoritarianregime.ItspresidentwasFulgencioBatistawhohadseizedpowerinMarch1952inamilitarycoupwhichhecalledarevolution.IncontrastwithBatista’s coup, the eventually successful struggle of Castro and his comrades,which began in 1953 with a failed attempt to seize the Moncada militarybarracks in Santiago de Cuba, was a genuine revolution. Castro and hiscomrades-in-arms called for social transformation as well as nationalindependence, viewing their large neighbour, the United States, as anexploitative imperial power. The fact that Batista was hand in glove withcrooked American businessmen, most notably the mafia boss Meyer Lanskywho became his ‘official adviser for casino reform’, helped to stoke a quitewidespread popular anti-Americanism.93 During the 1950s the predominantinfluence on Castro was not Marx but the hero of the island’s struggle forfreedom fromSpanish colonial rule, JoséMartí,whodied in 1895 before thatindependencewasachieved.Martí,althoughnotaMarxist,wasanadvocateofasocially just democracy as well as of national self-determination. Castrocontinued toadmireMartí.Ashe laterput it: ‘IwasfirstaMartíanand thenaMartían,MarxistandLeninist.’94

Castrowas the sonof a relationship betweenhis landowner father and thecook-housekeeper,whomCastro’s father latermarried.Fidel,whowasborn inAugust1927,wrotea letterasaboytoFranklinRoosevelt,congratulatinghimon his election victory in 1940 and asking if he would send him ten dollars‘becauseIhavenotseenatendollarsbillAmericanandIwouldliketohaveoneof them’.95 He received an acknowledgement of his letter from the StateDepartment,butnodollarswereenclosed.Castrolaterremarkedthat‘therearepeoplewho’vetoldmethatifRoosevelthadonlysentme$10Iwouldn’thave

given the United States so many headaches!’96 Castro attended a prominentJesuit school and thenentered theLawFacultyofHavanaUniversity in1945.Yearslaterhesaidhedidn’tknowwhyhehaddecidedtostudylaw,adding:‘Ipartlyassociateitwiththosewhosaid:“Hetalkssomuchheshouldbecomealawyer.”’97 As a student, Castro was drawn into radical politics, but wasunusualinthathemanagedtocombinepoliticalactivismwithnotablesportingachievements.NineyearsafterhisrequesttoRooseveltfortendollars,heturneddown the offer of a $5,000 signing-on fee from the New York Giants, forAmericantalentscoutshadnoticedhisgreatpromiseatbaseball.98

After he embarked on serious revolutionary activity, Castro on numerousoccasionscameclosetobeingkilled.WhentheattempttocapturetheMoncadabarracksin1953failed,manyofthosewhotookpartintheattackwereshot,inmost cases after gruesome torture and mutilation. Castro escaped but wascapturedfivedays later.Hewasabout tobekilledon thespotwhen theblackofficerinchargeofthearmypatrol,LieutenantPedroManuelSarria,orderedhismen to stop.According toCastro,he thenadded: ‘Don’t shoot.Youcan’tkillideas;youcan’tkillideas...’99WhenhewasbroughttotrialinOctober1953,Castromade a stirring speech to the courtwhich lasted for several hours.Heconcluded it with the words: ‘Condemn me, it does not matter. History willabsolveme!’100Hewassentencedtofifteenyearsofimprisonment,butservedonlyoneyearandsevenmonthsofthesentence.Followingbothpublicpressureand the intervention ofArchbishopPérez Serantes,who suggested thatCastroandhisassociatesnolongerposedadanger,hewasreleasedaspartofawideramnesty.101 Less than two months after leaving prison, Castro left Cuba forMexico where he joined his younger brother, Raúl who, unlike Fidel, wasalreadyattractedtoCommunism.HealsomettheyoungArgentiniandoctorandMarxistrevolutionary,Ernesto(betterknownas‘Che’)Guevarawho,attwenty-seven,wastwoyearsyoungerthanFidel.OrderedoutofMexicoinNovember1956,thisgroupofrevolutionariesacquiredanancientboat,theGranma(whichlaterbecamethetitleofthemainCubanCommunistpartynewspaper)and,afteroverloadingitwithweaponsandammunitionaswellaseighty-twopeopleinavessel meant to accommodate twenty-five, they set off for Cuba. They cameclosetosinkinginastormintheGulfofMexicoandtooktwodayslongerthanthey intended to reachCuba,eventually runningagroundaboutamileshortofwheretheyplannedtodock.

AftertakingtothehillsoftheSierraMaestra,theymadesteadyprogressinwinningsupport for theircause from the ruralpopulation. Itwasnotprimarilythepeasantrywhoprovidedtheirmostsolidsupport,butworkerswhoearnedaliving wage from the sugar industry during the harvest season and hardlyanything outside it. They were described at the time as ‘semi-proletarianizedlabourers’. The revolution in due course brought in other social groups(including urban workers), for Cuba was, by Latin American standards, arelatively urbanized and literate society, with some significant trade unions.Thus, this was not simply a peasant uprising, but it began in the countrysideundertheleadershipofmiddle-classrevolutionaries.

Castro and his core group of rebels confiscated livestock from largelandowners and distributed them to peasants with little or no property. In theearliest months of 1957 the group around Fidel, who was the acknowledgedleader,numberedjusteighteen.Castroalreadyrecognizedthevalueofpublicityand news management, and agreed to be interviewed by a New York Timescorrespondent,HerbertL.Matthews.Afteranarduousclimb,andtakingcaretoavoidBatista’ssoldiers,MatthewsreachedCastro’scampandinterviewedhim.Meantime, Raúl organized frenetic activity intended to convey the impressionthat the company of armed rebels wasmuch larger than it actuallywas. Thisincluded a messenger arriving breathlessly with a report from a ‘SecondColumn’,whichdidnotactuallyexist.102TheinterviewprovidedagreatboosttoCastro,and thesizeofhisgroupsoongrewtoaround threehundred. In thepiece he published, Matthews wrote of Fidel: ‘The personality of the man isoverpowering.ItwaseasytoseethathismenadoredhimandalsotoseewhyhehascaughttheimaginationoftheyouthofCubaallovertheisland.Herewasaneducated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage and of remarkablequalitiesofleadership.’103TheTimespublishedaphotographofCastroholdingatelescopicrifle.

Fidel Castro had been the only person in the group who was known ascommandante,butheconferredthattitleonGuevarawhonotonlyactedasthegroup’s field doctor, but took an active part in their armed struggle. Hepersonallyshotdeadoneof theirscoutswhohadaccepted10,000dollarsfromBatista’s army to lead the revolutionaries into an ambush.104After numerousskirmishes,Castro’sgroupcontrolleda substantialpartofeasternCubaby themiddleof1958andsetuparadiostationinthatterritory.WheninJulythatyeareight Cuban opposition parties and anti-Batista groupsmet in theVenezuelan

capital,Caracas,andissueda‘ManifestooftheCivil-RevolutionaryOppositionFront’, theyrecognizedFidelas their leader.Castro’s radiostationwasable tobroadcasttheirstatement.TheCubanCommunistPartydidnotparticipateintheCaracasmeeting, but shortly afterwards their leader,CarlosRafaelRodríguez,belatedly realizing that thismovementhadmorepotential thanhehadhithertoappreciated,madehiswaytotheSierraMaestraforameetingwithCastro.Theywent on to establish good relations, and Rodríguez subsequently served ingovernmentunderCastro’sleadership.

Bylate1958Castro’sfightingforcehadrisentosomethreethousandpeople,and the support for themwasmuchmorewidespread. Theymet less and lessresistancefromanincreasinglydemoralizedarmy.AstherebelsmovedtowardsHavana,Batistadecidedthathisdaysaspresidentwerenumbered.On1January1959 he left by plane with his relatives and some friends for the DominicanRepublic. Two other planes followed, filled not onlywith some of the peopleclosest toBatistabutwithalmost allofCuba’sgoldanddollar reserves.By3JanuaryCastro had embarked on a victory parade across the island, and on 8JanuaryheledhiscolumnintoHavanatothesoundofchurchbellsandfactoryand ship sirens.Castro addressed a crowdof several hundred thousandpeoplefrom the balcony of the presidential palace, characteristically speaking forseveralhours.TotheBritishambassadortoCuba,Fidelseemedtobe‘amixtureofJoséMartí,RobinHood,GaribaldiandJesusChrist’.105AtthattimeCastroand his followers were widely perceived to be radical democrats rather thanMarxist revolutionaries, and that was not entirely a misconception, althoughRaúlCastroandCheGuevara,whileknowingverylittleabouttheSovietUnion,werealreadymoresympathetictoCommunismthanwasFidel.IncorporationintheinternationalCommunistmovement(andthealliancewiththeSovietUnion)wastocomelater.

TheCubanrevolutionisaclearcasewhereleadershipmatteredagreatdeal.Itwas not the organizational discipline of aCommunist party in this instancethatbroughtrevolutionariestopower,butsomethingmuchclosertocharismaticleadership in the person of Fidel Castro. He did not manufacture a cult ofhimself in the manner of some Communist leaders – there were no streets,buildingsorparksnamedafterhimduringhisyearsasCubanleader–butthatwaspartlybecausehispersonalitywassooverwhelmingthathedidnotneedto.Hisstyleofrulewaswidelyknownasfidelismo,averyparticularvariantoftheLatinAmericantraditionofcaudillo,apopularleaderwhocomestobetrustedand obeyed as a father figure.OrthodoxCommunists, such as those reporting

fromtheGDRembassyinCuba,disapprovedoftheemotionalcomponentofhisleadership,butitwasonereasonwhyCastrocouldevokeawarmthofresponseand at times touch hearts in a way thatWalter Ulbricht and Erich Honeckernever could. A confidential report from the GDR embassy to the politicalleadership inEastBerlin in1964complainedofCastro’s ‘nationalismand leftradicalism’, his ‘subjective evaluation of trends and their causes’ and of hispropensity to ‘guide the popular masses from a basically emotional point ofview’andofhis‘lettingoffsteam’indifficultsituations.106

Castroalsohadaneyeforthetheatricalgestureandknewhowtoprojecthispersonality.WhenheappearedattheUnitedNationsin1960andaddressedtheGeneralAssemblywearinghis characteristicolive-greenbattledress, thismadehisimpactallthegreater.HealsocockedasnookattheUSadministrationandhostileAmericanmassmediabymoving,withhiseighty-five-persondelegation,froman expensiveNewYorkhotel toone in themiddleofHarlem,wherehewascheeredbyblackandLatinosupporters.Inthatunusualsettingforhead-of-government diplomacy, he received the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, theIndian premier Jawaharlal Nehru and the Egyptian president Gamal AbdelNasser as well as the radical black leader Malcolm X.107 Ever attentive tosymbolism,Castrosucceededinpreservingatthesametimeagreaterfranknessandspontaneitythanistypicalofleaderswhohavespentmanyyearsinpower.Hewasalsountouchedbymaterialmotives.Ashismajorbiographerobserves:‘Not only those who claim to know him personally, but also his variousopponents,thinkthatheisoneofthefewabsoluterulerswhohavenotenrichedthemselvesinofficeandsaltedawaymillionsinSwitzerland.’108

Somerevolutionsbeginwhenhugenumbersofpeopletaketothestreetsorstorm government buildings without waiting for a leader to spur them intoaction. Others depend much more on a particular leader or small leadershipgroup.Cubawasclearlyinthelattercategory.Theaudacityandabilitytoinspireof Castro and his comrades-in-arms, and their evident desire to redress thegrievancesoftheruralpopulationandtoremovethescourgeofcorruption,wonthem increasing support.Castro himself later emphasizedwhat a tiny group itwaswhosettherevolutionaryprocessinmotion:‘Ifyoulook,itwasjustthreeor four of us who created the embryo of the movement that attacked theMoncadabarracks.Fromthebeginning–it’sstrange–wehadasmallcorpsofleaders and a small executive committee of just three people’.Hewent on togeneralize the point: ‘Radical revolutionary parties are often born in the

underground,clandestinely–they’recreatedandledbyaveryfewpeople.’109At the time he led the Cuban revolution Castro was neither a Marxist nor aLeninist,buthisviewofthemovement’soriginsisconsistentwithLenin’sideathatthemassofthepeopleneededanavant-gardeofprofessionalrevolutionarieswhowould lead them to understand that ameliorationof the conditions of lifewasnotenough(indeed,itcouldbedangerouslydistractingandseductive);whatwasrequiredwasthecompleteoverthrowoftheoldregimeandthecreationofafundamentallydifferentsystemandnewsociety.

THEDEMISEOFCOMMUNISMINEUROPE–NOTREVOLUTIONS

It may seem odd to discuss non-revolutions in a chapter on revolutions andrevolutionary leadership.The reason fordoing so is very simple.Themythofthe East European ‘revolution’ of 1989 is very pervasive. Both within thecountriesthatunderwentdramaticchangeandintherestoftheworld,theeventsofthatyeararefrequentlyreferredtoasarevolution.It isatellingexampleoftheromanticaurawhichhasclungtothewordeversincetheFrenchRevolutionthatpeoplewhohaveexperiencedsomethingdifferentfrom–andbetterthan–revolutionsstillyearnfor thatoldrevolutionaryélanandfeelaneed tobolstertheirbeliefthatsystemicchangewasalltheirowndoing.

Itmakessense,onthecontrary,todifferentiaterevolutions,longunderstoodto involve violence or the threat of violence, not only from peacefultransformative change but also from the collapse of a regime which hascontinued to exist only so long as it is backed by a foreign power.When theleadershipofaregionalhegemondecidesthatitwillnolongerimposeasystemofruleonothercountriesagainstthewilloftheirownpeople,thentheresultantcollapse of the regimes in question does not amount to revolution. Thetransformation of Eastern Europe in 1989–91was a case in point. GorbachevandhisalliesintheSovietleadershiphadmadeitclearthattheywouldnotuseforcetomaintainCommunistsystemsinEasternEurope,themoresosincetheywereintheprocessofdismantlingthepillarsofsuchasystemathome.110TheCommunist states ofEastEurope (with the exceptions ofYugoslavia,AlbaniaandRomania)werepenetratedpoliticalsystems,bynomeansfullyautonomous.WhentheSovietUnionabdicatedfromdeterminingandenforcingthelimitsofchangeintheregion,nationalindependencewasquicklyasserted.Gorbachev,as

we have seen in the previous chapter, publicly declared in Moscow in thesummer of 1988, and inNewYork at theUnitedNations inDecember of thesame year, that the peoples of every country had the right to decide forthemselveswhatkindofsystemtheywishedtolivein.Andin1989theKremlinleadership had not only removed the threat of Soviet armed intervention, theyalsostronglyadvisedCommunistleadersinEasternEuropenottoresorttoforceeither.111 Large-scale peaceful demonstrations took place, but they were asmuch a symptom as a cause of systemic change. They did not constitute arevolution;theywerebetterthanthat.

In Poland and Hungary, in particular, there was a negotiated transition todemocracy. They were the first countries to take advantage of the newopportunities opened up by change in Moscow, and Poland led the way ininstalling a non-Communist primeminister, TadeuszMazowiecki, as early asAugust1989.InCzechoslovakiathereweremassivedemonstrationsagainsttheCommunist regime in the last two months of the year, once it had becomeobvious that this would not produce another Soviet armed response. For twodecades those who had written and distributed underground literature hadnumbered not more than a thousand people, a small circle persecuted by theauthoritiesandignoredbythemajorityofthepopulation.112Theranksoftheirovertsupportersswelledinthecourseof1989andon19Novemberofthatyeartheembattledminority,whohadcreatedCharter77asanoppositionalpressuregroup in 1977, converted their movement into one called the Civic Forum,whoseinformalleaderwasVáclavHavel.ComingtogetherintheMagicLanternTheatre inPrague frommid-November to earlyDecember, theyheldmeetingsthatwerehighlydemocratic,witheachparticipantallowedtohavehisorhersayand important issues decided by vote.113Yet TimothyGartonAsh,whowaspresentthroughoutmostofthesediscussions,notedalsotheindividualstandingHavelhadacquired.While‘alessauthoritarianpersonalitythanHavelwouldbehard to imagine’,heoftenbecame the finalarbiter, ‘theonepersonwhocouldsomehow balance the very different tendencies and interests in themovement’.114

Large but peaceful protests against Communist rule put pressure on thegovernment,butthefinalstrawforthemwasadeclarationfromaWarsawPactsummitmeetinginearlyDecemberthatthe1968invasionhadbeenwrongandillegal. Since every member of the top leadership team ultimately owed hisposition to that earlier Soviet intervention, their positionwas now completely

untenable. Within days the prime minister Ladislav Adamec and presidentGustáv Husák resigned in quick succession and a predominantly non-Communist government was formedwhich included leading Chartists. Beforetheyear’send–on28December1989–AlexanderDubček,whohadbeenthereformist First Secretary of theCommunist Party in 1968,was co-opted to beChairman of the Federal Assembly (Speaker of the Parliament) and thefollowingdaythatstillotherwiseunreconstructedbodybentbeforethewindsofchangeandelectedHavelasPresidentofCzechoslovakia.

In Bulgaria the long-serving Communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, wasdeposedinwhatwasessentiallyapalacecouponedayaftertheBerlinWallwasbreachedinNovember1989.Betweenthenandmulti-partyelectionsinOctober1991,Bulgariamade apeaceful transition todemocracy.So, too, didAlbania,whichovermanyyearshadbeenthemostrepressivecountryinEurope.Albaniawas outside the Soviet bloc, but not immune to contagion from what washappeningwithinit.InDecember1990ameetingoftherulingCommunistpartyagreed to the legalization of opposition parties, and the following day theDemocraticPartyofAlbania(DPA)wasformed.Inelectionsheldin1991,thenew party fared less well than the successor party to the Communists, theSocialistPartyofAlbania,butin1992theDPAwonanoverwhelmingvictory.Not one of these peaceful transformations of political systems in East-CentralEuropeamountedtoarevolutioninthenormalsenseoftheterm.115

Only in Romania, where the example of the changes in the Soviet UnioninfluencedthepopularmoodbutwheretheSovietleadershiphadlongceasedtohave leverage, was there something that looked more like a revolution (butwhich, nevertheless, did not meet the criteria of Huntington or Dunn). Theregime used brutal force in the attempt to suppress those who demonstratedagainstthedictatorialruleofNicolaeCeauşescu.TherewasviolencealsofromsomeofCeauşescu’sopponentswithin the systemaswell asmorewidespreadnon-violentresistanceonthepartofthepopulation.Therewasastrongelementofmanipulationoftheprocesswithonesectionofthepoliticaleliteseizingtheopportunitytoreplaceanother.116EastGermanyandYugoslaviawerealso, intheirdifferentways,exceptionstowhatwashappeningelsewhereinCentralandEasternEurope,althoughinneitherinstancediditamounttorevolution.Inthecase of the German Democratic Republic, as East Germany was officiallyknown,demonstrations in favourofdemocratizationof theGDRin1989weresoon superseded by demands for the unification of Germany, leading to a

process of negotiation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, as theprincipalactors,whichborefruitin1990.

In Yugoslavia, national sentiments had the opposite effect. Whereas inGermany, theemphasison thenation led twostates tobecomejoinedinone–theenlargedFederalRepublic–inYugoslaviafervidemphasisonnationhood,attheexpenseofthemultinationalstate,becameasourceofdiscordandcivilwar.By the end of the 1980sMarxism-Leninism had lost whatever appeal it oncehad, and ever since the death of Tito there had not been a leader who couldcommand respect in all the very unevenly developed republics ofYugoslavia.TheSerbianCommunist leaderSlobodanMilošević led theway inplaying thenationalistcard.RealizingthatTito’sfederationwasunlikelytosurvive,hesetabout creating (or attempting to recreate) aGreater Serbia. The consequencesweredisastrous,butthepropernameforthatdisasterisnotrevolution.117

Thesystemicchangeof1989–91inEasternEuropehad,then,somecommonelements,butalsomuchdiversity.Communist leadershipswhichhadappearedfirmly entrenched, so long as they could count on the backing of Moscow,steppedasidewithvaryingdegreesof resentmentor resignation.Transnationalinfluences,emanatinginthefirstplacefromtheSovietUnionbutthenfromoneCentralandEastEuropeancountrytoanother,playedadecisiverole.Ideaswerecritically important – not only the idea of national independence but theaspirationfordemocracy.WhereMoscow’swrithadceasedtorunyearsearlierthan 1989, but where national Communist leaders had maintained their owndomestic authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, the transition fromCommunismwas much less smooth, especially in two of the three cases. The CommunistPartyofRomaniasplit,morethanathousandpeoplewerekilledintheclashesthat took place between demonstrators and the authorities in December, andCeauşescu,withthefullconnivanceofsomeofhisformerPolitburocolleagues,wasshotbyfiringsquadonChristmasDay1989.118TheAlbanianCommunistsnegotiated their own path to political pluralism in a country which wasnationallymorehomogeneousthanmost.MultinationalYugoslaviadisintegratedinbloodycivilwar,whileitssuccessorstatesoverthenexttwodecadesfelttheirway,atverydifferentspeeds,tovaryingdegreesofdemocracy.

LEADERLESSREVOLUTIONS

Whereas indigenous Communist seizures of power have been led by a ruling

groupwithinthoseparties,oftenwithoneespeciallyauthoritativefigureplayinga decisive role, many revolutions break out so suddenly that even the mostorganizedofoppositiongroupsaretakenbysurprise.Thus,SunYat-senwasinColorado when the Chinese revolution of 1911 broke out and Lenin was inSwitzerland when the first of Russia’s two revolutions of 1917 occurred.Revolutions in the Middle East in more recent times have also been moreleaderlessthanled.ThatistrueevenoftheIranianrevolutionof1979aswellasof the revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world in the second decade of thetwenty-firstcentury.

TheIranianRevolution

TheIranianrevolutionof1977–79sawvastpopulardemonstrationsagainsttherule of Shah Reza Pahlavi, with as many as two million people on someoccasionstakingtothestreets,indefianceofthesecretpolice.Althoughmostofthe demonstrationswere peaceful, therewas violence aswell, especially fromthesideoftheregime.Iranhadalongtraditionofstreetprotests,goingbackatleasttothelatenineteenthcenturyand,morerecently,insupportofMuhammadMossadegh,theliberalnationalistIranianprimeministerwhointheearly1950sclashedwith the Shah (as well as with British commercial interests) andwasoustedinacoup.Afirstattempt,thoughtupbytheBritishintelligenceservice,failed, but MI6 then persuaded the American government that there was animminentthreatofIrangoingCommunist,andthoughtherewaslittlesubstancein the claim, it had the effect the British authorities wanted. A second coup,orchestratedbytheCIA,succeededinremovingMossadeghin1953.ItwasnotonlythepeopleofIranwhowerethelosers,buttheWesterncountrieswho,bytheir actions, earned long-lasting Iranian mistrust. Moreover, no subsequentleaderofIranhasbeenasliberalorasrelativelydemocraticaswasMossadegh.TheShah,whennolongershackledbyapopularprimeministerintheshapeofMossadegh, headed an authoritarian regime. Until he was removed (in arevolution, rather than a coup, in 1979), hewas, in contrastwithMossadegh,subservienttoWesterninterests,butonlywhenthoseweredefinedasnarrowlyandshort-sightedlyastheywereinWashingtonandLondon.119

Crowds returned to the streets of Iran in 1963 in support of AyatollaRuhollahKhomeiniwhenhedenouncedtheShahforgrantingAmericanmilitarypersonnelimmunityfromIranianlaws.120Khomeiniwas,however,exiledfrom

IranthefollowingyearandwasnotabletoreturnuntilFebruary1979aftertherevolutionhadsucceededinoustingtheShah.WhileforsomeofthosewhotookpartintheseriesofdemonstrationsagainsttheShah’sregime,Khomeiniandtheidea of an IslamicRepublicwere an inspiration, thereweremany otherswholooked back with admiration to the liberal and secular government ofMossadegh. Human rights violations under the Shah came under increasedWestern scrutiny in the 1970s, and Jimmy Carter’s victory in the Americanpresidential election of 1976 gave an undoubted boost to opponents of theregime.During theelectoralcampaignCarterhad referred to Iranasacountrywhich should do more to protect human rights. The Shah was sufficientlyconcernedtoorderSAVAK,hissecretpolice,tostoptorturingprisoners.121

TheShah’spartialliberalizationallowedmanyoldorganizationstoreappear– among them Mossadegh’s National Front, the Writers’ Association, theAssociationofTeachers,andtheTudehParty(meaning‘themasses’but,infact,the Communist Party) – and numerous new ones to appear, including aCommittee for the Defence of Political Prisoners and a Committee for theDefence of Human Rights.122 Demonstrations against the Shah’s rule, itsassociatedcorruption,andhisdependenceonforeigninterestsbeganinTehranin1977 andbecamemorewidespread in1978.Therewere riots in the cityofTabrizinFebruary.Thecrowdsweredispersedbythemilitarywhoarrested650demonstratorsandkillednineofthosewhohadattackedpolicestations,luxuryhotelsandtheofficesoftheIran-AmericanSocietyandPepsiCola.Mostoftherioterswereyoungpeople–students,schoolpupilsandyoungfactoryworkers.The unrest spread to other cities, and in August 1978 a cinema was burneddown, killing the 430 people inside.Aftermartial lawwas declared in elevencities inSeptember, themilitarygovernorofTehranordered troops todispersethe crowds which had gathered, chanting anti-Shah slogans. They firedindiscriminately at them, and even the regime put the number of deaths ateighty-seven.Theoppositionclaimedthatatleastfourthousandpeoplehadbeenkilled,anoverestimateinresponsetotheauthorities’understatingthenumberofdeaths. By November the demonstrators themselves were becoming moreaggressive, and numerous buildings in Tehran were set alight or ransacked,amongthemtheBritishEmbassy.Bytheendoftheyear,manyofthesoldiersaswellasthedemonstratorswerenolongerpreparedtoputupwiththerepression.TheShahleftIran,nevertoreturn,inJanuary1979,having‘realizedthathehadlostcontrolnotonlyofthestreetsbutalsoofthemilitary’,someofwhomwere

refusing to obey orders, deserting, and even handing over weapons to thedemonstratorsorthemselves‘firingatgung-hoofficers’.123

The Iranian revolutionwas far frombloodless, although the figure of oversixty thousand ‘martyrs’ which became official after an Islamist regime wasestablished seems to have been a great exaggeration and contrasts with theestimateoftwosociologiststhatsomethreethousandpeoplewerekilled.ErvandAbrahamian, a specialist on modern Iranian history, has emphasized that therevolutionemergedspontaneouslyfrombelowratherthanbeingmanagedfromabove.Hewrites:

Therewerenostatewideparties,nosystematicnetworks,andnocoordinatedorganizationsmobilizingthemassprotests,meetings,andstrikes.Onthecontrary,thecrowdswereoftenassembledbyadhocgroups,grass-roots organizations, and, at most, informal networks: classmates in high schools, colleges, andseminaries;teenagersintheslums;guildmembers,shopassistants,andoccasionally,mosquepreachersinthecitybazaars.124

Whathappenedaftertherevolutionwasanothermatter.AyatollaKhomeiniandradical Islamistsdidnotmake the revolution,but theywerequick to seize theopportunity to become the main beneficiaries of its success. Moreover, theradical pronouncements of Khomeini were in tune with widespread publicsentimentsatthetimeoftherevolution’striumph.HehimselfreturnedtoIranon1 February 1979, seventeen days after the Shah had left the country. Hewasgreetedbyanenthusiasticcrowdof twomillionpeople.Thefinalphaseof therevolution occupied only a few days. Crowds prevented the Shah’s ministersfrom reaching their offices and broke into armouries, using the weaponsobtained to fightwith the only part of themilitary still remaining loyal to theShah’sregime, theImperialGuards.125Takenasawhole, theprocessshowedthatrevolutionscanbemadewithoutleadersbutthat,evenwhenthathappens,leaders will quickly emerge in the aftermath of the revolution. In Iran thatleadership was, and remains, Islamist – a theocracy in which the religiousauthoritieshavewieldedmorepowerthanthesecular–withKhomeiniitsmostauthoritativefigurefromthetimeofhisreturnuntilhisdeathin1989.

ArabRevolutionsoftheTwenty-firstCentury

It is,however,misleadingtoconflate thediversegroupswhomadetheIranianrevolutionof1977–79intoradicalIslamists,eventhoughthelatterweretofindthemselvesbestplacedtoreapthefruitsofthesuccessfulrebellion.Thesameis

evenmoretrueoftheArabrevolutionsthatgotunderwayagenerationlater.ThepopularuprisingsacrossmuchoftheArabworldbeganinDecember2010withanapparentlyrandomevent.InspectorsinTunisiaconfiscatedtheproduce,cartandweightsofapoortrader,MohamedBouazizi,whowasunregisteredwiththeauthoritiesbecausehedidnothavethemoneyneededtobribeofficialstoobtainapermit.Indespairaboutlosingeverythingandattheinjusticeofhisplight,hesetfiretohimselfanddiedofhorrificburnsalittleovertwoweekslater.

ThereweregoodgroundsforrevolutionintheArabworld–repressiveruleof dictatorial leaders, massive unemployment, nepotism, corruption, povertycombined with huge inequality, subjugation of women, sectarianism andintoleranceamongthem.ManycouldidentifywiththedespairwhichBouazizi’sself-immolation exemplified. What, for most of the time, had preventedrevolutionfromoccurringwasjustifiedfearoftheterribleretributionthatwouldbemeted by the authorities on anyonewho rebelled. TheBBC’sMiddle EastEditor,JeremyBowen,observedinhisbook,TheArabUprisings:

WhenIdidmyfirsttriptotheMiddleEastafterIraqinvadedKuwaitin1990IheardsomereporterswithalotmoreexperiencesayingthatArabslikeastrongleader.Apparentlythattraitexplainedthesurvivalofthelikes of SaddamHussein, even though they imprisoned and often killed their subjects. I realised almoststraight away that despots ruled through violence and fear, and that the notion that Arabs liked it wasabsurd,butIamashamedtoadmitthatthelinemighthavecreptintoafewscriptsbeforemybrainkickedin.126

The uprisings, for which Bouazizi lit a fuse, led to the overthrow of thedictatorial rulers of Tunisia (Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali) and Egypt (HosniMubarak) and the capture and killing of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. Theuprising inYemen led to the resignationofAliAbdullahSalehwhohadbeenpresident for more than thirty years, although the outcome has remainedambiguous.He stayed in the country andmany securityofficials, still loyal tohimandhisfamily,remainedinpost.127Therevolutionaryupsurgeaffectedthewholeof theMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,withcontagionhugelyassistedbythe significance of Arabic being a common language across the region; thecomprehensibility, accordingly, of the broadcasts of Al Jazeera (including thetransmission of amateur videos); the internet; and the widespread availabilityanduseofmobilephones.TheQatari-financedAlJazeeraplayedanespeciallyimportant role in circumventing the censorshipof authoritarian regimesand ingiving‘voicetothevoiceless’.128

In virtually every country of the region there was a new belief in the

possibilityofchange,agreaterconfidenceengenderedbythesheernumbersofthose prepared to resist the regimes, and the energizing example of theoverthrowofsuchfirmlyestablishedautocraciesas thoseofBenAli,MubarakandGaddafi.The first two leadersand their entourageswere removedentirelyby their owncitizens. InGaddafi’s case, althoughLibyans themselves roseupagainst him and overthrew his regime, they benefited from the NATO airsupportwhichtheyrequestedandweregranted,withthebackingoftheUnitedNations. As David Gardner, the former Middle East Editor of the FinancialTimes, has noted, both European and American governments had long been‘wedded to a network of regional strongmen’. The Arab revolutions were aseriouschallenge tosuch ‘realists’and led toan incoherent responsewhereby,forexample,LibyanrebelsweregivenmilitaryhelpbutBahrainwasjustmildlyrebuked for brutal suppression of unarmedprotesters.129 Inmost cases,whenpeoplefirsttooktothestreetsagainsttheregimes,theprotestswereentirelynon-violent and that worked to their advantage in getting international opinion ontheirside.Whentheregimespredictablyturnedtorepression,varyingdegreesofviolencewereusedalsoby theprotesters. InSyria, inparticular, the resulthasbeen prolonged and tragic civil war. Monarchies in the region, although alsoauthoritarian, have survived with fewer problems than the republics. That ispartly because their leaders appeared to be accorded a somewhat greaterlegitimacy than were self-appointed republican despots. Their (neverthelessprecarious) survival was also aided by their making some mildly liberalcompromisesaswellasbymoresubstantialmaterialconcessionswhichhelpedtodampendowndiscontent.InJordanandMorocco,inparticular,reformswereintroduced in 2011 precisely to forestall radical demands or revolutionaryupheaval.

The hereditary principle has beenmore readily accepted in states ruled bymonarchs, in which it is a traditional and basic norm of the system, than inrepublicswhereitisseenasusurpersaddinginsulttoinjury.Thus,thefactthatMubarak,GaddafiandSalehallhadplanstobesucceededbyoneoftheirsonsonlyaddedtothepopularclamourinEgypt,LibyaandYementoremovethem.ThehereditarytransferofpowerhadalreadytakenplaceinSyriaattheturnofthecenturyandsubsequentexperiencehashardlybeenanadvertisementforthismode of political succession. Although initially Bashar al-Assad seemed animprovement over his ruthless father, Hafez al-Assad, the ferocity andindiscriminatecharacterof theviolenceusedagainst thosewho–peacefullyinthe first instance (although not for long) – rose up against his regime was

reminiscent of the elder Assad. As a leading analyst of the Middle Easternrevolutionshasnoted,‘notonlythedictatorsbuttheirsonsandheirs’havecometobe‘regardedasevilandassymbolsofthewickednessoftheregime’.130

TheArab revolutionsof 2011, both thosewhich succeeded in toppling theoldregimeandthosewhichdidnot,wereessentiallyleaderless.Wheretherehasbeen a prolonged struggle, as in Syria, organized groups, including Islamistones,havecometoplayamoreprominent role in thefightevenwhile theoldregime has remained precariously in place, but in the revolutions whichsucceededmostquickly–thoseofTunisiaandEgypt–massiveresistancetotheregimeemanated fromawidevarietyofsocialgroupsand took theauthoritiesbysurprise.Theveryfactthatleaderscouldnotbeidentified–andaccordinglyeliminated–wasconfusingfortheregimesunderthreat.Iftheyoung,educatedandmiddleclassplayedadisproportionatelyprominentpartintheupheaval,themore successful revolutions benefited from the participation of the poor whoprovidedthenumbersandwhohad‘nostakeintheoldworldandnothingtoloseby rising up’.131 There were, naturally, informal leaders even in streetdemonstrations, but they tended not to belong to formal structures such aspoliticalpartiesortradeunions,norwerethey‘charismatic’leaders.Rather,theywere internet activists who were committed to spreading word of thedemonstrations and of the cruelties of the regime’s response, thus helping tomobilizetheirfriendsandengagestillwidercircles.132

IntheaftermathofthoseArabuprisingswhichhavesucceededinremovingessentiallysecularautocrats(allofwhom,however,paidvaryingdegreesoflip-service to Islam), the advantages of a leaderless revolution turned into adisadvantage(as in Iran in1979).Thebest-organizedgroupsmovedrapidly tofillthevacuumandthenewleadersweremoreintentonimposingtheirwillthanonbuildingconsensusanddemocratic institutions.The2012election inEgypt(whichwasdemocraticatleasttotheextentthatthevoteswerehonestlycountedand the result not known in advance) was reduced to a choice between twocandidateswhowerenot to the likingof a greatmanypeoplewhohad riskedmuchtodemandtheremovalofMubarak.TheywereaskedtochoosebetweenMubarak’slastprimeminister,AhmedShafiq,whowasbackedbythemilitary,andaleadingmemberoftheMuslimBrotherhood,MohammedMorsi,whowona narrow victory. Many secular Egyptians who were distrustful of theBrotherhoodvotedforMorsionthegroundsthattosupportaprominentmemberoftheMubarakregimewouldmeanthatthesacrificesofthosewhohaddiedor

beenmaimedintherevolutionhadbeeninvain.InEgyptandelsewhere, theMuslimBrothershadgainedprestige fromthe

very fact that they had been imprisoned and persecuted by the secularautocracies, and had earned some popularity for the charitable services theyprovidedtothepoor.Thefactthattheyhadanexistingorganizationmeantthattheyweremuchbetterpreparedthanweresecularliberalstoflourishinthepost-revolutionary political climate.Yet it appears, asOlivierRoy has argued, thatthe‘ArabSpringtooktheBrothersbysurprise’.133Researchonpublicopinionin the Arab world has shown deep divisions in most countries on the rolereligionshouldplayinpolitics,withtheexceptionofLebanonwherethereisaconsensusthatitsinfluenceshouldbeminimal,reflectingsectariandivisionsandfearsofareturntodevastatingcivilwaralongreligiouslines.134InmostoftheArab countries surveyed, there was an emerging consensus that the clergy‘should not seek to affect the political behavior of ordinary citizens’ butsignificantdisagreementonhowmuchinfluencereligiousofficialsshouldhaveon governmental decisions. For amajority ofArab respondents, though – andthiswasquitenotablysoinTunisiaandEgypt–economicissueswereatthetopof people’s agenda.Unemployment and inflationwere the problems thatmostworriedthem,followedinorderofimportancebycorruption.135

Although theMuslimBrotherhoodwere not the primemovers in carryingout the revolutionof2011, theywere itsmain initialbeneficiaries.ThosewhoworriedabouttheircapacitytogoverndemocraticallybutgaveMorsithebenefitofthedoubtatthetimeofthepresidentialelectionsoonhadtheirdoubtsratherthantheirhopesamplyreinforced.Morsi’spopularityhaddroppedfrom57percent at the time of his election inmid-2012 to 28 per cent byMay 2013.136Whatwasmorefundamentalwashisuseofanarrowmajoritytopushthroughpartisanchangesratherthanbuildconsensus.Anewconstitutionwasratifiedinaturnoutofonly32percentofeligiblevoters.Therecouldscarcelyhavebeenasharpercontrastbetween themanner inwhichMohammedMorsiproceeded togovernandthewaythatAdolfoSuárezusedthepowersconferreduponhiminthe Spanish transition to democracy (discussed in Chapter 4). Morsi had, ofcourse, a host of problems to contend with, quite apart from the teeteringeconomy,whichwas thebiggest issue formanyEgyptians.The institutionsofthe‘deepstate’ thathaddeveloped inMubarak’s time– thearmy, thesecurityforces,asignificantpartofthejudiciaryandofbigbusiness–weredistrustfulofthe Muslim Brotherhood. The military had managed to emerge from the

revolution of 2011with its authority enhanced, since it had acquiesced in theremovalofMubarak.OpponentsoftheMorsigovernmentweretobefoundonseveral different flanks. It had even disappointedmore extreme Islamists, theSalafis, who had briefly formed an alliance with it. So far as they wereconcerned, the government was too liberal and insufficiently committed to arigid interpretation of their religion. Above all, the secular liberals had everyreason to be disappointed withMorsi’s use of his small electoral majority toexcludethemfromthepoliticalprocess.

Thesefailuresmeantthattherewaswidespreadsupportfrommanysectionsofsocietyfor themilitarycoupthat toppledthegovernmentinearlyJuly2013and placedMorsi under arrest.Not for the first time, thosewho had played amajorpartinoverturninganunpopularautocraticregimefeltthattherevolutionhadbeenbetrayed.Both thewayMorsigovernedand themanner inwhichhewas, in turn, removed frompower illustrated the advantages of a pact-makingprocess whereby in some of the most successful transitions fromauthoritarianismtodemocracy–mostnotablySpain–verybroadagreementwasreached,asaresultofbargainingandcompromise,onthenewrulesofthegame.TheMorsigovernmentshowedlittleinterestinorunderstandingoftheneedfor‘societal’ as distinct from ‘majoritarian’ legitimacy. Interestingly, a scholarlyopinionsurveyconductedinEgyptinDecember2011foundstrongsupportfordemocracy, rejection of the idea that what the country needed was a strongleadereven if thatpersonoverthrewdemocracy,and thiswasaccompaniedbymorethan60percentofthepopulationrejectingalsothestatement‘themilitaryshouldwithdrawentirely frompolitical life for good’.That last opinionmightseem,onthefaceofit,tobeatoddswiththefirsttwo.Itappears,though,thatwith their recent experience in mind, many Egyptians had come to see themilitary as the ultimate guardians of the democracy they desired.137 Themajority who were ready to concede a political role for the military wouldincludealsopeoplewhowerecontentwithEgyptthewayitwasunderMubarak.

This helps to explain the breadth of the alliance in support of the forcibleoverthrowoftheMorsigovernmentinJuly2013.ItembracedthosenostalgicfortheMubarak regime and determined to hold on to their former privileges andsomeofthatoldregime’smostdedicatedliberalanddemocraticopponents.Yetit is hard to see how the overturning of the result of a reasonably democraticpresidential election will promote legitimate rule. It is equally difficult tocomprehendhow thebanningofEgypt’s largest socialmovement, theMuslimBrotherhood, is compatiblewith democracy. For themilitary elitewho seized

power,andwhodidnothesitatetokillhundredsofBrotherhoodprotesters,thesemay not be issues that particularly trouble them, but for the ‘liberals’ whocheered themon it seemsall too likely thatdisillusionmentwith the resultsofviolentoverthrowofaregimewillonceagainfollow.

*

Some revolutions, then, are led – as inRussia inNovember 1917 or Cuba in1958–59–andothersarerelativelyleaderless,asinTunisiaandEgyptin2011.Itisclearthatregimechangeofitselfdoesnotnecessarilyrequireanestablishedorganization, an outstanding leader or even a handful of leaders but can, in arevolutionary situation, be a much wider, looser and unstructured movement.That is not to deny that in some revolutions particular leaders have been soimportant that the systemwouldnothavechangedwhen itdid,orwouldhavechanged in very different ways, in their absence. When the opportunity ofholding leaders and regimes accountable for theirmisdeeds is absent, the casefor systemic change is overwhelming. When that can be done by peacefulmeans, as it was in post-Franco Spain or in Eastern Europe in 1989, this ishugelypreferabletorevolution.Inthelastresort,however,thereisjustificationforviolent revolution– the forcible removalof tyrants frompower–whenallattempts tochangeanoppressive systembypeacefulmeanshave failed.Whatfollows, however, seldom lives up to the rhetoric and hopes of the moreidealistic of the revolutionaries, asmost of the cases examined in this chapterandthenextillustratealltooclearly.

*AlthoughthecityofPekingisnowknowninEnglishasBeijing,anexceptionhasbeenmadeforPekingUniversitybytheUniversityitself.Becauseitalreadyhadaninternationalreputationunderthatname,theUniversityinitsofficialcommunicationsinEnglishcontinuestorefertoitselfasPeking.*Itcanstakeaclaimtocontinuousexistenceuptothepresentday.Underthesamename,itisoneofthetwomajorpoliticalpartiesincontemporaryTaiwan.*Manyrevolutionaryleaders,asrebelsagainst,orasfugitivesfrom,theconservativeauthoritarianregimestheywere intentonoverthrowing, adoptedanomdeguerre.Thus, forexample,UlyanovbecameLenin,DjugashvilibecameStalin,BronsteinbecameTrotskyandBrozbecameTito.

6

TotalitarianandAuthoritarianLeadership

Thefirst,andperhapsonly,dictator tousetheadjective‘totalitarian’asoneofwarmapprovalwasBenitoMussoliniininter-warItaly.Ithadbeenemployedasearlyas1923bytheDuce’sopponents,buttwoyearslaterwasembracedbyhissupporters andbyMussolini himself.He spokeof ‘our fierce totalitarianwill’andcontinued: ‘Wewant tomake thenation fascist, so that tomorrow ItaliansandFascists...willbethesamething.’1Mussolinilikedtodescribethesystemconstructedunderhisleadershipaslostatototalitario,thetotalitarianstate.2Hehad borrowed the term from the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile whobecameanideologistoffascism.Gentile’sGermanequivalentwasCarlSchmitt,an academic lawyer who provided some of the intellectual foundation forHitler’s dictatorship, arguing that ‘the Führer’ stood higher than any stateinstitution and that he was ‘the highest judge of the nation and the highestlawgiver’.3 Schmitt, too, approved of the notion of the ‘totalitarian state’, butHitler rarely used the term and,when he did so, prefaced itwith ‘so-called’.4Communist leaders and ideologists never applied ‘totalitarian’ to their ownsystemsandonlyoccasionallywhenreferringtofasciststates.5

Althoughthenotionoftotalitarianismpredatedboth‘highStalinism’,atermcoinedtodescribetheSovietUnionfromtheearly1930suntilStalin’sdeathin1953, and the coming to power of Hitler, it was critics of both fascist andCommunist systemswhomost commonly spoke of totalitarianism.What gave

the term tractionwas theobservation in the1930s that,obviousdifferencesofpolicy and goals notwithstanding, there were a number of notable similaritiesbetween theSoviet andNazi regimesheadedby JosifStalin andAdolfHitler,eventhoughtheyclaimedtobepolaropposites.BothintheSovietUnionandinGermanytherewasahierarchicalsinglepartywhichexistedinparallelwith,buthadasuperiorauthorityto,governmentalinstitutionsatalllevels.6Therewasinbothcountries apoliticalpolice forcewhich in the1930semployed terror andviolence, although more selectively in pre-war Germany than in the SovietUnionwhereattimesitwasonamassscale.Eachoftheseregimeshadalsoabody of doctrine which purported to explain both history and contemporarysociety,providingaframeworkintowhichallsocialphenomenacouldbefitted.Thedoctrinesthemselveswereverydifferent,ofcourse,withtheideasofMarxandLenin(evenintheirStalinistcodifiedversion)muchthemoresophisticatedofthetwo.Eachideologyofferedavisionofthefuture–intheNazicasethatofa racially pure and powerful greater Germany and in the Soviet case of aharmonious, classless society. These imaginary futures were of far lessconsequence than scapegoating and violent repression in the present. InGermanymillionsrespondedtopropagandawhichportrayedJewsasthesourceoftheworld’sillsandofGermany’smisfortunesmostspecifically,whileintheSovietUnionmillionsapprovedofthepunishmentofclassenemiesandboughtinto the myth that Stalin’s tyrannical rule meant that the working class hadgained power in what was represented as a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’*Both regimes were also characterized by a cult of personality of the GreatLeader.

The term ‘totalitarian’ gained still wider currency after the SecondWorldWar when it was often applied indiscriminatingly to all Communist states,althoughthereweresignificantchangesovertimewithinthesecountriesaswellassubstantialdifferencesbetweenoneandanother.Thereis,forexample,avastdissimilaritybetweencontemporaryChinaandcontemporaryNorthKorea.Andtoapplythesameundifferentiatinglabelof‘totalitarian’toPolandandHungarywhen theywereunderCommunist rule, toTito’sYugoslavia in the1960sand1970sandtoNorthKoreaunderanyofthethreesuccessiveKimsisunhelpful.In these three European Communist countries some elements of civil societyexisted (the Churchwas especially important in Poland), while being entirelyabsentinNorthKorea.Communistpoliticalsystemswere–and,wheretheystillsurvive,are–neverlessthanhighlyauthoritarian,buttoputthemallinthemore

extremetotalitariancontaineristoobscureimportantdifferences.7The very notion of totalitarianism is controversial. There are scholarswho

reject itsapplicationeven to theSovietUnion from theearly1930s (bywhichtime Stalin had consolidated his power) until Stalin’s death or to Hitler’sGermanyfromthemid-1930stothecountry’sdefeatin1945,makingthepointthatnoteverythingwascontrolledfromabove.If,however,totalitarianismweretobedefinedasasysteminwhichonepersondecideseverything,thentherehasnever been such a system.That, however, is nomore a reason for completelyeschewing the term than the imperfectionsofall actuallyexistingdemocraciesarea reasonfor refusing tocallanycountrydemocratic. It isevident that totalcontrol, especiallyoverpeople’s thinking, existedonly in thepagesofGeorgeOrwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.8 But Orwell himself was well aware that indepicting tendencies he observed in Communism and fascism, he was notprovidingaprecisedescriptionofsocialrealitybutwasdrawingout‘totalitarianideas . . . to their logicalconsequences’.*ForOrwell, totalitarianismwaswhatMaxWebercalledan‘idealtype’(bywhich,needlesstosay,Weberwasnotinanywayimplyingapositiveevaluation).Weberarguedthat itwasanalyticallyuseful to express in extreme or pure form what was meant by a particularpoliticalorsocialcategory–as,forexample,bureaucracy,thesubjectofoneofhismostfamousanalyses.9

Itmakes sense, similarly, to present the features of totalitarianism in starkandextremeterms.Particularcountriescanthenbestudiedtoseeiftheycomesufficientlyclose to the ideal type tobemeaningfullydescribedas totalitarian.This is preferable to constantly changing the definition (as tended to happenduring theColdWaryears), so thatCommunist statesgenerally, or theSovietUnionspecifically,wouldalwaysremain‘totalitarian’,nomatterhowmuchtheymightchange internally.That tendencyled, in turn, toanotherconfusion,mostclearly exemplified by the American scholar, Jeane Kirkpatrick, whowas theReaganadministration’sambassadortotheUNinthefirsthalfofthe1980s.ShehelpedtopopularizetheviewthatallCommunistregimesweretotalitarianandthatwhereasauthoritariansystems,orwhatshecalled‘right-wingautocracies’,couldbechangedfromwithin,totalitarianregimescouldnot.10Thus,theSovietUnion,inparticular,wouldbeimpervioustochangeemanatingfrominsidethesystemorfromSovietsociety.Proponentsofthiswidespreadviewconfusedtheabstract notion of totalitarianismwith actualCommunist states.They failed toseethatanumberofCommunistsystemshadinthepost-Stalinerabecomemore

authoritarian than totalitarian and that within the ruling Communist partiesthemselves, there was diversity of view behind the monolithic façade theypresentedtotheirownsocietiesandtotheoutsideworld.

Adherents of the totalitarian-and-impervious-to-change school overlookedalso the importance of educational advancements under Communism – thedevelopment not only of universal literacy but also of substantial highereducationsectorswithinthesesocieties.IfCommunismcontained‘theseedsofits own destruction’ (to use Marx’s phrase about capitalism), it was througheducating people to the point at which theywere open to new ideas and lessinclined to accept outdated dogmas uncritically. Those who thought thatCommunist systemswere immune to change fromwithin also overlooked thefact that leadership – which played an important part in the transition toCommunist rule, as well as in sustaining it – could be an instrument oftransformativechange.

In political and social reality totalitarian and authoritarian regimes arelocated on a continuum.At one end there is the totalitarian extreme of EnverHoxha’sAlbaniaorKim IlSung’sNorthKorea and at theother end themildauthoritarianism of Singapore, which, while not a democracy, has a vibrantmarketeconomyand,formostpracticalpurposes,aruleoflaw.Inbetweentherearecountriesaboutwhich therecanbe legitimateargumentas towhether theycome close enough to ideal-typical totalitarianism to be called totalitarian orwhethertheyarebetterdescribedasauthoritarian.Theremaybesomedispersalofpowerwithin thegroupat theapexof thehierarchy,but ina totalitarianasdistinct from authoritarian system, one man (and all such regimes have beenmale-dominated)holdspreponderant, andoften supreme,power.Authoritarianregimes, in contrast, can be either autocracies or oligarchies. In other words,someareruledbyasingledictatorandothershaveamorecollectiveleadership.Evenwithintheoligarchies,aleader’spersonalityandvalueshavethepotentialtomakeabiggerdifferencetothesystemthanisopentoaleaderinademocracywherepowerismoredispersedandbothinstitutionsandpublicopinionimposestricterlimitsonwhataleadermaydo.

STALIN’SDICTATORSHIPANDSOVIETOLIGARCHIES

Adam Smith noted that ‘gross abuse’ of power, as well as ‘perverseness,

absurdity,andunreasonableness’weremoreliabletobefoundundertheruleof‘singlepersons’thanoflargerassemblies.11Whileitwouldbefoolishtodeny–and Smith did not do so – that groups are also capable of coming to stupiddecisionsorofsponsoringdreadfulactions,unconstrainedpersonalruleismoredangerous. In the experience of the two major Communist states, the SovietUnionandChina,periodsofmorecollectiveleadershipwerefarlessdevastatingandmurderous than those duringwhichStalin andMaoZedongwielded theirgreatest individual power. In the Soviet case there was a basically collectiveleadershipforat leastadecadeafter the1917Bolshevikrevolution,firstunderLeninandthenunderStalin,whilethelatterwasstillgraduallystrengtheninghispowerbase.SolongasLeninwasalive,hewasthemostinfluentialfigureintheCommunist Party, although his highest formal position was as head of thegovernment (Chairmanof theCouncil of People’sCommissars) rather than ofthe party. Within the party leadership, however, Lenin relied on his politicalprestige,naturalauthorityandpowersofpersuasiontocarrytheday.Insidehisownparty,hedidnotemploythetypeofcoercionandterrorhevisitedonthosewhostoodinthewayoftheCommunists’consolidationoftheirpower.Thefact,however, that Stalin became the most notorious mass murderer in the lasthundredyearsofRussianhistorydoesnotabsolveLeninfromcreatingmanyofthepreconditionsforStalin’styranny.ItwasLeninwhoplayedadecisiveroleindestroying a fragile political pluralism and in laying the foundations of futuredictatorshipwithhisemphasisoncentralizationofpowerwithinasingleparty,his contempt for parliamentary politics, his rejection of judicial independence,andthecreationofpunitivepoliticalpoliceorgans.

Untilthelate1920sStalin,asLenin’ssuccessor,wasgraduallyconsolidatinghisauthority,sidingfirstwithonegroupandthenanotherintheleadershipoftheCommunistParty,while avoiding the appearanceof seekingdictatorial power.By 1929 Stalin was clearly the predominant Soviet leader, although someelementsofcollectiveleadershipwerestillpresentevenatthebeginningofthe1930s.By1933,however,asaleadingspecialistonthisperiodofSoviethistoryhas observed, Stalin ‘was already a personal dictator, whose proposals wereapparently never challenged in the Politburo’.12 Themost notable of Stalin’srivals, Leon Trotsky, had been successively expelled first from the topleadershipandthenfromtheparty(in1927),sentintointernalexilein1928,andexpelled from the Soviet Union in 1929. Later, many of the leadingrevolutionaries of 1917, including Nikolay Bukharin, were to be killed at

Stalin’s behest. For amajority thismeant execution followingMoscow show-trialsin1936–38;forTrotskyit involvedassassinationwithanice-pickbyoneofStalin’sNKVDagentsinMexicoin1940.

Mostofthe1920s,incontrastwiththe1930s,wereatimewhensomedebatestilltookplacewithintheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion,althoughotherpolitical parties hadbeenoutlawed.After theRussianCivilWarLenin’sNewEconomic Policy included economic concessions to the peasantry whichpersistedduringtheperiodofmorecollectiveleadershipuntilthelatetwenties.From1929Stalin spearheaded the campaignof compulsory collectivization ofagriculture,whichbytheendof1933hadresultedinthedeportationfromtheirlocalityofmorethantwomillionpeasants.Famine,whichwasaconsequenceofthe high grain procurement quotas the state demanded from the collectivizedpeasantry,broughtaboutthedeathsofmorethanfivemillionpeopleinUkraine,southern Russia and the North Caucasus.13 Stalin took a particularly closeinterest in the collectivization process, and personally insisted on theintroductionofthedeathpenalty(byadecreeissuedon7August1932)fortheftofgrainfromcollectivefarmfields.14

Stalinwasdeterminedtoachievethespeedyindustrializationofthecountryand,accompaniedbyrapidsocialmobility,thismadegreatstridesinthe1930s,butataterribleprice.ItwasobviouslyimpossibleforStalinpersonallytotakeeverymajordecisionintheSovietUnion,evenwhenhewasattheheightofhispower.PowerwaswieldednotonlybyStalinbutbybureaucraciesatdifferentlevels of the system, and these bodies acquired, and attempted to defend,institutional interests of their own. Stalin, however, did succeed in destroying‘the oligarchical system’ that had developed in the 1920s and, as theRussianscholar who has studied his rule most closely observes, at the root of hispersonal dictatorship was his ‘limitless power’ over ‘the fate of any Sovietofficial,includingthemembersofthePolitburo’.15

Stalin took a more detailed interest in some institutions than others. Inparticular,hekepttheorgansofstatesecurity–thepoliticalpolice–underhisclosecontrol,andsupervisedtherepression.Intwoyearsalone,1937–38,morethan1.7millionpeoplewerearrestedandatleast818,000ofthemwereshot.16They included vast numbers of imaginary enemies of the Soviet state and ofStalin, and somewhat smaller numbers of real anti-Communists. Among thevictimswereseveralmembersof thePolitburoaswellasa largeproportionofthe senior army officer corps. The latter included, as an especially notable

casualty,MarshalTukhachevskywho had fought on theBolshevik side in thecivilwarandlaterplayedakeyroleinthemodernizationoftheRedArmy.WithhistightcontrolovertheNKVD,Stalinwieldedapoweroflifeanddeathoverhis ‘colleagues’. He also spread his net far wider. Some social groups weretargetedmore than others. The old nobility, clerics, intellectuals and peasantswere, in proportion to their numbers, more likely to be arrested than wereindustrialworkers.Bythelater1930s,whenStalinwasincreasinglylookingforthe enemy within, high party and state officials were frequent victims of hischronicdistrust.Andsuccessiveheadsofthepoliticalpolice,theverybodythatcarriedout thepurges,stoodexceptionallyhighchancesofbeingexecuted.Nosocialgrouporindividualcouldfeel immunefromtheriskofarrestforcrimesthat (unlike those of theNKVD)were oftenmore imaginary than real. It hasbeenrightlyobservedthatStalin’suseofmassrepression‘sethisregimeapartfromitsLeninistpredecessorandfromtheselectiveuseofrepressionemployedbysuccessiveSovietregimes’.17

NikitaKhrushchev,Stalin’ssuccessor, illustratedboth thepotentialand thepitfallsofleadershipwithinasystemthatsomewouldstillregardastotalitarianbut by then is more aptly described as post-totalitarian authoritarianism. LikeStalin,heusedthemostseniorpositionintheparty–theGeneralSecretaryship,renamedFirstSecretaryshipduringtheKhrushchevera–tobringhissupportersinto the top leadership team and thus gradually enhanced his already strongposition. It did not, however, become anything like the grotesque power thatStalinaccumulated.Khrushchev,whoseownhands in theStalinerawereveryfar from bloodless, displayed courageous leadership when he attacked Stalin,whose genius and godlike infallibility had been hailed for three decades, in aclosed-sessionspeechtodelegatesattheTwentiethPartyCongressin1956and,openly, at the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961. He made the 1956breakthrough speech against the wishes of some senior members of thePresidiumoftheCentralCommittee(asthePolitburowasknownatthetime).

Amongthoseanxioustopreservethelatedictator’simageintact,VyacheslavMolotov, Lazar Kaganovich and Kliment Voroshilov were especially vocal.MolotovdeclaredataPresidiummeetingthat‘StalinwasthegreatcontinuerofLenin’s work’ and that ‘under the leadership of Stalin, socialism wasvictorious’.18Khrushchev replied: ‘Stalinwas a betrayer of socialism, and bythemostbarbaricmeans.Heannihilatedtheparty.HewasnoMarxist.’RatherthanprotectStalin’smemory,Khrushchevinsisted,theyneededto‘intensifythe

bombardmentofthecultofpersonality’.19OneofKhrushchev’sclosestalliesinthe party leadership on the issue of destalinization, Anastas Mikoyan, laterwrote: ‘Hehad thecharacterof a leader:persistence,obstinacy inpursuitof agoal,courage,andawillingnesstogoagainsttheprevailingstereotypes.’WhenKhrushchev was seized of a new idea, Mikoyan added, there would be nomeasured response. He ‘moved forward like a tank’. That could have itsdisadvantages, but, said Mikoyan, it was an excellent quality for a leaderengagedinthebattlefordestalinization.20

The fears of Khrushchev’s opponents within the leadership about theconsequences of attacking Stalin seemed to them all too justified when theFebruary 1956 speech had huge repercussions within the internationalCommunistmovement.ItshookthefaithofmanypartymembersworldwideandstimulatedunrestinEasternEurope,especiallyPolandandHungary.Beforetheendof theyear,revolutionagainstCommunistrulehadbrokenout inHungaryand it was put down ruthlessly by Soviet tanks. Blaming Khrushchev fordestabilizinginternationalCommunism,amajorityofthePresidiumattemptedtodeposehim in1957.Khrushchevoutmanoeuvred thembyappealingover theirheads to the Central Committee, the larger body in which he had moresupporters,many of them recently promoted by him. In principle, theCentralCommittee had a still higher authority than the Presidium (Politburo), butnormallyitdidthebiddingofthatsmallergroup.Givenanopensplitintheinnerleadershipteam,theCentralCommitteehadachoiceofwhomtofollow.In1957they ralliedbehindKhrushchev. Itwasadifferent story in1964whenamuchmore overwhelming majority of the Presidium had decided to get rid ofKhrushchev(withonlyMikoyanprepared toput inawordforhim).This timetheCentralCommittee gave their full support to the party leader’s opponents.Khrushchevhad,theybelieved,actedincreasinglycapriciouslyandunilaterally.Astheysawit,hehadunderminedtheinterestsofvirtuallyeveryinstitutionandelitegroupwithinthesystem.

While Khrushchev deserves real credit for beginning the process ofdestalinization,hisownprogressionfromheadingacollectiveleadershipinthemid-1950stomakingimpulsiveandarbitrarydecisionsbytheearly1960swasdamaginganddangerous.ThedecisiontoplaceSovietmissilesinCuba,whichbrought the world close to nuclear war in 1962, was Khrushchev’s.Domestically,hewasdoingmoreharmthangoodtotheeconomy.LikeStalin,he was taken in by the quack scientist Trofim Lysenko, backing his useless

nostrums for increasing agricultural production and ignoring the evidenceproduced by serious specialists. Infuriated by opposition from within theAcademyofSciencesandtheAgriculturalAcademy,KhrushchevcalledinJuly1964fortheAcademyofSciencestobeabolishedandtheAgriculturalAcademyto be banished from Moscow and reconstructed in the countryside.21 Thesethings did not happen, for alreadyhis senior colleagueswere playing for timeand justwaiting for the optimalmoment to remove a leaderwho had becomeincreasinglyautocraticaswellasirascibleandunpredictable.Theystruckon14October 1964, calling him back from vacation to Moscow to send him intocompulsoryretirement.APravdaeditorialtwodayslaterdidnotevenmentionKhrushchev by name but spoke of ‘harebrained scheming, half-bakedconclusionsandhastydecisionsandactionsdivorcedfromreality,braggingandbluster,attractiontorulebyfiat’andan‘unwillingnesstotakeintoaccountwhatscienceandpracticalexperiencehavealreadyworkedout’.22AlthoughthatwasnotthewholestoryofKhrushchev’sleadership,itwascertainlypartofit.

With the elevation of Leonid Brezhnev, in succession to Khrushchev, asleaderoftheSovietCommunistPartyin1964,eighteenyearsofmorecollectiveleadershipensued.Onceagainthegeneralsecretarywasabletousethepoliticalresources available to theholderof thatoffice to strengthenhis authorityovertime, and in the 1970s a series of evermore absurd honourswere heaped onBrezhnev,includingtheOrderofVictory,thehighestawardformilitaryvalour,forBrezhnev’s role in theSecondWorldWar (whichhadnot seemedquite soremarkable at the time) and the Lenin Prize for literature, the highest awardavailable towriters,whichBrezhnev received forhis slimvolumesofghostedmemoirs.BrezhnevandhisPolitburocolleagueswerehappytoallowtheKGBtouseavarietyofmethods toquell anyovertmanifestationsofdissentwithinSoviet society – from warnings to lengthy imprisonment in labour camps orincarcerationinmentalhospitals.Howcouldyoubesane, thequestionseemedtobe, if you thoughtyou could challenge thepowerof theSoviet state?Withdissidentswhoenjoyedgreatprestige,bothinternationallyandwithasignificantminority of Soviet citizens, different methods were used. Thus, the writerAleksandr Solzhenitsyn – anti-Communist but more Russian nationalist thanliberal – was forcibly expelled from the country, with his Soviet citizenshiprevoked, and the physicist and liberal critic ofmany of the party leadership’sactions,AndreySakharov,wassentintointernalexile.

As these measures underline, Brezhnev was a conservative Communist.

Eventheanti-StalinismthatKhrushchevhadsetinmotionwasputintoreverse.Stalinwasnotfullyrehabilitated,butitbecameeasiertopraisehiminprintthantocriticizehim.Brezhnev’sbasicpositionwasthatallrockingoftheboatshouldbestrictlydiscouraged.ButindealingwiththevariousSovietelites–thehigherechelonsof theparty, themilitary, theKGBand theministries–his stylewasconciliatory. The Brezhnev era was the golden age of the Soviet bureaucrat.Stalin had threatened (and often taken) their lives.Khrushchev had threatened(and often removed) their security of tenure.With Brezhnev presiding in theKremlin, theywereallowed togrowold together, incomfortandwith little tofear.With its lack of freedom, shortage of consumer goods, and long queueseven forbasic foodstuffs, itwas far fromagoldenage for theaveragecitizen,andyetwhenRussianswereasked inaserioussurveyconductedat theendofthetwentiethcenturywhatwasthebesttimetohavelivedinRussiainthoselasthundredyears,theBrezhneverawasmentionedmoreoftenthananyother.23Itwasseenasatimeofpredictabilityandstability.

Under Stalin anyone could be arrested, even if they were not in the leastcritical of the regime. The secret police had quotas to fulfil, Stalin waschronically suspicious, and you could be the subject of an anonymousdenunciationbyaneighbourwhocovetedyourapartment.IntheBrezhnevera,youhadactuallytodosomethingtoattracthostileattentionfromtheauthorities.These could be activities that would be regarded as perfectly legal in ademocracy, but which in the Soviet Union led to severe sanctions – such ascalling for greater national autonomy (in, for instance, Ukraine or Lithuania),circulatingbannedcreative literature in typescript,orwritinga letterofprotest(about, for example, the hounding of Solzhenitsyn andSakharov). In contrast,Soviet citizenswhoobserved all theoutwardproprieties could feel reasonablysecure.Under Stalin, hundreds of thousands of arrestswere quite arbitrary. IntheBrezhneveratherewerediscerniblerulesofthegame.

AnumberofseniorfiguresinthePolitburoinadditiontoBrezhnevcarriedweight in the 1970s, among themMikhail Suslov, Aleksey Kosygin, AndreyGromyko and Dmitriy Ustinov. The regime was never less than highlyauthoritarian, but in their own homes people were no longer afraid to speakfreely, in contrast with Stalin’s time. Paradoxically, there were more truebelievers that theSovietUnionwasbuildinganewsociety,one thatwouldbevastly superior to anything in the contemporary West, during the years ofStalin’sterrorinthelater1930sthanweretobefoundinthe1970s.Thatkindofoptimism also existed, and had even taken a new lease of life, under

Khrushchev. This had been, among other things, the era in which the SovietUnionput the firstperson in space, a sourceofgreatpride formostRussians.TheBrezhnevera,incontrast,wasoneofgrowingcynicism.Itwasaperiodof‘doublethink’, to use Orwell’s term, in which people could simultaneouslyproclaim the superiority and eventual triumph of the Soviet system whileenvying the standard of living in the West, yearning for its products anddreamingofspendingsometimethere.Crucially,however,essentiallycollectiveleadership was at least a vast improvement over Stalin’s dictatorship. Theconditionsof life in1977werequalitativelybetter forSovietcitizens,whethermanual workers, peasants or well-educated professionals, than they were in1937.ThecollectivecautionofthetopleadershipteamdidnotinflictremotelyasmuchpainontheirownpeopleasStalinhaddone.

PERSONALRULEVERSUSOLIGARCHYINCHINA

A similar pattern can be discerned in the other Communist giant, China. Thegreatest disasters occurred during the period when Mao Zedong wieldeduntrammelled power. In contrast, the Chinese Communists had some notableachievementsintheearlyyearsafterthesuccessoftheirrevolutionin1949andagain after Mao’s death. Between 1949 and 1957, the new Communistgovernment brought inflationunder control, largely eliminated corruption, andmade substantial strides in industrialization. During this time hundreds ofthousands of peoplewere killed by the new regime, and so the period shouldcertainly not be idealized, but there were more real achievements and fewerpremature deaths than in the years of Mao’s greatest individual exercise ofpower.

Eveninthefirsthalfofthe1950s,MaoZedongunquestionablyhadahigherauthority than any of his colleagues, but his individual impact on policy wasquite limited. That was partly because China was drawing heavily on Sovietexperience, while carefully avoiding at that stage some of the worst Sovietexcesses in thecollectivizationofagriculture.TheChinese leadershipsharedacommitment to rapid economic development and technological advance,although opinions differed on the speed and manner in which this could beachieved.Maointhoseyearshelda‘relativelycentristposition’that‘servedtoameliorateconflictandbuildaconsensusratherthanpolarizedifferenceswithin

the leadership’.24 Until the mid-1950s, as two leading specialists on Chinesepolitics have noted, ‘Mao seemed tolerant of debate in the Politburo, evenacceptingdefeatoneconomicpolicy.’25It isnotaccidental that inall thetimeChina was under Mao’s leadership, these years saw the most solidaccomplishments.DisasterbeckonedwhenMaodecidedheknewbetterthananyspecialistsandbulldozedhiscolleaguesintoapprovingin1958whatwascalledthe‘GreatLeapForward’.

The Great Leap was immediately preceded by the Hundred Flowersmovement,whichgained itsnamefromMao’s remark, ‘Letahundredflowersbloom in culture’ and ‘let a hundred schools of thought contend’.26 NikitaKhrushchevwasnottheonlyonewhothoughtthatwhatMaowantedwastogetcritics to reveal themselves, so that he could identify anddealwith them.YetoneimpetustothisapparentliberalizationhadbeenKhrushchev’sownexposureofatleastsomeofthecrimesofStalin.IthadbecomeprudentforMaoatsuchatimetoattempttodemonstratethathewasnothingliketheSovietdictator.Maowaswillingtoencouragecriticismofspecificerrors,whilehavingabsolutelynodesiretoletloosefundamentalcritiquesoftheCommunistsystem.Thecriticismthat did ensue was clearly more than he had bargained for, with seriousdifferences of opinion within the Communist Party revealed. Mao’s ownposition in the Politburo was weakened in 1957, and his response was to re-emphasize the importance of class struggle and to launch an ‘anti-rightistcampaign’. It led to the expulsion from the party of several hundred thousandmembers.27 TheGreat Leap Forward,which he next embarked upon,was anexerciseinmassmobilizationinwhichMaostoppedlisteningtoengineersandtechnologists, including well-qualified specialists from the Soviet Union, andsidelined the institutions of the Chinese central government. Inspirationalideology,soitappeared,wasabouttomakeexpertiseredundant.Huge‘people’scommunes’werecreated in thecountryside,asMaosought tobringcloser theultimategoalofbuildingCommunism,aswellassettingthemoreprosaictargetofovertakingBritaineconomicallywithinfifteenyears.Noheedwaspaideithertomaterialobstaclesortoprofessionaladvice.Oncethismassmobilizationwasunderway, false reporting suggested increased grain output,whereas in realitytherehadbeenadrasticdrop.Mao’sman-madecatastrophewasnothelpedbynature,fortherewereseriousfloodsin1959and1960.

Alongwiththedeliberatekillingoftensofthousandsofthosewhodraggedtheir feet, rather thanmaking the ‘GreatLeap’, at least thirtymillionpeople–

forty-fivemillionaccording toa recenthigh-endestimatebasedon research inprovincialChinesearchives–diedprematurelybetween1958and1961,mainlyofstarvationandalsoofdisease,towhichmalnourishedandexhaustedworkerswere especially prone.28 Liu Shaoqi, who was at the time the number twopersoninthePolitburoandMao’sputativesuccessor,wentasclosetocriticizingMao as was possible in a speech in January 1962 when he attributed thedisastrousconsequencesof theGreatLeap30per cent tobadweather and thewithdrawal of Soviet aid, but 70 per cent to bad political decisions.29 Theventure had beenMao’s personal initiative andwas driven ruthlessly by him.Thetragedyitproducedwasonsuchascalethatamoreorderlygovernmenthadtobereintroducedintheearly1960stoputthestateandsocietytogetheragain.The collegiality of the first half of the 1950s was not, however, restored. In1962, with the Great Leap Forward abandoned, Mao ‘disrupted the ongoingnational recovery effort by forcing his colleagues to accept renewed classstruggle’andmadeitclearthathewouldtoleratenoopposition.30

Institutionswhichhadbeendowngraded,especiallyinthethree-yearperiodof 1959–1961, were, nevertheless, restored to something approachingCommunistnormality.Maobelievedthatitwashisradicalinitiativesthatwerenow being watered down and rendered more innocuous by the bureaucracy.Althoughhispositionintheearly1960sasthepre-eminentleaderwashardlyindoubt, other leaders also enjoyed considerable authority. They included suchsenior officials as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and the First Secretary of theBeijingpartyorganization,PengZhen.Maonotonlywantedtoplacehimselfona still higher pedestal, he also retained an enthusiasm for ultra-radical ideas.HavingbeenverycriticalofSoviet‘revisionism’underKhrushchev,hebecameincreasingly concerned that Chinawas losing its revolutionary élan. Thiswascombined with an egocentric preoccupation with his own legacy which hepreferred to entrust to radical revolutionaries rather than to bureaucrats orreformists. His solution was to launch what was called the ‘Great ProletarianCultural Revolution’. It lasted for a decade and during that time made lifeimpossible for bureaucrats and for pragmatic reformers alike. Mao set aboutradicalizingChina’s youth and encouraging them to reject everything old andestablished and to build anew. School teachers were prime victims ofrevolutionarypersecution.Dismissed from their jobs and abused, theywere inmanycasesinruralareastorturedtoconfesstopoliticalcrimes.31Universitiesstopped functioning for several years in the late 1960s, as students became

emissaries of Maoism. Mao himself played an incendiary role, urging thedistributionof arms toworkers and students active in the revolutionary cause.‘Armtheleft’becameasloganandonethatwasactedupon.32Violencegotsoout of hand that by 1969 the military were brought in to reduce the level ofdisorder.TheCulturalRevolution lastedfrom1966untilMao’sdeath in1976,althoughwithalesserintensityinthefirsthalfofthe1970sthaninthesecondhalfofthe1960s.Inthelongrun,itachievedpreciselytheoppositeofwhatMaohad intended. The revulsion against the turmoilwas such that the pragmatistsandreformersgainedascendancyin thepost-Maoera,withDengXiaoping(asalreadynotedinChapter4)playingthemostdecisiverole.

TheChineseCommunistPartyhasbeencautiousaboutcriticizingMao–hisface still adorns the country’s paper money – so crucial was his role in theparty’s history.Hewas the leader before the revolution, during the successfulrevolutionary struggle and for over a quarter of a century thereafter when helatterlyacquireddictatorialpoweroverthepartyandtherestofsociety.Yetthepost-Mao leadership, with Deng especially prominent, could hardly avoidcondemningtheCulturalRevolution,sincemanyof themhadsufferedfromit,andasthetaskofrepairingthedamagefelltothem.Nor,whilepropagatingtheideathatoverhiscareerMaoZedonghaddonemoregoodthanharm,couldtheydisguisethefactthatthepersonwhoboreresponsibilityfortheturmoilwasnoneother than Mao. In a ‘Resolution on Party History’ of 1981, the CentralCommitteedeclared:

The ‘cultural revolution’, which lasted fromMay 1966 to October 1976, was responsible for the mostseveresetbackandtheheaviestlossessufferedbytheParty,thestateandthepeoplesincethefoundingofthePeople’sRepublic.ItwasinitiatedandledbyComradeMaoZedong.33

Inreality,manymoredeathswerecausedbyMao’searlierfolly,theGreatLeapForward,butthevastmajorityofthosewhoperishedthenbelongedtotheruralcommunitywhoconstitutedat thattimeoverwhelminglythegreaterpartoftheChinese population. On a global scale of suffering, that was a still greatertragedy than the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’. The CulturalRevolution,however,lastedformuchlongerandthepeoplewhowereattackedduring it included officials and the most highly educated segment of thepopulation.WhereastheGreatLeapForwardmeantrevolutionaryturmoilinthecountryside,theCulturalRevolutionwasbothanurbanandaruralphenomenon.Initially, it affected mainly the towns, but from the winter of 1968–69 thecountrysidewas also hard hit by zealots and thugs in the name of revolution.

Recent research puts the number killed in the countryside alone in a rangebetween 750,000 and 1.5 million people and as many again afflicted withpermanentinjuries.34ThenumberwhodiedinthetownsasadirectresultoftheCulturalRevolutionhasbeenestimatedat‘approximatelyhalfamillionChinese,outofanurbanpopulationofaround135millionin1967’.35

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had a dire effect on Chineseeducation as well as on economic growth, and it affected the political eliteadversely to a far greater extent than had the Great Leap Forward. Indeed, ahigherproportionofofficialswereremovedfromtheirpostsinthecourseoftheCulturalRevolutionthanwereoustedevenbyStalinintheSovietUnioninthelate1930s,althoughalowerproportionwereimprisonedorexecutedinChina.Asanillustrationofthescaleofthelossofoffice,therewerethirteenmembersoftheSecretariatoftheparty’sCentralCommitteein1966,butonlyfourstillinplacein1969,andbetween60and70percentofofficialsinthecentralorgansof the party were dismissed.36 For these various reasons, nothing in Chinesehistory in the years since the revolution seemed worse to the post-Maoleadership than theCulturalRevolution,and theycouldhardlyabsolveMaoofresponsibilityforit.

FromMaotoDeng

Inthelaunchofthis‘lastrevolution’ofMao’slifetime,hiswifeJiangQing,whowaspartofagroupofradicals,playedamajorrole,eventhoughsheandMaonolongerhadaparticularlycloserelationship.Anactressbyprofession,JiangusedherpositionasMao’swifetofurtherherownpoliticalambitions,andinterpretedpart of her task as encouragingMao to beMao, that is to say a revolutionarywho would not allow time-servers and pen-pushers to get in the way ofpurificationthroughconflict.Inparticular,JiangreinforcedMao’sbeliefthatthecountryneededaculturalrevolution.Whatensuedwasinrealityananti-culturalrevolution. Many treasures of Chinese culture were destroyed – among themhistoric buildings, paintings, museum exhibits and books. The youthful RedGuardswereencouragedtoattackthe‘FourOlds’–oldthought,oldculture,oldcustomsandoldhabits.Oldpartyofficialsalsohadaveryhard time,with theobvious exception of oldChairmanMao,whose personality cultwas taken tonewheights(ordepths).DengXiaopingwascondemnedasa‘capitalistroader’in1966, removedfromofficeandputunderhousearrest in1967beforebeing

senttoworkinafactory.LiuShaoquiwasremovedfromhispostsin1967andcondemnedasa‘traitor,renegadeandscab’.Hediedunderhousearrestin1969.

Mao’sdeathin1976wassoonfollowedbythecomeuppanceofJiangQingandher threeprincipalallieswhoconstituted the ‘GangofFour’,which (foratime, at least) had been a ‘Gang of Five’, with Mao as the fifth andoverwhelminglythemostimportant.Hedidnot,however,trytoanointanyoneof the four former partners-in-crime as his potential successor.Whenby1976MaowastooilltoattendgovernmentandPolitburomeetings,theywerechairedbyHuaGuofengwhomMaohadnominatedasactingpremierwithaneyetohissuccession.Huaoccupiedamiddlepositionbetweentheradical‘GangofFour’on theonehandandDengXiaopingon theother.During these lastmonthsofMao’s life,Deng, according tohisdaughter, attended thePolitburoonlywhensummoned,forhefelt‘muchbetterathomewithhischildrenandgrandchildrenthanhavingtolookatthemadfacesofthe“GangofFour”’.Whenhedidattend,hepractisedaselectivedeafness.WhenoneoftheGangofFour,suchasZhangChunqiao,attackedhim,Dengclaimednottohavebeenabletomakeoutwhathadbeensaid.However,asZhangcomplainedbitterly,whenHua,at theotherend of the table, announced in a low voice ‘meeting adjourned’, Dengimmediately pushed back his chair and got ready to leave.37 A month afterMao’s death, the Gang of Four (all of themmembers of the Politburo) werearrested.Theirultra-revolutionaryactivitieshaddependedontheacquiescence,andattimesactiveencouragement,ofMao.WithMaogone,thoseinthepartyandgovernmentelitewhohadsufferedat theirhandswereable toconsolidatetheirforces.Attheirsubsequenttrial,JiangQingandZhangChunqiaowerebothsentenced to death, although the sentence was later commuted to lifeimprisonment. In 1991, by which time she was suffering from cancer, Jianghangedherself.Zhangwasreleasedfromprisonafterservingtwentyyears.38

Mao’s short-term successes in leading a revolution, involving massmobilizationandviolence,againstthepartyandstateestablishmentturnedouttobe wholly counterproductive. The reformism that followed Mao’s death,includingthecreationofasubstantialprivatesectorandmovementtoamarketeconomy, far exceeded the ‘revisionism’ of Khrushchev or of the Brezhnevleadership in the Soviet Union which Mao had found shocking. It was anunintendedconsequenceoftheCulturalRevolutionthatthosepartyofficialsandintellectuals who had survived it were inoculated for life against the kind ofcrude,unthinking,ultra-leftrevolutionismwhichhadbeensotraumaticforthem

personallyandwhichhadsodamagedthesocialandeconomicdevelopmentofChina.39

That was at least a beneficial side-effect in the midst of the misery theCultural Revolution heaped on China – and there was one other. Those whoattempted to introducemarketizingmeasures in the SovietUnion, even in theGorbachev era, ran up against tremendous opposition from entrenchedbureaucracies in the economicministries and from the party apparatus. Thosebureaucratic structures had been so shattered in China during the CulturalRevolutionthattherecouldbenosimilarpowerfulbureaucraticresistancetothestillboldermarketizingreformswhichDengXiaopingespoused.ThecollectiveleadershipthatsucceededMao,inwhichDengquitesoonemergedasthemostinfluential member, listened to specialist opinion. The policies they pursuedwerefarmorerationalthanwereMao’sfromthelate1950sonwards,bywhichtimehehadplacedhimselfonahigherpedestalthananyofhiscolleagues.

Deng’srolehasbeendiscussedatlengthinChapter4.Themainpointwhichneeds underlining in the present context is how different was not only thecontent of his policy but also his style of leadership as compared withMao.Deng,duringhisperiodofgreatest influence– from1978until theendof the1980s–didnotholdthehighestrankwithinthepartyandstate.Hedidretain,however,until1989theleadershipoftheparty’sCentralMilitaryCommission,and his confidence that he could rely on the support of the army was asignificantunderpinningforhisauthority.By1990–91,Deng’sideaswerelosingground inBeijing,partlybecauseof thedevelopingcrisis in theSovietUnion,culminating in the break-up of the Soviet state at the end of 1991, whichdramaticallyillustratedforveteranChineseCommuniststhepotentialdangersofliberalization. Deng was weakened also by the mass demonstrations inTiananmenSquarein1989andtheirbloodyoutcome.ConservativeCommunistsandMaoistleftistsalikeblamedadecadeofreformforwhettingtheappetiteofyoung people for politically liberal change. Reform and the opening to theoutsideworldwerecastigatedforallowingintheevilinfluenceofcapitalismandindividualism. All this strengthened the hands of those who emphasized onceagain the importance both of class struggle and of central planning and whomadecleartheirhostilitytofurtherliberalizationoftheeconomicsystem.Withaless determined, skilful and widely admired politician than Deng available torespond, the conservative backlash could have been more successful and far-reaching.Deng’scontentionwas thatonlyadecadeof reformhadenabled the

party to survive the upheaval of 1989.40 He opposed democratization butrefusedtobedeflectedfromtheeconomiccoursewhichhehadpresidedover.

ThroughouttheperiodwhenDengXiaopingwasChina’sparamountleader,hisviewsprevailedmoreoften thannot.Yet,seriousargumentwentonwithinthepartyleadership.Someleaders,notablyHuYaobangandZhaoZiyang,wereprepared to contemplate more significant political reform than Deng wouldcountenance, while also backing the radical economic reform which Dengespoused.* Others, such as Hua Guofeng (Mao’s hand-picked immediatesuccessor) and Li Peng (primeminister at the time of the Tiananmen Squaremassacre)stronglyopposedanypoliticalrelaxationandwereverysuspiciousofDeng’s marketizing economic policy. After Deng had ceased to be the mostpowerful figure within the leadership, ‘Deng Xiaoping theory’ was added toMarxism-Leninism andMao Zedong Thought as part of the official ideology(making it a still more heterogeneous and contradictory motley). Yet Deng,unlikeMao,sawhimselfasapragmatist,notatheoretician,andhadnotaspiredtosuchideologicalsanctification,anymorethanhehad(insharpcontrastwithMao)soughttopromoteacultofhispersonality.

His immense contribution to economic systemic change apart, Deng alsooversaw one very important development in China’s political system. Abesettingdifficultyforauthoritarianregimes,andforCommunistsystemsquitespecifically,hasbeenthatofmanagingleadershipsuccessions.*Theyposedtwodifferent but serious problems.On the one hand, they led to excessively longtenureofthepartyleadership,asthepersonatthetopofthehierarchyappointedmore and more of his favoured people to senior positions, and they, in turn,supportedhimoutoffearfortheirsecurityoftenureunderhissuccessor.Ontheotherhand,whenaleadershipchangebecameinevitable,oftenonlyasaresultofthe death of an elderly incumbent, intra-party conflict could become sharpenoughtothreatenthesystem’sstability.OneofDeng’spragmaticachievementswastopavethewayforthecompromisefigureofJiangZemintobecomeleaderof the Chinese Communist Party in 1989 (following the Tiananmen Squaremassacre) and from 1993 president. More importantly, he presided over aninstitutionalizationof the succession,whereby the very highest party and stateofficeswouldbeheldfortenyearsonly–throughthetwofive-yeartermswhichseparatedpartycongresses.DengevenmanagedtohaveadecisiveinfluenceonthechoiceofJiang’ssuccessor longaheadof thechangeover.Thatperson,HuJintao,dulyattainedthehighestpartypostin2002.SometimebeforeXiJinping,in turn, succeededHu as party leader inNovember 2012, it hadbecome clear

thathewouldbethechoiceofthetopleadershipteam.Establishingrulesofthegameforleadershipsuccessionhas,forthetimebeingatleast,alleviatedatleastoneoftheproblemsfacedbyauthoritarianregimes.

OvertheperiodofaquarterofacenturyfromJiang’selevationtothepartychairmanshipin1989,neitherhenorhistwosuccessorshaveenjoyedasimilarauthoritytoDeng,nottospeakofpowercomparablewiththatofMao.Thepartychairmanshipmeansthattheholderofthisofficeisthemostimportantmemberof the top team, but that leadership has been collective.Not that all has beensweetness and light, as was illustrated by the fall and arrest in 2012 of theambitious provincial leaderBoXilai,whosewifewas accusedofmurdering aBritish businessman.Possible cover-up byBoof a real crimewas used to thepolitical advantage of those whowere his rivals for promotion to the highestechelonoftheparty,theStandingCommitteeofthePolitburo.Hewasconvictedofthisin2013andfoundguiltyalsoofcorruptioninatrialwhichwasclosedtothepublicbutwasneverthelessreported(especiallywidelyintheoutsideworld).Within the leadership, the role of the party chairman has increasingly becomeone of balancing competing intra-party interests rather than of dominating thepolicyprocess.41 In relation to the broader society, and especially the variouselites, the system has become one of consultative authoritarianism, as theleadership (again in sharp contrastwithMao) has drawnon the knowledge ofexperts outside government. The system retains the faults endemic toauthoritarianregimes–aboveall,lackofaccountabilityofthetopleadershiptothewiderpublic,giventheabsenceofcompetitiveelectionsother thanat locallevel. Among themajor problems ismassive corruption, involving high partyand state officials. Nevertheless, the post-Mao years have been a time of fasteconomic growth and dramatically improving living standards for the greatmajorityofthepopulationofChina.EvenwithoutaleaderofDengXiaoping’spoliticalstanding,Chinaunderanessentiallycollective leadershiphasover thepasttwodecadesmademuchgreaterprogress,withfarlessviolenceandlossoflifethandisfiguredtheyearswhenMaowieldeddespoticpower.

THELEADERUNDERCOMMUNISM

The SovietUnion andChinawere far from alone in theCommunistworld inhavinganindividualleader(StalinandMao),aroundwhomacultofpersonalitywascreated,withthatpersonwieldingvastlymorepowerthananyoneelse.This

occurredeven inYugoslavia,which,underTito’s leadership,developedby the1960s and 1970s into a far milder authoritarian regime than its Soviet andChinese counterparts. Moreover, the leaders of Yugoslavia’s constituentrepublicsbecameincreasinglysignificantpoliticalfiguresasthefederalformsofthe country acquired greater political substance. Tito’s prestige had beenimportant for holding themulti-nationalYugoslav state together, and from thetimeofhisdeathin1980thedangerofitsdisintegrationincreased.

During his years in power, however, Tito did nothing to discourage thecreation of a personality cult around him. It never reached anything like theabsurd levels of Stalin’s,Mao’s, Nicolae Ceauşescu’s in Romania, or Kim IlSung’s in North Korea, and, compared with a number of other Communistleaders who presided over the creation of myths of their greatness, such asCeauşescu, therewasrealsubstance toTito’spopularstanding.Hehad led thehighly effective Partisan resistance to German occupation during the SecondWorldWar; hewas the leader of the Communist Partywhen it seized powerthroughitsownstrength(ratherthanbycourtesyoftheSovietarmy);andhewasthenationalleaderwhohadbeenpreparedtostanduptotheSovietUnionwhenYugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Tito went on to become animportant figure among the leaders of non-aligned countries who stood apartfrom both theAmerican and the Soviet camps during theColdWar.MilovanDjilas, one of the Partisan leaders who fought alongside Tito in wartime andbecame a prominent figure in the post-warCommunist government – until hebeganarguingforthecountry’sdemocratization–hadanappropriatelynuancedviewofTito.WritingshortlyafterTito’sdeathin1980,Djilasdescribedhimas‘apoliticianof formidable resourcefulness,unerring instinct, and inexhaustibleenergy’.42 However, he noted Tito’s ‘inborn sense of superiority’ and ‘hisconvictionthathedeservedspecialcare’.Moreover,‘intheendautocraticpowertransformedproudanddecentimpulsesintoself-servingandundemocraticones,and [Tito’s] closest and most faithful comrades became both leaders andtoadies’.43

InCommunistcountriestheelevationofoneleaderfarabovethecollectivewas a striking departure from the ideas that had inspired the revolutionaries.Leader-worship was an intrinsic component of fascism, but was far removedfrom the ideas ofMarx and Lenin, though Lenin’s certitude of belief and hisconviction that theCommunist Party had to be strictly centralized, disciplinedand hierarchical created preconditions for future personal dictatorship.

Nevertheless,evenunderStalin,obeisancewaspaidtoideaswhich,inprinciple,were higher than the leader. Stalin could hardly have launched a campaign ofprivatizationofSovietindustryinthe1930sor1940s,forthiswouldhavebeentoo fundamentalabreakwith theofficial ideology.Not,ofcourse, thathehadanydesiretodoso,forhewas,inmanyrespects,atruebeliever.EvenwhenhediddepartfromtheideasofMarxandLenin,hecouldnotadmittodoingso.AsAlan Bullock appositely summed up the differences in relation to doctrine ofHitler and Stalin: ‘In the case ofHitler, ideologywaswhat the Führer said itwas;inthecaseofStalin,itwaswhattheGeneralSecretarysaidMarxandLeninsaiditwas.’44

Stalin, however, played a full part in the build-up of the cult of hispersonality, which set him by the 1930s far above those who had been hisfellow-revolutionaries during the first two decades of the twentieth century.AfterKhrushchevdeliveredhis‘secretspeech’attheTwentiethCongressoftheSovietCommunistParty in1956, inwhichhedenouncedStalin,hewassentaletterbyanoldBolshevik,P.Chagin,whohadjoinedthepartyinthesummerof1917. Chagin recalled an evening in April 1926 when Stalin, on a visit toLeningrad,wasinvitedtosupperbySergeyKirov(whointhatyearbecameheadoftheLeningradpartyorganization).AstheeditorofaLeningradnewspaperatthe time, Chagin was also a guest at the gathering. During the conversationKirovsaid:‘WithoutLenin,itis,ofcourse,difficult,butwestillhavetheparty,theCentralCommittee,andthePolitburo,andtheywill lead thecountryalongtheLeninistpath.’Stalin,whowaspacingupanddowntheroom,responded:

Yes,it’salltrue–theparty,theCentralCommittee,thePolitburo.Butkeepinmind,ourpeopleunderstandlittleofallthat.ForcenturiesthepeopleinRussiawereunderthetsar.TheRussianpeoplearetsarist.FormanycenturiestheRussianpeople,andespeciallytheRussianpeasants,havebeenusedtobeingledbyjustoneperson.Andnowtheremustbeone[italicsadded].45

Stalinwasdoubtlesssincereinexpressingsuchviews(whichconstitutedanon-Marxistversionofhistoricaldeterminism),but theywerealso self-serving, forhe was in no doubt about who was going to be the ‘one’. In another privateconversation a decade later, Stalin said that ‘the people need a tsar’,meaning‘someone to revere and inwhose name to live and labour’.46 This viewwassharedbymanySovietpropagandistswhobelievedthatitwaseasiertoinstilandfortify admiration for a great leader than to get the majority of the peopleenthusiastically to embraceMarxism-Leninism.At a timewhen the cult ofhispersonality was rampant, and regarded by Stalin as no less than his due, he

wouldoccasionally, andhypocritically, suggest thatapublisherwasoverdoingit. Thus, in 1938 he told the children’s literature publishing house that theyshould burn a book called Stories of Stalin’s Childhood because a ‘cult ofpersonalities’ and of ‘infallible heroes’ was inconsistent with ‘Bolsheviktheory’.47

The cult of personality of the leader was not embraced in all Communistcountries. Thus, for example, János Kádár, who was the top person in theHungarian leadership for more than three decades – from 1956 to 1988 –avoided it.Kádárwas far removed from the image of a heroic leader, but hissurvival in the highest office for so long was based neither on extremes ofoppressionnoronprojectinganimageofhisgreatness.Byvirtueofhispositionattheheadoftheparty,hewastheprincipalarbiterofHungarianpolicy,butnodictator. In the earliest years after the Hungarian revolution of 1956, he hadpresided over severe repression, but from the early 1960s onwards Kádárpursuedacautiously reformistcourse.Fromthenuntil themid-1980sHungaryunderwent more economic reform and experienced greater cultural relaxationthananyotherEuropeanCommuniststateduringthatquarterofacentury.KádárwasamasterofambiguityandofjudginghowfaritwassafetogoindeviatingfromSovietorthodoxy.WhenKhrushchev tookhisdenunciationofStalin intotheopenattheTwenty-SecondCongressoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion in October 1961, Kádár seized the opportunity to intensify Hungariandestalinization. Ideologically, he went further than was permitted within theSovietUnionitself.Hisdeclarationinlate1961that‘whoeverisnotagainstusiswithus’reflectedawillingnesstoacceptpoliticalquietismandcontrastedwithKhrushchev’scampaigningstyle.48

Still more, it was a world away fromMaoist ‘Great Leaps’ and ‘CulturalRevolution’.Insteadofmassmobilizationcampaignstogeteveryoneembracing,orat leastmouthing, theofficial ideology, therewasanacceptance thatpeoplecouldgetonwith theirownlivesand thoughts,so longas theydidnotopenlychallengethesystem.ConcessionstothemarketinHungarianagriculturemeantthat it became a relative success story, at least in comparison with otherCommunistcountries.Hungaryhadeconomicreformerswhopushedforthisandforothermodificationsof theeconomicsystem.ItwasnotKádárwhowasthedriving force, buthedidnot stand in theway.49 In comparisonnotonlywithotherCommunist leadersbut inrelationto thewideopportunitiesopentohim,Kádárlivedmodestlyand,inthetraditionofhisruralchildhood,keptchickens

in the garden of his home. In sharp contrast with Mátyás Rákosi, his mainpredecessorasHungary’sCommunistleader,heentirelyeschewedapersonalitycult.50

Hungary under Kádár was sometimes called ‘the happiest barracks in thecamp’(areferencetotheSovietblocofEuropeanCommuniststates).Tosaythecountrywas‘happy’issomethingofanexaggeration,anditwasnotanadjectiveanyone would reach for in describing Kádár himself. Moreover, Poland atvarious times and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were freer, but Hungary over alengthy period was generally the least repressive barracks in the camp.Hungarian citizens’ perceptions of Kádár himself underwent a remarkablechange. He was widely regarded as a national traitor in 1956 and for theremainderofthefifties,havingbecometheSoviet-endorsedleaderchargedwith‘restoring order’ in Hungary, following the crushing of the Hungarianrevolution. Over time he came to be viewed as the ‘least bad’ of the variousrealisticoptionsavailabletothecountry,giventheexternalconstraintsimposedfromMoscow.Thatdevelopedintoagrudgingrespect–orevenmore.Whenhediedinthesummerof1989,overahundredthousandpeoplecongregatedforhisfuneral.Moreremarkably,onedecadelater(andtenyearsintoHungary’spost-Communist democracy), the lugubrious and unheroic JánosKádár emerged inmore than one opinion survey as the ‘greatest Hungarian’ of the twentiethcentury.51Whilehewasnoliberaldemocrat,hewas justasfarremovedfrombeing a dictator in the style of Romania’s Ceauşescu, a Communist potentatewho, because of his deviation at times from Soviet foreign policy, was overmanyyearstreatedwithgreaterrespectinWesterncapitalsthanwasKádár.

FidelCastroinPower

Communism in Cuba has had a vigorous nationalist component, closer to theanti-colonialist Communism to be found in Asia than the Communism of therulingpartiesinEasternEurope.ThepatrioticaspectwascertainlyimportantforCastrowho,asnotedinChapter5,hadnotyetbecomeaCommunistatthetimehe acquired power as the leader of the successful revolutionary struggle inJanuary1959.Hishero,JoséMartí,hadnotonlysoughtCuba’sliberationfromSpanishcolonial rule,hehadalsowarnedagainst thisbeingreplacedbya lessformal domination from the United States. In 1961 Castro merged hisrevolutionary July 26thMovementwith theCommunists.His desire for social

justice and anti-capitalism, together with the sheer difficulties of running aneconomy in which big business had been nationalized or frightened off, ledwithin a very few years to the adoption of orthodox (and thus highlyauthoritarian)Communisteconomicandpoliticalinstitutions.Castro’sCubawasofficially recognized to be part of the international Communist movement in1963.

By the time Castro, with his health declining, ceded the leadership of thecountryin2008tohisbrotherRaúl,hehadbeeninpowerforhalfacentury.Hispoliticallongevityderivedinsubstantialpartfromhispersonalappeal,butalsofromtheadoptionofthecharacteristicinstitutionsofaCommunistsystem(withtheir proven instruments for control). It has additionally owed much to thecounterproductive policies pursued by the United States. Early attempts tooverthrowtheCastroregime,followedbyapolicyofisolatingandendeavouringtoundermineit,enabledFidelbothtoappealtoCubanpatriotismandtosustainasiegementality.*SolongasCubawasaSovietallyduringtheColdWar,thepolicyofsuccessiveAmericanadministrationswasslightlymoreunderstandablethanitbecameaftertheSovietUnionitselfhadceasedtoexistandCubacouldnolongerbeseenasathreattotheUnitedStatesotherthanbythemostfeveredimagination.*ApolicyofmaximumengagementwithCubawouldhavemadeitharder for Castro to resist liberalizing and democratizing measures. No suchliberalizationtookplacesolongasFidelwasleader,andonlymodesteconomicreform has ensued since he was succeeded by Raúl (accompanied by somelimited relaxation also of American policy towards Cuba under the Obamaadministration).Until thedemiseofCommunist rule inRussia,Cubabenefitedfrom its tradewith the SovietUnion,which supplied it with both energy andarmaments.Ithad,accordingly,ahardtimeinthe1990swhenthathelpwasnolonger forthcoming from post-Soviet Russia. Material conditions deteriorateddrastically;therewerefoodshortagesandlengthyelectricityblackouts.52

ItwasasurprisetomanyobserversthatHavanaremainedCommunistafterMoscow had become capitalist. A moderate degree of political relaxationprobablyhelped,althoughthis,inmanycontexts,canstimulatedemandformorefar-reaching change. The most important policy shift was an extension ofreligious tolerance, so that religious belief no longer prevented someone fromholdingofficialoffice.53Economicassistancearrivedattheendofthedecade,with the coming to power ofHugoChávez inVenezuela in 1999 providing anewsourceofsubsidizedoil.LivingstandardsinCuba,however,remainedlow.

Themainsuccessstories(trueofanumberofCommunistcountriesbutinCubamore thanmost)were inhealthandeducation. Itwasanespecially impressiveachievement that Cuba in the twenty-first century has had an infantmortalityrate and average life expectancy very similar to that of the United States,notwithstandingthevastlygreaterwealthoftheUSA.54

Improving the educational and health prospects of the poor, especially therural poor (for there was a high level of urban literacy already in pre-revolutionary Cuba), has been matched neither by a spread of pluralistdemocracynorofpolitical liberty.OpponentsoftheCubanCommunistregimehaveover theyearsbeen repressed, although thenumberofpoliticalprisonershasgreatlydeclinedovertime.55Theuseofthesafetyvalveofemigrationhasmeant thatmanypotentialopponentsof the regimewereabroad rather than inCuba.Severalhundredthousandcitizenswereabletoleaveeitherforotherpartsof Latin America or for the United States in successive waves of permittedemigration.CubaunderFidel, having adopted aSoviet-type economic system,didnotreformiteventotheextentofKádár’sHungary.Castroremaineddeeplysuspicious of any kind of ‘market socialism’. Nor did he try to emulate thepolitical reforms ofGorbachev’s perestroika.Although fully capable of takingdecisionsindependentlyoftheSovietUnion,Castroduringthe1960sand1970sinternalizedtheorthodoxCommunistconceptionof‘socialism’.Hestuckwithitdoggedly, even while it was being abandoned in Russia. Thus, for example,Castro,whoovertheyearshadmanymeetingswithFelipeGonzález,theleaderofthedemocraticSocialistpartyinSpainandSpanishprimeministerfrom1982to1996,resistedthereformstheSpanishsocialdemocratsuggestedtohim.56

So long as he held office as party leader and president, Castro was thedominant figure in the policy-making process as well as the custodian of theidealsoftherevolution.Hisprestige,intelligenceandpersonalityweresuchthathedidnotneedanartificiallyconstructedcult.Toaperhapssurprisingextent,givenhowlonghisleadershiplastedandtheproblemsordinaryCubansfaced,heretained respect and loyalty.WhileCubahasbeen far fromfreeofcorruption,Castro personally was untainted by it. He remained contemptuous ofmaterialism.Duringthe1990s,whentheissueformanyCubanswasobtainingthebasicmaterialnecessitiesoflife,ratherthanmaterialistexcess, thesurvivalof the system owed a good deal to residual loyalty to Castro. An Americanspecialist on Cuba, Julia Sweig, has emphasized the importance of ‘FidelCastro’spersonalleadershipandcharismaduringthistime’for‘Cuba’sdefiance

andsurvival’,adding:‘ItwasthroughhisubiquitouspresencethatmanyCubans,evenassomeoftheirneighborsrecededintoapathyorleftforgood,continuedtoseetherevolutionasasetofidealsinwhichtheypersonallyhadastake.’57

NorthKoreanExtremes

Of theworld’s five remaining Communist states, four inAsia and one in theCaribbean,theonlyoneinwhichafull-blowncultofpersonalityoftheleaderisstill tobe found isNorthKorea.Threegenerationsof theone family,albeit indescendingorderofadulation,havenowbeenthesubjectsofmyth-creationonagrandscale.ThepersonalitycultexcessesaremostabundantinrelationtoKimIlSung,thestate’sfirstCommunistruler.Kimdidenjoysomegenuinesupportas the North’s leader during the Korean War, which (with massive Chineseassistance on the side of the North Koreans, and vast participation from theUnited States and other democracies on the South Korean side) ended instalemate.MostNorthKoreansbelievedthatSouthKoreanshadstartedthewarby invading the North and that, under Kim Il Sung’s leadership, they hadsubsequentlyemergedvictorious fromtheconflict.58Alongwitha regimentedsocietyclosedtotheoutsideworldwentamanufacturedcultoftheleaderwhichdefied parody. All of the country’s advances, such as they have been, areattributedtoKimandtohisfamily.It isdifficulttoimaginethatoutsideNorthKorea aCommunist Partywould describe its late leader, asKim Il Sungwasportrayed, as being ‘superior to Christ in love, superior to Buddha inbenevolence, superior to Confucius in virtue and superior to Mohammed injustice’.59

Children, by the time they reached kindergarten age, had learned to say‘Thank you,Great FatherlyLeader’when they received a snack.60Typically,Kimwas the ‘Sunof theworld, supremebrainof thenation’.61Moreover,he‘notonlyprotected thepolitical lifeof thepeoplebutalsosaved theirphysicallife,hislovecuredthesickandgavethemanewlife,likethespringrainfallingon the sacred territory of Korea’.62 Apart from acquiring godlike attributes,Kim’smost distinctive innovation in the world of Communist politics was tocombine lip-service toMarxism-Leninismwith the creation of hereditary rule,grooming his son, Kim Jong Il to succeed him, which he did on the father’sdeathin1994.This, then,hasbeena totalitarianismcombined‘withsultanistic

aspects’.63 Interestingly, the dynastic aspiration had long been signalled by achange in the North Korean Dictionary of Political Terminology. The 1970editionhad thefollowingentry: ‘Hereditarysuccession isa reactionarycustomof exploitative societies whereby certain positions or riches may be legallyinherited.Originallyaproductofslavesocieties,itwaslateradoptedbyfeudallords as ameans to perpetuate dictatorial rule.’64 That definition disappearedfromthe1972editionofthebook.WhenKimJongIldiedinDecember2011,thedynastywascarriedonbyhisyoungestson,KimJongUn.65ThedictatorialruleofthethreegenerationsofKimshasdonelittletoimprovethelivesofNorthKoreanswhohavesufferedfaminesandamiserablestandardofliving.Teenagedefectors fromNorthKoreaare ‘onaverage five inchesshorterand25poundslighterthantheirSouthKoreancounterparts’.66Sooppressiveandintrusivehasbeen the regime that it has come closer than most totalitarian regimes tomirroringthekindofsystemandsocietyportrayedinOrwell’sNineteenEighty-Four.

THELEADERUNDERFASCISM

ThecreationofmythsaboutthegreatnessoftheleaderwasaradicaldeparturefromMarxism-Leninism, an excrescencewithinCommunist systems, howevervaluable its function in consolidating support for the regime withinpredominantlypeasantsocieties.Incontrast,thecultoftheleaderwascentraltofascistthinkingandoftheutmostimportanceinthetwomajorfascistregimesofthe twentieth century – Benito Mussolini’s and Adolf Hitler’s. But what allleadership cults had in common– in fascist Italy,NaziGermany and in thoseCommunist states which indulged in them – was their utility in generatingsupport for the regime on the part of those least interested in ideologicalformulations.Mussolini,aswehaveseen,embraced the ideaof the totalitarianstate.Forhimandthosearoundhimitwasadesiredgoal.YethighlyrepressivethoughMussolini’srulewas,itwassomewhatfurtherawayfromthetotalitarianidealtypethaneitherHitler’sGermanyorStalin’sSovietUnion.

Mussolini

Mussolinihadbeenananti-clericalsocialistbeforetheFirstWorldWar.Bythe

endofthewarhehadturnedstronglyagainstsocialismandCommunism,buthewas still anti-Catholic. Before long, he found it prudent to drop much of hishostility to theChurch, since an accommodationwith theVaticanmademoresense than struggle. Moreover, they shared some beliefs. Mussolini talkedrepeatedlyabouttheneedforreassertionofauthority,disciplineandorder,and‘his passionate opposition to socialism, liberalism and the doctrines ofmaterialism’ was well received by many in the Church.67 Having been arepublican,Mussolinireconciledhimselfalsotokeepingthemonarchy,solongasheratherthanthekingwieldedsupremepower.Sincethemonarchcould,intheearlieststageofMussolini’srise,haveorderedthearmytocrushthegrowingfascistmovement,itsleaderdecidedthatitwouldbeunwisetomakeanenemyof King Victor Emmanuel III. Mussolini’s fascist movement developed veryquickly.Withagroupoflike-mindedwarveterans,heestablishedthenationalistFasci di Combattimento (Fighting Leagues) in 1919, and soon the Blackshirtgangs they spawned were interpreting the name literally, fighting againstsocialists, liberals and other democrats. The fascist party, which Mussoliniheaded, had some twenty thousand members by 1920, and that number hadgrowntoalmost220,000bytheendof1921.Partofitsappealwasthepromiseofjobsforthosewhojoinedthemovement,buttherewasalsoasenseofmissionand of sacrifice for the nation. The party appealed to young people, andespecially to rural youth.Aquarter of themembers by1921were agriculturallabourers;farmerscountedforanother12percent.68

Mussolinibecameprimeministerin1922asaresultofthreatandbluster.Heappealed to the king not to oppose the ‘fascist revolution’.69 But he alsothreatenedamassmarchonRomebyhisBlackshirts against theexistingcivilauthority. The king refused to sign a decree presented to him by the primeminister,LuigiFacta,declaringastateofemergencyinthecountry,whichcouldhavefacilitatedtheuseoftroopsagainstMussolini’sragtagarmyofinsurgents.Itwas not entirely clear, however, that either the army or the police could berelied upon, for within their ranks there was sympathy forMussolini and hiscause.Whetherforthatreason,orasanattemptsimplytoavoidbloodshed,theking invitedMussolini to head a coalition government.70 Brutality continuedthroughthe1924electioncampaignthatsawMussolini’sgovernment-supportedlist of candidates win two-thirds of the votes. They were condemned inparliament by a well-known socialist politician, Giacomo Matteotti, whocomplained of violence and intimidation in the election.Mussolini, he added,

hadmade it clear that, even ifhehadbeen inaminorityafter theelection,hewouldnothavegivenuppower.LessthantwoweekslaterMatteottiwasstabbedtodeath.71Mussolinihadclearlysanctionedthekilling,althoughhedeniedit.

Conservative opinion continued to support Mussolini both at home andabroad. InLondon,TheTimesnotedhissuccess incombatingBolshevismandsaid that his fall ‘would be too horrible to contemplate’. In January 1925Mussoliniputanend toparliamentarismandseizedfulldictatorialpower.Theking once again facilitated this, having evidently decided that right-wingauthoritarian rulewas preferable toweak parliamentary government and partycompetition.72 By the end of 1926Mussolini had banned all political partiesother than his own and, having established a special tribunal for the purpose,either imprisoned or put under police surveillance most of the Communistleadersandotherprominentanti-fascistactivistsinItaly.73

Therewere several attempts onMussolini’s life in 1925 and 1926, but hesurvivedunscathed.ThePopesaidthatMussoliniwas‘trulyprotectedbyGod’,and the Archbishop of Naples declared in a sermon that Mussolini had beenpreservedfor‘somehighdestiny’thatwouldbe‘forthegreatergoodofourItalyand perhaps of the whole world’.74 Robert Paxton has noted that long afterMussolini’s regime had settled into a routine, he still liked to talk about the‘Fascist revolution’. What he meant was ‘a revolution against socialism andflabbyliberalism,anewwayofunitingandmotivatingItalians,andanewkindofgovernmentalauthoritycapableofsubordinatingprivatelibertiestotheneedsofthenationalcommunityandoforganizingmassassentwhileleavingpropertyintact’.75Mussolini was, however, prepared tomanoeuvre in order to get hiswayandsecureasmuchassentaspossible.Hetoldanoldfriendofhiswhataneffort had been involved in seeking ‘equilibrium’ among such influentialinstitutions and interests within the country as the ‘government, party,monarchy,Vatican,army,militzia,prefects,provincialparty leaders,ministers,the head of the Confederazioni [corporatist structures] and the giantmonopolistic interests’.76 Establishing totalitarian power remained forMussoliniaratherdistantaspiration.

Thecreationofaleadershipcultwastheprincipalmechanismforenhancinghisauthorityandmaintainingpower.Apowerfulorator,Mussolini in themid-1920s offered the supposed benefits of the ‘strong hand’ and of establishing‘order’.AsChristopherDugganhasobserved,‘Aftertheturmoiloftheprevious

fewyears, themythof “order”wasmesmerising. Itwas ironic that thosewhohad been the chief instigators of the violence and who had done more thananyone else to undermine the rule of law and bring the state into disreputeshould emerge as the principal beneficiaries of the widespread craving forstability.’77TheprojectofbuildingupanimageofMussolini’sgreatnesscameat that time largely from within the fascist party organization, for the party,which was less popular than the Duce, hoped to benefit from some of thereflected glory. Simultaneously, however, the cult ofMussolini put a distancebetween him and the roughhouse tactics of the Blackshirts. In general, whenthingswentwrong,theproblemscouldbeblamedonothers.Duringthe1930s,as Duggan notes, fascism’s failings were regularly ‘imputed to the Duce’sincompetent,corruptortreacherousentourage,withMussolinihimselfviewedasignorantofthesinsofthosearoundhimorotherwisemagnanimouslyforgivingofthem’.78

EvenanItalianjournalistwhowouldhavelikedfascismtohavebeenmoremonolithicacceptedthattherehadbeen‘variouscurrents’withinitand‘theonlyunifyingelementwasthemythoftheleaderandhispresumedinfallibility’.79Inthecourseofthe1930s,Mussolinihimselfincreasinglycametobelieveinthatmyth,saying:‘IhavenevermadeamistakewhenIfollowedmyinstinct;IhavealwaysgonewrongwhenIlistenedtoreason.’Itwascharacteristicoffascismtoelevate ‘instinct’ above reason.80 There were, however, important differencesbetween Italian and German fascism. Whereas anti-Semitism was absolutelycentral toHitler’screed, thiswasnot thecasewithMussolini.TheMinisterofFinance inhisgovernment from1932 to1935wasJewish,andJewshadbeenmore than proportionately represented in Mussolini’s party from its earliestexistence.81ItwasduringtheperiodofgrowingfriendshipwithNaziGermanyinthelate1930sthattheissueofJewishinfluenceinItaliansocietybegantoberaisedsharplyandlegislationdiscriminatingagainstJewswasintroducedintheautumnof1938.82

By the time itbecameevidentduring the later stagesof theSecondWorldWar that Italy was on the road to defeat, Mussolini’s ‘contempt for hisopponents’ was ‘extended to include his followers’.83 His earlier enormouspopularitydwindledfastwhenthesufferinginflictedbythewarappearedtobeall for no purpose. When Mussolini and his mistress Claretta Petacci werecaptured and shot by Communist partisans in April 1945, and subsequently

strungupbytheirfeetsothatlargecrowdscouldgawp,itwasquicklyforgottenhowpopularMussolinihadearlierbeen.Oneyoungjournalistwhowaspresentsummed up the rapid shift from eulogizing to cursing the fallen leader as‘Tyranny at the top, credulity and conformism at the bottom’ and the changefromonepoliticalmythology toanotheraspeople ‘whowouldhave rushed toany piazza in Italy to screamdeliriously forMussolini’ reacted as if they hadbeenopposedtohimallalong.84

Hitler’sRisetoPower

Even though they sometimes used the language of revolution, bothMussoliniand Hitler, as Robert Paxton notes, ‘were invited to take office as head ofgovernment by a head of state’ who did so ‘in the legitimate exercise of hisofficial functions, on the advice of civilian andmilitary counsellors’.85HitlerhadattemptedaputschinBavariain1923,hopingtoseizepowerinMunichasastepping-stone toBerlin, but hewas arrested and spent a year inprison.Afterthat experience he decided to campaign for electoral office rather than grabpower unconstitutionally. That was not because he had been converted to abeliefintheruleoflaw,butbecauserelyingonhisgrowingappealseemedthemore dependable route.Dictatorship could come later.Hitler used his time inprisontoreadandtoworkonhisbook,MeinKampf(MyStruggle),whichwaspublishedintwovolumesinthemid-1920s.HisfixationonanimaginedAryan‘racialpurity’andobsessiveanti-Semitismarerunningthemes.Hitlerwasableto tap into the sense of humiliation and injustice in Germany in the 1920s,followingtheFirstWorldWar.Viewingthecountryasbeinginastateofcrisisandcollapse,he insisted that ‘ofall thecausesof theGermancollapse . . . theultimate andmost decisive remains the failure to recognise the racial problemand especially the Jewish menace’.86 Hitler also inveighed against pacifism,writing,‘Thosewhowanttolive,letthemfight,andthosewhodonotwanttofightinthisworldofeternalstruggledonotdeservetolive.’87

Harshpeacetermsimposedbythevictoriousalliesin1919,hyper-inflationin the early 1920s, followed by serious unemployment enabled the NationalSocialist (Nazi) organization Hitler had established in 1919 to make someprogressduringthe1920s,butadegreeofeconomicrecoveryinthesecondhalfofthatdecadehelpedtoensurethattheyremainedafringeparty.Thischanged

after theWall Street crash of October 1929. The knock-on effect meant thatGermanbankswithdrew their loans to businesses and by 1932more than oneworker in threewas unemployed.88Hitler’s partywas amajor beneficiary ofthat economic crisis. In the parliamentary election of 1928 they had securedtwelve seats and 2.6 per cent of the vote. In the election for theReichstag ofSeptember1930, that rose to107 seats and18.3per cent.TheNaziPartyhadbecome thesecond largest in theparliament,andmore thansixmillionpeoplehad voted for it.89 Hitler’s major biographer, Ian Kershaw, offers ageneralization which has, indeed, a much wider application than to inter-warGermanywhenhewrites: ‘Thereare times– theymark thedangerpoint forapoliticalsystem–whenpoliticianscannolongercommunicate,whentheystopunderstandingthepeopletheyaresupposedtoberepresenting.ThepoliticiansofWeimar’spartieswerewellonthewaytoreachingthatpointin1930.’90

TwoyearslaterHitler’ssupportwasstillstronger.TheagedReichPresident,FieldMarshalvonHindenburg,cametotheendofhisseven-yeartermofofficeand stood for re-election. Hitler entered the contest against him, as did theCommunistleaderErnstThälmann.HindenburgdidnothaveanoverallmajorityonthefirstroundofvotingandHitlerwastherunner-up.Inthesecondroundhesecured37percentofthevotes,andmorethanthirteenmillionpeoplevotedforhim.91Hitlerbelievedthat,asaconsequenceofthatshowing,hewasentitledtobe offered the Chancellorship, the main position of power as head of thegovernment, but he was rebuffed by Hindenburg. (The latter’s majority wassecured partly thanks to the votes of Social Democrats, since, conservativethough Hindenburg was, he was clearly preferable to Hitler.) The Nazis hadmixed fortunes in 1932. There were Reichstag elections in both July andNovemberof thatyearandthepartygot twomillionvotesfewer inNovemberthan they had received in the summer. Hindenburg thought he was cleverlytakingadvantageoftheNazis’comparativeweakness,therefore,whenhefinallyaccededtotheirdemandthatHitlerbemadeChancellor,appointinghimtothatpostattheendofJanuary1933,butsurroundinghimwithinthegovernmentbyconservatives rather than fascists.Hebelieved thatHitler’spowerswould thusbeconstrained.

Hitlerhadotherideas,andhewasgreatlyhelpedbytheburningdownoftheReichstag(parliament)buildingon27February1933.Thiswasachanceevent,for it was thework of a youngDutch socialist who had acted alonewith theintentionofgalvanizingGermanworkerstostruggleactivelyagainsttheirright-

wing government and against capitalism.Hitler took the opportunity to blametheCommunistscollectivelyforthearson,crackingdownespeciallyonthembutalso on Social Democrats and other anti-fascists. In an election on 5 March1933,markedbyextremeintimidation,theNaziPartywonjustunder44percentofthevote,whichgavethem288outof647seatsinthenewReichstag.Inspiteofthebrutaltacticsusedagainstthem,withCommunistsandSocialDemocratsbeatenupandsometimesmurdered,theCommunistPartygatheredmorethan12per cent and theSocialDemocrats over 18per cent of thevote.92TheNazis,however,hadnotonlyemergedasbyfarthelargestsingleparty,theyalsohadan overall parliamentary majority as a result of their coalition withconservatives.Theydidnot,infact,evenneedtorelyonthelatter’ssupportinorder to seize power, for the Nazis ensured that Communist deputies electedwerenotabletotaketheirseats.Theyhadeitherbeenarrestedortakenflight.Intheintimidatingpresenceofthetwoparamilitaryorganizations,theSAandtheSS, only the votes of ninety-four Social Democrats were cast against anEnablingAct,which,with441deputiesvoting for it, essentiallypassedpowerfrom parliament to theNational Socialists.93 (Importantly, theCentre Party –theprecursorofthepost-warChristianDemocrats–whowerenotnaturalalliesof the Nazis voted for the law.) By the summer of 1933 over one hundredthousandCommunists,SocialDemocratsandtradeunionistshadbeenarrested,andevenofficialestimatesput‘thenumberofdeathsincustodyat600’.94

Already in 1933 Hitler, with the particular assistance of the chief Nazipropagandist Joseph Goebbels, had instigated a nationwide boycott of Jewishshops and businesses. Dismissal of Jews – defined by ‘racial’, not religiouscriteria – affected thewhole of cultural and educational life. By 1934 around1,600outof5,000universityteachershadbeenhoundedoutoftheirjobseitherbecausetheywereJewishorbecausetheywerepoliticalopponentsoffascism.95Therewasamplecooperationfrombelowaswellasencouragementfromabove.StudentsplayedalargepartinhasteningtheexpulsionofJewishandanti-Naziprofessors. The regime’s ideology had become increasingly widely imbibed.Hitler, after all, had ‘one great gift: the ability to move crowds with hisrhetoric’.96

ManyofHitler’sfollowerswereeagerforhimtotakedictatorialpower,andhewasnowabletoadvancemorerapidlyinthatdirection.Theonethreattohiscomplete ascendancywas apotential alliancebetween conservative forces andthe army, especially since senior army officers were increasingly concerned

about the pretensions of the fascist party’s paramilitarywing, theSA,with itsfourandahalfmillionmembers.Notonlywere theyarresting,beatingupandsometimeskillingJews,CommunistsandSocialDemocrats,theyseemed,undertheir ambitious leader, Ernst Röhm, to be seeking a superior authority to thearmy.Inthecircumstances,HitlerchoseacrackdownontheSAleadership.Thiswasnot just a short-termconcession to thearmy,butanenterprisehedecidedwastohisownadvantage,forhehadcometosuspecttheloyaltyofRöhm.Hehad him arrested and shot. Hitler’s praetorian guard, the SS, previouslysubordinatetotheSA,werenowelevatedaboveit,andtheSA‘turnedintolittlemore thanamilitary sports and trainingbody’.97The showdownwith theSAtookplaceinJuly1934–atthesametimeasHitlerdealtwithapotentialthreatfromaquitedifferentsource.ThekillingoftopSAleaderswasparalleledbytheshootingofanumberofrespectedconservativefigures,amongthemtheformerchancellor,GeneralKurtvonSchleicherandhiswife.Yet,withanemphasisontheir bringing the SA to heel, Hitler and Goebbels presented the purge as aheroicmeasure topreventacoupbyRöhmthatwouldhaveplungedGermanyinto continuous revolution. This spurious claimwas taken sufficiently at facevalue by manymiddle-class Germans to lead them to believe that Hitler hadsavedGermanyfromchaos.

Until thedeathofHindenburgat thebeginningofAugust1934,Hitlerdidnot, however, attain the fully fledged ‘Führer state’. While Hindenburg wasdying,Hitlerpushedthroughanimportantconstitutionalchangewherebyonthepresident’sdeaththatofficewouldbecombinedwiththeReichChancellorship.Since it was the president who had been commander of the armed forces, itmeant that this important powerwas being transferred toHitlerwho in futurewas officially to be addressed as ‘Führer andReichChancellor’.98 From thattimeon,hisabsolutismbecamegreaterandideologicalgoalsclearer.Althoughanegomaniac,Hitlerhadnotbeendrivenbylustforpoweralone.Hewasalso‘an ideologue of unshakeable convictions’.99 Accompanying his racialinterpretation of historical development was an impassioned belief in a ‘greatman’ understanding of history. He was an ardent admirer of the eighteenth-century Prussian monarch, Frederick II (Frederick the Great). For Hitler, heperfectlyexemplifiedgreatness, sincehecombinedabsolute rule athomewithmilitary success abroad, greatly expanding the boundaries of the state andmakingPrussia the leadingmilitarypower inEurope. In the laterstagesof theSecondWorldWar,whenitwascleartoothersthatimminentdefeatbeckoned

for Nazi Germany, Hitler was still taking inspiration from the Germantranslation of Thomas Carlyle’s biography of Frederick which Goebbelspresentedtohim.100

By1934thenormalwayofaddressingHitlerwas‘MeinFührer’,whilehehimself,whenspeaking tomostNazi leaders,used just theirsurname.He tookfargreaterpainsoverprojectinghis image (though thatwasnot the termusedthen) than in the contentofpolicy.Theexceptionswere the areaswhichmostobsessedhim–eliminatingJewishinfluence(whichultimatelybecameapolicyof eliminating Jews themselves), building up German military power, andforeignpolicy (discussed in thenext chapter).One important respect inwhichthesystemwaslessthantotalitarianisthatargumentonmanyotherpoliciestookplaceat a levelbelowHitler,with subordinates followinghisbroadguidelinesandtryingtodowhattheythoughthewouldapprove.Thismerelyenhancedhisimmense authority, although leadership by means of inaccessibility,unpredictable interventions, long-winded monologues and lack of interest inpolicydetailhardlymadeforefficientgovernment.101

Hitler hated cabinet meetings in which there could be critical discussion.When in 1933 he was still heading a coalition government, containing moreconservativesthanNazis,thecabinetmetfourorfivetimesamonthupuntilthesummer recess, but thereafter much less frequently. He preferred one-to-onemeetings, which he could be certain to dominate, and he practised strongfavouritismamonghisministers.102By the later1930s thecabinetnevermet.Bythistime,allsemblanceofcollectivegovernmenthaddisappearedandnoonewithinthesystemdoubtedthattheFührer,andhealone,hadtheultimaterighttotake decisions. Policy onwhichHitler chose to focuswas decided by him, inconsultationwithwhicheverindividualshedecidedtosummonatanyparticulartime.103

By 1936 Hitler’s popularity in Germany could not be doubted. While anelectioninthatyearwhichgavealmost99percentofthevotetotheNazisowedmuch,forasignificantminoritywithintheelectorate,tointimidationandfearoftheconsequencesofanegativevote,itseemsclearthatbythistimeHitlerwassupported by the greater part of the German population. The recovery of theeconomy, national pride in the country’s renewed military might and awidespread belief in the greatness of Hitler were political realities. No onebelievedmore inhisgenius thanHitlerhimself.AsKershawwrites, ‘Hubris–that overweening arrogancewhich courts disaster – was inevitable. The point

wherehubristakesoverhadbeenreachedin1936.’104Byearly1938Hitlerwasremarking to the Austrian dictator Kurt von Schuschnigg: ‘I have achievedeverything that I set out to do and have thus perhaps become the greatestGermanofallhistory.’105

Fascismwasverymuchamovementoftheinter-warperiodofthetwentiethcentury,and ItalyandGermanyare theclearestexamplesof thismovement inpower.Thefactthatthereweresomedissimilaritiesbetweenthosetworegimesdoesnot invalidate theuseof ‘fascist’ todescribe themboth; therewere,afterall, big differences at various times among Communist systems, includinginternationaltensions(astheSino-Sovietdisputetestified).Fascismconstitutedaparticulartypeofpoliticalmovement.AlthoughtheideologycouldbechangedbytheleaderfarmoreeasilythanMarxist-LeninistdoctrinecouldbediscardedbytheirCommunistcounterparts,fascismwasamovementwithsomecommonelements. They included glorification of war and violence, expansionism,racism, an aspiration for total control, a fixation on national solidarity andrefusaltoadmitlegitimatedifferencesofinterestandvalueswithinthesociety,and–notleast–abeliefinheroicleadership.TotheseRobertPaxtonadds,interalia,‘thebeliefthatone’sgroupisavictim,asentimentthatjustifiesanyaction,without legal ormoral limits, against its enemies, both internal and external’;‘thesuperiorityoftheleader’sinstinctsoverabstractanduniversalreason’,and‘right being decided by the sole criterion of the group’s prowess within aDarwinianstruggle’.106

There were fascist movements between the two world wars in manyEuropean countries, including France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands andNorway.TheytookinspirationfromItalyandGermanybutmade,however,onlyaminorimpactontheirdomesticpoliticalsystems.AsPaxtonputsit:‘Mostofthese feeble imitations showed that it was not enough to don a colored shirt,march about, and beat up some localminority to conjure up the success of aHitler or Mussolini. It took a comparable crisis, a comparable opening ofpolitical space, comparable skill at alliance building, and comparablecooperation from existing elites.’107There has been a tendency to stretch themeaningoffascismtocovertoomanydifferentregimes,butjustasdressingupasagroupandbeatingupothersdidnotnecessarilymakeapoliticalmovementsuccessful,sonoteverybrutalandrepressiveright-wingregimewasbythatverytoken fascist. Thus, neither Spain under General Franco nor Portugal underAntónio de Oliviera Salazar was, strictly speaking, fascist, although highly

autocratic. In both cases the regimes began as military dictatorships andremained authoritarian, but, in the Spanish case especially, some elements ofpluralismhadcreptinevenbeforethebreakthroughtodemocracyofthe1970s.Significantly, both Spain and Portugal preserved traditional elements ofconservatism more than did either Mussolini’s Italy or (especially) Hitler’sGermany.BothFrancoandSalazarwereCatholicswhoembracedtheChurchasan institutionandcountedon itsbacking.Nevertheless,Franco flirtedwith themajorfascistdictators,benefitingintheSpanishCivilWarfromtheaidofbothMussolini and Hitler. In the aftermath of that conflict, he engaged in bloodyrepression,inwhichsometwohundredthousandpeoplewerekilled.108

Hitler’s ‘genuine and immense popularity among the great mass of theGermanpeople’continueduntil themiddleof theSecondWorldWar.109(Hisforeign policy miscalculations, which brought calamity to his nation anddestroyed him, are one of the themes of the next chapter.) Nazi Germanycombined the cult of Hitler’s personality with the institutions of a powerfulmodernstate.EvenafterHitler’scharismabegantofade,inthemidstofwartimesuffering,theinstitutionsofthestatecontinuedtofunction.ForHitler,however,themainpurposeof the statewas to promote a great leader to the positionofhighest authority and to serve him loyally.As early as 1920 he had declared:‘Weneedadictatorwhoisagenius.’110HailedbyaregionalNazipartyleaderas‘anew,agreaterandamorepowerfulJesusChrist’,111Hitlerheldmillionsin thrallasa resultofhismagnetism, theapparentsuccessuntil theendof the1930sofhisundertakings,andthesharedmyththatwhatGermanyneededmostofallwasagreatandstrongleader.‘Success’,wroteAdamSmith,when‘joinedtogreatpopularfavour’,oftenturnedtheheadsofeventhegreatestof leaders,leadingthemto‘ascribetothemselvesbothanimportanceandanabilitymuchbeyond what they really possessed’ and ‘by this presumption, to precipitatethemselves into many rash and sometimes ruinous adventures’.112 WhileHitler’sgreatness,otherthaninacapacitytowhipupevil,wasanillusion,itwasanillusionthatcertainlygeneratedruinousadventures.

MYTHSOFDICTATORIALREGIMES

In the eighteenth century Turgot wrote: ‘Despotism is easy. To do what youwant to do, is a rule which a king learns very quickly; art is necessary to

persuadepeople,butnoneisnecessarytogiveorders.Ifdespotismdidnotrevoltthose who are its victims, it would never be banished from the earth.’113Despotism does sooner or later provoke its victims into overthrowing it(althoughviolentrevolutionhasoftenbeenbutapreludetoadifferentvariantofauthoritarianrule).Evenanautocrat,however,cannotrulebyforcealone,forhemustbeabletopersuadethosearoundhim–hispraetorianguard,armychiefsorheadof thepoliticalpolice– that it is either for thegoodof the countryor intheir personal interests (or,more commonly, both) to support him loyally.AsTurgot’s older contemporary David Hume put it: ‘No man would have anyreasontofearthefuryofatyrant,ifhehadnoauthorityoveranybutfromfear;since,asa singleman,hisbodily forcecan reachbuta smallway,andall thefurtherpowerhepossessesmustbefoundedeitheronourownopinion,oronthepresumedopinionofothers.’114

Thus, persuasion as well as force has to be part of the armoury of anauthoritarian leader.Autocrats in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries havehadattheirdisposalmeansandmediaundreamtofbyEnlightenmentthinkers–fromtheamplifiedmassmeeting,usedtosucheffectbyMussoliniandHitler,toelectronicsurveillance,toradioandtelevisionandamonopolycontroloverthemessagestheyconvey.*Linkedtotheneedtoinfluenceopinionisthenecessityoforganization,sincerulingamodernstateisdifferentfrombeingchiefofwhateighteenth-century writers called a ‘rude tribe’. Traditional monarchies apart,many authoritarian regimes in an age of democratization feel the need for afaçade of democracy, including ‘elections’ offering no real choice, but whichcan be and are, nevertheless, presented as evidence of popular support for theregime. A monopolistic ruling party will normally play an important part inorganizing such elections and mobilizing people to vote. There is evidence,indeed, thatautocratswhohaveapartyat theirdisposalenjoygreaterpoliticallongevitythanthosewhorelyonpersonalisticrulewithoutapoliticalparty.Notonlyispartyorganizationusefulformobilizationalpurposes;itmayalsohelp‘toregulatetheambitionsofpoliticalrivalsandbindthemtotheruler’.115

TheBaathPartywasanimportantsupportforthepowerofSaddamHusseinin Iraq, although it was founded inDamascus by Syrians and introduced intoIraq in 1951 by a young Iraqi engineer who was later to be murdered bySaddam.116WhileSaddamwasfiercelyopposedtoanydomesticCommunists–aswellastoradicalIslamists–thepartyorganizationwasnotdissimilartothatof ruling Communist parties. Like them, it played an important part in

subordinating thearmyand the security services to theparty.Politicalofficerswereinsertedinthearmytoinsurethatthemilitarybecamedeeplyimbuedwiththeparty’s–and,aboveall,Saddam’s–ideas.117Thepartywasalsothedrivingforce in the building of the personality cult of SaddamHussein. Thiswent toextremelengths,asdidtheobsequiousnessofhisassociatesandsubordinatesinhis presence. Towns, mosques, theatres and rivers were named after Saddam.Bannersdeclaredthat‘IraqisSaddamandSaddamisIraq’,whilewritersgushedthat ‘Saddam is the peak of the mountains and the roar of the seas’.118Nevertheless, the author of themost detailed study of Saddam and the BaathParty argues that the regime, although undoubtedly tyrannical, should beregardedasauthoritarianratherthantotalitarian.119

Totalitarianregimes,inordertojustifytheaspirationfortotalcontroloftheruling party and leader, characteristically offer a vision of a glorious future, anew golden age,which, for a time at least (as happened in the SovietUnion,Italy and Germany), inspires a significant proportion of the population.Moreprosaicargumentsusedtojustifybothtotalitarianandauthoritarianregimesarethat they provide order and are a source of stable government. The claim tosupply order is seductive, for most people most of the time want a peacefulenvironment,providingasettledorderinwhichtheycanbringuptheirfamilies.If theyare told,andbelieve, that thealternative to the ‘order’providedby thedictatorial regime is civil war and anarchy, many will give either willing orgrudgingassenttothepowersthatbe.

Thereare,however,several fundamentalproblemswith this justificationof‘order’. The first is that a majority of authoritarian regimes have themselvescreatedmassive disorder through contempt for a rule of law and by resort toviolence and the physical break-up of families, involving the arrest,imprisonment and killing of tens of thousands (as in the case of the Chileandictator Augusto Pinochet) or millions of their own citizens (as occurred inStalin’s Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China). Nothing could have beenfurther removed from order, however defined, than the Chinese Great LeapForwardandtheCulturalRevolution.Theseconddifficultyisthatsuchregimes,throughlackofaccountabilityandresponsivenesstogrievances,areincapableofresolving underlying problems; they merely repress them. When reform orrevolution eventually takes place, the difficulties have usually become moreratherthanlessintractable.Athirdproblemisrelatedtothefactthatmoststatesareethnicallydiverseandcountriesunderauthoritarianrulearenoexceptions.In

Africa, in particular, but also in the Middle East, national boundaries weredeterminedbyimperialpowerswithlittleornoregardforlocalallegiancesandethnic loyalties. As Paul Collier observes, ‘Typically, in ethnically diversesocietiesautocratsdependupon thesupportof theirownethnicgroup’and themorediverse the society, ‘the smaller the autocrat’s group is likely to be’.120This leads the autocrat to favour his own group both politically andeconomically.Resourcesarequitedisproportionatelyconcentrated in thehandsof thedominating religiousorethnicgroup.Thatexacerbatesunderlying inter-grouptensionsaswellasdamagingeconomicdevelopment.

It is no less of a myth that authoritarian rule provides stability. In anestablisheddemocracythedefeatandremovalofagovernmentisanormalandhealthyevent.Itdoesnotimplyacrisisforthesystemorsociety.Theremovalofagovernmentwithinanauthoritarianregime,incontrast,meanssystemiccrisis.In thepast fewdecades this hasbeenwell illustratedby the transformationofEasternEuropein1989andthemuchmoretumultuousupheavalintheMiddleEast since 2011. Democratic leaders until the recent past went on to enjoy amodestandwell-earnedretirement.Nowmanyofthempreferanimmodestandexceptionally well-remunerated retirement, in which they cash in on theircelebrity.Eitherway, their fatehasbeenverydifferent from thatofMussolini(shotandstrungupbyhisfeet),Hitler(shootinghimself inhisBerlinbunker),Ceauşescu (shot, along with his wife, by firing squad) or Muammar Gaddafi(torturedandkilledbyrebelfighters),although,admittedly,manyotherdictatorshavehadmorenaturaldeaths.

Themostpersistentmythofdictatorialregimeshasbeenthatofthegreatandfar-seeingleader.Thisappliesparticularlytoautocracies,lesssotooligarchies,inwhich the emphasis is generally on the unique insights andwisdom of theruling party rather than those qualities in an individual leader. Thewords for‘leader’ in Italian (Duce),German(Führer)andRussian (vozhd)changed theirmeaningsduringtheperiodsofMussolini’s,Hitler’sandStalin’srule.Thewordin each case came to signify the leader, someone of virtually superhumanstrength, understanding, insight and fatherly care for his people. Credulousfollowers bestowed on their leaders heroic qualities, in some cases before theleaderhadfullyinvestedhimselfwithsuchattributes.Hitler,mostnotably,wentfrombelievingthatGermanyneededagreatandheroicleadertodiscovering,tohis great satisfaction, that he was that person. In the early 1920s – unlikeMussoliniatthatpoint–Hitlerwasnotyettryingtobuildupapersonalitycult.Hisfollowers,however,werealreadydeclaringthattheyhad‘foundsomething

whichmillionsareyearningfor,aleader’.121Bytheendofthe1920sHitlerwasconvincedthattheywereright,andtheNaziPartybecameentirelyfocusedonitsleader. ‘For us,’ said Hitler in 1930, ‘the Leader is the Idea, and each partymemberhas toobeyonly theLeader.’122Thepersonalitycultwas sedulouslypromoted in all of these major dictatorships of the twentieth century by theleaderhimself (althoughpartofStalin’scultwasapropagationof the fableofhis supposedmodesty), but theywere never short of acolytes and sycophantswhoplayedtheirpartsinthecreationofthemythofthesupermanwholedthem.

*

Dictatorial power owes a vast amount to the social and political contexts inwhichleadersachievegovernmentaloffice,tofollowerswhohopetogainfromtheirpatronage,toeliteswhoaccommodatethemforfearofsomethingworse(asItalian and German conservatives cooperated with Mussolini and Hitler fromfearofCommunism),andtotheirrationalbeliefthatonepersoncanembodythewisdom of the nation. They are testimony, in a dangerous form, to the‘emotional tail wagging the rational dog’.123 They are the apotheosis of theillusion that what humanity needs is a strong leader and a reminder that, ifunchecked,thepowerofsuchaleaderwillleadtooppressionandcarnage.

*WhetherthosemillionsconstitutedamajorityoraminorityofSovietcitizensremainsasubjectofdebate.Thecollectivizationofagriculturecreateddeepunhappinessinthecountryside,andpeasantsinthe1930sstillmadeupthemajorityofthepopulation.However,thefactthateveninthetwenty-firstcenturyStalinfrequentlytopsthepollwhencitizensofpost-SovietRussiaareaskedtonamethegreatestleaderoftheircountry in the twentieth century suggests thatpropagandawhichassociatedall the country’s successes–aboveall,victoryintheSecondWorldWar–withhimandblamedfailures,oppressionandatrocitiesonothershadaprofoundimpactandleftitsmarkontheconsciousnessofasubstantialpartofthepopulation.* The fuller context is that of Orwell’s distress about the misunderstanding, especially common in theUnited States, of Nineteen Eight-Four as an attack on socialism. Orwell made clear that he was, andremained,a‘democraticSocialist’.(Hecontinuedtospell‘Socialism’withacapital‘S’.)Thus,hewrotetoanofficialof theUnitedAutomobileWorkers in theUSA,whohadbeen troubledby thegoodreceptionNineteenEighty-Fourhadreceivedinright-wingAmericanpublications:‘MyrecentnovelisNOTintendedasanattackonSocialismorontheBritishLabourParty(ofwhichIamasupporter)butasashow-upoftheperversionstowhichacentralizedeconomyisliableandwhichhavebeenpartlyrealizedinCommunismand Fascism. I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarilywill arrive, but I believe(allowingofcourseforthefactthatthebookisasatire)thatsomethingresemblingitcouldarrive.Ibelievealsothattotalitarianideashavetakenrootinthemindsofintellectualseverywhere,andIhavetriedtodrawthese ideasout to their logicalconsequences.’ (CitedbyBernardCrick,GeorgeOrwell:ALife,Penguin,Harmondsworth,1980,p.569.)

*TheGermanspecialistonCubaandCastro,VolkerSkierka,hasdescribedtheUSembargodatingbacktotheearly1960sas ‘the longest,mostuncompromising,andpoliticallymost senselesseconomicblockadethat a large countryhas ever inflictedon a smaller one, andwhichhas had theopposite of the intendedeffect’.SeeVolkerSkierka,FidelCastro:ABiography(Polity,Cambridge,2005),p.371.* Domestic political considerations apparently dissuaded Bill Clinton from adopting a more productivepolicytowardsCuba.HetoldTaylorBranchon6December1993thattheSpanishprimeminister‘FelipeGonzálezhadgivenhimahardtimetodayoverthethirty-yearUSembargoagainstFidelCastro’sCuba–callingitillogical,counterproductive,lonely,andwrong’.However,saidClinton,‘nowwasnotthetimetochange’.SeeTaylorBranch,TheClintonTapes:APresident’sSecretDiary(Simon&Schuster,London,2009),p.92.* It would be wrong to suggest that China has had no political reform in the post-Mao era. There hascertainlybeennoembraceofliberaldemocracy,buttherehavebeenincrementalreforms,andthepoliticalsystem(withouthavinghadanythinglikethetransformationwhichhasoccurredintheeconomicsystem)works significantly differently from the way it operated under Mao. See David Shambaugh, China’sCommunistParty:AtrophyandAdaptation(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,2008).*Themostsuccessfulauthoritarianregime,monarchiesaside,inarrangingorderlyandregularleadershiptransitionoverthegreaterpartofthetwentiethcenturywastheInstitutionalRevolutionaryParty–thePRI–in Mexico. Mexican presidents were limited to a single term of office and the party leadership thusconstantlyreneweditself,retainingitssinglepartyruleoversevendecades.Evenafterthepartywasfinallyvotedoutintheyear2000,itretainedalotofinformalpower,andin2012thePRIregainedthepresidencyin the person of Enrique PeñaNieto, albeit in amore or less democratic election. See Gustavo Flores-Macías,‘Mexico’s2012Elections:TheReturnofthePRI’,JournalofDemocracy,Vol.24,No.2,2013,pp.128–141.*Amonopoly,atanyrate,withinthestate.Foreignbroadcasts–as,forexample, thoseofRadioLibertyandRadioFreeEuropeinthecaseofCommuniststates–werejammed,butthejammingwasnoteffectivein all parts of the country. Thus, the monopoly over the dissemination of information and opinion ofauthoritarian and totalitarian states was incomplete, even before the intrusion of the internet presentedauthoritarianrulerswithseriousproblemsaswellasnewopportunities.

7

ForeignPolicyIllusionsof‘StrongLeaders’

Itwouldobviouslybemisleadingtosuggestthatbadforeignpolicydecisionsaretaken only by those who fancy themselves to be strong individual leaders,endowedwithspecialinsights.However,suchleadersaremorepronetoseriouserror because of their willingness to discount the accumulated knowledge ofpeoplewithexpertiseonthepartoftheworldinquestion.Theyarecharacterizedalsobyadisinclinationtopromoteuninhibiteddiscussion,basedonfullaccessto information,withgovernmental colleagueswho feel free to raiseobjectionsand to insist on consideration of alternative approaches. Worse decisions onforeign policy are, on the whole, taken in authoritarian regimes than indemocracies(thegulfisstillwiderondomesticpolicy),andtheworstofallarewithinautocratic,ratherthanoligarchic,regimes.Therethepreordainedlackofdissentfromtheviewsofthetopleaderfortifieshisbeliefthatheissupremelyqualifiedtomakethedecisivejudgementcall.Withinademocracy,theMinisterofForeignAffairs(SecretaryofStateintheUS,ForeignSecretaryintheUK)isusuallyaveryinfluentialfigureandtherewillbeaCabinet,CabinetcommitteeorNational SecurityCouncil,with seniorministers involved in themaking ofinternationalpolicy,althoughtoavaryingextentovertimeandfromonecountrytoanother.

Primeministers, however, for reasons elaborated earlier in the book, haveplayed agrowing role in foreignpolicy and there are special pitfalls for thosewhocometobelievein theunrivalledqualityof theirownjudgement.Leaderswhopride themselves on being ‘strong’, orwho are anxious to appear strong,

may be especially tempted by military intervention in another country. Warleaders often have a higher prestige than peacetime premiers and presidents,although the risks to their reputations – and, far more importantly, to otherpeople’s lives–arealsohigh.Leadingacountry intoanunnecessarywar,onewhich contravenes international law, which has been entered into on a falseprospectus, or whose costs outweigh its benefits, can fatally undermine aleader’sstanding.DavidOwenhasobserved‘thehubrissyndrome’whichtakesholdofover-confidentandhigh-handedleaders.Amongthesymptoms,towhichsuchleadersareprone,are‘anarcissisticpropensitytoseetheworldprimarilyasanarenainwhichtheycanexercisepowerandseekgloryratherthanasaplacewith problems that need approaching in a pragmatic and non-self-referentialmanner’;abelief that theyneednotfeelaccountable tomerecolleaguesbut tosomethinghigher,‘HistoryorGod’;andalackofcuriosityaboutwhatmightgowrong, which amounts to a ‘hubristic incompetence’, since excessive self-confidence‘hasledtheleadernottobotherworryingaboutthenutsandboltsofapolicy’.1

FOREIGNPOLICYILLUSIONSOFTOTALITARIANANDAUTHORITARIANLEADERS

The greater part of this chapter will focus on the foreign policy illusions ofdemocraticleadersand,mostspecifically,thoseofthreeBritishprimeministers– Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden and Tony Blair. Still more strikingdelusions, with often devastating consequences, are to be found, however,among the dictatorial leaders discussed in Chapter 6. Not all authoritarianleaders, however, seek foreign adventures. Some maintain a focus onconsolidating theirdomestic regimeandamongsuchauthoritarianstates, thoseofChineseculturalheritagehavebeenthemostsuccessfulinmodernizingtheircountries’economies.2

Hitler,StalinandMussolinicouldalsolayclaimtoeconomicmodernization,albeitwithabias towardsmilitaryproduction,especiallyinthefirst twocases.Whatthethree‘greatdictators’oftheinterwareraofthetwentiethcenturyhadincommonisthattheirmostseriousforeignpolicymisjudgementswerearesultofsuccumbingtotheirownmyths.Theycametobelieveintheirowngeniusand

inthetriumphoftheirindomitablewill.Self-consciouslystrongleaders,whetherwithindictatorshipsordemocracies,havea tendency tobecomeover timestillmoreimpressedbytheirownjudgement,andlessinclinedtolistentoobjectionsevenfromwithintheexecutive.Theyalsotendtobeafraidofnothingsomuchasbeingperceivedtobeweakortohaveshownweakness.

Hitler’sandMussolini’sMiscalculations

Foreign interventions which achieve their immediate objectives may be seenverydifferently in laterperspective.Thus,Hitler’s takeoverofCzechoslovakiawasinitiallyentirelysuccessful.WiththeMunichAgreement,HitlersecuredtheSudetenlandterritory,butinthesecondhalfofOctober1938,justafewweeksafterthatsettlement,hewasplanningtobreachitsprovisions.Hegavethearmyinstructionstoprepareforthe‘liquidationofremainderoftheCzechstate’.3TheinvasionofCzechoslovakiainMarch1939wasnotphysicallyopposedbyothercountries at the time, so it appeared to be indubitably a German gain. Yet itchanged foreign opinion, not least in Britain. Thus, the lack of opposition toHitler’s expansionism fed his hubris at the very time that the realization wasgrowing in Europe that he could not be trusted. The seizure of the whole ofCzechoslovakia not only broke the promise that no further territorial demandswouldbemadebutdemonstratedalsothefalsityofHitler’sclaimthathisgoalwas simply that of uniting German peoples in a single state.4 As ‘the mostardentbelieverinhisowninfallibilityanddestiny’,Hitlerbecamemorerecklessfrom1938onwardsandledEuropeintodisaster.5

TheinvasionofPolandinSeptember1939broughtBritainandits imperialandcommonwealthallies, togetherwithFrance, into thewar, forboth theUKandFrancehadgivenguaranteestoPolandthat,ifitwereattacked,theywouldcome to its defence. Hitler believed that he had secured a free hand by hisagreement the previous month with Stalin to carve up Poland and the BalticstateswiththesigningofwhatbecameknownastheMolotov–RibbentropPact,named after the Soviet and German government’s foreign ministers whonegotiated and put their signatures to the agreement. It did not declare eternalpeace between two states which had been fierce ideological opponents, butcommittedthemtoavoidwarwitheachotherforaperiodoftenyears.AllowingtheSovietUnionatemporaryshareofthespoilssuitedHitler,foritmeantthat,for the time being, Germany would not be fighting a European war on two

fronts,evenshouldBritainandFrancereactdifferentlytotheinvasionofPolandfromthewaytheyhadrespondedtothetakeoverofCzechoslovakia.(AndHitlerdoubtedwhethertheywould.)ItalsosuitedStalinbecausetheSovietUnionwasmilitarilyweakat the time.Thatwas innosmallpartbecausehispathologicalsuspicionhadledhimtopresideoverthedestructionofthehighcommandoftheRedArmy.

Withhiscustomaryruthlessnessandcynicism,StalinagreedthathundredsofpoliticalrefugeesfromNaziGermany,includingGermanCommunists,wouldbehandedover to theGestapo. Inmany cases, theyhad alreadybeen arrested aspartoftheSovietGreatPurge.Forsomeofthemthetransferwasdirectlyfromthe Soviet gulag to a Nazi concentration camp.6 Andwith his barbarism andcynical disregard for anypledgesgiven,Hitlerwas the first to break thePact,orderingtheGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnioninJune1941.IntermsoftheSecondWorldWar’soutcome,thiswasHitler’smostdisastrousmistakeofall,forGerman losseswere fargreateron theRussianfront thanonanyotherandcontributed hugely to the Nazimilitary defeat and the consequent division ofGermany, which persisted for more than four decades. Hitler’s last majormeeting with his generals to brief them on the forthcoming invasion of theSovietUniontookplacejustaweekinadvanceofit.HetoldthemthatthoughtheRussianswouldputuptoughresistance,‘theworstofthefightingwouldbeoverinaboutsixweeks’.Amajorityofhismilitaryaudiencewereanxiousabouttheimplicationsofembarkingonatwo-frontwar,butthesystemwassuch,andthe cult of the leader sufficiently internalized, that none of them raised anyconcerns.7

Hitler had written in Mein Kampf, with himself in mind, that ‘thecombination of theoretician, organizer, and leader in one person is the rarestthingthatcanbefoundonthisearth’anditisthiscombinationthat‘makesthegreat man’.8 While ‘theoretician’ was clearly an exaggeration, ideologymattered forHitler, and he formed a few central notionswhich changed littlefromtheearlyyearsaftertheFirstWorldWartohissuicidein1945.Amonghismostbasicandunchangeable ideaswere thebelief thatGermanyneededmore‘livingspace’(Lebensraum)andtheneedtodismembertheSovietUnion,whichHitlerlinkedwithdestructionoftheJews.Obsessedby‘JewishBolshevism’,hebelievedthat‘theendofJewishruleinRussiawillalsobetheendofRussiaasastate’.9Itwasinthefirsthalfof1941thatHitlerdecidedthatthetimehadcometobringtheseaimstospeedyfruitionwithavictoryoverRussia,whichwould

bringthatcountry’s‘immeasurableriches’underGermanpoliticalandeconomiccontrol.ThiswouldalsofacilitatetherealizationofwhatIanKershawhascalledHitler’s‘twinobsessions’–‘removingtheJews’andLebensraum.10

Mussoliniwas inpowerfor longer thanHitler,but itwas in the1930s thathisforeignpolicybecameadventurist,anditturnedintotragedyforhiscountrywhenhefullyalliedItalywithNaziGermany.Earlier,hegavevigorousvoicetosentiments,quitewidelysharedbyhisfellow-citizens,thatItalyhadlostoutatatimewhenotherEuropeanpowerswereaccumulatingempiresaswellasinthedistribution of territorial rewards at the peace conference of 1919. With theLeague of Nations in place, different standards were meant to prevail by the1930s from those of the late nineteenth century. Mussolini’s Italy, however,having first consolidated its control of Libya, which had been an ItalianprotectoratesincebeforetheFirstWorldWar, invadedandconqueredEthiopiain 1935–36 and annexed Albania in 1939. Encouraged by these campaigns,Mussolinigaveassistancefromtheoutsetof theSpanishCivilWar toGeneralFranco’snationalist(andclosetofascist)rebels,agreeingtosendfiftythousandtroops.WhentheItalianssufferedseverelosses,theDuce’sresponsewastosendlarge quantities of aircraft, armoured vehicles and weaponry to Spain.11Mussolini’s support for Franco, and Italy’s provision of both personnel andmateriel,madeasignificantcontributiontothedefeatofdemocracyinSpainandthe establishment of Franco’s authoritarian regime. The commitment ofMussolinitothewarinSpainwasgreaterthanthatofeitherHitlerorStalin.12He was, however, allying Italy ever closer with Hitler’s Germany from 1936onwardsandbroughthiscountryintotheSecondWorldWarontheNazisideinJune 1940. The fall of France had left him in no doubt that he would be animportantpartneronthewinningside.YetItalywastobeverymucha junior,andunsuccessful,partnerinthewar.MussolinihadlostthesupportevenofthefascistGrandCouncilbythesummerof1943,wasdeposedbytheking,rescuedbytheGermans,andledonlyasmallpuppetregimeuntilhemethisgrislyendin1945.

Stalin’sMixtureofRealismandIllusion

Ofthetrioof‘greatdictators’,Stalinwasthemostcautiousforeignpolicyactor.Moreover,whereasviolenceandterritorialexpansionongroundsofnationalorracialsuperioritywerepartofthefascistcreed,Communistexpansioncouldbe

justified only on the grounds – usually spurious, as it turned out – that theyrepresentedthewishesofthelocalpopulationtoreplacecapitalismwithSoviet-style‘socialism’.Clearly,themajorityofcitizensoftheBalticstatesofEstonia,Latvia andLithuania didnotwish to be incorporated in theSovietUnion, butfollowing theMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact, they were first forced to host Sovietmilitarybasesin1939andthenannexedin1940.There,aselsewhere,however,therewereenoughlocalCommuniststodotheKremlin’sbidding.Adeterminedminority,whenbackedbySoviet force, could install and sustain anunpopularregime.FinlandhadalsobeenplacedbytheNazi–Sovietagreementwithin theSovietsphereofinfluence,buttheFinnsputupfierceresistance.IntheWinterWar of 1939–40, Finland lost territory to the Soviet Union, but RussianmanpowerlosseswerevastlygreaterthanthoseoftheFinns.Asaresult,apeacetreatywasconcludedinMarch1940whichleftFinlandindependent.13

Stalin, having seen the great difficulties theRedArmy experienced in theSoviet–Finnish war, wasmuchmore reluctant than was Hitler to engage in awiderconflict.Better,inhisview,forcapitalistandimperialiststatestofightadevastatingwarwitheachother,while theSovietUnionstoodon thesidelinesandbenefitedfromtheirresultantweakness.Whatisofspecialrelevanceinthepresent context, however, is thatStalin’s faith in his own foresight led him todisbelievearangeofwarningshereceived–fromSovietdiplomatsinGermany,fromtheSovietspyRichardSorgeinJapan,andfromWinstonChurchill,amongothers – of the impending German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June1941.14ThevarietyofsourcesfromwhichStalinreceivedtheinformationthatan all-out German attack was imminent should have led him to question hisassumptionthat,forthenearfuture,thiswasoutofthequestion.OnedaybeforetheNaziinvasion,theheadoftheNKVD,LavrentiBeria,hopingtoavoidbeinga future scapegoat,wrote toStalin that ‘I andmypeople, IosifVissarionovich[Stalin], have firmlyembedded inourmemoryyourwise conclusion:Hitler isnotgoingtoattackusin1941.’15

ItseemedthatthemorepeoplewarnedStalinofthecomingGermanattack,themore he suspected a deliberate campaign of disinformation. Stalin,who issometimesdepicted as theultimate realist inpolitics,was surprisinglygulliblewhereHitlerwas concerned.He evidently trusted the leader ofNaziGermanymore than he trusted his own most senior officers, since three of the fiveMarshalsof theSovietUnionweresentencedtodeath in1937–38andthe twowhowereleftweretheleastcompetent.Sovietlossesintheearliestdaysofthe

warwouldhavebeennowherenearasgreatastheywere,hadthewarningsbeentaken seriously, andhad theSoviethighcommandnotbeen savagedbyStalinhimself. In the conductof thewar,Hitler andStalinboth addedgreatly to theloss of life in their own armies by refusing their commanders permission toretreat,evenwhentheywereinhopelesspositions.

Stalin,however,wasbetter thanHitleratcalculating the likelyreactionsofWestern governments – including the administration of the most powerfulcountry,theUnitedStates–tohisactions.Thus,withtheendingoftheSecondWorldWar, he got awaywith the creation ofwhat became theSoviet bloc inCentralandEasternEurope. In the immediateaftermathofwarwithGermany,there was no appetite in theWest – or by 1945–46 the physical resources inWestern Europe – for embarking on anotherwar, this time against theirmostimportantallyinthedefeatofNaziGermany.Stalin,moreover,knewwheretodrawtheline.TheSovietUnionwasasphysicallyandmateriallydevastatedbyitswartimevictoryaswasNaziGermanyindefeatandinnopositionatthattimeto combatAmericanmilitary strength.Even after Soviet hegemony inEasternEuropehadbeensecured,with theestablishmentofCommuniststatesall loyal(initiallyatleast)toMoscow,StalinwasopposedtohelpingCommunistscometopowerinGreece.HewithheldSovietbackingfortheminordertoavoiddirectconflictwith theWestern powers and thus risk the loss of the SovietUnion’srecentgainsontheEuropeancontinent.16

The creation of Soviet client states in Europe was in the long run of noadvantagetoRussiansandtheothernationsthatmadeuptheSovietUnion.TheSoviet takeover of Eastern Europe was the principal cause of the ColdWar,leadingtovastmilitaryexpenditureonbothsides,whichwasagreaterdrainonthesmallerSovieteconomythanonthatoftheUnitedStates.Stalin’sinsistencenot simply on having regimes in East-Central Europe which would not be athreat to the Soviet Union but also on the establishment of Soviet-typeoppressivesystemsin thosecountriesmeant therewas littlechanceofwinningheartsandmindsinthe‘people’sdemocracies’.Hispreferencefor‘Muscovite’Communists(thosefromEast-CentralEuropewhohadspentalotoftimeintheSovietUnionandhadmanagedtoavoiddisappearingintheNKVDmaelstromofthelate1930s)over‘nationalCommunists’,whohadactivelyengagedintheanti-fascistresistanceofthedomesticunderground,onlymadethattaskharder.PopularunrestincentralEuropeatvarioustimes–inadditiontotherefusalofTito(whohadspentplentyoftimeinMoscowbut,morecrucially,hadledthePartisan resistance to German occupation) to take orders from Moscow –

broughtmajorheadachesfortheKremlin.Ultimately,theanimositytowardstheSovietUnionofamajorityofthepopulationofcentralandeasternEuropeasaresult of having Communism imposed on them meant that for the Sovietsuccessorstates,andRussia in the first instance, therewasa legacyofdistrustthatwasonlypartiallyredeemedbythetransformationofSovietforeignpolicyunderGorbachev.

Stalinshowedamixtureofcautionandbravadointherun-uptotheKoreanWar.TheinitiatoroftheproposalforNorthKoreatoattacktheSouthandextendthe Communist regime to the whole of Korea was Kim Il Sung. He had,however,toseekStalin’sagreement,forhewasnotonlyheavilyindebtedtotheSovietUnionforbringinghimtopower,healsoneededSovietweaponry.WheninMarch1949Kimfirstproposed toStalinaNorthKoreansurpriseattackontheSouth to unite the country, Stalin vetoed the idea.At that time therewere7,500American troops in the South and Stalin was anxious to avoid a directconfrontationwiththeUnitedStates.TheAmericansdidnot,however,expectanattackfromtheNorthandlaterthatyeartheirtroopsbeganawithdrawal.Bytheend of January 1950 Stalinwaswon over byKim.Much had changed in themeantime.ThewithdrawalofUStroopswasalmostcomplete,withonlysomefive hundred remaining. More significantly, the Chinese Communists hademerged victorious in their civil war and had established a Communistgovernment in Beijing. Should it turn out that the North Koreans could notachieve victory on their own, this raised the possibility of China supplyingtroops to ensure a successful outcome. Stalin had no intention of involvingSoviettroops,butwouldsupplymateriel.17

Mao,forhispart,wasreluctanttocommitChinatoparticipationinaKoreanwar. The country and especially the army were exhausted, andMao in thosedays had to listen to opinion within the Politburo where there was a strongfeelingthatChinashouldfocusondomesticreconstruction.Stalin,however,wasaccepted even byMao as the senior and most authoritative figure within theworldwide Communist movement (a deference he never showed to anysubsequentSoviet leader).Maoalso felt someobligation to theNorthKoreanswhohadsenttensofthousandsoftroopstofightontheCommunistsideintheChinesecivilwar.TheywerenowreturningtoKorea,battle-hardened,andreadytofightintheSouth.18Havingeventuallyagreedinprincipletosupplytroops,MaowasslowtofollowthroughafterNorthKorealaunchedthewaron25June1950. Initially, itdidnot seemnecessary, for theelementof surprisehadbeen

effective and the North Koreans had soon captured Seoul, the capital of theSouth. However, the tide was to turn when the US led a United Nations-sanctioned multinational force to assist the South Koreans who themselvessuppliedthelargestcontingentoftroops.NeithertheSouth(RepublicofKorea)nor theNorth (Democratic People’sRepublic ofKorea)was amember of theUN.Moreimportantly,neitherwasthePeople’sRepublicofChina.InthefaceofAmericanrefusaltorecognizethenewChinesegovernmentandaccordittheseat reserved for China in the UN, the Soviet delegation was currentlyboycottingtheUnitedNations.IntheirabsencefromtheSecurityCouncil, thatbodyvotedby9to0(withYugoslaviaabstaining)tocondemntheNorthKoreanattackand(twodayslater)tocallonUNmemberstoresistit.

TheUNforcesdrovetheNorthKoreantroopsbackbeyondthe38thparallel,the dividing line drawn in 1945 between the Soviet-andUS-controlled zones.Stalin called onMao to send a fighting force,writing that he did not think itwould draw them into a ‘big war’, but if it did, this was not something theyshouldfear‘becausetogetherwewillbestrongerthantheUSAandEngland’.19When China did commit troops, it was on an enormous scale. Three millionsoldiers crossed into Korea and, according to US estimates, they suffered asmany as 900,000 casualties, taking together the killed, missing or wounded;among those killed, in an American air raid, was Mao’s eldest son.20Inconclusive armistice talks began in 1951, but by 1952 Kim Il Sung hadbecome more ready to make peace, having realized that the attempt atreunificationonhistermswouldnotsucceed.WiththeSovietUnionsupplyingmassive amounts of armaments but no troops, while the Americans sufferedlosses,Stalin,however,hadnowishtocallahalt.NordidMao,inspiteofthescaleofChinesecasualties.Thestalematemighthavegoneonformuchlonger,with a still higher death toll, had Stalin not died in March 1953. The newcollectiveSoviet leadership looked to improve their relationswith theWesternworld andwere ready to seek a compromise agreement to end thewar.AfterthreemillionKoreanshadbeenkilled(approximatelyatenthofthepeninsula’spopulation),anarmisticewassignedinJuly1953,withKoreadividedalongthelineoftheceasefire.21

After his initial caution about supporting Kim Il Sung’s attempt to uniteKorea under Communist rule by force, Stalin had been firmly committed tocontinuing the struggle, however heavy the cost in other people’s blood. ForStalintheKoreanWarhadtheadvantageofensuringthatChinawasinalliance

with theSovietUnionagainst theUnitedStates andhebelieved that themainloserfromtheconflictwastheUS–the‘mainenemy’.Rightuptothetimeofhis death Stalin was urging Mao and Kim Il Sung to drag their feet in theceasefiretalks.Stalin’sconfidenceinthewisdomofhissupportforthewarwas,however, misplaced. As a leading Russian historian, Vladimir Pechatnov, hasobserved, the Korean conflict had very negative consequences for the SovietUnionin the longer term.It ‘led toamassiverearmamentof theUnitedStatesand NATO’s transformation into a full-fledged military alliance’ and ‘it alsoboostedtheUnitedStates’long-termmilitarypresenceintheregion’.22

AutocratsandOligarchsinChineseandSovietForeignPolicy

IfMaoiscomparedwiththepost-MaoistChineserulinggroupandKhrushchevcomparedwithhissuccessors,wefindthattheyfitthepatternwherebythemoreautocratic individual leaderwas the readier to takemajor foreign policy risksthanthemorecollectiveleadership.Thetwomenwerethemselvesonacollisioncourse from1956onwards.Theywere both dominatingpersonalities and theyweremovingpoliticallyindifferentdirections.ThatcombinationprecipitatedtheSino-Soviet split. As Khrushchev embarked on destalinization, Mao becamemoreideologicallyextreme.TheChineseleaderwasscarcelylessruthlessthanStalin in disposing of opponents, real or imagined, within the ruling party,although hisGreat Leap Forward and especially theCulturalRevolutionweredissimilarfromStalin’sstyleofrule.EvenafterStalinhadbecomeanobjectofattackintheSovietUnion,Maocontinuedtodefendhim,andtheSovietvozhd’sworkswererepublishedinChinalongaftertheyhadceasedtoappearinRussia.AlthoughStalin had at times treatedMao less than respectfully,Khrushchev’sdebunking of him was not to Mao’s taste and threatened his own ‘cult ofpersonality’–eventhoughthathadnotyetapproachedtheheightsitreachedadecade later during the Cultural Revolution when the ‘Little Red Book’ ofquotationsfromMaowastreatedwithareverencegreaterthanthataccordedtheentireworksofMarxandLenin.

Sharpforeignpolicydifferencesalsoemerged.Thepost-StalinSovietUnionwas the firstof the twomajorCommunistpowers toseekbetter relationswiththe United States and, in spite of Khrushchev’s impetuousness andinconsistency,theSovietleadershipasawholewerevitallyconcernedtoavoid

nuclear war. Mao, in contrast, took a recklessly irresponsible view of theprospectofall-outwar.He told the Indianprimeminister JawaharlalNehru in1954that‘thesocialistcampwouldsurviveanuclearwarwhiletheimperialistswouldbe totallywipedoff the faceof theearth’.Threeyears laterheshockedEast European Communists when he told a gathering of the internationalCommunistmovementinMoscowinNovember1957that,inanuclearwar,theworldwouldloseathird,orperhapsahalf,ofitspopulation,butthosenumberswouldsoonbemadeup,andasaresultofthewartheimperialistswouldhavebeenutterlydefeated‘andthewholeworldwillbecomesocialist’.23

In the remaining years of the 1950s following Stalin’s death, Khrushchevwas strengthening his position within the Soviet leadership which remained,however, essentiallycollective. Itwas from theearly1960s,bywhich timehehad set himself above his colleagues and frequentlymade policy on the hoof,thatKhrushchevwasathismostwilfulanddangerous.OfnothingwasthatmoretruethanhisideaofinstallingnuclearweaponsinCuba.Thisledtoastand-offwith the United States which could have led, had either side refused tocompromise,tocatastrophicnuclearwar.Intheend,goodsenseprevailed.TheKennedy administrationmademajor concessions, butwon the public relationsbattle. The United States agreed that they would not in future sponsor anyinterventionstotopplethegovernmentledbyFidelCastroinCuba.Theyfurtherpromised that they would, after a decent interval, remove their missiles fromTurkey,wheretheyhadbeeninstalledineasyreachoftheSovietUnion.Itwasagreed,however,thattherewouldbenoannouncementofthelatterconcession.Thus, when the Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba, it appeared as ifonlyKhrushchevhadbackeddown.TherehadbeenmajordoubtsintheSovietleadershipand in themilitaryaboutplacingmissiles inCuba in thefirstplace,but being forced to ship themoutwas seen by the army (and byCastro) as ahumiliation.WhenKhrushchevwasdeposedinOctober1964,oneofthemajorerrors of which he was accused was the Cuban missile escapade.24 Moregenerally,hiscolleagues,mostofwhomhadtreatedhimfawninglyintheyearsofhisascendancy,spokeofhis‘impulsivenessandexplosiveness,hisunilateral,arbitraryleadership,hismegalomania’.25

OneofthestimulitoMaoZedong’sbreakwiththeSovietUnionwaswhatMaotooktobeKhrushchev’sdesiretoreachanaccommodationwiththeUnitedStates(nomatterhowinconsistentlytheSovietleaderwentaboutit).Hewastobe at least as concerned by the relative cosiness of the Nixon–Kissinger

relationshipwiththeSovietleadershipinBrezhnev’stime.Maohimself,though,was prepared to flirt with theUnited States to avoid having a simultaneouslyfractiousrelationshipwithbothmilitarysuperpowers.IncommonwiththeentireBeijingleadership,healsohadthelongstandinggoalofshiftingtheUSfromitspositionofsupportfortheTaiwanese(RepublicofChina)governmentastheonelegitimate Chinese state. The belated recognition by the United States of thestatehood of the People’s Republic of China was accomplished by RichardNixonin1972,althoughafullernormalizationofUS–Chineserelationsdidnotoccur until 1979 when it was achieved by President Jimmy Carter and DengXiaoping.26 It was only after Deng emerged as Mao’s most authoritativesuccessorin1978thathispoliciesof‘reformandopening’sawChinabegin‘theprocess of integrating itself, really for the first time, into the internationalsystem’.27Deng’sfirstforeigntripafterreturningtothecentreofpowerwastoSingaporewhich he had last visited almost sixty years earlier. In 1920 it hadbeena‘colonialbackwater’,nowitwas‘apowerhouse’.28Ithad,inthewordsofthemajorarchitectofthattransition,LeeKuanYew,gone‘fromThirdWorldtoFirst’.Lee,whohadgot toknowavastnumberofworld leadersduringhislongpolitical career,wrote of that 1978 conversationwithDeng: ‘Hewas themostimpressiveleaderIhadmet.Hewasafive-footer,butagiantamongmen.At74,whenhewasfacedwithanunpleasanttruth,hewaspreparedtochangehismind.’29Deng, forhispart,wasmuch impressedbySingapore’sprogress.Hewenton toestablishgoodrelationswithLeeand toaccept thathiscountryhadmuch to learn from thoseChinesewho had experience ofmakingmarketeconomieswork.

WhereasMaoaimedtodazzletheworldwiththepowerofhisradicalideasand of China’s revolutionary example, his successors have pursued morepragmaticpolicies.ThecoursewassetbyDeng,eventhoughhedidapproveonemajor military enterprise – the attack on Vietnam in 1979 in response to theVietnamesedrivingthePolPotregimeoutofCambodia.OnavisittotheUnitedStates,DenginformedPresidentCarterofChina’sconcernabouttheVietnameseoccupationofCambodiaandtheirintentionto‘teachVietnamalesson’.CarterwasprevaileduponbyhisNationalSecurityAdviser,ZbigniewBrzezinski,nottotrytoohardtodissuadetheChinesefromthisaction.30DengtoldhisWhiteHouseinterlocutorsthatitwasChina’sintentionthatitshouldbeashortwar.Itmayhavebeenevenshorterthanhehadinmind,foritwasfarfromatriumphfortheChineseforces.Theywereforcedtowithdrawwithinlessthanamonth,

inwhich time they had suffered an estimated 42,000 casualties in the face offierceVietnameseresistance.31

IntheyearssincethenChinahasmodernizeditsarmedforces,buthasreliedmuchmore on its growing economic power to exert influence throughout theworld. Ithas takenafairlynarrowviewof itsnational interest,punishingwithfewer high-level political contacts and a reduction of trade and investmentopportunitiesthosecountrieswhichofferedsupporttotheDalaiLama,raisedtoovociferouslyabusesofhuman rights inChina,or suggested thatTaiwanmightbecome a fully independent state. The pragmatism, however, has extended toimproving relations with Taiwan – to such an extent that a majority ofTaiwaneseprefertheirpresentsituationofdefactoautonomywithinapluralistdemocracytotheoptionofpoliticalintegrationwithCommunistChinaortodejureindependence.Thatlastoptionwouldnotonlyendthemutuallybeneficialeconomic relationship which the island now enjoys with mainland China butalsoraisetheseriouspossibilityofaChineseinvasionandthefurtherriskofawider conflict involving the United States. Post-Maoist China has establishedclose economic ties with countries in every continent of the world, using thetools of direct foreign investment and also overseas aid. Much of China’sinternational economic anddiplomatic activity is related to its energy and rawmaterial needs, but some is connectedwith the search for political support ininternationalbodies.EvenasmallCaribbeancountryhas,afterall,avoteintheUnited Nations.32 China’s economic power has been used by its post-Maoistleadershipasanimportantinstrumentofforeignpolicyinawayitnevercouldbe inMao’s time, since he so disrupted the country’s economic developmentwiththeGreatLeapForwardandtheCulturalRevolution.*

Ingeneral,China’smorecollectiveleadershipintheyearssinceMao’sdeathhasbeenquiterisk-averse in itsconductofforeignpolicy.Beingvulnerable tocriticism of its own human rights record and lack of political freedoms anddemocracy,twenty-first-centuryChinahasbeen,alongwithRussia(whichinthesameperiodhasseenanincreasinglydrasticcurtailmentofindependentpoliticalactivity), a firm advocate of the doctrine of non-interference in the internalaffairs of other states. Yet, even that doctrine has been laced with a cautiousrealism.Chinawasopposed to the2003USinvasionofIraqbut,asOddArneWestadnotes,itdidnotwishtotaketheleadinthecampaignagainstsomethingthatwasgoingtohappenanyway.Theywerecontent,therefore,toleavethetaskof‘mainopponentofunilateralUSaction’toRussiaaswellastosuchEuropean

allies of the United States as France and Germany.33 Moreover, the foreignpolicyteaminBeijinghad‘concludedthattheIraqandAfghanistanwarswereweakeningtheUnitedStates,ratherthanmakingitstronger’.34

The post-Khrushchev collective leadership in the SovietUnion (aswell aspost-Soviet Russia) also conducted a fairly cautious international policy.ConflictsinAfricasawtheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionbackingdifferentsides, fightingproxywarswithAfrican lives,butwhenCuban forcesplayedamajorpartinthewarinAngola,repulsingtroopsoftheSouthAfricanapartheidregime, thiswason the initiativeofFidelCastro,not theKremlin.Castro laterobserved: ‘Never before had any Third World country acted in support ofanothernationinamilitaryconflictoutsideitsowngeographicregion.’35Eventheworst Soviet foreign policy decisions of theBrezhnev era, the invasion ofCzechoslovakia in 1968 and of Afghanistan in 1979, were not expansionistundertakings, although the Afghan venture was interpreted as such inWashingtonatthetime.TheuseofmilitaryforcewasseeninMoscowtobeinboth cases essentially a defensivemeasure, designed to restore the status quoante. In the case of Czechoslovakia, it was to put an end to an attempt tocombinepoliticalpluralismwithsocialistownership,whilethecountryremainedaSovietally,althoughamoreenlightenedKremlinleadershipwouldhavebeeninterested inseeing theexperiment run itscourse.The intervention restoredanorthodox Soviet-type system and served as a warning to other EuropeanCommuniststatesofthelimitsofSoviettolerance.ItalsohelpedtoensurethatthebreakwiththeSovietUnion,whenitcameattheendofthe1980s,wouldbecomprehensive.

Sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan had the aim of ensuring that thisneighbouringcountrywouldnotproducea regimehostile to theSovietUnion.The decision was only in the most formal sense made by the Politburo as awhole. Itwasplanned insecrecybyaverysmallgroup,albeitnot theedictofjustoneperson.Indeed, theSoviet leader,LeonidBrezhnev,whosehealthwaspoorby this time,wasbrought into thediscussionsonlyata late stage.Bynomeans the most hawkish member of the group, he did not want a furtherdeteriorationofrelationswiththeUnitedStatesandhadtobepersuadedthattheoccupation of Afghanistan would be a short-lived affair. Among the seniormembers of the Politburo (and they alonewere involved in the decision), theChairmanoftheCouncilofMinisters,AlekseyKosygin,wasthemostopposedtomilitaryintervention.Whentheleaderofthemoreradicalofthetwofactions

into which the Afghan Communists were bitterly divided, Nur MohammadTaraki, inMarch1979 insistently requesteddirectSovietmilitaryparticipationto consolidate the government that had been installed in Kabul, Kosygin saidthatonlyarmsandtechnicalassistancewouldbeprovided,adding:‘OurenemiesarejustwaitingforthemomentwhenSoviettroopsappearinAfghanistan.’36Itwas,however,theGeneralSecretaryBrezhnevwhohadthelastword,foronamajor foreignpolicydecisionhis consentwas essential.The threepeoplewhopersuaded Brezhnev that the Soviet Union should intervene militarily inAfghanistanweretheKGBChairmanYuriyAndropov,theMinisterofDefenceDmitriyUstinovandtheForeignMinisterAndreyGromyko,withAndropovandUstinovthemostdecisiveduo.

The Afghan Communists’ seizure of power in April 1978 had taken theKremlinbysurprise,forithadbeenachievedbythefactionlessconnectedwithMoscowandlessfavouredthere.CommunistsinAfghanistanweretobringfarmore troubles for the Soviet leadership than had the traditional leaders of thecountry,withwhomrelationshadbeenuncomplicated.Aftertheygainedpower,Afghanistan’sCommunistsdevotedasmuchoftheirenergytokillingeachotherastosuppressingtheirtraditionalopponents.BythetimeoftheSovietinvasioninDecember1979,Tarakihadbeenimprisonedandexecutedbyhissuccessor,HafizullahAmin,amurderousrivalfromthesamefactionasTaraki.Andropov,Ustinov and Gromyko distrusted Amin, with Andropov and the KGB, inparticular, fearing that he might ‘do a Sadat’ and switch sides to theAmericans.37 He had studied in the United States and within the chronicallysuspiciousKGBtherewerethosewhowonderedifhemighthavebeenrecruitedbytheCIA.

Since Amin, like his predecessor Taraki, had been seeking direct Sovietmilitaryparticipation to consolidateCommunist rule inAfghanistan, heheld alunchtimepartyon27December1979tocelebratethefactthattheRussianshadfinallyarrived.TheKGBusedtheoccasiontopoisonhim.Aminsurvived,butwas still suffering ill effectswhenSoviet troops stormed his palace that nightandshothimdead.Thatwastheeasypart.TheSovietleadershipfounditmuchharder to get out of Afghanistan than to get in. Before Gorbachev becamegeneralsecretaryinMarch1985,hispredecessorswerealreadyawarethattheyweremaking limitedprogressatbestand that theprolongedwarhaddamagedtheir international standing.They had lost friends in theThirdWorld and hadseen a deterioration in their relations with both the US and China. From the

outset of his leadership,Gorbachev intended to bringSoviet troops home but,likeWesternleadersinsimilarsituations(includinganAmericanpresidentwithtroops in Afghanistan in the second decade of the twenty-first century), hewantedthewithdrawaltooccurinamannerthatwouldnotbeseenintheoutsideworld as a humiliating retreat. Like them, he could not tell parents of deadsoldiersthattheirsonshadlosttheirlivesinvain,although,asheobservedtohisforeign policy aide Anatoliy Chernyaev in the summer of 1987, he found it‘awfulwhen you have to defendBrezhnev’s policies’.38By the time the lastSovietsoldierleftAfghanistaninFebruary1989,over25,000oftheircomradeshad died there, with more than 50,000 wounded, while many others sufferedfrom post-traumatic stress disorder. Afghan losses were vastly greater. MorethanamillionofthemwerekilledduringtheSovietwar.39

Cold War paranoia led to many foolish decisions on both sides of theideological divide, and armed interventions without major unintendedconsequencesarerare.Timeandagaingovernmentsthinkthatthemilitarypartof the operationwill be over in amatter ofweeks ormonths, afterwhich theright kind of government will be securely installed. Outside specialists, asdistinct from seniorKGBofficers,were given no opportunity to influence theSovietdecisiontoinvadeAfghanistan.Thedirectorofaninstituteforeconomicandpoliticalanalysis,whichcontainedmoreradicalreformersthananyotherinMoscow, Oleg Bogomolov, sent a critical memorandum to the CentralCommitteeoftheSovietCommunistPartyon20January1980whichspokeofthe‘hopelessnessandharmfulness’ofthemilitaryintervention.40Bythenitwastoo late. The decision to intervene (planned for late December) had beenformallyratifiedataPolitburomeetingon12December1979,inwhichallthememberspresenthad toappend theirsignatures.Theprincipalopponentof theintervention, Kosygin (who more than once commended to the AfghanCommuniststheexampleoftheVietnamesewho,hesaid,hadseenoffboththeAmericansandtheChinesewithoutthehelpofanyforeigntroops),wasabsentfrom that Politburomeeting.41 The pros and cons of interventionwere neverdebated in the Politburo as a whole, and the opposition of Kosygin wasdisregarded by the small inner group who took the decision to invadeAfghanistan.

THESELF-DECEPTIONOFBRITISH

‘STRONGLEADERS’

Ifweturntodemocracies,Britainprovidesseveralexamplesofprimeministersintentondominating their colleagues andcoming todisastrous conclusionsonthebasisofamisplacedfaithintheirownjudgementonforeignpolicy.Thetwomost clear-cut cases are thoseofAnthonyEdenand thecollusionwithFranceandIsraeltoinvadeEgyptin1956andofTonyBlairandtheinvasionofIraqin2003.Inthelattercase,theprimemoverwas,ofcourse,theUnitedStates,wherethedecisionwassomewhatmoreconsensual.TheUSAwouldhave intervenedmilitarily in any event, whether or not Blair volunteered British lives andresourcestothejointeffort.42

There are arguments about the extent to which these leaders deceived thepublic,thatdeceptionbeingespeciallyclearinEden’scase,buttheywereguilty,aboveall,ofself-deception,ofbelievingwhattheywantedtobelieve.EdenandBlairdisregardedtheknowledgeandjudgementsofthosebestqualifiedtoassessthelikelyconsequencesoftheiractions.Whilethesupportsubsequentlygreatlydiminished, initially public opinion was fairly evenly split, with millions ofBritishcitizenspreparedtotakeatfacevaluethewordofbothprimeministersonamajorinternationalissueandespeciallyinclinedtosupportBritishtroopsinaction.*

In the Suez crisis the attack on Egypt was opposed by both the mainoppositionLabourPartyandthesmallLiberalParty.InthecaseoftheIraqwar,theConservativeLeaderof theOpposition, IainDuncanSmith,appeared tobetryingtooutbidBlairandtheLabourgovernmentinhisenthusiasticsupportforthepolicydecideduponbytheUSgovernment.ThewarwasopposedinBritainby the LiberalDemocrats and by the ScottishNational Party, aswell as by asubstantial minority of Labour MPs, a much smaller group of Conservativedissidentsandmillionsofcitizenswhodidnotbelongtoanyparty.Badforeignpolicy decisions often go along with, and may be influenced by, misleadinghistoricalanalogies.43SuezandIraqbothbroughtoutthemosthackneyedofallthe comparisons to be regularly recycled since the SecondWorldWar. It hasbeenNevilleChamberlain’sposthumousmisfortunetobehelduptimeandagainasexemplifyingtheonemodelwhichmustnotbefollowed–thatofappeasingdictators. His style of rule provided much justification for holding himpersonallyresponsibleforpoliciesbasedonthebeliefthatitwasfeasibletodoadeal with Hitler and Mussolini. Yet in their attempts to concentrate a major

foreignpolicydecisionintheirownindividualhands,primeministerswhohavebeenmostanxious todistance themselves fromChamberlainhavebeen in thatrespecthisclosestimitators.

ChamberlainandAppeasement

Chamberlain was, nevertheless, more in tune with the broad thrust of publicopinion inSeptember1938 thanwere eitherEdenorBlair.As comparedwiththosewhoopposedtheBritishgovernment’sactionin1956and2003, itwasamuch smaller proportion of the population in 1938 who were against theappeasement policy. Few felt ashamed of Chamberlain’s description of theconflict Hitler was stoking between Czechs and Sudeten Germans as one‘betweenpeopleofwhomweknownothing’.Moreover, thewordswithwhichChamberlain prefaced those remarks had a wide resonance. He said how‘horrible, fantastic, incredible’ itwas that ‘we should be digging trenches andtryingongas-maskshere’becauseofaquarrelinthat‘farawaycountry’.Whenhe returned from Munich in 1938 and proclaimed on 30 September that ‘Ibelieveitispeaceforourtime’,Chamberlainreceivedarapturousreception.44After the carnage of the FirstWorldWar, the intense desire to avoid anothersuch conflict was more than understandable. In retrospective justification ofChamberlain,itcanbealsoarguedthatitwastoBritain’sadvantagetogotowarwithGermanyayearlater,bywhichtimerearmamenthadproceededfurtherandNazi Germany’s subsequent aggressionmeant that the British population wasmorepsychologicallypreparedforbattleandsacrifice.

Chamberlain, however, did not sign an agreementwithHitler primarily tobuy time, anymore than Stalinwas simply buying timewith theNazi–SovietPact. Both men actually trusted Hitler to keep his word, and Chamberlainbelieved that it was a ‘peace with honour’ he had secured, not a mere delaybeforehostilitiesbegan.45Hispredecessor,StanleyBaldwin,hadbeenno lessanxious to avoid conflict, although he was averse to maintaining a constantinterest in foreignpolicy.He told theForeignSecretary,AnthonyEden, in theautumn of 1936 not to bother him with foreign affairs, since he would befocusingontheproblempresentedbythekingandhismistress,whichledtotheabdicationofEdwardVIII.Asthisremarkfollowedaperiodofthreemonthsinwhich Eden had not had a comment from the primeminister, he found it ‘anastonishingdoctrine’.46

In his biography of Baldwin, Roy Jenkins suggests that Baldwin was ‘asmuchof an appeaser asChamberlain, but less dogmatic and self-righteous’.47The second part of that statement is undoubtedly true, the first part morequestionable.TheEarlofSwinton(ViscountSwintonatthetime),whowasAirMinister inbothBaldwin’s andChamberlain’sgovernmentsuntilChamberlaindismissed him, did not dissent from the view that Baldwin ‘avoided foreignaffairs’,declaring: ‘Idonot thinkhe liked foreigners, andhecertainlydidnotunderstandthem.’48However,Swinton’sownefforts,andthatofothers in theAirMinistry,toinvestinnewtypesofaircraft–HurricanesandSpitfires–andin the development of radar were never obstructed by Baldwin who allowedministers to get on with the job. Chamberlain, who intervened constantly inpolicymatters,didnotgiveahighprioritytorearmament,andthatwasreflectedinhisremovalofSwintonfromtheAirMinistryattheendofMay1938.YearslaterChurchill toldSwinton: ‘Youweresackedforbuilding theAirForce thatwontheBattleofBritain,andtheycouldn’tundowhatyoudid.’49Baldwinwasmuchcriticized, especiallybyWinstonChurchill, for a speechhemade in theHouseofCommonsinNovember1936inwhichhesaidthatifhehadgonetothe country in the previous election and said thatGermanywas rearming and‘wemustrearm’,hecouldnotthinkofanythingthatin‘thispacificdemocracy’wouldhavemadeelectoraldefeatmorecertain.50Swintonpointsoutthatatthetimeofthe1935electionBritainwasinfactrearming(albeitmoreslowlythanChurchill deemed necessary) and, in particular, committing itself to a vastincreaseinexpenditureontheRoyalAirForce.51This,ofcourse,hadmoretodowiththedepartmentalministerconcernedthanwiththeprimeminister.

Chamberlain’sleadershipstylecouldnothavebeeninsharpercontrastwithBaldwin’s emollient and consensual manner. As Swinton noted, it was whenChamberlain ventured for the first time in his life into foreign affairs that hebecame especially ‘autocratic and intolerant of criticism’. The very field inwhich he was most inexperienced was the one in which ‘he became almostintolerablyself-assertive,sometimesevenmakingpersonaldecisionsandtakingpersonalinitiativeswithoutconsultingeitherhiscolleaguesortheexperts’.52Asa Foreign Secretary who had complained about Baldwin’s lack of interest ininternational affairs,Eden nowhad good reason for concern thatChamberlainwasgoingtotheoppositeextreme.Therelationshipwasstrainedfromtheoutsetbetween‘aheadstrongoldmanandaheadstrongyoungman’and‘Edenrightly

resentedthesecrecywithwhichChamberlainsurroundedhispersonalcontacts,his hush-hush messages from and meetings with mysterious go-betweens’.53TheForeignSecretary,whoseemphasisoncollectivesecurityandtheLeagueofNations put him at odds with Chamberlain, nonetheless found himself oftendefendingpolicieswhichwereessentially thePrimeMinister’sandwithwhichhewasoutofsympathy.Somewhatbelatedly,hedecidedhecouldputupwiththisnolongerandresignedinFebruary1938overChamberlain’splantobegin,withoutpreconditions, discussionswithMussolini.The resignation stoodEdeninverygoodsteadinthelongerterm,forheescapedcollectiveresponsibilityforappeasement and its failure. It led to his being Churchill’s choice as ForeignSecretary(afterabriefperiodasWarMinister) in1940,apostheheldfor theremainderoftheSecondWorldWarandinthegovernmentwhichChurchillledfrom1951to1955.54

Chamberlainpreferred tosurroundhimselfwithpeoplewhowouldsupporthis foreign policy views and kept out of the government the most vigorousConservative critics of appeasement. Thus, he was happy to appoint LordHalifax as Eden’s successor. Alfred Duff Cooper, the most anti-appeasementmemberof theCabinet,deplored thechange,writing inhisdiary that ‘Halifaxwill be a badForeignSecretary’, for he ‘knowsvery little aboutEurope, verylittleaboutforeigners,verylittleaboutmen.’Halifaxwasalsoa‘greatfriend’ofGeoffreyDawson,theeditorofTheTimes,whoseinfluencewas‘pernicious’.55HaroldNicolson,amemberofthegovernmentcoalitionasa‘NationalLabour’MP(andananti-appeaserwitha strong internationalbackgroundwhoseviewsbecameincreasinglyclosetothoseofhisfellowbackbencherWinstonChurchill)wroteoftheprimeministerinhisdiaryentryof26August1938:‘Chamberlainhas no conception really ofworld politics.Nor does hewelcome advice fromthosewhohave.’56

One of the most pro-rearmament Labour MPs, Hugh Dalton, wrote ofChamberlain thatnotonlywashe ‘inexperienced,gullible and ill-informed’ inforeignaffairs,but thathealso‘preferredadviserswith thesesamequalities tomen of experience, shrewdness and knowledge’. Thus, when he went tonegotiate with Hitler, he did not take with him any senior official from theForeignOffice,butinsteadSirHoraceWilsonwhoseexpertisewasinindustrialdisputes, not in international relations.57 Chamberlain had, said the Earl ofSwinton,‘apersonalfaiththathecouldhandlethedictatorsandmakethemsee

reason’.88 As Swinton observed: ‘Neville was running a one-man band, andbecameangryifanyoneappearedtoquestionhisjudgment.Allthenegotiationsand secret or official contacts withMussolini were his own.Munich was hisown.Hewasconvincedthathe,andhealone,couldunderstandandgetonwiththe dictators and secure a peaceful settlement with them.’89 Already out ofofficeby the timeof theMunichagreement,Swintonwas,nevertheless, askedfor his view of it by Chamberlain. He answered that he thought it had beenworthwhile ‘buying a year’s grace’, for in the course of a year much of theaircraft production programme would come to fruition. Provided the primeministerwoulddoeverythingpossibletoadvancerearmament,hewouldsupportMunichonthatbasis.‘ButIhavemadepeace,’repliedChamberlain.90

UntilthepointthatitbecameclearthatHitlercarednothingforanyapparentagreement he had reached with Chamberlain, only a minority in parliamentopposedtheprimeminister’seffortstoavoidwar.TheLabourPartyhadfailedto resolve its dilemma of being both strongly anti-war and vehemently anti-fascist and had actually voted against the sharp rise in expenditure on the airforce proposed by Swinton when the Air Estimates came to the House ofCommonsin1935.91AlthoughtherewasaminorityofLabourMPsinfavourofaccelerated rearmament, the official Opposition opposed the governmentprimarilyonthegroundsthatanarmsracewasleadingtowar.92Chamberlainwaspersonally andpoliticallydislikedbyLabourpoliticians, but hehadmorethanenoughdotingfollowersonhisownbenches.NonemoresothanSirHenry(‘Chips’) Channon, the American who, after his marriage to Lady HonorGuinness, became a leadingLondon socialite and aConservativeMP.*WhenChamberlain proudly announced to the House of Commons on 28 SeptemberthatHitlerhad‘invitedhimtoMunichtomorrowmorning’,Channonrecordedinhis diary that he felt ‘an admiration for the PM which will be eternal’ and‘longedtoclutchhim’.HedescribedthesceneintheHouse:‘Westoodonourbenches,wavedourorderpapers, shouted–untilwewerehoarse–asceneofindescribableenthusiasm–Peacemustnowbesaved,andwithittheworld.’93In his diary Duff Cooper provides a more balanced picture: ‘The scene wasremarkable,allGovernmentsupportersrisingandcheeringwhiletheOppositionsatglumandsilent.’94

Duff Cooper was one of the very few people in the Cabinet who waspreparedtostanduptoChamberlaininthefaceoftheprimeminister’sutterself-

belief. He had been Secretary of State for War when Baldwin was PrimeMinisterandwasmovedfrombeingtheministerinchargeofthearmytochargeof the navy by Chamberlain. As First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper’sdiscontentwithChamberlaingrew.NotinginhisdiarythatChamberlain‘hatesanyopposition’,hetookituponhimselftoprovidesome.95WithintheForeignOffice therewas a range of opinion, but its best-informedmembers tended totakeafirmerandmorerealisticlineonthedictatorsofGermanyandItalythandid the prime minister. Duff Cooper refers to an ‘admirable’ Foreign Officetelegramhereadon11September1938whichinstructedtheBritishambassador,SirNevileHenderson,‘tomakeitquiteplaintotheGermangovernmentwhereweshouldstandintheeventofwar’.Henderson,whowasanarch-appeaser,senta series of messages back which were ‘almost hysterical, imploring theGovernmentnottoinsistuponhiscarryingouttheseinstructionswhichhewassure would have the opposite effect to that desired. And the government hadgivenway.’96 By ‘the government’, Duff Cooper noted, was nowmeant justfour people – the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir JohnSimon, Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax and the Home Secretary Sir SamuelHoare.97

As thecrisis in relationswithGermanydeveloped in lateSeptember1938,Chamberlainspokeontheradioateighto’clockontheeveningof27September.ForDuffCooper,‘Itwasamostdepressingutterance.TherewasnomentionofFrance in it nor a word of sympathy for Czechoslovakia. The only sympathyexpressedwas forHitlerwhose feeling about theSudetens thePrimeMinistersaid that he could well understand. And he never said a word about themobilizationoftheFleet.Iwasfurious.’98ACabinetmeetingwasheldlaterinthesameevening.DuffCooperwroteinhisdiarythatnight:‘Ispokeatonce.Ithought it important to get my oar in before the Big Four, as once they hadspokenIknewthattheyesmenwhoarethemajorityoftheCabinetwouldagreewiththem.’99HesaidthatHendersoninBerlin‘hadshownhimselfadefeatistfrom the first’ and expressed his disappointment that Chamberlain in hisbroadcast had been unable to give any encouragement to the Czechs and‘reserved all his sympathy for Hitler’, adding: ‘If we nowwere to desert theCzechs, or even advise them to surrender, we should be guilty of one of thebasestbetrayals inhistory.’100On29SeptemberChamberlainflewtoMunichand came backwith the ‘agreement’ that allowed the Germans tomarch into

CzechoslovakiaandgaveHitlertheconcessionshewanted,albeitaccompaniedbyassurancesthatBritainandGermanywouldnevergotowarwitheachother.Chamberlainwasgreeted inLondon thefollowingdaywithwhatDuffCoopercalled‘scenesofindescribableenthusiasm’.Headdedthathe‘feltverylonelyinthemidstofsomuchhappinessthatIcouldnotshare’.DuffCoopercondemnedthe agreement at a Cabinet meeting that same day and resigned from thegovernment.101

EvenafterHitlerhadannexedtherestofCzechoslovakiathefollowingyear,Chamberlainwasseenbyhiscritics,suchasHaroldNicolson,tobefollowinga‘dualpolicy’, anovert stanceof arminganda covertpracticeof appeasement,using Horace Wilson as his personal envoy. Chamberlain reorganized thegovernmentinApril1939,butinhisdiaryentryofthe20th,Nicolsonwrotethat‘Chamberlain’sobstinate refusal to includeanybut theyes-men inhisCabinetcausedrealdismay’.102TherewerenoeasychoicesforaBritishgovernmentinthe late 1930s, faced by the expansionism ofNaziGermany and fascist Italy,especially since the choice of Stalin’s Soviet Union as a potential ally wasunpalatable formostmembers of the government headed byChamberlain andcertainlyanathemaforthePrimeMinisterhimself.*

Chamberlain’sguiltdidnotlieintryingtopreventawar.Therearegroundsfor deep scepticism about Churchill’s belief that war with Hitler’s GermanycouldhavebeenavoidedifithadbeenmadeclearmuchearlierthatBritain(andits still-existent empire)wasprepared to fight andhad armed itself adequatelyfor thatpurpose.Whatmightdetera rationalactor,even if thatpersonwasanauthoritarian ruler, would not necessarily have had the same effect on Hitler,given his personality and the nature of Nazi ideology. It was Chamberlain’sillusion that he understood foreign policy better than those with far greaterknowledgeandexperienceoftheworldbeyondBritishshores,andthathewasuniquely capable of preserving peace through establishing a constructiverelationship with the dictators, that was blameworthy. This involved him inplaying down the foreign aggression and domestic crimes of theGerman andItalian regimes. Not least important, Chamberlain’s exclusion of formidablecritics and potential rivals in his own party frommembership of the Cabinetstifleddebateat thehighestgovernmental level,makinghisconductof foreignpolicy a still pertinent illustration of the dangers of a prime ministerconcentratinganexcessivepowerinhis(orher)ownhands.

EdenandtheSuezCrisis

SirAnthonyEden,whosucceededWinstonChurchillasPrimeMinisterin1955,had a very different background from that of Neville Chamberlain. WhereasChamberlain’s previous political experience had lain in domestic policy,Edenwas very much a foreign policy specialist. He was also someone with longexperienceoftheMiddleEastandaPersianandArabicspeaker.Yetintheyearafter he entered 10Downing Street itwas a calamitous error of judgement inforeign policy, in relation to theMiddleEast in particular, that did permanentdamage tohis reputation.His folly couldnotbeputdown to ignoranceof thewider world, as Chamberlain’s could. A major part of the problem was thatEden, having been perceived as a weak leader, wished to show that he wasstrong.WritinginhisdiaryduringEden’sshortprimeministership,SirEvelynShuckburgh(whohadearlierbeenEden’sPrivateSecretaryandbythistimewasUnder-Secretary in theForeignOfficedealingwith theMiddleEast)observed:‘Heisfaraway,thinkinglargelyabouttheeffectheismaking,notinanywaystrengthenedincharacter,asIhadhoped,bytheattainmentofhisambition’ofhavingbecomeprimeminister.103Edenwasacutelysensitivetopresscriticismwhichincludedthechargethathewasindecisive.AsKeithKyle,theauthorofthe major book on Eden and the Suez crisis of 1956, noted: ‘He becameobsessiveaboutnotappearingtodither’.104

Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had come to power in Egypt, following anofficers’ coup of 1952, in which he was before long to emerge as the mostdeterminedandpopularpoliticalfigure.Followingapowerstruggle,hebecameEgyptian president in 1954. He was an Arab nationalist opposed both to theMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt (one of whom tried to assassinate him) and todomestic Communists. The fact that he imprisoned Egyptian Communists,however,didnotpreventhimfromdevelopingwithinaveryfewyearsfriendlyrelationswith theSovietUnion.EdenasForeignSecretaryhadinitiallysoughtgood relations with Nasser and had adopted a relatively conciliatory policytowardsEgypt.TheUKandEgyptiangovernmentshadreachedanagreementin1954thatallBritishtroopsbasedinEgyptwouldleavetheSuezCanalzoneby1956.Churchillwasfarfromenthusiasticaboutthispolicyof‘scuttle’,butwentalong with it. Some right-wing Conservative backbench MPs, who becameknownas the ‘Suezgroup’,wereoutspokenly critical.105 Just sixweeks afterthelastoftheBritishtroopsleftEgypt,NassernationalizedtheSuezCanal.106

ThiswaspartlytriggeredbyEgyptiandisappointmentthattheUnitedStatesandBritain had the previous year changed theirminds about financing theAswanDamontheRiverNile,aprojectdeartoNasser’sheart.ItwaslatertobebuiltwiththesupportoftheSovietUnion.

ThenationalizationoftheSuezCanal,whichhadpreviouslybeenownedbytheSuezCanalCompany,inwhichtherewereBritishandFrenchinterests,wasannounced by Nasser in a speech on 26 July when he stated that Egypt hadbegun‘totakeovertheCanalCompanyanditspropertyandtocontrolshippingintheCanal . . .whichissituatedinEgyptianterritory,whichispartofEgyptandwhichisownedbyEgypt’.107AlthoughNasserofferedcompensationtotheshareholders,Edenreactedwithoutrage,whichwassharedbyalargepartoftheBritishestablishment.EventheLabourPartyleader,HughGaitskell,whowastobecomeanoutspokenandeffectivecriticofthesubsequentIsraeli-Anglo-FrenchinvasionofEgyptalittleovertwomonthslater,saidinaspeechintheHouseofCommons:‘Itisallveryfamiliar.ItisexactlythesameasweencounteredfromHitlerandMussolini.’108Itwasapopularbuthighlymisleadinganalogy,usedby the PrimeMinister, Anthony Eden, and by the Foreign Secretary, SelwynLloyd,bothatthetimeandinretrospect.109EdenwasawarethathewasseeninsomeConservativecirclesasanirresoluteleader,tooreadytomakeconcessionsto those opposed to British interests to have the full approval of his ownparliamentaryparty.Thedubiousreferencestohistory,portrayingtheSuezcrisisof1956asanalogoustotheappeasementdilemmasandviewingNasserasanewHitlerorMussolini,addedtothemuddle.Egypt,incontrastwithNaziGermany,was not a major industrial power, and Nasser was neither a fascist nor aCommunist,butanationalist.

TheBritishandFrenchgovernmentsdecidedthat theywouldnotonly takethe Suez Canal back under international ownership but that they would alsotoppleNasser, by force if necessary.After the nationalization of the canal, an‘EgyptCommittee’ of theBritishCabinetwas established, andonly four daysafter Nasser had effected the Canal takeover, made clear its readiness toadvocatetheuseofforcetoachievewhatwouldnowbecalledregimechange.Theminutesofthemeetingof30Julyofthiscommittee–whichwastobecome,ineffect,aWarCabinet–stated:‘WhileourultimatepurposewastoplacetheCanalunder international control, our immediate [purpose]was tobring aboutthe downfall of the present Egyptian Government.’110 There was much talkabouthowimportantthefreeflowofmaritimetrafficthroughtheCanalwasto

Britainandtotheinternationalcommunity,andpatronizingaspersionswerecastonEgypt’sabilitytomaintainthis.However,nodisruptionofshippingactuallyoccurred, and life proceeded normally outside the hothouse atmosphere of 10DowningStreet.

There was no similar appetite for military action in the White House.President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, tookscarcely amore favourable viewofNasser than did theirBritish counterparts,although theyweremore concerned about his possible tilt towards the Sovietbloc and Communism than with historical comparisons with fascism. Edenmerged his own particular obsessionswith the different preoccupations of theUSadministrationinhiscommunicationswithEisenhower.Thus,inatelegramdispatchedtothePresidenton1October1956,hewrote:‘ThereisnodoubtinourmindsthatNasser,whetherhelikesitornot, isnoweffectivelyinRussianhands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler’s. It would be as ineffective to showweaknesstoNassernowinordertoplacatehimasitwastoshowweaknesstoMussolini.’111InthepoliticalcontextoftheColdWar,Eisenhowerwasawarethat international opinionwouldnot takekindly to operations that smackedofold-fashionedimperialismonthepartofBritainandFrance,andhemadeplainthathewasopposedtoamilitaryinvasionofEgypt.In1956hehad,moreover,apresidentialelection to fight, inwhich the formergeneralwasconcerned tobeseenasapeacemaker.EdenwasawareofEisenhower’sopposition–hehaditinblackandwhiteinlettersfromhim–buthedeceivedhimselfintobelievingthattheAmericanpresidentwouldaccepttheoutcomeofmilitaryinterventiononceitwaspresentedtotheUnitedStatesasafaitaccompli.

Nasser was an authoritarian leader, but one whose brand of pan-Arabnationalism was for a time hugely popular at street-level in theMiddle East,particularly because of his championship of the Arab cause vis-à-vis Israel,whichwouldeventuallysufferaheavyblowintheSix-DayWarof1967.WhatEden in1956had incommonwithChamberlain in1937–39hadfar less todowith a struggle against fascist dictators thanwith a similar domination of thedecision-making process and disregard of the views of those best qualified togiveadvice–mostnotably,inEden’scase,theMiddleEasternspecialistswithinthe Foreign Office and the government’s Law Officers.112 Nasser’snationalizationoftheCanalwasnotillegal.ItwasBritainandFrance,togetherwithIsrael,whoweretobeinbreachofinternationallaw.Britain’sambassadorsintheMiddleEast,theForeignOfficespecialistsandtheprincipallawofficers

within thegovernmentwereopposed to themilitary intervention inSuez,evenwithout knowledge of themost dishonest element in the policy, the collusionwithIsrael,althoughsomeofthemsuspectedit.113

Eden and Lloyd had already agreed on a policy proposed by their Frenchcounterparts that Israelwould attackEgypt and thatBritain andFrancewouldthen intervene, ostensibly to separate the warring parties, while going on tofinish the jobby reassertingcontrolover theSuezCanaland removingNasserfrompower. Itbecameknownas theChalleplan, for itwas firstelaborated toEdenatChequerson14October1956byGeneralMauriceChalle,deputyheadof theFrenchGeneral Staff.*Thismethodof bringing downNasser hadbeenthought up in Paris and discussed with leading figures in Israel, includingGeneral Moshe Dayan, the Chief of the General Staff. The Israeli PrimeMinister,DavidBen-Gurion,persistedincallingit‘theBritishplan’.Initiallyheviewed it warily, regarding it as ‘the best of British hypocrisy’, but he cameroundtoit.114

Thedetailsof theplanwereworkedoutatameetingon22–24October inSèvres,ontheoutskirtsofParis.115TheIsraelidelegationwasheadedbyBen-Gurion, theFrench teamwas ledby thepremierGuyMollet.Theheadof theBritish groupwas the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd (rather than the primeminister), althoughLloyddidnot stay for all threedaysof the conference.116ThemeetingwassosensitiveandsecretthatEdenwasadamantthatnowrittenrecordofitshouldbekept.Hewasdismayed,therefore,whenhediscoveredthatthe senior ForeignOffice official present, Sir PatrickDean, had after Lloyd’sdeparture signed a document summarizing what had been agreed.117 EdendispatchedanotherdiplomattoParisthenextdaytoretrieveit,andthatBritishcopywasthendestroyed.ItwasBen-Gurionwhohadproposedthataprotocolbindingonallthreepartiesbedrawnup,partlytomakesurethattheBritish,ofwhom he was suspicious, did not double-cross him.118 The Frenchgovernment’scopyoftheSèvresprotocolwassubsequentlylost,buttheIsraelionewasdeposited in theBen-GurionArchiveandsurfacedonly in theyearofthefortiethanniversaryoftheSuezaffair,1996.119*

On 29 October 1956 Israeli troops began their attack on Egypt. The nextmorningtheFrenchpremierGuyMolletandForeignMinisterChristianPineauflew to London, supposedly to draw up an Anglo-French ultimatum to thebelligerents, telling them to stop fighting otherwise British and French forces

wouldintervenetoseparatethemandtoseizetheCanal.Thedocumenthad,infact, been drawn up five days earlier.120 During the night of 31 October–1November, British aircraft, fulfilling a promise that had been made to Ben-Gurion, attacked four Egyptian airfields, destroying most of Egypt’s bomberforce.121 British and French paratroops were dropped on Port Said on 5Novemberand, following fierce fighting, controlled theareabefore theendofthe day. By 6 November the Secretary General of the United Nations, DagHammarskjöld,wasabletoannouncethatbothEgyptandIsraelhadacceptedanunconditionalceasefireandBritainandFrancewereaskedtodolikewise.Therehad been threats and bluster from the Soviet Union, although the Sovietleadership were secretly delighted by the Anglo–French folly, for it tookattentionawayfromthesuppressionoftheHungarianrevolutiononwhichtheywere simultaneously engaged and about to brutally intensify.Khrushchev hadflown toYugoslavia to seekTito’s support for the crackdown inHungary.HetoldTitothatBritain,FranceandIsraelhad‘providedafavourablemoment’forthefurtherinterventionofSoviettroops.TheuproarintheWestandattheUNabout Soviet actions in Hungary would be less because of the distraction ofSuez.122

Far more decisive than Soviet criticism, more crucial even thancondemnation at the UN or from large-scale opposition at home, was thepressureon thepoundsterlingandAmerican insistence that therewouldbenofinancialbailoutforBritainunlessanduntilhostilitiesinEgyptceased.Atthattime the pound was still a reserve currency and a flight from sterling wasunderway.HaroldMacmillanhadhopedthathiswartimefriendshipwithDwightEisenhowerwould lead the president to offer a helping hand, but though theyweretogoontore-establishexcellentrelationsafterMacmillanhadsucceededEdenasprimeminister,itdidnotleadtoasofteningofEisenhower’soppositiontotheSuezventure.Inalettertoanoldarmyfriendon2November,EisenhowerwrotethatBritainwasreacting‘inthemanneroftheVictorianperiod’.Hewenton: ‘But I don’t see the point in getting into a fight towhich there can be nosatisfactoryend;andinwhichthewholeworldbelievesyouareplayingthepartofabully,andyoudonotevenhavethefirmbackingofyourentirepeople.’123Ina telephonecall toMacmillan,Secretaryof theTreasuryGeorgeHumphreytold the Chancellor of the Exchequer: ‘You’ll not get a dime from the USGovernment until you’ve gotten out of Suez.’ Macmillan, taken aback, said:‘That’safrostymessageyouhaveforme,George.’Humphreyhad,forthesake

ofprivacy,retreatedtoarefrigerateddomesticmeatsafetomakethecall,sohereplied:‘Well,it’safrostyplaceI’mringingfrom.’124

TheBritishCabinet,muchinfluencedbyMacmillan’stotalturnaround,nowpreventedEdenfromcontinuingwiththemilitaryoption.AsKeithKyleputit:‘Throughout the three-month build-up of the crisis Eden had played anabsolutely determining role.He dominated those aroundhim, according to hisChairmanoftheChiefsofStaff,toagreaterextenteventhanChurchillintimeofwar,andhehadtakenonthedetaileddirectionofeverymoveinthegame.’Althoughhedidnotwishtoaborttheoperation,‘hefelthecouldnotgoagainstthevoicesofhisCabinet’.Thatwasallthemoresobecauseoftheseniorityofthose who had decided that the game was up. Not only Macmillan but alsoButler (more sceptical from the outset) andLord Salisburywere among thosenowfirmlyagainstcontinuingwiththeSuezoperationindefianceoftheUnitedStates,theCommonwealthandtheUnitedNations.125

AsGeneralSirCharlesKeightley, theCommander-in-ChiefofMiddleEastLand Forces, who had been put in charge of the military side of the Suezoperation, concluded: ‘Theone overriding lessonof theSuez operation is thatworld opinion is now an absolute principle of war and must be treated assuch.’126 Two junior ministers resigned from the government in protest atBritain’s military intervention in the Middle East, Sir Edward Boyle andAnthonyNutting. The latter’s resignationwas potentially themore damaging,forhewasMinisterofStateattheForeignOfficeandhadnegotiatedtheAnglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954. The Suez venture achieved almost the preciseoppositeofwhathadbeenintended.ItwasmeanttoshowthatBritainwasstillapower in the world, not least in the Middle East. It demonstrated instead itscomparativeweaknessandacceleratedtheendingof itspretensionsto imperialgrandeur.TheaimhadbeentoshowthatBritaincouldtakemilitaryactionevenwhentheUnitedStatesstoodalooforwasopposed,whereasthespeedatwhichthegovernmentsuccumbedtoAmericanpressuresuggestedtheopposite.Itwasintended to ensure that the SuezCanal remained open,whereas theEgyptianshad closed it at the outset of the hostilities. The toppling of Nasser wassupposedlygoingtosendanencouraginglessontotheconservativeArableaderswhocountedasBritain’sfriendsintheMiddleEast,fortheyhadfeltthreatenedbytheEgyptianpresident’sambitionsandpopularity.Instead,Nuttingobserved,by ‘making Nasser a martyr and a hero, we had raised him to a pinnacle ofpower and prestige unknown in the Arab world since the beginning of the

eighteenthcentury’.127TheCanalwas not reopened to shippinguntilApril of the followingyear.

Eden,whohadhopedtoconsolidatehisownnationalandinternationalstandingbyplayingtheleadingroleintheoverthrowofNasser,washimselfundermined,bothpoliticallyandinhisfragilehealth.Heresignedtheprimeministershipon9January1957andretiredfromactivepolitics.On18JanuaryheboardedashipforaholidayofrecuperationinNewZealand.NigelNicolson,oneofthebandofConservativeMPsontheoppositewingofthepartyfromthe‘SuezGroup’whohad opposed Britain’s military intervention in Egypt, wrote to his father, SirHaroldNicolson,on22January:‘IsupposeyouknowthatEdenleftonSaturdaytogotoNewZealandtheotherwayround,viathePanamaCanal,because,forsomereason,theSuezCanalwasnotopen.’128*

BlairandtheWarinIraq

For the second time since the Second World War, in 2003 a British primeministerledhiscountryintoawarfoughtonafalseprospectus,withTonyBlairfollowing in the footsteps of Eden in 1956. There were, of course, majordifferences. Eden took this action against the wishes of a RepublicanadministrationintheUnitedStates,whereasBlairactedasthejuniorpartnerofamuch less knowledgeable Republican president than Eisenhower. Moreover,thanks innosmallpart to theAmericanopposition, theSuezwarof1956wasshort-lived. The Iraq conflict, in contrast, led to a new spiral of violence.Following the removal from power of a secular dictator, internecine andsectarianconflictwasstilltakingaheavydailytolloflivesandlimbsmorethanadecadeaftertheUS-ledinvasionoccurred.Astudy,ledbyGilbertBurnham(apublichealthspecialist,medicaldoctorand formermilitaryofficer),conductedat the Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in the US, estimated anexcessmortalityof655,000 in thefirst fortymonthsafter the invasionof Iraq.This high figure has tended to be either ignored or dismissed by those whosupported the invasion, but has stood up to further professional scrutiny.129EventheIraqigovernment’sestimatesput thenumberofcivilianskilledinthefirstfiveyearsaftertheinvasionasbetween100,000and150,000.By2009over4,300 Americans and 170 Britons had been killed in Iraq, while more than31,000foreignsoldiershadbeenwoundedbytheinsurgents.130

ThedecisiontoinvadeIraqwasverymuchanAmericanone,andalreadyinthesummerof2002 it seemedhighlyprobable that itwasgoing to takeplace,withorwithouttheparticipationofBritainorothercountries.SaddamHusseinheaded a viciously authoritarian regime, but onewhich theUnited States hadassisted, withDonald Rumsfeld as President Reagan’s special envoy, when itwasatwarwithIran.*Theattacksof11September2001onthetwintowersinNew York and on the Pentagon were seized upon by those within the USadministration who were looking for a pretext to attack Iraq. That theseparticularcrimeshadnothingwhatsoevertodowithSaddamHussein,whowasnofriendofradicalIslamists,wasconfirmedbytheCentralIntelligenceAgency.As Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s National Security Adviser in the run-up to theinvasion,observesinhermemoirs,‘theCIAfeltstronglythattherehadbeennocomplicitybetweenSaddamandalQaeda in the9/11attacksand said so’.131Ever since theGulfWarof1991ano-flyzonehadbeen imposedon Iraqandenforced,mainlybyAmericanaircraftbutwithUNsupport.Vice-PresidentDickCheney had been Secretary of Defense at the time of that earlier war and heregarded Saddam Hussein’s continuing rule in Iraq, however constrained andeven intermittently bombed by international forces, as ‘unfinished business’.FromtheoutsetoftheBushpresidencyinJanuary2001Iraqwasforhimahighpriority.132PresidentBushwasreceptive,especiallyafter9/11,totheviewthatSaddamHussein,withhissupposedweaponsofmassdestruction,constitutedathreatwhichmustbeconfronted.133Thefactthathewasatyrant,althoughfarfromtheonlyoneamongcontemporaryworldleaders,didnotprovideareasonconsonantwithinternationallawforhisremoval.

Internationallaw,however,wastheleastoftheconcernsofCheney,DefenseSecretaryRumsfeldandDeputySecretaryofDefensePaulWolfowitzwhowerethemost intentonregimechange inIraq.Wolfowitzrefused tobelieve thatanorganization headed by Osama bin Laden could have carried out the 2001attacksinNewYorkandWashingtonwithoutastatesponsorand,furthermore,that SaddamHusseinmust be the sponsor.134 The 9/11 attackswere used asammunition in the campaign of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz to movetowardsaninvasionofIraq.DespitetheCIA’spositionthat‘therewassimplynoconvincingcase’for the linkage,CondoleezzaRicenoted:‘TheVicePresidentand his staff, however,were absolutely convinced that Saddamwas somehowculpable.’135Cheney,inhismemoirs,offersalameretrospectiverationalizationof that position, writing, ‘When we looked around the world in those first

months after 9/11, there was no place more likely to be a nexus betweenterrorismandWMDcapabilitythanSaddamHussein’sIraq.Withthebenefitofhindsight–even taking intoaccount that someof the intelligencewe receivedwaswrong–thatassessmentstillholdstrue.’136

WhenTonyBlair,becauseofhiseagerness tocommitBritish troops to thecoming war in Iraq, faced strong opposition in the UK and an impendingdifficultdebateintheHouseofCommons,PresidentGeorgeW.BushcalledhimatthebeginningofMarch2003and‘madeclearthathewouldthinknolessoftheprimeministerifBritaindidnotparticipateintheinvasion’.Blair’sresponsewas:‘Iabsolutelybelieveinthis.Iwilltakeituptotheverylast.’Bush‘heardanechoofWinstonChurchillinmyfriend’svoice’.137Blairevidentlyheardthesame echoes.He told anofficialwhourged cautionon Iraq: ‘You areNevilleChamberlain,IamWinstonChurchillandSaddamisHitler.’138

To win the support of the House of Commons for the UK joining in theattackonIraq,BlairfeltobligedtoresthiscaseonSaddamhavingweaponsofmassdestructionwhichposeda threatnotonly tohisregionbut toBritain.Toinvade another country in order to change its regime is, after all, a clearcontravention of international law.139Blair thus said: ‘Iraq continues to denythat it has any weapons of mass destruction, although no serious intelligenceserviceanywhere in theworldbelieves it.’Althoughhe listedanumberof theiniquitiesoftheSaddamHusseinregime–adding‘Iacceptfullythatthosewhoare opposed to this course of action sharemy detestation of Saddam’ – Blairinsisted:‘Ihaveneverputthejustificationforactionasregimechange.’140Inamemorandum to his chief of staff Jonathan Powell exactly one year earlier,however, Blair had written (in a document that has now been declassified):‘Saddam’s regime is a brutal, oppressive military dictatorship. He kills hisopponents,haswreckedhiscountry’seconomyandisasourceofinstabilityanddanger in the region. I can understand a right-wing Tory opposed to “nation-building”beingopposedtoit[militaryinvasion]ongroundsithasn’tanydirectbearingonournationalinterest.Butinfactapoliticalphilosophythatdoescareaboutothernations...andispreparedtochangeregimesonthemerits,shouldbegung-hoonSaddam.’141Blairhimselfwascertainly‘gung-ho’.

IntheHouseofCommonsdebateonIraqthreedaysbeforetheinvasiontookplaceon20March2003,RobinCook,whohadbeenForeignSecretaryforfouryearsbeforebecomingLeaderoftheHouse,madeaspeechwhichmorethana

decade later haswithstood the test of time.142Cook said that if the uncertainAmericanpresidentialelectionof2000hadgonetheotherwayandAlGorehadbeenpresident,hesuspectedtheissueofcommittingBritishtroopstoIraqwouldnothavearisen.HeaddedthattheBritishpeople‘donotdoubtthatSaddamisabrutaldictator,buttheyarenotpersuadedthatheisaclearandpresentdangertoBritain.Theywantinspectionstobegivenachance,andtheysuspectthattheyare being pushed too quickly into conflict by a US Administration with anagendaofitsown.’143Pointedly,Cooksaid:

Ironically,itisonlybecauseIraq’smilitaryforcesaresoweakthatwecanevencontemplateitsinvasion...WecannotbaseourmilitarystrategyontheassumptionthatSaddamisweakandatthesametimejustifypre-emptiveactionontheclaimthatheisathreat.Iraqprobablyhasnoweaponsofmassdestructioninthecommonlyunderstoodsenseof the term–namelyacredibledevicecapableofbeingdeliveredagainstastrategiccitytarget.Itprobablystillhasbiologicaltoxinsandbattlefieldchemicalmunitions,butithashadthem since the 1980swhenUScompanies soldSaddamanthrax agents and the thenBritish governmentapprovedchemicalandmunitionsfactories.Whyisitnowsourgentthatweshouldtakemilitaryactiontodisarmamilitarycapacitythathasbeentherefortwentyyears,andwhichwehelpedtocreate?144

Cookcouldwithoutqualmsreproduceinfullhisresignationspeechof17March2003 in thememoirhepublished later thatyear,whereasBlair’s speech in thesame Commons debate, much acclaimed at the time, has not worn well. Onehundred and thirty-nine Labour MPs voted against the Iraq war. A seniormemberofthe10DowningStreetpressoffice,LancePrice–subordinatetotheformidableAlastairCampbell– laterwrote: ‘HadeveryLabourMP, includingthosewithministerialjobs,votedwithhisorherconscienceitisalmostcertainthat Blair would have been the one to go . . . He survived thanks to theConservativeParty’sbackingforthewar.’145Thenumberofopponentsoftheinvasion grew when it turned out that much of the intelligence on SaddamHussein’s‘weaponsofmassdestruction’wasoutdated,misleadingorfabricatedby unreliable informants, and that any weapons in that category which Iraqformerlypossessedhadbeendestroyed.Moreover,thewaytheintelligencewasusedbyBlair,andalsobyPresidentBush,wentbeyond,initscertaintyoftone,whattheintelligenceanalyststhemselvescouldvouchforatthetime.

TonyBlairreferredtocriticsofhisintentiontocommitBritishtroopstotheinvasion of Iraq as the ‘anti-Americans’.146 If understanding the folly of theenterpriseandthefalsepremiseswhichunderlaythedecisionweretobecriteriaof anti-Americanism, their ranks would include the current President of theUnitedStates,BarackObama,andhisSecretaryofState,JohnKerry.Thelatter,

inNovember 2005, accused President Bush of orchestrating ‘one of the greatacts of misleading and deception in American history’ and of manipulatingflawedintelligencetofitapoliticalagenda.147In2006–andinthesameweekasTonyBlairdescribedas‘madness’whathecalled‘anti-Americanfeeling’ofsome European politicians – former President Jimmy Carter said in a BBCinterview: ‘Ihavebeen reallydisappointed in theapparent subservienceof theBritishgovernment’spoliciesrelatedtomanyoftheseriousmistakesthathavebeen originated inWashington.’ Carter, who opposed the war in Iraq, added:‘No matter what kind of radical or ill-advised policy was proposed from theWhiteHouse,itseemstomethatalmostautomaticallythegovernmentofGreatBritainwouldadoptthesamepolicywithoutexertingitsinfluence.’148

Two years earlier Carter’s former National Security Adviser, ZbigniewBrzezinski,hadmadethatpointespeciallycogently:

ThattheUS,ledbyapresidentwholikessimplisticManicheanslogans,mighterrinaregionunfamiliartoit – and that it might do so especially because of the shock effects of the 9/11 attacks – is perhapsunderstandable,evenifstilldeplorable. It isuptous,Americans, tocorrectourownmissteps.It ismoredifficult to understandwhy an allywith an intimate knowledge of theArabworld and a deep grasp ofIslamicculturewouldhavebeensofecklessasnottourgeawisercourseofaction.HadtheUK,America’smosttrustedally,spokenfirmlyasthestalwartvoiceofEuropeinsteadofactingasthesupinefollowerinanexclusiveAnglo-Americanpartnershipitcouldhavemadeitsvoiceheard.TheUSwouldhavehadnochoicebuttolisten.149

The problem was that, while Britain did have greater expertise on the ArabworldbothintheForeignOfficeandinacademia,Blairwasnotpreparedtotakeseriouslyviewsthatcontradictedhisowncertitudeorgotinthewayofhisdesirealways to be close to theAmerican president, whichever president thatmighthappentobe.CharlesTripp,aleadingspecialistonIraq,wasamongthosewhoattendeda10DowningStreetmeetinginNovember2002,atwhichTonyBlairand the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw met with academics familiar with theMiddleEast.Trippnoted that ‘ominously,Blairseemedwhollyuninterested inIraq as a complex andpuzzlingpolitical society,wanting confirmationmerelythat deposing SaddamHusseinwould remove “evil” from the country’.150AformerBritishambassadorintheArabworld,whocouldseein2002thatthewarwaslikelytohappen,said:‘Itwillbeadisaster.They’vegotnoideawhattheyaregettinginto.Iraqisaterriblycomplicatedcountry.Andtheyarenotlisteningtous.’151TherewasdeepdisquietamongtheMiddleEasternspecialistsintheForeignOffice,amongseniorarmyofficers,152andinMI5,thesecurityservice

withthemajorresponsibilityforcounteringterrorismwithintheUK.TheheadofMI5,BaronessManningham-Buller, said that prior toBlair’s gamble, therehadbeena‘verylimited’threatposedbySaddamHusseinandthatinvadingIraqwould ‘substantially’ increase it. Since then the radicalization ofmany youngMuslimsinBritainhadleftMI5‘prettywellswamped’byterroristthreats.Sheregarded the Iraq conflict as a distraction from combating al-Qaeda.Unfortunately, her warning that the UK would be at greater risk of terroristattackifBlairpursuedthemilitaryoptionagainstSaddamHussein’sregimehasbeenborneout.‘WhatIraqdidwasproduceafreshimpetusofpeoplepreparedto engage in terrorism,’Manningham-Buller told theChilcott Inquiry into theIraqWar.ShewasdismayedbythebombingsinLondonof7July2005,butsaidin2010thatshehadpredictedsuchanevent.153

Formerseniorcivilservantsandambassadorswerefreetomakepublictheirview that the invasion of Iraqwas likely to be a disastrous error in away inwhich officials still in post were not. Sir Michael Quinlan, who was the topofficialintheMinistryofDefencewhentheColdWarcametoanend,couldseeinAugust2002thewaythingsweregoinginWashington,andobservedthatthetime had come for Britain to oppose the US administration. He wrote: ‘Nodefinite proposition is on the table. But anyone who has worked withingovernment, and particularlywith theUS, knows that once one is tabled, thetime for effective influence is past; minds have been made up and domesticconsensus negotiated; psychological if not public commitmentwill often havegonetoofarforreversal.’154AsQuinlannotedmorethanhalfayearbeforetheinvasionofIraq:

A majority of people polled in a recent survey of opinion on the Arab street believed that a ZionistconspiracywasbehindtheSeptember11attacks;givensuchsentiment,itwouldbenaïvetoassumethataUS-ledoverthrowofMrHusseinwouldbehailedwithgeneral relief.And there remains theproblemofgoverningIraqafterwards.Claimsaboutviableregimes-in-waiting,especiallyoneslikelybothtopleasetheUSandtoenjoypopularsupport,carrylittleconviction.155

Sir Rodric Braithwaite, who chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee in theCabinet Office in the early 1990s, wrote in 2003 that ‘if Blair has had anyinfluenceonUSpolicyinthelastsixyears,ithasbeenonpackagingonly’and‘his blind adherence to the US position on Iraq has left his wider policy intatters’. Braithwaite is sceptical of the influence that the ‘special relationship’givesBritainintheUSevenatthebestoftimes,regardingitasflatteringmainlyfortheegosofprimeministersandtheirentourage.IthadmadeBlair‘aheroin

America’ (although not, it should be said, in themost liberal circles), adding:‘Heandhisadviserslikethat.’156

Most Cabinet Secretaries who served during the period when Blair wasprimeministerhavebeencriticalofthewayhedidbusiness–andinrelationtoIraqquitespecifically.LordWilson,CabinetSecretaryfrom1998tomid-2002,inthelastmeetinghehadwithBlairbeforeleavingthatpostwarnedhimof‘thedangers ofwhatwas going on and I reminded him of the legal position’. OnBlair’sattitudetomilitaryaction,herecalled:‘Iwouldhavesaidthereisagleaminhiseyewhichworriesme.’LordTurnbull,whosucceededWilson,said thatthe Cabinet was not shown ‘crucial material during the countdown to war,including aMarch2002paper layingout theUK’s strategic options regardingIraqandaJuly2002documentoutliningmilitaryalternatives’.BythetimetheyweregivenasupposedchoiceatameetinginMarch2003,itwastoolatetoturnback.ItwouldhaveledtoBlair’sresignationandtheCabinet‘wereprettymuchimprisoned’. The prime minister’s ‘favourite way of working’, said Turnbull,‘was togetagroupofpeoplewhoshared the sameendeavourand tomoveatpace’.157

Lord (Robin)Butler,whowasSecretaryof theCabinet from1988 to1998andthusworkedinthatpositionwiththreeprimeministers–MargaretThatcher,John Major and Tony Blair – has been critical of Blair’s style of rule on anumber of occasions. The forums included the official committee of inquirywhich produced, under Butler’s chairmanship, a Review of Intelligence onWeaponsofMassDestruction.158Concernedtoprotectintelligencejudgementsfrompoliticalpressures,thecommitteerecommendedthatthepostofChairmanof the Joint Intelligence Committee be held by ‘someone with experience ofdealingwithMinisters in a very senior role, andwho is demonstrably beyondinfluence,and thusprobably inhis lastpost’.Thefinal recommendation in thereportwas stillmorepertinent in its aspersionsonBlair’s styleof rule.Butlerand his colleagues said that ‘we are concerned that the informality andcircumscribed character of theGovernment’s procedureswhichwe saw in thecontext of policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informedcollectivepoliticaljudgement.SuchrisksareespeciallysignificantinafieldlikethesubjectofourReview,wherehardfactsare inherentlydifficult tocomebyandthequalityofjudgementisaccordinglyallthemoreimportant.’159

US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld embarrassed Blair by saying in publiclessthanamonthbeforetheinvasionwhatPresidentBushhadindicatedtothe

primeminister inprivate,namely that theattackcouldperfectlywellgoaheadwithoutBritishparticipation.160ThiswasawarofchoicefortheUnitedStatesanditwastheBushadministrationasawhole,withsomemembersmuchmoreenthusiasticabouttheimpendingactionthanothers,whichhadmadethechoice.InBritain, itwas essentiallyBlair’s choice because of the degree towhich hehadconcentratedforeignpolicy-makingpowerin10DowningStreet.AlthoughBlair, at amomentwhen it hadbeenpolitically convenient to do so, admittedthat statutory powers are conferred directly on Secretaries of State and otherministersandnotontheprimeminister, theCabinetOfficewasreorganizedtoservetheprimeministerpersonallyratherthantheCabinetasawhole.161TheDefenceandOverseasCommitteeof theCabinet,whichhad traditionallybeenthe key body for collective decision-making on foreign policy, fell intodesuetude during Blair’s premiership and did not meet at all in the monthspreceding the Iraq war.* Instead, there were ad hoc committee meetingssummonedbyBlair,inmanyofwhichnominutesweretaken.TheCabinetitselfwas not shown documents that were essential if they were to come to aninformed judgement. These included the provisional legal opinion of theAttorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, that without a UN resolution specificallyauthorizinganinvasionofIraq,theoccupationofthatcountrywouldbeillegalunder international law. (Following a visit to the United States, Goldsmithchangedhismind.)162

WhenthemilitarymightoftheUSAwasbroughttobear,itisnotsurprisingthat the aim of overthrowing Saddam Hussein was accomplished. But hisremovaldidnot,andcouldnot,carrythelegitimacythat itwouldhavedoneifachievedbyhisownpeople.TheinvasionofIraqunderlinedtherelevanceofthealready-quotedlessonGeneralSirCharlesKeightleydrewfromtheunsuccessfulSuezventurethat‘worldopinionisnowanabsoluteprincipleofwarandmustbe treated as such’. The Iraq invasion and occupationwas condemned by theSecretary-General of theUnitedNations,163bymost of itsmember states, byinternational lawyersand, as survey researchhas shown,by theoverwhelmingmajorityofArabs.164TheinitialsupportintheUnitedStatesevaporatedastheconflictcontinuedandAmericanliveswerelost.InBritain,whereopinionwasmore evenly divided at the time the troops went in, the war becameprogressivelymoreunpopular. ItdidnoteliminateSaddam’sweaponsofmassdestruction, for they had already been destroyed. The invasion led to inter-communalconflictinIraqandswitchedthebalanceofpowerfromSunnitoShia

MuslimsandhencebroughtIraqclosertoShiaIran.Moreover,thechancesoftheTalibanbeingdefeatedinAfghanistanandthe

prospects for the political success of that military intervention were seriouslyundermined.VictoryinAfghanistanwasalwaysgoingtobeadubiousprospectinthelongterm,butthedispatchofaninternationalforcetherehadalegitimacyattheoutsetwhichtheIraqinvasionlacked.TheinterventioninAfghanistanwasgivenUnitedNationsbackinginlate2001,sinceanattackonal-Qaedabasesinthatcountrywasseenasavalidresponsetothe9/11attacksintheUnitedStates.However, the extension of the ‘war on terror’ to anArab countrymademoreplausible the idea that theUnitedStatesand itscoalitionpartnerswerewagingananti-Islamic ‘crusade’.165TheonesidednessofUSsupport for Israel in theArab–Israeli disputes lent credence to that view.166 As most of those bestqualified to judge, including the head of the agency charged with counteringterrorisminBritain,havetestified,theinvasionofIraqwasastimulustoIslamistextremism and led to a great increase, not reduction, in the number of smallgroupsplanningmurderandmayhem(mostofwhichMI5intheUKsucceededin foiling). The response to 9/11, which, inter alia, was supposed to bringculprits‘tojustice’,involveddegradingill-treatmentofprisonersinIraqandtheindefinite imprisonmentwithout trialofothers inGuantánamoBay.Al-Qaeda,whichhadnochancetobeeffectiveinSaddam’sIraq,hasbecomemoreactivethere since the invasion. Its greatest setback occurredwhen the ‘Arab spring’,broughtaboutbycitizensofMiddleEasterncountriesthemselves,producedthefirst real hope of democracy – thus far, only very partially fulfilled – in theregion.

Theseconsequencesoftheinvasionwere,ofcourse,unintended,buttheydidimmensedamagetotheinternationalreputationoftheUnitedStatesand,totheextentthatittoowasinvolved,GreatBritain.ForpoliticianswhosupportedtheinvasionitisnotgoodenoughtosaythattheideaofattackingIraqwasrightandthe errors were only in implementation. In their memoirs, the Americanprotagonists, inparticular,blameotherofficialsandagenciesfor incompetenceandlackofforesight.Rumsfeld,forexample,writes:‘Inthelistofintelligenceshortcomings, the failure tohighlight thedangersofan insurgencywasamongthemore serious. Intelligence reports occasionally discussed the possibility ofpost-war disorder and instability, but I don’t recall seeing a briefing thatanticipated the likelihood of a sustained guerrilla campaign against thecoalition.’167ThattheinvasionwouldberegardedasillegitimateinIraqandthe

foreign troops treated as hostile occupiers did not come as a surprise tospecialistsontheArabworld.Manyoftheill-effectsoftheinvasionofIraqwerenotonlypredictablebutwereindeedpredictedbycriticsinadvanceofthewar,notleastinBritain.ForCharlesTrippthesectarianconflictandarmedresistanceagainst theoccupyingpowers appeared ‘a surpriseonly to those in theUnitedStates and the UK who had engineered the military occupation in the firstplace’.168

LessonsofIraq:Policy,Process,and‘StrongLeaders’

SaddamHusseincouldhaveavoidedtheinvasion.Heboreahugeresponsibilityforthesufferingthatwasimposedbytheinterventionaswellasfortheregimewhich preceded it. His spokesmen had denied that Iraq hadweapons ofmassdestruction, but Saddam had been more than content to maintain ambiguity.ObstacleswereputinthewayoftheUNweaponsinspectionteamledbyHansBlixsufficientlyoftentofeedthesuspicionthatSaddamhadsomethingtohide.Blix himself believed that some weapons of mass destruction probably stillexisted, but hewanted time to track themdownandwas against the invasion.Saddam had, as it turned out, something he felt he must hide or concerningwhichhemust, at least, keep theoutsideworld guessing– the fact that he nolongerhadsuchweapons.HehadspentallhisyearsasIraqi leaderburnishinghisimageasastrongmanandthemainreasonhewasunwillingtodemonstrateclearlythatIraqnolongerhadchemicalandbiologicalweaponswasthathedidnotwishtoappearweak,especiallyintheeyesofIran.ThatwaswhatSaddamtoldhisFBIinterrogatorsafterhiscapture.169Itwasalmostcertainlytrue.

Westernleaders,includingthosewhoopposedthewar,assumedthatSaddamhadsomeweaponsofmassdestructionbecausehehadtheminthepastandhebehavedasiftheystillexisted.Opponentsofthewardidnotseethatasareasonto abort the Blix mission or to invade and occupy Iraq, thus assumingresponsibility forwhat followed.David Fisher,who, afterworking in theUKMinistry of Defence for many years was the senior defence official in theCabinetOffice from 1997 to 1999,with access to all the intelligence reports,likewisebelievedthatSaddamstillhadsomechemicalandbiologicalweapons.Thebigmistakemade,henowargues,wastoanalyzeSaddam’sbehaviourasifthe Iraqi leader had been governing in a democracy, since no sane politician

there would incur ‘the penalties of immensely damaging economic sanctionsagainst his people and the threat of military action’. But though noWesterndemocraticleadercouldsurviveafterbehavingthewaySaddamdid,‘aruthlessArab dictator could or, at least he could for twelve years’.170 A leadingspecialistonSaddamandon theBaathparty, JosephSassoon,haswritten that‘theprincipleofbeingstrongatalltimesandatanycostaccompaniedSaddamHussein throughouthis life’.Process is important evenwithin an authoritarianregime.Compoundinghisobsessiveneedtoshowstrength,Sassoonwrites,wasSaddam’s‘stubbornnessoncehehadreachedadecisionandhisreluctancefromthemid-1980suntilhisdemisetoacceptnegativeviews’.171

Contraryviews to thoseof theUSpresidentand theBritishprimeministercould, of course, be raised within the executive and, it goes without saying,outsideitintheUnitedStatesandinBritain.Therewere,however,flawsinthepolicyprocesswhichcontributedtoill-conceivedpolicyinbothcountriesintherun-up to themilitary intervention in Iraq. In theUnitedStates ithasnotbeenuncommon for the State Department and the Defense Department to be atlogger-heads.IthappenedduringtheReaganadministration,but,ultimately,onthe big issuesReagan preferred the judgement of the former (and specificallyGeorge Shultz over Caspar Weinberger) when it came to dealing withGorbachev’sSovietUnion.IntheapproachtoIraqthealliancebetweenCheney,an unusually influential vice-president, and Rumsfeld gave the DefenseDepartment an advantage over State. Although Bush could override theobjections of bothCheney andRumsfeld (as he didwhen hewent alongwithTonyBlair’swish toget aUN resolution specifically authorizing the attack, adiplomaticeffortwhichpredictablyfailed),heallowedtheDefenseDepartmenttodetermine, toasignificantextent, Iraqpolicybeforeandespeciallyafter theinvasion. Condoleezza Rice, one of whose main tasks as National SecurityAdviser in theWhiteHousewas to facilitate cooperationbetween the relevantdepartments and agencies of government, reports the response of the vice-president when she tried to impress on him the need for inter-agencycoordination just after US forces had entered Baghdad. ‘The Pentagon justliberatedIraq,’Cheneysaid.‘WhathastheStateDepartmentdone?’172

Secretary of State Colin Powell, as a former army general, had far moreexperienceofrealwarthantheothers,inadditiontohisbackgroundasNationalSecurityAdvisertothefirstPresidentBush.Hewas,though,lessofamasterofWashington turf wars than were Cheney and Rumsfeld. Rice, who was often

caught in the middle, witnessed the extreme distrust between Powell andRumsfeld,withtheformer‘acautiousconsensusbuilderininternationalpolitics’and the latter ‘confrontational’.173 Within the National Security Council,Rumsfeld argued that theUSwas not obliged to have a view onwhatwouldcome next in Iraq after the ousting of Saddam Hussein – ‘If a strongmanemerged,sobeit.’174RicesurmisedthatamajorreasonwhyPowelldidnotputmore strongly and directly to the president his complaints that the DefenseDepartment, aided and abetted by the vice-president, were encroaching onmatterswhichshouldprimarilybelong toState,washis reluctanceasaformerprofessional soldier to challenge the commander-in-chief. There was also themoredelicatefactorinColinPowell’srelationshipwithBushthat,asRiceputsit,Powell‘hadtobeawarethatheprobablywouldhavebeenPresidenthadhechosentorun’.175DrawingonhisexperienceasBritishForeignSecretaryuntil2001, Robin Cook observed that one reason why the UK Foreign Office’sinfluencewaslimited,sofarasdecision-makingonIraqwasconcerned,was‘thefactthattheStateDepartmentitselfhadlittleinfluenceonwhatwashappeninginWashington’.176

Cook’ssuccessor,JackStraw–unlikethefourUKForeignSecretarieswhowerehis immediatepredecessors(threeConservative,oneLabour)–supportedthe invasion, although with far less ‘gung-ho’ enthusiasm than did the primeminister. Straw takes the view, however, that Blair’s reputation has justlysufferedfromhispreferringinformalmethodsofdecision-makingtoproperuseof theCabinet andCabinet Committees. In hismemoirs, Strawwrites that ‘itwouldhavebeen far better – forTony andhis reputation, aswell as for goodgovernment – if he, and I, and the Defence Secretary, had had to discussprogress with, and seek decisions from, a National Security Council, in turnreportingtotheCabinet–andonpaper,notbywayoforalbriefing’.177Strawadds that he is confident that the decision to joinwith theUS in the invasionwould ultimately have been the same. However, an unnamed senior Britishministerwasquotedassayingsoonafterthe2003invasionthat‘IfColinPowellhadbeenUSpresidentandJackStrawtheprimeministeryoucanbeprettysuretherewouldnothavebeenawar.’178 If thedepartments theyactuallyheadedhadbeen the prime institutional actors, the samewould stillmore surely haveapplied.

Given the extent towhichBlair’s colleagueshad allowedhim toget away

with thestrangeandegocentricnotion thatwhetherornotBritainwouldgo towarwasamatterforhimtodecide,evendueprocessmightnothavepreventedthe same decision being reached. There was, moreover, a vast differencebetween the political stature and public standing of Geof Hoon, Secretary ofStateforDefenceinBlair’sCabinetatthetimeoftheinvasion,andthatofDenisHealeywho held the office from1964 to 1970 duringHaroldWilson’s primeministership. Wilson has been given credit for keeping Britain out of theVietnamWar–whichdidhimnofavoursinWashington–butinaninterviewin2006Healey said that ‘Wilson was tempted and I said “Absolutely not”.’179Thatwastheproperrelationshipbetweenaministerandprimeminister.Ifeitheroneofthemhadbeensufficientlydissatisfiedwiththepositionoftheother,thenthe pros and cons needed to be argued out in a properly constituted Cabinetcommittee and subsequently in the Cabinet. In this case,Wilson had enoughsense to bow to the superior judgement of the senior minister departmentallyresponsible who had deep knowledge and long experience of foreign anddefencepolicy(followingactiveserviceasanarmyofficerintheSecondWorldWar).Inanon-presidentialsystem,aprimeministershouldhavetoworkhardtopersuadecolleaguesofhighpartyandnationalstandingonthemeritsofapolicyhe or she favours, and not be allowed to pull rank.Better-informed collectivejudgement, in the case of the Iraqwar, should have led to serious scrutiny ofeasyassumptionsaboutwhatwouldfollowtheoverthrowofSaddamHussein.*

*

Lack of due process placesmore power in the hands of a premier and of hisunelected advisers and has an impact on policy outcomes. In the three caseslooked at here,Chamberlain,Eden andBlair all actedhigh-handedly andkeptcolleagues inadequately informed about important discussions and documents.Bypassing the appropriate government structures becomes all the moredangerouswhentheprimeministerconcernedisdesperatelyanxioustobeseenas a strong leader. Of the three, Eden was the most guilty of deceiving theBritish public, but he circumvented correct procedures slightly less than didChamberlainandBlair.WhileChamberlainresentedopposition,itwasEdenandBlairwhowerethemostpreoccupiedwithbeingperceivedtobestrongleaders.ABritish journalistwho has followed TonyBlair’s career closely and (in themain) sympathetically since the 1990s, Andrew Rawnsley, wrote as early asBlair’s first year as primeminister: ‘MrBlair hasmany strengths.Among his

greatestweaknesses isanobsessionwithnot lookingweak.’180ThathasbeenaccompaniedbyBlair’sunsubstantiatedfaithinhisownjudgement.

Thewayintelligencewas interpreted in the lead-up to the invasionofIraq,byBlair inBritain,andalsobyCheney,Rumsfeldand,ultimately,BushintheUnitedStates,wasagood illustrationof ‘prematurecognitiveclosure’.Beliefssimplify reality and mould the way in which information is processed. Theyscreen out inconvenient facts and are systematically more receptive toinformationconsonantwithpriorbeliefsthantoinformationthatrunscontrarytothoseconvictions.181Ifaheadofgovernment–whetheraChamberlain,EdenorBlair–becomessoweddedtohisbeliefsthatallhewantsisforthemtobereinforcedbythosewhomheconsults,hefinishesupavictimofself-deceptionandillusion.Itis,therefore,essentialthatforeignpolicydecision-makingshouldnot be the province of one leader, helped by his or her loyal advisers.Undoubtedly, developments discussed in an earlier chapter – not least, thedramatic increase in speed of travel and communications – have led to moredirect interactionbetweenpremiers andpresidents, requiring them to speakonbehalfoftheircountries.Thismakesitmore,notless,importantthatthepoliciesthey espouse should have been worked out collectively within the electedgovernment. Determination of policy is not a task that should be left to apremier’s placemen, but is the responsibility, which they should not shirk, ofpoliticiansofindependentstandingandappropriatedepartmentalresponsibilitieswho,inmanycases,willnotsharealloftheleader’spredispositions.

*Moreworryingly forothercountries,however,Chinahasdevelopedcyber intrusions to suchanextentthatithasbeendescribedas‘themostaggressivecyberstateintheworldtoday’(althoughthereareotherstrong contenders). See David Shambaugh, China Goes Global (Oxford University Press, New York,2013), p. 297.MishaGlenny, however,writes: ‘For themoment, theUnitedStates is the acknowledgedfront runner as developer of offensive cyber weapons. But the Chinese, the French and the Israelis aresnapping at their heels, with the Indians and British not far behind.’ (Misha Glenny, Dark Market:CyberThieves,CyberCopsandYou,BodleyHead,London,2011,p.178.)* On 1–2 November 1956, just after the British air attack on Egyptian military targets had begun, anopinionpollfoundonly37percentanswering‘right’tothequestion,‘DoyouthinkwewererightorwrongtotakemilitaryactioninEgypt?’,with44percentsayingitwaswrong.OnceBritishgroundforceswereengagedinEgypt,somerallyingofsupportfortheactionoccurred,with53percenton10–11Novembersatisfied with what Britain was doing in the Middle East and 32 per cent against (with 15 per centundecided).SeeHughThomas,TheSuezAffair(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1967),p.133.TheIraqwarlikewisedividedtheBritishpeople,buttherewasaclearermajorityinfavouroftheactioninitiallythanthere had been for the Suez venture. The fact that both the major political parties supported it was animportantdifferencewith1956whentheLabourPartyopposedtheuseofmilitaryforce.AMoripolltakenbetween28and31March2003found47percentapprovingofTonyBlair’shandlingofIraq,ascompared

with44percentdisapproving.Themilitaryactionitselfwassupportedbyawidermargin,56percentforand38percentagainst.Incontrast,thewarevokedamuchmorepositiveresponseintheUnitedStates.ApollconductedintheUSAatthesametimeasthatintheUKfound69percentagreeingwithGeorgeW.Bush’s handling of Iraq. See http://ipsos-mori.com/newsevents/ca/180/Iraq-Public-Support-Maintained-8212-The-State-Of-Public-Opinion-On-The-War.aspx. In both countries, majority support for the warturnedintosubstantialmajoritiesagainstwithinaveryfewyears.* A characteristic entry (of 19 June 1938) in Channon’s diaries reads: ‘The “Sunday Express” todaypublishedamostextraordinaryparagraphtotheeffect thatIamreally41insteadof39,andhintedthatIhadfakedmyageinthereferencebooks.Theawfulthingisthatitistrue’.(Chips:TheDiariesofSirHenryChannon,editedbyRobertRhodesJames,Penguin,Harmondsworth,1970,p.198.)* His successor,Winston Churchill, who was second to none in his anti-Communism, was profoundlyrelievedwhen the Soviet Union in June 1941 did enter thewar. TheAmerican ambassador to London,GilbertWinant,whohadsucceededJosephKennedyinthatrole,spokewithChurchillon21June1941,thedaybeforeNaziGermanyinvadedRussiabutwhenChurchillwascertain itwasabout tohappen.Tohisaide John Colville’s suggestion that Churchill as an ‘arch anti-Communist’ would be in an awkwardposition supporting the Soviet Union, the prime minister’s response was: ‘Not at all. I have only onepurpose,thedestructionofHitler,andmylifeismuchsimplifiedthereby.IfHitlerinvadedHellIwouldatleastmakeafavourablereferencetotheDevilintheHouseofCommons.’SeeChurchill,TheSecondWorldWar,VolumeIII:TheGrandAlliance(Cassell,London,1950),p.331;andColville,TheFringesofPower:DowningStreetDiaries1939–1955(HodderandStoughton,London,1985),p.404.*In1961ChallebecametheleaderofanattemptedmilitarycouptooustPresidentdeGaulle,forwhichhewas sentenced by amilitary court to fifteen years of imprisonment. SeeCharles deGaulle,Memoirs ofHope:RenewalandEndeavour (Simon&Schuster,NewYork,1971),pp.105–111;andKyle,Suez,pp.296–297.*Bythetimeofthe1959generalelectioninBritain,Suezwasnolongeranespeciallysalientissue.IfthecontentsoftheSèvresprotocolhadbeenrevealedinthelate1950s,thecombinationofdeceitanddebaclewhichSuez representedwould have been very damaging for theConservativeParty.HaroldMacmillan,wholedthepartyinthatvictoriouselection,hadplayedacuriousroleintheSuezcrisis,whichwasaptlysummarisedas‘firstin,firstout’.Hehadbeenamongthemosthawkishofministersinsupportingmilitaryintervention,butasChancelloroftheExchequer,hewasthefirsttoseethatpressureonthepound,andtheunwillingness of theAmerican government to help until themilitary actionwas stopped,meant that thetroopswouldhavetobespeedilywithdrawn.*NigelNicolson’sownpolitical careerwashaltedbyhis opposition toEden.HewasdeselectedbyhisConservativeconstituencyassociationinBournemouthEastandthushisparliamentarylifeendedwiththeelectionof1959.* That visit in 1983 was at a time when Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction and whenSaddamhaddemonstratedjusthowdangeroustheforeignpolicyofanoverweeningleadercouldbe.Heitwaswho initiated thewarwith Iranwhich lasted from1980 until 1988, killedmore than half amillionpeople, and ended with neither country gaining any territory or changing the other’s regime. DuringReagan’sfirstterm,itwasdeemed,however,thatSaddamwasoneofthe‘lessbad’MiddleEasternrulers,in comparison especially with those of Iran and Syria. SeeDonald Rumsfeld,Known andUnknown: AMemoir(Sentinel,London,2011),pp.3–8,especiallyp.4.* A National Security Council was created as recently as 2010. The functional equivalent of the oldDefenceandOverseasPolicyCommitteeoftheCabinet,itischairedbytheprimeministerandbasedintheCabinetOffice, with aNational Security Secretariat, headed by a former seniormember of the ForeignOfficewhohas the title (new inUKpolitics) ofNationalSecurityAdviser.TheministerialmembershipincludestheForeignSecretary,HomeSecretary,DefenceSecretary,InternationalDevelopmentSecretary,SecretaryofStateforEnergyandClimateChangeand, in theCoalitionGovernmentformedin2010, the

DeputyPrimeMinister(theleaderoftheminoritypartyinthecoalition).*DavidFisherwho,asaseniordefenceofficial,didnotopposetheinvasionofIraqatthetime,reachedtheconclusionsomeyearslaterthatitdidnotmeetthecriteriaofajustwar.Fisherwrites:‘Ascasualtieshavemountedintheyearssince2003,ithasbecomeincreasinglydifficulttomaintainthatmoregoodthanharmwasproducedbymilitaryaction,howeverevilandoppressivetheSaddamregimehadundoubtedlybeen.Moreover,howeverthebalancesheetisscored,whatisclearisthatthecarefulassessmentofconsequencesrequiredbythejustwartraditionbeforeawarisembarkedonwasnotundertaken.Norwasthereadequateplanning to ensure the prompt restoration of peaceful conditions after military operations and theestablishment of a just peace.’ (David Fisher,Morality and War: Can War be Just in the Twenty-firstCentury?,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012,p.213.)

8

WhatKindofLeadershipisDesirable?

Of all the books that have beenwritten on leadership, a very high proportionhave emanated from the United States. In the political literature, this usuallymeansafocusontheAmericanpresidency,withothercountriesreceivingonlypassingmention.Moreover,asHughHeclohascomplained,manypresidentialstudiesimplicitlyleantowardsa‘greatman’conceptionofhistoryandpolitics.Success‘meansprevailingoveropponentsandostensiblyshapingthecourseofpublicpolicy’;successorfailure‘isamatterofwhetherornotthepresidentgetshis way’. Thus, presidential studies often become advocacy of presidentialpower.1 This point, as I have argued, has applied for some time now toassessments of political leaders more generally. Too often those who seekascendancy over their colleagues in government and try to dominate them areregarded as strong and, by that very token, successful, and those who workwithinamorecollectiveleadershiparedeemedtobeweakandlesssuccessful.

It is, though, unsurprising that special attention should be devoted toleaderships, individual or as a group, which play a decisive role in effectinggreat change. I have distinguished the rare transformational leaderswho havebeen crucially important in producing systemic change from redefininggovernments, still far from common, which alter the terms of the debate andstretch understandings of what is politically possible. Sometimes, to take theBritishexample, that redefiningwasdonebywhatwasverymuchacollectiveleadership,inwhichtheprimeminister’smaintaskwascoordinationoftheworkof others. Thatwas the casewith the Labour government headed byClementAttlee from1945 to 1951.There are other instanceswhere the primeminister

hasbeenthedrivingforce,asmayfairlybesaidoftheConservativegovernmentheadedbyMargaretThatcherbetween1979and1990.

IntheUnitedStatesthereisawidespreadtendencytoexpectthepresidenttodotoomuch,morethanispossibleforanychiefexecutivewithinasystemwithas many checks and balances.2 In recent decades there has been a similartendency for commentators to demand that premiers in parliamentarydemocraciesshoulddostillmorethantheyarealreadydoing.Theyareurgedtowield power with greater vigour, including power over their colleagues andpoliticalparty.Manyapremierandpartyleaderhasattemptedtooblige,havingbeen goaded by the mass media (and by political opponents with their ownagenda) intoademonstrationofpoliticalvirility,eager toprove‘he ishisownman’.IntheUKsomeobserversandformerinsidersbelievethatBritishprimeministers do not have enough powers. From time to time they advocate thecreationofaprimeminister’sdepartment,beingdissatisfiedwith theextent towhich recent incumbents of 10 Downing Street have already colonized theCabinet Office.3 In the United States, the gradual increase in size of theexecutiveofficeofthepresidency,createdbyFranklinD.Roosevelt,hasled,aswe have seen, to plaintive cries fromother parts of government of ‘toomanypeopletryingtobitemewiththepresident’steeth’.Infact,becauseofthewaypower is dispersed within the United States, with an especially powerfullegislature, there was and remains far more justification for the presidentialback-upinWashingtonthantherewouldbeforaprimeminister’sdepartmentinLondon.Thatwouldmeanacolytesguessing (evenmore thanatpresent)whattheprimeministerwanted,whichwouldoftenbeconvenientlyclosetotheirownopinions, as they attempted to bitemembers of parliament and evenministerswiththeprimeminister’steeth.

When an increasing number of issues are referred to a primeminister foradjudication,thisisunlikelytoleadtotheirsuccessfulresolution.Problemscanbecomemoreintractableasresponsibilityformakingdecisionsistransferredtothe head of government, thus delaying matters until that person can give theissueanecessaryminimum(butoften inadequate)amountofattention.4HecloseeswisdominthewordsoftheancientChinesephilosopherLao-tzuwhosaidthat‘aleaderisbestwhenmenbarelyknowheisthere,notsogoodwhenmenobeyandacclaimhim’.5That,headmits,isanunrealisticcounselofperfectionforamodernchiefexecutive,butheisrightwhenheurgesthatpresidents(andthis goes for premiers, too) who ensure that other people get together and

themselvesworkoutanswerstotheproblemsmaybeexercising‘amoresubtleand productive form of leadership’ than the ‘hyped-up kind of “follow me”drama’familiarinpopularculture.6

WhentheUnitedStatesisputintocomparativeperspective,itisclearthatitis virtually impossible for a modern president to be ‘transformational’ in thesenseinwhichthattermhasbeenusedinChapter4ofthisbook.Tochangethesystemisscarcelyfeasible.Eventoredefinethelimitsofthepossibleisnoteasy.FranklinD.RooseveltandLyndonB.Johnsonaretheclearesttwentieth-centuryexamplesof such redefining leadership, andwhat theyachievedwasgenerallypositive.7 (Thehuge andmost tragic exceptionwas Johnson’s embroilment inwarinVietnam.)Bothpresidentsmadeampleandeffectiveuseoftheir‘powertopersuade’,inRoosevelt’scasewithparticularappealtoabroadpublic,whileJohnsonfullyexploitedhislinkstoindividualsenatorsandintimateknowledgeofCongressasawhole.8

Somepresidentshavebeenattheirmosteffectivewhentheyletotherstakethe lead in importantpolicies.The roleofSecretaryofStateGeorgeMarshall,and the Marshall Plan, in Harry Truman’s presidency was, as noted in theIntroduction,anexampleofthisstyleofleadership.Truman,though,stoodfull-square behindMarshall in his support for the European recovery programme.The civil rights breakthrough, limited and bitterly contested as it was, whichoccurredonEisenhower’swatch–ending racial segregationof state schools–owedmuchmoretotheattorney-generalHerbertBrownellthantothepresident(and,aswasseeninChapter2,Eisenhowerwasgenerallythemorehesitantofthetwo).RonaldReaganacquiredareputationasahardliner,butitwaswhenhebehavedmorecollaboratively thathehadsome legislativesuccess inchangingsocial security and the federal taxcode.9The samecouldbe saidofReagan’sforeignpolicy.Hewascontent forGeorgeShultz and theStateDepartment totake the lead in responding to the radical change underway in Moscow, andReaganhimselfenteredintoaconstructiverelationshipwithMikhailGorbachev.

Nevertheless, in the light of the constraints which the American politicalsystemimposesonthepresident,thereismoreofacaseforanoccupantoftheWhiteHousemakingthemostofthepowershehasthanforprimeministersinparliamentarydemocraciestobesimilarlyassertive,giventhatthereisnormallyamajority in parliament (whether of the same party or a coalition of parties)readytosustainthegovernment.Thus,AlfredStepanandJuanLinzareamongthosewhoarguethatPresidentObamashould,oncomingtoofficein2009,have

worked closely with the Democratic majority in the Senate ‘to eliminate, orgreatly reduce’ that institution’s blocking power through filibuster. As theSenatehastherighttomakeitsownrulesatthebeginningofanewCongress,asimplemajorityvotewouldhaveeliminatedthefilibusterduring2009–2010.10GiventhattheUnitedStatespoliticalsystemhasbeendescribedasa‘vetocracy’,andhasmorevetopowerembeddedinitthanmost,Obamawasperhapsundulycautiousaboutusingthelegitimacyofhisfreshlyconferreddemocraticmandateto seek ‘the elimination of the extrememajority-constraining filibuster rules’.One result of thiswould almost certainly have been the passing of his healthreforms in less diluted (and less complicated) form, giving him a moreconvincingmessagetotaketothemid-term2010election.Inreality,themessyprocessofpassingthecomplexandcompromisedhealthlegislationcontributedto the defeat of theDemocrats.11The Patient Protection andAffordableCareActthatwaseventuallyapprovedcouldbecountedasa‘legislativesuccess’,inlightofthefierceoppositionandmisrepresentationitencounteredintheUnitedStates, but such a ‘success’ in theBritish contextwould have been deemed afailureliabletounderminetheauthorityoftheprimeminister.12

There has not been a transformational American president sinceAbrahamLincoln. Readmission to the Union of the eleven Confederate states that hadseceded and granting citizenship to black Americans constituted atransformation of the federal republic. Lincoln has been mentioned only inpassing earlier in this book, for its focus is on the twentieth and twenty-firstcenturies. He is, however, an outstanding example of how collaborative andcollegial leadership could be combined with attachment to principle and theachievement of path-breaking change. In an important sense, the republicwasrefounded on a newbasis. It is likely, as the leading authority on theLincolnpresidency James McPherson has written, that ‘without Lincoln’s determinedleadership theUnited Stateswould have ceased to be’.13Lincoln’s leadershipand Union victory in the Civil War, the same author observes, resolved twofundamentalproblemsthathadbeenleftunsettledbytheAmericanRevolutionand the Constitution alike. The first was the survival of the republic as onenation and the secondwas the ‘monstrous injustice’ (inLincoln’swords) of acountry ‘founded on a charter that declared all people deserving of theinalienablerightofliberty’whichhadbecome‘thelargestslaveholdingnationintheworld’.14On the latter issue, Lincoln came under strong pressure to dropabandonmentofslaveryasaconditionofpeace,butherefusedtodoso.After

noting thatmore than a hundred thousand black soldierswere fighting for theUnion as he spoke, he said: ‘If they stake their lives for us they must beprompted by the strongest motive – even the promise of freedom. And thepromisebeingmade,mustbekept.’15LincolnwentontoemployacombinationofhighprincipleandlowpoliticstogetthevotesneededtopasstheThirteenthAmendment,abolishingslavery,throughCongress.16

As Doris Kearns Goodwin has demonstrated particularly well, Lincoln’s‘political genius’ lay not only in the brilliance and profundity of his speechesandinhisresolve.Itrestedalsoonhisfeelfortiming,anabilitytobeaheadofpublic opinion but not so far ahead of it in the policies he pursued as toundermine the chances of success.17 And, as much as anything, it rested onLincoln’swillingnesstoworkcollegiallywiththemostcapablepoliticiansoftheday,includingthosewhohadbeenhismostformidablerivals.AlessassuredorlessmagnanimousleaderthanLincolnwouldhavebeendisinclinedtosurroundhimself by a group of men, each of whom thought, at the outset of hispresidency, that he had a stronger entitlement to the White House. A lesserleaderwouldhavebeenmoreinclinedtoappoint tocabinetpositions‘personalsupporterswhowouldneverquestionhisauthority’.18Instead,Lincolngavethemost senior posts to his principal rivals for the 1860 Republican presidentialnomination, Senator William H. Seward of New York, Governor Salmon P.ChaseofOhio,andtheMissourielderstatesmanEdwardBates.SewardcametoregardLincoln as ‘the best andwisestman’ he had ever known and observedthat his ‘magnanimity is almost superhuman’.19 Chase, who never quite gotoverwhat Lincoln called his ‘WhiteHouse fever’, on four occasions sent thepresident letters of resignation, and the fourth time Lincoln surprised him byaccepting it. Even so, Lincoln later appointed Chase, who had frequentlyintriguedagainsthim, to theofficeofChiefJustice.SubsequentlyLincoln toldSenatorZachariahChandlerthathe‘wouldratherhaveswallowedhisbuckhornchair than to have nominated Chase’, but that the decision was right for thecountry.20

Lincoln often said that ‘he, and not his Cabinet, was in fault for errorsimputedtothem’,observedGideonWelles,amemberofthatCabinet.Anotablecase involvedSimonCameron, thePennsylvanianpolitical bosswhohasbeencredited with the definition of an honest politician as ‘one who, when he isbought, stays bought’.21 Lincoln found it necessary to remove Cameron as

Secretary forWar after extensive corruption in theWarDepartment had beenexposed.However,thepresidentthenwrotealonglettertoCongressexplainingthat the unfortunate contracts had been ‘spawned by the emergency situationfacingthegovernment’andthatheandhisentireCabinet‘wereatleastequallyresponsible with [Cameron] for whatever error, wrong, or fault wascommitted’.22CameronwasforeverafterdevotedtoLincolnand,asGoodwinnotes,‘appreciatedthecourageit tookforLincolntosharetheblameatatimewheneveryonehaddesertedhim’.23

In a system which invests executive power in a president, that leadergenerallyhasthepowertomakeabiggerdifferencethanhasaprimeministerina parliamentary democracy. Yet the USA, if we leave aside foreign policy,scarcely fits into that generalization.ThemodernAmericanpolitical system isone in which power is so divided – among theWhite House staff, the othergovernment departments and agencies, Congress, the judiciary and the fiftystates that make up the federation – that the president has far less powerdomesticallythanmostprimeministerspossess,provided(anditisanimportantproviso) they can carry with them their Cabinet colleagues. This appliesespecially to countries with majoritarian electoral systems, rather thanproportionalrepresentation.Thepartyofwhichtheprimeministeristheleadernormallyhasanoverallmajorityinthelegislature.

Yet, thereareoccasions,especially in the fieldof foreignpolicy,when theelection of an American president has much more far-reaching consequencesthan the choice of government within parliamentary democracies. The USpresidentialelectionof2000wasaclearillustrationofthepoint.Itshowedthatevenwhen individuals as unexceptional in talent asGeorgeW. Bush becomeleadersofacountry,when it isoneaspowerfulas theUnitedStates, theycanmakeasignificantdifference,whetherforbetterorforworse.Yetthatelectionalso illuminated the partwhich chance and sheer luck can play in one, ratherthan another contender, reaching the highest office. It would not have takenmanymoreDemocrat-inclinedvotersinoneortwocrucialstatestohavevotedfor Al Gore rather than for the more radical (but no-hope) candidate, RalphNader,tohaveputGoreintheWhiteHouse.OrPalmBeachCountyinFloridamighthaveusedamorereliablevotingmechanismthanitsbutterflyballots(the‘hanging chads’, whose existence it thrust into the consciousness of anunsuspecting world).24 Or Gore might have won Arkansas ‘if he had beenwilling to letBillClinton’spopularitywork forhim’.25 In fact, itwasBush’s

goodfortunetoscrapevictoryintheelectoralcollegeasaresultoffactorssuchas these, even thoughhe lost the popular vote nationally.And thiswas surelyoneofthecaseswherethechoiceofleaderinademocracyhadahugeimpactonthe lives, and deaths, of others in countries far from the United States. AsNannerlKeohaneputsit:‘GoremightwellhavepursuedacourseinAfghanistannot toodifferent from thatofGeorgeW.Bush.Buthewouldalmost certainlynot have invaded Iraq, and on this score alone the world today would be adifferentplace.’26

‘NAPOLEONIC’RULEINBRITAIN?

Setting the top leader far above and apart from the ruling group within anauthoritarianregime,oraboveandapartfromhisorherCabinetinademocracy,serves thepurposeof strengthening the leader’spower at the expenseofpartycolleagues. It has, therefore, a real utility for the leader and for the leader’sentourage, if the purpose ismaximization of personal power rather than goodgovernment. In an autocracy, obedience to a dictator’s command and theabsence of overt opposition feeds his vanity. There is often alsomore than atouchofvanityinvolvedintheattemptsofdemocraticleaderstomaximizetheirpersonal power. Daily and hourly, Max Weber wrote, a politician has toovercome‘aquitevulgarvanity,thedeadlyenemyofallmatter-of-factdevotionto a cause and . . . of distance towards one’s self’.27 Weber sees lack ofobjectivityandirresponsibilityas‘deadlysins’inpolitics,andvanity,‘theneedpersonally to stand in the foreground as clearly as possible’, somethingwhichtemptsthepoliticiantocommitthoseoffencesandtobe‘constantlyindangerofbecoming an actor’, concerned, above all, with the impression that he ismaking.28

Margaret Thatcher, although described as an ‘egotist’ even by hersympatheticmajorbiographer,29wasmoreconcernedwithpowerasameanstouphold values she held dear than with seeking the limelight out of personalvanity.AswasarguedinChapter3ofthisbook,shehelpedtoredefinethetermsofpoliticaldebateinBritishpoliticsinawayinwhichTonyBlairdidnot.Blairaccepted the new centre ground of British politics which Thatcher and like-minded colleagues had helped to create. Kenneth Clarke, who served in theConservative cabinets headed both by Margaret Thatcher and then by John

Major,remarkedthatMajor’sgovernment‘wasdestroyedfromwithinbypeoplewhoconsideredthemselvestobethemostloyaltoMargaret’andit‘waslefttoTonyBlair to takeoverThatcherismwithahuman face’.30Domestically, thisincludedabiasinfavouroftheprivateoverthepublicsectorintheeconomyandincreasing the private sector component and application of market criteria inhealth, social and educational provision. In foreign policy Blair went beyondThatcherinhisacceptanceoftheviewsoftherightwingoftheUSRepublicanparty,reachingapositionwhichontheMiddleEastwasdifficulttodistinguishfrom that of American neocons. Blair influenced only the form, but not thesubstance,oftheBushadministration’sapproachtoIraq,whereasThatcherdidnot hesitate to take Ronald Reagan to task on certain issues, although theyenjoyed good relations and an ideological affinity. In particular, and afterlistening both to advisers within government and to outside specialists, sheplayed an important part in reinforcingReagan’s desire to engagewith a newSoviet leadership, helping to convince him that itmade sense to do so in thepersonofGorbachev.31Over time,however,MrsThatcher listenedmuch lessand would not hesitate to explain to Hungarians what was happening inHungary.*Shedidconcede,however,whenshevisitedaMoscowhousingestatein1987,thatthepeoplelivingthere‘knewthesystemevenbetterthanIdid’.32

Althoughfarmorepoliteto,andemollientwith,CabinetcolleaguesthanwasMrsThatcher,TonyBlair attempted to emulate or evenoutdoThatcher in thecentralization of power in 10Downing Street. Thatcher had as her right-handmanandPrivateSecretaryCharlesPowell.BlairappointedhisbrotherJonathanPowellwhoaskedfor,andwasgiven,thegrandertitleofchiefofstaff.33(Bothof them highly capable officials, they came to these posts from the ForeignOffice.)Interviewedin1996,sixyearsafterThatcherleftoffice,CharlesPowellsaid: ‘I’ve always thought there was something Leninist about Mrs Thatcherwhichcamethroughinthestyleofgovernment–theabsolutedetermination,thebelief that there’savanguardwhich is rightand ifyoukeep thatsmall, tightlyknit team together, theywill drive things through . . . They could go out andreallyconfrontpeople,laydownthelaw,bullyabit.’34JonathanPowell,beforeBlair had yet entered 10 Downing Street, in a remark at an off-the-recordseminarwhichwas leaked to the press, said that ‘wewanted tomove from afeudal to a Napoleonic system’. Explaining what he had in mind in a bookwrittenmuchlater(itsheroisMachiavelliratherthanNapoleon),Powellwrote:‘The British system of government is traditionally a feudal system of barons

(Cabinetministers)whohavearmiesandfunds(civilservantsandbudgets),whopayfealtytotheirliegebutreallygetonwithwhatevertheywanttodo.Thereisverylittle that theprimeministercandotomakethegovernmentconsistentorcoherent.Theonlyweaponhehasinhisarmoury,averybluntone,ishiringandfiringpeople. . .Weneededtohavegreatercoordinationatthecentreonbothpolicydevelopmentandimplementation.’35

Whether either Lenin orNapoleonwere appropriatemodels for a politicalleader inademocracy,orwhether a leaderwhohadneverheldeven themostjuniorministerialoffice(Blair’scase,althoughnotThatcher’s)needhaveotherministersregardhimastheir‘liege’(master),arequestionsthatshouldhaveonlyoneanswer.NothingremotelyNapoleonicoccurred,butatthebeginningoftheLabour government’s second term, a new institutional mechanism formonitoring the implementation of policy was introduced. Its initiator wasMichaelBarberwhoarguedthatifagovernmenthadanobjectiveortarget,thereshould be a plan for achieving it and means created for ensuring delivery.36Blair appointedBarber head of this newDeliveryUnit,which reported to theprimeminister.The targets it set for reducinghospitalwaiting times, reducingcrime and improving school performances were highly controversial, and hadsomeunintendedaswell as intendedconsequences.Nevertheless, inabook inwhichhereflectsonhisexperienceingovernment,Barberarguesstronglythatthe pluses outnumbered the minuses (although the ‘targets culture’ remainscontentious).

WhateverNapoleonic ambitionsBlairmayhaveharboured, and in spiteofhissenseofentitlementtotakedecisionsonbehalfofthegovernment,hecouldnever achieve his imperial goal, for if he was the Napoleon of 10 DowningStreet, exercising significant control over foreign policy and influencing thesocial agenda, there was another Napoleon next door where Gordon Browndominatedeconomicpolicy-makingandhencealargeswathofdomesticpolicy.Writing in the last days of the Blair premiership, Barberwas just one amongmany insiders who noted that ministers had to decide ‘whether they arepredominantlyintheBrowncamportheBlaircamporwhethertheywillseektobe inboth’.TheunusuallypowerfulchancellorwasaconstantconstraintuponBlair’spowerand,asthatpower‘ebbedaway’duringtheprimeminister’sthirdterm,thisconstraintbecamestillgreater.37

When Margaret Thatcher died in April 2013, much admiration for herachievementswasexpressed.Not the leastof thesewasherbecoming the first

woman prime minister in Britain, and doing so, moreover, as leader of theConservative Party, which had consistently lagged well behind Labour inbringingwomenintoparliamentandgovernment(althoughit,too,fellfarshortofthedegreeofgenderequalityattainedinScandinavia).Therewasalsomuchemphasis on Thatcher’s ‘strong leadership’ and praise for her being a‘convictionpolitician’.Thereis,indeed,muchtobesaidforapoliticianhavingathought-throughpoliticalphilosophyandfirmvalues.Suchapersonwillnotbeexcessivelydrivenbyopinionpollsorfocusgroups,thoughsheorhemaytakethemintoaccountindecidinghowtopresentpolicy.Convictions,however,andadeterminationtoactonthem,arenotnecessarilyanunalloyedblessing.Lenin,Mussolini,Hitler,StalinandMao,totakeafewobviousexamples,were‘strong’and domineering leaders, and they all (even Stalin) had exceedingly firmconvictions.AmajorityoftheConservativeCabinet(andalargesectionoftheparliamentaryparty)finallydecidedthat theywouldputupnolongerwithoneofMrsThatcher’sconvictionsinparticular–thebeliefthatshewasalwaysright.Almost a quarter of a century later, the cabinet ministers who told the primeministershewouldhavetogowerestillbeingscornedbythosenostalgicforthelost leader.The latter included thehistorianAndrewRobertswho, in languagestrangely reminiscentof thatusedbyStalin’sminionsabout thevictimsof theshowtrialsofthe1930s,describedtheCabinetministerswhosawoffMargaretThatcherin1990as‘anover-ambitiouscabalofcowards,foolsandtraitors’.38

GeoffreyHowe,whoseresignationspeechtriggeredtheforcedresignationofMargaret Thatcher from the premiership in 1990, wrote of how the primeministerhadcometodominatethereactionsofhercolleaguestotheextentthatmeetings inWhitehall andWestminsterwere ‘subconsciouslyattended,unseenand unspoken’ by her. He notes: ‘The discussion would always come aroundsomehowto:howwillthisplaywiththeprimeminister?Thatgraduallygrew,tothepointwhereshewassoaccustomedtogettingherownwaythatshebecameover-confident; less and less dependent on consultationwith colleagues,moreandmoredependentonanarrowcircle.It tendstohappen.IthappenedtoTedHeath. It happened to Tony Blair.’39 Kenneth Clarke recalled that on oneoccasiontheprimeministersaidinCabinet:‘WhydoIhavetodoeverythinginthisgovernment?’Clarkesays:‘TowhichIthinkIwasn’ttheonlypersonsittingroundthetablethinking:“Thetroubleis,Margaret,thatyoubelievethatyoudohaveto.Andyoushouldn’t.Andyoucan’t.”’40*

ThatchermayhavetriedtobludgeonherCabinet,anditwasultimatelyher

undoing,butshebypasseditratherlessthandidBlair.AlistairDarling,whowasnotonlyaCabinetmembercontinuouslyfrom1997to2010butalsoapoliticianwelldisposedtowardsthe‘NewLabour’emphasison‘MiddleBritain’,isamongthosewho have been critical of the lack of collective discussion, and thus ofgenuinecollectiveresponsibility, forpolicyduring thoseyears.Henotes thatareaderofBlair’smemoirsmightbeforgivenforthinkingthat‘forTonyitmeant,“NewLabour,c’estmoi”’.EmbracinginhisgeneralizationBrown’spremiershipaswell asBlair’s,Darling says thaton toomanyoccasions ‘wedidn’tdiscussissues,inprinciple,wellbeforethediewascast’.AsexamplesofbypassingoftheCabinet,Darling notes: ‘Tuition fees [for universities], a policywhich hasworked,wasneverdiscussedproperly,sotheresultwasnocollectiveownership.OnLebanontherewaslittlediscussion.Andbecausehethoughtitwastherightthingtodo,[Blair]waspreparedto ignorepublicopinionandanyreservationstheremayhavebeenintheCabinet.’41

LEADERSANDPARTIES

It is easier to define effective leadership than to get anything remotelyapproaching consensus on what is good or (the rarer) great leadership. Anevaluation of a leader as good will depend either on a subjective judgementaboutthatperson’slikeabilityoronwhetheroneapprovesordisapprovesofthepoliciestheleaderhaspromoted.Differentsituations,however,callfordifferentstyles and qualities of leadership. Thus, ‘the most effective leader in a givencontext is the group member who is best equipped to assist the group inachieving its objectives’.42 In Joseph Nye’s concise definition a leader issomeone ‘who helps a group create and achieve shared goals’.43 In anorganizationotherthanapoliticalpartyaleadermayalso‘determineorclarifygoals’,44 but determination of goals is not an appropriate function of a partyleader in a democracy. The broad objectives – for ‘goals’ have become lessgrandiose than they were for some political parties in the first half of thetwentiethcentury–shouldbetheprerogativeofthemembershipofthepartyinadialoguewiththepartyleadership,forwhyotherwiseshouldtheygiveuptheirtime towork for it? Inademocracy, effectivepolitical leadershipwill involvehelpingapoliticalparty towinpowerand,afterattaininggovernmentaloffice,helpingtoimplementthepoliciesthepartyhasespoused.

The relationship between the leadership group as a whole and the party’smembersinthelegislature(aswellastheleadership’srelationshipwiththepartymembershipinthecountry)isnormally,andshouldbe,atwo-wayprocess.Theleadershipteamhavetheadvantageofbeingabletodeterminepriorities,but iftheir actual policies are more influenced by media tycoons or by financiallobbies, this isneithereffectivenordemocratic leadership,butadifferentformoffollowership.Itismucheasierforapartyleader–certainlyinBritain–togetagoodpressbydistancinghimself fromhisownparty thanby standingup tomedia proprietors. Stanley Baldwin was much more robust in his attitude tonewspaper owners than have been his late twentieth-century and twenty-first-centurysuccessors(withthepartialexceptionofthecurrentLabourPartyleader,EdMiliband).Inaspeechin1929,Baldwinsaid:‘ThepapersconductedbyLordRothermere and Lord Beaverbrook are not newspapers in the ordinaryacceptance of the term. They are engines of propaganda for the constantlychangingpolicies,desires,personal likesanddislikesof twomen.’Continuinghisattackonthepressbarons,hefamouslywenton:‘Whattheproprietorshipofthese papers is aiming at is power, and power without responsibility – theprerogativeoftheharlotthroughouttheages...’45

Tony Blair, in contrast, was much more solicitous towards wealthynewspaperproprietorsandbusiness interests than tomembersofhisparty, theonlypeople,apartfromhisSedgefieldconstituentsinthenorth-eastofEngland,whohadvoteddirectlyforhim.AsnotedinChapter2,hedismissedthem–andnotinanoffhandremark,butinhismemoirs–as‘exiledforyearsintheSiberiaofpartydrudgeryfarfromthecentreofgovernment’andre-emergingintherun-up to a general election ‘in the halls of the Kremlin with renewed self-importance’.46 Inwhatwas an off-the-cuff remark, an unnamed close ally ofprime minister David Cameron was widely quoted in May 2013 describingConservativePartyactivistsintheconstituenciesas‘mad,swivel-eyedloons’.47Suchadisconnectionbetweenpartymembersandtheirleaders,anddisdainforthe rank-and-file by their leaderships, is not only unbecoming. It is alsodangerousfordemocracy.

Leadersshouldviewtheirpartiesnotjustasavehiclefortheirambitionsbutasasharedundertakingtoadvancethemostwidelysharedobjectivesandvaluesof that party. This obviously requires the serious pursuit of electoral success.Parties which put purity of principle ahead of all compromise are likely toremaininthepoliticalwilderness.Thisneednotmeandisregardingtheviewsor

disparagingthebeliefsofthegeneralityofpartymembers.Thosearenotlikelyto be identical to the opinions (or apathy) of the broader electorate, but anymemberofa legislatureaswellasaparty leaderhassomenecessaryroomformanoeuvre in negotiating between the active and inactive, between thecommittedandthesceptical.

Thereare,though,twoconclusionsonwhichstudentsofdemocraciesandofcountries in transition fromauthoritarian rule arewidely agreed.One is that aviable party system is an indispensable pillar of a democracy and that whenparties are manipulated from above, rather than allowed to develop anindependentandinfluentialexistence,acountryintransitionfromautocraticoroligarchic rule has got little or no chance of becoming a consolidateddemocracy. Amajority of the successor states to the Soviet Union, includingpost-SovietRussia,arecasesinpoint.Theotherfindingisthatpoliticalpartiesthroughoutmostoftheworldhaveseensubstantialdeclinesintheirmembershipin the period since the mid-twentieth century and that survey research showsthemtobeheldinlowesteem.Astheauthorsofamajorcomparativestudyofpolitical parties noted, ‘Large majorities of citizens in most countriesacknowledgethat“Withoutpartiestherecanbenodemocracy”,butthosesameindividuals often criticize parties for their “divisive”behaviour’.48Another ofthedilemmaspartiesinmanycountriesfaceispithilysummedupbyJuanLinzas ‘Parties Cost Money: But Not Mine, Not from my Taxes, and Not fromInterestGroups’.49 Interestingly, one country inwhich democracy has thrivedmore than most in recent decades is reunited Germany (and, indeed, WestGermany before that) where parties do receive state funding and where theirmembershiphasincreased,althoughthatowesagooddealtotheincorporationoftheformerGermanDemocraticRepublicintheunitedGermanstate.

Giventhatitisreasonabletoexpectleadersofpoliticalpartiesinafreeandpluralistic political system to have a prior commitment to democracy as such,and granted their need to connectwith thewider electorate, it is dangerous ifthey regard the rank-and-file membership of their party as little more than anecessary evil. The authors of a study of party organizational change in thetwentiethcenturynoted that, inorder toassert theirsupremacy,one‘answer isfor the leadership to marginalize the party on the ground, and even to let itwither away’. Whether consciously planned or not, at the beginning of thetwenty-first century, this appeared to reflect ‘the recent experiences of themainstreamparties inDenmarkand theNetherlands’.50 InBritain, incontrast,

therewasamajormembershipdriveby theLabourParty in theearlyyearsofTony Blair’s leadership. Successful though it was at the time, many of thosemembers, as well as other long-standing ones, subsequently left the party indisillusionment,theIraqwarbeingthelaststrawforasignificantnumber.Toogreat a concentration of power in the hands of a party leader debilitates theinternal lifeoftheparty,whileitsmembersarecaughtbetweenareluctancetocriticize the party leadership in a way that would give succour to politicalopponentsandanequalreluctancetodelegateexcessivepowertotheleader.51

Criticismoftheleaderfromwithintheparliamentarypartyorfromtherank-and-filemembershipwill,ofcourse,leadtocomplaintsthattheleaderhas‘lostcontrol’ of the party, but we need to question how much ‘control’ it isappropriate for a leader to have over the people who put him where he is.Equally,apartyleadershiphasaresponsibilitynottoallowintolerantextremiststotakeovertheparty.Thus,theUKLabourParty,undertheleadershipofNeilKinnock, expelled from their ranks theMilitant Tendency organizationwhichhadbeentakingoveranumberoflocalpartybranches,intimidating,beratingorboringothermembersintosubmissionorexit.Asimilarly‘hostiletakeover’,asMoisés Naim puts it, of the US Republican Party by the Tea Party hasendangered that political organization.52 The prestige of political parties hasdeclinedcross-nationallyforanumberofreasons.One,asNaimobserves,isanunintended consequence of a healthier development, freer media and moreindependentscrutiny,whichhasexposedcorruptionthatwaspreviouslyhiddenorsilently tolerated.53But the‘public tarnishing’,heargues, isalsoconnectedwith political parties having become less able to distinguish themselves fromtheiropponentsideologically.*Asaresult,theyhave‘reliedlessonthepopularappeal of their ideals and ideas andmore onmarketing techniques, themediaprowessofcandidates,and,ofcourse,themoneytheycouldraise’.54

Noneofthecriticismofovermightyorpresumptuousleadersshouldbetakentosuggestthatleadershipdoesnothaveadistinctiveandimportantroletoplay.Membersofthetopleadershipteam,andnotjustthetopindividualleader,havearesponsibilitytoexplainandjustifywhyaparticularactionisbeingtaken,evenif it isoneunanticipatedbypartymembersoronewhichdoesnot farewell inopinion polls. The polls themselves have a significant part to play in ademocracy – countries on theway to authoritarian rule can be relied upon tostifle independent survey research – but they do not relieve leaderships of theduty to give a lead. They need, however, to engagewith their parties, giving

them a leadership role inpublicdiscourse, rather than fob themoffwith shamconsultation,forifpoliticalpartiesbecomemoribund,sowilldemocracy.

It is easy for a leader to have his (or her) own beliefs reinforced by hisimmediateentourage. It isnot toodifficult,other than in the timeitconsumes,foraleadertospeakindividuallytoamajorityofcabinetmembersandgettheiragreementonaparticularissue.Mostofthemwillnothavegivenmuchthoughttothematterbecausetheyhavetheirowndepartmentalresponsibilitiesand,inaone-to-oneconversationwiththeheadofthegovernment,theywillbedisposedtoacquiesce.If,however,thisisanimportantmatterofpolicyprincipleforthegovernmentand thegoverningparty, it ismoreconducive togoodgovernanceandmore inkeepingwithdemocraticvalues for the issue tobepresented to aCabinetcommitteeor,ifneedbe,theCabinetasawhole.Theremaybeoneortwopeoplepresentwhohavethoughtseriouslyabouttheissue,havecometoaquitedifferentconclusionfromthepremier,andwhomayhavethemorecogentarguments.Whether that minority then becomes a majority depends on othermembers of the top leadership team. They will need not only to have beenconvinced of the merits of that opposing argument and the desirability of adifferentpolicydecision,butalsotopossessenoughbackbonetorejecttheviewoftheprimeminister.

Totheextentthatpoliticalpartiesdecline,theirplacewillbetakenbythosebothwithinthesocietyandfromwithoutwhohavethemostwealthtodeployinthe exercise of economic and political leverage. Notwithstanding the greatpolitical and social change that has occurred since the eighteenth century, thewordsofAdamSmithandJohnMillarquoted inChapter1havenot lost theirrelevance.‘Theauthorityoffortune’,observedSmith,is‘verygreateveninanopulentandcivilizedsociety.’HispupilMillarsimilarlynotedthattheinfluencederived from wealth ‘is not only greater than that which arises from merepersonalaccomplishments,butalsomorestableandpermanent’.55Itispoliticalparties, with a mass membership and strong organization – as well as,importantly, trade unions –which have exercised a democratic countervailingpower to that wielded by wealthy individuals, rich families, big business andfinancialinstitutions.*Ifleaderspaymoreattentiontothelatterthantheformer,theypavethewayfortwodangerousoutcomes.Oneisthattheircountrieswillmoreandmorebecomeplutocracies rather thandemocracies.Theother is thattheplaceofpoliticalpartieswill increasinglybe takenbydirectactiongroups.They are often not particularly interested in democratic norms and proceduresand are liable to fall into the samemistaken trap as revolutionaries a century

earlierofbelievingthatonlyendsmatter,andthatwhatevermeansaredeployedtoachievethoseendsarejustified.Evenwhenmovedbyrighteousangeragainstevidentinjustice,asinthe‘leaderlessrevolutions’ofrecentyearsintheMiddleEast, they may – given the absence of organization, policy coherence andcommitmenttopoliticalpluralismwhichademocraticpartycanprovide–pavethewayforanewauthoritarianism.

LEADERSHIPUNDERAUTHORITARIANISMANDDEMOCRACY

Amythmaycontainanelementoftruth,andyetbegreatlymisleading.Someofthe people who have been thought of as strong leaders – Hitler, Stalin, MaoZedong,KimIlSungorSaddamHussein–didindeedwieldenormouspower.Inthat sense they were strong leaders. The myth here consists of the idea,sedulouslypromotedbytheseleadersandtheirpropagandists,thateachofthemwassingularlywise,giftedandfar-seeing.Vast resourcesaredevoted inmanytotalitarian and authoritarian states to spreading the message of the people’sgoodfortunetohavesuchagreatleader.Intheabsenceofalternativesourcesofinformation and criticism, the regime’s narrative can be, and often has been,widelybelievedforatime.Thefabricationliesalsointheideathatconcentratingenormous power in the hands of an individual leader brought great benefit totheircountries.Inreality,theirtyrannicalrulehaddisastrousconsequences.

There is a qualitative differencebetween thepossibilities open to even themosthigh-handedandoverweeningleaderwithinademocracyandsuchaleaderinanauthoritarianortotalitarianregime.Howeverhardaleaderinademocracytriestodominatethepoliticalprocess, thatpersonand,morepertinently,hisorher party are ultimately accountable to the electorate. There are, however,lessonstobelearned,andwarningstobeheeded,fromlookingatleadershipinauthoritarian aswell as democratic systems.* The idea that one leader knowsbest, and is entitled to have a quite disproportionate share of executive powerwithin his or her hands, is not confined to dictatorial regimes. And evenauthoritariansystems,ashasbeensuggested inearlierchapters, tendtobe lessdangerouslyadventurousabroadandlessmurderousathomewhentheyareledbyanoligarchyratherthananautocrat.

The cult of the leader, which emerged in fascist and in many (not all)Communist states,waspernicious.But therehavebeenunconscious echoesof

whatinNaziGermanywastheFührerprinzip(theleaderprinciple)andwhatinStalin’s Soviet Union, from the early 1930s onwards, was known asedinonachalie (one-person command) also in democracies.We encounter it intheattitudesofpoliticiansandpoliticalcommentatorswhowant toplacemorepowersinthehandsofthetopleadernationallyandwhoalsopreferone-personruleatthelocalleveltomorecollectiveleadership.BothinNaziGermanyandin the Soviet Union, especially under Stalin, this big boss principle applied,above all, to theFührer or, in theRussian case, the vozhd at the apex of thesystem,butitwentallthewaydownthehierarchy,sothatlittleHitlersandlittleStalins at the regional and local level could justify their arbitrary decision-making on the basis of one-man leadership (and theyweremen, notwomen).After Stalin’s death the need to balance edinonachalie with kollegialnost(collegiality)begantobestressed.56

Aleader inahighlyauthoritarianpolitical systemwhowishes to introduceradicalreformhasajustificationforbypassingthepartyorganizationnotopentoa party leader in a democracy. Since the party itself has generally seized thereinsofgovernmentbyforce,proceeded tomonopolizepower,and thenretainthat power with a mixture of rewards for conformism and punishments fordeviation(allthewayuptothedeathpenaltyor,atbest,longimprisonmentforopposition),itcannotconvincinglyclaimeitheramoralorademocraticrighttorule. Thus, neither Gorbachev attempting to liberalize and, ultimately,democratizethepoliticalsystemoftheSovietUnionnorDengXiaopingaimingto liberalize and marketize the Chinese economic system was under anobligationtoabidebythenormsofthesystemeachmanwastryingtosupplant.Infact,asamatterofpoliticalprudence,theyworkedwithintheexistingsystemforaslongasittooktomakethechangesand,inDeng’scase,beyond.

InthePolitburochairedbyGorbachev,therewas,asevenmembersofitwhobecame his enemies admitted, freer and lengthier discussion, with everyopportunity for critical voices to be raised, than had existed under hispredecessors. Not knowing what policies he would pursue, the Politburo hadselected Gorbachev as party leader. At the time, this meant his automaticallybecomingthecountry’sleader.Untiltherewasqualitativechangeinthepoliticalsystem, that same group had the power to remove him from the first of thesepostsand,asanecessaryconsequence,fromtheother.Thus, itmadesenseforGorbachev to use his ‘power to persuade’within thePolitburo, carryingmoreconservativecolleagueswithhimand,whenhecouldnotdoso,makingtacticalretreats. From the point at which an executive presidency was created in the

SovietUnion–inMarch1990–GorbachevincreasinglybypassedthePolitburoto the furyof itsmembers.By then thePolitburowasno longer the functionalequivalentoftheCabinetinasystemsuchasthatofBritain.Itwasmerelythehighest policy-making committee within the Communist Party, which wasrapidly losingsupport in thecountryandwasno longer thecentreofpower intheSovietstate.57

*

Finally, several important misconceptions underlying the myth of the strongleader are worth reiterating. Within parliamentary democracies there is atendency tobelieve that the top leadercounts formore thanheorsheactuallydoes. Policy outcomes which have been brought about mainly by others arefrequently attributed to the premier. No less often electoral victories aremisleadinglyhailedasthepartyleader’sachievement,whereasonlyveryrarelyhas the leader made the difference between victory or defeat. The morefundamental error is to view the top individual leader who asserts his or herpolitical pre-eminence, bypassing senior colleagues and the machinery ofgovernment,relyingmoreonacoterieofpersonalattendantsthanonhisorherpoliticalparty,asthekindofleaderweshouldwishtosee.Usurpationofpowersthatmoreproperlybelongtoindividualministers,andwhich,inmattersofintra-governmental or intra-party contention, are more appropriately settled in thecourseofcollectiveconsiderationbyCabinetmembers,arenot,andshouldnotbe regarded as, the mark of a successful democratic head of government.Leaderswhobelievetheyhaveapersonalrighttodominatedecision-makinginmanydifferentareasofpolicy,andwhoattempttoexercisesuchaprerogative,do a disservice both to good governance and to democracy. They deserve notfollowers,butcritics.

*Whereasintheearlieryearsofherpremiership,MrsThatcherwascapablebothofaskinggoodquestionsand of listening to the answers, especially if they came frompeoplewith specialist knowledge, this hadchanged by her last years in office. IvanBerend, an importantHungarian reformer and President of theHungarian Academy of Sciences at the time of his meeting with Thatcher in August 1990, recalls thatimmediatelyafterhewasintroducedtoher,shegrabbedhisarm,tookhimtoacornerandaskedhimabouttheexcitingeventsinHungary.However,‘shedidnotwaituntilIbeganspeaking,andimmediatelystartedanswering her own questions and explained to me what was really happening in Hungary’. Berendcontrasted thiswithameetinghehad in the sameyearwith theSpanishprimeministerFelipeGonzález‘whoexpressedadeepinterestandexcellentunderstandingofwhatwashappeninginHungary,andaskedbrilliantquestions’.See IvanT.Berend,History inmyLife:AMemoirofThreeEras (CentralEuropean

UniversityPress,BudapestandNewYork,2009),p.225.*Thatinademocracyseniorpoliticiansshouldfeeltheneedtosubordinatetheirconvictionstothewillofonepersonislamentablyreminiscentoflifeunderautocracyinwhich,whentheleaderisabsentorhasnotgivenexplicitinstructions,tryingtodivinethewillofthedictatorbecomestheguidetoaction.InHitler’sGermany this was called ‘working towards the Führer’. As Ian Kershaw has written: ‘In the DarwinistjungleoftheThirdReich,thewaytopowerandadvancementwasthroughanticipatingthe“Führerwill”,and,withoutwaiting fordirectives, taking initiatives topromotewhatwerepresumed tobeHitler’saimsand wishes.’ (Ian Kershaw,Hitler, Penguin, London, 2009, p. 321.) Cabinet ministers in a democracy,behavinginasimilarlysupinemannerforthesakeofpromotion(oravoidanceofdemotion),couldusefullyberemindedthatmanyofthosewhohavecometooccupythehighestpoliticalofficewithintheircountrieswereatonetimecritics,andevenrebels,withintheirparties.*TheUnitedStateshaspartlybuckedthattrend,gravitatingincertainrespectstowardstheoppositedanger.ItismoderateRepublicanismwhichhasbeenunderthreat,ashasthenecessarymodicumofconsensusonwhatconstitutescivilizeddemocraticdiscourse.Rather than see implementationof thePatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct,whichhadgone throughdueprocess inCongress andhadbeenupheldby theSupremeCourt,theTeaPartyconservativesshowedthemselveswillinginOctober2013toshutdownthefederal government, lay off hundreds of thousands of workers, halt medical research, and seriouslyunderminenotonly thedollarbut theircountry’s internationalstanding.While theirextremism,and theirmisrepresentationofamodestand longoverduesocial reform,couldno longercomeasa surprise,whatwasmore remarkablewas their success in intimidatingmoremainstreamRepublican leaders into goingalongwithanactionwhich,ifprolonged,wasliabletodoprofounddamagenotonlytoAmericansocietybutalsototheglobaleconomy.*Smith’sandMillar’semphasisonfamilywealthandconnectionsasa‘sourceofauthority’appearsalltoorelevant twoandahalfcenturies later.Thepointapplies incontemporaryauthoritarianregimes,not leastChina,while in parliamentary democracies political parties need to be on their guard against having thebest-connected candidates foisted on them, rather than seeking breadth of experience, ability andcommitmenttotheparty’svalues.ThedangerisreadilydiscernibleinBritain.EvenintheUnitedStates,whichstillcherishesthe‘logcabintoWhiteHouse’parable(whichhasoccasionally,asinLincoln’scase,beenareality),‘keepingitinthefamily’hasbecomeapronouncedtrendinrecentdecades.Itbeggarsbelief– and statistical probability – that within a population of over three hundred million people, the bestpresidential candidates should turn up in the immediate family of PresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush. Familyfortuneshavecountedformuch,asinthecaseofJosephKennedy’ssons.Stillmoresignificant,however,are family members of a president inheriting the latter’s wealthy friends, fund-raisers and backers in asystem inwhichmoremoney is required towin an election than in any other democratic country. TheUnitedStates,moreover,remainsthemostunequaloftheworld’sdemocracies.Itwasatitsleastunequal,asnotedinChapter3,whenJohnson’sGreatSocietyreformswerehavinganimpact.Eventhen,however,theUSwasmoreunequalthanotherdemocraciesforwhichcomparabledataareavailable.* That is all themore so because in the contemporaryworld there aremany regimeswhich have beendescribedas‘electoraldemocracies’,inasmuchastheyhaveelectionsofasort,butinwhichtheoppositionisgivennoaccesstothemajormassmedia,andoppositionpartiesandindependentpoliticalmovementsarerestricted and harassed. These hybrid regimes – which, in most cases, fit the description of ‘electoralauthoritarianism’ (or ‘competitiveauthoritarianism’)better than ‘electoraldemocracy’–occupyamiddleground (although a far from goldenmean) between genuine democracies and indisputably authoritarianregimes.

Acknowledgements

Someofmydebtsareimmediatelyrelatedtothisbookandsomeareofamuchlonger-term character. Starting with the latter, I am grateful to a number ofinstitutionsinwhichIhavestudiedandworked,buttwoinparticularshouldbesingled out – the London School of Economics and Political Science and StAntony’s College, Oxford. Degree courses in Britain have become somewhatnarrowerandmorespecializedthantheyweremorethanfiftyyearsagowhenIwasanundergraduateandgraduatestudentattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.Therefore,IstillappreciatethefactthatintheB.Sc.Econ.atLSE,Iwasabletostudynot onlypolitics and economicsbut alsopolitical and economichistory,socialpsychologyandsociologyandtoattendlecturecoursesthatrangedfromMichaelOakeshottonthehistoryofpoliticalthoughtandLionelRobbinsonthehistory of economic thought to Hilde Himmelweit and Bram Oppenheim ontheories and concepts in social psychology and Leonard Schapiro on thegovernment and politics of the Soviet Union. As a student I benefitedparticularlyfromtheencouragementofJackHayward,KeithPanter-Brick,AlanBeattieandLeonardSchapiro.TheinstitutiontowhichIamevenmoreindebtedisStAntony’sCollege,Oxford–andOxfordUniversitymoregenerally– for,notwithstandingVisitingProfessorshipsandFellowshipsin,andnumerousstudyvisits to, other countries, it has beenmy academic home for more than fortyyears. St Antony’s, as a graduate college with a special focus on the socialsciences and modern history, is distinctive for the strength of its centres ofresearchonparticularregionsoftheworld–RussiaandEurasia,Europe,Africa,theFarEast, theMiddleEast, andLatinAmerica,among them. Ithasbeenofgreatbenefittobeabletodiscussparticularcountries–and,inthecontextofthis

book,particularleaders–withfirst-ratespecialistsonthepoliticsandhistoryofthosestates.Manyofthem,asmyindividualacknowledgementswill illustrate,have been Fellows of St Antony’s, although friends and colleagues from thewider Oxford academic community and from further afield have also beengenerouswiththeirtimeandinsights.

Inaddition toStAntony’sbeingverymuch in touchwith the realpoliticalworld, Ihavebenefited froma lotofdirectcontactwithpoliticalpractitioners,bothinBritainandinanumberofothercountriesovertheyears.Someofthesemeetings arose from ad hoc consultation by primeministers, party leaders orforeign secretaries; some fromparticipation inmeetingsof theWorldPoliticalForum and the InterAction Council, which bring together former heads ofgovernmentandanumberofacademicspecialists;whilemanyflowedfromtheVisitingParliamentaryFellowshipatStAntony’s.Imentionherebynameonlya few of the participants in public and political life with whom I have hadinteresting conversations of direct relevance to the subject of this book –leadership, power and influence in high politics. They include Sir MichaelBarber,IvanBerend,(Judge)WilliamBirtles,SirRodricBraithwaite,SirBryanCartledge,AnatoliySergeyevichChernyaev,Patrick(Lord)Cormack,SirJamesCraig, the late Ralf (Lord) Dahrendorf, Mark Fisher, Andrei SerafimovichGrachev,formerSenatorGaryHart,Geoffrey(Lord)Howe,Derry(Lord)Irvine,the late Rita Klímová, Nigel (Lord) Lawson, Jack F. Matlock, Jr, VadimAndreyevich Medvedev, the late Zdeněk Mlynář, Joyce (Baroness) Quin, SirMalcolm Rif kind, MP, the late Georgiy Khosroevich Shakhnazarov, Gillian(Baroness) Shephard, Stuart (Lord)Wood and the lateAleksandrNikolaevichYakovlev.

If that ispartof thebackground to thebook, it isevenmore important tohighlighttheforeground.Aworkwhichrangesaswidelyasthisvolumeincursmanydebts tootherauthors.Thosewhichderive frommy readingare, I trust,fullyacknowledgedintheendnotes.ButIhavealsohadmoredirecthelpfromfellowacademics.For answering specific queries, I amparticularly grateful toProfessor Alan Barnard (Edinburgh University), Professor John Curtice(Strathclyde University), Professor Graeme Gill (University of Sydney),Professor Leslie Holmes (University of Melbourne), Dr Philip Robbins (StAntony’s College), Professor Arthur Stockwin (St Antony’s) and Dr AnnWaswo(StAntony’s).Iappreciateevenmorethekindnessofthosefriendsandcolleagueswhoreadoneormorechaptersofthisbookinmanuscriptandofferedinvaluable comments and, in some cases, made necessary corrections. My

particular thanks for doing so go to Alan Angell (St Antony’s), ProfessorWilliamBeinart (StAntony’s),ProfessorGeoffreyBest (StAntony’s),DrNicCheeseman (Jesus College, Oxford), Malcolm Deas (St Antony’s), ProfessorRosemary Foot (St Antony’s), Peter Fotheringham (Glasgow University), DrSudhir Hazareesingh (Balliol College, Oxford), Professor Alan Knight (StAntony’s),ProfessorRanaMitter(StCrossCollege,Oxford),ProfessorKenneth(Lord) Morgan (Queen’s College, Oxford), Professor Tony Nicholls (StAntony’s), Dr Alex Pravda (St Antony’s), Dr Eugene Rogan (St Antony’s),ProfessorAviShlaim(StAntony’s),ProfessorSteveSmith(AllSoulsCollege,Oxford),ProfessorAlfredStepan (ColumbiaUniversity,NewYork),ProfessorArne Westad (LSE) and Professor Stephen Whitefield (Pembroke College,Oxford). I am especially grateful to Al Stepan for many stimulatingconversationsaswellasforhisvaluablecommentsonseveralchapters.

It is perhapsmore thanusually necessary to add that noonementioned inthese acknowledgements should be blamed formy views or assumed to be inagreementwithwhatIhavewritten.InafewcasesIcanbefairlysurethattheydisagree,sinceIamarguingagainstthingstheyhavewrittenorsaid.

I have been extremely fortunate to have asmyUK literary agent FelicityBryan and the splendid team she leads (in exemplary style) at Felicity BryanAssociates in Oxford and I am no less lucky to have as my American agentGeorgeLucasofInkwellinNewYork.Ihaveenjoyedahappyandcollaborativerelationshipwithmypublishers,theBodleyHeadinLondonandBasicBooksinNewYork,andhaveappreciatedverymuchtheencouragementandsupportof,first,WillSulkinandthenStuartWilliams,publishersat theBodleyHead,andofTimBartlettatBasicBooks.IamgreatlyindebtedtoLaraHeimert,publisheratBasic,whotookakeeninterest in thebookfromtheoutsetandsawtheUSedition through to publication. I am very conscious also of how muchindispensable work has been done by Katherine Ailes and Joe Pickering inLondonandbyMichele JacobandLeahStecher inNewYork.Special thanksare due, above all, to JörgHensgen of theBodleyHeadwho did the detailededitingof thisbookandmademanyexcellentsuggestions.They includedverygoodadviceonpointswhichcoulddowithfurtherelucidationandelaboration,and so he shares amodicumof blame formakingwhatwas not a short booksomewhatlonger.Finally,Iam,asever,hugelyindebtedtomywifePatwhohasalsoreadeverywordofthebookinmanuscript,beensupportiveineveryway,and has put up with the long hours I have spent working on it. By the timeanyonereadsthisinprint,we’llhavehadthelongholidayI’vebeenpromising.

NotesandSources

Preface

1.A.H.(Archie)Brown,‘PrimeMinisterialPower’,PartI,PublicLaw,Spring1968,pp.28–51;andPartII,Summer1968,pp.96–118.Inanabbreviatedversion,itwasrepublishedinMatteiDoganandRichardRose(eds),EuropeanPolitics:AReader(Macmillan,London,1971),pp.459–482.2. The interviewwas conducted for a Jesuit journal and reported in theNewYorkTimes, 19 September2013.

Introduction

1.Totakeanexampleatrandom,thefirstsentenceofarecentarticleinarespectednewspaperreads:‘Foryears,ithasbeenamatterofcommonagreementthatwhatJapanneeds,aboveall,isastrongleader.’SeeDavidPilling,‘WhyastrongleaderinJapanisaplusnotaminus’,FinancialTimes,18July2013.2.JohnRentoul,TonyBlair(Little,Brown,London,1995),p.427.3.Miliband,whoappearstobesufficientlybalancednottobeanoverbearingleader,rosetothebaitrathermorethanwasnecessary.Perhapsoverlyconcernedthathemightbeperceivedasweak,heremarkedinaninterview:‘Youdiscoverthingsaboutyourselfinthisjob[LeaderoftheLabourParty],whichisthatIamsomeone of real steel and grit . . .’, Guardian, 7 January 2012. Miliband’s use several times of ‘mygovernment’ (in the context of what the next Labour government would and would not do), during agenerallyimpressivespeechon24September2013totheLabourPartyannualconference,mayhavebeenasimilar response to exhortation to project an image of strength. However, no Labour leader or primeministerbeforeTonyBlair(whousedthefirstpersonsingularmuchmorethanhissuccessorbutone)wouldhaveemployedtheconstitutionallyincorrectandpoliticallyimperiousterminology,‘mygovernment’.4. ‘David Cameron and Ed Miliband clash over Lords reform’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-18798683.5.DonaldJ.Savoie,Power:WhereIsIt?(McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,Montreal,2010),p.96.6.JonathanMalloy,‘PrimeMinistersandtheirPartiesinCanada’,inPaulStrangio,Paul’tHartandJamesWalter (eds.), Understanding Prime-Ministerial Performance: Comparative Perspectives (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2013),pp.151–171,atp.168.7.Savoie,Power,p.96.

8. I am extremely grateful to Stephen Whitefield of Oxford University, under whose supervision theinvestigationsofpublicattitudeswereconducted,forgenerouslymakingavailabletomethesurveydataonthese postCommunist European states. The italics in the proposition, aswell as the interpretation of thedifferencesbetweenonecountryandanother,aremyown.9.MaxWeber,FromMaxWeber,translated,editedandwithanintroductionbyH.H.GerthandC.WrightMills(Routledge&KeganPaul,London,1948),pp.245–250,esp.p.245.10.S.AlexanderHaslam,StephenD.ReicherandMichaelJ.Platow,TheNewPsychologyofLeadership:Identity,InfluenceandPower(PsychologyPress,HoveandNewYork,2011),p.103.11.MargaretThatcher,TheDowningStreetYears(HarperCollins,London,1993),pp.6–7.12. The Lord Chancellor, Derry Irvine, chaired four Cabinet committees which formulated policy onconstitutionalreform–onScottishandWelshlegislativedevolution;onHumanRightslegislation;ontheFreedomofInformationAct;andonreformoftheHouseofLords.Irvinehad,alongwithDavidMiliband,draftedthe1997LabourPartyelectionmanifestoandhelpedtomakesurethattheseissuesofconstitutionalreform,whichhecaredabout,wereincluded.Thecommitmenttoholdareferendumontheestablishmentof a Scottish parliament had become firmLabour policy underBlair’s predecessor as party leader, JohnSmith,andtohaverenegedonitwouldhavebeentoodamagingtotheLabourPartyinScotlandforBlairtocontemplate. (Blair at the time thought that there was overlap among this legislation and that they,therefore, needed the same guiding hand. Thatwas amajor reasonwhy Irvine chaired all four of theseimportantcommittees.)13.TonyBlair,AJourney(Hutchinson,London,2010),p.516.14.Brown’seconomicadviser(lateraMemberofParliamentandminister),EdBalls,playedanimportantroleinthedevisingofthetests,andLordChancellorDerryIrvinelenthislegalskillstotheirdrafting.15.AlistairDarling,‘Thelureofcommonsense’,Guardian,11September2010.16. Jonathan Powell, The NewMachiavelli: How toWield Power in theModernWorld (Bodley Head,London,2010),p.112.Powell adds that therewereno ‘reallybig ideologicaldifferences’betweenBlairandBrownoneconomicpolicy–‘justarefusalonGordon’spart toinvolveTonyandNumber10intheprocess’ (ibid., p. 113).AsPeterMandelson aptlynoted: ‘AnyChancellorwieldsmajor influenceon allaspectsofgovernment,throughcontroloftaxandspending’.ButBrown’sinfluencewasmuchgreaterthanthatofmostChancellors.Itwas,Mandelsoncontends,‘ofanentirelydifferentorder’.Brown‘believedthathisownacumen,andthetalentsofhisinnercircle,servedthegovernment’spolicy-makingfarbetterthananythinginNumber10’.SeeMandelson,TheThirdMan:LifeattheHeartofNewLabour(HarperPress,London,2010),p.240.17.Blair,AJourney,p.522.18.SeeRichardGunther,JoséRamónMonteroandJuanJ.Linz(eds.),PoliticalParties:OldConceptsandNewChallenges(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2002).19.WhenJohnMajor resignedhis leadershipof theBritishConservativeParty,whileprimeminister, inJune1995 inorder to force a re-election for thepartypost, thiswas an exception to that generalization.Majordidnotpretendtoamonopolyofwisdom,but, facedbyverypersistentsnipingat thegovernmentfromhisbackbenches,especiallyonpolicytowardsEurope,hedeemeditnecessarytoshowwhohadthegreatersupport.Hisopponentintheelection,JohnRedwood,received89votesascomparedwithMajor’s218.Itwasasufficientvoteagainstasittingprimeminister(especiallywhenoneaddsineightabstentionsand twelve spoiled papers) by his own side in the House of Commons to be of only modest help inconsolidating his authority. It was, however, enough to enableMajor to continue until the next generalelectioninMay1997.SeeJohnMajor,TheAutobiography(HarperCollinspaperback,2000),pp.617–647.20.Blair,AJourney,p.545.21.Powell,TheNewMachiavelli.22.Ibid.,p.59.23.ThomasCarlyle,OnHeroes,Hero-Worship,andTheHeroicinHistory(Chapman&Hall,London,3rded.,1846),p.1.24. Louis Fisher,Presidential War Power (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 2nd ed., 2004); and

DavidGrayAdler,‘LouisFisherontheConstitutionandWarPower’,PS:PoliticalScienceandPolitics,Vol.46,No.3,2013,pp.505–509.25.Fisher,PresidentialWarPower,esp.pp.278–279.26.Ibid.,pp.261–262.27.Cf.JamesBlitz,‘Alongweek:Putin’sdiplomaticgambit’,FinancialTimes,14September2013.28.Fisher,PresidentialWarPower,pp.81–104.29. For Fisher, however, resolutions passed by the UN Security Council matter less than the USConstitution,withtheformernomorethan‘abeguilingbutspurioussourceofauthority’(ibid.,p.81).30.Many, however,would regardTruman’s decision to use the atomic bomb on two heavily populatedJapanesecitiesasamajorblotonhisrecord.Ithasbeenarguedthat‘atestdemonstrationinanunpopulatedareawouldhavebeenafarmorehumanemeansofachievingthesameobjective’,whichwastobringtoarapidendtheprolongedsufferingonbothsidescausedbythewarwithJapan.SeeRichardF.Haynes,TheAwesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Louisiana State University Press, BatonRouge,1974),p.269.31.RobertL.Beisner,DeanAcheson:ALifeintheColdWar(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2006),p.27.32.PercyCradock,InPursuitofBritishInterests:ReflectionsonForeignPolicyunderMargaretThatcherandJohnMajor(JohnMurray,London,1997),p.24.33.RichardE.Neustadt,PresidentialPowerandtheModernPresidents:ThePoliticsofLeadershipfromRoosevelttoReagan(FreePress,NewYork,1990),p.10.34.Ibid.35.HarryS.Truman,OfftheRecord:ThePrivatePapersofHarryS.Truman,editedbyRobertH.Ferrell(Harper&Row,NewYork, 1980), p. 96. In a farewell address by radio and television to the nation inJanuary 1953, Truman said: ‘When Franklin Roosevelt died, I felt there must be a million men betterqualifiedthanI,totakeupthePresidentialtask.Buttheworkwasminetodo,andIhadtodoit.’QuotedinDavidMcCullough,Truman(Simon&Schuster,NewYork,1992),pp.919–920.36.Truman,OfftheRecord,p.207.37.Ibid.,p.211.38.RoyJenkins,Truman(Collins,London,1986),p.187.39.Haynes,TheAwesomePower,p.255.40. There was, however, a ‘Truman Doctrine’. That was the name given to the policy, enunciated byTrumaninMarch1947,ofcontainmentofCommunistexpansion,bymilitarymeansifnecessary.ItinitiallyandspecificallyreferredtotheneedtopreventtheCommunistsubversionofGreeceandTurkeyaftertheBritish had admitted that they no longer had the economic strength to providemilitary underpinning ofthoseefforts.41. Stephen Graubard,The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from TheodoreRoosevelttoGeorgeW.Bush(AllenLane,London,2004),p.326.42.Thus,onthebasisofanunsupportedassumptionthatthesmallermembershipofBritishpoliticalpartiesascomparedwiththe1950smakesthemlessrepresentativeofthewiderpopulation,oneprominentpoliticalcommentator worries that this makes the parties ‘even more difficult for leaders to lead’. See AndrewRawnsley,‘Thenumbers thataddupto troubleforallpoliticalparties’,Observer,14July2013.It isnotclear,totakeacasecitedbyRawnsley,whyoneleader,chosenbyanelectoratewhichincludedthemassmembership of his party, should be more ‘representative’ than the one hundred and ninety thousandmembersoftheLabourPartyasof2013.And,inreality,successiveLabourleadersJohnSmith,TonyBlair,GordonBrownandEdMilibandhavebeengivenamucheasier rideby the smaller and supposedly lessrepresentativemembershipoftheirpartythanwasHughGaitskellasleaderofamuchlargerLabourParty(overamillionmembers)inthe1950s.43. In the financialcrisisandprolongedeconomicdifficultieswhichbegan in2008, therewasmoreofatendencytolooktotechnocratsthantocharismatic‘strongmen’.ThatisnotanevilonthescaleoftheriseofMussoliniandHitler,butitisalsoathreatto,andnosubstitutefor,democracy.

44.EdPilkington,‘“TheTalibanthoughtthebulletwouldsilenceus.Buttheyfailed”,defiantMalalatellstheUN’,Guardian,13July2013.45. In thatspeech,MalalaYousafzaisaid that ‘theextremistsareafraidofbooksandpens’and that ‘thepowerof thevoiceofwomenfrightens them’.Makingclearherown loyalty to Islam,describing itas ‘areligionofpeace,humanityandbrotherhood’,shesaidthatthereligionnotonlyassertedtherightofeachchildtoreceiveaneducationbutmadethisaduty.ShescornedtheTalibanconceptionoftheirdeityas‘atinylittleconservative’whowouldsendgirlstohell‘justbecauseofgoingtoschool’(ibid.).46.Ibid.47.DavidRemnick,TheBridge:TheLifeandRiseofBarackObama(Picador,London,2010),p.574.48.JeanBlondel,PoliticalLeadership:TowardsaGeneralAnalysis(Sage,London,1987),pp.19–26.49.The‘transforming’andthe‘transactional’isthefavoureddichotomyofJamesMacGregorBurns.SeeBurns,Leadership(Harper&Row,NewYork,1978);andBurns,TransformingLeadership:ANewPursuitofHappiness(AtlanticBooks,London,2003).

1 PuttingLeadersinContext

1. Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1976).2.SeeChristianMarouby,‘AdamSmithandtheAnthropologyoftheEnlightenment:The“Ethnographic”Sources of Economic Progress’ in Larry Wolff and Marco Cipolloni (eds), The Anthropology of theEnlightenment(StanfordUniversityPress,Stanford,2007),pp.85–102;AlanBarnard,SocialAnthropologyandHumanOrigins(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2011);andBarnard,HistoryandTheoryinAnthropology(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2000).3.Meek,SocialScienceandtheIgnobleSavage,pp.238–239.4. Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,2001),p.242.5.AdamSmith,LecturesonJurisprudence,editedbyR.L.Meek,D.D.RaphaelandP.G.Stein(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1978). Ihaveused throughout thismostscholarlyeditionof thecompleteworksofSmith(known as the Glasgow Edition and published by the Clarendon division of Oxford University Press).However, when quoting from these works, I have modernized and corrected the spelling, whereas theeditors retained some archaic spellings of Smith himself and themisspellings of his student note-takers.Smith was such a perfectionist that, when he was dying, he caused the book manuscript on law andgovernmentwhichhehadnotsucceededinfinishingtohisownsatisfactiontobedestroyed.Hewouldhavebeenhorrifiedhadheknown that studentnotesof the lecturesonwhich thebookwasbasedwere tobepublishedinstead.However,thesesetsofnotesdomorethanenoughtoindicatethevalueofthemanuscriptwhichwas lost. Smith taught atGlasgow from1751until early 1764 (asProfessor ofMoralPhilosophyfrom1752).6.Smith,LecturesonJurisprudence,pp.201–202.7.AsJohnLockehadearlierargued(TwoTreatisesofCivilGovernment,EverymanEdition,Dent,London,1953,p.180;firstpublished1690).8.AgriculturebeganearlierthanSmithassumed,andmixedformsofsubsistenceweremorecommonthanheandhis contemporariesknewor acknowledged.Archaeological evidence suggests that as longagoas7000BC,thehunter-gatherersofNewGuineaalsopractisedagriculture.SeeJaredDiamond,Guns,Germsand Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years (Vintage, London, 2005), p. 148.Moreover,ChristianMaroubyobserves:‘Wenowknowthatexceptinthemarginalconditionsofsub-articregions, hunter-gatherers the world over relied on the collection of plant foods formore than half, andfrequentlymore than70percentof theirdiet.Ofcourse . . .AdamSmithcannotbefaultedfor ignoringstudiesineconomicanthropologythatwereonlyundertakeninthe1960s’(Marouby,‘AdamSmithandthe

AnthropologyoftheEnlightenment’,p.90).9.Turgot onProgress, Sociology andEconomics, translated and edited byRonaldL.Meek (CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1973),p.72.Ipayattentioninthischaptertothefour-stagestheorymainlybecause those who expounded it were vitally concerned with the development of government and ofpoliticalleadership.Thestadialtheoryitself,especiallyinthelightofmorerecentresearch,canbeseentobeagreatoversimplification.Yet,boldgeneralizationisausefulantidotetotheparticularismofthekindofanthropologicalresearchthatseekstoemphasizetheutteruniquenessofeverytribeortofittheirexperienceintoevermorecomplexandvariegatedtypologies.10. David Hume, ‘Of the First Principles of Government’, in Hume, Essays and Treatises on SeveralSubjectsContainingEssays,Moral,PoliticalandLiterary:ANewEdition,Vol.1(Cadell,London,1788),p.37.11.Hume,‘OftheOriginofGovernment’,inHume,Essays,p.43.12. Ibid. Some anthropological research of recent decades provides empirical support for Hume’ssupposition.Thus,intheHighlandsofPapuaNewGuinea,‘certainmilitary“leaders”beginbehavinglikebigmen,particularlybyrelyingonawidernetworkofacquaintancesthantheordinarymassofindividuals’,and a ‘warrier-organizer’ gradually ‘turns into amanipulator of social relations andwealth’. See PierreLemonnier, ‘From great men to bigmen: peace, substitution and competition in the Highlands of NewGuinea’, inMauriceGodelierandMarilynStrathern (eds.),BigMenandGreatMen:PersonificationsofPowerinMelanesia(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1991),pp.7–27,atp.19.13.AdamSmith,AnInquiryintotheNatureandCausesoftheWealthofNations,editedbyR.H.CampbellandA.S.Skinner(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1976),Vol.2,p.711.14.Ibid.15.AnthropologicalresearchcarriedoutinthetwentiethcenturywasconsonantwithanumberofSmith’sgeneralizations.Thus,forexample,discussingtheemergenceofleadersamongtheNeurofsouthernSudan,LucyMairwrites:‘Thekindofmanwhoattractspeopletoattachthemselvestohimwillprobablybe...theeldestofagroupofbrotherswhothemselveshaveadultchildrenlivinginthevillage.’Suchaninformalleader would be comparatively wealthy – measured by ownership of cattle – and would have gainedprestige ‘from a reputation for prowess in fighting in his youth, for skill in debate, or for ritual powers(whicharebelievedtobeinherited)’.SeeMairPrimitiveGovernment(Penguin,Harmondsworth,1962),p.64.TheNeur,however,didnothavechiefs.Therewasnosinglepersonwithultimatepower.Rather,someindividuals gained authority as people ‘worth listening to’. Here, and elsewhere in Africa, colonialadministrators(notleastBritishDistrictCommissioners)setaboutcreatingchiefs,bringingwiththemtheirowncultureofhierarchyandadesire tohavearecognizedleaderwithwhomtointeract(Mair, ibid.,pp.257–258). Mair’s work remains unusual in that she brought together the findings of anthropologicalresearch on many different tribes in geographically dispersed countries of Africa, focusing on theirleadership, distribution of power, and conflict resolution. Shemakes clear that chieftainship was by nomeans a universal phenomenon. The Alur of western Uganda had ‘recognized hereditary chiefs’, butneighbouringpeoples, theLenduandOkebu,hadnochiefsoftheirown.TheAlurchiefssupposedlyhadthe mystical power of controlling rain, but their secular function was to settle disputes that had led tofighting.Accordingly,neighbourswithoutchiefswould turn to them,andsometimes requestoneof theirchief’ssonstocometothemasachiefinordertoresolveconflict(Mair,ibid.,pp.120–121).Evenwithinaparticulargroupofpeoplewithacommonsenseofidentity,theabsenceofauthoritativemeansofsettlingserious disputes can be deadly.By the end of the 1970s, the Fayu hunter-gatherers ofNewGuinea hadreducedthemselvesfromaround2,000people toabout400,divided intofourclans,asaresultofkillingeach other in the absence of social or politicalmechanisms for conflict-resolution. SeeDiamond,Guns,GermsandSteel,pp.205–266.16.Smith,AnInquiryintotheNatureandCausesoftheWeatlhofNations,p.712.17.Ibid.18.Ibid.,pp.712–713.19.Ibid.,p.713.

20. Ibid.There neverwas, Smith adds, ‘a great family in theworld’whose illustriousness ‘was entirelyderivedfromtheinheritanceofwisdomandvirtue’(ibid.,p.714).21.Smith,LecturesonJurisprudence,p.323.22.Ibid.23.Ibid.TheRussian‘revolutions’towhichSmithrefers,insofarastheyweresuccessful,weremoreinthenature of palace coups. Peasant risings in eighteenth-century Russia ended very badly for the rebels.Interestingly,thiscourseoflectures,inwhichSmithreferredtorecentRussianexperience,wasattendedbytwoRussianstudents,SemyonEfimovichDesnitskyandIvanAndreevichTretyakov,whospentsixyearsattheUniversityofGlasgow.BothofthemsubsequentlybecameprofessorsoflawatMoscowUniversity.SeeA.H.(Archie)Brown,‘AdamSmith’sFirstRussianFollowers’inA.S.SkinnerandT.Wilson(eds),EssaysonAdamSmith(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1975),pp.247–273.24.JohnMillar,TheOriginoftheDistinctionofRanks,3rdedition,1779,reprintedinWilliamC.Lehmann(ed.), JohnMillar of Glasgow 1735–1801: His Life and Thought and his Contributions to SociologicalAnalysis(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1960),p.254.JohnLockehadearlierjustifiedpeople’sright to rebelagainst tyrannicalgovernment (withcharacteristicconcernforproperty rights). ‘Theendofgovernmentisthegoodofmankind,’hewrote,‘andwhichisbestformankind,thatthepeopleshouldbealwaysexposedtotheboundlesswilloftyranny,orthattherulersshouldbesometimesliabletobeopposedwhen they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not thepreservation,ofthepropertiesoftheirpeople?’(Locke,TwoTreatisesofCivilGovernment,p.233.)25.Millar,TheOriginoftheDistinctionofRanks,p.250.26.Ibid.,p.271.27.Ibid.,pp.263and271(italicsintheoriginal).28.Lockesurmisedin1690that‘ifwelookback,asfarashistorywilldirectus, towards theoriginalofcommonwealths,weshallgenerallyfindthemunderthegovernmentandadministrationofoneman’(TwoTreatisesofCivilGovernment,p.168).29. The most ambitiously comprehensive scholarly account of government from its origins until thetwentieth century is that of S.E. Finer,TheHistory ofGovernment From theEarliest Times, 3 volumes(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1997).30.Finer,TheHistoryofGovernment,Vol.III,p.1476.31. The phrase, ‘democracy on the installment plan’ is that of Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions toDemocracy:TowardaDynamicModel’,ComparativePolitics,Vol.2/3,1970,pp.337–363,atp.356.Onthe argument in nineteenth-centuryBritain that further democratizationwould be a threat to liberty, seeAlbertO.Hirschman,TheRhetoricofReaction:Perversity,Futility,Jeopardy (HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,1991),pp.86–101.32. It was Sir Walter Scott, rather than James Boswell, who reported this particular exchange in aconversation between Johnson and Alexander Boswell (Lord Auchinleck). The great Boswell scholarFrederickPottlewasnotpreparedtovouchfortheaccuracyofScott’saccountoftheAuchinleck–Johnsonconversation. SeeBoswell’s Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson, LL.D., edited byFrederickA.PottleandCharlesH.Bennett(VikingPress,NewYork,1936),pp.375–376.33. Robert A. Dahl notes that only one delegate at the constitutional convention, Alexander Hamilton,lookedfavourablyonmonarchy,andthisstancereducedhis influence.SeeDahl,HowDemocraticIs theAmericanConstitution?(YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,2nded.,2003),p.11.34.Dahl,HowDemocraticistheAmericanConstitution?,p.16.35.Ibid.,p.31.DahlisreferringtotheelectionofGeorgeW.BushforhisfirsttermasPresidentwhenhisDemocraticopponent,AlGore,obtainedabout540,000morevotesnationallythanBush(approximately0.5percentofallvotescast)butlostnarrowlytohisRepublicanopponentintheelectoralcollege.36.AlexisdeTocqueville,Democracy inAmerica, translatedbyGeorgeLawrence,editedbyJ.P.Mayer(AnchorBooks,NewYork,1969),p.101.37.Finer,TheHistoryofGovernment,Vol.III,p.1526.38. The proposed legislationwas not very radical to beginwith, and itwas furtherwatered down in its

passage through Congress, with numerous concessions made to legislators and special interests. Moregenerally,asJohnKaynoted,‘Americans...engageinahealthcaredebateonissuesthatinEuropearenotevenopentodiscussion.Yetexperiencearoundtheworldisthatonlytherichcanbuyphysicaloreconomicsecurity for themselves.Othersmust look to the state,more successfully inSweden thanSomalia’ (Kay,‘OnlymarketevangelistscanreconcileJekyllwithHyde’,FinancialTimes,6June2012).39.EdwardLuce,‘Obamawinsahealthcarebattle,butthewarrageson’,FinancialTimes,2July2012.40.Dworkin’s suggestionwas thatChief JusticeRobertswanted ‘to blunt the anticipated accusations ofpolitical partisanship’ in a series of contentiousmatters – including abortion and theVotingRightsAct1965–whichbeforelongwouldbecomingtotheSupremeCourt.SeeRonaldDworkin,‘ABiggerVictoryThanWeKnew’,NewYorkReviewofBooks,Vol.LIX,No.13,16August–26September2012,pp.6–12,atp.8.41.Tocqueville,DemocracyinAmerica,p.270.42.WhiletheFrenchRevolutiondividesopiniontothisday,thereisalsoaschoolofthoughtwhichseesitsbreakwiththepastasnothinglikeasmomentousastherevolutionariesinsisted.TocquevillestandsoutasthefirstandmostfamousofthosewhohaveemphasizedcontinuitiesbetweentheAncienRégimeandpost-revolutionaryFrance.Hisemphasisonthe‘futility’oftheFrenchRevolution,Hirschmansuggested,didnotendearhimtoeithersetofprotagonistsortolaterhistorianswhoweredevotingtheirlivestothestudyoftheRevolutionandperceivingittobethepivotaleventofmoderntimes.SeeHirschman,TheRhetoricofReaction,pp.48–49and138–139.43. See, for example, Stephen F.Cohen,Bukharin and theBolshevikRevolution:APolitical Biography1988–1938 (Wildwood House, London, 1974), especially pp. 131 and 144; and Baruch Knei-Paz, TheSocialandPoliticalThoughtofLeonTrotsky(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1978),pp.392–410.44.Finer,TheHistoryofGovernment,Vol.III,p.1540.45.JonathanI. Israel,DemocraticEnlightenment:Philosophy,Revolution,andHumanRights1750–1790(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2011),p.928.46.Thestatisticisbasedonacomparisonof2004and2008exitpolls.SeeKateKenski,BruceW.Hardyand Kathleen Hall Jamieson, The Obama Victory: HowMedia, Money, and Message Shaped the 2008Election(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2010),p.103.Theauthorsaddthatthey‘foundevidencethatrace-basedperceptionsplayeda role in thevotesof some.ButObama’scampaignboostedblack turnoutandwhitevotesoutside theDeepSouthenough tocompensate for theseanti-Obamaballots’ (ibid.). It isworthnotingthattheRepublicanshavehadthesupportofamajorityofwhiteAmericanvoterseversince1968,butthatthisisadecliningassetforthem,astheethniccompositionoftheUnitedStateschanges.Notonly did more black and Hispanic voters go to the polls in 2008, but they supported the Democraticcandidatestillmorestronglyinthatyearthanin2004with7percentmoreoftheAfrican-AmericanvotegoingtoObama,ascomparedwiththeirvotesfortheDemocraticcandidatein2004,andaremarkable14percentmoreofHispanicsvotingforObamathantheydidforKerryfouryearsearlier.47. If, as John Dunn, argues, ‘democracy is above all the name for political authority exercised solelythroughthepersuasionof thegreaternumber’, thendemocratizationindeedmadeimportantstrides in thenineteenthcentury,inpartundertheimpactofboththeAmericanandtheFrenchRevolutions.SeeDunn,SettingthePeopleFree:TheStoryofDemocracy(AtlanticBooks,London,2005),p.132.48. Cf. W.G. Runciman, The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge,2009),pp.42–45;andDiamond,Guns,GermsandSteel,pp.271–278.49.Barnard,SocialAnthropologyandHumanOrigins,pp.49–50.50.Diamond,Guns,GermsandSteel,p.272.Diamondalsoobserves:‘IntraditionalNewGuineasociety,ifa New Guinean happened to encounter an unfamiliar New Guinean while both were away from theirrespectivevillages,thetwoengagedinalongdiscussionoftheirrelatives,inanattempttoestablishsomerelationshipandhencesomereasonwhythetwoshouldnotattempttokilleachother’(ibid.,pp.271–272).51.SahlinswasinfluencedatthetimebyaMarxismthathelaterabandoned.Thissummaryofhisviewofthetransitionfrombig-mentochiefsisdrawnfromAdamKuper,Culture:TheAnthropologists’Account(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,2001),pp.163–164.

52.Diamond,Guns,GermsandSteel,p.273.53.Thus, chiefs emerged in thehighlandsofMexico,Guatemala,PeruandMadagascar,butnot inNewGuinea.Ibid.,p.423.54. Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman and Timothy Power, ‘Rethinking the “presidentialism debate”:conceptualizing coalitional politics in cross-regional perspective’, Democratization (2012) DOI:10.1080/13510347.2012.710604.55.PaulCollier,War,GunsandVotes:DemocracyinDangerousPlaces(BodleyHead,London,2009),pp.230–231.Collieralsoobservesthatfashionableenthusiasmformulticulturalismhastendedtoobscurethepointthat‘therightsofminoritiesrestonsystemsthatdependuponthepriorforgingofanoverridingsenseof common nationality’ (ibid., p. 185).Anti-colonialismmade a useful contribution to building nationalunity.A factor specific to JuliusNyerere’s success inpromotinga senseof commonnationalitywas thepresenceofalinguafrancainTanzania–Swahiliinthiscase.ThatwasanassetthatmanyotherAfricanleadersdidnotpossess.Insomecasestheattempttocreateasinglenation,asdistinctfromstate-building,iscounterproductive.On this, seeAlfredStepan, JuanJ.LinzandYogendraYadav,CraftingState-Nations(JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,Baltimore,2011).56.Collier,War,GunsandVotes,pp.51–52.57.Ibid.,p.52.58.Thatdoesnot,ofcourse,invalidateit.Iflackofagreementindelineatingaconceptweretobeenoughtodamnit,weshouldhavetostoptakingseriouslysuchfundamentallyimportantnotionsasfreedomanddemocracy.AninfluentialformulationhasbeenthatofCliffordGeertz:‘Believing,withMaxWeber,thatmanisananimalsuspendedinwebsofsignificancehehimselfhasspun,Itakeculturetobethosewebs,andtheanalysisofittobethereforenotanexperimentalscienceinsearchoflawbutaninterpretiveoneinsearchofmeaning.’SeeGeertz,TheInterpretationofCultures(BasicBooks,NewYork,1973),p.5.Foraninteresting critique of both ‘the deployment of the attitude survey method by positivists’ and thedeploymentof‘semiotic“reading”ofculturebyinterpretivists’,seeStephenWelch,TheTheoryofPoliticalCulture(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2013).59.Or,asRichardW.Wilsonobserves:‘Inthemostgeneralsensepoliticalculturesaresociallyconstructednormative systems that are the product of both social . . . and psychological . . . influences but are notreducible to either. They have prescriptive qualities that stipulate not only desirable ends but alsoappropriatemeans toachieve thoseends.Thenormsarenotcoterminouswith legalcodes,although theyoften overlap.’ See Wilson, ‘The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches’,WorldPolitics,Vol.52,No.2,2000,pp.246–273,atp.264.60.Valuesneed tobedistinguishedfrommereattitudes.Far fewer innumber thanattitudes, theyare,asStanleyFeldmanputsit,nevertheless‘morenumerousthanthesingleideologicaldimensionthatistypicallyusedtounderstandpoliticalconflict’.Feldmanobservesthatwhilevaluepriorities‘maychangeslowlyovertime’aspeopleadapt toachangingenvironment, theytendtobe‘inertialenough. . . to lendstability toevaluations and behavior’. See Feldman, ‘Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes’, inDavidO.Sears,LeonieHuddyandRobertJervis(eds.),OxfordHandbookofPoliticalPsychology(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2003),pp.477–508,atp.479.61.Strongevidence tosupport thatcontention(in thecontextofculture,morebroadly) is tobe found inGeertHofstede,Culture’sConsequences:InternationalDifferencesinWork-RelatedValues(Sage,BeverlyHillsandLondon,1980).62.LeMonde,13September2010;andFinancialTimes,14September2010.63.RobertPutnam,inanotablestudy,hascomparedhistoricallyconditionedpoliticalculturesindifferentregions of Italy and documented the importance of public engagement in northern Italy and the linkbetween the strength of civic associations and more effective democratic institutions. See Robert D.Putnam,MakingDemocracyWork:CivicTraditionsinModernItaly(PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,N.J.,1993).64. Vztah Čechů a Slovaků k dějinám (ČSAV, Prague, 1968), p. 7; and Archie Brown and GordonWightman, ‘Czechoslovakia:Revival andRetreat’ inBrown and JackGray (eds.),PoliticalCulture and

PoliticalChangeinCommunistStates(Macmillan,London,1977),pp.159–196,atp.164.65.ItwastheChairmanoftheCouncilofMinistersoftheSovietUnion,AlekseyKosygin,whoreferredtoDubček as the ‘NumberOneScoundrel’. SeeArchieBrown,TheRise andFall ofCommunism (BodleyHead,London,andEcco,NewYork,2009),pp.395–396.66.IvanKrastevandStephenHolmes,‘AnAutopsyofManagedDemocracy’,JournalofDemocracy,Vol.23,No.3,2012,pp.32–45,atpp.35–36.67.BorisDubin, ‘Stalin idrugie.FiguryvyssheyvlastivobshchestvennommneniisovremennoyRossii’,Monitoringobshchestvennogomneniya,No.2(64),March–April2003,pp.26–40,atp.34.68. Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The RussianElectionsof1999and2000(BrookingsInstitution,Washington,DC,2003),pp.220–223.69.JeffreyW.Hahn,‘Yaroslavl’Revisited:AssessingContinuityandChangeinRussianPoliticalCulture’,in Stephen Whitefield (ed.), Political Culture and PostCommunism (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke,2005),pp.148–179,atp.172.70.Dubin,‘Stalinidrugie’,esp.p.34.71.YuriyLevada,Ishchemcheloveka.Sotsiologicheskieocherki,2000–2005(Novoeizdatel’stvo,Moscow,2006), p. 140. There is evidence supporting the idea of ‘political generations’ as a more generalphenomenon,partlybasedontestingthehypothesisthatindividualsareparticularlysusceptibletoinfluenceon their political attitudes in late adolescence and early adulthood. SeeDavidO. Sears and Sheri Levy,‘Childhood and Adult Political Development’, in Sears, Huddy and Jervis (eds.),Oxford Handbook ofPoliticalPsychology,pp.60–109,atpp.84–87.72.SearsandLevy,ibid.,p.77.73.Theautocraticmodernizer tsar,Peter theGreat,hasbeenconsistentlymentionedmoreoftenthananyotherpersonwhenRussianshavebeenaskedatfive-yearlyintervalstonamethe‘mostoutstandingpeopleof all times and nations’. See Boris Dubin, ‘Stalin i drugie. Figury vysshey vlasti v obshchestvennommneniivsovremennoyRossii’,Monitoringobshchestvennogomneniya,No.1(63),2003.74.DanielKahneman,ThinkingFastandSlow(AllenLane,London,2011),p.342.75.AdamSmith,TheTheoryofMoralSentiments(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1976[firstpublished1759]),p.52.76.Ibid.77.Ibid.,p.62.78.BarbaraKellerman is a notable case inpoint.See, for example,BadLeadership:What It Is,How ItHappens,WhyItMatters(HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,Boston,Mass.,2004);andKellerman,TheEndofLeadership(HarperCollins,NewYork,2012).79.S.AlexanderHaslam,StephenD.ReicherandMichaelJ.Platow,TheNewPsychologyofLeadership:Identity,InfluenceandPower(PsychologyPress,HoveandNewYork,2011),p.199.80. JeanLipman-Blumen,TheAllureofToxicLeaders:WhyWeFollowDestructiveBossesandCorruptPoliticians–andHowWeCanSurviveThem(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2005),p.241.81. Barbara Kellerman,Reinventing Leadership:Making the Connection between Politics and Business(StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,Albany,1999),p.46.82. James Fallows, cited in JamesMacGregorBurns,RunningAlone. Presidential Leadership – JFK toBushII.WhyItHasFailedandHowWeCanFixIt(BasicBooks,NewYork,2006),pp.126–127.83.DrewWesten,ThePoliticalBrain: TheRole ofEmotion inDeciding theFate of theNation (PublicAffairs,NewYork,2007),p.125.84.Haslam,ReicherandPlatow,TheNewPsychologyofLeadership,p.200.85.Ibid.,p.201.86.Ibid.,p.200.87.Kahneman,ThinkingFastandSlow,p.217.88.HaroldSeidman,whoworkedformanyyearsasaseniorofficial in theBureauof theBudgetbeforebecomingaProfessorofPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofConnecticut,coinedtheterm‘Miles’slaw’forthisaphorismofRufusMileswhowasassistantsecretaryforadministrationwithintheDepartmentof

Health,EducationandWelfareof theUSgovernment.InSeidman’sformulationit is: ‘Whereonestandsdepends on where one sits.’ See Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of FederalOrganization(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,3rdedition,1980),p.21.(ThefirsteditionofSeidman’sbookwaspublishedin1970.)89.RoyJenkins,Churchill (PanMacmillan,London,2001),pp.219–222andp.397. It shouldbeaddedthat the circumstances, as well as Churchill’s institutional affiliation, had also changed. Before 1914GermanyhadchallengedBritain’snavalsupremacy.Inthemid-1920sthatwasnotthecase.90. JenniferL.Hochschild, ‘WhereYouStandDepends onWhatYouSee:Connections amongValues,Perceptions of Fact, and Political Prescriptions’, in James H. Kuklinski (ed.), Citizens and Politics:PerspectivesfromPoliticalPsychology(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2001),pp.313–340.91.Ibid.,p.321.92.Ibid.,p.320.93. Much of this comes under the heading of cognitive dissonance, on which there is a large body ofexperimentalandtheoreticalliterature.See,forexample,J.RichardEiser,CognitiveSocialPsychology:AGuidebooktoTheoryandResearch(McGraw-Hill,LondonandNewYork,1980),esp.pp.127–163;andRobert A. Baron and Donn Byrne, Social Psychology: Understanding Human Interaction (Allyn andBacon,Boston,5thed.,1987),esp.pp.132–138.94.HowardG.Lavine,ChristopherD.JohnstonandMarcoR.Steenbergen,TheAmbivalentPartisan:HowCriticalLoyaltyPromotesDemocracy(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2012),p.125;andCharlesS.Taber,MiltonLodgeandJillGlathar, ‘TheMotivatedConstructionofPolitical Judgments’, inKuklinski(ed.),CitizensandPolitics,pp.198–226,atp.213.95.SeeespeciallyWesten,ThePoliticalBrain;andRogerD.Masters,‘CognitiveNeuroscience,Emotion,andLeadership’,inKuklinski(ed.),CitizensandPolitics,pp.68–102.96.Westen,ThePoliticalBrain,p.121.97.Ibid.,pp.121–122.98. SeeRajmohanGandhi,Gandhi: TheMan,HisPeople and theEmpire (Haus,London, 2007);LouisFischer,TheLifeofMahatmaGandhi(HarperCollins,NewYork,1997);B.R.Nanda,MahatmaGandhi:ABiography (Allen&Unwin,London,1958);NelsonMandela,LongWalk toFreedom (Abacus,London,1995);NelsonMandela,ConversationswithMyself(Macmillan,London,2010);TomLodge,Mandela:ACriticalLife(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2006);AungSanSuuKyi,FreedomfromFear(editedandintroducedbyMichaelAris,Penguin,London,newed.,2010);JustinWintle,PerfectHostage:AungSanSuuKyi,BurmaandtheGenerals(Arrow,London,2007);BertilLintner,AungSanSuuKyiandBurma’sStruggleforDemocracy(SilkwormBooks,ChiangMai,Thailand,2011);PeterPopham,TheLadyandthePeacock:TheLifeofAungSanSuuKyi (RandomHouse,London,2011);andJohnKane,ThePoliticsofMoralCapital(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2001).99.RobertA.Caro,TheYearsofLyndonJohnson,Volume3:Masterof theSenate (Vintage,NewYork,2003),p.xxii.100. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Volume 4: The Passage of Power (Bodley Head,London,2012),p.110.101.DorisKearns,LyndonJohnsonandtheAmericanDream(Signet,NewYork,1976),p.171.102.Inhismemoirs,Bushobserved:‘Ididn’tlookatthevice-presidentasanothersenioradviser.Hehadputhisnameon theballot andgottenelected. Iwantedhim tobecomfortablewithall the issuesonmydesk.Afterall,itcouldbecomehisatanymoment...Ihadn’tchosen[Cheney]tobeapoliticalasset;Ihadchosenhimtohelpmedothejob.Thatwasexactlywhathehaddone.HeacceptedanyassignmentIasked.Hegavemehisunvarnishedopinions.HeunderstoodthatImadethefinaldecisions.Whenwedisagreed,he kept our differences private.Most important, I trustedDick. I valued his steadiness. I enjoyed beingaroundhim.Andhehadbecomeagoodfriend.’SeeGeorgeW.Bush,DecisionPoints(Crown,NewYork,2010),pp.86–87.Forhispart,Cheneynotes:‘Historyisfullofexamplesofvice-presidentswhowerekeptfarfromthecenterofpower.Indeed,I’veknownafewpersonally.ButatthebeginningGeorgeW.BushhadsaidthatIwouldbepartofgoverning.Hehadbeen–asIhadknownhewouldbe–amanofhisword’

–DickCheney(withLizCheney),InMyName:APersonalandPoliticalMemoir(Threshold,NewYork,2011),p.519.103.SeeCaro,TheYearsofLyndonJohnson:ThePassageofPower,pp.112–115.104. CondoleezzaRice,NoHigherHonour:AMemoir ofMyYears inWashington (Simon&Schuster,London, 2011), p. 23. After admitting to these errors of judgement, Rice somewhat disarmingly adds:‘Fortunately, no one remembers that we wrote policy guidance questioning Gorbachev’s motives andsettingup careful “tests” ofMoscow’s intentionsmonths before the collapse ofSoviet power inEasternEuropeandtheunificationofGermany’(ibid.).105.JackF.Matlock,Jr,ReaganandGorbachev:HowtheColdWarEnded(RandomHouse,NewYork,2004),p.314.106.B.GuyPeters, InstitutionalTheory inPoliticalScience:The ‘NewInstitutionalism’ (Pinter,LondonandNewYork,1999),p.115.Althoughpartystructureshavesomewhatweakened,therehasbeennolet-upinpartypartisanship.Recent evidence suggests that amongAmericancitizens ithas, if anything, ‘grownstrongeroverthepasttwodecades’.SeeLavine,JohnstonandSteenbergen,TheAmbivalentPartisan,p.2.107.Peters,InstitutionalTheoryinPoliticalScience,p.115.108.AstheAustralianpoliticalscientistJudithBrettnotes:‘Since1990Laborhastwiceejectedelectorallypopular primeministers, and JohnHoward [who led theLiberalParty to four electionvictories]workedhard to prevent a challenge in his last term in office.’ See Brett, ‘PrimeMinisters and their Parties inAustralia’, in Paul Strangio, Paul ’t Hart and James Walter (eds.), Understanding Prime-MinisterialPerformance:ComparativePerspectives(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2013),pp.172–192,atp.177.109.NeilHume, ‘RuddoustsGillardasLabor leader’,FinancialTimes,27June2013. Incontrast to thecasesnotedbyJudithBrett innote108,Gillard’spublicopinionpollstandingwaslowatthetimeofherremovalfromthepartyleadership.110.Brett,‘PrimeMinistersandtheirPartiesinAustralia’,p.189.111. ‘Australian PMGillard in reshuffle after “unseemly” vote’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21920762,25March2013.112. Financial Times, 25/26 February 2012; and ibid., 28 February 2012. Judith Brett noted Rudd’s‘general unavailability toparliamentary colleagues and seniorbureaucrats, hismania for control, andhisrudenesstoeveryonefrommembersofcabinettoairhostesses’(Brett,‘PrimeMinistersandtheirPartiesinAustralia’, p. 188). In the view ofAndrewHughes, an analyst of Canberra politics from theAustralianNationalUniversity,JuliaGillardwas‘veryefficientasprimeminister.Butthatmessagehasn’tgotthroughtotheAustralianpublic’.Headded:‘Theproblemisthewaysheseizedpower.It’sbeenanalbatrossroundherneckand it’sstill there’ (FinancialTimes,22March2013).OneobserverofAustralianpolitics,ErikJensen, wrote soon after Rudd’s short-lived return to the premiership: ‘Rudd stands atop the ruins of agovernmentheplayedno small part inwrecking.’ Jensennoted that a numberofministers had resignedratherthanworkwithRuddandthataformerLaborleaderhadcalledforhimtobeexpelledfromtheparty.SeeJensen,‘Thepeople’spsychopath’,NewStatesman,5–12July2013,p.14.113. The editors of a recent comparative study of primeministers note that even before the AustralianLaborParty’selectionvictoryin2007,‘Ruddhadsignalledthathewouldnotbebeholdentohispartyinthe way he led his government’ and announced that he would appoint ministers rather than have themelected by the parliamentary party (Strangio, ’t Hart and Walters, Understanding Prime-MinisterialPerformance, p. 8). FollowingLabour’s defeat in 2013, election of the cabinet and shadow cabinetwasrestoredtotheparliamentarycaucus.114. The senator was Steve Hutchins; the Cabinet minister was speaking off the record. See the well-informedarticlebyAnnabelCrabbintheAustralianjournalTheMonthly,August2011,pp.30–41.Whentheglobalfinancialcrisishit,decision-makingbecameconcentratedinwhatwas,ineffect,aninnerCabinetdominatedbyRudd.CalledtheStrategicPrioritiesandBudgetCommittee,itcontainedjustthreeCabinetministersinadditiontotheprimeministerbutwasattendedbyagrowingnumberofnon-electedadvisers.This body did not exist prior to Rudd’s first becoming primeminister. It was formed in late 2007 andabolished by Julia Gillard in 2010. However, Gillard had been a member of the ‘Gang of Four’ who

belonged to the SPBC, and ‘she defended this system right up until the point at which she declared itintolerable’(ibid.,p.37).115. See, for example, Arend Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,1992);AlfredStepan,ArguingComparativePolitics(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2001),esp.PartIII,‘TheMetaframeworksofDemocraticGovernanceandDemocraticStates’;andRobert Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance (Oxford University Press,Oxford,2011).116.Elgie,Semi-Presidentialism(p.24)listsfifty-twocountrieswithsemi-presidentialconstitutions,asofDecember2010.117.ThisisoneofthemainargumentsofElgie,ibid.,forwhichheprovidesmuchsupportingevidence.118.Elgie, ibid.,pp.151–152.Politicalscientists, includingElgie,use the term‘premier-presidential’ forsystems in which the primeminister and cabinet are responsible only to the legislature and ‘president-parliamentary’ for the form of semi-presidentialism inwhich primeminister and cabinet are responsibleboth to the parliament and to the president. The latter case prevails in Russia. On Putin as leader, seeRichard Sakwa,Putin: Russia’s Choice (Routledge, London, 2004);Alex Pravda (ed.),Leading Russia:Putin in Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), Chapters 2 and 6–13; Lilia Shevtsova,Putin’sRussia(CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,Washington,DC,revisedandexpandeded.,2005); Angus Roxburgh, The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia (Tauris, London,2012);andFionaHillandCliffordG.Gaddy,MrPutin:OperativeintheKremlin (BrookingsInstitution,Washington,DC,2013).119.Cf.LiliaShevtsovaandAndrewWood,ChangeorDecay:Russia’sDilemmaandtheWest’sResponse(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2011); and Angus Roxburgh, TheStrongman.

2 DemocraticLeadership:Myths,Powers,Styles

1.TonyBlair,AJourney(Hutchinson,London,2010),p.xvi.2.Ibid.,p.50.3. Anthony King (ed.), Leaders’ Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2002),p.216.4. See, for example, Lauri Karvonen, The Personalisation of Politics: A Study of ParliamentaryDemocracies(ECPRPress,Colchester,2010),esp.pp.4–5.Televisionhasbeenamajornewfactorinthepersonalizationofpolitics,forpeopleareeasier toportraythantheissues.However, thewaynewspapersreportpoliticshasalsochanged.AstudyofhowTheTimesreportedBritishpoliticsintheyearssince1945foundthatthe‘overallvisibilityofprimeministershasgrown;referencestotheirleadershipqualitieshavebecomemorecommon;and theyare today referred to inclearlymorepersonal terms than threedecadesago’(Karvonen,ibid.,pp.87–93,esp.p.93).5. See especially Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics: AComparativeStudyofModernDemocracies(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,paperback2007).6.Occasionallypoliticalcommentatorsrecognizethis–as,forexample,RafaelBehrwhowrote:‘TheviewthatBritainholdspresidentialelectionsdisguisedasparliamentaryonesiscommonplaceinWestminster–andwrong, . . . It is themedia coverage that is presidential but voters see beyond that’ (‘Project “Ed’sCharisma”– themission tohelpMiliband loosenup’,NewStatesman,28September–4October2012,p.10).7.Karvonen,ThePersonalisationofPolitics,p.102.8.AmandaBittner,PlatformorPersonality?TheRoleofPartyLeaders inElections (OxfordUniversityPress, Oxford, 2011), p. 73. Bittner is, nevertheless, among the academic authors who emphasize theimportanceofleaderevaluations,especiallyincloselycontestedelections.Sheobservesthat‘thescholarly

literaturetodateonpartyleadersisundecidedastowhetherornotpartyleadersactuallymatterinthefirstplace’(p.139).Itwouldbedifficult,though,tofindaseriousscholarwhoarguedthatleaderswereofnoaccount.Whattheevidence-basedliteraturedoessuggest,however,isthattheirroleismuchexaggeratedbymostpoliticaljournalists–whohaveembracedapersonalizationofpolitics–andbymanypoliticians.9.Karvonen,ThePersonalisationofPolitics,p.20.10.Ibid.11.SörenHolmbergandHenrikOscarsson,‘PartyLeaderEffectsontheVote’,inKeesAarts,AndréBlaisandHermannSchmitt(eds.),PoliticalLeadersandDemocraticElections(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2011),p.47.12.King (ed.),Leaders’Personalitiesand theOutcomesofDemocraticElections,p.214.Kingadds: ‘Ifanything, Kennedy as an individual was a handicap to his party. As a Catholic, he cost the Democratssubstantial numbersofvotes,mostly among southernProtestants.’A recent scholarly studyofAmericanvoters concludes: ‘As central as individual actors are, it is the political parties that are the enduringfoundationofAmericanpoliticalconflict.Political leadersenterandexit thepublic stage,but thepartiesandtheirsymbols,platformsandgroupassociationsprovidealong-termanchortothepoliticalsystem.’SeeHowardG.Lavine,ChristopherD. Johnston andMarcoR. Steenbergen,TheAmbivalentPartisan;HowCriticalLoyaltyPromotesDemocracy(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2012),p.2.13. Peter Brown of Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, cited in Kate Kenski, BruceW. Hardy andKathleenHallJamieson,TheObamaVictory:HowMedia,Money,andMessageShapedthe2008Election(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2010),p.14.14.Kenski,HardyandJamieson,TheObamaVictory,p.289.TheDemocrats’advertisementshammeredhomethe‘McSame’message,butitwasreinforcedalsointhemassmedia.Kenskietal.note:‘Themoreonewatchedtelevisionnews,readthenewspaper,orwentonlineforcampaigninformation,themorelikelyonewastoembracethenotionofMcCainasMcSame’(pp.288–289).15.Ibid.,p.16.16.DieterOhrandHenrikOscarsson,‘LeaderTraits,LeaderImage,andVoteChoice’,inAarts,BlaisandSchmitt,PoliticalLeadersandDemocraticElections,pp.187–214,atp.197.17. Roy Pierce, ‘Candidate Evaluations and Presidential Election Choices in France’, in King (ed.),Leaders’PersonalitiesandtheOutcomeofDemocraticElections,pp.96–126,atpp.124–126.18.Ibid.,p.126.19.SörenHolmbergandHenrikOscarsson,‘PartyLeaderEffectsontheVote’,inAarts,BlaisandSchmitt(eds.),PoliticalLeadersandDemocraticElections,pp.35–51,atp.50.20.Ibid.,p.49.21. John Bartle and Ivor Crewe, ‘The Impact of Party Leaders in Britain: Strong Assumptions, WeakEvidence’,inKing(ed.),Leaders’PersonalitiesandtheOutcomesofDemocraticElections,pp.70–95,esp.pp.77–78.22.NeilO’Brien,‘TheLanguageofPriorities’,NewStatesman,9July2012,pp.22–25,atp.22.23. Ibid.; and Dennis Kavanagh and Philip Cowley, The British General Election of 2010 (PalgraveMacmillan,Houndmills,2010),p.378.24. David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 (Macmillan,London,1971),pp.24and64.25.SeeKennethO.Morgan,Callaghan:ALife(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1997),pp.692–693.SeealsoAnthonyKing inKing (ed.),Leaders’Personalitiesand theOutcomesofDemocraticElections,pp.214–215.26.OhrandOscarsson,‘LeaderTraits,LeaderImage,andVoteChoice’,inAarts,BlaisandSchmitt(eds.),Political Leaders andDemocraticElections, pp. 197–198.An interesting finding that holds good acrosscountriesandovertimeisthatleadersofConservativepartiestendtoberatedmorehighlyon‘competence’and leaders of Left parties on ‘character’ (Bittner, Platform or Personality, pp. 78–84). In a reversal,however,of thegeneralcross-nationalLeft–Right trend,Howardwas ratedmorehighly thanKeatingforempathy(OhrandOscarsson,‘LeaderTraits,LeaderImage,andVoteChoice’,p.197).

27.BlairinterviewwithLionelBarber,‘WaitingintheWings’,ft.com/magazine,30June/1July2012.28.BartleandCrewe,‘TheImpactofPartyLeadersinBritain’,p.94.29.JohnMajor,TheAutobiography(HarperCollinspaperback,London,2000),p.312.30.PeterMandelson,TheThirdMan:Lifeat theHeartofNewLabour (HarperPress,London,2010),p.150.31.JohnCurticeandMichaelSteed,‘TheResultsAnalysed’,inDavidButlerandDennisKavanagh(eds.),TheBritishGeneralElectionof1997(Macmillan,Houndmills,1997),pp.295and320.32.BartleandCrewe,‘TheImpactofPartyLeadersinBritain’,p.90.33. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2001 (Palgrave Macmillan,Houndmills,2002),p.241.Elaboratingthepoint,ButlerandKavanaghwrite:‘AnanalysisbyICMfoundthat,outofanumberofissuesdeterminingthevote,Labour’seconomicperformancewasmostinfluential,followedbyeducation,health,lawandorder,withEuropetheleastsignificant.’34.DavidButlerandDennisKavanagh,TheBritishGeneralElectionof2005(PalgraveMacmillan,2005),p.204.35.DwightEisenhowermadeasimilardistinction,butwithoutMacmillan’sorTruman’sirony,when,afterretiring from the presidency, he wrote of Nikita Khrushchev: ‘In our use of the word, he is not . . . astatesman, but rather a powerful, skillful, ruthless, and highly ambitious politician.’ See Jim Newton,Eisenhower:TheWhiteHouseYears(Doubleday,NewYork,2011),p.195.36.Quoted byBillClinton in his speech to theDemocratic PartyConvention of 1984, cited in StephenGraubard,The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from Theodore Roosevelt toGeorgeW.Bush(AllenLane,London,2004),p.626.37. Harold M. Barger, The Impossible Presidency: Illusions and Realities of Executive Power (Scott,Foreman&Co.,Glenview,1984),p.227.38. Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization (OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,3rded.,1980),pp.85–86.39.SeeBillClinton,MyLife (Hutchinson,London,2004),pp.523–524;andTaylorBranch,TheClintonTapes:APresident’sSecretDiary(Simon&Schuster,London,2009),p.70.40. ‘Obama’s trust wasn’t enough to save Rice appointment’, International Herald Tribune, 15–16December2012.Obamadid,however,seeoffcongressionalresistancein2013tohisnominationofChuckHagel(himselfaRepublican)asSecretaryforDefenseinsuccessiontoLeonPanetta.41.WilliamE.Leuchtenburg,‘FranklinD.Roosevelt:TheFirstModernPresident’, inFredI.Greenstein(ed.),LeadershipintheModernPresidency(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,1988),pp.7–40,at pp. 13 and23.See alsoCharlesM.Cameron, ‘ThePresidentialVeto’, inGeorgeC.Edwards III andWilliamG.Howell (eds.),TheOxfordHandbook of theAmericanPresidency (OxfordUniversity Press,Oxford,2009),pp.362–382.42. GeorgeC. Edwards III, ‘The Study of Presidential Leadership’, in Edwards andHowell (eds.),TheOxford Handbook of the American Presidency, pp. 816–837, at p. 833. Roosevelt was also losing theconfidence of many Southern Democrats, but that (as is discussed in Chapter 3) was because of theirconcern that the longer-termeffectof someNewDeal legislationwas toundermine the racistorderoverwhich they reigned in theSouth.See IraKatznelson,Fear Itself:TheNewDealand theOriginsofOurTime(Norton,NewYork,2013),esp.pp.156–194.43. Graubard, The Presidents, pp. 807–808; and Jim Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years(Doubleday,NewYork,2011),p.86.44.Newton,Eisenhower:TheWhiteHouseYears,p.218.45.Ibid.,pp.250–252.46.Ibid.,p.202.47. Randall Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (Harvard University Press paperback,Cambridge,Mass.,2007),p.440.48.Ibid.,pp.512and570.49.JosephS.Nye,Jr,ThePowerstoLead(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2008),p.80.

50.MichaelSchaller,RonaldReagan(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2011),p.xiii.51.WilliamK.Muir,Jr,‘RonaldReagan:ThePrimacyofRhetoric’,inGreenstein(ed.),LeadershipintheModernPresidency,pp.260–295,atp.260.52.Schaller,RonaldReagan,pp.45–46.53.Ibid.,p.39.54.Ibid.,p.78.55.Ibid.,pp.77–80.56.AlonzoL.Hamby,‘HarryS.Truman:InsecurityandResponsibility’,inGreenstein(ed.),LeadershipintheModernPresidency,pp.41–75,atpp.73–74.57.JoeKlein,TheNatural:TheMisunderstoodPresidencyofBillClinton(Hodder&Stoughton,London,2002),pp.123–124.58. Klein, The Natural, pp. 179–180. Clinton’s approval rating for the performance of his presidentialdutieswasaround60percentattheendofhissecondterm,andwhenvoterswereaskedhowtheywouldvoteifthe1996electionweretoberunagain,‘theresultswerealmostthesameasthey’dbeen:46percentsaidClinton, 36 percent saidDole, 11 percent said Perot’ (ibid., p. 180). The term ‘special persecutor’,appliedtoStarr,appearsinDrewWesten,ThePoliticalBrain:TheRoleofEmotioninDecidingtheFateoftheNation(PublicAffairs,NewYork,2008),p.372.59.Klein,TheNatural,p.209.60.EarlofSwinton(incollaborationwithJamesMargagh),SixtyYearsofPower:SomeMemoriesof theMenWhoWieldedIt(Hutchinson,London,1966),p.49.61.LordBeaverbrook,TheDeclineandFallofLloydGeorge:AndGreatWastheFallThereof (Collins,London,1963),p.40.62.PhilipZiegler,‘ChurchillandtheMonarchy’,inRobertBlakeandWm.RogerLouis(eds.),Churchill(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1993),pp.187–198.‘Butforthewar,’Zieglerobserves,‘itseemslikelythatGeorgeVIwouldhavecontinued toviewChurchillwithsomeuneaseasaman tobe, ifnotkeptatarms’length,thenatleastnotembracedasatrustedconfidant’(p.194).63.Swinton,SixtyYearsofPower,p.116.64.IainMacleod,NevilleChamberlain(Muller,London,1961),p.165.65.A.G.Gardiner,CertainPeopleofImportance(JonathanCape,London,1926),p.58.66.RobertBlake,‘HowChurchillbecamePrimeMinister’,inBlakeandLouis(eds.),Churchill,pp.257–273,atp.264.67.Ibid.,p.266.68.RobertBlake,TheConservativePartyfromPeeltoChurchill(Fontana,London,1972),p.248.69. John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955 (Hodder and Stoughton,London,1985),pp.126–127.70.DavidReynolds,‘Churchillin1940:TheWorstandFinestHour’,inBlakeandLouis(eds.),Churchill,pp.241–255,atp.254.71.Attlee’sinvolvementintheallocationofpostsisconfirmedinhisbriefandratherdryautobiography,AsItHappened(Odhams,London,1954),pp.132–133.72.RobertCrowcroft,Attlee’sWar:WorldWar IIand theMakingofaLabourLeader (Tauris,London,(2011),p.231.73.Ibid.,p.174.74.RoyJenkins,Churchill(PanMacmillan,London,2002),pp.775–777.75.Colville,TheFringesofPower,p.555.76.Ibid.,p.554.77.Ibid.,pp.554–555.78.Jenkins,Churchill,p.777.79.LordMoran,WinstonChurchill:TheStruggleforSurvival,1940–1965(Constable,London,1966).80. My interview with R.A. (Lord) Butler, when he wasMaster of Trinity College, Cambridge, on 23September1966.(Itwasonanon-attributablebasisduringButler’slifetime.)

81.Ibid.82. Lord Butler, The Art of the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler K.G., C.H. (Hamish Hamilton,London,1971).p.164.83.Moran,WinstonChurchill,p.404.84.Ibid.,p.553.85.AlanBullock,ErnestBevin:ForeignSecretary1945–1951(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1985),p.87.86.Ibid.87.Ibid.,p.89.88.Ibid.,p.55.89.BernardDonoughueandG.W.Jones,HerbertMorrison:PortraitofaPolitician(newedition,Phoenix,London, 2001), p. 490; andAttlee,As ItHappened, p. 239.Donoughue and Jones express doubts aboutAttlee’sabilityinthiscasetocalmthetroubledwaters,saying‘itisdifficulttoseehowAttleeoranyoneelsecouldhavedevisedaformulawhichwouldenableBevantostaywithoutforcingGaitskelltogo’.90. Clement Attlee, Leader’s Speech to Labour Party Conference at Scarborough, 1948,http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=158.91.Ibid.92.DavidCameronhasbeenthemostovertlyconstrainedofthefourleadersmentioned,asheisthefirstprimeministersincetheSecondWorldWartobepresidingoveracoalitiongovernmentinBritain.ThishasalsoaddedtotensionsanddiscontentamongbackbenchMPsinhisownConservativeParty.93. HaroldWilson, The Governance of Britain (Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, London,1976),p.9.94.DavidCameronconducted a reshuffleofministerial responsibilities in the late summerof2012, andLansleywasmovedfromtheDepartmentofHealthtothenon-departmentalroleofLeaderoftheHouseofCommons.95.Butler,TheArtofthePossible,p.184.96.D.R.Thorpe,Supermac:TheLifeofHaroldMacmillan(Pimlico,London,2010),p.86.97.Ibid.,pp.345–346.Hoosieristhepopularnameforanativeofthemid-WesternstateofIndiana.98.MysourceforthiswasSelwynLloyd.Iinterviewedhimon7July1966,onanon-attributablebasisatthetime.Heiscited,as‘averyseniormemberofMacmillan’sCabinet’,sayingthisinmyarticle,‘PrimeMinisterialPower’,PublicLaw,PartI,Spring1968,pp.28–51,atp.41.Inthesameinterview,Lloyd,whohad served under all three men, described Churchill and (perhaps more surprisingly) Eden as ‘moreCabinet-mindedthanMacmillan’.99.My7July1966interviewofSelwynLloyd.100.Thorpe,Supermac,p.519.101.TheMacmillanDiaries,VolumeII:PrimeMinisterandAfter,1957–1966,editedwithanintroductionbyPeterCatterall(PanMacmillan,London,2012),p.89.102.ReginaldBevins,TheGreasyPole:APersonalAccountoftheRealitiesofBritishPolitics(HodderandStoughton,London,1965),pp.137–138.Lord(R.A.)Butlermadeasimilarpoint,albeitlessdogmatically,when he wrote that such an action could stimulate countervailing forces within the government party‘becauseall thepeoplewhogoouthavefriendswhomobilizeroundthem’(TheListener,16September,1965, p. 409). Lloyd later remarked on Macmillan’s ‘utter ruthlessness’, which led him to attempt toconciliatehimnotoutof friendshipbut ‘becauseIhadbecomeapossibledanger’ (Thorpe,Supermac,p.524).103.PercyCradock,InPursuitofBritishInterests:ReflectionsonForeignPolicyunderMargaretThatcherandJohnMajor(JohnMurray,London,1997)pp.100and201.104.MargaretThatcher,TheDowningStreetYears(HarperCollins,London,1993),p.840.105.Ibid.,p.851.106.Ibid.,p.847.107.Ibid.,pp.860–861.

108.Blair,AJourney,p.119.109.Ibid.,p.201.110.Ibid.,p.287.111.Ibid.,p.486.BlairclaimedanemotionallinkwiththeBritishpeople,andhefeltthisdissipatingthelongerhewasinoffice.‘Formeandforthepeople’,hewrites,‘thiswassad.Myrelationshipwiththemhadalwaysbeenmore intense,moreemotional, if that’s therightword, than thenormalrelationshipbetweenleader and nation’ (p. 658). He attributed the disenchantment to his increasing unwillingness tomodifypolicy in the face of opposition and disagreement: ‘“Being in touch” with opinion was no longer thelodestar.“Doingwhatwasright”hadreplacedit’(ibid.,p.659).112.Ibid.,p.609.113.Ibid.,p.117.114.TonyWright,DoingPolitics(Biteback,London,2012),p.31.115.Ibid.116. Holmberg and Oscarsson, ‘Party Leader Effects on the Vote’, in Aarts, Blais and Schmitt (eds.),PoliticalLeadersinDemocraticElections,p.50.

3 RedefiningLeadership

1.JeanBlondelusestheterm‘redefiners’,butdifferently.Heregardsleadersinthatcategoryaspromotersof‘moderatechange’asdistinctfrom‘reformists’whoproduce‘largechange’.InthewayIusetheterm,redefining leadersare radical reformers.Cf.Blondel,Political Leadership: Towards aGeneralAnalysis(Sage,London,1987),p.97.2.TheodoreRoosevelt’stenureoftheWhiteHouseaddedlustretothepresidency,andhisgraspofforeignpolicyandtheworldbeyondAmerica’sshoreswasmuchgreaterthanthatofmanyofhispredecessorsandnotafewofhissuccessors.3.Cf.JamesMacGregorBurns,Leadership (Harper&Row,NewYork,1978);andBurns,TransformingLeadership:ANewPursuitofHappiness(AtlanticBooks,London,2003).4. JamesMacGregorBurns,Roosevelt:TheSoldierofFreedom (HarcourtBrace Jovanovich,NewYork,1970),p.351.5.Ibid.,p.352.6. Stephen Graubard, The Presidents: The Transformation of the American Presidency from TheodoreRoosevelttoGeorgeW.Bush(AllenLane,London,2004),p.272.TherewasnolovelostbetweenFranklinRooseveltandJoeKennedy,andHarryTruman,forhispart,retainedtotheendofhislifeanintensedislikefortheelderKennedy.ReferringtoJackKennedy’sCatholicism,whenJFKbecameaseriouscontenderfortheDemocraticnominationaspresidential candidate,Trumanquipped tohisdaughter: ‘It’snot thepopeI’mafraidof,it’sthepop’(DavidMcCullough,Truman,Simon&Schuster,NewYork,1992,p.970).7.IraKatznelson,FearItself:TheNewDealandtheOriginsofOurTime(Norton,NewYork,2013),pp.302–303.8.Ibid.,pp.336–337.9.QuotedbyKatznelson,ibid.,p.337.10. George McJimsey, The Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (University Press of Kansas,Lawrence,2000),p.41.11.Ibid.12.Ibid.,p.288.13.Ibid.,pp.287and293.14.Katznelson,FearItself,p.162.15.Ibid.,p.486.16.McJimsey,ThePresidencyofFranklinDelanoRoosevelt,p.154.

17.Ibid.,p.163.18.Katznelson,FearItself,pp.178–179.19.McJimsey,ThePresidencyofFranklinDelanoRoosevelt,p.169;andmoregenerallyontheroleandinfluenceofEleanorRoosevelt,pp.151–170.20.Graubard,ThePresidents,pp.258–259.21. Harold M. Barger, The Impossible Presidency: Illusions and Realities of Executive Power (Scott,Foresman&Co.,Glenville,Ill.,1984),pp.101–102.22.Ibid.,p.102.23.DavidMcCullough,Truman(Simon&Schuster,NewYork1992),p.972;andTaylorBranch,PillarofFire:AmericaintheKingYears1963–65(Simon&Schuster,NewYork,1998),p.295.24. See Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality ofDemocracyintheUnitedStates’,PerspectivesonPolitics,Vol.9,No.4,December2011,pp.841–856,atp.843.Sincetheearly1970s,thesameauthorsnote,inequalityintheUSAhasgotmuchworse,bothbycomparisonwiththe1960sandbyinternationalstandards:‘Fromanall-timebestmeasureontheGiniindexof.388in1968,by2009theUSCensusBureauhadputtheUSGiniat.469,America’sworstGiniindexinmanydecades’(ibid.,p.844).25.Graubard,ThePresidents,pp.456–457.26.RandallB.Woods,LBJ:ArchitectofAmericanAmbition(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,paperback,2007),pp.440and442.27. Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Volume 4: The Passage of Power (Bodley Head,London,2012),p.352.OnJohnson’srelativelackofeducation(SouthwestTexasStateTeachersCollegeversusHarvardorOxfordRhodesScholars),Caroadds,‘NothingtheKennedysfeltaboutLyndonJohnsoncouldbeanyworsethanwhatLyndonJohnsonfeltabouthimself.’28.RobertA.Caro,TheYearsofLyndonJohnson,Volume3:Masterof theSenate (Vintagepaperback,NewYork,2003),p.xxiii.29.Ibid.,pp.xv–xvi.30.Caro,TheYearsofLyndonJohnson,Volume4,p.xvi.31.RobertA.Caro,TheYears of Lyndon Johnson,Volume 2:Means ofAscent (BodleyHead,London,1990),p.xxi.32.Caro,TheYearsofLyndonJohnson,Volume4,pp.419–420.By including ‘theJohnsonsof Johnsoncity’,Johnsonwastalkingalsoaboutpoorwhites–andabouthisownfarfromprivilegedyouth.33.Ibid.,p.488.34.Ibid.,p.484.35.Ibid.,pp.xvii–xviii.36.RandallB.Woods,LBJ,p.884.37.MichaelSchaller,RonaldReagan(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2011),pp.88–89.38.Ibid.,p.90.39.BrianHarrison,TheTransformationofBritishPolitics1860–1995 (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1996),p.69.40.Ibid.41.QuotedinRoyJenkins,Churchill(PanBooks,London,2002),p.146.42. Rhodri Walters, ‘The House of Lords’, in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), The British Constitution in theTwentiethCentury (OxfordUniversityPress for theBritishAcademy,Oxford, 2003), pp. 189–235, at p.192.43.Jenkins,Churchill,p.160.44.Ibid.,p.144.45.KennethO.Morgan,LabourinPower1945–1951(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1984),p.37.46.Ibid.,p.37.47.KingsleyMartin,HaroldLaski:ABiography(JonathanCape,London,newedition,1969),p.153.48.Ibid.,p.173.IcanaddoneanecdoteonAttleeandLaski.WhenIwasstudyingattheLondonSchoolof

Economics,IattendedafunctionorganizedbytheDepartmentofGovernmentatwhichReginaldBassett–aprofessor in thatdepartment(andauthor, interalia,ofanotablebook,TheEssentialsofParliamentaryDemocracy,firstpublishedin1935)–toldasmallgroupofusaboutareturnvisitAttleemadetotheSchoolwhenhewasPrimeMinister.Attlee,whohaddonealotofpracticalsocialworkinEastLondon,lecturedonlocalgovernmenttoprospectivesocialworkersattheLSEintheyearsjustbeforetheFirstWorldWar(forwhichheimmediatelyvolunteeredandservedasanofficer,beingseveraltimeswounded).BassettwasinthecirclearoundAttleewhenanothermemberofthestaff,aformermilitarymanwhohaddrunkmorethanwaswise,cameup toAttleeandsaid: ‘Clem,Clem, Ibelieve I’m theonlymanalivewhohaseverkickedHaroldLaskiupthearse.’Thedeferenceaccordedprimeministerswasgreaterthenthannow,andthe familiarity of this address to someone as formal as Attlee embarrassed the speaker’s (and Laski’s)colleagues.Attleewasunperturbed.‘Good,’hesaid.‘Weneedmoremenlikeyou.’49.Morgan,LabourinPower,pp.99and117.50.Ibid.,pp.370–371.51.Ibid.,p.172.52.NicklausThomas-Symonds,Attlee:ALifeinPolitics(I.B.Tauris,London,2010),p.167.53.ArchieBrown,‘TheChangetoEngagementinBritain’sColdWarPolicy:TheOriginsoftheThatcher–GorbachevRelationship’,Journal ofColdWarHistory,Vol. 10,No. 3, 2008, pp. 3–47. (I used theUKFreedomofInformationActtohaveCabinetOfficeandForeignOfficedocuments,aswellasthepapersofthe academics for the Chequers seminars discussed in that article, declassified. They contain revealingannotations by Thatcher.) See alsoRodric Braithwaite, ‘Gorbachev and Thatcher’, Journal of EuropeanIntegration History, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010, pp. 31–44; and Archie Brown, ‘Margaret Thatcher andPerceptionsofChangeintheSovietUnion’,ibid.,pp.17–30.54.RichardAldous,ReaganandThatcher:TheDifficultRelationship(Hutchinson,London,2012),p.207.55.QuotedinGeoffreyHowe,ConflictofLoyalty(Macmillan,London,1994),p.332.56.SeeHowe,ConflictofLoyalty;andDouglasHurd,Memoirs(Little,Brown,London,2003).Itisworthnoting that although not even NelsonMandela’s personal advocacy, when hemet with her, could shiftMargaret Thatcher’s opposition to sanctions against the apartheid South African regime, Mandela waspleasantlysurprisedbyher.Inarecordedinterviewhesaid:‘Shewasverywarm,youknow;shewasjusttheoppositeofwhatIwastold...Iwasalsotremendouslyimpressedbyher...Iwasimpressedbyherstrengthofcharacter–reallyanironlady...’SeeNelsonMandela,ConversationswithMyself(Macmillan,London,2010),p.385.57.The reluctanceofpoliticalcommentators toseegovernmentsasother thanextensionsof thepoliticalwill of their party leadersmeans that evenAttlee, a consensus-seeking leaderof theLabourParty and aprimeminister who did not attempt to dictate to ministers, is all too often portrayed as if he were thedominantfigureinallareasofpolicyduringtheLabourgovernmentsof1945–51.ThustheBBC’spoliticaleditor,NickRobinson,writingontheeveofthe2012LabourPartyconference,inanarticleheaded‘IsEdMilibandaChurchilloranAttlee?’,writes:‘ItwastheLabourman,ashissuccessormaywellremindusonTuesday,whobuilt theNHS, strengthened thewelfare state andcreated theArtsCouncil evenat a timewhentherewas“nomoneyleft”’(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-19773185,29September2012).58.IanGilmour,DancingwithDogma:BritainunderThatcherism(Simon&Schuster,London,1992),p.5.Gilmour also observes: ‘Facedwith aPrimeMinisterwhodisliked cabinet government and sought toevadeitinorderalwaystoprevail,hermostseniorcolleagueshadeithertoacquiesceinwhatwasgoingon–insofarastheyknewwhatitwas–ortopresentherwithanultimatumthatunlessshechangedtacktheywould resign theiroffices.Since toact in suchawaymightwellhave split theConservativeparty, theywouldhavebeeninaseriousdilemma,hadtheyeverconfrontedit.Infacttheydidnot’(ibid.,p.33).59.Foraccounts,interalia,oftheirpoliticalrelationswithMargaretThatcher,seeNigelLawson,TheViewfromNo.11:MemoirsofaToryRadical (Transworld,London,1992);andMichaelHeseltine,LifeintheJungle:MyAutobiography(HodderandStoughtonpaperback,London,2001).60.InhisresignationspeechtotheHouseofCommonson31October1989,Lawsonalsosaidthat‘foroursystemofCabinetgovernment toworkeffectively, thePrimeMinisterof thedaymustappointMinisters

whomheorshe trustsand then leave themtocarryout thepolicy.Whendifferencesofviewemerge,asthey are bound to do from time to time, they should be resolved privately and, whenever appropriate,collectively’(Lawson,TheViewfromNo.11,p.1063).61.CharlesMoore,MargaretThatcher:TheAuthorizedBiography.VolumeOne:Not forTurning (AllenLane,London,2013),p.423.62.TonyBlairwaslesswillingtospendtimeintheHouseofCommonsthanwasMargaretThatcherandotherearlierprimeministers.Duringhispremiership,primeminister’squestionswerereducedfromtwiceaweektoonceaweek(althoughthesessionitselfbecamelonger)andsotheyhaveremained.63.Moore,MargaretThatcher,p.424.64.Ibid.,p.422.65.ThefullestaccountoftheriseofMargaretThatcherandofherpremiershipfrom1979to1982istobefound inMoore’s authorized biography,Margaret Thatcher, which containsmuch fresh information. Inaddition to Moore’s substantial volume, Gilmour’s critical assessment, Dancing with Dogma, and thememoirsofotherministerswhoserved ingovernmentsheadedbyMrsThatcher, twoespeciallyvaluableaccounts of the Thatcher years, from quite different points of view, are those of Geoffrey K. Fry, ThePoliticsoftheThatcherRevolution:AnInterpretationofBritishPolitics,1979–1990(PalgraveMacmillan,Houndmills,2008);andHugoYoung,OneofUs:ABiographyofMargaretThatcher(Macmillan,London,1989).66.AnthonyKing,TheBritishConstitution(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2007),p.316.67. David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 (Macmillan,London,1971),p.195.68.Lawson,TheViewfromNo.11,p.7.69.PeterHennessy,ThePrimeMinister:TheOfficeanditsHolderssince1945(Penguin,London,2001),pp.105–106.70.Lawson,TheViewfromNo.11,p.561.71. Ibid., p. 574.Describing the poll tax asMargaretThatcher’s greatest political blunder of her elevenyearsasprimeminister,Lawsonaddsthat‘atthetimeofitsinitiationin1986,shehadopenlyboastedtoher favourite journalists abouthowshehad“seenmeoff”. Ironically in theend itplayeda largepart inseeingheroffasPrimeMinister’(ibid.,p.584).72.DavidButlerandDennisKavanagh,TheBritishGeneralElectionof1992(Macmillan,London,1992),pp.10and72–75.73.D.R.Thorpe,Supermac:TheLifeofHaroldMacmillan(Pimlico,London,2011),pp.321–322.74. The Macmillan government accepted the Robbins Report in principle. It was left to the Labourgovernment, elected in 1964 and headed byHaroldWilson, to find themoney to implement a dramaticincrease in the number of universities and of students attending them. ‘This’, noted Ben Pimlott, ‘itunflinchinglydid...andtheresultwasthebiggestproportionateincreaseinthenumberofstudentsinfull-timehighereducationever’.SeePimlott,HaroldWilson(HarperCollinspaperback,London,1993),p.513.75.RoyJenkins,ALifeattheCentre(newedition,Politico,London,2006),p.206.AsJenkinspointedout,thelawhadlongbeendifferentinScotlandwheremajorityverdictswereallowed.76. As Patricia Hollis noted, ‘Wilson, characteristically, was not very keen on lifting censorship – hethought playwrights might say rude things about the royals.’ See Hollis, Jennie Lee: A Life (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1997),p.274.77.SoskicewasarelativelyconservativeHomeSecretaryandmuchlessreadytochallengetheviewsofhisdepartment and, in particular, loath to overrule his formidable Permanent Secretary, Sir CharlesCunningham. Jenkins, from the outset, made clear that he would be running the Home Office, not thedepartmentrunninghim.78.SeeEmrysHughes,SydneySilverman:RebelinParliament(CharlesSkilton,London,1969),esp.pp.96–112and171–192.79.SeeRoyJenkins,TheLabourCase(Penguin,Harmondsworth,1959),esp.pp.135–146;andJenkins,ALife at theCentre, esp. pp. 175–213.TheHouse ofLords amendedSilverman’s abolition bill, so that it

wouldapplyonlyforfiveyears,afterwhichitwouldhavetobereviewed.BythattimeJamesCallaghanhad succeeded Jenkins asHomeSecretary.Althoughmore socially conservative than Jenkins,Callaghanwasafirmopponentofcapitalpunishmentoflongstanding.Hesaidthathe‘wouldresignratherthanorderanymoreexecutions’.AndonafreevoteintheHouseofCommonstheabolitionofthedeathpenaltywasmadepermanent (by amajority of 158) inDecember 1969.SeeKennethO.Morgan,Callaghan:ALife(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1997),p.297.80.Jenkins,ALifeattheCentre,p.196.81. Ibid., pp. 208–209. The Cabinet was divided on both issues. Although a substantial majority ofministersfavouredbothreforms,‘threeorfourwereopposed,andanother largergroupwishedtheissueswouldgoaway’(ibid.,p.208).82. JennieLeewas a national figure and highly regarded bymanyLabour Party activists. Shewas lesspopularwithherownlocalelectorateandthepartymembersintheStaffordshireconstituencyofCannock.AScotsminer’s daughter, she had a somewhat regal style, anddid notmuch concern herselfwith localissuesorherconstituents’particularproblems(Hollis,JennieLee,pp.371–380).83. SeeHollis, Jennie Lee, pp. 297–359;Ben Pimlott,HaroldWilson, pp. 513–515; and Philip Ziegler,Wilson:TheAuthorisedLifeofLordWilsonofRievaulx(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1993),p.201.OntheOpenUniversity,Zieglersumsup:‘Bevan’swidow,JennieLee,wasputinchargeoftheenterprise.Withoutherenergyandenthusiasmitwouldhavegotnowhere,butwithoutWilson’scontinuedsupportshewould have had no chance to do what she did’ (ibid.). This new educational institution was granteduniversitystatusin1969andadmitteditsfirststudentsin1971.WithinthenextfourdecadesmorethanoneandahalfmillionpeopleweretobecomeOpenUniversitystudents.84.VernonBogdanor,TheNewBritishConstitution(Hart,Portland,Oregon,andOxford,2009),p.62.85.TonyBlair,AJourney(Hutchinson,London,2010),pp.516–517.Evenatthetime,oneseniorCabinetminister from those years toldme, Blairmade it clear that hewas ill-disposed towards the Freedom ofInformationAct,andtheoriginaldraftwaswatereddownbytwoministers,DavidClarkandJackStraw.‘Fortunately,’saidthesameminister,‘ParliamentrestoredsomeofthesubstancetotheActwhichhadbeentakenoutofit.’Inhismemoirs,StrawmakesclearthathewaspersonallyhorrifiedbytheimplicationsoftheFreedomofInformationActandwasactiveinreducingitsscope,butheportraystheministerincharge,Clark, ashavingbecomeevangelical in supportof theFoIAct, under the strong influenceofhis specialadviser,JamesCornford.SeeJackStraw,LastManStanding:MemoirsofaPoliticalSurvivor(Macmillan,London,2012),pp.275–282and285–287.86.Derry Irvine haswritten illuminatingly on the background to the constitutional legislation. SeeLordIrvine of Lairg, PC,QC,Human Rights, Constitutional Law and theDevelopment of the English LegalSystem:SelectedEssays(Hart,OxfordandPortland,Oregon,2003);andonScottishdevolutionspecificallyin ‘A Skilful Advocate’ in Wendy Alexander (ed.), Donald Dewar: Scotland’s first First Minister(Mainstream,EdinburghandLondon,2005),pp.125–129.IrvineandDewar(thelatterbecameSecretaryofStateforScotlandandsubsequentlythefirstoftheFirstMinistersofScotlandafterdevolutionwasenacted)had‘asharedviewthat therenaissance inScotland’ssenseof itsnational identitydemanded theamplestdevolutionoflegislativeauthoritytoaScottishParliamentconsistentwiththemaintenanceoftheUnion’.Theywere,however,over-optimisticintheirbeliefthataconsequencewouldbe‘themarginalizationoftheSNP[ScottishNationalParty]’(p.127).87.KennethO.Morgan,AgesofReform:DawnsandDownfallsof theBritishLeft (I.B.Tauris,London,2011),p.75.IrvinehadbeenpickedoutasLabour’sfutureLordChancellorwhileNeilKinnockstillledtheLabourParty.AsabrilliantLabour-supportingbarristerwhowasaclosefriendofJohnSmith,hiscentralrole inconstitutionalreformwouldhavebeenevenmoreassuredhadSmithnotdiedin1994.IrvinewasalsothepersonwhogaveBlairhisfirstjob–asapupilinthelegalchambersheheaded.Theotheryoungpupilhe tookon in1975wasCherieBoothwhomarriedBlair fiveyears later.Whilenoting this,PhilipStephensgetsthechronologyandBlair’ssupposedpatronageofhisformermentorwrongwhenhewrites:‘Afterthe1997election,IrvinewasamplyrewardedbyhisyoungpupilwithaseatintheHouseofLordsandthepostofLordChancellor,theheadofthenation’sjudicialsystem’(PhilipStephens,TonyBlair:The

PriceofLeadership,Politico’s,London,revisededition2004,pp.44–45).Infact,IrvinebecamealifepeerwhenMargaretThatcherwasPrimeMinisterandNeilKinnockwasLeaderoftheOpposition–in1987.88.Theconstitutionalimplicationsarethat,increasingly,theeuro’slonger-termsurvivalisseenaslikelytodependon less fiscaldisparityandonmovement towardsstillclosereconomicandpoliticalunionof thememberstates.89.Hennessy,ThePrimeMinister,p.477.90.GilesRadice,Trio:InsidetheBlair,Brown,MandelsonProject(Tauris,London,2010),pp.174–176.91.TonyBlairwasquite explicit inhis approvalofmuchofwhatMargaretThatcher achievedasprimeminister.Inhismemoirshewritesthat‘BritainneededtheindustrialandeconomicreformsoftheThatcherperiod’(Blair,AJourney,p.99).92.RobinCook,ThePointofDeparture(Simon&Schuster,London,2003),p.121.Cookadded:‘PartofGordon’stragedyisthatheisanoldbelieverinredistribution,butstuckwithinaBlairiteideologywhichonlyallowshimtodoitbystealth.’93.Blair,AJourney,pp.116and508.AsChancellor,Brownhadblockedorseverelymodifiedanumberofchanges topublic services thatBlair favouredandwhichwere, inmanyways, a logicalextensionof theremodellingofthewelfarestatebegunbyThatcher.Brownsuccessfullyresistedchanges,backedbyBlair,whichAlanMilburnasSecretaryofStateforHealthattemptedtointroduce,to‘delivergenuinecompetitionandchoice’intheNationalHealthService.SeePeterMandelson,TheThirdMan:LifeattheHeartofNewLabour(HarperPress,London,2010),pp.364–365.94.Radice,Trio,p.220.ForverydistinctiveaccountsofhowtheLabourgovernmentdealtwiththeimpactof the global financial crisis which became apparent in 2008, see Gordon Brown, Beyond the Crash:Overcoming the First Crisis of Globalisation (Simon& Schuster, London, 2010); and Alistair Darling,BackfromtheBrink(AtlanticBooks,London,2011).95.Thedeputyleaderoftheparty,inparticular–NicolaSturgeon–establishedareputationasaveryableministerandtalentedpolitician.96.DavidTorrance,Salmond:AgainsttheOdds(reviseded.,Birlinn,Edinburgh,2011),p.22797.OnHaroldWilsonasa‘rolemodel’forSalmond,ibid.,pp.339–340.98.Asnoted inChapter1, that is a central argumentofDrewWesten,ThePoliticalBrain:TheRoleofEmotioninDecidingtheFateoftheNation(PublicAffairs,paperbackedition,NewYork,2008).99.FrankBrettschneiderandOscarW.Gabriel,‘TheNonpersonalizationofVotingBehaviorinGermany’,in Anthony King (ed.), Leaders’ Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections (OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2002),pp.127–157,atp.138.100.RobertElgie,PoliticalLeadershipinLiberalDemocracies(PalgraveMacmillan,Houndmills,1995),pp.81–86.101.PeterPulzer,GermanPolitics1945–1995(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1995),pp.46–47.102.Mary Fulbrook,History ofGermany 1918–2000: TheDividedNation (Blackwell,Oxford, 2nd ed.,2002),p.52.Immediatepost-warGermanywasdividedintozonesadministeredbytheoccupyingpowers.IntheAmericanzone,theoverseerswerepresentedwithadilemmawheninonetownaNazimayorwasre-electedbymajorityvote.AsFulbrookobserves(pp.115–116):‘Itwasnotimmediatelyclearwhetherthemost “democratic” thing todowouldbe to reject thedemocratic vote for anundemocratic person, or toinstall, undemocratically, a democratic candidate against the wishes of the majority. What was clear,however, was that many Germans had little conception of what was meant by “democracy”: it wasassociatedforallthosewhowereoldenoughtohaveexperienceditasadultsintheWeimarRepublicwithnationaldefeatandhumiliation,economiccrisis,andpoliticalchaos.’103.ColognewaswithintheBritishzoneofGermanywhenthecountrywasadministrativelydividedupattheendofthewar.AdenauerwasactuallydismissedasMayorofColognebytheBritishin1945.FreedtodevotemoretimetotheChristianDemocraticParty,hetookfulladvantageoftheopportunityandbecametheparty’sChairman.104.Germanyhas,indeed,beendescribedas‘Europe’soldestwelfarestate’.SeePulzer,GermanPolitics1945–1995,pp.63–64.

105.Ibid.106.GordonA.Craig,citedbyGilesRadice,TheNewGermans(MichaelJoseph,London,1995),p.79.107.WillyBrandt,MyLifeinPolitics(Penguin,London,1993),p.74.108.Ibid.,p.78.109. Thomas A. Bayliss,Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies (StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,Albany,1989),p.76.110.Fulbrook,HistoryofGermany1918–2000,p.168.111. I say this partly on the basis of personal experience and countless conversations inRussia in thoseyears.IspentthreemonthsintheSovietUnionin1966,tenmonthsin1967–68andtwomonthsin1976,and noted the big difference in attitudes to Germany in the third of these academic exchange visits ascomparedwith the first two. There is little reason to doubt that it wasWilly Brandt and his change ofGermanforeignpolicywhichplayedamajorroleinbringingaboutthatdevelopment.112. Archie Brown, ‘Did Gorbachev as General Secretary Become a Social Democrat?’, Europe-AsiaStudies,Vol.65,No.2,2013,pp.198–220.113. Shortly after Brandt’s death, Gorbachev published a journal article ofwarm tribute to hisGermancolleague in the broader context of the role of the individual in themaking of politics and history. SeeMikhailGorbachev,‘Delaetlichelovekpolitiku?Delaetlichelovekistoriyu:razmyshleniyaonaslediiVilliBrandta’,Svobodnayamysl’,No.17,1992,pp.17–21.OfBrandt’sOstpolitik,Gorbachevwrote:‘Thereisno doubt that it exerted an appreciable influence on the spiritual and political atmosphere not only inGermanyitself,butalsoinEuropeasawhole,includingonus.The“EasternPolicy”promoteddeepeningreflection inour society, reflectionon the relationshipbetween freedomanddevelopment,ondemocracyandthefutureofourcountry’(p.19).114.Brandt,MyLifeinPolitics,p.200.115.Ibid.116.Ibid.,p.6.117.Kohl’sNewsweekinterviewisquotedinHelgaHaftendorn,‘TheUnificationofGermany,1985–1991’,inMelvynP.LefflerandOddArneWestad(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryof theColdWar,VolumeIII:Endings(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2010),pp.333–355,atp.335.118. TimothyGartonAsh,TheMagic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89Witnessed inWarsaw, Budapest,BerlinandPrague(RandomHouse,NewYork,1990),p.72.119.Haftendorn,‘TheUnificationofGermany,1985–1991’,p.351.120.Bushlaterwrotethat‘Thatcher’slackofsympathyforandevendistrustofreunificationwasobvious’,butadded:‘WhileIdidnotagreewithMargaret’sconcernabouttheimplicationsofaunitedGermany,tosome degree I did share her worry about the adverse political effect reunification could have onGorbachev.’SeeGeorgeBushandBrentScowcroft,AWorldTransformed(Knopf,NewYork,1998),pp.192–193.See alsoPhilipZelikowandCondoleezzaRice,GermanyUnifiedandEuropeTransformed:AStudyinStatecraft(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,1995).121.FrederickTaylor,TheBerlinWall13August1961–9November1989(Bloomsbury,London,2006),p.645.122.GeorgeC.Edwards III,ThePublicPresidency:ThePursuitofPopularSupport (StMartin’sPress,NewYork,1983),p.208.123.StephenSkowronek,‘TheParadigmofDevelopmentinPresidentialHistory’, inGeorgeC.EdwardsIIIandWilliamG.Howell (eds.),TheOxfordHandbookof theAmericanPresidency (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2009),pp.749–770,atp.761.124.RichardRose,ThePostmodernPresident:GeorgeBushMeetstheWorld(ChathamHouse,Chatham,N.J.,2nded.,1991),p.183.125.Ibid.126. Hugh Heclo, ‘Whose Presidency is This Anyhow?’, in Edwards and Howells (eds.), The OxfordHandbookoftheAmericanPresidency,p.776.127.Thatwasscarcelylesstrueevenagenerationago.SeeEdwards,ThePublicPresidency,pp.187–210.

128.IhaveinmindthereadmissiontotheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionofStalin’sright-handman,VyacheslavMolotov,andtheproposalataPolitburomeetingpresidedoverbyChernenkotorestoretothecityofVolgograditsfamouswartimenameofStalingrad.TheideawastodothisaspartofthecelebrationofthefortiethanniversaryofthevictoryoverNaziGermanyinMay1985.Theseweresymbolicgestures(Molotov himself was aged ninety-three by that time), but of political significance – moves towardsrehabilitation of Stalinwhichwould bolster anti-reformist forceswithin the party and society.However,although Molotov was duly readmitted to the party in 1984, by May 1985 Gorbachev was GeneralSecretary.Theprincipaladvocateofareturn to‘Stalingrad’,MarshalDmitriyUstinov,wasdead,andnosuchname-changetookplace.SeeArchieBrown,TheRiseandFallofCommunism(BodleyHead,London,2009),p.484.129.For thisquotationandamuchmoredetailedstudyofCardoso’s leadership, Iamindebted toAlfredStepan’s forthcoming chapter, ‘Cardoso as Academic Theoretician and Democratic Leader’, in DietrichRueschemeyerandRichardSnyder(eds.),CardosoandApproachestoInequality(LynneRienner,Boulder,2014).130. As Adrian Guelke put it, the government led by the National Party in South Africa had become‘increasingly reliantonanti-communism to justify itspolicies internationally,particularlyasany residualsympathyforracialoligarchyintheWesternworldfaded’(Guelke,‘TheImpactoftheEndoftheColdWarontheSouthAfricanTransition’,JournalofContemporaryAfricanStudies,Vol.14,No.1,1996,p.97).131.NelsonMandela,LongWalk toFreedom:TheAutobiographyofNelsonMandela (Abacus,London,1995),p.660.132.SeeDavidWelshandJackSpence, ‘F.W.deKlerk:EnlightenedConservative’, inMartinWestlake(ed.),Leaders ofTransition (Macmillan,London, 2000), pp. 29–52.The fact that in the years followingMandela’s retirement,SouthAfricanpoliticsandsocietyhavehardly livedup to thehighhopesof1994doesnotlessenthescaleofMandela’s–and,indeed,deKlerk’s–achievement.133. Ching-fen Hu, ‘Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan’,StanfordJournalofEastAsianAffairs,Vol.5,No.1,2005,pp.26–44,atp.43.134. See The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (Grosset & Dunlap, New York, 1978), pp. 544–580; HenryKissinger,TheWhiteHouseYears(Little,Brown,Boston,1979),pp.684–787;MargaretMacMillan,SeizetheHour:WhenNixonMetMao(JohnMurray,London,2006);JimmyCarter,KeepingFaith:TheMemoirsof a President (Bantam Books, New York, 1982), pp. 186–211; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power andPrinciple:MemoirsoftheNationalSecurityAdviser1977–1981(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1983),pp.401–425.135.Ching-fenHu,‘Taiwan’sGeopoliticsandChiangChing-Kuo’sDecisiontoDemocratizeTaiwan’,p.38.136.Ibid.,p.42.

4 TransformationalPoliticalLeadership

1.CharlesdeGaulle,TheCompleteWarMemoirsofCharlesdeGaulle(Carroll&Graf,NewYork,1998),p.3.2.Ibid.,p.233.WritingabouthimselfinthethirdpersonwascharacteristicofdeGaulle.3.WinstonS.Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar:VolumeII:TheirFinestHour (Cassell,London,1949),pp.136–137,141–142.4.Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar:VolumeII,p.142.5.QuotedbyPhilipM.WilliamsandMartinHarrison,DeGaulle’sRepublic(Longmans,London,1960),p.75.6.VincentWright,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofFrance(UnwinHyman,London,3rded.,1989),p.4.7.WilliamsandHarrison,DeGaulle’sRepublic,pp.3–4.

8.Ibid.,p.35.9.Ibid.,p.41.10. JohnGaffney,PoliticalLeadership inFrance:FromCharlesdeGaulle toNicolasSarkozy (PalgraveMacmillanpaperback,Houndmills,2012),p.15.11.EspeciallymemorablewasdeGaulle’sopeningsentenceofhiswarmemoirs:‘Toutemavie,jemesuisfaitunecertaineidéedelaFrance’(quotedbySudhirHazareesingh,LeMythegaullien,Gallimard,Paris,2010,p.58).12.Gaffney,PoliticalLeadershipinFrance,p.11.13.SeeMichelDebré,EntretiensaveclegénéraldeGaulle1961–1969(AlbinMichel,Paris,1993).14.Gaffneynotes(PoliticalLeadershipinFrance,p.32):‘Opinionpollsatthetimesuggestedthat50percentof theFrench– aswithmost textsof thiskind–hadnot even lookedat thedraft constitution theywouldvoteupon,andonly15percentclaimedtohaveproperlyreaditatall.’15.Wright,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofFrance,pp.53–54.16.Ibid.,p.60.17.Gaffney,PoliticalLeadershipinFrance,pp.33–34.18.Presidentialpowerwasalsodrasticallyreducedduringthetimeswhentheincumbentdidnothavethesupportofamajority in the legislatureandhad to ‘cohabit’withaprimeministerofadifferentpoliticalpersuasion.Thisdidnothappen,however,duringdeGaulle’selevenyearsinthepresidency.19.RobertElgie,PoliticalLeadershipinLiberalDemocracies(PalgraveMacmillan,Houndmills,1995),p.64.20.Wright,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofFrance,p.37.21.WilliamsandHarrison,DeGaulle’sRepublic,p.209.22.Wright,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofFrance,p.28.23. Sudhir Hazareesingh, In the Shadow of the General: Modern France and the Myth of De Gaulle(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012),pp.172–173.24.Ibid.,pp.179and182.25.Ibid.,p.104.26. De Gaulle advised Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy not to become embroiled in Vietnam andsubsequentlypubliclyopposedLyndonJohnson’sescalationof thewar (Gaffney,PoliticalLeadership inFrance,pp.54–55).27.Hazareesingh,IntheShadowoftheGeneral,p.107.28.Wright,TheGovernmentandPoliticsofFrance,pp.18–20.29.SurveyresearchshowedthatdeGaulle’sstandingremainedrelativelyhigh.WheninApril1968Frenchcitizenswereaskedwhether,all thingsconsidered,deGaulle’s return topower in1958hadbeenagoodthingorabad thing,67percentsaid ithadbeengood.Even inNovember1969whenrespondentswereaskediftheyweresatisfiedwithwhatdeGaulledidintheyears1958–1969,53percentwereeither‘verysatisfied’ or ‘more satisfied than dissatisfied’. See JeanCharlot,LesFrançais et deGaulle (Plon, Paris,1971),pp.165–166.30.González,whohadbecomeSocialistPartyleaderwhilehispartywasstillabannedorganizationunderFranco’srule,wasoneofSuárez’sstrongestcriticsandhimselfapoliticianwhoplayedanimportantpartinthetransitionfromauthoritarianismandastillgreaterroleintheconsolidationofSpanishdemocracy.HewastobecomeSpain’slongest-servingdemocraticprimeminister,holdingthepremiershipcontinuouslyforfourteenyears–from1982until1996.Hispopularityathomeandimpactabroadwasmuchgreater thanthat of Suárez, but it was the latter who played the most indispensable part in the transition fromauthoritarianrule.31. The ‘Eurocommunist’ parties distinguished themselves by being prepared to criticize some of theactionsof theSovietUnion.Mostnotably, theywerecriticalof theSoviet invasionofCzechoslovakia inAugust 1968, having been themselves sympathetic to the Prague Spring reformers. See Paulo Filo dellaTorre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story (eds.), Eurocommunism: Myth or Reality? (Penguin,Harmondsworth,1979);andRichardKindersley(ed.),InSearchofEurocommunism(Macmillan,London,

1981).32. Simon Parlier, ‘Adolfo Suárez: Democratic Dark Horse’, in Martin Westlake (ed.), Leaders ofTransition(Macmillan,London,2000),pp.133–155,atp.144.33. Quoted in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:SouthernEurope,SouthAmerica,andPostCommunistEurope(JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,Baltimore,1996),pp.96–97.34. The quotations are fromAdolfo Suárez González,Un nuevo horizonte para España: Discursos delPresidentedelGobierno1976–1978(ImprentadelBoletínOficialdelEstado,Madrid,1978).IowethesereferencestoAlfredStepan.TheentiresectiononSuárezhasbenefitedgreatlyfrommyconversationswithProfessor Stepan and from his generous sharing of the insights he gained from his long interviewwithSuárezon24May1990.35.Ibid.,p.101.36.ShouldCatalonia,oreventheBasquecountry,becomeindependentstatesinthefuture,thereiseveryreasonnowtosupposethatboththeyandtheSpanishstatewouldstillbedemocracies.37.Parlier,‘AdolfoSuárez,pp.148–149.38.QuotedinLinzandStepan,ProblemsofDemocraticTransitionandConsolidation,p.114.39.Parlier,‘AdolfoSuárez’,p.149.40. Ibid., p. 150. The Basque National Party called on its supporters to abstain and 50 per cent of theelectoratedidso.41.LinzandStepan,ProblemsofDemocraticTransitionandConsolidation,p.89.Someevidencecametolight as recently as early 2012which suggested that the king had become somewhat disenchantedwithSuárezbythetimeoftheattemptedcoup.HetoldtheGermanambassadortoMadridon26March1981,indocuments declassified only in February 2012, that the military plotters had ‘wanted what we are allstrivingfor,namely,there-establishmentofdiscipline,order,securityandcalm’.HealsoblamedSuárezforfailing‘toestablisharelationshipwiththemilitary’.SeeFionaGovan,‘JuanCarloswas“sympathetic”to1981 coup leaders’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9072122/Juan-Carlos, 9February2012.Thequotedremarksnotwithstanding, theheadingdoesnotdojusticetotheking’sroleatthetimewhenhisactionsspokelouderthanhislaterwords.42.Manyof thepointsmadebriefly in theGorbachevsectionof thischapter Ihaveelaboratedat lengthelsewhere.Beginningwithavolumepublishedintheearly1980s(ArchieBrownandMichaelKaser,eds.,SovietPolicy for the1980s,Macmillan,London,1982), I havewrittenextensively aboutGorbachevandperestroika in books and articles over the years. See especially Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996); Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika inPerspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007); and Brown, ‘The Gorbachev Factor Revisited’,ProblemsofPostCommunism,Vol.58,Nos.4–5,2011,pp.56–65.43.NewYorkTimes,13March2010.44.TheheadofSovietspaceresearch,RoaldSagdeev,wasamongthespecialistsextremelyscepticalaboutSDI.When, at ameetingwith Gorbachev, a representative of the Soviet space industry told the Sovietleader that ‘We are losing timewhile doing nothing to build our own counterpart of theAmerican SDIprogram’, Sagdeev says, ‘I nearly died from suppressing my laughter.’ See Sagdeev, TheMaking of aSovietScientist:MyAdventuresinNuclearFusionandSpaceFromStalintoStarWars(JohnWiley,NewYork,1994),p.273.45.RonaldReagan,AnAmericanLife(Simon&Schuster,NewYork,1990),p.608.46.Hehad,however,sharedsomeofhiscriticalviewswithEduardShevardnadze,theFirstSecretaryoftheGeorgianpartyorganizationandacandidate(ornon-voting)memberofthePolitburo,and,stillmore,withAleksandr Yakovlev, the Director of the think-tank IMEMO and a former high official of the CentralCommittee.Twoyearsearlier,atGorbachev’sbehest,YakovlevhadbeenbroughtbacktoMoscowafteraten-yeardignifiedexileasSovietambassadortoCanada.47.OntheprocessbywhichGorbachevbecameGeneralSecretaryinMarch1985,seeBrown,SevenYearsthatChangedtheWorld,pp.29–67,esp.39–40.

48.MikhailGorbachev,Zhizn’ireformy(Novosti,Moscow,1995),Volume1,p.395.49.MikhailGorbachevinXIXVsesoyuznayakonferentsiyaKommunisticheskoypartiiSovetskogoSoyuza:Stenograficheskiyotchet(Politizdat,Moscow,1988),Volume1,p.43.50. JeanBlondelmakes thegeneralpoint that ‘leaderswhosegoalschangeareamong thosewhoare themost important’, suggesting that they are ‘drawn primarily from the relatively small groupwho stay inofficeforsubstantialandevenverylongperiods’.SeeBlondel,PoliticalLeadership:TowardsaGeneralAnalysis(Sage,London,1987),p.85.Gorbachev’sgoals,however,changedwithinquiteashorttime–inaperiodoflittlemorethanthreeyearsafterhehadbecomeSovietleader.51.MikhailGorbachev,Ponyat’perestroyku...Pochemuetovazhnoseychas(Al’pina,Moscow,2006),p.180.52.AleksandrYakovlev,Predislovie,Obval,Posleslovie(Novosti,Moscow,1992),p.267.53.‘ZasedaniePolitbyuroTsKKPSS,15Okybrya1987goda’,VolkogonovCollection,NationalSecurityArchive,Washington,DC,pp.149–150and155.Gorbachevhadalreadyusedtheterm‘socialistpluralism’atameetingwithrepresentativesofthemassmedia,reportedinPravdaon15July1987.Oncehehadgiventhe hitherto taboo word ‘pluralism’ his imprimatur, reformist intellectuals began to use it, sometimesdropping the ‘socialist’ qualifier. Gorbachev himself, by February 1990, was speaking not of ‘socialistpluralism’butof‘politicalpluralism’.54.The top foreignpolicyofficialswhomGorbachev replacedwere theMinisterofForeignAffairs, theheadsof the InternationalDepartment and theSocialistCountriesDepartmentof theCentralCommittee,and his own principal foreign policy adviser. Especially important were the first of these and the last(EduardShevardnadzereplacingAndreyGromykoasForeignMinisterandAnatoliyChernyaevtakingtheplaceofAndreyAleksandrov-AgentovasforeignpolicyaidetotheGeneralSecretary).Itwasmuchharderto replace the key officials in the economic sector, therewere somany of them.Half of themore thantwentydepartmentsoftheCentralCommitteewereconcernedwiththeeconomy.(Intheautumnof1988,threeandahalfyearsafterhebecameSovietleader,Gorbachevmanagedtoabolishallbuttwoofthem.)Thereweredozensofeconomicministries,andeveryregionalpartyofficialandmanagerofalargefactorywasinvolvedintheimplementationofeconomicpolicy,inmostcasesrepresentinganobstacletoreform.55. V.I. Vorotnikov, I bylo eto tak . . . Iz dnevnika chlena Politbyuro TsK KPSS (Sovet veteranovknigoizdanie,Moscow,1995),p.260.Seealsopp.460–461.56.AleksandrYakovlev,Sumerki(Materik,Moscow,2003),p.501.57.Ibid.58.Vorotnikov,Ibyloetotak,p.461.59.Ibid.,p.260.60.Bythetimehecametowritehismemoirs(TheMakingofaSovietScientist),SagdeevwaslivingintheUnitedStates.Aneventinhispersonallifehadoccurredwhich,earlierthanthelateperestroikaera,wouldhavebeenunimaginableforahigh-rankingSovietscientistwhohadclosecontactswiththeSovietmilitary-industrialcomplex.SagdeevhadbecomethehusbandofSusanEisenhower,thegranddaughterofPresidentDwightD.Eisenhower.61.Sagdeev,TheMakingofaSovietScientist,p.272.Gorbachevcameupagainstthelimitsofhispowersof persuasion when he tried to convince Lithuanians in 1990–91 that they would be better off in ademocratizedandgenuinelyfederalSovietUnionthanintheseparatestatetheywereseeking.62.Ibid.63.According to the survey research of themost reliable investigators of public opinion in those years,VTsIOM, led byTatianaZaslavskaya,BorisGrushin andYuriyLevada. SeeReytingiBorisa Yel’tsina iMikhailaGorbachevapo10-bal’noyshkale(VTsIOM,Moscow,1993).64. These were not yet multi-party elections, and most of the deputies elected were members of theCommunistParty.However,whatwasdecisivelyimportantwasthattheycompetedagainstoneanotheronfundamentallydifferentpoliticalplatforms,thusrevealingthefullextentofthepoliticaldifferenceswithinthepartywhichlaybehindthemonolithicfaçadethatthepartyleadershiphadhithertomaintainedbeforeitsownsocietyandtheoutsideworld(andthathadbeenjustifiedbythedoctrineof‘democraticcentralism’,

whichwasnowasdeadasthedodo).Anintra-partypluralismpreparedthewayfortherapiddevelopmentofcompetingpoliticalpartieswhichwerefullylegalizedbyachangetotheSovietConstitutioninMarch1990.65.GeorgiyShakhnazarov,Tsenasvobody:ReformatsiyaGorbachevaglazamiegopomoshchnika(RossikaZevs,Moscow,1993),pp.77–78.66.RyzhkovclaimedtohavereadStalin’scopyofMachiavelli’sThePrince(intheRussiantranslationof1869), completewithStalin’s underlinings and annotations. SeeNikolayRyzhkov,Perestroyka: Istoriyapredatel’stv(Novosti,Moscow,1992),pp.354–355.67.Ryzhkov,Perestroyka,p.364.68.MikhailGorbachevandZdeněkMlynář,ConversationswithGorbachev:OnPerestroika, thePragueSpring,andtheCrossroadsofSocialism(ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork,2002),p.15.69. Archie Brown, ‘Did Gorbachev as General Secretary Become a Social Democrat?’, Europe-AsiaStudies,Vol.65,No.2,2013,pp.198–220.Ofalltheforeignheadsofgovernmentwithwhomhecameincontact while he was Soviet leader, Gorbachev’s favourite was the Spanish democratic socialist primeminister,FelipeGonzález.70.FromtimetotimetheabsurdsuggestionthatGorbachevwashimselfcomplicitinthecoupisfloatedbyGorbachev’s enemies and by ill-informed authors, sometimes given more publicity than such nonsensedeserves.Forrefutationsoftheconspiracytheories,seeAnatolyChernyaev,MySixYearswithGorbachev(PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,UniversityPark,2000),‘AfterwordtotheU.S.Edition’,pp.401–423;andBrown,SevenYearsthatChangedtheWorld,pp.319–324.71.AleksandrDugin,‘Perestroykapo-evraziyski:upushchennyyshans’,inV.I.Tolstykh(ed.),Perestroykadvadtsat’letspustya(Russkiyput’,Moscow,2005),pp.88–97,atp.96.72.AleksandrYakovlev,‘Etokrupneyshiyreformator’,Ogonek,No.11,March1995,p.45.73.EzraF.Vogel,DengXiaopingandtheTransformationofChina(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,2011),pp.18–24and487.74.RanaMitter,ABitterRevolution:China’sStrugglewiththeModernWorld (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2004),p.161.75.SeeVogel,DengXiaopingandtheTransformationofChina,pp.15–36.76.Ibid.,p.38.77.SeeFrankDikötter,Mao’sGreatFamine(Bloomsburypaperback,London,2011),pp.88,92and118–119.78. RoderickMacFarquhar andMichael Schoenhals,Mao’s Last Revolution (Harvard University Press,Cambridge,Mass.,2006),pp.358–359.79.Ibid.,p.359.80.Vogel,DengXiaopingandtheTransformationofChina,p.313.81.Ibid.,p.247.82.Ibid.,p.377.83.KhrushchevRemembers:TheLastTestament,translatedandeditedbyStrobeTalbott(Deutsch,London,1974),p.253.84.MacFarquharandSchoenhals,Mao’sLastRevolution,p.457.85.PeterNolan,ChinaattheCrossroads(PolityPress,Cambridge,2004),p.3.86.Ibid.,p.1.87. For an excellent analysis of the ‘insurance policy’ against regime changewhich a number of seniorChinese officialsmaintain through businesses abroad, whereby publicly owned productive and financialassets are turned into private property (with the overseas enterprises run more often than not by theirchildren),seeX.L.Ding,‘InformalPrivatizationThroughInternationalization:TheRiseofNomenklaturaCapitalism inChina’sOffshoreBusiness’,BritishJournalofPoliticalScience,Vol.30,No.1,2000,pp.121–146.88.Vogel,DengXiaopingandtheTransformationofChina,pp.703–704.89.ZhaoZiyang,Prisonerof theState:TheSecretJournalofZhaoZiyang, translatedandeditedbyBao

Pu,ReneeChiangandAdiIgnatius(Simon&Schuster,London,2009),pp.25–34,esp.p.28.90. Somemilitary commanders refused to take part in the violent suppression of young demonstrators,among them a general who was, as a consequence, court-martialled and sentenced to five years ofimprisonment. See Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers(Penguin,London,2011),pp.109–110.91.GreenCross International,MikhailGorbachev:ProphetofChange.FromColdWar toaSustainableWorld (Clareview,EastSussex,2011),p. 243.DeKlerk alsonotes that, quite apart from thechanges inEurope, under Gorbachev’s leadership ‘the Soviet Union played a constructive role in the negotiationsbetweenSouthAfrica,AngolaandCuba,whichresulted in thewithdrawalofCubanforces fromAngolaandthesuccessfulimplementationoftheUnitedNationsindependenceprocessinNamibia’(ibid.).92.NelsonMandela,LongWalktoFreedom(Abacus,London,1995),p.24.93.Ibid.94.Ibid.,p.25.95.Ibid.,p.134.96.Ibid.,p.436.97.Ibid.98.WilliamBeinart,Twentieth-CenturySouthAfrica(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2nded.,2001),p.166.99.TomLodge,Mandela:ACriticalLife (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,paperbackedition,2007),p.82.100.AlsobannedwasthePanAfricanCongress,amilitantgroupwhichhadbrokenawayfromtheANCandhadbeeninvolvedintheproteststhatleduptotheSharpevillekillings(ibid.).101.Ibid.,pp.90and92.102.NelsonMandela,ConversationswithMyself(Macmillan,London,2010),p.413.103.Ibid.;andLodge,Mandela,p.99.104.Mandela,LongWalktoFreedom,p.438.105. Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge,2002),p.153.106.Mandela,ConversationswithMyself,p.344.107.Ibid.,pp.344–345.108.Lodge,Mandela,p.205.109.Ibid.,p.211.110.Ibid.111.Ibid.,p.213.112.TaylorBranch,TheClintonTapes:APresident’sSecretDiary(Simon&Schuster,London,2009),pp.303–304.113. Stefan Hedlund, Russia’s “Market” Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism (ICL Press,London,1999).SeealsoHedlund,InvisibleHands,RussianExperience,andSocialScience:ApproachestoUnderstandingSystemicFailure(CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2011).114. See Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market BolshevismAgainstDemocracy(UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,Washington,DC,2001);andforamoresympatheticview of Russia’s first postCommunist president, Timothy J. Colton,Yeltsin: A Life (Basic Books, NewYork,2008).

5 RevolutionsandRevolutionaryLeadership

1. Ludvík Vaculík speech atWriters’ Congress in Prague, June 1967: IV Sjezd Svazu československýchspisovatelů, Praha 27–29 června 1967 (Československý spisovatel, Prague, 1968), p. 141 (translated in

DušanHamšík,WritersAgainstRulers,Hutchinson,London,1971,p.182).2.SamuelP.Huntington,PoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties(YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,1968),p.266.3.JohnDunn,ModernRevolutions:AnIntroductiontotheAnalysisofaPoliticalPhenomenon(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2nded.,1989),p.12.4.See, forexample,SharonEricksonNepstad,NonviolentRevolutions:CivilResistance in theLate20thCentury (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011). In contrast, Chalmers Johnson has written that‘“nonviolentrevolution”,solongasthesewordsretainanyprecisemeaningwhatsoever,isacontradictionin terms’.See Johnson,RevolutionaryChange (UniversityofLondonPress,London,1968),p.7.At thesame time, Johnson defines ‘violence’ quite broadly to include revolutions accomplished ‘without anybloodflowingintheguttersorasingledeathbeingcaused’(ibid.).5.Nepstad,NonviolentRevolutions,pp.4–5.Onesurveyoftheuseoftheconceptofrevolutionconcludedthat ‘there isageneralconsensus thatviolence isanecessarycharacteristicof revolution’,withonlyoneauthor(CharlesTilly),amongthosesurveyed,whodid‘notmakeitadefiningcharacteristic’.SeeChristophM. Kotowski, ‘Revolution’, in Giovanni Sartori (ed.), Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analaysis(Sage,BeverlyHills,1984),pp.403–451,atp.414.6. For a useful review of these attempts, see Jack A. Goldstone, ‘Comparative Historical Analysis andKnowledgeAccumulation in the Study of Revolutions’, in JamesMahoney andDietrich Rueschemeyer(eds.),ComparativeHistoricalAnalysis in the Social Sciences (CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2003),pp.41–90.7.Ihaveusedtheterm‘institutionalrelationships’toconveythemeaningofwhatMarxcalled‘therelationsofproduction’.8. See especially KarlMarx,Critique of the Gotha Programme (Foreign Languages Publishing House,Moscow,1959), p. 22. (Marx’s critiqueof the ‘GothaUnityCongress’of theGermanSocialDemocratswaswritteninLondonin1875,andfirstpublishedbyFriedrichEngelsin1891.)Marx,itshouldbeadded,onlyrarelyusedtheexpression‘dictatorshipoftheproletariat’.ItwasLeninwhoturneditintoamuchmorecentraltenetof‘Marxist-Leninist’revolutionarytheory.9.AlthoughnotclaimingthecomprehensiveexplanatorypowerwhichMarxsought,twonotablestudiesofrevolutionarychangewritten in the secondhalfof the twentiethcenturywereBarringtonMoore’sSocialOriginsofDictatorshipandDemocracy:LordandPeasantintheMakingoftheModernWorld(Peregrine,London, 1969); and Theda Scocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,Russia, and China (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979). Moore offers a non-Marxist classanalysis, inwhichhe isespeciallyconcerned toexplore thecircumstances inwhichpeasantsbecome themajorrevolutionaryforce.Scocpol’semphasisisonthestate,viewedasrelativelyautonomousfromclassinterests.Shecomparesboththestatecrisesthatpavedthewayforthethreemajorrevolutionswithinherpurview–thoseofFrance,ChinaandRussia–andthepost-revolutionaryuseofstatepower.10.EricHobsbawm,Revolutionaries(Abacuspaperback,London,1999),p.295.11.IhavedrawnhereonseveralarticlesbytheleadinghistorianoftheMexicanrevolution,AlanKnight.12.AlanKnight,‘TheMythoftheMexicanRevolution’,PastandPresent,No.209,November2010,pp.223–273,esp.p.228;seealsoKnight,‘TheMexicanRevolution:Bourgeois?Nationalist?Orjusta“GreatRebellion”?’,BulletinofLatinAmericanResearch,Vol.4,No.2,1985,pp.1–37.TheMexicanrevolution,writesKnight,‘wasjustifiedlessasaleapintoanunknownfuture,thanasarestorationofapreferredstatusquoante’(‘TheMythoftheMexicanRevolution’,p.231).13.Whenwespeakofa‘revolutionfromabove’,suchasoccurredwithintheSovietUnionbetween1985and1989, this is a figurativeuseof revolution.Similarly, ‘revolutionary changeby evolutionarymeans’indicatesfundamentalchange,introducedgradually,ratherthanrevolutionmorestrictlydefined.14.Knight,‘TheMexicanRevolution:Bourgeois?Nationalist?Orjusta“GreatRebellion”?’,p.8.15.Knight,‘TheMythoftheMexicanRevolution’,pp.237–238.16. Alan Knight, ‘Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, especiallyMexico’, Journal of LatinAmericanStudies,Vol.30,No.2,1998,pp.223–248,atpp.235–236.

17.Ibid.,p.237.18.JonathanD.Spence,TheSearchforModernChina(Norton,NewYork,2nded.,1999),pp.244–253.19.Ibid.,pp.262–263;andJonathanFenby,ThePenguinHistoryofModernChina:TheFallandRiseofaGreatPower,1850–2008(AllenLane,London,2008),p.121.20.Fenby,ThePenguinHistoryofModernChina,pp.125–126.21.Spence,TheSearchforModernChina,pp.274–276.22.Fenby,ThePenguinHistoryofModernChina,p.123.23.Spence,TheSearchforModernChina,pp.276–277;MargaretMacMillan,Peacemakers:SixMonthsthatChangedtheWorld(JohnMurraypaperback,London,2002),pp.331–353;andRanaMitter,ABitterRevolution:China’sStrugglewiththeModernWorld(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2004),pp.35–36.24.SeeSpence,TheSearchforModernChina,pp.277–289.25.OntheMayFourthmovement,seeSpence,ibid.,pp.299–313;andMitter,ABitterRevolution,pp.6–11.26.Spence,TheSearchforModernChina,pp.284–285.27.Ibid.,p.314.28.Mitter,ABitterRevolution,pp.141–142.29.Spence,TheSearchforModernChina,pp.314–322.30.Fenby,ThePenguinHistoryofModernChina,p.144.31.AndrewMango,Atatürk(JohnMurray,London,1999),p.76.32.Ibid.,p.176.33.MacMillan,Peacemakers,p.445.34.Mango,Atatürk,pp.300–304.35.AlbertHourani,TheEmergenceoftheModernMiddleEast(Macmillan,London,inassociationwithStAntony’s College, Oxford, 1981), p. 17. As Hourani noted: ‘Many of the early leaders (although notAtatürk himself) came from the families of the officers and bureaucrats who had been at the centre ofOttomangovernmentandreform’,ibid.36.Mango,Atatürk,p.364.37.Ibid.,p.406.38.ErikJ.Zürcher,Turkey:AModernHistory(Tauris,London,1993),p.178.39.Ibid.,pp.176–180.40.Mango,Atatürk,p.403.41.Ibid.,pp.407and434–435.42.Zürcher,Turkey,pp.227–228;andMango,Atatürk,p.531.43.ImperialRussiain1917wasthirteendaysbehindtherestofEuropeinitsmeasurementoftime.Until1920RussiausedtheJuliancalendar(stillemployedbytheOrthodoxChurch)beforeswitchingtothemoregenerallyusedGregoriancalendar.44.Thiswasarecentlyinventedtradition,establishedbysocialistpartiesinseveraldifferentcountries,tofocusattentiononequalrightsforwomen.45. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,1998),p.35.46. The Bolshevik name dated back to 1903 when there was a split within the Russian revolutionarymovement,instigatedbyLenin,betweentheBolsheviksandMensheviks,withtheformertakingaharderandmoreuncompromisinglinethanthelatter.Theofficialnameoftheparty,ledbyLenin,atthetimeofthe1917revolutionswastheRussianSocialDemocraticLabourParty(Bolsheviks).In1918thenamewaschangedtoCommunistParty(although‘Bolsheviks’wasretainedinbracketsuntil1952).47.S.A.Smith,‘TheRevolutionsof1917–1918’,inRonaldGrigorSuny(ed.),TheCambridgeHistoryofRussia:VolumeIII,TheTwentiethCentury(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2006),pp.114–139,atpp.124and138.48.Suny,TheSovietExperiment,p.38.49.Ibid.;andSmith,‘TheRevolutionsof1917–1918’,pp.114–115.

50.SheilaFitzpatrick,TheRussianRevolution(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,3rded.,2008),p.49.51.Fitzpatrick,TheRussianRevolution,p.47.52.RobertService,Lenin:ABiography(Pan,London,2002),pp.300–301.53.SeeLeonTrotsky,ThePermanentRevolutionandResultsandProspects(PathfinderPress,NewYork,3rded.,1972).54.Fitzpatrick,TheRussianRevolution,pp.49–50.55.Suny,TheSovietExperiment,p.59.56.Ibid.,p.52.57.Ibid.,pp.64–65.58.LeonardSchapiro,TheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion(Methuen,London,2nded.,1970),p.183.Sheila Fitzpatrick, while accepting that in electoral democratic politics ‘a loss is a loss’, has noted arationalizationfortheBolsheviks’spurningoftheresultof theelectiontotheConstituentAssembly.Shewritesthat‘theycouldanddidarguethatitwasnotthepopulationasawholethattheyclaimedtorepresent.Theyhadtakenpowerinthenameoftheworkingclass’.AndtheelectionsbothtotheSecondCongressofSovietsandtotheConstituentAssemblysuggestedthatinOctober–November1917theBolsheviks‘weredrawingmoreworking-classvotesthananyotherparty’(Fitzpatrick,TheRussianRevolution,p.67).59.PhyllisAuty,Tito:ABiography(Longman,London,1970),pp.29–39.60.BertramD.Wolfe,ALife inTwoCenturies:AnAutobiography (SteinandDay,NewYork,1981),p.441.61.SeeTheDiaryofGeorgiDimitrov1933–1949 (introducedandeditedby IvoBanac,YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,2003).62.Ibid.,p.474.63.F.W.D.Deakin,TheEmbattledMountain(OxfordUniversityPress,London,1971),pp.79–80.64.Deakin,havingfoughtalongsidehim,notedDjilas’s‘outstandingphysicalcourage’(ibid.,p.84).65.MilovanDjilas,TheNewClass:AnAnalysisoftheCommunistSystem(ThamesandHudson,London,1957),p.47.66.MilovanDjilas,Tito:TheStoryfromInside(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1981),pp.13–15.67.Auty,Tito,p.266.68.ApartfromTito,itsmemberswereEdvardKardelj,aSlovene;theSerbsMošaPijade(whowasalsoofJewishorigin)andAleksandarRanković;andDjilas,whowasaMontenegrin.69.TheArtfulAlbanian:TheMemoirsofEnverHoxha,editedandintroducedbyJonHalliday(Chatto&Windus,London,1986).70. JürgenDomes, ‘TheModel forRevolutionaryPeople’sWar:TheCommunistTakeoverofChina’, inThomasT.Hammond (ed.),TheAnatomyofCommunistTakeovers (YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,1975),pp.516–533,atpp.520–521.71.Spence,TheSearchforModernChina,pp.463–464.72.MilovanDjilas,ConversationswithStalin(RupertHart-Davis,London,1962),pp.164–165.73.Spence,TheSearchforModernChina,p.467.74.RoderickMacFarquharinMacFarquhar(ed.),‘Introduction’,inThePoliticsofChina:TheErasofMaoandDeng(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2nded.,1997),pp.1–4,atp.1.75.Ho’soriginalnamewasNguyenTatThan,butformanyyearsheachievedfameasNguyenAiQuoc(NguyenthePatriot).Thelasttimeheusedthatnamewaswhenhesignedan‘appealtothepeople’in1945,callingforVietnamese independencefromFrance.SeeWilliamJ.Duiker,HoChiMinh (Hyperion,NewYork,2000),p.306.76.Ibid.,p.75.77.Ibid.,p.95.78.PatrickJ.Heardon,TheTragedyofVietnam(PearsonLongman,NewYork,3rded.,2008),pp.18–19.79.Ibid.,pp.20–23.80.Ibid.,p.29.81.Ibid.,p.181.

82.DavidW.P.Elliott, ‘OfficialHistory,RevisionistHistory,andWildHistory’, inMarkPhilipBradleyandMarilyn B. Young (eds.),Making Sense of the VietnamWars: Local, National, and TransnationalPerspectives(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2008),pp.277–304,atp.278.83.Duiker,HoChiMinh,pp.5and572.TheauthornotesthathehadbeenfascinatedbyHoChiMinheversinceheservedasayoungforeignserviceofficerattheUSEmbassyinSaigoninthemid-1960s,whenhewas ‘puzzled by the fact that the Viet Cong guerrillas fighting in the jungles appeared to be betterdisciplinedandmoremotivatedthanthearmedforcesofourally,thegovernmentofSouthVietnam’(ibid.,p.ix).84.Ibid.,p.572.85.Jean-LouisMargolin,‘Cambodia:TheCountryofDisconcertingCrimes’, inStéphaneCourtoisetal.,TheBlackBookofCommunism:Crimes,Terror,Repression(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,1999),pp.577–635,atp.581.86.NicholasShakespeare, ‘Letter fromCambodia:How thedead live’,NewStatesman, 15–21February2013,pp.37–41,atp.38.87.Margolin,‘Cambodia’,p.582.88.Ibid.,pp.630and635.89.Ibid.,p.577.90.BradleyK.Martin,UndertheLovingCareoftheFatherlyLeader:NorthKoreaandtheKimDynasty(StMartin’sPress,NewYork,2006),pp.30–31.AKoreanCommunistPartyhadbeensetupinsecretin1925,butitwasdisbandedbytheCominternin1928.91.ChristopherBluth,Korea(Polity,Cambridge,2008),p.12.92.Martin,UndertheLovingCareoftheFatherlyLeader,pp.56–57.93.VolkerSkierka,FidelCastro,translatedbyPatrickCamiller(Polity,Cambridge,2004),p.30.94.Castro,MyLife,editedbyIgnacioRamonetandtranslatedbyAndrewHurley(reviseded.,AllenLane,London,2007),p.157.95.Skierka,FidelCastro,p.5.96.Castro,MyLife,pp.80–81.97.Skierka,FidelCastro,p.20.98.Ibid.,p.24.99.Ibid.,pp.35–36.100. Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me: The Moncada Trial Defence Speech, Santiago de Cuba,October16th,1953(JonathanCape,London,1968).101.Skierka,FidelCastro,pp.38–39.102.Ibid.,p.51.103.Ibid.104.Ibid.,pp.53–54.105.Ibid.,p.69.106.Ibid.,p.183.107.Ibid.,pp.96–97.108.Ibid.,p.378.109.Castro,MyLife,p.85.110. For documentation of Gorbachev’s abandonment of Communist ideology and embrace of socialdemocraticvalueswhilehewasstillSovietleader,seeArchieBrown,‘DidGorbachevasGeneralSecretaryBecomeaSocialDemocrat?’,Europe-AsiaStudies,Vol.65,No.2,2013,pp.198–220.111.See, forexample,JacquesLévesque,TheEnigmaof1989:TheUSSRandtheLiberationofEasternEurope(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,1997),pp.133and186.112.Thefigureof1,000forthosewhotookpartinthemainoppositionmovement,Charter77,isgiveninH.GordonSkilling,Charter77andHumanRightsinCzechoslovakia(Allen&Unwin,London,1981),p.79.113. TimothyGartonAsh,TheMagic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89Witnessed inWarsaw, Budapest,

BerlinandPrague(RandomHouse,NewYork,1990),p.90.114.Ibid.,pp.89–90.115. It isunderstandable thatmanyof thosewho tookpart in thesystemic transformationofCentralandEasternEuropein1989wishtocallwhatoccurredarevolution,sinceitwouldmeanthattheythemselveswerethemainagentsofchange.Theyarejoined,though,byasubstantialnumberofacademicauthorswhoinclude the East European systemic transformations of 1989–90 under the rubric of revolution. See, forexample, Goldstone, ‘Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study ofRevolutions’; Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions; and Stephen K. Sanderson, Revolutions: A WorldwideIntroduction to Political and Social Change (Paradigm, Boulder and London, 2005). For my owninterpretationof theeventsof1989–91 inEasternEurope, seeBrown,TheRiseandFallofCommunism(BodleyHead,London,andEcco,NewYork,2009),esp.ch.26,‘TheEndofCommunisminEurope’,pp.522–548.116.TimothyGartonAshhasobservedthat,comparedwiththeeventselsewhereinEasternEurope,inits‘immediate outcome (the transfer of power from one set of communists to another)’, what happened inRomania ‘was in substance one of the least revolutionary of them all’. Garton Ash retains sufficientattachmenttotherevolutionaryidealtowishtobroadenitsscopetoinclude‘new-style,nonviolenttransfersofpoweroverstates’within‘anewgenreofrevolution,qualitativelydifferentfromtheJacobin-Bolshevikmodelof1789and1917’.SeeGartonAsh,‘ACenturyofCivilResistance:SomeLessonsandQuestions’,inAdamRobertsandTimothyGartonAsh(eds.),CivilResistanceandPowerPolitics:TheExperienceofNonViolentActionfromGandhitothePresent(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2009),pp.371–390,esp.pp.375–377.117.International(Western)interventionhasalsoplayedapartinthereconfigurationofthemapofformerYugoslavia,especiallyinthecaseofKosovo,whichhadthestatusofan‘autonomousprovince’withintherepublicofSerbiainCommunistYugoslavia.AsCharlesKinghasobserved:‘Kosovoisthefirstinstanceinthe postcommunistworld of a newly independent state that (1) achieved de facto independence in largemeasurebecauseoftheinterventionofexternalpowers,(2)hasboundariesreflectingsomethingotherthanthe internal borders of a highest level administrative component of a preexisting federation, and (3) hasachievedwidespreaddejurerecognition’.SeeKing,ExtremePolitics:Nationalism,Violence,andtheEndofEasternEurope(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2010),p.127.118.TheofficialfiguresforcasualtiesfromclashesbetweendemonstratorsandthearmyinRomaniawere1,033 dead and 2,383 wounded, of whom a quarter were soldiers. See Robin Okey, The Demise ofCommunistEastEurope:1989inContext(HodderArnold,London,2004),p.97.119. See Christopher de Bellaigue,Patriot of Persia:MuhammadMossadegh and a Very British Coup(BodleyHead,London,2012).120.ErvandAbrahamian,‘MassProtestsintheIranianRevolution,1977–79’,inRobertsandGartonAsh(eds.),CivilResistanceandPowerPolitics,pp.162–178,atp.166.121.Ibid.,pp.166–167.122.Ibid.,p.168.123. Ibid., pp. 173–174. See alsoCharles Tripp,ThePower and thePeople: Paths of Resistance in theMiddleEast(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2013),pp.77–82.124.Abrahamian,‘MassProtestsintheIranianRevolution’,p.177.125.Ibid.,pp.174–177.126. JeremyBowen,TheArabUprisings: ThePeopleWant theFall of theRegime (Simon&Schuster,London,2012),p.25.127.SudarsanRaghaven(fortheWashingtonPost),‘PowerfulelitecastashadowoverreformsinYemen’,republishedinGuardianWeekly,22February2013.Yemen’sbranchofal-Qaedahasalsobeenamongthemostthreateningintheregion.128. Farhad Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World (Paradigm, Boulder andLondon, 2012), p. 154. The author notes that ‘Al Jazeera has not only voiced Arab public opinion butliterally contributed to its shaping, helping to establish it by providing a vehicle for free expression.’

Khosrokhavaradds: ‘Ofcourse,as it is financedbyQataricapital,when itcomes toSaudiArabiaor theUnitedArabEmirates,AlJazeeralosesitsedgeandbecomesmuchlessincisiveandcritical.OnthemajorissuesconcerningtheArabworld,however,ithasplayedacrucialroleinraisingthepublic’sawarenessanditscapacityforcriticalassessmentandreflexivethought’(ibid.).129.DavidGardner, Preface to the PaperbackEdition ofLastChance: TheMiddleEast in theBalance(Taurispaperback,London,2012),p.xxi.130.Khosrokhavar,TheNewArabRevolutionsThatShooktheWorld,p.267.131.Bowen,TheArabUprisings,p.293.132.Khosrokhavar,TheNewArabRevolutionsThatShooktheWorld,pp.91–93.133. Olivier Roy’s article is (controversially) titled ‘ThereWill BeNo Islamist Revolution’, Journal ofDemocracy,Vol.24,No.1,2013,pp.14–19,atp.15.EugeneRogan,incontrast,emphasizes‘thepowerofIslam’astheinspirationalforceleadingArabstobelievethatthey‘couldoverthrowautocratsandstanduptosuperpowers’(Rogan,TheArabs:AHistory,Penguin,London,2010,atp.497;seealsopp.498–550).ExceptinrelationtotheWestand,stillmore,toIsrael,however,Islamdividesaswellasunites.Aswithalltheworld’smajorreligions,itcontainsmanydifferentstrands.IthaslongbeensaidthattherearenoArabdemocracies,althoughthismayormaynotbechanging,but,asAlfredStepanhasemphasized,evenwhenitwas clearly true as a generalization about theArabworld, that did not demonstrate an incompatibilitybetweenIslamanddemocracy.TherearedemocraciesinoverwhelminglyMuslimcountries(withTurkeyprobablythemostsuccessfulexample)andatleast435millionMuslimslivingunderdemocracy,if‘fragile’and‘intermittent’democraciesareincluded.Islamitselfisnotimmunefromchangeinanevolvingglobalculture.See‘TheWorld’sReligiousSystemsandDemocracy:Craftingthe“TwinTolerations”’,inStepan,ArguingComparativePolitics(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2001),pp.213–253,esp.p.237.134. Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal and Michael Robbins, ‘New Findings on Arabs and Democracy’,JournalofDemocracy,Vol.23,No.4,2012,pp.89–103,atp.97.135.Ibid.,pp.95–101.136.HebaSaleh,‘Arevolutionbetrayed’,FinancialTimes,28June2013.Thisprescientarticle,writtenaweekbeforeamilitarycouptoppledtheMuslimBrotherhoodgovernmentinearlyJuly2013,convincinglyoutlinedthefailuresoftheMorsigovernmentandthegravetensionsithadgenerated.137.IamverygratefultoProfessorStephenWhitefieldofOxfordUniversityforthesurveydataandforhisinterpretationofthem.

6 TotalitarianandAuthoritarianLeadership

1. Abbot Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (Oxford University Press, NewYork,1995),pp.13–30;seealsoLeonardSchapiro,Totalitarianism(PallMall,London,1972),pp.13–17.2.Schapiro,Totalitarianism,p.13.3.RichardOvery,TheDictators:Hitler’sGermanyandStalin’sRussia(Penguin,London,2005),p.294.4.Schapiro,Totalitarianism,pp.13–14.5.Inthesummerof1991thedraftprogrammeoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion,overseenandstronglyinfluencedbyGorbachev,didimplythattheregimehadbeentotalitarian.Itincludedthestatementthat ‘our party indisputably bears responsibility for the fact that it was not able to erect a barrier todespotism and allowed itself to be used as an instrument of totalitarianism’. That programme itself,however, which a majority of party officials had no intention of implementing (and which was shortlythereafterovertakenbytheAugust1991attemptedcoup,withGorbachevplacedunderhousearrestathisholiday home), was more social democratic than Communist. The draft, ‘Sotsializm, demokratiya,progress’,waspublished inNezavizimayagazeta, 23 July1991.TheSovietUnionhad ceased to have aCommunistsysteminthecourseof1989–90.6. TheCommunist Party of the SovietUnion, as a political institution,was evenmore powerfulwithin

SovietsocietythanwastheNationalSocialistPartywithintheGermansystem.YetStalinhadacquiredapositionofsuchpowerbythemid-1930sthat,likeHitler,hecouldplayoffoneinstitutionagainstanother.Thepartyhadasuperiorauthorityinprincipleto thepoliticalpolice,butStalinwasabletousethelatteragainst the former, so that evenmembers of the highest echelons of the partywere liable to arrest andexecutionathisbehest.7.ThedifferencesbetweenHitler’sGermanyandStalin’sRussiawerealsoverygreat,andinanumberofrespectsGermanyinthe1930swasfurtherremovedfromidealtypicaltotalitarianismthanwastheSovietUnion.Inanyevent, theconceptof totalitarianism,whileofsomeclassificatoryutility, isofonly limitedexplanatory value. As Ian Kershaw has observed, totalitarianism has become less fashionable as ‘aninterpretationof thebehaviourofordinaryGermansduring theThirdReich’.Recent researchhas, rather,‘increasinglytendedtoplacetheemphasisupontheenthusiasticsupportoftheGermanpeoplefortheNaziregime, and their willing collaboration and complicity in policies that led to war and genocide’. SeeKershaw,TheEnd:Hitler’sGermany(Penguin,London,2012),p.9.Foranauthoritativeexplorationoftheregime–societyrelationship,seeRichardJ.Evans,TheThirdReichinPower1933–1939(Penguin,London,2006).Twonotable comparative studies ofHitler andStalin by historians also largely eschewusing thenotion of totalitarianism. SeeAlan Bullock,Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (Fontana edition, London,1993);andOvery,TheDictators.8.Orwell’snovelwaswrittenin1948(hence1984wasareversalofthelasttwodigits)andfirstpublishedin 1949. For a scholarly edition of the book, seeGeorgeOrwell,Nineteen Eighty-Four, with a CriticalIntroductionandAnnotationsbyBernardCrick(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1984).9. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills(Routledge&KeganPaul,London,1948),pp.196–244.10. See Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ‘Dictatorship and Double Standards’, Commentary, November 1979.Kirkpatricksuggestedthatno‘revolutionary“socialist”orCommunistsociety’hadeverbeendemocratized,but that ‘right-wingautocraciesdosometimesevolve intodemocracies’ (p.37).She turned thehistoricalgeneralization into apredictionwhen shewrote that ‘thehistoryof this centuryprovidesnogrounds forexpectingthatradicaltotalitarianregimeswilltransformthemselves’(p.44).Notsurprisingly,thetitleofabookshepublishedjustoveradecadelaterwasTheWitheringAwayoftheTotalitarianState...andOtherSurprises(AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,Washington,DC,1990).11.ThisremarkofSmithinoneofhisGlasgowlecturesiscitedinpartinChapter1ofthisvolume.Forthefull context, seeAdamSmith,Lectures on Jurisprudence, edited byR.L.Meek,D.D.Raphael andP.G.Stein(eds.)(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1978),pp.322–323.12.R.W.Davies, ‘Stalin as economic policy-maker’, inSarahDavies and JamesHarris (eds.),Stalin:ANewHistory(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2005),pp.121–139,atp.138.13.DavidR.Shearer,‘Stalinism,1928–1940’,inRonaldG.Suny(ed.),TheCambridgeHistoryofRussia.Volume III:TheTwentiethCentury (CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2006),pp.192–216,atpp.196–197.14.Davies,‘Stalinaseconomicpolicy-maker’,p.131.15.OlegV.Khlevniuk,‘Stalinasdictator:thepersonalizationofpower’,inDaviesandHarris(ed.),Stalin:ANewHistory,pp.108–120,atp.109.16.ThefiguresarethoseoftheRussianNGOMemorial,whichisdedicatedtoinvestigatingtherepressionandpreservingthememoryofitsvictims(reportedinJohnson’sRussiaList,No.203,27September2007).17.Shearer,‘Stalinism,1928–1940’,p.214.18.‘ProtokolNo.185.Zasedanie1fevralya1956g.’inA.A.Fursenko(ed.),PresidiumTsKKPSS,Tom1:Chernovyeprotokol’nyezapisizasedaniy.Stenogrammy(Rosspen,Moscow,2004),pp.96–97.19.Ibid.,p.97.20.AnastasIvanovichMikoyan,Takbylo:razmyshleniyaominuvshem(Vagrius,Moscow,1999),pp.597–598.21.WilliamTaubman,Khrushchev:TheManandHisEra(Simon&Schuster,London,2003),p.616.22.Ibid.,p.620.

23.TheBrezhneverafaredbest,forexample, inasurveyof1999conductedbythemostprofessionalofRussianpollsterorganizations,headedbyYuriyLevada.SeeLevada,Ishchemcheloveka:Sotsiologicheskieocherki,2000–2005(Novoeizdatel’stvo,Moscow,2006),p.68.24. Frederick C. Teiwes, ‘The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949–1957’, inRoderickMacFarquhar (ed.),ThePolitics ofChina: TheEras ofMao andDeng (CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2nded.,1997),pp.5–86,atpp.14–15.25. RoderickMacFarquhar andMichael Schoenhals,Mao’s Last Revolution (Harvard University Press,Cambridge,Mass.,2006)pp.9–10.26.RanaMitter,ABitterRevolution:China’sStrugglewith theModernWorld (OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2004)p.189.27.LorenzM.Lüthi,TheSino-SovietSplit:ColdWarintheCommunistWorld(PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,2008),p.72.28.FrankDikötter,Mao’sGreatFamine:TheHistoryofChina’sMostDevastatingCatastrophe,1958–62(Bloomsburypaperback,London,2011)p.277.Dikötter’sisthemostrecent,specialiststudyoftheGreatLeapForwardandit ishewhoestimates(p.325)thatitwasthecauseofsomeforty-fivemillion‘excessdeaths’.29. Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘TheGreat Leap Forward and the Split in theYan’an Leadership 1958–65’, inMacFarquhar(ed.),ThePoliticsofChina,pp.87–147,atp.117.30.MacFarquharandSchoenhals,Mao’sLastRevolution,p.10.31. AndrewG.Walder and Yang Su, ‘The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing andHumanImpact’,TheChinaQuarterly,No.173,2003,pp.74–99,atp.76.32.MacFarquharandSchoenhals,Mao’sLastRevolution,pp.215–216.33.Quotedinibid.,p.3.34.WalderandSu,‘TheCulturalRevolutionintheCountryside’,pp.95–96.35.HarryHarding,‘TheChineseStateinCrisis,1966–1969’,inMacFarquhar(ed.),ThePoliticsofChina,pp.148–247,atp.244.36.Ibid.,pp.242–243.37.MacFarquharandSchoenhals,Mao’sLastRevolution,p.417.38.Ibid.,pp.444–455.39.Harding,‘TheChineseStateinCrisis’,pp.246–247.40. Joseph Fewsmith, ‘Reaction, Resurgence, and Succession: Chinese Politics since Tiananmen’, inMacFarquhar(ed.),ThePoliticsofChina,pp.472–531,atp.497.41.JosephFewsmith,ChinaSinceTiananmen:FromDengXiaopingtoHuJintao(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2nded.,2008),p.284.42.MilovanDjilas,Tito:TheStoryfromInside(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1981),p.179.43.Ibid.,p.23.44.Bullock,HitlerandStalin,p.451.45.‘SekretaryuTsKN.S.Khrushchevu’,APRF,f.3,op.24,VolkogonovPapers,NationalSecurityArchive(Washington,DC),R1217.ThedateatthebottomofChagin’sletterlookslike14.2.56,butitwasevidentlywritteninMarch1956(probably14March),fortheletteropensbyreferringtoKhrushchev’sspeechtotheTwentiethCongressonthecultofpersonality,whichhedeliveredon24–25February.Chagin,whoin1926waseditorofthenewspaper,Krasnayagazeta,saysheregardeditashispartydutytodrawKhrushchev’sattentiontoStalin’sremark.ThedocumenthastheCentralCommitteestampof22March1956,consigningittothearchivesoftheGeneralDepartment.46.DavidBrandenberger, ‘Stalin as symbol: a case studyof thepersonality cult and its construction’ inDaviesandHarris(eds.),Stalin:ANewHistory,pp.249–270,atp.250.47.Ibid.,p.261.48. For Kádár’s declaration, and its context, see Roger Gough, A Good Comrade: János Kádár,CommunismandHungary(Tauris,London,2006),p.135.FedorBurlatsky,areformistintellectualwithinthe Communist Party of the Soviet Union, quoted approvingly in the Soviet press Kádár’s ‘who is not

against us iswith us’, and (as Burlatsky toldme some years later) hewas severely rebuked by LeonidIlyichev, a Secretary of the Central Committee with responsibility for ideology, for ‘trying to teach uslessons’.49.Gough,AGoodComrade,pp.249–253.50.Ibid.,p.139.51.Ibid.,pp.xiand255–256.52.JuliaE.Sweig,Cuba:WhatEveryoneNeedstoKnow(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2009),pp.127–128.53.Ibid.,p.128.54.GloriaGiraldo,‘CubaRisinginMajorUNIndices’,MEDICCReview,9April2007;MarcSchenker,‘Cuban Public Health: A Model for the US?’, CIA World Facebook, 2001 andschenker.ucdavis.edu/CubaPublicHealth.ppt; and Fidel Castro,My Life, edited by Ignacio Ramonet andtranslatedbyAndrewHurley(AllenLane,London,2007),p.585.55.Sweig,Cuba,pp.65–68.56. Castro did not count González as a socialist and, certainly, González’s political outlook was farremovedfromMarxism-Leninism.Fidel,therefore,wassurprisedwhenGorbachevtoldhim‘howmuchheadmired FelipeGonzález’, and strongly disagreedwith the Soviet leaderwhen he referred to him as ‘aSocialist’.Castro told IgnacioRamonet (hisquestioner inan interview-basedautobiography) that ‘Felipewasnosocialist’.Castro,MyLife,p.487.57.Sweig,Cuba,p.130.58.BradleyK.Martin,Under theLovingCareof theGreatFatherlyLeader:NorthKoreaand theKimDynasty(ThomasDunne,NewYork,2006),p.4.59.JasperBecker,RogueRegime:KimJongIlandtheLoomingThreatofNorthKorea(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2005),p.77.60.Martin,UndertheLovingCareoftheGreatFatherlyLeader,p.166.61. Bruce Cumings, ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, in Bogdan Szajkowski (ed.), MarxistGovernments:AWorldSurvey,Vol.2(Macmillan,London,1981),pp.443–467,atp.453.62.Becker,RogueRegime,p.77.63.JuanJ.Linz,TotalitarianandAuthoritarianRegimes(LynneRienner,Boulder,2000),p.35.64.QuotedbyMartin,UndertheLovingCareoftheFatherlyLeader,p.194.65.AnotherCommunistleaderwhosucceededinarrangingadynasticsuccessionwasHeidarAlievwhoformanyyearsheadedtheCommunistPartyorganizationinAzerbaijan.However,bythetimehedidthis, itwas1993andhewaspresidentofpost-SovietAzerbaijan.Hewassucceededbyhisson,IlhamAliev.Onthe broader issue of hereditary succession in countries other than monarchies, see Jason Brownlee,‘HereditarySuccessioninModernAutocracies’,WorldPolitics,Vol.59,No.4,2007,pp.595–628.66.CarlGershman,‘AVoicefromtheNorthKoreanGulag’,JournalofDemocracy,Vol.24,No.2,2013,pp.165–173,atp.171.67.ChristopherDuggan,FascistVoices:AnIntimateHistoryofMussolini’sItaly (BodleyHead,London,2012),p.81.68.Ibid.,p.30.69.Ibid.,pp.50and57.70.Ibid.,pp.59–60.71.Ibid.,pp.87–90.72.Ibid.,pp.91–94.73.DonaldSassoon,OneHundredYearsofSocialism:TheWestEuropeanLeft intheTwentiethCentury(Fontana,London,1997),p.75.74.Duggan,FascistVoices,p.108.75.RobertO.Paxton,TheAnatomyofFascism(Penguin,London,2005),p.63.76.QuotedbyLinzinAuthoritarianandTotalitarianRegimes,p.166.77.Duggan,FascistVoices,p.70.

78.Ibid.,p.101.79.Ibid.,p.231.80.Ibid.,p.280.81.Ibid.,p.305.Mussoliniwaslistedin1933byAmericanJewishpublishersamongtheworld’s‘twelvegreatestChristianchampions’oftheJews(Paxton,TheAnatomyofFascism,p.166).82.Duggan,FascistVoices,p.305.83. F.W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Fascism (Weidenfeld &Nicolson,London,1962),p.795.84.Duggan,FascistVoices,pp.416–417.85.Paxton,TheAnatomyofFascism,p.96.86.AdolfHitler,MeinKampf, translatedbyRalphManheimwithanintroductionbyD.C.Watt(Pimlico,London,1992;2009reprint),p.296.87.Ibid.,p.262.88.Evans,TheThirdReichinPower1933–1939,p.8.89.IanKershaw,Hitler(Penguin,London,newedition,2008),p.204.90.Ibid.,p.206.91.Ibid.,p.227.92.Ibid.,pp.276–277.93.Ibid.,pp.281–282.94.Evans,TheThirdReichinPower,p.11;andKershaw,Hitler,pp.274–282.95.Evans,TheThirdReichinPower,p.16.96.Ibid.,pp.7and16.97.Kershaw,Hitler,p.313;andforafulleraccountof theshowdownwith theSAand theassassinationalsoofleadingconservativefiguresatHitler’sbehestinJuly1934,ibid.,pp.301–319.98.Ibid.,pp.317–318.99.Ibid.,pp.xland320–321.100.Hitler,MeinKampf,pp.194,217and137;andKershaw,Hitler,pp.909–910.101.Kershaw,Hitler,pp.212–215.102.Ibid.,p.324;andEvans,TheThirdReichinPower,p.27.103.Kershaw,Hitler,p.511.104.Ibid.,p.356.105.Evans,TheThirdReichinPower,p.649.106.Paxton,TheAnatomyofFascism,pp.219–220.107.Ibid.,p.75.108.Ibid.,p.149.109.IanKershaw,TheEnd:Hitler’sGermany,1944–45(Penguin,London,2012),p.13.110.Overy,TheDictators,p.100.111.Ibid.,p.120.112.AdamSmith,TheTheoryofMoralSentiments(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1976),p.251.113.TurgotonProgress,SociologyandEconomics,translatedandeditedbyRonaldG.Meek(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1973),p.76.114.DavidHume, ‘Of theFirstPrinciples ofGovernment’, inEssaysandTreatises onSeveral SubjectsContainingEssaysMoral,PoliticalandLiterary:ANewEdition,Vol.1(Cadell,London,1788),p.39.115. Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge,2007),pp.202–205.116.WilliamR.Polk,UnderstandingIraq(Tauris,London,2006),p.109.117. Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2012),pp.130–131.118.Ibid.,pp.5and181.119. Ibid., p. 5.Sassoon’s book is basedon a detailed studyofBaathPartydocuments, capturedby the

AmericanoccupyingforcesaftertheinvasionofIraqin2003.120. Paul Collier,The Bottom Billion:Why the Poorest Countries are Failing andWhat Can BeDoneAboutIt(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2008),p.49.121.Kershaw,Hitler,p.111.122.Ibid.,p.201.123.DanielKahneman,ThinkingFastandSlow(AllenLane,London,2011)p.140.

7 ForeignPolicyIllusionsof‘StrongLeaders’

1. David Owen, The Hubris Syndrome: Bush, Blair and the Intoxication of Power (Methuen, revisededition,York,2012),pp.1–2.2. Francis Fukuyama observes that ‘virtually all of the world’s successful authoritarian modernizers,including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore andmodern China itself, are East Asian countries sharing acommonChineseculturalheritage’.SeeFukuyama,TheOriginsofPoliticalOrder:FromPrehumanTimestotheFrenchRevolution(Profile,London,2011),p.313.InthecasesofTaiwanandSouthKorea,someofthatmodernizationhas,ofcourse,comeafterauthoritarianrulegavewaytodemocracy.3.CitedbyIanKershaw,Hitler(Penguin,London,2009),p.473.4.Kershaw,Hitler,p.479.5.Ibid.,pp.420and422.6.RichardJ.Evans,TheThirdReichinPower1933–1939(Penguin,London,2006),pp.692–695.7.Kershaw,Hitler,p.619.8.Ibid.,pp.157–158.9.Ibid.,pp.154–155.10.Ibid.,p.588.11.ChristopherDuggan,FascistVoices:AnIntimateHistoryofMussolini’sItaly (BodleyHead,London,2012),p.298.12.StanleyG.Payne,TheSpanishCivilWar, theSovietUnion,andCommunism (YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,2004),p.172.13.ArchieBrown,TheRiseandFallofCommunism(BodleyHead,London,andEcco,NewYork,2009),pp.91–92.14. For the plethora of warnings of the imminence of the German invasion which Stalin received andignored, see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate (Cassell,London,1951),p.443;JohnErickson,TheRoadtoStalingrad:Stalin’sWarwithGermany(Weidenfeld&Nicolson, London, 1975), pp. 87–98; and Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The MitrokhinArchive:TheKGBinEuropeandtheWest(AllenLane,London,1999),pp.122–125.15.AndrewandMitrokhin,TheMitrokhinArchive,p.124.16.SeeTheDiaryofGeorgiDimitrov1933–1949, introducedandeditedby IvoBanac (YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,2003),pp.434–441;andMilovanDjilas,ConversationswithStalin(RupertHart-Davis,London,1962),pp.164–165.17.WilliamStueck,‘TheKoreanWar’,inMelvynP.LefflerandOddArneWestad(eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryoftheColdWar,VolumeI:Origins(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2010),pp.266–287,esp.273–276.SeealsoOddArneWestad,TheGlobalColdWar(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2005),p.66.18.Stueck,‘TheKoreanWar’,p.274.19.LetterofStalintoMao,dated4October1950,sentviaSovietAmbassadortoBejing,5October1950,ColdWarInternationalHistoryProjectBulletin,No.14/15,pp.375–376.20.CraigDietrich,People’sChina:ABriefHistory (OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,3rded.,1998);andJungChangandJonHalliday,Mao:TheUnknownStory(Vintage,London,2006),p.394.21.Stueck,‘TheKoreanWar’,p.283.22.VladimirO. Pechatnov, ‘The SovietUnion and theWorld, 1944–1953’, in Leffler andWestad,TheCambridgeHistoryoftheColdWar,Volume1:Origins,pp.90–111,atpp.109–110.23.LorenzM.Lüthi,TheSino-SovietSplit:ColdWarintheCommunistWorld(PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,2008),p.77.24.For themajorbiographyofKhrushchev,whichgivesfullweight tobothhismeritsanddemerits,see

WilliamTaubman,Khrushchev:TheManandHisEra(FreePress,NewYork,2003).OnKhrushchevandtheCubanmissilecrisis,seeAleksandrFursenkoandTimothyNaftali,Khrushchev’sColdWar:TheInsideStoryofanAmericanAdversary(Norton,NewYork,2006),pp.409–508.25.William Taubman, ‘The Khrushchev Period, 1953–1954’, in Suny (ed.),The Cambridge History ofRussia.VolumeIII,pp.268–291,atp.290.26. SeeMargaretMacMillan,Seize theHour:WhenNixonMetMao (JohnMurray paperback, London,2007).27.DavidShambaugh,ChinaGoesGlobal:ThePartialPower(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2013),p.309.28.OddArneWestad,RestlessEmpire:ChinaandtheWorldsince1750(BodleyHead,London,2012),pp.419–420.29.LeeKuanYew,FromThirdWorldtoFirst.TheSingaporeStory:1965–2000[volumetwoofMemoirsofLeeKuanYew](Times,Singapore,2000),p.667.30. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1983),pp.409–414.31.Shambaugh,ChinaGoesGlobal,pp.275–276.Shambaughobserves:‘Insteadof“teachingVietnamalesson”...itwasVietnamthatadministeredthelessons.’32.BenedictManderandRobinWigglesworth,‘China’sCaribbeaninfluencegrows’,FinancialTimes,21May2013.33.Westad,RestlessEmpire,p.437.34.Ibid.,pp.437–438.35.FidelCastro,MyLife(AllenLane,London,2007),p.322.36. ‘Zapis’ besedyA.N.Kosygina,A.A.Gromyko,D.F.Ustinova,B.N. Pomomareva sN.M.Taraki 20marta1979goda’,HooverInstitutionArchives,Fond89,1.1003,opis42,file3,p.3.37.Westad,TheGlobalColdWar,p.316.MuhammadAnwaral-Sadat,Nasser’ssuccessorasPresidentofEgypt,setaboutimprovinghiscountry’srelationswiththeUnitedStatesandexpelledaround20,000Sovietadvisers.HealsomadedramaticoverturestoIsraelandfollowingpeacenegotiationsbrokeredbytheCarteradministrationintheUS,hesignedtheCampDavidpeaceagreementof1978.HereceivedtheNobelPeacePrizethatsameyear,andwasassassinatedin1981.38. Artemy M. Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Mass.,2011),p.118.39.Westad,TheGlobalColdWar,p.356;andRodricBraithwaite,Afgantsy:TheRussiansinAfghanistan1979–1989(Profile,London,2011),pp.329–331.40.BogomolovwasDirectoroftheInstituteofEconomicsoftheWorldSocialistSystem.Itwasnotuntilthe perestroika era that he first drew public attention to the existence of that memorandum – in thenewspaper,Literaturnayagazeta,16March1988.OnthesignificanceofBogomolov’sinstituteandontheimpressivearrayofradicalreformerswhoworkedthere,seeArchieBrown,SevenYearsthatChangedtheWorld:PerestroikainPerspective(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2007),pp.172–178.41.Westad,TheGlobalColdWar,p.321;andBrown,TheRiseandFallofCommunism,p.353.42.DavidGardner, theInternationalAffairseditorof theFinancialTimesandaspecialiston theMiddleEast,dismissesBritain’sroleasthatof‘spear-carrier’and‘asideshow’,whilenotingthatIraqwasalsoademonstrationof‘apitilesslypublicspectacleofthelimitstoUSpower’.SeeFinancialTimes,9/10March2013.43. For broader discussionof historical analogy in theprocess of political perception, seeRobert Jervis,PerceptionandMisperception in InternationalPolitics (PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,1976)andRichardE.NeustadtandErnestR.May,ThinkinginTime:TheUsesofHistoryforDecisionMakers(FreePress,NewYork,1986).SeealsoYuenFoongKhong,AnalogiesatWar:Korea,Munich,DienBienPhu,andtheVietnamDecisionsof1965(PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,1992).44.KeithFeiling,TheLifeofNevilleChamberlain(Macmillan,London,1946),p.381.IainMacleod,inhissympathetic biography ofChamberlain, argues that toomuch can bemade ofwhatChamberlain, in the

elationof themoment,said to thecrowdinDowningStreet. InwhatMacleodcalledhis‘moremeasuredwordstotheHouseofCommons’,ChamberlainexpressedthehopethatMembersofParliamentwould‘notreadintothosewordsmorethantheywereintendedtoconvey’,adding:‘Idoindeedbelievethatwemayyetsecurepeaceforourtime,butInevermeanttosuggestthatweshoulddothatbydisarmament,untilwecan induceothers todisarm too . . .’See IainMacleod,NevilleChamberlain (Muller,London,1961),p.256.45.R.A.Butler,inhismemoirs,presentsasoneofthejustificationsoftheMunichagreementthatitboughttime for the British rearmament programme and suggests that this was part of his own motivation forstrongly supporting – and, as a junior minister at the Foreign Office, implementing – the policy ofappeasement. SeeThe Art of the Possible: TheMemoirs of Lord Butler K.G., C.H. (Hamish Hamilton,London,1971),esp.p.63.PatrickCosgrave,inhisR.A.Butler:AnEnglishLife(QuartetBooks,London,1981) observes: ‘Butler argues that theMunich agreementwas consciouslymade out of a realization ofBritain’sweaknessandanawarenessthattimewasneededtostrengthenherdefences;andthisisnottrue’(p.53).Cosgrove,whoseaccountofRabButler’spoliticalcareerismorenuancedthanhostile,notesalsothat‘Butlerdidnotmerelygoalongwithappeasement:heworkedhard,longandenthusiasticallyforit,andthereisverylittleevidenceinthepublicrecordsforthetimethathetooktheslightestcontemporaryinterestintherearmamentprogrammetowhichhedevotessuchemphasisinhismemoirs’(p.43).46.RoyJenkins,Baldwin(Papermac,London,1987),pp.147–148.47.Ibid.,p.164.48.Ibid.,p.81.49. Earl of Swinton, Sixty Years of Power: Some Memories of the Men Who Wielded It (Hutchinson,London,1966),p.120.50. Winston Churchill quotes at length from that House of Commons speech of Baldwin in his warmemoirs,TheSecondWorldWar:Volume1,TheGatheringStorm(Cassell,London,1948),pp.169–170.AlthoughChurchilldidnotcompiletheindextothebook,hedoubtlessmadeanexceptionfortheentrytothosepageswhichreads‘[Baldwin]confessesputtingpartybeforecountry’(p.615).51.Swinton,SixtyYearsofPower,pp.86and89.52.Ibid.,p.111.53.Ibid.,pp.115–116.54.AviShlaim,PeterJonesandKeithSainsbury,BritishForeignSecretariessince1945(David&Charles,NewtonAbbot,1977),p.82.LordCranborne,thefuturefifthMarquisofSalisburyandajuniorministerintheForeignOfficein1938,resignedfromthegovernmentalongwithEden.55.TheDuffCooperDiaries1915–1951,editedbyJohnJuliusNorwich(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London2005),p.245.56.HaroldNicolson,DiariesandLetters1930–1939,editedbyNigelNicolson(Fontana,London,1969),p.351.57.HughDalton,TheFatefulYears:Memoirs(Volume2),1931–1945(FrederickMuller,London,1957),p.176.88.Swinton,SixtyYearsofPower,p.121.89.Ibid.,p.116.90.Ibid.,p.120.SwintonaddsthatChamberlaindidconfirmthatrearmamentwouldgoahead,towhichherespondedthatheacceptedMunichonthatbasisbuthad‘noillusionsaboutpeace’.91.Ibid.,p.123.92.AmongLabourMPs,HughDalton,whowastobecomeamemberofthewartimecoalitiongovernmentand a prominentCabinetminister in the first post-warLabour administration,was one of those pressingmoststronglyforananti-appeasementpolicyandforfasterrearmament.Hehadanumberofdiscussionswith anti-Chamberlain Conservatives, including Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan, on makingcommoncauseagainstChamberlain’sforeignpolicy.SeeDalton,TheFatefulYears,pp.161–221.93.Chips:TheDiariesofSirHenryChannon,p.213.94. Duff Cooper adds: ‘And then, when Attlee gave the plan his blessing, our side all rose again and

cheered him – cheers with which the opposition had to join, though looking a little foolish’, The DuffCooperDiaries,p.269.95.TheDuffCooperDiaries,p.258.96.Ibid.,pp.257–258.97.Ibid.,p.258.98.Ibid.,p.268.99.Ibid.100.Ibid.,pp.268–269.101.Ibid.,p.271.102.Nicolson,DiariesandLetters1930–1939,p.392.103. Quoted in Wm. Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez andDecolonization(Tauris,London,2006),p.638.104.KeithKyle,Suez:Britain’sEndofEmpireintheMiddleEast(2nded.,Tauris,London,2003),p.68.MaxBeloff similarlyobserved: ‘Press criticismofhis alleged indecisiveness tended tomakeEdenmoredetermined toshowhimselfas tough.’SeeLordBeloff, ‘TheCrisisand itsConsequences for theBritishConservative Party’, in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956: The Crisis and itsConsequences(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1989),p.320.105.Louis,EndsofBritishImperialism,pp.609–626.ChurchillretainedsomeoftheracialstereotypesandimperialistassumptionsofapoliticianwhohadfirststoodforParliamentwhenQueenVictoriawasonthethrone.While he was still prime minister, Churchill’s advice to Eden as Foreign Secretary on ‘how tohandletheEgyptians’was:‘TellthemthatifwehaveanymoreoftheircheekwewillsettheJewsonthemanddrivethemintothegutter,fromwhichtheyshouldneverhaveemerged’(ibid.,p.635).106.GillBennett,SixMomentsofCrisis:InsideBritishForeignPolicy(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2013),p.38.107.Kyle,Suez,p.134.108.CitedbyNigelNicolson,PeopleandParliament(Weidenfeld&Nicolson,London,1958),p.108.109.TheMemoirsofSirAnthonyEden:FullCircle (Cassell,London,1960),p.431;andSelwynLloyd,Suez1956:APersonalAccount(JonathanCape,London,1978),p.192.110.QuotedinLouis,EndsofBritishImperialism,p.632.111.Eden,FullCircle,p.498.112.Theareaspecialists intheForeignOfficeweredeniedaccesstomanyofthecrucialpapersand‘theoverwhelmingmajorityof theForeignOffice’considered theSuezadventure tobea ‘badmistake’ fromwhichBritainmust‘urgentlyextractherself’.Thatconfidentialnotewaswrittenon2November1956andaddressedtothePermanentUnder-SecretarySirIvoneKirkpatrickwhohadbeenatleastascommittedtotheenterpriseaswasEden.SeeKyle,Suez,p.397.113.Kyle,Suez,pp.391and397.114.Kyle,Suez,p.299.115.ForadetailedandscholarlyaccountoftheSèvresmeeting,seeAviShlaim,‘TheProtocolofSèvres,1956:anatomyofawarplot’,InternationalAffairs,Vol.73,No.3,1997,pp.509–530.116.Ibid.ForSelwynLloyd’saccountofthemeeting,inabookhewrotenotlongbeforehisdeath,seehisSuez1956,pp.180–190.117.Shlaim,‘TheProtocolofSèvres1956’,p.522.118.Ibid.A.J.P.TaylorwastoobserveoftheSuezventure:‘ThemoralforBritishGovernmentsisclear.Likemostrespectablepeople,theywillmakepoorcriminalsandhadbettersticktorespectability’(quotedbyKyle,Suez,p.585).119.AviShlaim,TheIronWall:IsraelandtheArabWorld(Penguin,London,2001),pp.174–177.120.AnthonyNutting,NoEndofaLesson:TheStoryofSuez(Constable,London,1967),p.115.121.Ibid.,pp.126–127.122.VeljkoMićunović,MoscowDiary, translatedbyDavidFloyd(Chatto&Windus,London,1980),p.134. Mićunović, who was the Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union, attended this meeting of

KhrushchevandMalenkovwithTitoattheYugoslavleader’svillaontheislandofBrioni.123.Kyle,Suez,p.427.124.D.R.Thorpe,Supermac:TheLifeofHaroldMacmillan(Pimlico,London,2011),p.350.Forafulleraccount of the economic dimensions of the Suez crisis, seeDianeB.Kunz, ‘The Importance ofHavingMoney:TheEconomicDiplomacyoftheSuezCrisis’,inLouisandOwen(eds.),Suez1956,pp.215–232.125.Kyle,Suez,pp.467–468.126.KeithKyle,‘BritainandtheSuezCrisis,1955–1956’,inLouisandOwen(eds.),Suez1956,pp.103–130,atp.130.127.Nutting,NoEndofaLesson,p.171.128.HaroldNicolson,DiariesandLetters1945–1962(Fontana,London,1971),p.301.129. John Tirman,The Deaths of Others: The Fate of Civilians in America’sWars (Oxford UniversityPress,NewYork,2011),pp.324–336,esp.p.327.TirmanisPrincipalResearchScientistandDirectoroftheCenterforInternationalStudiesattheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.130.EugeneRogan,TheArabs:AHistory(Penguin,London,2010),p.615.131. CondoleezzaRice,NoHigherHonour:AMemoir ofMyYears inWashington (Simon&Schuster,London,2011),pp.170–171.132.BobWoodward,PlanofAttack(Simon&Schuster,London,2004),p.9.133.GeorgeW.Bush,DecisionPoints(Crown,NewYork,2010),p.229.134. RichardA. Clarke,Against All Enemies: Inside America’sWar on Terror (Free Press,NewYork,2004),pp.231–232.135.Ibid.,p.170.136.DickCheney,withLizCheney,InMyTime:APersonalandPoliticalMemoir(Threshold,NewYork,2011),p.369.137.Rice,NoHigherHonour,pp.202–203;andBush,DecisionPoints,p.246.138.SimonJenkins,‘Blairmayitchtoreturn,buthefacesacruelrealitycheck’,Guardian,27July2012.Jenkinsadds:‘WecanseewhyBlairadmittedtoRoyJenkinsthatheregrettednothavingstudiedhistory.’PeterStothard, a former editor ofTheTimeswhowas allowed to shadow theBritish primeminister forthirtydaysinMarch–April2003,publishingafairlysympatheticaccountoflifein10DowningStreetintherun-uptoandimmediateaftermathof theinvasionofIraq,wrotethat‘whenTonyBlairfinallymeetshisjudge,hemayfindhimselfcomparedneitherwithChurchillnorEden,norMacmillannoranyoftheothernames that have been called up in all the pre-war debates, but with earlier figures, nineteenth-centurymissionary imperialists, or much earlier ones, the Romans who created deserts and called them peace’(Stothard,30Days:AMonthattheHeartofBlair’sWar,HarperCollins,London,2003,p.173).139. The great majority of international lawyers regarded the invasion ofMarch 2003 as being againstinternationallaw.ThecaseforitsillegalityismadeveryclearlybythelateLordBinghamwhowasLordChiefJusticeofEnglandandWalesandSeniorLawLordoftheUK.SeeTomBingham,TheRuleofLaw(Penguin,London,2011),pp.120–129.SeealsoRoyAllison,Russia,theWest,andMilitaryIntervention(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2013),especiallypp.106–112.140.HouseofCommonsHansardDebatesfor18March2003,Blairspeech,atcolumns763and772.141.http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media50751/Blair-to-Powell-17March2002-minute.pdf.142.CookwasForeignSecretaryfrom1997to2001whenBlairreplacedhiminthatofficebyJackStraw.CookremainedintheCabinetasLeaderoftheHouseuntilheresignedovertheIraqwar.143.RobinCook,PointofDeparture(Simon&Schuster,London,2003),pp.361–365,atp.364.144.Ibid.,pp.361–365.145.LancePrice,WherePowerLies:PrimeMinistersv.theMedia(Simon&Schuster,London,2010),p.370.146.Stothard,30Days,p.8.147.MenziesCampbell,‘NoMoreEvasions’,Observer,27November2005.FormerVice-PresidentDickCheney’sresponsetoKerryinhismemoirsisthattheDemocrats‘didnot,apparently,wanttoadmitthattheytoohadacceptedandreliedonfaultyintelligence’.SeeCheney,InMyTime,pp.412–413.

148. ‘Ex-president blasts Blair US role’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5346976.stm, 14September2006.149.ZbigniewBrzezinski, ‘America’spolicyblunderswerecompoundedbyBritain’,FinancialTimes,6August2004.Brzezinskiadded,withreference toBlair, ‘Superiorpersonaleloquence inmakingthecaseforahistoricallyrecklesscourseisnobadgeofmeritbutadisservicenotonlytoAmericabutultimatelytothedemocraticWestasawhole.’150. Charles Tripp, ‘Militias, Vigilantes, Death Squads’, London Review of Books, Vol. 29, No. 2, 25January2007,pp.30–33,atp.30.151.SirJamesCraig,inconversationwiththeauthorinlate2002.152. The important principle that themilitary are subject to political controlmeant that serving officerscould not publicly criticize the decision to invade Iraq, but retired senior officers were not similarlyconstrained.Oneofthemostdistinguishedofthem,GeneralSirMichaelRose(whowasUNcommanderinBosnia)saidthatTonyBlair’sactionswere‘somewhereinbetween’gettingthepoliticswrongandactingillegally.Hewenton:‘Thepoliticswerewrong’and‘herarelydeclaredwhathisultimateaimswere. . .harpingcontinuallyonweaponsofmassdestructionwhenactuallyheprobablyhadsomeotherstrategyinmind.Andsecondly, theconsequencesof thatwarhavebeenquitedisastrousbothfor thepeopleof Iraqand also for the west in terms of our wider interests in the war against global terror’(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4594216.stm,9January2006).153. See Alex Barker, ‘Security chief exposes Blair’s gamble on Iraq’, and James Blitz, ‘MI5 headdismayedby stanceonSaddam felt ignoredbypremier’,FinancialTimes, 21 July2010; andTimRoss,‘Iraqwasnot a threat toBritainbefore invasion, says formerheadofMI5’,DailyTelegraph, 29August2011.Manyothers,withhighlyrelevantexperience,cametothesamejudgementbeforetheinvasionasthatreached by Baroness Manningham-Buller. Lord (Patrick) Wright, who chaired the Joint IntelligenceCommitteefrom1982to1984andwasHeadoftheDiplomaticService,1986–1991,wrotethathewasfarfromaloneinaHouseofLordsdebateon26February2003insayingthat‘anattackonIraq. . .willbeseen as a direct attack against Islam and will fuel further terrorist attacks against the west’. He alsorequested that the advice received on this question ‘fromBritish heads ofmission in Arab and Islamicposts’bemadepublic(lettertoFinancialTimesofLordWrightofRichmond,13/14September2003).SeealsoAviShlaim,‘ItisnotonlyGodthatwillbeBlair’sjudgeoverIraq’,Guardian,14May2007.Shlaim,aspecialistontheMiddleEastwhoisathomeinbothHebrewandArabic,arguesthat‘Blair’sentirerecordintheMiddleEastisoneofcatastrophicfailure’.154.MichaelQuinlan,‘WaronIraq:ablunderandacrime’,FinancialTimes,7August2002.155.Ibid.156.RodricBraithwaite,‘Endoftheaffair’,Prospect,Issue86,May2003,pp.20–23atp.22.157. Lord Wilson and Lord Turnbull were giving evidence to the Chilcott Inquiry. Seehttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12278788,25January2011.158.ReviewofIntelligenceonWeaponsofMassDestruction:ReportofaCommitteeofPrivyCounsellors.Chairman:TheRtHonTheLordButlerofBrockwell(StationeryOffice,London,2004).159.Ibid.,pp.159and160.160.TonyBlair,AJourney(Hutchinson,London,2010),pp.432–433;andStothard,30Days,pp.20–21.161.PeterHennessy,ThePrimeMinister:TheOfficeanditsHoldersSince1945(Penguin,London,2001),p.532;andOwen,TheHubrisSyndrome,pp.80–81.162.Onthis,seePhilippeSands,‘AVeryBritishDeceit’,NewYorkReviewofBooks,30September2010.163.KofiAnnanwithNaderMousavizadeh,Interventions:ALifeinWarandPeace(AllenLane,London,2012),esp.pp.344–358.164. Especially importantly, thiswas true of Iraq itself.A leadingAmerican academic specialist on theMiddleEast,writingin2005,notedthat‘arecentindependentpublicopinionpollholdsthatonly2percentof Iraqi Arabs view the United States as liberators’. SeeWilliam R. Polk,Understanding Iraq (Tauris,London,2006),p.190.165.On this, seeSherardCowper-Coles,Cables fromKabul:TheInsideStoryof theWest’sAfghanistan

Campaign (HarperPress,London,2011).Theauthor,whowasUKambassador toKabul, speaksof ‘thetragicdiversionofattentionandthenresourcesfromAfghanistantoIraq’(p.xxiii).Seealsopp.4and59–60.166. Rogan, The Arabs, esp. pp. 607–625; and David Gardner, Last Chance: The Middle East in theBalance(Tauris,London,paperbacked.,2012),pp.16–17and86–90.167.Rumsfeld,KnownandUnknown,p.520.168. Charles Tripp, The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in the Middle East (CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2013),p.42.169. Bush, Decision Points, p. 269; and Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th Party: Inside anAuthoritarianRegime(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2012),p.165.170.DavidFisher,MoralityandWar:CanWarbeJust in theTwenty-firstCentury? (OxfordUniversityPresspaperback,Oxford,2012),p.202.171.Sassoon,SaddamHussein’sBa‘thParty,p.165.172.Rice,NoHigherHonour,p.208.173.Ibid.,p.20.Cf.Bush,DecisionPoints,pp.87–88.174.Rice,NoHigherHonour,p.187.175.Ibid.,pp.21–22.176.Cook,PointofDeparture,p.323.177.JackStraw,LastManStanding:MemoirsofaPoliticalSurvivor(Macmillan,London,2012),pp.544–545.178.PhilipStephens,TonyBlair:ThePriceofLeadership(Politico,London,revisededition,2004),p.319.179.ArchieBrown,‘ThemythoftheboundlessdebtLabourowesBlair’,FinancialTimes,11September2006.180.AndrewRawnsley,‘TonyBlair’sobsessionwithsize’,Observer,14December1997.181.JackS.Levy,‘PoliticalPsychologyandForeignPolicy’,inDavidO.Sears,LeonieHuddyandRobertJervis (eds.),OxfordHandbookofPoliticalPsychology (OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork, 2003), pp.253–284,atpp.264–265.

8 WhatKindofLeadershipisDesirable?

1.HughHeclo, ‘WhosePresidency isThisAnyhow?’, inGeorgeC.EdwardsIIIandWilliamG.Howell(eds.),TheOxfordHandbookoftheAmericanPresidency(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2009),pp.771–796,atp.782.2.That,moreover,appliesto‘checks[English‘cheques’]andbalances’inamonetaryaswellaspoliticalsense.3. Michael Barber, Instruction to Deliver: Tony Blair, Public Services and the Challenge of AchievingTargets (Politico, London, 2007), pp. 291–340. This is a long chapter (in an interesting book) called‘Enhancing the power of the Prime Minister’. Having worked with Tony Blair, Barber came to theconclusionthattheprimeminister’spowerswereinsufficient.Whileenhancingthepowerofgovernmenttoachieveitsobjectives,subjecttocriticismandscrutinyinparliamentandoutside,isdoubtlessdesirable,thatdoes not mean – here I disagree fundamentally with Barber – that it is at all desirable to strive for‘strengtheningthePrimeMinister’scapacitytoexercisehispower’(p.339).4.Cf.Heclo,‘WhosePresidencyisThisAnyhow?’,p.791.5.Ibid.6.Ibid.7.Iamnotpersuadedthatitisnecessarytoattemptastrictseparationoffactandvalueswhendiscussingpolitical leadership, so long as this is done consciously and openly. Thus, I have argued that‘transformational’,asin‘transformationalleadership’,doesineverydayspeechhaveapositiveconnotation,

and it is in that sense it has been used in this book. Adolf Hitler played the principal part in effectingprofound change in the German political system and German society in the 1930s, but the category of‘transformational leader’ would become too disparate to be meaningful if this accorded him a placealongsidedeGaulle,GorbachevandMandela. ‘Redefining leadership’,as Ihaveused the term, isvalue-neutral.Redefiningthelimitsofthepossiblewithinanyparticularsystemcanbeinadirectionofwhichoneapprovesor,onthecontrary,disapproves.8. One notable specialist on the American presidency has remained surprisingly sceptical even of thepresident’sabilitytopersuade.GeorgeC.EdwardsIIIbelievesthattheevidenceforthisistooanecdotal,adding:‘Thereisnotasinglesystematicstudythatdemonstratesthatpresidentscanreliablymoveotherstosupportthem’(Edwards,‘TheStudyofPresidentialLeadership’,inEdwardsandHowell(eds.),TheOxfordHandbookoftheAmericanPresidency,pp.816–837,atp.821).A‘systematic’study,ifbythatismeantastudy which separates the influence of the president from every other communication and source ofinformationincitizens’environment,is,ofcourse,virtuallyimpossibletooperationalize.9.Heclo,‘WhosePresidencyisThisAnyhow?’,p.791.10.AlfredStepanandJuanJ.Linz,‘ComparativePerspectivesonInequalityandtheQualityofDemocracyintheUnitedStates’,PerspectivesonPolitics,Vol.9,No.4,2011,pp.841–856,atpp.848–849.11.Ibid.,p.849.12.KeithDowding,‘PrimeMinisterialPower:InstitutionalandPersonalFactors’,inPaulStrangio,Paul’tHart and JamesWalter (eds.),UnderstandingPrimeMinisterialPerformance:ComparativePerspectives(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2013),pp.56–78,atp.61.13.JamesP.McPherson,AbrahamLincoln(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2009),p.62.14.Ibid.,p.64.15.Ibid.,p.57.16.DorisKearnsGoodwin,TeamofRivals:ThePoliticalGeniusofAbrahamLincoln(Penguin,London,2009),pp.686–690.17.Ibid.,pp.571–572.GoodwinquotesacontemporaryofLincoln,JohnForneyoftheWashingtonDailyChronicle,arguingthatLincolnwas‘themosttrulyprogressivemanoftheage,becausehealwaysmovesinconjunctionwithpropitiouscircumstances,notwaitingtobedraggedbytheforceofeventsorwastingstrength in premature struggles with them’ (p. 572). On the momentous issue of Emancipation, JamesMcPherson concludes that if Lincoln ‘had moved decisively against slavery in the war’s first year, asradicals pressedhim todo, hemightwell have fracturedhiswar coalition, drivenborder-stateUnionistsovertotheConfederacy,lostthewar,andwitnessedthesurvivalofslaveryforatleastanothergeneration’(McPherson,AbrahamLincoln,p.x).18.Goodwin,TeamofRivals,p.319.19.Ibid.,pp.364and507.20.Ibid.,pp.633and680.21.Ibid.,p.217.22.Ibid.,pp.412–413.23.Ibid.,p.413.24.NannerlO.Keohane,ThinkingaboutLeadership(PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,2010),p.12.25.Ibid.26.Ibid.KeohaneaddsthatthereisplentyofevidencethatGorewould‘havepursuedaverydifferentsetofgoals in office, particularly in environmental policy but also in international and domestic policy moregenerally’,althoughhowmuchofthishewouldhavebeenabletoaccomplishremainsquestionable,giventheconstraintsimposedbyCongress.27.MaxWeber,‘PoliticsasaVocation’,inFromMaxWeber:EssaysinSociology,translatedandeditedbyH.H.GerthandC.WrightMills(Routledge&KeganPaul,London,1948),pp.77–128,atp.116.Weberacknowledges that vanity is far from being a distinctive sin of politicians, observing: ‘In academic andscholarlycircles,vanityisasortofoccupationaldisease,butpreciselywiththescholar,vanity–howeverdisagreeably itmay express itself – is relatively harmless; in the sense that as a rule it does not disturb

scientificenterprise.’28. Ibid. InApril2000, inaprivatenote tohisstaff,TonyBlairasked themtoproduce‘aseriesofeye-catchinginitiatives’(especiallyonissueslikecrime,thefamily,anddefence),and,hecontinued,‘Ishouldbe personally associated with as much of this as possible.’ Philip Stephens, who reported this, adds:‘Translated,theprimeministerwantedmoreheadline-grabbinginitiativesandwheezestokeephiminthepubliceye.’SeeStephens,TonyBlair,ThePriceofLeadership(Politico,London,2004),p.188.29.CharlesMoore,MargaretThatcher.TheAuthorizedBiography.VolumeOne:Not forTurning (AllenLane,London,2013),pp.xivand432.30.Guardian,9April2013.31.ArchieBrown,‘MargaretThatcherandtheEndoftheColdWar’,inWmRogerLouis(ed.),ResurgentAdventureswithBritannia:Personalities,PoliticsandCultureinBritain(Tauris,London,2011),pp.259–273.32.RodricBraithwaite,AcrosstheMoscowRiver:TheWorldTurnedUpsideDown(YaleUniversityPress,NewHavenandLondon,2002),p.45.33. Jonathan Powell, The NewMachiavelli: How toWield Power in theModernWorld (Bodley Head,London,2010),p.2.34.PeterHennessy,ThePrimeMinister:TheOfficeanditsHolderssince1945(Penguin,London,2001),p.397.35.Powell,TheNewMachiavelli,p.78.36.Barber,InstructiontoDeliver,p.84.37.Ibid.,pp.306–307.38.Guardian,9April2013.39.Ibid.Howeadds:‘InMargaret’scase,shebecamepreparedtotestherwilltodestruction.FirstMichaelHeseltinewalkedout,followedbyLeonBrittan,thenNigelLawson,thenme.’40.Guardian,9April2013.41.Guardian,11September2010.42.MichaelA.Hogg,‘InfluenceandLeadership’,inSusanT.Fiske,DanielT.GilbertandGardnerLindzey(eds.),HandbookofSocialPsychology(Wiley,Hoboken,N.J.,5thed.,2010),pp.1166–1207,atp.1190.43.JosephS.Nye,ThePowerstoLead(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2008),p.18.44.Keohane,ThinkingaboutLeadership,p.23.45.RoyJenkins,Baldwin(Papermac,London,1987),p.120.46.TonyBlair,AJourney(Hutchinson,London,2010),p.287.47.See,forexample,GeorgeParker,‘PM“losingcontrol”ofhisparty’,FinancialTimes,20May2013.48. José Ramón Montero and Richard Gunther, ‘Introduction: Reviewing and Reassessing Parties’, inRichardGunther,JoséRamónMonteroandJuanJ.Linz(eds.),PoliticalParties:OldConceptsandNewChallenges(OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2002),pp.1–35,atp.31.49. Juan J.Linz, ‘Parties inContemporaryDemocracies:ProblemsandParadoxes’, inGunther,MonteroandLinz(eds.),PoliticalParties,pp.291–317,atp.307.50.RichardS.KatzandPeterMair,‘TheAscendancyofthePartyinPublicOffice’,inGunther,MonteroandLinz(eds.),PoliticalParties,pp.113–135,atp.126.51.Linz,‘PartiesinContemporaryDemocracies:ProblemsandParadoxes’,inGunther,MonteroandLinz(eds.), Political Parties, pp. 291–317, at p. 303. Recent work by Robert Rohrschneider and StephenWhitefield has underlined how important mass organization of political parties is to democraticrepresentationandalsohowmuchmore effective it still is, in spiteof adecline inpartypartisanship, inWestern Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. See Rohrschneider andWhitefield, The Strain ofRepresentation:HowPartiesRepresentDiverseVotersinWesternandEasternEurope(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012),esp.pp.174–183.52.MoisésNaim,TheEndofPower(BasicBooks,NewYork,2013),p.239.SeealsoRichardMcGregor,‘AmericaGoesDark’,FinancialTimes,5–6October2013.53.Naim,TheEndofPower,p.240.Naimadds:‘Itisimpossibletoascertainwhetherpoliticalcorruption

actuallyincreasedinthepastdecades,butitcertainlyhasbeenmorepublicizedthaneverbefore.’54.Ibid.,pp.239–240.55.AdamSmith,AnInquiryintotheNatureandCausesoftheWealthofNations,editedbyR.H.CampbellandA.S.Skinner(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1976[firstpublished1776]),Vol.2,p.712;andJohnMillar,TheOriginoftheDistinctionofRanks,3rded.,1779,reprintedinWilliamC.Lehmann(ed.),JohnMillarofGlasgow 1735–1801: His Life and Thought and His Contribution to Sociological Analysis (CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1960),p.250.56. Elena Viktorovna Shorina,Kollegial’nost’ i edinonachalie v sovetskom gosudarstvennom upravlenii(Yuridicheskayaliteratura,Moscow,1959).57.IntheendneitherGorbachevnorhisopponentswhohadbecomeamajoritywithinthepartyapparatus,atbothhigherand lower levelsof theorganization,prevailed.TheAugustcoupof1991byconservativeCommunists and hardline Russian nationalistsmerely accelerated the break-up of the Soviet Union andhencetheendbothoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionandofGorbachev’spoliticalleadership,forhehadbecomeon15March1990thepresidentofacountrywhichby31December1991hadceased toexist. I have written about this much more fully elsewhere. See, for example, Archie Brown, TheGorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996) and Brown, Seven Years that Changed theWorld:PerestroikainPerspective(OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2007).

Index

Abbott,Tony58AbdülhamidII,Sultan207Abdülmecid,Caliph209Abrahamian,Ervand243,417Abse,Leo124Acheson,Dean15,17,106,370Acquino,Benigno‘Ninoy’39Acquino,Corazón39Adamec,Ladislav238Adenauer,Konrad73,129,130–2,133,146,400(n.103)Afghanistan11,13,141,192n,308–11,335–6,348,433(n.165)AffordableCareActseePatientProtectionandAffordableHealthCareAct,USAfrica37,41–2,187,292,308,373–4(n.15),377–8(n.55),409(n.91);seealsounderindividualnationname

AfricanNationalCongress(ANC)53–4,143,144,184–9,409African-Americans32,37,74,105,377(n.46)Ahern,Bertie125AlJazeera244–5,417(n.128)al-Assad,Bashar13,246al-Assad,Hafez246al-Qaeda327,332,335,336,417(n.126)Albania218,221–2,237,238–9,240,254,298,414Aleksandrov-Agentov,Andrey406(n.54)AlexanderII,Tsar173nAlgeria152–3,154,155–6,157Aliev,Heidar422(n.65)Aliev,Ilham422(n.65)Alonso,Sonia161nAmery,Leo83Amin,Hafizullah309Anderson,Martin105Anderson,SirJohn(ViscountWaverley)87Andropov,Yuriy47,167,168,309

Angola308,409(n.91)appeasement,Chamberlain’spolicyof84,312–19,321,427–8(n.45),429(n.92)Arabrevolutions,twenty-firstcentury240,243–9,417–18(n.126–37)Argentinax,39–40,97,117–18Ashdown,Paddy98Asia16,38–9,109,218,222–31,275;seealsounderindividualnationnameAsquith,Herbert111,112,113,124–5,146Atatürk(MustafaKemal)198,207–10,412(n.35)Attlee,Clement5,6,72n,84,85,86–9,89n,91,92–3,94,94n,111,114–16,118,121,124–5,146,343,389–90(n.71;n90),393–5(n.48;n.57),429(n.94)

Auchinleck,Lord31,375(n.32)AungSanSuuKyi39,53,54,189–90Australiax,21,57–9,64,69,382–3(n.108–14)authoritarianleadershipseeleadershipauthoritarianism/authoritarianregimesvii,viii,x,1,3,6,7,8,9,10,24,27n,39,40,250–93;improvedchancesofmakingchangehappenwithinsystemofx,6;hybridregimes(regimesthatfallbetweendemocraticandauthoritariansystems)1,3,82,182,231,360n,413(n.58);transitiontodemocracyfrom1,3–4,4n,46,59,60,61,141–6,158–64,165,165n,196,197,198,248,288–9,355,357;politicalcultureand3–4,44,45,46–8,191;authoritarianmodernizers3–4,46,59,60,61,146,158–64,424–5(n.2);contrastwithtotalitarianregimes8,253,254,257;collectiveleadershipin8,254,seealsooligarchies;Machiavelli’smaximsforprinceoperatingwithin10;heightofleaderin27n;leadersprofessingtobeabovepartyin59;differentstylesofleadershipwithin61;RussiatakesauthoritariandirectionafterdegenerationofYeltsin’sleadership61,191n,seealsoRussia;cultofpersonalityandseecultofpersonality;redefiningleadershipin146;revolutionaryleadersand148,149,195,196,197,198,201,204,207,208,212,217,219,222,225n,231,238,240,241,245,248,290;ideasrequireinstitutionalbearersin177;‘right-wingautocracies’andchangefromwithin253;managingleadershipsuccessionsin269,269n,270;consultativeauthoritarianisminChina270;persuasionastoolof290–1,290n;providesorderandstabilitymyth291–2;foreignpolicyillusionsunder294,303–41;politicalpartiesin358–9n;leadershipunder359–62;seealsounderindividualleaderandnationname

Azerbaijan422(n.65)

BaathParty291,337Bachelet,Michelle40Bahrain245Baldwin,Stanley12,68n,82,83,84,85,313,314,317,354,428(n.50)BanKi-moon20Bandaranaike,Sirimavo38,39Barber,SirMichael351,354,434(n.3)Bartle,John69,71Basquenationalism160,161,163,404(n.36;n.40)BasqueNationalParty,Spain161,404(n.40)Bassett,Reginaldix,393–4(n.48)Bates,Edward346–7Batista,Fulgencio231,233,234Beaufort,Dukeof113Beaverbrook,Lord88,89,89n,354Beazley,Kim69Behr,Rafael384(n.6)Belarus3–4Beloff,Max429(n.104)

BenAli,Zineel-Abidine244,245Ben-Gurion,David323,324Berend,Ivan135n,350n,364Beria,Lavrenti300Berlinblockade,1948–9133BerlinWall132–3,135,137,238Berlinguer,Enrico158–9Berlusconi,Silvio43Best,Geoffrey89nBevan,Aneurin91,93,114,116,124,389(n.89)Bevin,Ernest17,72n,87,91–2,93,94n,114,115Bevins,Reginald96,390(n.102)Bhutto,Benazir39Bhutto,Zulfikar39bigman/bossprinciple40–1,360–1,373(n.12),377(n.51)binLaden,Osama328Bingham,LordChiefJustice431(n.139)Bismarck,Ottovon112,131Bittner,Amanda385(n.8)Blair,Tony2,5,7–8,9–10,17,22,62,67,69,70–2,72n,93,96,98–100,111,122,125–7,295,311–12,311–12n,326–41,349,350,351,352,353,354–5,356,368(n.3;n.12),369(n.16),371(n.42),391(n.111),395(n.62),397(n.85),398(n.87;n.91;n.92),399(n.93),431(n.137;n.142),432–3(n.149;n.152;n.153),434(n.3),436(n.28)

Blake,Robert85,86Blanco,AdmiralCarerro158Blix,Hans337Blondel,Jean391(n.1),406(n.50)BoXilai270Bogdanor,Vernon125Bogomolov,Oleg310,427(n.40)Bolsheviks35,169,205,206,211–18,225,255,256,272,273,280,298,412–13(n.46),413(n.58),416(n.116)

Bonaparte,Napoleon27n,30,35,36,79,350,351BonarLaw,Arthur82Boswell,James31,375(n.32)Botha,P.W.143,187Bouazizi,Mohamed244Bowen,Jeremy:TheArabUprisings244,417(n.126;n.131)Boyle,SirEdward325Bracken,Brendan88Braithwaite,SirRodric117n,332–3,364Branch,Taylor276nBrandt,Willy129,132–6,134n,135n,400(n.111;n.113)Bratislava193Brazil40,142–3BrazilianWorkers’Party40Brett,Judith382–3(n.108;n.112)Brezhnev,Leonid47,134,169,259,260,261,267,305,308,309,310,420(n.23)Brittan,Leon(Lord)437(n.39)Brown,Gordon5,7–8,17,59n,68,71,72n,99,126,351,353,368–9(n.14;n.16),371(n.42),398(n.

92),399(n.93)Brownell,Herbert77,344–5Brundtland,GroHarlem38Brzezinski,Zbigniew145,306,331,432(n.149)Bukharin,Nikolay214,255Bulgaria3,4n,209,219,238Bullock,Alan92,272Burlatsky,Fedor421–2(n.48)Burma39,54,189–90Burnham,Gilbert326–7Burns,JamesMacGregor102,371(n.49)Bush,GeorgeH.W.56–7,79,110,138,139,359n,401–2(n.120)Bush,GeorgeW.11,65–6,67,71,312n,327,328,330,334,338,339,341,348,349,375(n.35),381–2(n.102)

Butler,Lord(Robin)333–4Butler,R.A.(Rab)87,90,90n,94–5,325,389(n.80),390(n.102),427–8(n.45)Byrnes,JamesF.16

Callaghan,James68–9,69n,70,70n,72n,396–7(n.79)Cambodia226,228–9,306Cameron,David2,13,22,93,99,355,390(n.92;n.94)Cameron,Simon347Campbell–Bannerman,Henry111–12Campbell,Alastair99,330Canadax,2,38,67,368(n.6)Cardoso,FernandoHenrique142–3,401–2(n.129)Carrington,Lord119Carlyle,Thomas10,286Caro,RobertA.54,108,109,392–3(n.27),393(n.32)Carrillo,Santiago158,159,163Carter,Jimmy50,79,145,241–2,305,306,330–1,426–7,(n.37)Cartledge,SirBryan117n,364Castro,Fidel6,231–6,275–7,305,308,422(n.56)Castro,Raúl231,232,233,234–5,275,276CatherineIIofRussia,Empress38CatholicChurchx,31–2,43,48,131,132,191,200,201,252,279,281,289,385(n.12),392(n.6)Ceauşescu,Nicolae231,239,240,271,274,292Chagin,P.272,421(n.45)Challe,GeneralMaurice322–3,322nChamberlain,Neville12,17,82,83,84,85–6,87,100,295,312–19,328,340,341,427(n.44),428(n.90),429(n.92)

Chandler,Zachariah347Channon,SirHenry(‘Chips’)316,316nCharlesIofEngland,King31,49CharlesIIofEngland,King31Chase,GovernorSalmonP.346,347Chávez,Hugo276Cheney,Dick55,327–8,338,341,381–2(n.102),432(n.147)Chernenko,Konstantin141,166,167,168,401(n.128)Chernyaev,Anatoliy310,364,406(n.54),408(n.70)

ChiangChing-kuo142,144–5,178ChiangKai-shek142,144,178,207,222,223,224ChilcottInquiry332Chile40,97,292China222;MaoZedongandseeMaoZedong;KoreanWarand16,301–3;DengXiaopingandseeDengXiaoping;Taiwanand144–5,305,306–7;civilwar145,178,222,223,224,301–2;rapprochementwithUSbeginning1972145,305;economy177,180–2,262–3,267,269,306,307,361;LongMarch178;Politburo178,180,262,263,266,270,302;civilwar/revolution178,207,223,224,226,261,301–2;‘GreatLeapForward’179,262–4,265,274,292,304,307,420–1(n.28);CulturalRevolution179,180,229,264–5,266,267,274,292,304,307;‘GangofFour’180,266;TiananmenSquareprotests,1989182,268,269,409(n.90);revolution,1911–12198,199,200,201–7,240,411(n.9);Qingdynasty201,202,207;provincialassemblies201–2;SunYat-senand198,202,203,205–7,240;Japanand202,204,205,206,222,223;draftconstitution,1912203;elections,1912–13203–4;VersaillesPeaceConferenceand204–5;MayFourthmovement205,207;PekingUniversity205,205n;SovietUnionand206,223,261–2,304,305;SecondWorldWarand222–3;Communists’captureofpowerin222–4;foundationofPeople’sRepublicofChina224;Vietnamand226,227,306,310;Cambodiaand229;NorthKoreaand230,252,278,301–2;collectiverulein254–5,261,307–8;personalruleversusoligarchyin261–70;leadershipsuccessionsin269–70;AmericanrecognitionofPeople’sRepublicofChina302,305;autocratsandoligarchsinforeignpolicy303–4,305–11;Sino-Sovietsplit304,305;Sino-VietnameseWar,1979306,310;Tibet/DalaiLamaand306;advocateofdoctrineofnon-interference307–8;Iraqinvasionand307–8;cyberintrusions307n;wealthasasourceofauthorityin358n;‘nomenklaturacapitalism’408(n.87)

ChineseCommunistParty178,206,222,223,230,264,269ChineseNationalistParty178,206,207,222ChoManSik230ChristianDemocraticUnion,Germany64,130,131,134,138,285,400(n.103)Chun,Prince202Churchill,Clementine87–8,89nChurchill,Winston4–5,50,51–2,76,83,84–92,89n,90n,94,95,103,112,113–14,115,122,150–1,150–1n,185,299,314,315,318,318n,319,320,325,328,380(n.89),388(n.62),390(n.98),425(n.14),428(n.50),429(n.92),429(n.105),431(n.138)

CIA241,309,327,328civildisobedience195civilrights5,20,31,54,74,76–7,104–5,106,107,108,109,110,344,345,346CivilRightsActs1964/1965,US108CixiofChina,EmpressDowager201Clark,David397(n.85)Clarke,Kenneth349,352–3Clinton,Bill23,66,74,80–1,125,190,276n,348,388(n.58)Clinton,Hillary74,81coalitiongovernment22,56,67,83,84,85,87,88,91,94,111,114,115,130,134,138–9,144,151,211,213,217,280,285,287,315,334n,345,390(n.92),428–9(n.92)

cognitivedissonance381(n.93)ColdWar57,79,80,81,96,110,166,167,175,183,191,229,253,271,275,301,310,321,332,394(n.53),409(n.91),426–7(n.37)

Collier,Paul42,292,377–8(n.55)Colton,TimothyJ.47Colville,SirJohn(Jock)86,87–9,318nCominform271Comintern178,219,225,415(n.90)

Communismvii,16,21,44,45–6;revolutionsinEurope210–22;revolutionsinAsia222–31;Cuba231–6,275–7;demiseofCommunisminEurope–notrevolutions238–40,416(n.115;n.116,n.117);theleaderunder271–9;seealsounderindividualnationname

CommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion45,47,80,165,168,171,172,173,174,190,216–18,255,256,257,272,273,361–2,401(n.128),413(n.58);418–19(n.5),421–2(n.48),438(n.57)

Congress,US10–11,11n,12,13–17,33,64,73,74,75,76,80–1,102,103–5,106–7,109–10,140,147,344,346,347,357n,375–6(n.38),387(n.40);

ConservativeParty,UK2,5–6,17,59n,67,68,68n,69,70–1,72,83,84,85,86,87,89,94,95,96,97–8,111,113,115,116–22,123,126,312,315,316,320,323n,326n,330,339,343,349,352–3,355,369(n.19),390(n.91),396(n.58)

Constitution,US10–11,13,15,32–5,37,38,56,73,185,346,370(n.30)Cook,Robin126,329–30,339,398(n.92),431(n.142)Coolidge,Calvin75Cornford,James397(n.85)Corwin,Edward103Cosgrove,Patrick427–8(n.45)Cowper-Coles,SirSherard433(n.165)Crabb,Annabel383(n.114)Cradock,SirPercy15,96,117nCranbourne,Lord428(n.54)Crewe,SirIvor69,71Cripps,SirStafford91,93,114Cromwell,Oliver31,34Crossman,RichardixCrowcroft,Robert87Cuba6,231–6,249,258,275–7,275n,276n,305,308,409(n.91),426(n.24)409(n.91);Cubanmissilecrisis305,426(n.24)

cultofpersonality/leadership148,178–9,180,229,231,235,251,257,269,271–4,277–89,291,292–3,297,304,360–1,421(n.45)

culture/culturalcontext25,40–2,378(n.58)Cunningham,SirCharles396(n.77)Curzon,Lord82–3,92CzechRepublic3,44Czechoslovakia3,44–6,84,137,192–3,194–5,237–8,296,297,308,313,317–18,404(n.31),416(n.112)

daSilva,Lula40,142–3Dahl,RobertA.375(n.33;n.35)DalaiLama306Dalton,Hugh91,93,114,315,428–9(n.92)Darling,Alistair7,126,353Dawson,Geoffrey315Dayan,GeneralMoshe323deGaulle,GeneralCharles59,66,73,76,132,149–58,150–1n,193,226,322n,403–4(n.18;n.26;n.29),435(n.8)

deKlerk,F.W.142,143–4,183,187,188,409(n.91)deTocqueville,Alexis34,35,37,201Deakin,Arthur92Deakin,SirWilliam(Bill)219,413(n.64)Dean,SirPatrick323

Débre,Michel154,155democracy:mythof‘strong’leaderinvii,ix,x,1,2,3;transitionfromauthoritarianruleto3–4,4n,46,59,60,61,141–6,158–64,165,165n,196,197,198,248,288–9,seealsounderindividualleaderandnationname;dominationofoneleaderin6–7,9–10,18;individualandcollectiveleadershipin9–14;‘democracyontheinstallmentplan’31,375(n.31);choosingleadersindemocracies21–4;theevolutionofdemocracyandofdemocraticleadership36–53;institutionsand53–61;myths,powers,styles62–100;electionoutcomesin62,63–72,362;havedemocraticleadersbecomemoredominantovertime?63,72–100;typesofleadersinseeleadership;leadershipunder359–62

democraticleadershipseeleadershipDemocraticParty,US11,57,65,66,81,104,105,106,107,387(n.36)democratization36–40,158–77,183–93;ThirdWave165n;FourthWave165nDengXiaoping27n,149,177–83,189,193,263,264,265–70,305,306,361Denmark38,356Desnitsky,S.E.374(n.23)despotism30,152,289–90,418(n.5)destalinization45,257–8,273,304Dewar,Donald398(n.86)Diamond,Jared40–1,374(n.15),377(n.50)Diaz,Porfirio198–9dictatorsseeunderindividualdictatornameDikötter,Frank420(n.28)Dimitrov,Georgi219Dion,Stéphane2Disraeli,Benjamin64Djilas,Milovan219–20,271–2,413(n.64)Douglas-Home,SirAlec17,67–8Douglas,Lew92DuanQirui205Dubček,Alexander45,379(n.65)DuffCooper,Alfred315,316–17,318,429(n.94)Duggan,Christopher281,282Duiker,WilliamJ.414(n.83)Dulles,JohnFoster76,321DuncanSmith,Iain312Dunn,John195,239,377(n.47),410(n.3)Dworkin,Ronald35,376(n.40)

EastGermany(GermanDemocraticRepublic)133–4,134n,137–9,193,235,239,356Eden,SirAnthony76,83,85,87,91,92,94,95,122,295,311,312,313,314–15,319–26,326n,340–1,429(n.104;n.109)

EdwardVIIIofEngland,King83,313Edwards,GeorgeC.435(n.8)Egypt235,244,245,246–9,311,311n,312,319–26,426–7(n.37)Eisenhower,GeneralDwightD.15,15n,73,76–7,107,109,321–2,324,326,344,387(n.35),403(n.26),407(n.60)

elections:leadersandoutcomesof2,5,9,17,22–3,62,63–72,97,100,129,385(n.8;n.12);Britishgeneralelection,19455,114–15,150;Britishgeneralelection,196417,67–8;Britishgeneralelection,198717;Britishgeneralelection,199217;Britishgeneralelection,201017,68;Germany,193018;USpresidential,200437,376–7(n.46),385(n.14);USpresidential,200837,65–6,376–7(n.46);USpresidential,201237;USpresidential,1980,materialself-interestand52–3;removalofleadersoutside

57–9,130;Britishgeneralelection,199762,67,69,70–2;Britishgeneralelection,200162,67,71;Britishgeneralelection,200562,67,71,72n;Frenchpresidential,196566;Frenchpresidential,196966;Britishgeneralelection,197068;Britishgeneralelection,197968–9;Britishgeneralelections,197468,120;Britishgeneralelection,January1910113;Germany,2013130;Germanunificationand138–9;SouthAfrica,1994144,187–8;Taiwan145,146;Frenchconstitutionand154–5;Spain,1977160,162;nationalistpartiesinSpanish160–1;Spain,1979163;endofSovietUnionand170n,171,172,174,190;YeltsinelectedPresidentofRussia,1991175;Solidarityand191–2;Mexicanpresidential,1910/191198–9;Mexicanpresidential,1924200–1;China,1912–13203–4;Turkey,1950210;Russia,1917211–12,215;Yugoslavia,1945220–1;USpresidential,1940232;Bulgaria,1991238;Albania,1991239;USpresidential,1976242;Egypt,2012246–7,249;Mexico,2012269n;Italy,1924280;Germany,1928283;Germany,1932284;Germany,1933284–5;Germany,1936287;authoritarianregimesandfaçadeof290–1,360n;USpresidential,1956322;USpresidential,2000329,348,375(n.35);Britishgeneralelection,1935314;Britishgeneralelection,1959323n;USmid-termelections,2010345;familyfortunesandconnectionsinUS359n

Elgie,Robert383–4(n.116;n.117;n.118)ElizabethIofEngland,Queen27n,38Ellison,RalphWaldo110EmmanuelIII,King280,281emotions,importanceofinpolitics22–3,50,52,53,61,80,81,128,137,154,184,235,293,388(n.58),391(n.111)

England:evolutionofpowerin31–2;republicanleadersin34;monarchyin38;Thatcherandpublicopinionin120;polltaxin122;centralizationofpoliticalpowerin130n;seealsoUK(UnitedKingdom)

Enlightenment25–30,32n,35,40,290,371–2(n.2)Erhard,Ludwig131,132Estonia166n,176,299ETA163Euro7,126,128,138,139,398(n.88)EuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC)132,152,157,162EuropeanUnion(EU)118,120,132,162Evans,RichardJ.419(n.7)ExchangeRateMechanism(ERM)70

Facta,Luigi280FalklandsWar,198297,117–18,121fascism103,133,134,135,220,250,252,252n272,279–89,299,318,360;seealsounderindividualleaderandnationname

FBI106–7,337Feldman,Stanley378(n.60)Fernández,Christina39–40Finer,S.E.30,34,375(n.29)Finland38,214,215,299FirstWorldWar,1914–1820,37,38,52,82,131,204,208,211,218,225,226,279,283,297,298,313Fisher,David337,340nFisher,Louis11,11n,12–13,370(n.20)Fitzpatrick,Sheila413(n.58)ForeignOffice,British15,82–3,91–2,118,315,317,322,323,331,334n,339,350,394(n.53),427(n.45),428(n.54),429–30(n.112)

foreignpolicyseeleadershipandunderindividualleadernameformsofgovernment,leadersand60–1France:Enlightenmentthinkersin25;Bonapartecomestopowerin30;Revolution32,35–6,195,236,376

(n.42);DeclarationofHumanRights35;monarchicalrule35;NationalAssembly36,154;universalmalesuffrage37;politicalparties,sub-culturesand43;FourthRepublic43,152,156,157;FifthRepublic43,60,154–5,156;semi-presidentialsystem60,82,152,154–5,156,403(n.14);deGaulleandseedeGaulle,Charles;impactofpersonalityonelectionoutcomesin66,385(n.17);presidentialelection,196566;presidentialelection,196966;relationswithGermany132,139,152,157;SecondWorldWarand149–51,296,297,298,317;Algerianproblem152–3,154,155–6,157;constitution152,154–5,156,403(n.14),403(n.18);electoralprocess154–5;NATOand157;relationswithSovietUnion157;socialunrest,1968157;DengXiaopingin177–8,179;HoChiMinhin225;warinIndochina226,403(n.26),414(n.75);PolPotin229;Suezcrisisand311,320,321,322,323,324

Francis,PopexiiFranco,GeneralFrancisco158,159,160,161,163,164,249,288,289,298,404(n.30)FrederickII(theGreat),ofPrussia,King286FreeFrench149,150,151FreedomofInformationAct,UK7,125,368(n.12),394(n.53),397(n.85)FrontdeLibérationNationale(FLN)153Furman,Dmitriy173–4n

Gaddafi,Muammar244,245,292Gaitskell,Hugh72n,93,320,371(n.42),389(n.89)Galtieri,Leopold97Gandhi,Mahatma20,38–9,53,189Gardiner,A.G.84Gardner,David245Garner,JohnNance55GartonAsh,Timothy238,400–1,416(n.116)Gentile,Giovanni250GeorgeVIofEngland,King83,85,388(n.62)Germany:SecondWorldWar/ThirdReichand12,84,89n,102–3,130,133,134,149–51,152,185,204,213,218,220,271,279,282,296–8,299–300,301,313,314,425(n.14);riseofHitlerand18,20,131,250,251,252,279,283–90,293,353n,360–1,419(n.6;n.7),435(n.7);womenleadersin22,38,129;chancellorship54,82,129,130,139;politicalpartiesin64,seealsounderindividualpartyname;socialinsurancein112,131;unificationof118,128,134,135,136,137–9,239,356,382(n.104),401(n.120);redefiningleadership/establishmentofpost-wardemocracyin128–39,399–400(n.102),seealsounderindividualleadername;importanceofpartyidentityinelections129;Constitution,1948129–30;WeimarRepublic130,131,284,399(n.102);electoralsystem130;federalcharacterofGermangovernment130,130n;generalelection,2013130;‘economicmiracle’in131;post-warforeignpolicy132,152,157;NATOand132;EEC/EUand132,138;ColdWarand132–9,400(n.111;n.112);WestandEastGermany,relationsbetween133–9,134n,137–9,239,seealsoEastGermany(GDR)andWestGermany;SovietUnion,relationswith132,133,134,135,136–9,185,213,214,218,297,298,299,300,400(n.111;n.113);FirstWorldWarand204,208,213,214;aidesLenin213,214;totalitarianleadershipwithin250,251,252;Hitler’sforeignpolicyillusions296–8;Chamberlain,appeasementand312–20

Gillard,Julia57,58,382(n.109),383(n.112;n.114)Gilmour,SirIan118,119,395(n.58;n.65)Gingrich,Newt81Gladstone,William64Goebbels,Joseph136–7,285,286Goldsmith,Lord334–5González,Felipe158,161,163,164,276n,277,350n,404(n.30),407(n.69),422(n.56)Goodwin,DorisKearns346,347,435–6(n.17)

Gorbachev,Mikhail:astransformationalleader8,46,164–77,182,183,192n,193,200,361;differentiationofsupportfor48;relationswithUS56–7,79,338,345,349,382(n.104);Thatcherand96,116,117n,119,394(n.53),401(n.120);Brandtand135,400(n.113);Kohland136–8,139,239;evolutionofsocialdemocraticviews167–77,406(n.53),407(n.69),415(n.110);foreignpolicy167,170,175–6,237,301,309–10,409(n.91);powerofpersuasion171–7,361,407(n.61);seenas‘weak’leaderbysome175;Yeltsinand190;powerofappointment406(n.54);coup,1991and408(n.70),438(n.57)

Gore,Al329,348,375(n.35)governmentandleadership,evolutionof25–40Graubard,Stephen107‘GreatMan’or‘GreatWoman’conceptionofhistory18,23–4,53,286,297,342‘GreatSociety’5,107,359n;seealsoJohnson,LyndonB.Greece26,208,300,370(n.40)Gromyko,Andrey260,309,406(n.54)Guevara,Che231,233,234–5Guillaume,Günter134nGuinier,Lani74Guinness,LadyHonor316GulfWar,1991327

Halifax,Lord85,87,90n,315,317Hammarskjöld,Dag324‘hard’and‘soft’power141nHarding,Warren75Haslam,Alexander51Havel,Václav192,193,238Hazareesingh,Sudhir156,365Healey,Denis72n,339,340Heath,Edward6,68,120–1,352Heclo,Hugh140,342,344Hedlund,Stefan190–1Henderson,SirNevile317Hennessy,Peter15nhereditaryprinciple11,30,31,38,39,113,123,125,221,245–6,278,374(n.16),422(n.65)Heseltine,Michael119,437(n.39)hierarchy,socialandpolitical28–9,30,49–50,51,254,373–4(n.15)Hindenburg,FieldMarshalvon284,286Hitler,Adolfvii,4,12,18,20,84,131,133,136–7,185,218,250,251,252,272,279,282,283–9,290,292,293,295,296–9,300,312,313,315,316,317,318–19,318n,320,321,328,352,353n,359,361,419(n.6;n.7),435(n.7)

HoChiMinh6,224–8,414(n.75;n.83)Hoare,SirSamuel317Hobsbawm,Eric198Hollis,Patricia396(n.6)Holmes,Stephen46–7Honecker,Erich235Hoon,Geoff339Hoover,Herbert75Hoover,J.Edgar106–7Hourani,Albert412(n.35)

HouseofCommons,UK13,56,68,71,83,85,97,99,113,123,127,314,316,318n,320,328–9,369(n.19),390(n.94),395(n.60;n.62),397(n.79),427(n.44),428(n.50)

HouseofLords,UK2,7,11n,85,112–13,115,122–3,125,368(n.12),396–7(n.79),398(n.87),432(n.152)

HouseofRepresentatives,US11n,73,105,108,203Howard,John69,382(n.108),386(n.26)Howe,SirGeoffrey97,117n,118,119,352,437(n.39)Hoxha,Enver221,222,254HuJintao270HuYaobang268HuaGuofeng180,266,268–9Hughes,Andrew383(n.112)humanrights7,35,125,188,241–2,306,307,368(n.12);HumanRightsAct,UK7,125,368(n.12)Hume,David28,290,373(n.12)Humphrey,George324,325Hungary3,135n,137,167,193,237,252,258,273,274,277,324,350,350nhunter-gatherersocieties26,27,40,372(n.8),374(n.15)Huntington,Samuel195,239Hurd,Douglas118Husák,Gustáv238Hussein,Saddam71,244,291,327,327n,328,329,330,331,332,335,336–7,338,340,340n,359,432(n.152)

Hutchins,Steve383(n.114)hybridregimes(competitiveauthoritarianism)1,3,82,182,231,360n,413(n.58);seealsounderindividualnationname

India19–20,38,39,53,83,84,96,189,235,304,307nIndianNationalCongress53I·nönü,I·smet210institutions/institutionalpower,leadershipand4,19,25,34,41,42,43,44,51,52,53–6,60,61,88,129–30,142,155,156,157,169,170n,175,177,179,181,191n,195,196,197,200,201,208,217,218,221,246,250,254,256,258,262,263,275,281,289,339,345,351,358

InstitutionalRevolutionaryParty(PRI),Mexico269nInternationalWomen’sDay211,412(n.44)internet,effectuponpoliticsof12,65,244,246,290nIran80,240,241–3,246,327,327n,337,335Iraq:war,2003–8,11,13,71,125,126,128,141,307–8,311,311–12n,312,326–41,340n,348,349,356,431(n.138;n.142),432–3(n.152;n.153),433(n.164);GulfWar,1991and244,327–8;BaathParty291,337;warwithIran1980–8327,327n

Ireland32,82;seealsoNorthernIrelandIrvine,Lord(Derry)125,364,368(n.12),369(n.14),398(n.86;n.87)Islamists242–3,246,248,291,327,335–6,417–18(n.133)Israel38,82,307n,311,320,322–3,324,335,417–18(n.133),426–7(n.37)Italy18,20,43,158–9,220,221,250,279–82,288,289,291,298–9,293,317,318,319,378–9(n.63)IvantheTerrible173–4n

JamesIIofEngland,King31–2Japan103,201,202,204,205,206,222,223,226,230,299,367(n.1),370(n.30)Jaruzelski,Wojciech192n

Jenkins,Roy89n,123,313,396–7(n.75;n.77,n79)Jenkins,Simon431(n.138)Jenner,SenatorWilliam16Jensen,Erik383(n.112)Jews,SecondWorldWarand135,251,282,285,287,298,429(n.105);seealsoIsraelJiangQing265–6,267JiangZemin269,270Johnson,Chalmers410(n.4)Johnson,LyndonB.5,11,54–5,56,78,78n,101–2,106–10,147,227,344,359n,365n,393(n.32)Johnson,Samuel31Jordan245Joseph,SirKeith5JuanCarlosofSpain,King158,163–4,405(n.41)Judiciary8,56,73–4,111,113,185,248,255,347,398(n.87);seealsoSupremeCourt,US

Kádár,János273,274,277,421–2(n.48)Kaganovich,Lazar257Kahneman,Daniel49,51Karvonen,Lauri64,384(n.4)Katznelson,Ira105Kay,John376(n.38)Keating,Paul69,386(n.26)Keightley,GeneralSirCharles325,335Kellerman,Barbara380(n.78)Kennedy,Anthony111Kennedy,JohnF.54,55,65,73,78,79,106,108,147,227,305,385(n.12),392(n.6),403(n.26)Kennedy,Joseph103,318n,359n,391–2(n.6)Kennedy,Robert55Keohane,Nannerl348,436(n.26)Kerensky,Aleksandr212–13,216Kerry,John13,37,330,377(n.46),432(n.147)Kershaw,Ian283–4,287,298,353n,419(n.7),423(n.97)KGB47,167n,169,176,217,259,260,309,310KhmerRouge228–9Khomini,AyatollaRuhollah241,243Khosrokhavar,Farhad417(n.128)Khrushchev,Nikita45,73,169,180,222,235,257–9,260,261,262,263,267,272,273,303–5,308,324,387(n.35),421(n.45),426(n.24),430(n.122)

KimDaeJung190KimIlSung228,230–1,254,271,278–9,301,303,359KimJongUn278–9King,Anthony63,65,120,385(n.12)King,Charles416(n.117)Kinnock,Neil17,70,72,356–7,398(n.87)Kirchner,Néstor40Kirkpatrick,SirIvone429(.112)Kirkpatrick,JeanJ.253,419(n.10)Kirov,Sergey272Kissinger,Henry305Klein,Joe81

Knight,Alan411(n.11;n.12)Kohl,Helmut129,136–9,239Kollontai,Alexandra214Korea14,190,230–1,278,301–3;seealsoNorthKoreaandSouthKoreaKoreanWar,1950–314,16,76,278,301–3,425(n.17)Kornilov,GeneralLavr215Kosygin,Aleksey260,309,310,311,379(n.65)Krastev,Ivan46–7Kuomintang(KMT),China145,146,178,203–4,205,206,207,223,224Kyle,Keith319,322n,325,429(n.104)

LaborParty,Australia47–8,69,382(n.108),383(n.113)LabourParty,UK2,5,6,7,17,59n,62,64,68,70,70n,71–2,72n,85,86–9,89n,91,93,98,99,111,113,114–16,122,123,124,125,126,128,252n,311n,312,315,316,320,330,339,343,351,352,353,354,356–7,367–8(n.3),368(n.12),371(n.42),386(n.33),389–90(n.90),394–5(n.57),396(n.74),397(n.82),398(n.87),399(n.94),428–9(n.92),434(n.179)

Lansky,Meyer231Lansley,Andrew94,390(n.94)Lao-tzu344Laski,Harold114–15,114n,393–4(n.48)Latvia3,166n,176,299Lavrov,Sergey13Lawson,Nigel(Lord)119,121–2,364,395(n.60),396(n.71),437(n.39)leadership:authoritarianvii,viii,x,7,9,10,24,27n,39,40,250–93;hybridregimesand1,3,82,182,231,360n,413(n.58);transitiontodemocracyand1,3–4,4n,46,59,60,61,141–6,158–64,165,165n,196,197,198,248,288–9,355,357;politicalcultureand3–4,44,45,46–8,191;authoritarianmodernizers3–4,46,59,60,61,146,158–64,424–5(n.2);contrastwithtotalitarianleadership8,253,254,257;collectiveleadershipand8,254,seealsooligarchies;Machiavelli’smaximsfor10;heightofleader27n;leadersprofessingtobeabovepartyand59;stylesofleadership9–17,61;RussiatakesauthoritariandirectionafterdegenerationofYeltsin’sleadership61,191n,seealsoRussia;cultofpersonalityandseecultofpersonality;redefiningleadershipin146;revolutionaryleadersas148,149,195,196,197,198,201,204,207,208,212,217,219,222,225n,231,238,240,241,245,248,290;leadershipsuccessionsin269,269n,270;consultativeauthoritarianisminChina270;persuasionastoolof290–1,290n;providesorderandstabilitymyth291–2;foreignpolicyillusionsunder294,303–41;‘Napoleonic’ruleinBritain348–53;politicalpartiesin358–9n;leadershipunder359–62;seealsounderindividualleaderandnationname

autocraticx,19,36,58,228,246,248,259,271–2,288–91,292,294,303–11,314,355,360,379(n.73)charismatic2,4–5,18,20,22,23,55,129,164,172,190,193,235,246,277,289,371(n.42),384(n.6)classifications4–6,23–5collectivevii,2–3,5,8,9–14,18,29,63,93,101,104,113,118,170,183,188,228,254–6,258,259,261,267,270,287,304–5,307,308,334,340,341,342–3,353,360,362,395(n.60)

collegialvii,15,18,120,133–4,164,171,263,345–6,361context25–61cultofpersonalityand148,178–9,180,229,231,235,251,257,269,271–4,277–89,291,292–3,297,304,360–1,421(n.45)

democratic:mythof‘strong’leaderandvii,ix,x,1,2,3;transitionfromauthoritarianruleto3–4,4n,46,59,60,61,141–6,158–64,165,165n,196,197,198,248,288–9,seealsounderindividualleaderandnationname;dominationofoneleader6–7,9–10,18;individualandcollectiveleadershipand9–14;‘democracyontheinstallmentplan’31,375(n.31);choosingleadersindemocracies21–4;the

evolutionofdemocracyandofdemocraticleadership36–53;institutionsand53–61;myths,powers,styles62–100;electionoutcomesand,rolein62,63–71,362;leaders’influenceonelectoraloutcomesinBritain67–72;dominanceovertime63,72–100;theconstraintsontheAmericanpresidency73–6;presidentialpowersandleadershipstyle–theAmericancase76–82;primeministerialpowersandleadershipstyles–theBritishcase82–100;typesofleadersinseeleadership;leadershipunderdemocracy359–62

desiderata1–2,25domesticpolicyand11n,82,87,89,91,102,103–4,116,118,129,140,276n,294,319,351,436(n.26)dominating75–6,78,86,89–90,120,146–7,220,270,304,311economicpolicyand7,8,71,90,90n,93,94,95,119,122,154,180,188,201,217,256,262,269,351,369(n.16),406(n.54)

effective353–4electoraloutcomesand2,5,9,62,63–72,97,100,129,385(n.8;n.12)followersand4,20–1,26,30,50,51,53,78n,91,188,285,293,316,331,354,362foreignpolicy10–17,22,57,72–3,294–341,347–8,428–9(n.92)goals146,354,406(n.50)heightand26–7,26–7n,151,184hereditaryprinciple11,30,31,38,39,113,123,125,221,245–6,278,374(n.16),422(n.65)heroic50,51,92,187,188,273,288,293historicalcontextof25–40individual9–14,148,197,201,271,293,294,303,357,360,362inspirational4,19–21,86,91,106,133,144,189–93oligarchic3,8,254–70,293,294,303–11,355,360,402(n.130)optimismand49–50,79–80,81powerand17–21redefining:definitionof5–6,101;transformationalleadershipand5,6,102,127,139,141,142,144,183,342–3;seektomovecentregroundintheirdirection5,126,349;Attleegovernmentas6,114–16,394–5(n.57);Johnsonas54,101–2,106–10,344;Thatcheras97,116–22,396–7(n.58–65);Americanpresidentsas101–11,139;Rooseveltas101–6,344,391(n.2);Reaganand110–11;British111–28;thepre-FirstWorldWarLiberalgovernment111–14;thepost-SecondWorldWarLabourgovernment114–16;significantlyinnovativeBritishgovernments122–6;AlexSalmondandthepossiblebreak-upofBritain127–9;inpost-warGermany128–39;KonradAdenauer130–2;WillyBrandt132–6;HelmutKohl136–40;inperspective139–46;astransitionalleaderswhopavethewayfortransformation141–6;FernandoHenriqueCardoso142–3;F.W.deKlerk143–5,183;Taiwan145–7;redefiningthescopeofpoliticalactivity141–6,342–3

revolutionaryvii,viii;definitionof6,148–9,194–6;differencesbetweentransformationalleadersand148–9,194;failureofindemocracies194–5;definitionofrevolutionand195–6;characteristicsandconsequencesofrevolution196–7;leaderlessrevolutionsand198–201,240–9;Mexicanrevolution198–201;Chineserevolution1911–12201–7,240;Turkishrevolution207–10;CommunistrevolutionsinEurope210–22;Russianrevolutionsof1917(FebruaryandOctober)210–18,249;CommunistrevolutionsinSouth-EasternEurope218–22;CommunistrevolutionsinAsia222–31;ChineseCommunists’captureofpower222–4;HoChiMinhandtheVietnameseCommunists’ascenttopower224–8;PolPotandCambodia228–9;KimIlSung’saccessiontopowerinNorthKorea230–1;Cubanrevolution231–6;thedemiseofCommunisminEurope–notrevolutions236–40;Iranianrevolution241–3;Arabrevolutionsofthetwenty–firstcentury243–9;importanceofleadersinsomerevolutions249;justificationforviolentrevolution249

socialrankand28–9,358–9strengthandagilityand26,28styles25,61,76–100,120–1,354totalitarianvii,x,8,24,129,130,152,222,231,418–19(n.5;n.7;n.9);politicalcultureand46,47;

concept250–3;impervious-to-changeidea253–4;Stalin’sdictatorshipandSovietoligarchies254–61;personalruleversusoligarchyinChina261–71;theleaderunderCommunism271–9;theleaderunderfascism279–90;mythsofdictatorialregimes289–93;foreignpolicyillusionsof295–303,418–19(n.5–9)

toxic50transformational14,24,148–93,345–6;redefiningleadershipand5,6,102,127,139,141,142,144,183,342–3;definitionof6,102,148,342,435(n.7);rarityof6,189;Gorbachevas46,164–77,405(n.42),406(n.54);difficultyforAmericanpresidentstobecome139,344–6,403(n.18);redefiningleadersprecede141;distinguishedfromrevolutionaryleadership148–9;deGaulleas149–58,403–4(n.26);AdolfoSuárezas158–64,404(n.30;n.34),405(n.41);powerofpersuasionand171–7;DengXiaopingas177–83;Mandelaas183–9;andinspirationalleaders189–93;criteriafor189

weak–strongdichotomy1,2,23–4,120wealth/superiorityoffortuneand23,28–9,49–50,358–9,358–9n,373-4(n.15)whatkindofleadershipisdesirable?342–62

LeagueofNations298,314Lebanon117,244,247,353LeeKuanYew306Lee,Jennie124,397(n.82;n.83)Lemonnier,Pierre373(n.12)Lenin,Vladimir6,47,80,171,180,197,211,213,214,215,216,217,218,225n,251,255,257,272,304,350,351,352,411(n.8),412–13(n.46)

Levada,Yuriy47,379(n.71),420(n.23)Lewinsky,Monica81LiPeng268–9LiberalDemocrats,UK71,94,98,312LiberalParty,Australia58,64,69,382(n.108)LiberalParty,Canada2LiberalParty,UK84,111–14,124,186,312Libya117,244,245,298Lincoln,Abraham108,149,345–7,359n,435–6(n.17)Linz,JuanJ.11n,164,345,356,392(n.24),405(n.41),437(n.51)Lipman-Blumen,Jean50Lithuania166n,176,260,299,407(n.61)LiuShaoqui233,266LloydGeorge,David17,82–3,84,86,100,112–14Lloyd,Selwyn95,320,323,390(n.98;n.102)Locke,John374–5(n.24;n.28)LonNol,General228Lukashenka,Alexander3–4LutherKing,Martin4,20,106,107Luthuli,ChiefAlbert186Lysenko,Trofim258–9

MacArthur,GeneralDouglas16MacDonald,Ramsay82,83,115Machiavelli,Niccolò10,173,350,369(n.16),407(n.66)Mackintosh,John:TheBritishCabinetixMacleod,Iain122,427(n.44)Macmillan,Harold5,73,76,83,94–6,111,121,122–3,323n,324,325,335,390(n.98;n.102),396(n.74),429(n.92)

Madero,Francisco198,199,200Mair,Lucy373–4(n.15),402(n.56)Major,John2,69,70,71,98,333,349,369(n.19)Malenkov,Georgiy430(n.122)Manchuria230Mandela,Nelson21,41–2,53,97,144,149,183–9,193,394(n.56),402(n.132)Mandelson,Peter70,72n,369(n.16)Mango,Andrew210Manningham-Buller,Baroness332,432(n.153)

MaoZedong6,178–83,197,222–4,228,229,231,255,261–70,268n,271,274,292,302–7,359,420–1(n.28)

Marcos,Ferdinand39Marouby,Christian372(n.8)Marshall,GeneralGeorge15,17,344Martí,José231,234,275Marx,Karl196–7,251,253,272,304,410–11(n.7;n.8),411(n.9)Marxism171,211,214,224,225,234,236,239,257,269,273,278,288,377(n.51),422Marxism-Leninism171,239,269,273,278,279,288,422(n.56)Masaryk,Thomas44,46Massu,GeneralJacques153Matlock,JackF.57,364Matteotti,Giacomo280Matthews,HerbertL.233Mazowiecki,Tadeusz237Mbeki,Thabo188McCain,SenatorJohn66,386(n.14)McCarthy,SenatorJoseph16McFaul,Michael47McKinley,William26nMcPherson,James435(n.17),346media,mass8,22,43,48,52,52n,63–5,66,69,72n,75,81,86,88,89,89n,93,103,124,151,156,158,164,171,234,290,290n,315,317,343,354–5,357,360n,367(n.1),384(n.4),385(n.14)

Medvedev,Dmitriy61Meir,Golda38Mensheviks213,214,217,412–13(n.46)Merkel,Angela22,38,129,130Mexico198–201,269n,411(n.12)MI5331–2,335–6,432(n.153)MI6241Mic´unovic´,Veljko430(n.122)Mikoyan,Anastas257–8Milburn,Alan399(n.93)Miliband,Ed2,59n,72n,354,367–8(n.3),371(n.42),384(n.6),394–5(n.57)Miliband,David368(n.12)Millar,John29–30,32–3n,358,358–9nMiloševic´,Slobodan239–40Mitchell,SenatorGeorge125Mitterrand,François138,155Mollet,Guy323Molotov-RibbentropPact,1939296–7,299,313Molotov,Vyacheslav257,401(n.128)monarchy26,27n,29,30,31–2,33,35–6,38,46,53,85,158,159,162–3,164,220,245,280,281Monckton,Walter90Mongolia218,222Moore,Barrington411(n.9)Moore,Charles395(n.65)Moran,Lord90,91Morgan,Kenneth125,398(n.87)Morocco186,245

Morrison,Herbert87,91,93,114Morsi,Mohammed247,248,249,418(n.136)Mossadegh,Muhammad241,242Moynihan,DanielPatrick81Mubarak,Hosni244,245,247,248,249MunichAgreement,193812,84,296,315,427–8(n.45)Murrow,Ed86MuslimBrotherhood247–9,320,418(n.136)Mussolini,Benitovii,18,20,221,250,279–82,283,288,289,290,292,293,295,298–9,312,315,320,321,352,371(n.42),423(n.81)

Naim,Moisés357,438(n.53)Nasser,ColonelGamalAbdel319,320,321,322,325–6,426(n.37)NationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeople(NAACP)109NationalHealthService,UK116,124,399(n.93)NationalInsuranceActs,UK:1911,112;1946,115NationalSecurityCouncil,UK.334n,339NationalSecurityCouncil,US56–7,338,370(n.29)NativeAmericans26,28,32NATO132,157,245,303NaziParty12,44,84,89n,102–3,131,133,134,135,149,151,185,218,251,279,282,283–9,293,297,298,299–300,313,318,318n,319,321,360,399(n.102),401(n.128),419(n.7)

Nehru,Jawaharlal‘Pandit’39,96,235,304Netherlands356Neustadt,RichardE.15NewGuinea372(n.8),377(n.50)‘NewLabour’,UK72n,126,128,353NewZealand38,112,326Newton,Jim77NgoDinhDiem227NicholasII,Tsar47,212Nicolson,Harold315,318,326Nicolson,Nigel326,326n9/11327,328,336Nixon,Richard16,65,80,134,145,228,305NKVD217,255,256,257,300,301NobelPeacePrize20,186,187,190,427(n.37)nomdeguerre218,224–5,225n,230non-violentresistance20,186,189,195,230,239,245,416(n.116)NorthKorea13,146,190,228,230–1,252,254,271,277–9,301,302North,Oliver78,80NorthernIreland7,98,125Norway38,133,288Novotný,Antonín45nuclearwar/weapons16,132,167,258,304,305Nutting,Anthony325,326Nye,Joseph141n,354Nyerere,Julius41–2,377(n.55)

O’Connor,SandraDay111

Obama,Barack13–14,23,34,37,52n,65–6,74,276,330,345,376–7(n.46),385(n.14),387(n.40)Obregón,Álvaro200–1oligarchies8,254–71,293;seealsoleadership,oligarchicOpenUniversity124,397(n.83)Orwell,George252–3,252–3n,261,279,419(n.8)Owen,David295

Pahlavi,ShahReza241,242,243Pakistan20,39ParkChung-hee39ParkGeun-hye39parliamentarysystems2,5,9,12,15,17,21–2,31–2,33,55,56–61,62–74,82–100,139–40,152–3,157,160,162–3,172–3,185,203–4,206,255,281,283–5,316–17,320–1,343–4,345,347,348,382–3(n.112),385(n.8;n.12);seealsounderindividualnationname

parties,politicalvii,viii,1,2,9,10,18,19,21–3,29,38–9,40,43,56–60,59n,62–72,98–9,100,111,127,146,149,152,153,353–9,358–9n,371(n.42),382–3(n.109;n.112),390(n.94);seealsounderindividualpartyname

PatientProtectionandAffordableHealthCareAct,US34–5,345,357nPatrick,Deval74Paxton,Robert281,283,288Payton,John74Pechatnov,Vladimir303PekingUniversity179,205,205nPengZhen263Pentagon327,338Perkins,Frances106Perón,Evita39Perón,Isabel39Perón,Juan39personalizationofpolitics63,64,384(n.4),385(n.8)persuasion37,41,45,54,102,107,143,147,171–7,228,255,290,361,377(n.47),407(n.61)Pétain,Marshal149,150PetertheGreat,Tsar173–4n,379(n.73)Pierce,Roy66Pimlott,Ben396(n.74)Pineau,Christian323Pinochet,Augusto97,292Platow,Michael51Pliatzky,SirLeo70npluralism37,44,159–60,170,174,191,240,255,289,308,359,406(n.53),407(n.64)Poindexter,John78PolPot228–9,306Poland21,48,84,103,135,191–2,192n,193,237,252,258,274,296,297politicalculture42–8,61,156,172,197,378–9(n.59;n.63)politicalgenerations379(n.71)Polk,WilliamR.433(n.164)Pompidou,Georges66,157Portugal165n,288–9Powell,Charles350Powell,Colin338–9

Powell,Jonathan8,10,99,125,329,350–1,369(n.16)PragueSpring,196845–6,167,192,404(n.31)‘prematurecognitiveclosure’341presidentialsystems:hybridregimesand1,3,182,231,360,360n,413(n.58);USpowertoconductwarwithin10–11,11n,12,13–14;vice-presidencyand14–15,52,55,56,327–8,338–9,381–2(n.102),432(n.147);constraintsonpowerofUSpresident15,34,56–7,73–6,139–40,343,344–5,347–8;greatestareasofpresidentialpowerinUS16–17,56,107–8,329;campaigntrailandUSpresidency22–3;backgroundsofUSpresidents23;heightandelectionofUSpresidents26–7n;creationofUS33–4;comparativepowerofprimeministersandpresident33,55–6,73–4,345,347,348;effectofleaderonelectionoutcomeswithinUS65;USpresidentasheadofstate56;politicalpartiesand56–7;useofUSpresidencyas‘bullypulpit’56,79,140;legalchallengetoUSpresidentialdecisions34;SupremeCourtandUSseeSupremeCourt;presidentialdebates,US52,52n,65;CongressandUSseeCongressandSenate;complexityoffederalgovernmentandUS73–4;USpresidentpowertopersuadeand56,107–8;USpowerofappointmentwithin74–5,147,387(n.40);USvetopowerwithin75,75n,147;stategovernorshipsandUS76;devolutionofresponsibilitywithin76;powersandleadershipstyles–theAmericancase76–82;ExecutiveOfficeofthePresidency,US99,102,343;difficultyofbecomingaredefining,transformational,ordominatingleaderinUS139–40,146–7,149,344,345–6;powergreaterinforeignpolicythandomestic,US140–1;Frenchsystem152,154,155,157;dual/semi-presidentialsystems60–1,82,154–5,384(n.118);Russiaand170,170n,175,361;SouthAfricaand183,186,187,188,189,190;Polandand191–2;Mexicoand198–9,200–1,269n;Chinaand202,203–4,206,269;Turkeyand209,210;Vietnamand226,227;Czechoslovakiaand238;Egyptand247–9;Hitlerand284,286;advocacyofpresidentialpower342;expectationsofUSpresidency343;collaborativeleadership,successofwithin344,345–6;personalwealthand359n

presidentializationofpolitics63,64,73,81–2Price,Lance330Prior,Jim119primeministerix,2,6–7,10,15,15n,33,55,56–61,62,64,67–74,82–100,123,154–5,311–41,343–4,345,347,351,352–3,358,369(n.19),382–3(n.108;n.112;n.113),384(n.4),434(n.3);seealsounderindividualprimeministername

proportionalrepresentation(PR)electoralsystem67,127,130,154,347psychologyofleadership49–53publicopinion10,16,47,75,102–3,139,140,147,155–6,164,247,311,311–12n,312–13,353,403–4(n.14;n.18;n.26;n.29),417(n.128),433(n.164)

Putin,Vladimir13,47,59,60,61,191,191nPutnam,RobertD.378–9(n.63)Puyi,Emperor201,202

Quinlan,SirMichael332

Rákosi,Mátyás274Ránki,György135nRawnsley,Andrew341,371(n.42)Reagan,Ronald11,50,56,57,78–80,96,110–11,145,166,166–7n,327,327n,344–5,349redefiningleadershipseeleadershipRedwood,John369(n.19)Regan,Donald78Rehnquist,ChiefJusticeWilliam111Reicher,Stephen51religionx,31–2,36,41,43,48,131,132,174,182,191,200,201,208,209,210,222,243,247,248,252,276,279,281,285,289,292,371(n.45),417–18(n.133)

RepublicanParty,US11,13,57,65–6,74,76,77,80,81,104,106,326,349,357,357n,375(n.35),376–7(n.46),387(n.40)

RepublicanPeople’sParty,Turkey210revolutionaryleadershipseeleadershiprevolutionsvii,viii,6,29,31,32,35–6,46,102,105,148–9,167,169,175,177,178–9,180,192,194–250,255,256,258,261,272,273,275,276,277,280,281,286,290,298,301–2,324,346,359,374(n.23),376(n.42),410(n.4;n.5),411(n.13),412–13(n.46),413(n.58),416(n.115;n.116),417–18(n.126–37),seealsounderleadership:revolutionaryandunderindividualnationname

Rice,Condoleezza57,327,328,338,339,382(n.104)Rice,Susan74RobbinsReport,1963123,396(n.74)Robbins,Lord(Lionel)123,363Roberts,Andrew352Roberts,ChiefJusticeJohn34,35,376(n.40)Robinson,Nick394–5(n.57)Rodríguez,CarlosRafael234Rogan,Eugene417–18(n.133)Rogers,Will57Röhm,Ernst285,286Rohrschneider,Robert437(n.51)Romania231,237,239,240,271,274,416(n.116),417(n.118)Romney,Mitt52nRoosevelt,Eleanor105Roosevelt,FranklinD.5,15,55,56,75–6,75n,78,78n,101–6,107,110,146–7,150,185,232,343,344,387(n.42),391(n.2)

Roosevelt,Theodore75,79,101,102,140,391(n.2)Rose,GeneralSirMichael432(n.152)Ross,Charlie16Rothermere,Lord354Rousseff,Dilma40,143Roy,M.N.225Roy,Olivier247,417–18(n.33)Rudd,Kevin57–9,382–3(n,109;n.112),383(n.113;n.114)ruleoflaw1,31,32,34,37,77,174–5,254,281,283,291,431(n.139)Rumsfeld,Donald327,327n,328,334,336,338,341Russia:supportfor‘strongleader’in3,29,43,46–8,60–1,172,173–4n,251n,272,379(n.73);Syrianuprisingand13–14;‘strongleaders’andprevalenceofrevolutionsin29,374(n.23);1917revolutions(FebruaryandOctober)35,199,210–18,225,227,240,249,255,412–13(n.46);lackofdemocracyin43–4;Moscowprotestsoverriggedelections,2011and201244;politicalculture46–8,172;authorityandpopularityofleadersin46–7;Putin’sruleofseePutin,Vladimir;Yeltsin’sruleofseeYeltsin,Boris;politicalpartiesin59;semi-presidentialsystem60–1,384(n.118);returntostrongmangovernment60–1;MedvedevasclientofPutin61;LloydGeorgeand82;diversityof173n;firstfreeelection,November1917211–12;Duma212–13;FirstWorldWarand214;birthofSovietUnion217;Cheka217;CivilWar256;doctrineofnon-interference307;seealsoSovietUnion

Russo-Japanesewar,1904–5206Ryzhkov,Nikolay173,407(n.66)

SA285,286Sackville-West,Vita86Sadat,MuhammadAnwaral426(n.37)

Sagdeev,Roald172,405(n.44),407(n.60;n.61)Sahlins,Marshall41,377(n.51)Sakharov,Andrey259,260Salazar,AntóniodeOliviera288,289Saleh,AliAbdullah244,245Saleh,Heba418(n.136)Salisbury,Lord325Salmond,Alex127–8,399(n.97)Sarkozy,Nicholas43Sarria,LieutenantPedroManuel232Sassoon,Joseph337,424(n.119)Scalia,Antonin111Schmidt,Helmut136Schmitt,Carl250Scocpol,Theda411(n.9)Scotland7,25,32,32n,120,122,125,127–8,127n,130n,368(n.12),398(n.86)ScottishNationalParty(SNP)122,127,127n,128,312,398(n.86)Scowcroft,Brent56–7SecondWorldWar,1939–454–5,12,17,43,44,50,56,76,84,99,102–3,106,130,134,136,140,150,150n,151,165,174,178,185,210,218,221,222,226,251,251n,259,271,282,286,289,296–300,312–19,326,340

Seidman,Harold74,389(n.88)semi-presidentialsystems60–1,82,154–5,384(n.118)Senate,US11n,16,22,54–5,56,74,81,105,107,108,157,345Serantes,ArchbishopPérez232Sèvresprotocol,1956323,323nSeward,SenatorWilliamH.346–7Shafiq,Ahmed247Shakhnazarov,Georgiy172–3Shevardnadze,Eduard405(n.46)Shevtsova,Lilia191nShlaim,Avi430(n.115),432–3(n.153)Shuckburgh,SirEvelyn319Shultz,George78,338,344–5Sihanouk,Prince228Silverman,Sydney123,396–7(n.79)Simon,SirJohn317Singapore254,306,425(n.2)Sisulu,Walter184,186Skierka,Volker275nslavery32,32–3n,35,37,278,346,435–6(n.17)Slovakia3,44,192,193Slovo,Joe186Smith,Adam26,26n,27,28–9,30,49–50,254,358,358n,371–2(n.2;n.5),419–20(n.11)Smith,John70n,368(n.12),371(n.42)SocialDemocraticParty(SPD),Germany130,133,285socialism5,45,72n,89,89n,90,105,113,114,115,133,135,153,155,158,159,161,162,163,169,174,192n,206,211,212,213,216,217,220,239,252,252–3n,257,277,279,280,281,284,285,299,304,308,404(n.30),406(n.53;n.54),412(n.44),422(n.56)

SocialistParty,Spain158,159,161,163,277,404(n.30)

SocialistRevolutionaries(SRs)212,213,216Solberg,Erna38Solidarity21,191–2Solzhenitsyn,Aleksandr259,260SongJiaoren203–4Sorge,Richard299Soskice,SirFrank123,396(n.77)SouthAfrica21,41–2,53–4,97,118,122,142,143–4,183–9,308,394(n.56),402(n.130;n.132),409(n.91;n.100);CommunistPartyofSouthAfrica143,144,185,186

SouthKorea14,39,190,278,279,301,302,425(n.2)SovietUnion3,16,8,164–71;CommunistPartyseeCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion;collectiveleadershipin8,259–60,269–70,308;CommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion45,47,80,165,168,171,172,173,174,190,216–18,255,256,257,272,273,361–2,401(n.128),413(n.58);418–19(n.5),421–2(n.48),438(n.57);USand16,17,56–7,77,79,80,103,134,166–7,304,305,338,349;clientstatesinEasternEuropeand17,128,218–22,236–40,258,300–1,404(n.31);Politburo45,137,167,167n,168,169–70,170n,171,178,180,192n,219,240,255,256,257,258,259,260,272,308–9,310,311,361–2,401(n.128),405(n.46);TwentiethCongressoftheCommunistParty45,257,272;Twenty-SecondCongressoftheCommunistParty45,257,273;destalinizationin45,257–8,304;powerdeemedtoconferauthorityin46–7;attachmenttoruleof‘strongman’in46–8;GorbacheveraandliberalizationofseeGorbachev,Mikhail;ThatcherandseeThatcher,Margaret;SecondWorldWarand139,218,296–301,313,318,318n;relationswithWestGermany132,133–5,400(n.111);perestroika136,166n,169,172,173,174,175,277,seealsoGorbachev,Mikhail;invasionofCzechoslovakia,1968137,192,308,404(n.31);SouthAfricaand143,183;Chinaand145,178,179,223,225,227,261,262,263,288,301–2,304–5;deGaulleand157;Spainand165;CentralCommittee167,170,170n,176n,257,258,272,310,405(n.46),406(n.54),421(n.45),422(n.48);Augustcoup,1991176n,438(n.57);invasionofAfghanistan,1979192n,308–11,427;Russianrevolutions,1917(FebruaryandOctober)andbirthof210–18,255,413(n.58);purges/terrorunderStalin217,219,256–8,261,265,297,352;Vietnamand227;NorthKoreaand230,231;Cubaand234–5,275,276,277,305;totalitarianandauthoritarianleadershipin250,251,251n,252,253,254–61,419(n.6;n.7);StalineraseeStalin,Josif;Moscowshow-trials,1936–8255;NewEconomicPolicy256;collectivizationofagriculture251n,256,262;KhrushcheveraseeKhrushchev,Nikita;BrezhneveraseeBrezhnev,Leonid;cultofpersonalityin272–3;foreignpolicyillusions299–303;KoreanWarand301–3;autocratsandoligarchsinforeignpolicy303–11;Cubanmissilecrisisand305;proxyColdWarconflictsinAfricaand308,409(n.91);Egyptand320,324,426(n.37)

Spain142,149,158–64,165,165n,248,249,277,288–9;298,404(n.30;n.36;n.40),405(n.41)SpanishCommunistParty158,159,160,161,162,163Stalin,Josif27n,45,47–8,165,169,170,173,173–4n,180,214–15,216,217,218,219,222,223,225n,228,229,231,250,251,251n,252,253,254–61,262,265,271,272–3,279,292,293,295,296–7,298,299–303,304,312,313,318,352,359,360–1,419(n.6;n.7)

Starr,Kenneth81,388(n.58)StateDepartment,US15,17,232,338–9,344–5Steel,David124Stepan,Alfred11n,164,345,392(n.24),401–2(n.129),404(n.34),405(n.41),418(n.133)Stephens,Philip398(n.87);436(n.28)Stimson,HenryL.102Stothard,Peter431(n.138)Sturgeon,Nicola399(n.95)StrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI),US79,167Straw,Jack331,339,397(n.85),431(n.142)Suárez,Adolfo142,149,158–64,165,175,193,248,404(n.30;n.34),405(n.41)

Sudetenland296,313,317Suezcrisis,1956311,311n,312,319–26,335suffrage,universal31,36–8,39,175,212‘summittalks’12SunYat-sen198,202,203,205–7,240SupremeCourt,US34–5,73,75–7,107,357n,376(n.40)Suslov,Mikhail260Sweden,67,133Swinton,Lord82,313–14,315–16,428(n.90)Switzerland37,211,213,214,236,240Syria13–14,245–6,291,327n

Taiwan142,144–6,178,203,207n,305,306–7,424–5(n.2)Taliban20,335,371(n.44;n.45)Tambo,Oliver184,185,186Tanzania41,377(n.55)Taraki,NurMohammad309Taubman,William426(n.24)Taylor,A.J.P.430(n.118)Taylor,Zachary55TeaParty357,357nTebbit,Norman15Tejero,Lieutenant-ColonelAntonio163television,personalizationofpoliticsand22,52,52n,64–5,81,156,158,164,290,384(n.4),385(n.14)Thälman,Ernst284Thatcher,Margaret5–6,15,15n,17,18,22,38,68–70,69n,80,93,96–9,100,111,116–22,117n,124–5,126,136,138,146,333,343,349–50,350n,351–3,394(n.53;n.56),395(n.58,n.62,n.65),396(n.71),398(n.87;n.91),399(n.93),401(n.120)

Thomas,Norman105Thorning-Schmidt,Helle38Thornycroft,Peter95Tirman,John430(n.129)Tito,Marshal(JosefBroz)6,218–21,225n,239–40,252,271–2,301,324,430(n.122)totalitarianleadershipseeleadershiptotalitarianismvii,x,8,24,129,130,152,222,231,418–19(n.5;n.7;n.9);politicalcultureand46,47;ThirdReichand129,130;concept250–253;impervious-to-changeidea253–4;Stalin’sdictatorshipandSovietoligarchies254–61;personalruleversusoligarchyinChina261–71;theleaderunderCommunism271–9;theleaderunderfascism279–90;mythsofdictatorialregimes289–93;foreignpolicyillusionsand295–303,418–19(n.5–9)

tradeunions21,91,97,113,118,121,142,233,246,285,358transformationalleadershipseeleadershipTreasury,UK8,51,71,94,95,122,124,324Tretyakov,I.A.374(n.23)tribes26,27,28,29,40–1,290,373–4(n.10;n.15)Tripp,Charles331,336Trotsky,Leon72n,214–15,216,217,225n,255Truman,Harry11,14–17,24,56,73,76,80,106,107,226,344,370(n.30;n.35;n.40),387(n.35),392(n.6)

Tukhachevsky,Marshal256Tunisia244,246,247,249

Turgot,Anne-Robert-Jacques27–8,289–90Turkey198,199,207–10,305,370(n.40),418(n.133)Turnbull,Lord333,433(n.157)

Uganda374(n.15)UK(UnitedKingdom):primeministerandCabinetix,82–100;electionsinseeelections;coalitiongovernmentin56,83,84,85,87,88,91,94,111,114,115,334n,390(n.92),428–9(n.92);devolutionand7,125–6,127,127n,130n,368(n.12);HumanRightsActand7,125,368(n.12);FreedomofInformationAct7,125,368(n.12),394(n.53),397(n.85);power-sharinginNorthernIrelandand7,125;Euroand7,126,398(n.87);universalsuffragein31,37,38;evolutionofpowerin31–2;BlackWednesdayand70;gradualdevelopmentofconstitutionalmonarchy31–2;CivilWar,1649–6031;‘GloriousRevolution’,168831–2;leaders’influenceonelectoraloutcomesin62–72;primeministerialpowersandleadershipstyles82–100;redefiningleadersin111–28;significantlyinnovativeBritishgovernments122–6;self-deceptionof‘strongleaders’in311–41;Suezcrisis311,311n,312,319–26;Iraqinvasion311,311–12n,326–41;appeasement,Chamberlainand312–19;‘specialrelationship’withUnitedStates333;‘Napoleonic’rulein348–53;seealsounderindividualleadername

Ukraine3,4n,256,260Ulbricht,Walter235UnitedNations14,20,74,128,168,229,235,237,245,253,302,307,324,325,327,334–5,337,338,409(n.91)

UnitedRussia(party)59UnitedStates:Blairand8,311,311–12n,326–41;CongressseeCongress,US,HouseofRepresentatives,USandSenate,US;redefiningleadersin5,101–11,139–41,147;civilrightsin5,20,31,54,74,76–7,104–5,106,107,108,109,110,344,345,346;warpowersin10–11,11n,12,13–17;Vietnamwarand11,78,106,109,141,156–7,226–8,310,339,344,403(n.26);Syrianuprisingand13–14;ConstitutionseeConstitution,US;SovietUnionand16,17,56–7,77,79,80,103,134,166–7,304,305,338,349;presidencyseepresidentialsystemandunderindividualpresidentname;AmericanRevolution32–5,346;BillofRights35;universalsuffragein36–7,38;socialissuesin57;impactofleadersonelectoraloutcomesin64–6,67,seealsoelections;DeclarationofIndependence32,32n,226;NewDealand5,75–6,104,105,106,147;leadershipsstyles76–82;inequalityin107,359n;militarystrikesinLebanonandLibya117;invasionofGranada,1983118;difficultyofbecomingaredefiningortransformationalleaderin139–40,149,345–8;unintendedconsequencesofmilitaryintervention141,326–8,330–2,335–6,338–9;Chinaand145,223,305;Cambodiaand228;NorthKoreaand230;Cubaand231,232,235,275–6;Iranand241–2;Arabrevolutionsand245;KoreanWarand301,302–3;Iraqinvasionand311,312n,326–41;Suezand322,323n,324–5,326;9/11and327,328,336;‘specialrelationship’withUK333;NationalSecurityCouncil334n;CivilWar346;threattomoderatevoicesin357n

Ustinov,Dmitriy166–7n,260,309,401(n.128)

Vaculík,Ludvík194,195,410(n.1)Vance,Cyrus180Venezuela234,276VersaillesPeaceConference204–5,225VietCong227,414(n.83)Vietminh226–7Vietnam:warwithAmerica,1956–7511,78,106,109,141,156–7,227–8,310,339,344,403(n.26);HoChiMinhandCommunists’ascenttopower6,224–8,414(n.75;n.83);invadesCambodia,1979229,306;Sino-VietnameseWar,1979306,310,426(n.31)

Villa,Francisco(‘Pancho’)199,200vonSchleicher,GeneralKurt286vonSchuschnigg,Kurtvon287–8

vonWeizsäcker,Richard129Voroshilov,Kliment257Vorotnikov,Vitaliy171

Wagner,RobertF.106Wał sa,Lech21,191–2Wales7,122,125,130nWalker,Peter15n,119Wallace,Henry16Warren,Earl77‘waronterror’335WarsawPact176,238Weber,Max4,252–3,349,378(n.58),436(n.27)Weinberger,Caspar338welfarestate87–8,112,113–14,115,118,131,395(n.57),399(n.93),400(n.104)Welles,Gideon347Wellington,Dukeof15nWestGermany73,128,130–9,157,356Westad,OddArne307,365,426–7(n.37)Westen,Drew53‘Westminstermodel’2,41Whitefield,Stephen366(n.8),368(n.8),418(n.137),437(n.51)Whitmore,Clive119Wilkins,Roy109WilsonMann,Woodrow77Wilson,Harold67,68,68n,72n,93,107,111,122,123,124,128,339–40,396(n.74;n.76),397(n.83)Wilson,Lord(Richard)333,432–3(n.153)Wilson,RichardW.378(n.59)Wilson,SirHorace315,318Wilson,Woodrow225,226Winant,Gilbert318nWolfowitz,Paul328women:leadershipof20,37–40;Talibanand20,371(n.45);suffrageand32,37–8,113,203;EleanorRooseveltseekstoimproveopportunitiesfor105;Mandelaandsubordinationof184;emancipationofTurkish210;InternationalWomen’sDay211;UKparliamentrepresentation352

Woods,Randall107Wright,Tony99–100Wright,Vincent156

XiJinping270

Yakovlev,Aleksandr169,171,177,364,405(n.46)Yeltsin,Boris46,59,60–1,172,175,190,191,191nYemen244,245,417(n.127)Yousafzai,Malala20,371(n.45)YuanShikai202,203,204,205Yugoslavia6,176,218–22,237,239–40,252,271–2,301,324,416(n.117),430(n.122)

Zapata,Emiliano199,200ZhangChunqiao266,267

ZhaoZiyang182,268Zhivkov,Todor238Ziegler,Philip388(n.62)Zyuganov,Gennady46