the making of india’s foreign policy...111 chapter - iii an analysis of the contribution of sardar...
TRANSCRIPT
111
CHAPTER - III
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF SARDAR K.M PANIKKAR IN
THE MAKING OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: EVOLVING THE
CONCEPT OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY
Antecedents of K.M Panikkar:
Kavalam Madhava Panikkar was born in the water locked village of Kerala
„Kavalam‟ in the year 1894 as the second son of Chalayil Kochukunji Amma and
Periamana Puthiyillam Parameswaran Nampoothiri. Chalayil was a renowned family
of the remote locality. The only bread winning prospect of the place was paddy
cultivation in low lying back water fields. The myth behind the Palliyarakkavu Devi
temple at Kavalam is that the idol, which is a swayambhoo – (formed by itself) – is
guarding the northwestern gateway of the river to the Vembanad lake with a crocodile
tied to the small toe of one of the legs with a golden chain to prevent the intruders
attacking or escaping on canoes through the only corridor of the two shores of
Kavalam and Kunnumma.
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The childhood of Sardar K.M. Panikkar was spent in Kavalam, one amongst a
cluster of islands in the lower Kuttanad area. Manually operated canoes were the only
mode of transportation for all the daily routine needs of the people of the area. If both
sides of innumerable canals in the village were not connected by a bridge (usually by a
single coconut stem), the transportation was possible either using manually operated
small canoes or swimming across.The industrial revolution was a springboard for
science and technology to develop in a steady track globally in the wake of the 20th
century. Kavalam was surrounded by water resulting in difficulty to get in touch with
the mainland like Kottayam, Alappuzha or Changanassery. It is just imaginable of the
predicament of the people living in that area towards the end of 19th century when
Sardar K.M. Panikkar as a child was receiving his primary education. The preliminary
education of Sardar Panikkar was started at the age of five under the supervision of
Ayyappa Panikkar. Another family relative Kunjunni Panikkar was running a kalari.
At this kalari, without any differentiation of caste and creed, he was imparting
education in Malayalam alphabet writing on sand besides comprehensive recital
training more related to the traditional style of transmitting from mouth to the ears.
Here he learned reading and writing on the sand, the technique of writing
„srikrishnacharitam manipravalam‟ on palm leaves and basic mathematics a subject
not very much to his liking. After the fall of dusk, his mother had the habit of regularly
reading Ezhuthachan Ramayanam and Bhagavatam is listening to, which had helped
him to develop a deep interest in the mother tongue and Sanskrit. Later in his life,
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being a prolific writer in English, he chose Malayalam as the medium for writing. His
autobiography shows his reverence to the mother tongue for self-expression. In a
course of one year, he could write each sloka of „srikrishna charitam manipravalam‟ in
the palm leaves and could recite them by heart. There were no schools anywhere near
to impart English education in those days. His grandmother decided that he would
leave for Thiruvananthapuram only after learning how to write using paper and pencil
and she entrusted this mission to Ayyappa Panikkar who was in charge of looking after
the family accounts. He was a strict disciplinarian and a rational and short tempered
person. He would give him paper and pencil to copy the accounts and practice some
lessons in mathematics.The literary area that fascinated him the most was that of
Kunjan Nambiar‟s Thullal stories, most of which he knew by heart. His youngest uncle
Govinda Panikkar and elder brother K.P. Panikkar were studying B.A and High school
classes respectively in Thiruvananthapuram and it was decided that the eight-year-old
boy would join them. It was his first voyage out of Kavalam and even though there
were steamboats that had just started plying from Alleppey to Quilon; he along with
his elder brother undertook the total voyage by manually operated canoe taking almost
four to five days to reach Thiruvananthapuram. This voyage is considered by him as
the most exciting one in his life, even though he had undertaken many voyages through
the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean to Europe many times later.
His study up to third form (fifth class) continued in Thiruvananthapuram. But
in the final examination of the third form he had failed for a strange reason - the
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mathematics answer paper had been kept in his pocket without submitting. It was at
this point of time that his youngest uncle Govinda Panikkar had completed his
B.A.B.L and elder brother K.P. Panikkar his F.A. It was then decided that there was
no point in his continuing at Thiruvananthapuram. The school chosen for extending his
studies was at Thalavady Anaprambal in the neighbourhood at Upper Kuttanad. This
was the school where Sardar Panikkar had to join to re-do his third form and continued
up to the fifth form. After that Sardar Panikkar was sent to Kottayam C.M.S. College
school. Meanwhile, his brother had left Madras to join medicine in Edinburgh and the
two years of Sardar Panikkar‟s study in Kottayam were nothing but the association to
Malayalam literature and literary people like P.K. Narayana Pillai; but the tragedy of
errors was that he failed in the matriculation examination. People at home judged him
to be unfit for academic excellence. He was so dejected that he consumed a bottle of
chloroform to end his life, but had to open his eyes the next day to see mother and
grandmother and other relatives pouring cold water on his face. His brother from
England wrote that he should be sent to Madras St.Paul‟s school to complete his
matriculation and that became a turning point in his life. Even after passing the
matriculation from Madras he was not sure what lay ahead of him until his brother
K.P. Panikkar who was on the verge of completing studies in medicine arranged his
admission to Oxford. Even while he was studying in Madras for intermediate, he
started regularly writing on Cherussery, Ezhuthachan, Kunjan Nambiar etc. in
„Deepika‟ a weekly published from Mannanam those days. But his real exposure to the
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international and national arena was lying ahead through his Oxford days. In April,
1914 he set out on the cruise from India around Good Hope of South Africa to reach
London in May 1914.
The real ability of Sardar Panikkar as a writer in English was proven in 1917,
when T.K. Swaminathan, who was publishing a magazine called „Colonial review‟
from Madras asked him to write about the Indians living outside India. Based on the
request, he wrote an essay on „The Problems of greater India‟ and was appraised as the
best by none other than C.P. Ramaswamy Iyer. The article was reviewed by Sir Roland
Wilson Baronet in the Asiatic review. East Indian Association secretary John Pollen
later invited him to speak (this was the first time for an Indian) on Indian Education.
Based on this talk, an education supplement of London Times was published with a
leading article on his talk. Sardar Panikkar‟s brilliant track record in Oxford was a
corridor of destiny for him to enter into the picturesque scenario of Indian National
movement and politics in the pre-independence era as well as the subsequent
diplomatic missions in Independent India. During this journey of forty six years, he
kept his academic and literary pursuit intact to substantiate what he had accomplished.
On returning to India, he first taught at the Aligarh Muslim University and later at the
University of Calcutta. He turned to journalism in 1925 as editor of the Hindustan
Times.
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Academics and scholarship
During his college years, Panikkar had cultivated a special interest in reading
Malayalam literature and had also a close association with the famous poet in the
Malayalam language Vallathol Narayana Menon. Later on, Panikkar published
scholarly works extensively and worked on ancient Indian history and more recent
historical developments. Arthur Hassall who was a famous Cambridge historian
remarked that in his long career as a tutor of history at Christ Church he had never had
a more brilliant student like Panikkar. Panikkar‟s interests extended into miscellaneous
areas such as art and history, poetry, novels and dance especially Kathakali. Apart
from these Panikkar was also a brilliant writer who wrote equally well in both
Malayalam and English languages and published over 50 books and numerous articles.
Notable works in English:
a. The Strategic Problems of the Indian Ocean (1944)
b. Asia and Western Dominance : A Survey of the Vasco Da Gama Epoch of
Asian History, 1498-1945 (1953)
c. In Two Chinas : Memoirs of a Diplomat (1955)
d. The Principles and Practice of Diplomacy (1956)
e. India and China: a study of Cultural Relations (1957)
f. India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on
Indian History (1962)
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g. Lectures on India's Contact with the World in the pre-British Period (1965)
h. Geographical Factors in Indian History (1969)
i. An Autobiography (1977).
Sardar Panikkar‟s work „Asia and Western Dominance‟ where he believes the
Western dominance in Asia could sustain due to industrial backwardness and
accessibility of cheap labour at a point of time, the interaction of Asians with west
brought out certain valuable payback or roll back that could not be written off. There
had been a number of social reformers from within India than westerners to bring
about a sweeping change in the Indian regional social fabric. He narrates holistically in
his „Asia and Western Dominance‟- the Indian sensitivity in the backdrop of Asian
history. He set apart few pages on how Russian Revolution affected the people of
Asia. As for Asians the events of 20th
century have shaped three distinct destinies:
1. Withdrawal of European colonies from Asia
2. A new awakening of Asia
3. Emergence of polarized world power as American and Soviet blocks
The book also mentions a fantasy puzzle of questioning Asian minds whether to
go left or right. In between the two sides, the question in free India would be to urge
Indians to select a value based Indian ethos of democracy where two sides were
evidently discerned - one side to reach self-sufficiency through dollar and the other
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looking for intellectual catalysts only from Kremlin. His reading of Asia came true as
far as China is concerned - a country never had to sign a treaty with western countries
and had an agreement with Russia only since 1689 became self-sufficient without
going after dollar even while the Soviet Union had to disintegrate.
Sardar Panikkar‟s career was entwined to the political, cultural, administrative
and diplomatic scenario of the country. Panikkar was a rolling stone that did not get
stuck anywhere in his inexhaustible journey, turning whatever he touched to gold.
Ayyappa Panikkar in his book „Kerala Writers in English‟ published for Macmillan
India Ltd. stated on Panikkar, “a dedicated researcher, a distinguished historian, an
able administrator, a far-sighted diplomat, an educationist with a vision, a powerful
writer in both English and Malayalam: all these divergent roles seemed to suit Major
Sardar K.M.Panikkar who had been Professor, Editor, Minister, Ambassador, and
Vice-Chancellor by turns.”1 The undeterred facet of his life was that he kept on writing
and he shaped and carved history from the perception of being an Indian. In spite of
being a prolific writer in English, Sardar Panikkar tried to narrate history in the true
perspective of an Indian in colonial India cherishing its own culture.
In March 1948, Panikkar was appointed as India‟s Ambassador to China. On
the 14th April, he reached Shanghai in eastern China and the next day proceeded to
Nanking (Nanjing) the capital of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi).When he was
exchanging the official papers with Kuomintang Government, they were already in the
midst of political uncertainty. Chiang Kai-shek and madam Kai-shek received him
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with all the warmth in diplomacy. The first impression of this man as Panikkar puts in
his book „In Two Chinas‟ is that of a saintly Christian who believed in Confucian
philosophy. He believed that nothing could be done by Mao Zedong‟s 5,000 guerrilla
red army against the 500,000 strong armies under his command. In May 1950,
Panikkar was granted the first interview with Chairman Mao Zedong and came away
greatly surprised. In his own words, “Mao‟s face was pleasant and benevolent and the
look in his eyes is kindly. There is no cruelty or hardness either in his eyes or in the
expression of his mouth. In fact, he gave me the impression of a philosophical mind, a
little dreamy but absolutely sure of itself. The Chinese leader had experienced many
hardships and endured tremendous sufferings yet his face showed no signs of
bitterness, cruelty or sorrow.”2 Mao started his talk in presence of premier Chou-En-
lai and an interpreter with an opening remark of a Chinese proverb “a man who lives
an ideal life in China will have a birth in India” and enquired what exactly was the
status of Buddhist religion at that point of time in India.3 The talk also covered the
concern over Dalai Lama and his hostility to Panchan Lama raised by the Indian Prime
Minister about which no dissent note from Chinese side had been recorded. However,
the scenario changed by the end of the decade.
In between his diplomatic tenure in Egypt and France, there was an important
mission for him to perform in India when appointed as one of the three members of the
State Reorganization Committee on 22nd
September 1952 where Pandit Hridaynath
Kunzru and Justice Syed Fazal Ali were the other members. Sardar Panikkar believed
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firmly that a large State like Uttar Pradesh if formed, was likely to lead to „disruptive
tendencies‟. He also knew such a huge state was administratively unmanageable.
Panikkar‟s idea was for a new state with Agra as center including some districts of
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. He suggested some districts, including Bhind,
Morena, Gird and Sivapuri from M.P and Jhansi, Agra, Rohilkhand, Meerut excluding
Dehra Dun and Pilibhit from U.P to set a balanced community. But for representative
members of Parliament, UP was a „Utility Pradesh‟ for congress at that point of time
and for obvious reasons, other two members were keen on not dividing UP. Panikkar
had recorded his dissent note saying the consequence of the dominance of Uttar
Pradesh would be a danger to the country. The population of UP has grown up from 63
million to three folds that the division became inevitable eventually.
After an attack of a stroke while in France in April 1959, his health was
declining and he underwent Ayurvedic treatment in Kerala. He was subsequently
nominated as a member of Rajya Sabha while concentrating on academics by serving
as founder,Vice Chancellor of Jammu & Kashmir University and later at Mysore
University until he passed away in Mysore on 10th of December,1963 while presiding
over a function introducing Amiya Chakravarty, the great author and Bengali Poet.4
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Nehruvian Foreign Policy: Role of Sardar Panikkar
The international relations scholarship has largely held that India‟s foreign
policy originated at the dawn of independence and was largely inspired by the vision
of one man, Jawaharlal Nehru. There are few studies that have explored the roots of
India‟s foreign policy in the two traditions that it had inherited – one was the
worldview of the national movement and the other was the foreign policy imperatives
of the Government of India before independence. Further compounding this was the
near-universal interpretation of Jawaharlal Nehru‟s foreign policy vision as an entirely
idealist in its orientation. To be sure, a strong sense of liberal internationalism
permeated Nehru‟s worldview, the articulation of India‟s foreign policy and its actual
conduct. At the same time, Nehru also had a strong realist tendency in his worldview
that was reflected most acutely in his approach to security cooperation with the
neighbours.
The traditional discourse on Nehru‟s foreign policy and its roots in idealism is
focused on his response to the emergence of the Cold War, his activism in favour of
international peace, and his search for Afro-Asian solidarity. He was deeply
geopolitical in his thinking and his attitudes towards the Himalayan kingdoms
underlined his vision of India as a major power that is prepared to defend its security
interests, however cautiously and carefully.5 Nehru‟s interest in security diplomacy
was not limited to the northern frontier. The early years of independence saw Nehru
embark on significant cooperation with other neighbours, especially Burma (now
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Myanmar) and Indonesia. Nehru‟s ideas were echoed in Panikkar‟s thinking also.
Writing before independence, K. M. Panikkar underlined the importance of Burma for
India‟s security: “the defense of Burma is in fact, the defense of India, and it is India‟s
primary concern no less than Burma‟s to see that its frontiers remain inviolate. In fact,
no responsibility can be considered too heavy for India when it comes to the question
of defending Burma”.6 Panikkar was convinced that Burma was not in a position to
defend itself and the country‟s domination by another power would be disastrous for
India. Panikkar also understood that emerging nationalism in the post-colonial period
would make substantial defense cooperation between Delhi and Rangoon difficult. Yet,
he was confident that the logic of a defense union will work in Delhi and Rangoon.
What emerged, however, was a more complex story of India-Burma defense
cooperation after the Second World War.7 Panikkar‟s writings highly inspired Nehru to
formulate India‟s foreign policies and security strategies to deal with many
neighbouring nations. The review of Nehru‟s treaty diplomacy underlies the very
different universe that independent India had to contend with. The logic of India‟s
security was bound to the nature of its territoriality that was constructed under the Raj,
and a measure of continuity in India‟s security politics was inevitable. Nehru sought to
reconstruct such continuity in security politics in the Himalayan inner ring on a
modified basis, showing accommodation where possible towards the interests of the
smaller neighbours, but making it absolutely clear that they were an integral part of
India‟s defense system. India‟s significant prestige in the international system and its
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military weight were also recognised by other countries, small and large, as they
sought security cooperation with it. Nehru‟s ability to construct and maintain an
inherited security system was constrained by a number of factors, including the
emergence of a unified and powerful China on its northern frontiers. While the
perceived threat from China initially created the conditions for stronger security
cooperation, Beijing‟s determined quest to improve relations with India‟s neighbours
and the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations constrained Delhi‟s room for maneuvre.
China would remain an important factor in strengthening the essence of India‟s
Himalayan policy in the following decades, while its articulation and implementation
had to be continuously adjusted. If Nehru had difficulties in managing this new
dynamic in the inner ring of the Himalayas, his successors struggled continually to
adapt and offer concessions to the neighbours but never agreed to undo the framework
that he had put in place. Underlying India‟s intensive security diplomacy in recent
years are the propositions which Nehru had laid down clearly that Delhi‟s interests
would extend beyond its borders – Aden to Malacca or Suez to the South China Sea.
As a large geopolitical unit, Nehru believed, India had the responsibility to assist
friends and partners in the military domain. Nehru‟s sights were not limited to
promoting narrowly defined national interests of India. He recognised that India should
contribute to international peace and security and took the initiative to participate in
United Nations peacekeeping operations. It was a legacy that his successors would
pursue despite deepening military challenges on India‟s frontiers. They would make its
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armed forces one of the largest contributors to international peace operations and invite
the characterisation of India as a „net provider of security‟ in the Indian Ocean littoral
and beyond.8
Regarding Non-alignment, while other states have pursued other paths in the
pursuit of power through tight alignments, Indian policymakers have consistently
emphasized the dangers of dependence. Nehru summed up this approach in 1948:
“There is a psychological reason also for continuing our policy of neutrality at the
present juncture in world affairs. Any deviation from it will weaken us and will make
us camp-followers of some group. We will not think of relying on our own strength but
will progressively place our reliance on some other country which may or may not
help us in time of need.”9 This strategic orientation emerged from a commonly-held
reaction to the dangers of colonial domination. Indians of all political stripes felt a
strong need to avoid subordination for fear of a return to the pre-independence period.
Nationalist elites examined Indian history and identified dependence and foreign
involvement as the route through which India became colonized and dominated. Good
examples of this analysis are Jawaharlal Nehru‟s, „Discovery of India‟ and K. M.
Panikkar‟s, „ India and the Indian Ocean.‟ A fascinating explanation for the Indian
rejection of alliance ties in the two decades after independence can be found in the
writing of K. M. Panikkar, both a defense intellectual and the Indian ambassador to
China, France, and Egypt in the decade after independence. Panikkar explicitly asks
“why has India denied herself the benefits of an alliance with more powerful states at
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a time when even great powers like England have found it necessary to join offensive
and defensive alliances in order to safeguard their interests?” Panikkar‟s answer is
that “to understand this, one has to go back to Indian history. It was through
„subordinate alliances‟ for the purpose of defending their territories that the rulers of
India lost their independence ………… by calling in a stronger power to help you in
defending your independence, you subordinate your policies to the advice of the
protecting power and thereby limit your independence.”10
Therefore, from its earliest
years (and even before, in the freedom movement), the consensus was that India must
preserve its independence and autonomy from dependence while building up
indigenous military strength that would force the major powers to accept India as an
equal .
The rapport between Sardar Panikkar and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was that of
mutual understanding and respect, and both are being recognized as Historians. After
independence and the early years of his tenure as the prime minister there were two
distinct dogmatic sides - „left‟ and „right‟ being developed amongst the ministerial
colleagues where PM Jawaharlal Nehru was the focal point. On the left, it was the
proximity and trust of Prime Minister to V.K. Krishna Menon who was the defense
minister in the 50‟s and to the right was the remoteness and lack of trust of prime
minister with Sardar Patel, the Home Minister then. Defence minister Krishna Menon,
had such high esteem for Panikkar as a historian and diplomat and his authority in
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analyzing the strategic problems of Indian Ocean that he once remarked, “Panikkar
can write a history book in half an hour which he could not even in six years”.11
Strategic significance of the Indian Ocean:
Geography plays an important role in the process of foreign policy
formulation. Hence, to illustrate the importance of geography geopolitical theorists
have highlighted various geographical factors in the determination of foreign policy
considerations such as the acquirement of natural boundaries, admittance to important
sea routes and have power over strategically important land areas. Regarding the
importance of sea routes in determining the foreign policy, it could be boiled down to
the four main attributes, or ways in which it has been used, namely resources it
contained, utility as a means of transportation and trade, importance as a means of
exchanging information and as a source of power and dominion.12
The physical
background for India is the way that very few nations in the world geographically
dominate an ocean area as India dominates the Indian Ocean, which leads to the
question of how far this geographical preeminence is reflected in the political arena.13
The Indian Ocean is vast. Its western border is continental Africa to a longitude of
20° E, where it stretches south from Cape Agulhas; its northern border is continental
Asia from Suez to the Malay Peninsula; in the east it incorporates Singapore, the
Indonesian archipelago, Australia to longitude 147° E and Tasmania; while in the
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south it stretches to latitude 60° S as determined per the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.
There are 26 Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) states dependent upon the Indian Ocean for
trade and communications.14
IOR stretches from Suez Canal in the west to the Strait of
Malacca in the east and is restricted by choke points on either end. Indian peninsula
juts into this strategically important space of IOR and overlooks the maritime activities
across it. In the words of Nehru – „It is so situated that she is the pivot of Western,
Southern and Southeast Asia and enjoys a strategic centrality of vital geo-strategic,
economic, and energy network.‟15
Being contiguous to Gulf region, resources as well
as, commercial cargo, have to pass through the busiest international shipping lanes
close to India. Security of this trade and the energy flow and their vulnerability to
disruptions are a potent source of conflict in the region. IOR, therefore, continues to be
strategically significant on account of SLOCs and remains a critical global economic
hub.
The Indian Ocean had from time immemorial been the scene of intense
commercial trade. From the beginning of history, Indian ships had sailed across the
Arabian Sea up to the Red Sea ports and maintained intimate cultural and commercial
connections with Egypt, Israel and other countries of the Near East. Long before
Hippalus disclosed the secret of the monsoon to the Romans, Indian navigators had
made use of these winds and sailed to Bab-el-Mandeb. To the east, Indian mariners had
gone as far as Borneo and flourishing Indian colonies had existed for over 1,200 years
in Malaya, the islands of Indonesia, in Cambodia, Champa and other areas of the coast.
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Indian ships from Quilon made regular journeys to the South China coast. A long
tradition of maritime life was part of the history of Peninsular India. The supremacy of
India in the waters that washed her coast was unchallenged till the rise of Arab
shipping under the early khalifs. But the Arabs and Hindus competed openly, and the
idea of „sovereignty over the sea‟ except in narrow straits was unknown to Asian
conception. It is true that the Sri Vijaya Empire dominating the Straits of Malacca
exercised control of shipping through that sea lane for two centuries, but there was no
question at any time of any Asian power exercising or claiming the right to control
traffic in open seas. It follows from this conception of the freedom of the seas that
Indian rulers who maintained powerful navies like the Chola Emperors, or the
Zamorins, used it only for the protection of the coast, for putting down piracy and, in
case of war, for carrying and escorting troops across the seas. Thus during the hundred
years‟ war between the Sailendra Kings of Sri Vijaya and the Chola Emperors, the
reported battles are all on land, the Chola king carrying whole armies across to the
Malayan Peninsula and fighting successive campaigns in the territories of the Malayan
ruler.
India is a littoral state. However, she alone geographically projects into the
Ocean, her long triangle wedge-shaped landmass extending some 1500 miles into the
Indian Ocean. Her position is literally „pivotal‟ in the Indian Ocean.16
India is
effectively „the only viable link‟ between the various maritime zones of the Indian
Ocean region, i.e. between the Malacca Straits, Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal, Central
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Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and its extensions in the Gulf and the Red Sea.17
Andaman
and Nicobar Islands provide India with the potential to dominate the strategic sea lanes
and choke points in the east and makes them a cornerstone of Indian maritime strategy.
For decades, the Indian Ocean was a boutique theme that excited a section of India‟s
strategic community.18
It included navalists who were nostalgic about the undivided
subcontinent‟s primacy in the Indian Ocean under the Raj. Delhi‟s diplomatic rhetoric
was focused on getting great powers out of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, before
independence, in theory, Nehru gave weight to India‟s potential role in the Indian
Ocean as India moved to independence. He argued (1946) for a permanent UN
Security Council seat for India, “demanded by her geographical position, by her great
potential and by the fact that she is the pivot around which the defense problems of the
Middle East, the Indian Ocean and South-east Asia revolve. . …this dominant
position.”19
Elsewhere (1946) came his vision of an India as the “center of economic
and political activity in the Indian Ocean, in South-East Asia and right up to the
Middle East.”20
Consequently, Nehru (1948) considered, “anything that happens in the
whole Indian Ocean region, affects and is affected by India. It simply cannot help it.”21
The Indian Ocean is an important resource as the third largest body of water on
earth, providing the major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia
with Europe and the western hemisphere. The region is rich in energy resources and
minerals such as gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminum and cadmium and also
contains abundant fishing resources. Oil and gas traversing the Indian Ocean are of
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great importance to the global economy. Roughly 55 percent of known oil reserves and
40 percent of gas reserves are in the Indian Ocean region. The Gulf and Arab states
produce around 21 percent of the world‟s oil, with daily crude exports of up to 17,262
million barrels representing about 43 percent of international exports.22
The sea lanes
in the Indian Ocean are considered among the most strategically important in the
world. According to the „Journal of the Indian Ocean Region‟, the Indian Ocean choke
points are commercially very significant where more than 80 percent of the world‟s
seaborne trade in oil transits regularly through these choke points, where 40 percent
passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 percent through the Strait of Malacca and 8
percent through the Bab el-Mandab Strait.23
In the first decade of 21st century, Indian
Ocean Region (IOR) is witnessing sweeping changes and considerable turbulence. It is
humming with commercial and military activity with unbelievable economic growth
based on trade over the sea. This ocean has always been central to the Indian economy,
prosperity and indeed her freedom. However, the vulnerability of this region has also
been a matter of serious concern today due to the disruptive activities prevailing in this
region by both regional as well as extra-regional players. Moreover, the security of this
region has great economic and political implications. The Indian Ocean, gradually has
become the focal point of big power rivalry in the recent past because of its resources
and its importance in maintaining the strategic balance among the big powers. It poses
a grave security threat to the countries of the Indian Ocean Region which are
militarily, economically and industrially weak but rich in human and material
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resources. These resources of the Indian Ocean Region, which had served the best
interests of the colonial powers in the past are again being exploited for the economic
and political benefits of these powers in the recent times also. The security of shipping
and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean is an issue of major
strategic concern. In the first instance, sea-lane security is important to the national
economies of Indian Ocean countries, specifically to their industrial and commercial
sectors, since trade is their main link to global markets. The Indian Ocean is
furthermore a vital transit route between the Pacific region, Africa and Europe, with
vast cargoes passing through the region. Finally, the world‟s most important oil and
gas routes go across the Indian Ocean, because of the Indian Ocean‟s strategic
importance and the fact that the free flow of traffic can easily be interfered with, many
extra-regional forces operate in its waters. Keeping the SLOCs open is vital to the
global economy. Furthermore, the volatile security situation and the tensions in the
Persian Gulf have stimulated foreign military intervention (the Iran-Iraq War in the
1980s, the Iraq-Kuwait War in the early 1990s, the Iraq War in 2003 and the war in
Afghanistan are recent examples), while piracy, the asymmetrical threat and the flow
of vital energy resources have recently caused much anxiety and the deployment of
many navies. More than half the world‟s armed conflicts are presently located in the
Indian Ocean region, while the waters are also home to continually evolving strategic
developments including the competing rises of China and India, potential nuclear
confrontation between India and Pakistan, the US interventions in Iraq and
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Afghanistan, Islamist terrorism, growing incidence of piracy in and around the Horn of
Africa,and management of diminishing fishery resources. As a result of all this, almost
all the world‟s major powers have deployed substantial military forces in the Indian
Ocean region.
India‟s first Chief of Naval Staff, within ten days of independence, submitted a ten-
year plan for naval expansion to bring India “to a position of preeminence and leadership
among the nations of South-East Asia.”24
Sardar Patel (1948), the „Iron Man‟ and Deputy
Prime Minister of India, also recognized the importance of a strong naval power for the
maritime security of India. He stated that “the geographical position and features of India
make it inevitable for India to have a strong navy to guard its long coastline and to keep a
constant vigil on the vast expanse of the sea that surrounds us25 …………. The “size” of the
Indian Navy was to be built up, developing an invincible navy (at least so far as the Indian
Ocean is concerned) to defend not only her coast but her distant oceanic frontiers with her
own navy.”26 In the present day situation, India‟s strategic anticipation in the Indian Ocean
rests most evidently on its maritime forces. In this regard former Admiral of the Indian Navy
Arun Prakash mentioned that “it is vital, not just for India‟s security but also for her continued
prosperity, that we possess a Navy which will protect the nation‟s vast and varied maritime
interests,” where “the Navy‟s role is to help maintain peace in the Indian Ocean, meet the
expectations of our friends and neighbours in times of need, and underpin India‟s status as a
regional power.”27 The Indian Fleet Review of 2006 proudly unfurled the world‟s 4th
biggest navy (137 ships), showcasing over 50 Naval ships, including an aircraft carrier
(with 55 aircraft), submarines and advanced stealth frigates.28
Nonetheless, the country
133
is undergoing a maritime renaissance as evidenced by the growing size of its navy and
the Indian economy‟s growing dependence on overseas trade. This is complemented by
India‟s maritime infrastructure, including the country‟s 13 major ports and 187 minor
and intermediate ports that are scattered across the 7,517 km Indian coastline, as well
as more than two dozen shipyards and 14,500 km of navigable inland waterways.29
India attracts many powers of the world that want to bring her under their
control or influence due to her strategic location in the Indian Ocean availability of
mineral resources, its large population providing the big pool of a workforce along
with its industrial and economic backwardness. But ever since her independence India
followed an independent path of Non-alignment without allowing her to go under the
influence of any of these worlds powers who were eager to bring her under their
control or influence. Presently, it has proved a guiding beacon to the underdeveloped
world of the third world countries and is providing them requisite leadership for the
equitable and just economic order against the exploitation of the industrial North.
Factors contributing to the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean for India consist
of her very location in this big ocean which is of paramount importance to her.
Panikkar’s Perception of Strategic Relevance of the Indian Ocean:
The Indian Ocean is the only ocean in the world which is known after the name
of one of its littoral countries. India‟s standing as the most populous state in the Indian
134
Ocean Region and its central position in the northern Indian Ocean has long
contributed to beliefs about India‟s destiny to control its eponymous ocean. Now,
there is a well-established tradition among the Indian strategic community that the
Indian Ocean is, or should be, „India‟s Ocean‟. Many in the Indian Navy see it as
destined to become the predominant maritime security provider in a region stretching
from the Red Sea to Singapore and having a significant security role in areas beyond.30
Indian maritime strategists see predominance in the Indian Ocean as potentially also
delivering significant influence in East Asia.31
The first Indian voice in the strategic significance of Indian Ocean is that of
Sardar K.M. Panikkar. In his book „India and the Indian Ocean‟ focusing on the
strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. According to Panikkar, for geophysical
reasons (namely the winds that accompany the cyclic SW and NE monsoons, as well
as the prevailing currents) it was the Indian Ocean, and specifically, the lands washed
by the Arabian Sea, which saw the first oceanic sailing activity. He maintains that
European historians err grievously when they assume that the navigational tradition
first developed in the limited waters of the Aegean. He clinches his extensive
arguments by stating, “Millenniums before Columbus sailed the Atlantic and Magellan
crossed the Pacific, the Indian Ocean had become a thoroughfare of commercial and
cultural traffic between the west coast of India and Babylon, as well as the Levant.”32
Even before India‟s independence, maritime strategist Panikkar argued that the Indian
Ocean must remain „truly Indian‟. He argued that “While to other countries, the
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Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her
lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that
water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political
structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected...”.33
By justifying this
point he advocated the creation of a „steel ring‟ around India through the establishment
of forwarding naval bases in Singapore, Mauritius, Yemen (Socatra) and Sri Lanka.34
Sardar Panikkar was the first person in India who emphasized the strategic significance
of islands in the Indian Ocean. The submarine ridges form a large number of islands in
the ocean. There are three main chains of islands along the longitudinal (North- South)
direction. They are the Western, Central and Eastern group of islands. Western group
of islands could be further divided into North-Western groups, Central-Western and
South- Western group of islands. In North West group, important islands are Masirah,
Socrata and Kuria-Muria. Central Western group of islands forms a rough circle by
Madagascar, Diego- Suarez, Comoros, Zanzibar, Amirante, Seychelles, Agalega,
St.Brandou group, Mauritius and Reunion. In South western group fall prince Edward,
Crozet and Karguden islands. In the central group of islands towards the north are
Laccadives islands, Maldives and Sri Lanka. In the center are Chagos, Archipelago in
which the much publicized Diego-Garcia islands is situated. It is now a well known
US, UK naval and air base. In the south of this chain lie St. Paul and Amsterdam
islands. In the Eastern group of islands, there is a chain of islands in a convex shape
between Burma and Sumatra, and Indian Andaman and Nicobar group of islands and
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there is another series of Indonesian islands. In the past these islands served the
strategic purpose of a number of western maritime powers and helped them in the
control of the Indian Ocean and its littoral and hinterland countries with a few
exceptions, most of these islands are now independent countries or they are the part of
some sovereign littoral country. Important island states in the Indian Ocean are
Bahrain, Indonesia, Maldives, Malagasy (Madagascar), Mauritius, Seychelles,
Singapore and Sri Lanka.35
Some of these islands and group of islands enjoy great
strategic importance in the region due to their location and well-developed harbours.
Sri Lanka which is close to the Southern tip of India has two very fine harbours:
Colombo and Trincomalee whose strategic importance can hardly be underestimated.
Almost all cargo ships moving in the upper reaches of Indian Ocean generally can pass
on these ports. Madagascar, which provides excellent cover to South African coast has
a unique naval base at Diego- Suarez had earlier used by French. In importance, it is
only next to Singapore.36
Daman and Diu are the two important coastal enclave and
enclave island respectively in the Southern Peninsula of Gujrat which are near enough
to afford protection to the main coastline of their province.37
The island‟s limited
capabilities provide possibilities of naval defence, as in the maritime interests of the
nation. The Government of India has however, established several ports in these
strategic islands.38
The western coastline of India has five major ports, 16 intermediate
ports and nearly 116 minor ports in all.39
The province-wise distribution of ports on the
western coast of India is given in the table :1
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Table- 3.1
The Province Wise Distribution of Ports on the Western Coast of India
Source: Raj Narain Misra, „Indian Ocean and India‟s Security, Mittal
publications, New Delhi:1986, p.13
The eastern coastline of India is shared by West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu provinces and Union Territory of Pondicherry.
Geographically, except West Bengal other three provinces form the part of the Eastern
coastal plain of India. Important rivers : Ganga, Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna and
Cauvery form delta on this seaboard and fall in the Bay of Bengal. The province-wise
distribution of ports on the eastern coast of India is given in table-
Sl
No
State Major Ports Intermediate Ports Minor
Ports
1 Gujrat Kandala Okha, Porbandar,
Bhavnagar, Navlakhi, Bedi,
Veraval,Bharuch, Mandvi,
Sikka and Surat
40
2 Maharashtra Bombay Ratnagiri and Redi 46
3 Karnataka New
mangalore
Karwar and Mangalore 19
4 Kerala Cochin Kozhikode and Alleppey 9
5 Union territory of Goa,
Daman and Diu
Marnagao
-
2
Total 5 16 116
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Table-3.2
The Province Wise Distribution of Ports on the Eastern Coast of India
Sl
No
State Major ports Intermediate ports Minor ports
1 West Bengal Calcutta - -
2 Orissa Paradip - 2
3 Andhra Vishakha Masulipatnam, Kakinada 5
4 Tamilnadu Madras, New Tuticorin Cuddalore,
Nagapattinam, Tuticorin
8
5 Pondicherry - - 1
Total 5 5 16
Source : Raj Narain Misra, „Indian Ocean and India‟s Security, Mittal
publications, New Delhi:1986, p.16
The strategic location of the Indian ports on its eastern sea board could be
properly appreciated by observing their distances from some of the other important
ports of the region.40
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Table: 3.3
Distances of Indian Ports from Foreign Ports
Ports (India) Ports (Neighbouring Countries) Distance (k.m)
Calcutta Rangoon 1255 k.m
Calcutta Penang 2446 k.m
Calcutta Colombo 1988 k.m
Madras Rangoon 1642 k.m
Madras Colombo 942 k.m
Source: Raj Narain Misra, „Indian Ocean and India‟s Security, Mittal
publications, New Delhi:1986, p.16
Indian strategic thinkers have historically viewed the Indian Ocean as India‟s
backyard and so have emphasized the need for India to play a greater role in
underwriting its security and stability. Indian strategic elites have often drawn
implication from a quote attributed to Alfred Mahan: “Whoever controls the Indian
Ocean dominates Asia. The ocean is the key to seven seas, in the 21st century, the
destiny of the world will be decided on its waters”.41
This quote, though apparently
fictitious, has been highly influenced in shaping the way Indian naval thinkers have
looked at the role of the Indian Ocean for Indian security.42
Sardar Panikkar who was
recognized as the father of Indian maritime history laid the groundwork for this mode
140
of maritime thought, which obtained support from the highest levels including Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Indian elites inherited the notion of maritime primacy and
an expansive definition of a strategic frontier stretching from Aden to Malacca from
the British Raj. Panikkar was strongly in favour of Indian dominance of the Indian
Ocean Region much in the same mould as several British and Indian strategist viewed
India‟s predominance of the Indian Ocean as virtuality moveable. Panikkar was
“perhaps the most important Indian exponent of a forward policy aimed at control of
the Indian Ocean,” leaving his legacy in “the „blue water‟ thinking of Indian officers.
Acknowledging Mahan‟s argument on “the dominating role that sea power has played
in shaping the course of world history,” Panikkar went on to apply that to India.43
Looking back, the past was an inspiration for Panikkar: “to the Indian Ocean, then we
shall have to run as our ancestors did when they conquered Socotra (Sukhdara) in the
Arabian Sea.”44
Looking around, the present was one where “Indian interests have
extended to the different sides of this Oceanic area. . .Her interests in the Indian
Ocean, based as they are on the inescapable facts of geography, have become more
important than ever before.”45
He was unequivocal that the future of India will be
decided on the sea and suggested that “a navy can be created strong enough to defend
its home waters, then the waters vital to India‟s security and prosperity can be
protected…”46
For Panikkar, it would be the primary responsibility of the Indian navy
to guard the steel ring created by Singapore, Ceylon, Mauritius and Socotra‟ and
continued against the naval policy of a resurgent China.47
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The observations made by Sardar Panikkar has been seen in the expansion of
China‟s influence in the Indian Ocean. Over the last decade or so there has been a
major expansion of China‟s economic role in the Indian Ocean Region, providing it
with a level of influence that in many cases far exceeds that of India. But the full
strategic impact of this is not yet clear. Pakistan has long anchored China‟s strategic
presence in the Indian Ocean Region. China pursued the relationship following the
1962 war, establishing itself as a major supplier of arms to Pakistan and providing it
with considerable diplomatic support against India. The so-called „all-weather
friendship‟ with Pakistan, alongside its relationship with North Korea, is the closest
China has come to a long-term alliance. Since the 1960s, the China factor has played a
major role in limiting India‟s strategic options with Pakistan and keeping India
strategically preoccupied in South Asia.48
The growth of China‟s economic influence
in the region could well have a significant effect on India‟s ability to expand its
military footprint in the Indian Ocean.49
Besides, China has made greater progress in
developing transport connections to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar. This is part of
what Beijing has called the national bridgehead strategy of turning Yunnan province
into a bridgehead for strategic engagement with the Indian Ocean as a part of China‟s
„Two Ocean Strategy‟.50
All these projects are viewed with considerable suspicion by
many in New Delhi. There is a visceral dislike of any Chinese presence anywhere in
Southern Asia, but some also not wish to see any reduction of China‟s dependence on
the Malacca Strait. But the creation of a security dilemma in the Indian Ocean is not
142
necessarily to India‟s advantage. Sardar Panikkar, recognised long ago the potential
dangers of a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean, and he suggested
among other things that Rangoon should be turned by international treaty into a „free
port‟, which should provide China with a trading outlet on the Indian Ocean and
alleviate its fears of blockade of its Pacific.51
The geo-political past of the Indian Ocean Region reveals a persistent
phenomenon of local conflicts and foreign conquest and domination. The pre-capitalist
quest for empire building by the local powers and the extra-regional colonial
expansion of the 15th
and 19th
centuries shared some identical objectives in the Indian
Ocean Region. They all pursued the goals of national glory, power, access to resources
and security through the use of force and political subjugation of the important areas.
Lack of cohesiveness and rivalries among the local powers contributed greatly to the
vulnerability of this region to external penetration on land and from the seas.52
As an
apologist for newly independent India and Asia‟s emerging post-colonial order,
Panikkar espoused the ideas of Alfred Mahan regarding the influence of sea power on
history. He thereby tended to overdate India‟s past role in naval and maritime issues,
highlighting sea battles in which Indian forces like the Cholas excelled, and assigning
sea power an altogether prominent place in India‟s destiny. In Panikkar‟s view the
decline of Indian naval power and the capitulation of Arab-Islamic naval forces at
Cochin (1503) and Diu (1509) enabled the Portuguese to construct a naval empire and
pursue an „Oceanic Policy‟ that led to „the supreme mastery of Eastern seas which
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continued for over 400 years.53
Given that from the year 1500, „till today the Ocean
has dominated India and that „the economic life of India will be completely at the
mercey of the power which controls the sea.‟54
Sardar Panikkar’s Analysis of Indian Maritime History
Sardar Panikkar described a vivid picture of India‟s maritime past as he
emphasized the activities took place in the 4th
century BCE Mauryan empire. He
provides evidence that the waters of the Bay of Bengal witnessed a continuum of
commercial colonization as well as cultural and religious osmosis by sea from India‟s
east coast ports to South-East Asia. The existence of ancient Hindu kingdoms right
across South-East Asia, then known as Suvarnabhumi, is still vividly evident in the
architecture, culture, religious belief of this region. Regarding the nature of naval
fights, Sardar Panikkar argued that ancient Hindus, possessed the skills to construct
sturdy ocean-going ships and knew the use of the magnetic compass for accurate
navigation. He clinches his extensive arguments by stating that: “Millennium before
Columbus sailed the Atlantic and Mecllan crossed the Pacific, the Indian ocean had
become a thoroughfare of commercial and cultural traffic.”55
Panikkar also reminds us
that this cultural empire could not have been sustained without the endeavor of skillful
and courageous Indian seafarers who braved the turbulent Indian Ocean for
generations. Moreover, Panikkar also highlighted that there were brave and resolute
144
sea captains who led indigenous naval forces and put up determined resistance against
seaborne inter loppers. While natural heroes like Kunjal Marakkar and Kanhoji Angre
constitute bright spots in an otherwise bleak maritime scenario, they commanded
coastal forces which could never match the oceanic supremacy of the Europeans.
Panikkar consistently emphasizes that India‟s fate has been determined not on land
frontiers, but on the oceanic expanse that washes its three sides. He declares that „India
will be in peril if the Indian Ocean ever ceases to be a protected sea.‟56
Having
established India‟s historical maritime credentials and criticality of our maritime
security to national survival, Panikkar‟s wisdom in this regard is always remained
significant. Panikkar noted that „if India desires to be a naval power it is not sufficient
to create a navy, however efficient and well-manned. It must create a naval tradition in
the public, a sustained tradition in oceanic problems and a conviction that India‟s
future greatness lies on the sea‟.57
Former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash said, “No historian, with
the exception of K. M. Panikkar, has taken the trouble to chart out how India‟s
seafaring activity helped forge and sustain cultural linkages in this part of the
world.”58
Sardar K. M. Panikkar elaborately described the seafaring activities of
ancient India. It appears that since the passing of Panikkar, no Indian researcher has
been willing to do this doughty historian‟s onerous mantle and carry forward the torch.
Therefore, neither scholarly investigations of India‟s glorious maritime past nor
historical accounts of the exploits of our ancient seafarers have been found. Prakash
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also stated that “It is observed that one of the reasons of maritime blindness is, that as
a nation, we have been indifferent to the reading as well as the writing of history; both
our own and that of others.”59
Most works on maritime history originating in the West
start with a description of the seafaring tradition in the Mediterranean basin around
3000-2500 BCE, and dwell on the maritime exploits of Greeks, Phoenicians,
Carthaginians and Romans.60
Panikkar mentioned in his book „The Problem with
Maritime History‟ that “Indian historians have neither the wherewithal to look for
marine artifacts, nor sufficient nautical expertise to interpret whatever they do find.”61
The influence of the sea on Indian kingdoms continued to grow with the
passage of time. North-West India came under the influence of Alexander the Great,
who built a harbour at Patala where the Indus branches into two just before entering
the Arabian Sea. Alexander‟s army goes back to Mesopotamia in ships that were built
in Sind. Records show that in the period after his conquest, the Mauryas, the Andhras,
the Pallavas, the Chalukyas and the Cholas established themselves firmly in the Indian
Ocean. Chandragupta Maurya established an Admiralty Division under a
Superintendent of Ships as part of his war office, with a charter including
responsibility for navigation on the seas, oceans, lakes and rivers. But Panikkar
elaborates that Hindu influence could not have prevailed so far from home from the 5th
to the 13th
century without resolute and substantive maritime sustenance from the
mother country.62
Interestingly, the first Arab invasion of India was waged from the
sea in 636-637 A.D. Though the Arabs were not much successful in their invasion yet
146
it is clear evidence of the weaknesses of India in respect of sea power, which continued
under the Mughals. The growths of Maratha navy under Shivaji in the 17th
century was
constrained in proportion to his power and resources, even then he justifiably
anticipated its importance. History records that Indian ships traded with countries as
far as Java and Sumatra, and available evidence indicates that they were also trading
with other countries in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. India had a flourishing trade
with Rome and there are many references and descriptions of India in Greek works
even before the invasion of Alexander. Pliny the Elder, a Roman writer described the
Indian traders carrying away large quantities of gold from Rome, in payment for much-
sought exports such as precious stones, skins, clothes, spices, sandalwood, perfumes,
herbs and indigo. Trade of this volume could not have been conducted over the
centuries without appropriate navigational skills. Sadar Panikkar mentioned about two
Indian astronomers of repute, Aryabhatta and Varahamihira, having accurately mapped
the positions of celestial bodies, developed a method of computing a ship‟s position
from the stars. A crude forerunner of the modern magnetic compass was being used
around the fourth or 5th Century A.D. called „Matsya Yantra‟, it comprised an iron fish
that floated in a vessel of oil and pointed North.63
Sardar Panikkar goes on to assert
that Hindus had to use this „Matsya Yantra‟ (magnetic compass) and possessed the
skills to construct ocean-going ships, sturdy enough to venture into the distant reaches
of the Arabian Sea. Debunking the commonly held belief that all Hindus had a
religious objection to crossing the seas, he says, “it was never true of the people of the
147
South”.64
Panikkar then recounts the continuum of colonisation as well as cultural and
religious osmosis by sea from India‟s east coast of South-East Asia. Between the 5th
and 10th centuries A.D., the Vijaynagaram and Kalinga kingdoms of Southern and
Eastern India had established their rule over Malaya, Sumatra and West Java. The
Andaman & Nicobar Islands then served as an important midway point for trade
between the Indian peninsula and these kingdoms, as also in China. The daily revenue
from the eastern regions in the period 844-848 AD was estimated at 200 maunds (eight
tons) of gold. In the period 984-1042 A.D., the Chola kings despatched great naval
expeditions which occupied parts of Burma, Malaya and Sumatra, while suppressing
piracy by the Sumatran warlords. In 1292 A.D., Marco Polo described Indian ships as
“...built of fire timber, having a sheath of boards laid over the planking in every part,
caulked with oakum and fastened with iron nails. The bottoms were smeared with a
preparation of quicklime and hemp, pounded together and mixed with oil from a
certain tree which is a better material than pith.” A 14th Century description of an
Indian ship credits it with a carrying capacity of over 100 people, giving a fair idea of
both the shipbuilding skills and the maritime ability of seamen. Another account of the
early 15th Century describes Indian ships as being built in compartments so that even
if one part was damaged, the rest remained intact, enabling the ship to complete her
voyage.
Panikkar in his books on India‟s maritime history also described that the
decline of Indian maritime power commenced in the 13th Century, and Indian sea
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power had almost disappeared when the Portuguese arrived in India. The latter
imposed a system of license to trade, and set upon all Asian vessels not holding
permits from them. In the year 1529, a brief naval war in Bombay Harbour took place
which resulted the surrender of Thana, Bandora and Karanja to the Portuguese. To
strengthen their naval power in the Indian Ocean the Portuguese had organised a
grand naval review in the year 1531. Gradually, they acquired absolute control of the
harbour in 1534. But under a treaty of marriage between Charles II and Infanta
Catherine of Braganza, they finally relinquished it to the British in the year 1662. The
Portuguese trade was challenged by the Zamorin of Calicut of the Malabar coast of
India, when Vasco da Gama, after receiving permission to trade and refused to pay the
customs levy as per the trade agreement. As a result, two major wars were fought
during this period. The first battle was the „Battle of Cochin‟ in the year 1503, clearly
exposed the limitation of the Indian navies and designated to the Europeans a prospect
for building a naval empire. The second naval war was the „Battle of Diu‟ that took
place in the year 1509 which gave the Portuguese mastery over Indian waters for the
next 400 years.
In the late 17th
century, Indian maritime interests witnessed a significant
resurrection when the Sidis of Janjira on the Konkan coast of India allied with the
Moghuls to become a major power on the West Coast. As a part of this cooperation,
the Mughal Sultan Aurangzeb had supplied the Siddis of Janjira state with thousands
of soldiers, arms and ammunitions and two large Man-of-war battleships. The war
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preparation of Janjiras had led to Maratha king Chhatrapati Shivaji creating his own
naval army in the Konkan coast fleet. Shivaji‟s naval army was commanded by
Admirals like Sidhoji Gujar and later Kanhoji Angre. Under the leadership of Kanhoji,
the Marathas developed a naval presence on the western coast of India - Konkan and
also developed a naval base at Vijayadurg and keeping the English, Dutch and
Portuguese at bay. The death of Angre in 1729, left a vacuum in leadership and this
resulted in the decline of the Maratha sea power. Though the disintegration and
disappearance of Indian kingdoms with the arrival of western domination, Indian
shipbuilders sustained to hold their shipbuilding skills well into the 19th
century. Many
Indian ships were inducted into the Royal Navy, such as HMS Hindustan in 1795,
HMS Cornwallis (a frigate) in 1800, HMS Camel in 1806 and HMS Ceylon in 1808.
HMS Asia was the flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington at the Battle of
Navarino in 1827. Thus, the two Indian-built ships witnessed history in the making of
the Treaty of Nanking, conceded Hong Kong to the British, was signed on board HMS
Cornwallis in 1842. Gradually, several numbers of war ships were also constructed, the
most famous was the HMS Trincomalee, that was launched on 19 October 1817 with
the capacity of carrying 46 guns and displacing 1065 tons. It was later renamed as
Foudroyant and is reputed to be the oldest ship afloat in the world today. The Bombay
Dockyard was established in July 1735 by the East India Company and also known as
Naval Dockyard and it is widely used in Indian shipbuilding even today. 65
The period
of 4000 years between Lothal and Bombay Dock, therefore, offers tangible evidence of
150
the seafaring skills the nation possessed in the days of sail. Thus, in the early 17th
century, when British naval ships came to India, they discovered the existence of
considerable shipbuilding and repair skills, and a seafaring person - an ideal
combination for supporting a fighting force.
Like his analysis of India‟s maritime history, Panikkar also analysed the
genesis of Indian navy to keep the security and stability of the Indian Ocean. The
genesis of the Indian Navy is very important to know about India‟s maritime strategy.
India‟s tryst with maritime security is often seen as being steeped in history. K.M
Panikkar writes: “The importance of the sea came to be recognised by the Indian
rulers only when it was too late.66
The history of the Indian Navy can be traced back to
1612 when Captain Best encountered and defeated the Portuguese. Besides this
incident, frequent troubles and difficulties in trade caused by the pirates forced the
British East India Company to maintain and preserve a small convoy at Swally, near
Surat. On 05 September 1612, the First Squadron of fighting ships arrived in India and
it was called the Honourable East India Company‟s Marine. The main responsibility of
the Honourable East India Company‟s Marine was the protection of the East India
Company‟s trade in the Gulf of Cambay and the river mouths of the Tapti and
Narmada from the pirates. The officers and the men of this force went on to play an
important role in surveying the Arabian, Persian and Indian coastlines. The company
established its first trading center in Surat and expanded further. The Indian Ocean
region was dominated by several foreign nations like Dutch and Portuguese. For the
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British, it was not an easy task to overcome the Dutch and Portuguese resistance in the
Indian Ocean. Many battles were fought, and later with the French, to gain supremacy
in the region. Besides, there was also the Maratha threat to counter. Besides the rivalry
in the Indian coastal region, they struggled for the neighbouring areas also. Their
navies clashed for obtaining bases in the Persian Gulf, Aden, Mauritius, Java, etc. It
seems that of all, the East India Company remained pragmatic and persistent for the
cause. The Indian Marine, therefore, continued to grow with an increasing number of
ships. Moreover, with continued encounters with the Maratha Fleet, the British found it
more convenient to shift major forces and trading establishment from Surat to Bombay
in 1688. Seven years later the Crown leased Bombay to the East India Company at a
rent of 10 pounds a year. Bombay, therefore, came rather easily to the British which
they used greatly to their advantage. Its strategic location and shipbuilding
infrastructure proved to be an asset. By 1735 a full-fledged shipbuilding dockyard was
established and named „Bombay Dockyard‟. The Indian Marine thereafter acquired the
name „Bombay Marine‟. This force rendered unique service, fighting not only the
Portuguese, Dutch and French, but also interlopers and pirates of various nationalities.
By 1782, the British had firmly established their control over the Indian Ocean area
and the hinterland. The force was augmented and it underwent some transformation,
and very early in the twentieth century was renamed „The Royal Indian Marine‟. Its
main action was trooping and hydrographic surveys of ports and coast-line. All high
level officers and sailors were British while the other staff was recruited from India,
152
predominately from the Konkan Coast. The British employed the Bombay Marine to
fight against the Marathas and the Sidis of Janjiras and also participated in the Burma
War in 1824. In 1830, the Bombay Marine was renamed Her Majesty‟s Indian Navy.
The Navy‟s commitments grew manifold, after the capture of Aden by the British and
the association with the Indus Steam Flotilla which was a freight and passenger
steamship company and its deployment in the China War in 1840 bears sufficient
indication to its proficiency. Whilst the Navy‟s strength continued to grow, it
underwent numerous changes of nomenclature over the next few decades. Her
Majesty‟s Indian Navy resumed the name Bombay Marine from 1863 to 1877, after
which it became Her Majesty‟s Indian Marine which had two divisions. The Eastern
Division was based at Calcutta under the authority of a Superintendent, the Bay of
Bengal and the Western Division was based at Bombay under the Superintendent,
Arabian Sea. In recognition of the services rendered during various campaigns, its title
was changed to Royal Indian Marine in 1892, by which time it consisted of over 50
vessels. The Royal Indian Marine participated in the First World War and expanded
considerably. The Royal Indian Marine went into action with a fleet of minesweepers,
patrol vessels and troop carriers during the First World War, when mines were
detected off Bombay and Aden and was utilized mainly for patrolling, ferrying troops
and carrying war stores to Iraq, Egypt and East Africa. The first Indian to be granted a
commission was Sub Lieutenant D.N. Mukherji who joined the Royal Indian Marine as
an engineer officer in 1928. The Royal Indian Marine was re-organised into the Royal
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Indian Navy in the year 1934 and for its splendid services, it was presented the King‟s
Colour in the year 1935.67
But the end of the war brought severe retrenchment and the
Royal Indian Marine was reduced to a very small force capable of only defense duties
of a few ports. A large number of Indians, therefore, lost their jobs. The maritime
defence of India was entrusted to the Royal Navy depriving Indians of valuable
seafaring experience. On the insistence of some prominent citizens, the British relented
to introduce a small fighting force in the name of the Royal Indian Navy. Bombay
became the Headquarter of the Royal Indian Navy and it was agreed that in due course
it will predominantly be manned by Indians. Recruitment of officers in the Royal
Indian Navy started in the early 1930s.
With the commencement of the Second World War in 1939, the Royal Indian
Navy expanded rapidly and some merchant ships were also converted into men-of-war.
At that time, the Royal Indian Navy consisted of eight warships. More and more
Indians were inducted into the service and they gave a very good account in maritime
combat. After the Second World War the Royal Indian Navy‟s strength had ascended
to 117 combat vessels and 30,000 personnel had seen involved in various operations
where quite a few were offered gallantry awards. In 1950 when India became a
Republic, the prefix „Royal‟ was dropped and the nomenclature was changed to just
Indian Navy.68
But the Royal Indian Navy consisted of only 32 aging vessels which
were suitable only for the coastal patrol, along with 11,000 personnel after India
attaining Independence. The senior officers were drawn from the Royal Navy, with
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Rear Admiral John Talbot Savignac Hall, CIE, being the first Post-independence
Commander-in-Chief. The names over the Years-
• Indian Marine: 1612 - 1686
• Bombay Marine: 1686 – 1830
• Indian Navy: 1830 - 1858
• Her Majesty's Indian Navy: 1858 - 1863
• Bombay and Bengal Marine: 1863 - 1877
• Her Majesty's Indian Marine: 1877 - 1892
• Royal Indian Marine: 1877 - 1934
• Royal Indian Navy: 1934 - 1950
• Indian Navy: 1950 – Present
There is a long tradition in India of viewing the maritime dimension of security
as central to India‟s strategic priorities. Sardar Panikkar had elucidated the conditions
under which the Indian Navy had to develop: firstly more symbolic as the Royal Indian
Navy, secondly, as a force to take over the coastal duties and thirdly to create a naval
tradition.69
Present India‟s naval strategy truly proved Sardar Panikkar‟s elucidation as
real and relevant to cope-up with the present political scenario. Panikkar, who was
India‟s first post-colonial strategic thinkers, almost 70 years ago stated that “The
future of India will undoubtedly be decided on the sea”.70
These words were prophetic
considering that 95 percent of India‟s total external trade is now conducted by sea,
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with over 70 percent of the country‟s oil imports transiting the maritime domain and
70 percent of Indian hydrocarbons also emanating from offshore blocks. In this regard,
Panikkar said that some Indian naval enthusiasts have long argued that the essential
dependence of India‟s trade on maritime traffic means “ the economic life of India will
be completely at the mercy of the power which controls the sea.”71
In this vein, the
Navy‟s early leaders believed their primary purpose was “the protection of India‟s
shipping and lines of communication”.72
History and geography in a way can both
limit and conversely also set a limitless arena for a region maritime security. In the
Indian Ocean context, prior to World War- II, the maritime security issue, mainly due
to the British colonial mindset, focused on India as the maritime center piece of its
Indian sub-continent ruled territories, territories which were connected to India mostly
by the seas. The British lake was seen by England as its domain to firstly dominate the
region, secondly to connect this area to London and thirdly to connect to the far east.73
British supremacy in the region more or less remained unchallenged from the early 19th
century to World War- II, till the entry of Japan into the Indian Ocean demonstrated
clearly the entire dependence of the security of India on the mastery of the seas.74
The
Japanese not only captured the Andaman and Nicobar islands but also shelled the port
of Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of India and paralysed merchant shipping in the
Bay of Bengal. In April 1942, the Japanese had also sunk Royal Naval ships off
Colombo and Trincomalee, and their submarines were attacking shipping in the
Mozambique channel.75
Therefore, World War-II left India‟s even more acutely aware
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of their nation, state‟s vulnerability to seaborne perils.76
After independence, the first
naval plan papers envisaged the role of navy to “safeguard her shipping on the high
seas from interference in war; to ensure that supplies, can both reach and leave India
by sea in all circumstances, to keep open her ports and coastal shipping routes, to
prevent an enemy landing on her shores; and to support the army in any operations
which may be required in the furtherance of the national policy”.77
The first plan, with
a suggested period of 10 years included two light fleet carriers, three cruisers, eight
destroyers for training and auxiliary purposes.78
However, the plan was not
implemented due to the 1947-48 war with Pakistan and Kashmir, and budgetary
constraints.79
By 1961, the Indian Navy has acquired a number of major warships.80
These are reflected in the following table-4
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Table:3.4
No. of Warships acquired by the Indian Navy 1947-61
Type of ship Number Year delivered Delivering nations
Light cruiser 02 1948, 1957 Britain
Light destroyers 03 1949 Britain
Landing ship tank 01 1949 Britain
Escort destroyers 03 1953 Britain
Light tanker 01 1953 Italy
Inshore minesweepers 02 1954 Britain
Coastal minesweepers 02 1954 Britain
Anti aircraft frigates 03 1958-1960 Britain
Surface escorts 02 1958-1959 Britain
Anti submarine frigates 03 1955 Britain
Light aircraft carrier 01 1961 Britain
Source: Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean An
Indian Perspective”,Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, January-
March 2014, pp. 49–63
Sardar Panikkar has traced the history of weapons making and defense
organizations and tactics, especially in India in such a way as to conclude that the
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inventor of the most advanced weapons has usually won at warfare. In stressing the
importance of India‟s attaining an advanced self-generating industrialism and
technology, Sardar Panikkar has not lost sight of the national morale factor. It is
important to mention that India‟s vision towards maritime security in the Indian Ocean
has been driven and affected by the influences and strategic thought processes of the
colonial period. Moreover, the predominant and the unresolved border issues are a
matter of serious concern that has driven India‟s maritime strategy outlook. In the
aftermath of India‟s independence, Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned India as a great power
and set about to rebuild India in that mold. Nehru dismissed many of the external
threats to India in favor of economic reconstruction.81
The overall threat to Indian
maritime security during this era was considered insignificant. The British navy had
protected colonial India‟s maritime interests in the past and Nehru remained confident
that a free India was secure against attack because of its geo-strategic position, size,
and the balance of power.82
Therefore, defense planning was primarily for internal
defense against the “untamed tribes on the frontier” and internal rebellion.83
India
would utilize the power of the British Army and the Royal Navy to maintain its
security in the post-Independence period. It was not until China shattered this belief
that India truly experienced its independence and the vulnerability that comes with it.
The maritime threat from Pakistan did not represent a threat to the survival of the
Indian government. The Pakistani threat was viewed as limited to Kashmir and did not
present a real threat to the Indian center. Pakistan, in the early years of its existence,
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was incapable of conducting a major attack, though India did realize that the threat
from Pakistan would continue to evolve. Given that Pakistan‟s only line of
communication was around India and over the seas, India believed this condition
would compel Pakistan to build a formidable navy.84
A Pakistani buildup would inturn,
require India to expand its capabilities to respond to that threat, but Nehru believed
India‟s security was intact in the near term and would enable him to concentrate on its
economic buildup. The threat from China was considered more worthy and acceptable
due to its size, population and history as a great civilization but the actual maritime
threat were still remote.85
Indian strategists were aware of China‟s maritime tradition
and its recent expansion into the Indonesian archipelago, and they also believed that in
time China could develop a great maritime force which could threaten India‟s maritime
interests, but neither presented India with a need to respond immediately.86
The threat
from the Soviet Union between 1947 and 1962 was effectively dismissed by Nehru
who believed the threat from the Soviet Union was „largely imaginary‟.87
The Indian Fleet Review of 2006 proudly unfurled the world‟s 4th biggest navy
(137 ships), showcasing over 50 Naval ships, including an aircraft carrier (with 55
aircraft), submarines and advanced stealth frigates.88
Nonetheless, the country is
undergoing a maritime renaissance as evidenced by the growing size of its navy and
the Indian economy‟s growing dependence on overseas trade. This is complemented by
India‟s maritime infrastructure, including the country‟s 13 major ports and 187 minor
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and intermediate ports that are scattered across the 7,517 km Indian coastline, as well
as more than two dozen shipyards and 14,500 km of navigable inland waterways.89
India‟s strategic thinking and planning vis-a-vis the Indian Ocean has remained
tentative, inchoate and disjointed. For many years after independence, India‟s decision-
makers remained trapped in a „continental mindset‟ and persevered in the conventional
belief that all threats to national security emanated from Himalayan mountain passes.
Thus, a combination of „sea-blindness‟, the absence of a strategic culture and the
detachment of the political establishment from national security issues has created a
hiatus as far as the Indian Ocean is concerned. Fortunately, Sardar K.M. Panikkar‟s
ideas and vision gradually changed the minds of the policy makers of India. The post-
Cold War period, the ingress of China and present disposition of the U.S in the region
have also resulted in a change in India‟s perspective. Post- 1945, the Cold War also
ensured that the focus within the Indian Ocean remained a subset of the US-Soviet
rivalry. India was seen by the West as a Soviet ally and this further restricted the
maritime discourse within India, to events in the Indian Ocean. India‟s maritime power
as perhaps recognized for the first time after the 1971 war wherein the Indian Navy
was used decisively with innovative ideas.90
The myriad of issues could result in the
Indian Ocean evolving from a comparatively peaceful area into an area of severe
composition and issues and establishment of a comparative security mechanism
involving both regional and extra-regional players in an option that could retain the
peaceful element in the Indian ocean security debate.91
The desire to defend the
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countries sphere of influence from hostile powers is one factor potentially driving
Indian naval modernization. India possesses nearly 4,800 miles of coastline and a
massive 2.54 million square mile exclusive economic zone that constitute nearly 10%
of Indian Ocean. The core of India‟s maritime strategy is to defend the entire Indian
Ocean as the countries „rightful and exclusive sphere of interest.92
The steady progress of India‟s „New Indian Ocean Policy‟ in recent years is one
of establishing a consensual, rules-based maritime order that all stakeholders can
share. The maritime security framework India envisions for the Indian Ocean would be
built on the cooperation of all the stakeholders who have a legitimate presence in the
region. India and China have a 50-year old history of conflict, but bilateral trade and
diplomacy are, currently, keeping tensions in check. However, the fact that the Sino-
Indian military and nuclear equation is heavily tilted in China‟s favour, and that the
Sino-Pakistan politico-military nexus has a pronounced anti-India slant is a matter of
concern. China‟s recent aggressive posturing over claims on Indian Territory, Tibet
and the South China Sea has served to heighten this concern. However, India‟s
geographic location at the median between key choke-points of Hormuz and Babel
Mandeb on one side, and Malacca on the other permits domination of the Indian Ocean
trade and energy traffic. This is an opportune juncture to pay heed to K.M Panikkar‟s
sage advice and to craft a coherent, long-term „Indian Ocean Policy‟ while providing
fiscal support for a robust naval build-up, bearing in mind that India‟s maritime
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superiority would provide a useful quid pro quo for intimidation on the Himalayan
heights, in the South China Sea or anywhere else.93
Sardar Panikkar said, “The Indian security sphere covers the entire Indian
Ocean area. India‟s interest in the security of the Persian Gulf, the integrity and
stability of the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, the neutralisation of Sinkiang and Tibet
and the security of Burma, Siam and the Indo-Chinese coastline, apart, of course, from
Malaysia and Singapore, is obvious enough to all”.94
Panikkar believed and argued
that for its security, India must become the pivot of an organization meant to preserve
peace in this large area, with the primary security responsibilities remaining with
Britain, and with defence as India‟s responsibility. It was his view that India‟s defense
should be based on a “ring-fence concept”.95
Panikkar’s contribution to India’s Naval Diplomacy:
Any serious study of the problem of national security of India would remain
incomplete if their maritime dimension is not properly explored. India has many
security stakes, making adequate provision for the maritime security of India is the
national responsibility and even the casual neglect could end in peril. The Indian
Navy‟s Strategic Defense Review notes that naval diplomacy is designed to influence
the adversary in situations short of full hostility. This is to be achieved through three
distinct ways:
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(a) Presence
(b) Preventive and precautionary diplomacy
(c) Pre-emptive diplomacy
One of the traditional ways of naval presence is achieved through port calls to
remind local inhabitants of the effectiveness of the navy and the state that owns it.
These visits are not intended to represent the threat of force; instead, the ships act as
goodwill ambassadors for a favourable impression. There are occasions when States
influence the adversary in the initial stage of a crisis by positioning naval forces and
carrying out offensive maneuvres. This demonstration contributes towards crisis
prevention. Several incidents/events have proved that the Indian Navy has the capacity
and capability to further national interests.
Regarding the implication of naval diplomacy, the first work was examined by
Sardar K. M. Panikkar, who entailed a significant diplomatic experience in the post-
independence period examines India‟s strategic picture in that period with a view
toward the need for developing greater defense capabilities than economic
development and growth.Panikkar‟s notable work on the subject is contained in his
book „India and the Indian Ocean‟, (1945) and his another book „Problems of Indian
Defense‟, (1960) which analysed the importance of India‟s naval strategy. He provides
a sound and rational argument for expanding India‟s naval forces, especially given the
strategic picture of that time. While his work was the foundational piece which
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indicated India‟s quest to develop its naval force during the post-independence
period.96
His book „India and the Indian Ocean‟, was also a deliberate echo of
American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan‟s work „The Influence of Sea power on
History‟ (1890). As an apologist for independent India and the emerging post-colonial
order in Asia, Sardar Panikkar espoused Alfred Mahan‟s ideas of the influence of
seapower on history. In doing so, he tended to overstate India‟s past role in naval and
maritime issues, highlighting sea battles in which Indian forces like the Cholas fared
well, and assigning sea power an altogether prominent place in India‟s destiny. Peter
Brobst, in his book „The future of great game‟ remarks that the Indian Ocean Region
which is the birthplace of maritime civilization and was considered a playground of
rich industrial European nations during the colonial era”.97
In classical Mahanian style,
the Indian Maritime Doctrine highlighted the need to control choke points, important
islands and vital trade routes. With the commencement of decolonization in 1946, the
euphoria of independence was overshadowed by the turbulence of internecine conflicts
and inter-state wars that followed. Central to India‟s current strategic thinking is the
Indian Ocean, the thrust to make the Indian Ocean „India‟s Ocean‟. The Indian Ocean
is currently described as part of India‟s „extended neighbourhood‟; and as such
somewhere for India‟s diplomatic, security and economic interests to be safeguarded
by the Indian Navy.98
Panikkar‟s observations were very much in tune with the
strategic thinking as he said “The Indian security sphere covers the entire Indian
Ocean area. India‟s interest in the security of the Persian Gulf, the integrity and
165
stability of the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, the neutralisation of Sinkiang and Tibet
and the security of Burma, Siam and the Indo-Chinese coastline, apart, of course, from
Malaysia and Singapore, is obvious enough to all.” The main challenge of India‟s
maritime strategy is the threat from external powers. Threats are also a lever for
India‟s „blue water‟ naval expansion. The trend towards India‟s naval voices being
more readily heard is also due to wider external factors concerning India‟s various
strategic needs and perceived threats that it faces. Interestingly enough, Panikkar long
back in 1945 had also commented on a future rise of China posing a maritime
challenge to India. At present, India‟s own naval rise has also been in part a reaction
by India to China‟s own „blue water‟ aspirations and appearance in the Indian Ocean.
China has triggered India‟s concerns over being encircled in and around the Indian
Ocean. To some extent India has responded to China‟s appearance in the Indian Ocean,
not only by augmenting its own power in the Indian Ocean, but also by projecting
Indian maritime presence further eastwards into China‟s own maritime backyard of the
South China Sea and beyond, for which it needs a highly technical and powerful „blue
water‟ navy.99
This China dimension remains an ongoing factor in Indian maritime
thinking. Indian strategists were aware of China‟s maritime tradition and its recent
expansion into the Indonesian archipelago, and they also believed that in time China
could develop a great maritime force which could threaten India‟s maritime interests,
but neither presented India with a need to respond immediately.100
This reinforced the
belief that India had time to build up its military capabilities with a meager allocation
166
towards its maritime security forces. India had been shown time and again throughout
history that when it neglected its maritime security, the subcontinent was put at great
risk. The Chinese invaded in the 15th century and the British in the 17th Century. Each
represented a period of significant decline in maritime security and eventually led to
Indian colonization by the British. Thus, the need to address its maritime security
interests was recognized. Given the overwhelming importance assigned to problems of
internal security, the maritime strategy was assigned as a lower priority in the near
term yet it remained a long-term goal of the nation to build up its naval forces to
properly safeguard it from external threats.101
Due to financial constraints and the
continued presence of the British in the Indian Ocean between 1947 and 1962, Nehru
chose to pursue a „Fiscal-Based Maritime Strategy‟.102
After independence, India was
an extremely poor country that clearly did not have the economic or military
capabilities to secure its maritime interests on its own. Nehru sought to utilise India‟s
political alliances to better secure its interests. The British Army and the Royal Navy
remained in the region and Nehru believed this to be a virtual guarantee of Indian
security. This would enable Nehru to concentrate on developing India‟s economy and
industrial capabilities which could afford greater military capabilities in the future.
Given that India was able to defend its maritime interests during this era its strategy
can be viewed as a successful one, but the continued pursuit of this strategy was
considered fraught with danger and India therefore, sought change.
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Sardar K.M Panikkar, the architect of India‟s naval doctrine, highlighted that
policymakers of India should recognize the significance of the Indian Ocean for the
development of its economy, trade and security. In his book „India‟s defense
problems‟, Panikkar regretted the adverse tendency of Indian people to neglect the
Sea. Panikkar stated that „India never lost her independence till she lost the command
of the sea in the first decade of the 16th Century‟. His comments stemmed from the
study of atrocities heaped on Malabar shores by the Portuguese.103
Regarding the
importance of a strong navy historian Panikkar had written as early as 1945: “A navy is
not meant for the defense of the coast. The coast has to be defended from the land. The
objective of the navy is to secure the control of an area of the sea, thus preventing
enemy ships from approaching the coast or interfering with trade and commerce and
conversely after securing the control to blockade the enemy‟s coast and destroy his
shipping. So, a Navy merely based on the coast degenerates into a subordinate unit of
the army. The Indian Navy, whether it be large or small, must learn this lesson. Its
purpose is to protect the seas and not the land and if it cannot protect the seas vital to
India‟s defense, then it is better not to have navy at all”.104
Despite the exhortations of
scholar diplomat K.M Panikkar, neither the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean
nor, what is more relevant in the present context, the importance of Andaman and
Nicobar islands were recognized by the policymakers in New Delhi for a long period
of time. An important edition of the „Indian Maritime Doctrine‟ (2004) issued by the
Naval Headquarters and India‟s Maritime Strategy (2007) presented a critical insight
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into how the Navy represents its inspiration and conceives of its present and future
mandate in a strategically dynamic era.105
Fortunately, in India, there was Pandit
Nehru who saw things much more clearly and persuaded policy planners to follow a
strategy of non-alignment.The happy results of that choice are evident in the degree of
strategic autonomy that India now enjoys. In the last sixty years, Indian capacities have
been transformed, the world around us has changed radically, technology has
developed at an unprecedented pace, and in military affairs also so many changes and
developments have taken place. Panikkar would be happy that his „blue water‟
aspirations for India, of half a century ago, now seem being realized. Panikkar would
recognize how his injunctions, on maritime „seapower‟ are being translated into „blue
water‟ reality for India.106
His work was the foundational piece which indicated India‟s
quest to develop its naval force during the post-independence period. The Indian
maritime strategy is designed to respond to a range of external threats and safeguard
India‟s economic, political and security interests in the maritime domain, with a
purposefully-designed set of maritime capabilities. The circumstances India is faced
with today are different from those it has faced in the past, but the historical evolution
of that maritime strategy is important because it reveals the various approaches to
maritime strategy that India has adopted over the course of its history.
It would appear that the strategic planners of India in the post-British era took
their ideological cue from Panikkar‟s maritime vision, which he succinctly
encapsulated by stating that “To the Indian Ocean we shall have to turn, as our
169
ancestors did, who conquered Socotra long before the Christian Era and established
an Empire in the Pacific, which lasted for1500 years.” The hegemonic elements of this
strategic vision are obvious by the nostalgic reference to an era when they exercised
control over an area extending from the Red Sea in the West to Fiji in the Pacific
Ocean. Given the rather modest fleet that the Indians inherited from the British in 1947
and the fact that the „historic greatness‟ Panikkar referred to was so far distant in time,
it was indeed an act of vision and courage that the Indian planners decided to convert
the strategic concept into policy. The first manifestation of the policy was the
acquisition of the aircraft carrier „Vikrant‟ in the fifties and the decision by Indira
Gandhi in 1970 to construct a nuclear-powered submarine under the garb of an
Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV) and made it a permanent national endeavour. In
the sixties, Indian nuclear physicists and nuclear engineers were being trained in
different countries of the world, civilian and naval shipyards were being developed and
updated but the Indian navy was busy learning submarining at sea in the primary
Foxtrot class Soviet diesel submarines. In 1988, the Soviet Union leased a nuclear-
powered submarine to India. Scientists, engineers, naval architects, submarine crews
and all other relevant Indians extracted maximum value from the presence of this
invaluable Soviet asset in their country.107
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Panikkar and Tibet issue:
The very existence of a credible foreign policy establishment presupposes
a degree of agreement within the elite on the core objectives of external engagement
and a grand strategy to achieve them. To be sure, there is the widespread belief within
India and those outside who study its external relations that there was once a golden
age of „Nehruvian consensus‟ on foreign policy.108
As a charismatic and domineering
political figure, Jawaharlal Nehru did have his way on defining the foreign policy of
India in the early years of the Republic. Michael Brecher in his book „Nehru: A
Political Biography‟ (1959) described him as “the philosopher, the architect, the
engineer and the voice of his country‟s policy towards the outside world”. This was
not an exaggeration, as the Congress‟ spokesman on foreign affairs during India‟s
struggle for independence, he had already outlined the contours of the country‟s post-
independence foreign policy. From 1946 till his death in 1964, he emerged as the chief
exponent of India‟s world-view and the principal determinant of what should be the
foreign policy goals in the emerging world order and the mode of attaining the
objectives.
Nehru was highly influenced by the thoughtful writings of historian and
diplomat Sardar Panikkar regarding India‟s defense and security strategies particularly
on naval strategies and to strengthen the India-China relations. But K.M Panikkar was
also criticised for his role in the Tibet uprising. Even during his tenure as Ambassador
to China (1948-52), he was criticised even by certain members of Nehru‟s Cabinet for
171
his role in substituting the word „sovereignty‟ for „suzereignty‟ while delivering
India‟s aide-memoire to the Chinese Foreign Office in the wake of the occupation of
Tibet in 1950.
Two significant events Chinese invasion of Tibet and the Chinese intervention
in the Korean War trembled Asia and the world in the year 1950. The Chinese invasion
of Tibet was occurred near India‟s borders and the Chinese intervention in Korea was
liitle risk and relevant for India as it occured far away from India. But from the logical
point of view India should have given more concentration in Tibet issue, instead of the
Chinese intervention in Korean War. But India‟s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had
performed a completely opposite task. He considered the Tibetan crisis in a haphazard
manner and heavily involved in the situation of Korea. As a result, India today is
paying for this recklessness by being the only country of its size in the world without
an official boundary with its giant neighbor.109
The Tibetan history shows the uniqueness of Tibet which is shaped more by
spirituality than political movements. In 1882-83 the then Chinese Government had
unequivocally stated that Tibet was not a part of the Chinese empire. Earlier to that,
the Chinese had imposed and lost theirs overlordship of Tibet. Historically, the
„Shimla Agreement‟ of 1914, had governed the Indo-Tibetan relationships. This
agreement specified that the „Outer Tibet‟ (present day Tibet) was completely
autonomous where neither China would interfere in this region nor convert it into a
Chinese province. But forty years later, China violated both the provisions of the
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agreement. The „Shimla Agreement‟ of 1914 also demarcated the McMahon Line as
the boundary between India and Tibet. Ironically, Chinese representative was not
invited for the negotiation and no Chinese opinion was considered in the process of the
final demarcation. The entire decision was conducted between the Tibetan
representative Lonchen Shatra and Sir Henry McMahon.Through this agreement, all
the concerned parties were convinced and recognized that Tibet had complete right to
settle its boundary with India. This agreement also referred the Eastern and Northern
parts as „Inner Tibet‟. Afterwards, the „Inner Tibet‟ region was the main center of the
disputes between China and Tibet. At the time India maintained missions in Lhasa and
Gyangtse. It is important to mention that very close relations existed between India and
Tibet for centuries. Besides, Tibet‟s transactions with the outside world were
conducted mainly through India due to the unsettled conditions in China. Three months
after the conquest of power, the Chinese Government, led by Mao Zedong, asserted on
January 1, 1950 that their basic task during the year would be the „liberation‟ of Tibet.
On October 7, 1950, the Chinese troops crossed the Dre Chu river which had been the
traditional boundary between Tibet and China and the resistance was useless. It is
important to mention that China had a mission in Lhasa, but after the defeat of the
Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kai Shek in the civil war the Tibetan
Government forced the Chinese Mission to leave the country. A few records indicated
that the expulsion of the Chinese mission was a plan of the Tibetan government. In
this case, the Indian Government also articulated its weak position and never asked the
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Tibetan authority about the reason of expulsion of the Chinese mission. Nehru wrote to
Lhasa: “The Tibetan Government are the best judges of their own interests but to us, it
would seem unwise on their part to take any steps which, in effect mean the forced
discontinuance of the Chinese mission in Lhasa.”110
Nehru‟s neutral statement clearly
reflects that the government of India already considered the „Tibetan Government‟ as
an independent body which was not a subsidiary to China in any means. The expulsion
of Chinese mission from Lhasa was the main cause of Chinese invasion in Tibet which
took place in 25 October 1950. By justifying the invasion, the Chinese government
announced their purpose to „free Tibet from imperialist forces‟, and „consolidate its
border with India‟. As a reaction to the Chinese invasion, Nehru remarked that the
Indian Government were “extremely perplexed and disappointed with the Chinese
Government‟s action… Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese would settle the future
of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet…
.”111
In this matter, it was believed that Sardar Panikkar assured Nehru that the
Chinese government was enthusiastic to maintain a friendly relations with India. After
reveiving this positive gesture from the Indian diplomat Panikkar, Nehru took this
injudicious step. As a result, India had lost the right to make any useful judgement and
adopt an approach of resistance of the Chinese action. Later, Nehru felt it as „political
folly of the first magnitude‟. He lamented by stating that “while recognising China‟s
suzerainty over Tibet, India had a right to express her interest in the maintenance of
Tibetan autonomy; and a friendly caution might not be misunderstood. 112
On May 23,
174
1951, the Tibetan Government was forced to sign under duress a fifteen-point
agreement that formalised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. It was observed that in the
Tibetan issue, Nehru completely ignored the suggestions given by Sardar Vallabhai
Patel and preferred to be guided by Krishna Menon and K.M. Panikkar, who were
regarded as strong supporters of the leftist ideology. As a result of these, India had lost
the treaty rights and interests that inherited from the British, and China received a
complete autonomy in Tibet. Concurrently, Nehru was busy in Korean War where he
project himself as a mediator between the Socialist world and the West. In both cases,
it seems that Nehru was most interested in sacrificing the national interest in search of
worldwide grandeur overseas.113
Nehru‟s erroneous faith on China that a „socialist‟
country can never be aggressive and the Chinese control in Tibet create no risk to
India‟s security. During the period of 1950-60, Nehru‟s China Policy was
predominated by his relative idealistic assessment. His idealistic view was completely
contrary to the Kautilyan maxim that „the neighbouring country must necessarily be
regarded as a potential enemy‟.114
But gradually, various strategic activities of China
made it imperative for the government of India to adopt certain strategic planning in
India‟s defence and foreign policies. The communist revolution of China along with
the Chinese invasion in Tibet, Chinese military upsurge on India‟s borders, Chinese
assertion on immense portion of Indian territory from the mid-50‟s proved Nehru‟s
misconceptions in India-China relations.
175
Regarding India- Tibet Policy, Panikkar wrote in a journal in August 26, 1950,
that “India‟s Tibetan policy is one of “autonomy within the framework of Chinese
sovereignty.”115
But India‟s policy towards Tibet was completely opposite that the
stement given by panikkar. The historical truth is that since the first British venture in
Tibet, China only having the „suzerainty‟ over Tibet and till August 26 1950, India
continued to state that China had „suzerainty‟ over Tibet.116
Diplomat Panikkar‟s
statement about „Chinese sovereignty‟ reflects that India was given the go-ahead to
China for „liberating Tibet‟. As per the direction of Nehru, Panikkar tried continuously
to rectify the mistake about the issue infront of international community. But from the
Chinese point of view, when India slowly sending this correction it was believed that
Nehru didn‟t actually bother if China was to invade Tibet and by doing so, Nehru was
showing himself to be a „capitalist lackey.‟117
Due to this simple mistake cost Tibet its
independence and made India suspicious in the eyes of the Chinese.Actually, it was
believed to be a cause of the 1962 India-China war. A second rumor in the 50s, which
spread like a wildfire in international community that Pannikar was bribed by the
Chinese government and offering him „extremely good treatment‟.118
As a result, on 17
November, Panikkar was advised “to draw the attention immediately of the Chinese
Foreign Office to the use of oversight” in the aide memoir of 26 August of Chinese
„sovereignty‟ and that the correct phrase was „suzerainty‟ as used in the latest message
to China on 1 November. In a cable to Panikkar on October 26, 1950, Nehru said:
“This morning‟s papers report an official handout in Peking ordering units of the
176
Chinese Army to advance into Tibet … We deeply deplore this development both from
the point of view of the continuance of friendly relations between India and China and
because this will help the drift to world war. We tried our utmost to develop the
friendly relations and to work for peace. It is a matter of great regret to us that the
Chinese Government have suddenly taken this action, which appears to us to be
contrary to assurances of peaceful settlement given to us and on the eve of the
departure of the Tibetan Mission for Peking. We are protesting formally against this
action to the Chinese Ambassador….”119
Nehru was now no longer willing to accept
China‟s „sovereignty‟ on Tibet. In a Note on Policy regarding China and Tibet, on
November 18, 1950, he wrote:“ It is true that in one of our messages to the Chinese
Government we used „sovereignty‟ of China over Tibet. In our last message we used
the word „suzerainty‟. After receipt of China‟s last note, we have pointed out to our
Ambassador that „sovereignty‟ was not the right word and that „sovereignty‟ has been
used by error…..I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in
a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood whatever of Tibet
being able to resist this or stop this. It is equally unlikely that any foreign Power can
prevent it. We cannot do so. If so, what can we do to help in the maintenance of
Tibetan autonomy and at the same time avoiding continuous tension and apprehension
on our frontiers.”120
M.O. Mathai, the former Principal Private Secretary of Nehru
blamed Sardar Panikkar to intentionally change the crucial word which completely
changed the India‟s policy on Tibet. According to him “ the government of India sent
177
a telegram to Panikkar authorizing him to communicate to the Chinese government the
former‟s recognition of Chinese „suzerinity‟ in Tibet, but Panikkar changed the crucial
word to sovereignty. when questioned later, Panikkar is said to have blamed the cipher
transmission for the corruption”121
.Mathai argued that “ Nehru should have taken
prompt steps to clear the matter with the Chinese; and that, if necessary he should
have repudiated Panikkar‟.122
It was ironical that during the time of Chinese invasion in Tibet there was little
concern in Indian official about the Chinese intentions. The Indian Ambassador in
Beijing, Sardar Panikkar also stated that there was „lack of confirmation‟ of the
presence of Chinese troops in Tibet. Panikkar argued that by protesting the Chinese
invasion of Tibet would be an “interference to India‟s efforts on behalf of China in the
UN”.123
Through this attitude, it is reflected that Sardar Panikkar was more concerned
in defending Chinese interests in the UN rather than India‟s own interests on the
Tibetan border.124
Remarkably, Nehru corresponds with his Ambassador, where he
wrote, “our primary consideration is the maintenance of world peace… Recent
developments in Korea have not strengthened China‟s position, which will be further
weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet.”125
Sardar panikkar‟s biasness
towards communist ideology and his immense influence forced Nehru to forgo India‟s
national security interests in Tibet and his continuous efforts to strengthen China‟s
case in the United Nations. A question arises among international community about
178
India‟s stand on NAM and how Nehru‟s „primary consideration‟ of maintaining world
peace would be served by the Chinese invasion of Tibet.126
It is really a tragedy that at this critical moment in history Nehru was misguided
by K.M. Panikkar. As Sardar Panikkar was serving as Indian ambassador in China,
became practically a spokesman for Chinese interests in Tibet. A letter to Jawaharlal
Nehru, written by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on 7 November 1950, not only criticised
the role and actions of Indian Ambassador K.M Panikkar but also warned about the
dangers from China. By observing the biasness of Panikkar towards communist China,
Sardar Patel stated that“Panikkar has been at great pains to find an explanation or
justification for Chinese policy and actions.”127
Unfortunately, Nehru ignored Patel‟s
letter. Sardar Patel, though not flamboyant like Nehru, clearly understood that “In Kali
Yuga, we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. If anybody resorts to force against us, we
shall meet it with force and it is the ground rules of international affairs including the
timely and effective use of force”. 128
Patel felt that during the period of 1950, when
China was struggling to consolidate its position, it was a golden opportunity for India
to take a strong action against Chinese invasion in Tibet. Infact, world opinion was
strongly against the Chinese invasion in Tibet and India received international support.
Actually, the world was expecting a strong India‟s voice in this regard.
The Government of India accepted that the Tibetan Government as an
independent body and was ready to help Lhasa with its security concerns. In 1948,
Sardar Panikkar expressed his views to the Indian government that the Chinese
179
suzerainty over Tibet as „hazy‟. He also asked the Indian government to support the
recognition of Tibet‟s independence.129
During that period three important points
dominated the India‟s Tibet policy. First, Nehru had accepted the Tibetan invasion;
second, for Nehru and his advisors Tibet was a rather primitive country and social
reforms were long overdue. The third point is that Nehru „was not frightened‟ at the
idea of having a new neighbour on his Northern border.130
On November 1, Nehru announced for the first time in Parliament about the
invasion of the Chinese troops in Tibet. The next debate opened with an remorseful
statement by Nehru who clearly said that India had no territorial or political objectives
in Tibet. India‟s relations with Tibet is entirely based on cultural and commercial
spheres. He also stated that India only wants that Tibet should maintain the autonomy
it has had for at least the last 40 years. India is not going to challenge and deny the
suzerainty of China over Tibet and Nehru advocated a peaceful negotiation in dealing
with the issue. As the Tibetan crisis had a grave security concern, and the debate
heated the Indian parliament. All political parties except the Communists, expressed
their agony at the happenings on the „Roof of the World‟. Nehru concluded the debate
“…since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the
people of Tibet that should prevail and not any legal or constitutional arguments.
That, I think is a valid point. Whether the people of Tibet are strong enough or any
other country is strong enough to see that this is done is also another matter. But it is a
right and proper thing to say and I see no difficulty in saying to the Chinese
180
Government that whether they have suzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Tibet,
surely, according to any principles they proclaim and the principles I uphold, the last
voice of the Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else.” 131
The Statesman in Calcutta reported its own version of the incident. According
to them, it was the result of a careless slip in transcribing a coded message in the
diplomatic communication from New Delhi to Beijing in 1950:“A corrigendum did
follow after the mistake (or mischief) had been detected, and was traced to
inadvertence in the transmission of a coded message. It was K.M. Panikkar, then
Indian Ambassador to China, who held back the correction on the ground that it would
mean discomfiture for the Indian Government. As the matter stands now because of
this blunder, (a permanently sad commentary on the functioning of the Foreign
Service), India remains committed to „Chinese sovereignty‟ over Tibet.132
Downgrading the Lhasa Mission :
In May 1951, 17-point Agreement was signed in Beijing.After signing the
agreement India‟s Ambassador to China Sardar Panikkar came to India and discussed
about the situation in China. As Nehru had a keen desire to know about new China, the
Indian ambassador had supplied all informations that occurred in new China. That was
the starting point that Nehru strated to rely more on Panikkar. Even in a press
conference, Nehru had denied the diplomatic status of Indian mission at Lhasa. But
181
this was not completely true because the British and then Indian Representative
definitively had a diplomatic status in 1950/51. He later cautiously admitted, “the fact
of the matter is that the status of the Representative in Lhasa has never been defined
for the last 30 years”.133
In a conversation between Zhou Enlai and Sardar Panikkar in
June 1952, Zhou mentioned that “he presumed that India had no intention of claiming
special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past and was prepared to
negotiate a new and permanent relationship safeguarding the legitimate interests.”134
Panikkar conveyed the massege to Nehru that Zhou wanted the “transformation of the
Indian Mission in Lhasa” into a Consulate-General. Obviously, Nehru‟s response was
positive and he had no objection to converting the Mission in Lhasa into a Consulate-
General. Besides, Nehru advocated the opening of a Chinese consulate in Bombay.135
By receiving a green signal from Nehru, Zhou requested Nehru for the „regularization‟
of the Indian Mission in Lhasa and in 6 September 1952, through a cable
communication with the Indian mission in Lhasa, Nehru clarified the policy of the
Government of India.136
After regularization of Indian mission in Lhasa Pannikar was
transferred to Cairo.In the mean time, the changing status of the Mission in Lhasa also
changed the status of Tibet. Tibet as an autonomous nation was converted into a
province of China. After the signing the 17-point Agreement, the situation took a new
turn. Pannikar had a formal meeting with Zhou Enlai on September 21. In this meeting
Zhou informed Panikkar that there was no disparity of opinions in terms of Tibet
between India and China.As usual Panikkar reported the Indian government that Zhou
182
“was particularly anxious to safeguard in every way Indian interests in Tibet”.137
In
this conversation Zhou and Panikkar discussed about the stabilization of Indo-Tibetan
border and Panikkar was convinced that India and China had no difference of opinion
on the border and both are agreed to the McMahon Line. Though Nehru was convinced
by the optimistic massege provided by Panikkar but other officials of the Ministry of
External Affairs was not agreed with Panikkar‟s views. 138
A former Diwan of Sikkim,
John Lall, clearly wrote that “Very few people in Delhi other than Nehru had any
illusions about Pannikar”. N.P.Pillai, also severely criticized Panikkar and remarked
that “Pannikar had the reputation as a historian mixing fiction and fact and in his
reporting from Peking he had the tendency to believe what he wanted to believe”. 139
On 14 June 1952, Panikkar met again with Zhou regarding the matter of Korea
settlement.In this meeting Pannikar tried hard to raise the Indo-Tibet border issue but
Zhou totally ignored the matter. Zhou‟s behaviour frustrated Nehru and finally he
wrote to Panikkar, “We think it is rather odd that, in discussing Tibet with you, Chou
En-lai did not refer at all to our frontier. For our part, we attach more importance to
this than to any other matters. I do not quite like Chou-En-Lai‟s silence about it when
discussing even minor matters.”140
Nehru‟s approach to the problem of China and Tibet seems to have been
somewhat overshadowed by a powerful idealism which influenced his short-term
assessment of Chinese policy towards India.141
It would thus appear that Nehru‟s
fundamental and long-term realism with regard to India-China relation was associated
183
with an element of idealism which resulted in a relative underestimation of the nature
of the politico-military threat posed by China in the short run. The element of relative
idealism particularly manifested itself in the apparent absence of short-term strategic
thinking on the problems of India‟s security.142
184
185
Notes and References:
1 K. M. Panikkar, An Autobiography (Madras: Oxford University Press,1977), P.372
2 K.M Panikkar, In Two Chinas, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), p. 81.
3 In 1954, Mao told the Dalai Lama in Beijing that all these religious beliefs were
„poisonous‟. Available at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/tibet-the-panikkar-
factor/4/1.[Accessed on 13/3/2013]
4 P. Velayudha Panicker Kavalam, “A Sardar from Kavalam”, available at
www.pvpanicker.com/books/asardarfromkavalam.pdf, [Accessed on 15 August, 2013]
5 C Raja Mohan , “India‟s Regional Security Cooperation:The Nehru Raj Legacy”, 1ISAS
Working Paper No. 168 – 7 March 2013, available at
www.isas.nus.edu.sg/.../ISAS_Working_Paper_168_
6 K.M. Panikkar, The Future of South East Asia, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943),
p. 45.
7 C. Raja Mohan, op.cit.
8 Ibid.
9 Uma Iyengar,eds, The Oxford India Nehru (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.
522.
10 K. M. Panikkar, Problems of Indian Defence (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960),
p. 124.
11 P. Velayudha Panicker Kavalam, op.cit.
12 Geoffrey Till, Sea power: A guide for the Twenty-First century, II nd edition, (Abingdon:
Routledge Publication, 2009), p.286
13 R.N. Misra, Indian Ocean and India‟s Security (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1986), p.
19.
14 Christian Bouchard, “The Indian Ocean regional geo-strategic and maritime context”,
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, (Canberra, Australia:
Proceedings from the Indian Ocean Maritime Security Symposium, 2009), p.10.
186
15 P.K Roy, “Indian Ocean Region Strategic Importance and Evolving Trends”, India
Strategic, (December,2014),p.69 Available at
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3629_strategic_importance_and_evolving_trends.ht
m [Accessed on February, 10, 2015]
16 A Tellis, “Demanding Tasks for the Indian Navy,” Asian Survey, 25.12, (December 1985):
P.p.1186–1213, 1190 in Harsh V. Pant (Ed.), The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal
Vulnerabilities, External Challenges, (Newyork: Routledge, 2012) p.5,
17 K.R. Singh, “The Changing Paradigm of India‟s Maritime Security,” International Studies,
40.3, (2003): Pp. 229–245
18 P.K Roy, op.cit.
19 J. L. Nehru, “India and the Membership of the Security Council,” 30 October 1946, in S.
Gopal, ed. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series. Vol.1, (New Delhi:
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), pp.464–466
20 J. L. Nehru, The Discovery of India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 1989), p. 536.
21 J. L.Nehru, “Nationalisation and Private Enterprise”, 28 March 1948, in S. Gopal ed.
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series. Vol.5 , (New Delhi: Jawaharlal
Nehru Memorial Fund, 1987), Pp. 385–394
22 British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008.
23 Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, “Why the Indian Ocean Matters,” The Diplomat, March 02,
2011, available at URL: http://www.thediplomat.com/2011/03/why-the-indian-ocean-
matters/ [Accessed on 4/12/2012]
24 J. Hall, “Outline Plan for Reorganisation and Development of the Royal Indian Navy,” 25
August 1947, cited in Roy-Chaudhury, Sea-Power and India‟s Security, p. 27. (London:
Brassey‟s, 1995), also cited in Sandeep Singh, „The Role of Identity in India‟s Expanding
Naval Power, A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Otago in
fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Masters Of Arts, 2013
25 K.B. Vaidya, The Naval Defence of India, (Bombay: Thacker & Co. Ltd. 1949), Front
page.
26 Ibid., P. 9.
187
27 A. Prakash, “At a Seminar on Warship Building,” 22 March 2006, in David Scott,
“India‟s Drive For A „Blue Water‟ Navy”, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol.
10, Issue 2.( Winter 2007-08) URL: jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/90/100
[Accessed on 15 April, 2012]
28 http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/90/100
29 Chietigij Bajpaee, “Reinforcing India‟s Maritime Credentials: Need of the Hour”,
Vivekananda International foundation, URL: www.vifindia.org/.../reinforcing-india-s-
maritime-credentials-need-of-the hour.html, [Accesed on 24 June, 2013]
30 Donald L. Berlin, “India in the Indian Ocean”, Naval War College Review, vol. 59, no. 2
(Spring 2006): p. 60.
31 David Brewster , “An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean”? Security
Challenges, Vol-6. No. 3, (Spring2010): p.4, also available at
URL:http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/vol6no3Brewster.pdf
32 Admiral Arun Prakash, “At Sea About Naval History”, The tribune,Sunday, September 2,
2007
33 K.M. Panikkar, India and Indian Ocean, (Bombay: Allen & Unwin Publication, 1971), p.
45
34 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India‟s New Foreign Policy (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 205.
35 R.N Mishra, op.cit., p.3
36 K.M Panikkar, op.cit. p.20
37 Ibid.
38 Times of India directory and year book, 1980-81, p.198
39 Times of India directory and year book 1980-81. p. 198
40 For distances, see “The Oxford School Atlas”, New Delhi, 1978, second impression, 1980
p.26
41 Anu Unny, “The Indian Ocean Region and Changing Security Dynamics” in Suresh R. ed.
Maritime security in India: the coastal Security challenges and policy options,(New Delhi:
Vij books India Ltd.2014), P. 52
42 Rahul Roy Choudhury, Sea Power and Indian Security (London: Brassey‟s, 1995), p.199
188
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p.16.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid, p. 15
47 Ibid. p. 95
48 David Brewster, India‟s Ocean: The Story of India‟s Bid For Regional Leadership
(Newyork: Routledge, 2014), p.186
49 Ibid.,p. 191
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.192
52 Rasul B. Rais, The Indian Ocean and the super powers: Economic, political and strategic
perspectives, (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble books 1987), Pp. 13-14
53 Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, op.cit., Pp.41-43
54 Ibid. pp. 8-16
55 Arun Prakash, “Maritime security of India: Future Challenges,” (New Delhi: Institute of
Defense and Analyses Publications, Nov 26, 2013.)
URL:www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/MaritimeSecurityofIndiaFuturechallenges.html [Accessed
on 18 February, 2014]
56 KM Panikkar, India and Indian Ocean, op.cit.,p.99.
57 Ibid.
58 Arun Prakash, “At Sea About Naval History”,op.cit.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Arun Prakash, op.cit.
62 Arun Prakash, op.cit.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Arun Prakash, “Shaping India‟s Maritime Strategy – Opportunities & Challenges,”
Speech delivered as Chief of the Naval Staff (India) at the National Defence College,
India. Indian Navy. Retrieved 26 April 2012.
189
66 Panikkar, India and Indian Ocean, op.cit, p.9
67 P. Namboodri, Intervention in the Indian Ocean, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing,1882),
pp.50-57
68 Arun Prakash, “At Sea About Naval History”,op.cit.
69 Panikkar, op.cit., pp.9-10
70 Ibid., pp. 83-84.
71 Ibid., p.14
72 R. Roy Choudhury, op.cit., pp.27-29
73 Ibid.p.50
74 Panikkar, op.cit., p.81
75 G.M. Hiranandini, Transition to Eminence: The Indian Navy 1976-1990, (New Delhi:
Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defense (Publication Division), Navy 2005): p.5
76 James Holmes et al., Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty First Century, (London:
Routledge, 2009), p.28
77 Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945-50, (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press and IBH Publishing Co. 1986), p.36
78 Ibid.
79 Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean An Indian Perspective”,
Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, (January–March 2014): pp.52-53.
80 G. M. Hiranandani, Transition To Eminence: The Indian navy-1976-1990, (New Delhi:
Lancer Publications, 2005), pp.21-22
81 Jagat S. Bright, Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Lahore: Indian Printing Works,
1951), pp138-153.
82 Lorne Kavic, India‟s Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965 (Berkeley and Los
Angeles:University of California Press, 1967)p. 23
83 Panikkar, Problems of Indian Defense, op.cit.,p.45.
84 Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, op.cit., p.83.
85 George K. Tanham, Securing India (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), p.59.
86 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, op.cit., p.86.
87 Lorne Kavic, op.cit.
190
88 http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/90/100
89 Chietigij Bajpaee, “Reinforcing India‟s Maritime Credentials: Need of the Hour”,
Vivekananda International foundation, URL: www.vifindia.org/.../reinforcing-india-s-
maritime-credentials-need-of-the hour.html, [Accesed on 24 June, 2013]
90 Parmer, op.cit, p.53
91 Ibid., p. 56
92 Eric Margolis, “India Rules The Waves”, in US Naval Institute Proceedings, 131(3)
(March 2005): p. 70
93 Arun Prakash, “Indian Ocean : A New Vision”, Foreign Policy Research Centre
(FPRC)New Delhi, Journal (2), (2013): p.13
94 Defence and Diplomacy Journal Vol. 1 No. 3, 2012 (April-June)
95 Ibid.
96 Daniel R. Rahn, “Unlocking Indian Maritime Strategy”(Monterey, California : Naval
Postgraduate School, 2006), p.3
97 Peter Brobst, The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India‟s Independence, and
the Defense of Asia (Akron: The University Of Akron Press,2005), pp.26 30
98 http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/90/100
99 Ibid.
100 Panikkar, “India and the Indian Ocean”, op.cit,p. 86
101 Daniel R. Rahn, op.cit.
102 Henry Bartlett et al., “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning” in Strategy and Force
Planning, 3rd Edition, US:Naval War College, (2008): p.31.
103 http://maddy06.blogspot.in/2009/06/sardar-km-panikkar-luminary.html
104 Sardar KM Panikkar, a luminary, June 15, 2009, available at
http://maddy06.blogspot.in/2009/06/sardar-km-panikkar-luminary.html [Accessed on
12/5/2012]
105 Vipin Staniland and Paul Narang, “Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security
Policy”, India Review, Vol. 11, no. 2, (2012): pp. 76–94
106 http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/90/100
107 Tauquir H Naqvi, “Indian nuclear submarine programme”, The Nation, May 13, 2012
191
108 The term „Nehruvian consensus‟ is almost axiomatic in the literature on Indian foreign
policy and is rarely contested. Part of the problem is that there are quite a number of
political scientists writing on India‟s foreign policy, but few historians have devoted time
to this subject. The unwillingness of the Indian government to release any documentation
in turn makes it difficult for historians to access and assess the conduct of India‟s external
relations.
109 Kameng Shambala, “The Great Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the China-Tibet
blunder”, 2016, Central Tibetan Administration, also available at
http://tibet.net/2016/08/the-great-indian-prime-minister-nehru-and-the-china-tibet-blunder/
[Accessed on 21/5/2013]
110 SWJN, Series II, Vol.12, p.411. Cable to Harishwar Dayak, Political officer of Sikkim to
New Delhi dated 26 July 1949 in Claude Arpi, Tibet: The Lost Frontier (New Delhi:
Lancer Publications, 2013), URL: https://books.google.co.in/books?isbn=1935501496
[Accessed on 12/3/2014]
111 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography, Vol. II (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press,1979), pp. 105-06. (Also available at http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm)
112 Barun Das Gupta,“Looking Back on History: Fifty Years After the Chinese Aggression”,
Mainstream, Vol. No 44, October 20, (2012): p.59
113 Claude Arpi, Fate of Tibet, When big insects eat small insects,(New Delhi:Har-Anand,
1999),URL:http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/FateofTibetSamphel.pdf
114 J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India‟s Foreign Policy (New Delhi : Allied Publishers,
1970), p. 239
115 http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm
116 Ibid.
117 Claude Arpi, “ Fate of Tibet, op.cit.
118 Harshavardhan , “The 1962 Sino-Indian War-a Historical Perspective, Tibet, China, Nehru
and Pannikar”, available at vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm, accessed date 18-02-2014 [Accessed
on 15/2/2014]
119 S. Gopal, Ed. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 15, Part II (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 331.
192
120 Ibid., p. 343.
121 J. Bandyopadhyaya, op.cit., p 239, available at http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm
122 Ibid.p.239
123 http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm
124 Claude Arpi, “Fate of Tibet, When big insects eat small insects”, op.cit. Also available in
URL: http://www.savetibet.org/news/may98/052098.html
125 Op.cit.
126 Claude Arpi, op.cit
127 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel‟s letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 November 1950
128 Claude Arpi, op.cit, also available at http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm
129 Claude Arpi, „The blunder of Nehru‟s Tibet policy‟, Tibetan Bulletin Volume 4, Issue 2,
(May-June, 2000), also available in URL: http://www.tibeticlt.org/reports/chron.html
[Accessed on 4/2/2014]
130 Ibid. also available at http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm
131 Ibid.
132 Claude Arpi, “Tibet: The Panikkar Factor”, Indian Defence Review, (4 March, 2011), also
available at URL: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/tibet-the-panikkar-factor/3/
133 Claude Arpi,Op.cit.
134 Ibid.( Available at http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm)
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.( Available at http://vepa.us/dir00/tibet1.htm)
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 J. Bandyopadhyaya, op.cit., p.232
142 Ibid. p.233