METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 14, No. 1 , January 1983

THE LIBERAL POSITION ON ABORTION AND WELFARE RIGHTS CLIFTON PERRY

It has recently been argued that the liberal position on abortion is in- consistent with respect to certain other allegedly liberal positions, namely, the liberal position concerning the welfare rights of distant peoples and future generations. In an essay entitled “Abortion, Distant Peoples and Future Generations” Professor James Sterba quite persuasively argues that if one takes a liberal position toward either of these latter sets of rights, then one must, out of respect for logical consistency, give up or significantly amend one’s liberal position on abortion.’ I shall argue that this lamentable situa- tion also arises with respect to the conservative position but more importantly, that at least one version of the liberal position can escape the charge of in- consistency without altering any position whatsoever.

I

Sterba argues that if we grant the foetus a full right to life (which many liberal concede arguendo in accordance with Judith Jarvis Thornson’) but also say that this right does not place an obligation upon the mother to give the foetus her life support system, then we are being inconsistent if we also say that we have an obligation to save (perhaps by supplying food, medical resources, etc.) distant peoples. But this, it is maintained, is just what the liberal usually argues, i.e., that the mother is not obliged to save the foetus but we are obliged to save distant peoples. Thus, the liberal is inconsistent since he accepts a principle with respect to one situation but flatly rejects it when applied to a supposedly analogous situation.

Unfortunately the same charge may be leveled against the conservative. The conservative, with respect to abortion, argues that insofar as the foetus enjoys a right to life the mother has an obligation to save it, i.e., has an obligation not to abort. Nevertheless, it is also usually argued by the con- servative that economic and political individualism is preferred over a welfare state or e ~ o n o m y . ~ That is, the conservative argues that the mother has an obligation to save the foetus but that we don’t have an obligation to save not only distant people but also “near” people. Yet obviously if the foetus’ right to life places an obligation upon the mother, then the right to life enjoyed by

’ Sterba, James. “Abortion, Distant Peoples and Future Generations”, The Journal of Philosophy, Voi. LXXVII, #7 (July 1980); pp. 424-440.

Thornson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, # i , (Fall 1971);pp. 47-66. ’ See, for instance, the conservative position presented by Jan Narveson in his essay “Morality and Starvation” in World Hunger and Moral Obligation edited by W. Aiken and H. LcFollette; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977.

12

THE LIBERAL POSITION ON ABORTION AND WELFARE RIGHTS 13 distant people places an obligation upon those not in the position of economic and social penury.

It will do no good to argue that there is a difference of intimacy between the relation of the mother and foetus and that which exists between distant people and ourselves since, according to Sterba, the conservative position would at least be the denial of the liberal position. Inasmuch as the liberal position merely states that a right to life merely entails a right not to be killed unjustly but not a right to be saved, then the conservative position would be the conjunction of a right of life and either being killed or a right to be saved. Since the conservative would deny, as would the liberal, the former disjunct, the conservative position at the very least would be that if one enjoys a right to life, then one also enjoys certeris paribus a right to be saved. Therefore, since distant people enjoy a right to life, then they also enjoy a right to be saved irrespective of how distant (or non-intimate) the relationship between the right holder and the duty holder. Intimacy may invoke within us a more evasive feeling about fulfdling our duty but it surely is not necessary for having such a duty.

It might, in the conservative’s defense, be argued that one does not merely let the foetus die in an abortion but actually kills it. It is not a matter of our obligation to save a life but rather our duty not to take a life. Therefore, the conservative position is not inconsistent since although we do not have an obligation to save distant or near peoples we do have a duty not to kill them. Likewise, we have an obligation not to kill the foetus.

It would seem that the reason for the conservative’s distinction is that in the abortion case, one does something, namely, stop the foetus from using the mother’s body; while in the case of distant peoples, one does not stop them but rather merely fails to aid them. This position may be impugned if it can be shown that there are cases where someone does something which results in another’s death and the results were known to be certain or pro- bable, and yet the conservative would deny or be very reluctant to say that killing rather than letting die was involved. Consider, for example, a country comprised solely of Haves and Have Nots. If a Have Not has somehow secured food which would save him from starving yet which did not belong to him and in fact belonged to a Have, the conservative would say that the Have had a right to take the food back. Nevertheless, it is clear that the conservative would want to say that the Have killed the Have Not. The reason, I take it, rests with the prior behavior of the Have Not. In this case the Have Not took the aid the Have had no obligation to give.4 Now if the Have had not given the aid, the Have Not would have died and the Have would have merely allowed it. In our case the Have reclaimed what he had no obligation to give

One might say that the foetus had no prior behavior and thus the two cases are dis- analogous. This contention might be circumvcntcd by noting that the foetus gained possession of the mother’s body without the mother giving up exclusive ownership of such. After all the Have Not has no more right to property which bclongs to another but which he found than that which he took.

14 CLIFTON PERRY

and then, in failing to give to the Have Not, merely allowed him to die. It is unclear that the Have killed the Have Not even though the Have did some- thing which resulted in the Have Not’s death. Thus, it is not solely a matter of whether or not one does something which distinguishes letting die from killing.

If the woman’s body is her own, then at least with paradigm cases of abortion on demand, it might be maintained that the abortion of the foetus is a taking back of something the foetus did not have an intrinsic right to. If the foetus has a right to the mother’s body, it is because the foetus has a right t o those things necessary in order to stay alive, i.e., it has a right to be saved.

Appearances to the contrary, the above arguments are not examples of ad hominem tu quoque. The purpose of the above was not proffered to justify the liberal position but rather to show that the liberal position, if inconsistent, is not unique; that if this version of the liberal position stands in need of repair, so also does the conservative position. Nevertheless, it may be that this inconsistency is merely chimerical with respect to the liberal position.

The liberal position may be extricated from the charge of inconsistency simply by reappraising the relation between distant people and ourselves. All that needs to be shown is that there could exist an obligation between our- selves and at least some distant people but never between the mother and foetus in paradigm cases of abortion on demand. It need not be shown that an obligatory relationship holds between ourselves and all distant peoples but never between the mother and foetus is paradigm cases of abortion on demand. The reason, of course, is that the charge of inconsistency rested upon the notion that if the mother did not have an obligation toward the foetus, then there could never obtain a similar obligation between ourselves and distant peoples.

If it could be maintained, for instance, that the state of surplus or ad- vantage enjoyed by the United States was at the direct or indirect expense of distant peoples but that the state of hegemony enjoyed by the mother was not at the expense of the foetus, then it could be maintained that we do have an obligation to save distant peoples because of their welfare rights but mothers do not suffer a similar obligation to the foetus.’ Therefore, it might be argued that the sort of situation which is described between ourselves and distant peoples is one which refers to retribution or compensation while the situation described between mother and foetus is one which resides exclusively with a right t o life. But, of course, since Sterba notes that distant peoples’ welfare rights may be in rem rights or in personan and that such rights may appeal to “fair treatment” besides a right to life: it seems that at least in

Consider the remarks made by Michael Slote in “The Morality of Wealth” (pp. 124- 147) and William Aiken in “The Right to be Saved from Starvation” (pp. 85-102), both in World Hunger and Moral Obligation and Onara O’Neill in “Lifeboat Earth” in Philo- sophy and Public Affairs, Vol. IV, #3 (1975); pp. 213-292.

Sterba, p. 426.

THE LIBERAL POSITION ON ABORTION AND WELFARE RIGHTS 15 principle, one need not be inconsistent in maintaining that the mother does not have an obligation to save the foetus but that we have an obligation to save distant peoples.

Of course, the liberal might only be partly satisfied with this remark. It might be maintained that it is, after all, our duty to help even those people whose state of poverty is not the direct or indirect result of our economic policies. The liberal position so constructed would, unfortunately, be in- consistent. Unfortunately, this same problem disparages the conservative position also.

Inasmuch as the conservative, at least according to Sterba, is committed to the obligation to save based upon the right to life, and welfare rights are grounded in either a right to life or fair treatment, then the conservative is committed to some sort of social welfare. The conservative is so committed because of his acceptance of the entailment between a right to life and a right to be saved.

I1

There are, of course, many liberals on abortion who do not accept Thomson’s argument.’ Many liberals, that is, find Thomson’s individualism unacceptable and the potentiality principle, upon which a right to life is extended to the foetus, unintuitive. For instance, a liberal might impugn the use of the potentiality principle by noting that under normal circumstances the potential to do or be X is never by itself sufficient to grant to the potential X the status of X. The rights enjoyed by a physician are never granted upon the potential to be a physician. Neither are the potentials to operate an auto, graduate from college, practice law, etc. alone sufficient to grant the status of auto operator, college graduate, lawyer, etc. If the Con- stitution will not appraise the foetus as a person and yet we grant the foetus the status of a person on the basis that it will become a person in a given period, then we have done something which we do not do normally. Now it may be quite proper to grant personal status, and thus a right to life, to the foetus on its potential to achieve such but the justification of such a move has yet to be established.

It might be maintained that in the above examples while we do not grant full status on the basis of potential we at least acknowledge this right to continue to achieve that status. For example, while we do not treat college students like college graduates we do acknowledge college students’ right to continue their education and graduate from college. Thus, although the foetus may not possess the status of a person as specified in the Constitution, it does possess the right to continue to achieve that status. Insofar as this response makes the argument for the foetus’ continuance consistent with our ’ Many liberals would say that people do indeed have an obligation to extend help to others in need. Professor Mark Wicclair, for instance, has suggested that Thomson is actually a conservative or rather a libertarian in liberals’ clothing.

16 CLIFTON PERRY

other practices in granting social status, it justifies our State interests in protecting potential persons.

Upon further investigation, however, the above argument may be found wanting. In the examples employed, it will be noticed that the right of the college student to continue his education and graduate is not a particular right of college graduates. In particular, the right to continue one’s education is a right of a student and is quite different from the tights of the college graduate. Likewise, the right to continue one’s legal or medical education is not the same as the rights enjoyed by the individual who has achieved those ends. At each level the right to acheve something is enjoyed by those who have yet to achieve and is quite separate from the rights enjoyed by those who have achieved. Thus, having the right to continue towards a goal is quite different being granted the rights associated with achieving the goal; and in no way does the possession of the former imply the possession of the latter. In the case of the foetus, however, a right to continue on and become a person, i.e., a right to life, is, since the right to life is enjoyed by full-fledged persons, tantamount to granting a right associated with a particular status on the basis of potentially possessing such status; and this palpably conflicts with what was argued above. Unlike the college student, lawyer, and physician examples, the right needed to guarantee possession of foetal life so as to allow the foetus to become a person is exactly the type of right particularly enjoyed by a full-fledged person. Therefore, since the right to continue one’s education is different from the rights associated with the completion of such education there is no danger of circularity in maintaining that although we may not grant the right’s of college graduate to college students, college students still have the right to continue their education. However, this is not true of the foetus example since the right to continue on to become a person is just the right enjoyed by persons. Thus, in order to guarantee the foetus the oppor- tunity to achieve a certain status we must, by this argument, already ascribe to it that status.

The above has been taken as a viable liberal argument’ which is quite independent of the Thomson argument and quite obviously does not conflict with the notion of welfare rights of distant peoples. Nevertheless, Sterba notes that this liberal position conflict with the traditional liberal position anent the welfare rights of future generations. How, it is argued, can one consistently maintain that we suffer no obligation to save the life of a potential person but that we must endure such an obligation toward a potential group of people? Thus, it would seem that this liberal position runs afoul since liberals do believe that the potentiality of future generations obliges us to act in a certain way, i.e., that it is morally relevant, but that the potentiality of the foetus does not oblige us to behave in any particular way, i.e., that it is not morally relevant.

Professor Gary E. Jones argued in this manner a t the Fourth Annual Conference on Science and Human Values at the State University of New York at Geneseo in April 1979.

THE LIBERAL POSITION ON ABORTION AND WELFARE RIGHTS 17 Unlike the former charge against the liberal position, this argument cannot

be turned against the conservative position. The conservative, insofar as he does take the potentiality of the foetus and future generations to be morally relevant, acknowledges our obligations toward both. Consequently, this argument, if correct, uniquely and unhappily reflects upon the liberal position. Nevertheless, it seems that the liberal might have at least three different responses.

It might first be argued that we need not be inconsistent if our attitude toward a member of a class fails to duplicate our attitude toward the class itself. Are we actually inconsistent if we take the potentiality of the future generation to be significant and yet not take the potentiality of any given member of the generation as significant? We do, after all, predicate of classes what we cannot of individuals without fear of inconsistency, e.g., “the argument was senseless yet each premise was sensible”. A man is not in- consistent if he cares little about any individual hair and yet cares a great deal about being bald. Neither is one inconsistent if he says that he does not care if any given peach is destroyed but he does care about his entire crop. If these examples are relevant in the appropriate ways, then it just is not clear that the liberal is inconsistent in believing that the potentiality of the foetus is morally insignificant while the potentiality of future generations is significant. The right to an abortion is distributive, the rights of future generations is collective.

Alternatively, one might argue that the two cases are disanalogous since the future generation is wanted, the foetus is not. Potentiality, it might be suggested, becomes morally significant, at least in these cases, when the potential entity is wanted but not when it is not. The potentiality of the foetus would be morally significant if the parents want the child. The liberal is not inconsistent if it is maintained that potentiality is not itself sufficient to create moral significance yet potentiality when conjoined with other factors may indeed be significant. Indeed, this was the argument designed to demonstrate the untenability of the potentiality principle initially. The liberal position has already acknowledged the significance of potentiality to become a person when conjoined with the potentiality to be a separate entity (viability) in Roe v. Wade. Why could not the liberal position agree that potentiality of this particular foetus becomes significant only if conjoined with the given parents’ desire to have the child and that the moral significance of potentiality supplied by parental interests is superseded at the stage of viability by state interests? I f this is a plausible position, then until state interests become compelling, at the stage of viability, the potentiality enjoyed by the foetus gains moral significance only if the continued growth of the foetus is desired by the appropriate people. Such a position is not irrelevant to the liberal belief that it is morally permissible to allow abortions prior to viability when the mother does not want the foetus. But if this is correct, then the cases between the future generations and the foetus are indeed dis- analogous. The aborted foetus is not wanted but future generations, according to Sterba’s own argument, are wanted. Consequently, it is not

18 CLIFTON PERRY

inconsistent for the liberal to maintain that the potentiality of wanted future generations possesses moral significance but that the potentiality of the un- wanted foetus does not possess such significance.

Finally, the liberal might simply deny that when we talk about future generations we are talking about potentiality at all? Our concern about future generations is a concern about actual living people who do not yet exist but if and when they become existant, have a right to a certain quality of life. Our concern about the foetus, on the other hand, is not about actual living persons who do not yet exist but rather about actual living potential persons who are now existent. I t is one thing to maintain that actual people, if and when they become existent, enjoy rights and quite another to say that potential people now enjoy rights. One does not believe that a liberal woman is being inconsistent when she maintains that a foetus prior to viability does not, because of a denial of the potentiality principle, enjoy a right to life but that a given child if and when it becomes existent does enjoy a right t o life. The liberal might, quite correctly I suspect, maintain that children, if and when they exist, enjoy a right to life but that this granting of a right based upon the satisfaction of a condition is quite different from the granting of a right based upon the potential to satisfy the condition. Thus, it is not in- consistent to maintain that as-yet-nonexistent persons will have certain rights if and when they exist but that nonexistent beings do not have a right to exist.

If the above is correct, then it is simply not true that the liberal arguments that the foetus may enjoy a right to life but not a right t o everything necessary for life or that the foetus does not enjoy a right t o life based upon a denial of the potentiality principle, need come into conflict with either welfare rights of distant peoples in the first case or will conflict with the welfare rights of future generations in the second.*

AUBURN UNIVERSITY AUBURN, ALABAMA 36830 USA

It seems that talk of the “foetus’ right not to be born” is simply an acceptance of the potentiality principle which was to be denied in this particular version of the liberal position. If in denying the potentiality principle, the unwanted foetus may be aborted, it is because it is not, as it stands, a candidate for rights, a right to life 0r.a right not to be born.

* Note I should like to thank Professors Gary E. Jones and Mark Wicclair for their help o n an earlier draft of this paper.