the june 22 2009 track wreck
TRANSCRIPT
8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-june-22-2009-track-wreck 1/7
The June 22, 2009 Train WreckPosted on December 19, 2010 by washingtondcmetro
On June 22, 2009, near the Fort Totten Metro Station, 9 people (the train op
and scores more were injured unnecessarily in a horrific wreck on Metro’s R
and should never have happened.
Incidentally, because Metro carries Workers’ Comp (WC) insurance, the fam
McMillan, cannot sue Metro. Everyone else can sue but Ms. McMillan’s fami
relation to what the passengers and/or their dependents will receive. A passe
wreck (for example) will almost certainly receive a much larger settlement th
grossly unfair and needs to change. Employees (anywhere) should not be for
condition of employment.
Most of the details about the worst accident in Metro’s history have been rep
in me repeating them here.
However, there is something that to the best of my knowledge was not menti
or PMI we performed to check the track circuits. The “Track Circuit Data Sh
working for Metro in 1983 had two (2) columns for the verification procedur
We ATC technicians had been specifically instructed to only use one of the tof the two procedures because that’s how the PMI was written and it’s how w
performing the second half of the verification all of those people would almo
celebrating the holidays with their family and friends as I write this.
That’s really all you need to know. For those who are interested in some brie
If you’ve got coffee, drink it now!
Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out 27 years with WMATA, the 51st State
Follow
Page 1 of 7The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck | Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out
1/4/2014http://washington-dc-metro.com/2010/12/19/the-june-22-2009-train-wreck/
8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-june-22-2009-track-wreck 2/7
Seriously, if you’re at all interested in how subway trains can move automati
interesting. If not, well, read at your own risk.
This photo should be helpful in visualizing what I am referring to below. Th
‘impedance bond’. The small cable carries the train detection and speed co
yellow sign is a ‘chain marker’. A ‘chain’ is 100 feet. This is 71,700 feet from
track#1. This is just north of the Twinbrook Station. The tracks on the othe
Follow
Page 2 of 7The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck | Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out
1/4/2014http://washington-dc-metro.com/2010/12/19/the-june-22-2009-train-wreck/
8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-june-22-2009-track-wreck 3/7
~~~~~
The railroad tracks are divided into sections, aka “track circuits”. Like city bl
length from less than 100 feet to maybe 1,300 feet or more.
In order to detect the location of the trains, a signal is fed through the rails fr
other. It is an audio frequency signal which you can actually hear in some pl
conduct the signal. Where the signal enters the rails is called the transmitter
the receiver (Rx) end.
Normally, with no train in the circuit, the signal goes out to the tracks throu
the rails to the receive end and back to the TCR. As long as the signal makes
assumed to be vacant (no train). Any approaching train should get unrestrict
of the posted speed limit on a public road).
When a train enters the circuit, its steel wheels and steel axles form a short c
which prevents the signal from making it to the receiver end. When the sign
track circuit is assumed to be occupied by a train.
It is done this way for safety. Anything that causes the signal to not complete
(a cracked rail, a blown fuse, a broken rail clamp, etc) will be interpreted as
supposed to be a “fail-safe” system, and it is – unless Metro “engineers” start
with old equipment from another mfr. More on that later.
A ‘track circuit verification’ is vital but pretty basic. We would use a ‘shunt st
short across the rails – to simulate a train – and confirm that our equipment
occupied. We called this ‘dropping’ the circuit (causing it to show occupancy
Above I said we only did half of the procedure. The data sheet had columns f
asking my supervisor back in 1983 or ’84 why we never did the verification a
necessary and clearly wasn’t interested in talking about it any further.
In fairness, what he said made sense intuitively – if the signal could be short
strongest, verifying the Rx end would be an unnecessary waste of time. To mFollow
Page 3 of 7The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck | Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out
1/4/2014http://washington-dc-metro.com/2010/12/19/the-june-22-2009-train-wreck/
8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-june-22-2009-track-wreck 4/7
this over the years – not even the most intelligent and conscientious technici
are _real_ engineers).
We continued verifying the transmitter end only, until after the wreck in Jun
After the wreck, what we found was that contrary to what our training and c
actually more difficult to ‘drop’ most track circuits at the Rx end. What that
would be possible for a train to be in a track circuit and not be detected – for
disappear!
That’s exactly what happened the day of the accident. An inbound train was
for the train ahead of it to clear the platform. It happened to be sitting close t
not detected. Therefore, the train approaching from behind on the same trac
commands. The operator of that train, Ms. McMillan, saw the stationary trai
emergency brake (or “mushroom”, named for its mushroom shape) but it wa
the rear of the stationary train causing catastrophic damage to the first two c
instantly.
Early warning:
Prior to the accident, ATC technicians had been instructed to install new ‘im
couples/transfers the train detection and speed command signals to and fro
they were told to install were made by a different mfr than the rest of the equ
the techs questioned the wisdom of this but they were blown off, as per usual
circuits weren’t adjusting properly and reported this but were told to “crank
idea from a safety standpoint. If the signal is too strong the circuit might not
A particular circuit (the one the struck train was in) began picking and drop
then vacant – days before the accident. This was confirmed by the system lo
published in a local paper. A ‘work order’ was opened for a ‘bobbing track ci
indicating occupied then vacant – ‘train/no train/train/no train’). It was tha
would be obvious on the huge display at Central Control (OCC) downtown at
In fact, that’s almost certainly why the work order was opened! After the acci
Follow
Page 4 of 7The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck | Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out
1/4/2014http://washington-dc-metro.com/2010/12/19/the-june-22-2009-train-wreck/
8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-june-22-2009-track-wreck 5/7
Share this:
letter issued by the mfr of the bonds clearly warning against mixing them wi
NTSB hearing the “engineer” claimed that he “never saw the letter” (althoug
WMATA claimed that they “never knew” about the track circuit problems be
clear paper trail showing they absolutely did know. Was anyone fired or dem
subsequent blatant lies? Was anyone prosecuted for manslaughter? Hell no
Heads will roll. We’re on top of this…”. OK, back to sleep now…
And in a nutshell, THAT’s what’s wrong with Metro. There is absolutely ZER
at OCC when my two coworkers were killed this past January is guilty of vol
any consequences? No way. Can my coworkers’ widows sue them? Sorry, W
WMATA, they can’t sue any Metro employee acting in his/her ‘official capaci
husband/wife; sister/brother; mother/father. Go away now, you’re bringing
people…”.
The “engineer” responsible for instructing us to install the mismatched equi
engineer, he doesn’t even have a high school diploma! He has a GED, that’s i
“engineers” are the subjects of a recent newspaper article which I linked to i
accident but now works as a “safety consultant” for Metro!!
This is so outrageous it would almost be funny if people weren’t injured and
Hopefully this accident will forever prove to be the nadir of the history of Me
About these ads
Follow
Page 5 of 7The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck | Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out
1/4/2014http://washington-dc-metro.com/2010/12/19/the-june-22-2009-train-wreck/
8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-june-22-2009-track-wreck 6/7
Facebook 1 Twitter StumbleUpon Email Digg Reddit
Like this:Like Loading...
This entry was posted in Inadequate Training, Management Follies, Safety Incidents, The Metro Hall of Shame and tagmoney. Bookmark the permalink.
2 Responses to The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck
Ted K. says:
April 3, 2011 at 4:07 AM
Cranking up the power is a no-no in other fields :
1) As a data comm. tech. I’m well aware that the telephone company has a hard m
2) The FCC has published limits for equipment like citizen’s band radios; and
3) Aircraft engines are de-rated for safety and service life reasons.
By the way, that supervisor’s instruction to boost the power could be considered a
interference in nearby radio gear. It’s against the law to jam somebody else’s radi
Reply
washingtondcmetro says:
April 3, 2011 at 4:47 AM
Metro doesn’t concern itself with petty details like FCC regulations — they don
This accident should never have happened. Even though I wasn’t involved I fee
primary cause was ATC equipment. There are always ‘what if’s’ after an accide
pressed harder about why we were only verifying track circuits at the transmitt
The only thing worse than an accident in which people are hurt and/or killed i
Reply
Follow
Page 6 of 7The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck | Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out
1/4/2014http://washington-dc-metro.com/2010/12/19/the-june-22-2009-train-wreck/
8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-june-22-2009-track-wreck 7/7
Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out
The Twenty Ten Theme. Blog at WordPress.com.
Follow
Page 7 of 7The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck | Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out