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The “Caliphate” in the Digital Age: the Islamic State’s Challenge to the Global Liberal

Order

By

Dr. Anthony N. Celso Associate Professor Department of Security Studies Angelo State University San Angelo, TX 76909 anthony.celso@angelo.edu

“They [Islamic State mujahidin] have a statement to make that will cause the world to hear

and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism,

destroy the idol of democracy and uncover its deviant nature.” 1

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham‘s (ISIS) June 2014 Mesopotamian conquests shocked the world. More astounding was ISIS’ later announcement that a caliphate [Islamic State-IS] had

been established. With territory stretching from Iraq to Syria, IS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi’s declared caliphate erases colonial borders. Proclaimed as Caliph Ibrahim, Baghdadi’s July 2014 Mosul Grand Mosque sermon demanded the loyalty of the world’s Muslims and he proposed

their emigration (hijrah) to his transnational state.2 Assisted by thousands of foreign fighters, advanced US weapons captured from a retreating Iraqi army and a revenue base from oil profits,

illicit enterprise, and charitable donations, the Islamic State’s has declared war on the West.3 Its media operations celebrate attacks by IS supporters in Paris, Brussels, Sydney, Copenhagen, New York and Ottawa and its representatives make impassioned appeals for further attacks.

The jihadist state meticulously reports its tactics and finances and audaciously expresses its

ideological message.4 There is, moreover, a connection between IS’ aims and its activities underscoring its ideological sincerity. Using the group’s publications, speeches and videos, this essay analyzes the Islamic State’s worldview and the jihadist network’s efforts to challenge

Western hegemony. The essay discusses IS’ vision of a global Muslim community (ummah) and its belief that it is preordained to destroy the Western order. The Islamic State’s media

operations argue that: (1) a Western influenced jahiliyyah or ignorance of divine judgment has infected Muslim society; (2) a Zionist-Crusader order supports dictatorial anti-Islamist Arab regimes to control Mideast oil reserves; (3) the West uses Shi’ite and Alawite client states (Iran,

Iraq and Syria) to oppress the Sunni Muslim world; and (4) the liberal global order is destined to be destroyed by IS’ caliphate.

The analysis also examines the caliphate in a global context. The Islamic State is paradoxically

an opponent of and advocate for globalization. Its tens of thousands of foreign fighters and its

sophisticated social media campaigns have created broad support among radicalized Muslims

across the globe.5 It’s vision of a new global order is predicated upon expansion beyond its Iraqi-

Syrian base. The caliphate’s success is ironically assisted by international communications and

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modern transport. While the Islamic State’s worldview may be medieval and barbaric, the means

it employs are thoroughly modern.

Reversing Westernization and the Ummah’s Atrophy

“So Allah’s help is sought against what has struck our era of the different shades of shirk,

heresy and deviation, for the people have absorbed the bulk of these creeds and become

affected by them.” 6

The Islamic State views the West as a corrupting the development of the global Muslim ummah

(community). IS’ English language magazine Dabiq rails against Western dominance that

historically has weakened Islam and perverted its 7th century values.7 From the jihadist

organization’s perspective the ummah achieved its highest development under Muhammad and

his four righteous successors. Islam, Dabiq claims, thereafter, began to regress.

Dabiq argues that Muslim revisionist rulers wrongfully incorporated European practices in law,

art, science, philosophy, warfare and governance in their societies. Assimilation of non-Islamic

values expanded under the Ottoman Turks and then accelerated calamitously during colonialism

and independence. The spread of Western ideas (nationalism, liberalism, socialism, capitalism

and secularism) accordingly shattered the ummah’s foundations by separating religious from

political authority. Borrowing from Salafi intellectual currents, the magazine asserts this

heretical deviation substituted divine practices (Sharia based rule) for the imperfection of

manmade institutions.8 Islamic society, moreover, has been betrayed by a revisionist clergy

(ulama) unwilling to defend traditional values and who are acquiescent to Westernized political

elites.9

Islamic State views these alien influences as undermining the divine stitching of Muslim order.

Dabiq’s tale the Millah [path] of Ibrahim sees Islam’s historical degeneration as legitimating

secular tyrannical rulers.10 IS believes Muslim society has reverted back to a pre-Islamic state of

ignorance or jahiliyyah. This progressive erosion of Quranic values, accordingly, led to the loss

of Ottoman dynamism, the caliphate’s 1919 collapse and colonial humiliation.

The jihadist organization’s interpretation of jahiliyyah relies on past and contemporary Salafist

thinkers. Medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah argued the Mongol invasions and the Abbasid

caliphate’s collapse were harmful to Islamic society for Mongol values were antithetical to the

religion’s original principles.11 Taymiyyah reasoned that Mongol conversion to Islam did not

make them true Muslims for their rule was not Quran based. Given this violation of the divine

path, Taymiyyah urged rebellion to restore Allah’s true intent and reinvigorate the caliphate.

Writing sixty years ago Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb analyzed Western

Enlightenment’s impact on Islamic society.12 Qutb’s Milestones and the In the Shade of the

Quran argued that Muslim society was beset by a hideous schizophrenia that separated the

earthly from the spiritual breaking the ummah’s communal bonds.13 This departure from Allah’s

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guidance, Qutb argues, produced chronic dysfunctions in Muslim society that can only be

reversed by fortifying traditional religious principles. Initially Qutb believed that missionary

preaching (dawa) could achieve this transformation by convincing the masses of the true path.

Later, however, he concluded that only a revolutionary vanguard could violently effectuate such

a development.14 Having formed revolutionary cells in Nasser’s apostate Egyptian government

in the 1960’s, Qutb was arrested, tortured, tried and executed.

Religious rebellions against apostate rulers have occurred across Islamic history. Early in the

development of Islam, the Kharijites rebelled against what they perceived as corrupt illegitimate

rulers. The medieval Shi’ite Assassins engaged in a terror campaign against impious Muslim

rulers and Western crusaders.15 The Islamic State’s quest for an ultraviolent transformation of the

ummah is not unprecedented. Like the Kharijites and the Assassins, IS view’s itself destined to

purify Muslim society and restore Muhammad’s original uncorrupted vision.

Islamic State publications intersperse Muhammad’s life with the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq

(AQI) leaders. Muhammad’s hijrah (emigration) to Medina, his establishment of a community,

his defeat of the pagans, his crushing of the “traitorous” Jews and his conquest of Mecca are

juxtaposed with the ideological, leadership and organizational trajectory of AQI and its Islamic

State successor.16 By linking Zarqawi with the Prophet, IS legitimates its effort to lead the

global jihadist struggle.

Like the Prophet Zarqawi made his hijrah from Jordan to Afghanistan to Iraq, fought against

polytheists (the Shia) and infidels (U.S. forces) and the Jordanian wanted to recreate a modern

version of the Prophet’s Medina in Iraq’s Anbar Province. Dabiq presents AQI leaders including

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as part of divine path of Islamic renewal, purification and conquest.17 It

presents each leader as part of an eschatological dynamic that foreshadows global Islamic

conquest.

IS’ Syrian stronghold in Raqqa is portrayed as a new Medina. Dabiq’s depicts jihadist rule in

Raqqa by juxtaposing images of its Shura council rulings commanding stoning, crucifixion,

beheadings, amputations and floggings with pictures of its charitable and educational

programs.18 The Institute for the Study of War argues the Islamic State has developed governing

capacity in Raqqa delivering basic services and its Shura councils strictly enforce Sharia law.19

Education, garbage collection, welfare provision and security services have become IS functions.

Morality police patrol the streets to strictly enforce mandatory prayers and ban alcohol, smoking,

and music. Women are forced to were the veil and be accompanied by a male companion.

With its June 2014 conquests, Raqqa’s model has been imposed across the caliphate including

Iraq’s second largest city Mosul. Viewed as shirk (polytheism) by IS militants Mosul’s Shi’ite

mosques, tombs and shrines have been destroyed and infidel Yazidi and Christians have been

killed, enslaved or expelled.20 Homosexuals have been thrown off high buildings and IS’

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morality police strictly enforce Islamic norms and stern punishments. Primary, secondary and

university education has been reorganized to reflect Islamic values.

Faced with the IS’ June 2013 military victories in Iraq that threatened further territorial conquest,

America militarily intervened through airstrikes against jihadist forces. Since interceding the US

has supported Baghdad and Erbil’s efforts to counter IS’ brigades. Led by the United States the

international community’s military campaign aims to degrade and destroy IS’ caliphate. While

the caliphate’s military momentum has stalled and jihadist forces have experienced reversals at

Kobane, Amerli and Mosul Dam, the campaign against IS has only succeeded in capturing a

fraction of the territory IS has under its control. With a caliphate stretching from Aleppo, Syria

to Diyala Province in Iraq, IS rules over six million people.21

Combating the Zionist-Crusaders and Muslim Apostates

“The flag of the Khalifah will rise over Makkah [Mecca] and al-Madinah [Medina], even if

the apostates and hypocrites despise such. The flag of the Khalifah will fly over Baytul-Maqdis

[Jerusalem] and Rome, even if the Jews and Crusaders despise such.”22

In the IS video The End of Sykes-Picot jihadists capture an Iraqi-Syrian border post and

announce the end of colonial era borders.23 Speaking in English the videos IS spokesperson

confidently predicts jihadist victory against the tawaghit (Arab despots) and he denounces the

Yazidi as devil worshipers foreshadowing the organization’s attempt to eradicate Mount Sinjar’s

Yazidi communities. The video brazenly abrogates the Franco-British Sykes-Picot accord.

Signed in 1896 the treaty divided the Ottoman Empire’s North African and Mideast holdings

between the French and the British whose colonial rule over these territories allowed the

colonizers in IS’ view to deepen jahiliyyah.

Jihadists see WWI’s outcome as leading to Western domination of the Mideast.24 Britain’s 1917

Balfour Declaration promising European Jews a national homeland in Palestine is interpreted by

IS jihadists as creating a Mideast European neo-colonial presence. The Ottoman Empire’s 1919

collapse and Turkey’s 1924 abolition of the caliphate, is interpreted as an imperial scheme to

dominate the region and destroy Islam.

The Islamic State’s WWI colonial narrative borrows from Al Qaeda thinkers like Abu Bakr Naji

and Abu Musab al-Suri.25 They saw apostate Arab rulers as post-colonial puppets allied with a

Zionist-Crusader order to plunder the Mideast. British and American policy is accordingly

oriented toward supporting Israel and puppet Arab states to insure access to oil, strategic

waterways and the defeat of Islamist forces. When their strategic interests are threatened by

regional powers or local insurgency, the Western militaries intervene to insure access to Mideast

oil. The 1991 and 2003 Gulf wars are thus a neo-imperial strategy to dominate the regions

petroleum reserves.

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Abu Musab al-Suri argued that Islamist revolts in Syria and Egypt during the 1980’s failed

because their hierarchical organizations were vulnerable to regime counter-terror operations.26

He advocated a decentralized jihad and guerilla warfare capable of withstanding government

attacks. Modifying Suri’s strategy, IS is adept at asymmetrical and conventional warfare and its

hierarchical chain of command gives provincial commanders considerable autonomy.27

Dabiq attributes Suri and Naji’s ideas to AQI’s founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The Return of

the Khalifa endorses Abu Bakr Naji’s strategy outlined in The Management of Savagery as

Zarqawi’s plan. 28 Dabiq sketches a series of steps: hijrah (emigration), jamaah (unity),

destabilize taghut (apostate state), tamkin (unity) and Khilafah (caliphate) contained in Naji’s

book by juxtaposing this sequence with Zarqawi actions and the behavior of his ISI/ISIL/IS

successors. With its calculated brutality Naji’s book may be the inspiration for ISIS’ many

atrocities including its February 2015 Twitter posting of the immolation of a captured Jordanian

air force pilot.

While the Islamic State’s critique of a Zionist-Crusader conspiracy is not unique, its strategy to

combat Western dominance is novel. By conquering territory across national borders IS’ leaders

hope their caliphate will eventually defeat the liberal order. The terror organization’s strategy

has occupied land along the Tigris and Euphrates River Basins controlling key resources (water,

oil, food). Dams, oil wells and grain storage bins are particularly coveted. Such resources IS

believes can finance conventional military capabilities to challenge the international status quo.

The Islamic State’s caliphate centric approach diverges from Al Qaeda far enemy strategy of

attacking the United States.29 This deviation in strategy forced Al Qaeda Central to expel the

Islamic State from its network. When ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi refused to comply with

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s order to withdraw his network from Syria, AQ Central expelled its Iraqi

affiliate.30 Baghdadi’s subsequent repudiation of Zawahiri’s leadership forced a schism within

IS’ network with its Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) pledging alignment with Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda’s inability to force a wholesale American retrenchment from the Mideast and its failure

to decisively strike the US homeland after 9-11, created the need for an alternative jihadist

strategy. AQ’s post 9-11 fragmentation and the crippling of its Waziristan operations by US

drone strikes gave the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in Iraq the chance to build an alternative

movement. ISI’s opportunity to build a caliphate centric movement became a reality during the

Arab Spring and the US disengagement from Iraq.

The fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt due to mass protests and the NATO

assisted overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya had vast political consequences across the

region. The March 2011 protests against Syria’s Bashar al- Assad’s dictatorial state eventually

morphed into civil war that extended across Damascus’ borders into Iraq. After the 2011 US

withdraw from Iraq, Baghdad pursued polices that persecuted the Sunni minority. Sunni

politicians were prosecuted for supporting terrorism, Sunni army officers were demoted, and

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many Sunni tribal militias were dismembered.31 Sunni protests were brutally repressed. Badly

damaged during the later period of the US occupation, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was able to

recover as a protector of Sunni interests.

By 2013 ISI had rebuilt its terror network by securing political and tribal alliances and

replenishing its ranks by attacking prisons and liberating hundreds of jihadist prisoners. The

Syrian civil war, moreover, created the conditions for ISI’s transnational expansion. The Sunni

dominated rebellion against Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime must be viewed within the

context of Syria’s fragile confessional configuration. While avowedly secular, Syria’s Baathist

regime is dominated by Alawite, Shi’ite and Christian minorities. Comprising seventy percent of

the population, Sunni grievances have been unaddressed. Prior revolts by the Sunni Muslim

Brotherhood in the early 1980’s were brutally repressed by Damascus.

The 2011 rebellion in key cities forced Assad’s to redeploy his forces away from the Iraqi

border. This permitted ISI to transfer part of its network to Syria capitalizing on the chaos and

Sunni disenchantment. ISI’s April 2012 formation of a Syrian branch Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)

exploited preexisting jihadist recruitment networks and capitalized on the migration of foreign

fighters into Syria to fight the Assad regime.32

Events in Syria and Iraq acted synergistically fortifying ISI’s transnational network. By spring

2014 ISI’s Breaking the Walls and Soldiers of Harvest terror campaigns had freed scores of

jihadist prisoners and killed enough Iraqi security forces that the network was able to capture

many Sunni towns and cities.33 Entire Iraqi army divisions melted away with little resistance

before the jihadist onslaught. Iraq’s second largest city Mosul fell uncontested to ISIS militants.

Shortly after Mosul’s fall, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al- Adnani announced the caliphate

and the organization’s investiture of ISI emir Baghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim. This proclamation

was reconfirmed in ISI’s leader’s Grand Mosul Mosque July 4, 2014 address where Baghdadi

demands the loyalty of Muslims across the world.

Baghdadi’s transnational state challenges Al Qaeda’s leadership of the global jihadist movement.

IS believes such a jihadist consolidation is necessary to secure victory against crusader forces.

Since January 2014 IS militants have waged a war against fellow jihadists in Syria and IS leaders

have consciously sought to fragment Al Qaeda’s network by attracting dissidents.34 Dabiq’s

Remaining and Expanding documents pledges of IS support from Algerian, Egyptian, Yemeni

and Saudi jihadists. Recently IS’ caliphate has branched out into Libya where its militants have

established strongholds in Derna and Sirte.35 The e-magazine’s sixth edition Al Qaeda in

Waziristan critiques Zawahiri’s leadership of the jihadist movement and his loyalty to Mullah

Omar.36

In Dabiq’s The Flood IS challenges their Al Qaeda opponents to theological duel known as the

mubahalah where divine intercession resolves disputes by favoring the righteous and punishing

transgressors of Allah’s will.37 Within this context, IS success in fighting AQ aligned Jabhat al-

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Nusra (JN) and the Islamic Front in Syria is seen by the movement ideologues as Allah’s

blessing. Those who refuse to join the IS Dabiq argues will face inevitable destruction.

Al Qaeda’s quarrels with its Iraqi branch have a turbulent history dating back to Zarqawi’s

leadership of AQI and the Jordanian’s sectarian strategy. The two organizations never aligned

organizationally, tactically or ideologically. It is to this issue that we now turn.

Zarqawi’s Long Sectarian Shadow

“Obama now strengthens the Iraqi regime, which is undeniably backed by Iranian

intelligence, military and finances. “38

The Islamic State’s sectarian approach is reflected in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 2004 letter to Al

Qaeda Central. Intercepted by U.S. authorities, Zarqawi’s message argues that Shi’ites are

confirmed polytheists.39 The Jordanian viewed Shi’ites and Kurds as enablers of a diabolical

Jewish conspiracy to establish an Iraqi Zionist state after the 2003 U.S. invasion. Zarqawi’s

hatred toward Shi’ites joined with his plans to form a Sunni jihadist emirate. Hoping to ignite

sectarian civil war, state collapse and U.S. withdraw, AQI targeted Shi’ite civil and religious

institutions killing thousands. Forming an Islamic emirate in 2006, Zarqawi rebranded AQI as

the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and his successors after his June 2006 death have fanatically

pursued his sectarian vision. After the U.S. killed ISI’s post Zarqawi leadership, Baghdadi

became its emir in 2010 and has amplified the Jordanian’s vision by extending ISI operations

into Syria.

Islamic State publications criticize Shi’ite and Kurdish apostasy and celebrate their killing.40

They depict a Muslim world plagued by shirk [polytheism] with pious Sunnis repressed by

Shi’ite and Alawite tawaghit [despots] and their Zionist-Crusader masters. Based on Qur’anic

verses and hadith The Return of the Khilafah sees the Islamic State as Allah’s prophesied

vanguard to rejuvenate Islam by restoring tawid [unity], purging it of shirk [polytheism] and

fortifying the true ummah [community] by integrating political and religious authority under

Caliph Ibrahim.41 Report on the Islamic State 4 venerates the slaughter of 1,700 Shi’ite army

prisoners after Mosul’s fall. 42IS’ militants proudly stand by mass graves in the edition’s many

horrific photos. Western hostages, Syrian soldiers and Christian Copts have been the subjects of

grisly beheading videos enthusiastically posted on You Tube and Twitter.

The Islamic State uses takfir [excommunication] to legitimate killing Muslims. Traditionally the

concept was confined to expel impious rulers and immoral individuals from the faith. Jihadist

clerics, however, have progressively expanded its use by collectivizing tafkir to large numbers of

Muslims.43 Takfir has been applied to civilian supporters of impious states, regime soldiers and

to religious minorities like Shi’ites and Alawites, considered polytheists by Sunni militants for

their reverence of the Prophet’s son in law Ali and his son Husayn.44

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Ibn Tamiyyah’s medieval ruling that Shi’ites were apostates legitimates IS’s sectarian strategy.45

Recalling past Shia revolts against Sunni authority, Taymiyyah viewed them as un-Islamic and

he called for killing their leaders. Zarqawi expanded Tamiyyah’s ruling to the Shi’ite population

and extended it to the Kurds whose beliefs he viewed as infected by communist influences. Like

Zarqawi, Caliph Ibrahim has little regard for Christian and Yazidi infidels whose ritualistic

slaughter by IS militants is revered in the organization’s media outlets. Notoriously the Islamic

State’s conquest of north Iraq has been associated with the mass expulsion and massacres of

Christian and Yazidi populations. Dabiq’s The Failed Crusade justifies the sexual slavery of

Yazidi women.46 In a February 2015 video entitled A Message Signed in Blood to the Nation of

the Cross IS beheads dozens of Egyptian Christian Copts on a Libyan beach and its American

accented IS spokesperson concludes that the caliphate will occupy Rome from Libya’s shores47.

The destruction of Shi’ite and Alawite populations is considered essential by IS’ leaders for the

caliphate’s advance. Their rationale is twofold. First, Shi’ite and Alawite polytheism contributes

to a pre-Islamic ignorance that represses the ummah’s development. Only by purifying the

community of all shirk (polytheism) can the caliphate fortify its spiritual capability to defeat

crusader forces. Second, they believe the Shia and Alawites are Washington’s allies against the

Islamic State. Dabiq 4 and 6 addresses an insidious U.S.-Iranian alliance against the Sunni

world.48 In short sectarian cleansing fortifies the Islamic State’s capacity to destroy the Zionist-

Crusader Western order.

IS’ Apocalyptic Ideology

“It was only a matter of time before the oppressive tawaghit would begin to fall one by one to

the swords of the mujahidin who would raise the banner of tawid, restore hukm of Allah,

direct the masses back to the prophetic method of jihad and away from the corruption of

democracy and nationalism and unite them under one imam.”49

The Islamic State’s ideology combines millennial, takfiri, salafi and sectarian components in a

powerful jihadist narrative of Islamic regression, exploitation, redemption, and triumph. Dabiq

presents IS’ caliphate as a transcendental step leading to an end times scenario destined to

destroy crusader forces. Under its millenarian narrative Caliph Ibrahim is subliminally portrayed

as the Mahdi [redeemer] whose emergence triggers the return of Issa [Jesus] and the vanquishing

of Islam’s enemies.

Dabiq is named after the Syrian town that is the basis of a hadith based prophecy foretelling

Islamic annihilation of their crusader adversaries.50 Now under IS occupation Dabiq centers

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heavily in IS’ apocalyptic discourse. IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s January 2015

Die in Rage address to Islamic state soldiers and their crusader enemies confidently predicts

eminent victory against Western powers51:

“So unsheathe your sword and take out your spears. Be firm and do not weaken or soften. It will be either through victory that Allah will reward Islam and the Muslims,

or shahadah [martyrdom] by which we will meet Allah having been excused, and indeed, we see victory in only two bows length away or even closer. As for the near term, by

Allah’s power, this crusade will be broken, and we will thereafter—by Allah’s permission a meeting in Al Quds [Jerusalem] and an appointment in Rome, prior to which the crusader armies will be defeated in Dabiq. Indeed, what they see as distant, we see as near.

IS’ occupation of Dabiq presages Armageddon. The utilization of prophetic hadith epitomizes its

faith in divine forces that belie its tactical rationality. Dabiq’s apocalyptic imagery is a

dominant motif in its outreach to young jihadists. Many IS fighters are motivated by apocalyptic

themes. Jihadist social media is keenly interested in the prophetic method and the advent of the

end times.52

Apocalyptic imagery also motivates IS’ Shi’ite opponents who believe in the 10th imam

imminent return and his destruction of Satanic forces. Syria and Iraq are now major battlefields

where millenarian Sunni and Shi’ite militias slaughter each other to fulfill their respective

apocalyptic destinies.53 Like their Islamic State antagonists, Shia militias in Syria are recruiting

foreign fighters to defend the faith’s sacred shrines from the depredations of Sunni takfirists.

Bolstering this sectarian millenarian activism is Syria’s civil war, for intra-Muslim conflict

[fitnah], is viewed as an apocalyptic sign.

The Islamic State’s millennialism is a Sunni jihadist expression not seen since 1979’s Grand

Mosque Mecca seizure by Juhayan al-Otaybi’s apocalyptic cult.54 Though crushed by Saudi

security forces, it like Islamic State, borrowed from a Mahdist apocalyptic perspective. Jean-

Pierre Filiu argues the Mahdist tradition has inspired a variety of medieval and modern protest

movements.55 Led by Muhammad Ahmed, the 19th century Mahdist revolt challenged British

dominance in the Sudan. Though the Sudanese caliphate was defeated by English and Egyptian

forces, it is the closest historical parallel we have to the Islamic State. While historically jihadist

networks have not utilized an apocalyptic narrative, Filiu conclude his book by arguing that

millenarianism has the potential to energize jihadist activity.56 The Islamic State has distinctively

taped into this religious current by placing its jihadist war within an eschatological context.

Caliph Ibrahim’s July 4, 2014 Mosul address is viewed by IS ideologues as an apocalyptic omen.

Embracing a prophetic method, the caliphate is portrayed as the Muslim world’s purifier of

apostasy and avenger of Crusader injustice. With his doctorate in Islamic studies and his

supposed descent from the Prophet’s Quraysh tribe, IS portrays its caliph as predestined to

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rejuvenate the ummah.57 Despite its salafi-jihadist contempt for modernity and liberal values, IS

is a very contemporary organization.

The Paradox of the Islamic State in the Global Era

The Islamic State sees the liberal international system as corrupt and exploitive. The group’s

publications argue that Zionist-Crusader imperialism, Shi’ite revisionism and Muslim apostate

rule have diverted Islamic society from Allah’s true path. IS’ ideologues aspire to enforce

Medieval values and practices. The caliphate’s religiously mandated executions [hudud] and its

defense of slavery attempts to recreate Muhammad’s Medina community and catalyze prophetic

forces. The chart below sketches the core foundations of IS’s worldview.

Core Foundations of the Islamic State’s World View

Salafi-Jihadism Sectarianism Takfirism Millenarianism Islamic society is infected by jahiliyyah or ignorance from divine judgment and ruled by oppressive despots tied to a Zionist-Crusader order. Both problems can only be overcome by a revolutionary vanguard that seizes violently power to reinstate Quranic rule as practiced by the Prophet and his immediate 7the Century successors.

Islamic minorities (Shi’ites , Alawites, Druze and Sufis) have corrupted Allah’s vison by injecting shirk [polytheistic beliefs] deepening the state of jahiliyyah and they are proxies for a Zionist-Crusader conspiracy to weaken the Sunni Muslim world. The ethno-sectarian cleansing of these groups is critical to smash jahiliyyah and weaken the Zionist-Crusader order.

Given that Muslim society is infected with jahiliyyah and ruled by apostate regimes, violent revolutionary action is required. Since they [the regime and their supporters) are not true Muslims they can be expunged from the faith and killed to pave the way for a Sharia based regime.

Based upon prophetic hadith, IS is destined to defeat and occupy Rome after a decisive battle against cruder forces at Dabiq. The Islamic State is Allah’s chosen prophetic vehicle to usher in an eschatological dynamic leading to the return of Issa [Jesus], the defeat of diabolical forces and Islamic conquest across the globe.

Despite its pre-modern worldview, the Islamic State has a corporate organizational structure,

slick advertising teams, a diversified financial portfolio, a professional army and strict

accounting rules.58 Baghdadi’s caliphate resembles a theocratic version of the British East Indies

Company that governed the Indian subcontinent. Recently IS has minted its own gold based

currency that it believes will help it endure the West’s inevitable financial collapse. With Caliph

Ibrahim as its spiritual center, a policy-making Shura council, finance, military and religious

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ministries, separate command structures for Iraq and Syria, and provincial commanders

responsible for each district, the caliphate emulates Western bureaucracy.

Dabiq’s savvy Madison Avenue style magazine is complemented by the Hollywood nature of IS’

Al-Furqan English language production company videos, testimonials and documentaries.

Islamic state social media reaches millions through You Tube, Twitter and Facebook and it

employs a sophisticated team of internet hackers [Cyber Caliphate] to attack its enemy’s web

sites.59 In their 2015 study of ISIS social media use J.M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan estimate

that by late 2014 some 46,000 Twitter accounts were devoted to promoting the group’s

message.60 Given its cadre of over 10,000 foreign fighters from 90 different countries, few doubt

IS’ global appeal. The Islamic State’s criminal enterprises engage in illicit trade in oil,

antiquities, human organs, kidnapping, extortion and robberies to finance its caliphate.61 With its

imposition of taxation in areas it governs and its expropriations of abandoned property IS has

diverse revenue base making it less vulnerable to internationally imposed sanctions.

With its aspiration to unite the ummah, its propaganda messaging and its multinational fighting

force, the Islamic State is a perverse champion of globalization. Its video game, hip hop social

media and publication campaigns rail virulently against Western secular materialistic values.

Dabiq decries the sexual immorality of modern society, its denigration of marriage, its

reassignment of gender roles and its destruction of the family.62 IS’ choice to present Dabiq in

English seeks to reach the widest audience possible. Its grisly video beheadings of Western

hostages and enemy soldiers are slickly produced and widely available on the web despite the

best efforts of internet companies to pull these postings. IS’ infamous masked video executioner

Jihad Johnny speaks with a London accent.63 Islamic State inspired terror attacks in Brussels,

Ottawa, Sidney, New York, Copenhagen and Paris, demonstrate its global reach. IS’ promises

further attacks against the West as European security services strain to disrupt home-grown

terrorist plots and scuttle the caliphate’s external operations.64 Returning foreign fighters with

battlefield experience in Syria are a particular worry.

Driven by messianic pretentions Baghdadi’s caliphate project challenges the liberal global order

and its Westphalian era state system. IS’ theological totalitarian world view is antithetical to

liberal secularism, freedom and individualism. Challenging the harmony of the Post- Cold War

period, Benjamin Barber wrote in the 1990’s that tribal forces (jihad) were increasingly resistant

to corporate inspired globalization (McWorld).65 Paradoxically medieval but modern, the Islamic

State seems to have synthesized these two forces in a terrifying and savage manner. Defeating IS

requires a reciprocal strategy.

12

Notes

1 “The Return of the Khilafah” Dabiq 1 al-Hayat Media Center accessed at

http://www.jihadology.net/2014/07/05/al%e%68%sayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-

magazine-dabiq1/ 8 2 Bill Roggio, “ISIS announces formation of a Caliphate, rebrands as Islamic ‘State’” June 29, 2014 The Long War

Journal accessed at: http:/

www.thelongwarjournal.org/threatmatrix/archives/2014/06/isis_anounces_formation_of_a_ca..php. 3 Richard Barrett, The Islamic State November 2014 The Soufan Group accessed at:

http/www.thesoufangroup.com/category/research/the-islamic-state/. Barrett calculates some 20,000 foreign fighters

have gone to Syria half of whom fjoin Al Nusra or Islamic State 4 Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Indicate Metrics Driven Military Command” Institute for the Study of War

Backgrounder May 22, 2014 accessed at http/: www.understandingwar.org; Harleen K. Gambhir, “Dabiq: The

Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State” Backgrounder August 15, 2014 The Institute for the Study of War

accessed at http://understandingwar.org/sites/defalt/files/Dabiq%20Backgounde_Harleen %20Final.pdf. 5 Candyce Kelshall, “ISIL: the Ultimate Hybrid Enemy” at http://www.defenseiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defense-

services/articles/isil-the-ultimate-hybrid-enemy/. The author puts ISI forces between 90,000-200,000 which vastly

exceeds the 20,000 figure cited by the CIA and US military sources. 6 “The Flood” Dabiq 2 accessed at http://www.jihadology.net/2014/07/05/al%e%68%sayat-media-center-presents-

a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-magazine-dabiq2/ 11 This edition is aimed principally at Al Qaeda and especially

Al Nusra whose leaders are accused habitually of betraying the caliphate. 7 Ibid 8 Michael W.S. Ryan, “Dabiq: What the Islamic State’s New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction.

Recruitment Patterns and Guerilla Doctrine”, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 0: (2014) accessed at http://www.

jamestown.org/tm 9 “The Extinction of the Grey Zone” in Dabiq 7: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy accessed at

http://www.clarionproject.org/news/Islamic-State-ISIS-Isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq 54-58. This is a clear effort

to appeal to all Muslims that there can no longer be a third choice between the West and the Islamic State and that IS

will be successful in uniting the umma to destroy the crusader order. 10 “Imamah is from the Millah [Path] of Ibrahim” p 20-21 Dabiq 1, ibid. 11 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005): 75-97 doi:

10.1080/10567100590905057; “The Extinction of the Grey Zone” Dabiq 7, ibid. The magazine cites a passage of

Ibn Taymiyya about the martial and absolutist properties of Islam to debunk “revisionist” arguments that Islam is a

pacifist religion. 22-23 12 John Calvert, Sayyid Qub and the Roots of Radical Islam (New York :Columbia University Press , 2010) 13 Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003) 14 John Calvert, ibid 15 Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (New York: Basic Books, 1967) 16 “From Hijrah to Khalafah” in Dabiq 1 The Return of the Khalifah 34-40 17 Ibid 18 Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds,” ISIS Governance in Syria” Middle East Security Report 22 July 2014

The Institute for the Study of War accessed at

http://www.underderstandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf 19 Ibid 20 “Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit” Islamic State Report 4 Alhayat Media Center accessed at

http://jhadology.net/.../al-hayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-

magazine-islamic-state-report-4/ 3

13

21 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “How Many Fighters does the Islamic State Really Have?” War on the Rocks February

9, 2015 accessed at: http://www.warontherocks.com/2015/02/how-many-fighters-does-the-islamic-state-really-

have/?singlepages-1 22 “Expanding and Remaining” Dabiq 5 accessed at: http://www.jihadology.net/2014/07/05/al%e%68%sayat-

media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-magazine-dabiq2/ 23 http://www.shariaunveiled.wordpress.com/2014/07/02/ isis -end-of-sykes-picotvideo/commentpage.1/ 24 Paul Berman, ibid 117-118, 124-126 25 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Jihad: the Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Musab Suri (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2008); Kazimi, 2010, ibid. 26 Ibid 27 Alex Bilger, ibid 28 Michael W.S. Ryan, ibid 29 Michael W. S. Ryan, “From Theory to Action: The Rationale behind the Re-establishment of the Caliphate” in

Terrorism Monitor 12 (2014 ) 8-11; Aaron Zelin, “The War Between ISIS and Al Qaeda for Supremacy of the

Global Jihadist Movement” Research Note 20 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (June 2014) accessed

at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/documents/pubs/researchnote_20_Zelin.pdf 30 Thomas Jocelyn (2014). “Al Qaeda General Command Disowns Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham” Long War

Journal Feb. 3, 2014 access at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_general_cp.php 31Anthony Cordesman (2014) “Iraq in Crisis” Center for Strategic and International Studies access at

http://csis.org/files/publication/140421_Iraq_book.pdf.; Ken Pollack (2013), “The Fall and Rise and Fall of Iraq”

July 30, 2013 access at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/07/30-fall-rise-fall-iraq-pollack.pdf 32 Norman Benotman and Roison Blakc (2013), “Jabhat al-Nsura: A Strategic Briefing” Quilliam Foundation access

at http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/.../jabhat-a-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf 33Alex Bilger, ibid 34 Aaron Zelin, ibid 35 Andrew Engel, “The Islamic State’s Expansion in Libya” Policy Watch 2371 February 11, 2015 The Washington

Institute for Near East Policy accessed at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-Islamic-

States-expansion-in-Libya 36 “Al Qaeda in Waziristan” Dabiq 6 accessed at: http://www.worldpresstheclarionpoject.org/files/the-islamic-

state/the-islamic-state-ISIS-magazine-issue-5-al-qaeda-in-waziristan.pdf 37“ The Flood” Dabiq 2 accessed at: http:// www.jihadology.net/category/dabiq-magazine 38 “The Failed Crusade” Dabiq 4 accessed at: http://worldpress.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/the-islamic-

state-ISIS-magazine-issue-4-the-failed-crusade.pdf 40 39 “Letter signed by Zarqawi, seized in Iraq in 2004” reprinted in Jean -Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of

Al Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2005) Appendix VIII 233-251; Shmuel Barr and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri

Letter and Strategy of Al Qaeda” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 3 (2006)28-51 The Hudson Institute available

at http://www.currenttrends./op...thezawahirikms./.isn 40 Islamic State Report 4, ibid., 41 “The Return of the Khalifah” Dabiq 1. ibid 42Islamic State Report 4, ibid 43 Mohammad M. Hafez, “Tactics, Takfir and Anti-Muslim Violence” in Assaf Moghadan and Brian Fishman

(editors) Self-inflicted Wounds: Debates and Division in Al Qaeda and its Periphery ( West Point: Combating

Terrorism Center, 2010) 19-44 44 Nibras Kazimi, Syria through Jihadist Eyes (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 2010) 45 Ibid. 46 “The Failed Crusade” Dabiq 4.ibid; “Al Qaeda in Waziristan” Dabiq 6, ibid 47 Thomas Joscelyn, “21 Egyptian Christians beheaded in a ISIS Video” The Long War Journal February 15, 2015

accessed at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/15egyptian-christians.php 48 Ibid 49 “Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit” Islamic State Reports 4, ibid page 3 50 Hadith are statements attributed to the Prophet that accompany the Quran in the enforcement of Sharia based

governance. In its English language magazine Dabiq’s IS repeatedly retells the hadith by the Prophet’s companion

Abu Hurayrah that Muhammad’s statement that he foresaw an apocalyptic battle between Roman and Islamic armies

at Dabiq where the latter would be victorious and be the basis for later conquests.

14

51 “Die in Your Rage” January 26, 2015 audio message from ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani as Ashami

accessed at : http://www.pietervanostaeyen.worldpres s.com/20/Abu-Muhammad-al-Adani-as-Ashami-die-in-your-

rage/ 52 Aron Zelin and Philip Smyth (2014), “The Vocabulary of Sectarianism” January 29, 2014 The Washington

Institute for Near Eastern Policy accessed at http://washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-vocabulary-of-

sectarianism 53 Ibid 54 Thomas Hegghammer, The Meccan Rebellion: the Story of Jubayan al-Utaybi Revisisted (Bristol: Amal Press,

2011) 55 Jean-Pierre Filiu, Apocalypse in Islam (Berkley: University of California Press , 2012) 56 Ibid., 57 Michael Ryan, “From Theory to Action: The Rationale for the Reestablishment of the Caliphate”, ibid 58 Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State” Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper No. 13 November 14, 2014

accessed at http://www.brookings.org/research/files/reports/2014/11/profiling%20islamic%20state%lister/in-web-

lister.pdf 59 Dr. Erin Marie Saltman and Charlie Winter, “Changing the Face of Modern Jihadism” Quillium Foundation

November 2014 accessed at: http://www.quilliumfoundation.org/fee-publications/ 60 J.M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan. “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS

supporter on Twitter” Analysis Paper No. 20 March 2015 The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Muslim

World accessed at: http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/paper/2015/03/ISIS-twitter-census-berger-

morgan/ISIS-twitter-census-berger-morgan.pdf 61 Matthew Levitt and Lori Potkin Boghardt, “Financing ISIS (Infographic)’ September 12, 2014 Accessed at

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pilicy-analysis/view/funding-isis-infographic 62 “The Extinction of the Grey Zone” in Dabiq 7: From Hypocrisy to Apostasy, ibid 63 Chris Perez, “Masked Jihadist John the Beatle Identified” New York Post August 24, 2014 accessed at:

http://wwwnypost.com/2014/08/24/masked-jihadist-john-the-beatle-identified/ 64 “Die in Your Rage”, ibid 65 Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld: Terrorism’s Challenge to the World ( New York: Random House,

1996)

15

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