the interpersonal basis of self-esteem: - university … · web viewthe interpersonal basis of...
TRANSCRIPT
Leary - 1
The Interpersonal Basis of Self-Esteem:
Death, Devaluation, or Deference?
Mark R. Leary, Wake Forest University
I wish to thank Catherine Cottrell, Jennifer Saltzman, Richard Bednarski, and Misha
Phillips for their work on the unpublished research that is described in this chapter.
Leary - 2
The Interpersonal Basis of Self-Esteem: Death, Devaluation, or Deference?
Theorists have recognized for many years that self-esteem is strongly affected by how
people believe they are perceived and evaluated by others (Cooley, 1902; James, 1890), but the
reasons for this link between interpersonal appraisals and self-esteem has been a matter of
debate. In part, the controversy stems from the fact that self-esteem has traditionally been
conceptualized a personal self-evaluation, making it difficult to explain precisely why people’s
private self-views should be heavily influenced by what other people think.
For example, James’ (1890) well-known formula describing self-esteem as the ratio of
one’s successes to one’s pretensions conceptualizes self-esteem is an individual’s internal
assessment of how well one is doing. When self-esteem attracted the attention of humanistic
psychologists in the middle of the 20th century, self-esteem became tied to inner authenticity. For
example, Rogers (1959) proposed that true self-esteem arises when people live congruently with
their deepest “organismic”values. This view was echoed more recently by Deci and Ryan (1985)
who distinguished between true self-esteem (which arises when people behave autonomously in
ways that are consistent with their intrinsic or core self) and contingent self-esteem (which
depends on the person meeting certain standards or expectations). Bednar, Wells, and Peterson
(1989) offered a similar perspective when they suggested that true self-esteem result when
people cope effectively with psychological threats and does not fundamentally depend on
approbation from others. These and other intrapersonal perspectives do not deny that self-esteem
is sometimes affected by other people’s evaluations of the individual but view the effects of
interpersonal evaluations on self-esteem as reflecting either a secondary source of self-evaluative
information or an unhealthy reliance on the approval of other people.
Leary - 3
In contrast to these intrapersonal perspectives, other theorists have conceptualized self-
esteem in interpersonal terms, arguing that the self is an inherently social construction that arises
in the context of interpersonal relations (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). If we begin with the
assumption that the self is inherently social, it is then easy to explain why people’s feelings
about themselves are strongly related to how they believe others evaluate them.
Theorists have conceptualized the interpersonal nature of self-esteem in a variety of
ways, three of which are the focus of this chapter. Specifically, this chapter offers critical
reviews of three interpersonal perspectives on self-esteem–terror management theory, sociometer
theory, and dominance theory. A brief overview of each theory will be offered, existing
evidence reviewed, and new, often unpublished data relevant to each theory presented. The
chapter will conclude with an attempt to integrate the insights of these three perspectives
regarding the interpersonal nature of self-esteem.
Terror Management Theory
Terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) offers an intriguing, albeit controversial perspective on self-
esteem based on the work of Becker (1971, 1973). According to the theory, the continual
possibility of experiencing painful and tragic events (death being the ultimate such occurrence)
is a constant source of anxiety. To minimize the perpetual terror that results from awareness of
one's fragility and mortality in a dangerous and unpredictable world, people adopt views of
themselves and of the world that attenuate their fears.
Central to this anxiety-buffering process are individuals’ beliefs that they meet the social
standards by which people are judged to be worthwhile and valuable. All cultures specify what it
Leary - 4
means to be a "good" person and promise either symbolic or literal immortality to those who
meet standards of goodness. During development, children learn to associate meeting cultural
standards with parental support, thereby establishing a link between living up to cultural
standards (and the accompanying experience of self-esteem) and a sense of personal security.
Self-esteem has an interpersonal basis, according to TMT, because social approval typically
reflects the degree to which one is meeting cultural standards.
Studies have supported many key predictions of TMT, particularly the notion that people
endorse cultural standards more strongly when death is made salient. Because cultural standards
provide the basis for self-esteem and felt security, people punish those who violate such
standards when mortality is salient (Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Furthermore, evidence supports the
proposition that events that raise self-esteem lower anxiety not only about death but about other
threatening events as well (Greenberg et al., 1992).
Self-Esteem and Anxiety About Death
One untested implication of TMT is that people with low trait self-esteem should be
more anxious about death than people with high self-esteem. People with high self-esteem
should presumably be buffered against fear of death because meeting cultural standards (and the
consequent feelings of self-esteem) are associated with security. In contrast, people with low
self-esteem should worry more about death because they are less likely to believe they have met
the cultural standards that promise safety, if not immortality.
This prediction stands in contrast to an equally plausible position, however, namely that
people with low self-esteem are less afraid of dying than those with high self-esteem. Research
Leary - 5
shows that low self-esteem and self-blame are risk factors for suicide (Maris, 1981; Neuringer,
1974), suggesting that people with low self-esteem may be less worried about dying than people
who value themselves highly. One should be more worried about losing something the more
valued it is, and this should be true whether it is a personal possession or one's own life. One
study that examined the relationship between self-esteem and fear of death found none (Feifel &
Nagy, 1981), which led us to explore the relationship between self-esteem and fear of death
more closely.
Participants completed the Revised Death Anxiety Scale (RDAS; Thorson & Powell,
1992), which assesses four sources of death anxiety: no longer existing, helplessness, concerns
about what happens after death, and pain. They also completed two measures of trait self-esteem
– the self-regard subscale of the Self-Rating Scale (Fleming & Courtney, 1984) and the self-
feelings adjectives identified by McFarland and Ross (1982) (e.g., competent, inadequate,
confident, worthless)–and a measure of anxiety.
Table 1 presents correlations between the two self-esteem measures and the four
subscales of the RDAS. As can be seen, both of the self-esteem measures correlated weakly with
fears involving loss of control and pain, and with the total RDAS score. In addition, the self-
regard scale correlated weakly with concerns about what will happen after death.
Because research shows that trait self-esteem is related to anxiety (Barlow, 1988), these
correlations may be due to participants' anxiety rather than their self-esteem. To test this
possibility, partial correlations were calculated between the two self-esteem measures and the
RDAS scores while controlling for anxiety. All partial correlations were nonsignificant (-.14 < rs
< .11). In contrast, when self-esteem was partialed out of the relationship between anxiety and
Leary - 6
death-related fears, all correlations were statistically significant, rs > .17. The partial correlations
suggest that the correlations between self-esteem and death anxiety may be an artifact of the
relationship between self-esteem and anxiety. Persons low in self-esteem worry more about
nearly everything, including death.
Although trait self-esteem was negatively related to certain sources of death anxiety (as
TMT predicts), self-esteem was not related to fears about nonexistence which TMT suggests
should show the strongest relationship to self-esteem. As Solomon et al. (1986) stated,
"whenever we refer to the terror of death, we do not mean the intense fear of death per se, but
rather of death as absolute annihilation" (p. 96, italics in original). Yet, no relationship between
self-esteem and fear of nonexistence was found.
Self-Esteem and Domains of Death Anxiety
Although the RDAS has demonstrated reliability and validity as a measure of death
anxiety (Thorsen & Powell, 1992), we wondered whether its subscales tap all of the major
reasons that people fear death. For example, many people fear dying because they are distressed
about leaving loved ones or about the bereavement of those they leave behind (Fiefel & Nagy,
1981), but the RDAS does not include interpersonal concerns such as these. If the relationship
between self-esteem and death anxiety is mediated by fears not included on the RDAS, we might
not detect the correlation that TMT predicts.
To broadly sample fears about death, 76 undergraduate students were asked to write
down the primary reason they were bothered by thoughts of their own deaths. Two researchers
sorted respondents' answers, identifying six distinct categories of death-related fears: uncertainty
about what will happen after death, separation from loved ones, unfulfilled goals, the distress of
Leary - 7
other people, nonexistence, and painful dying. A questionnaire based on these categories was
then administered to122 participants, who rated the degree to which each of the six factors
bother them when they think about their own death: (a) uncertainty about what, if anything, will
happen to you after you die, (b) being separated from the friends and family you leave behind,
(c) the things you haven't done and the goals you haven't reached, (d) how upset and distressed
other people will feel about your death, (e) the fact that you will no longer exist, and (f) the pain
you may experience while dying. Participants also rated how they generally feel about
themselves on self-feelings and anxiety items (McFarland & Ross, 1982), and completed the
self-regard subscale of the Self-Rating Scale (Fleming & Courtney, 1984).
Correlations between self-esteem and fears of death are shown in Table 2. Self-esteem
was consistently related only to concerns regarding uncertainty about what will happen after
death. Neither self-esteem measure correlated with concerns about nonexistence--the aspect of
death specifically implicated by TMT. Overall, the multiple correlation between each of the
measures of self-esteem and the set of six death fears was only .18 for self-feelings and .22 for
self-regard. Clearly, trait self-esteem accounts for relatively little variance in death anxiety.
Because the measures of self-esteem correlated with anxiety (-.58 < rs < -.70), we again
calculated the partial correlation between each self-esteem measure and the six facets of death
anxiety while partialing out general anxiety scores. With anxiety removed, none of the
correlations in Table 2 remained statistically significant. In contrast, removing self-esteem had
virtually no effect on the magnitude of the correlations between anxiety and fear of uncertainty.
As in the earlier study, self-esteem showed only weak relationships to fears of death, and partial
correlations suggested that these relationships were attributable to anxiety rather than self-esteem
Leary - 8
per se.
Trait Self-Esteem and Reactions to Mortality Salience
TMT suggests that high self-esteem people should be less affected by thinking about
death than low self-esteem people because self-esteem buffers them against death-related
anxiety. To test this prediction, Participants completed two measures of trait self-esteem, then
reported to an experiment several weeks later, where they were randomly assigned to write one
of three essays. In the mortality-salient condition, participants were instructed to write an essay
about their own death, imagining "what it will be like when you die. Think about how you will
feel, what you will think, what you will experience as you are dying." In the rejection-salient
condition, participants were asked to write about being rejected by someone they care about:
"Imagine what it will be like to be rejected by a romantic partner, close friend, or family
member, or ostracized by a group." Participants in the control condition wrote about what it will
be like to retire after many years of working. After writing the essay, participants rated their
anxiety on eight scales (e.g., worried, insecure, safe, secure).
The participants' anxiety ratings were analyzed with hierarchical multiple regression
analyses that used essay condition (dummy-coded), pretest self-esteem scores, and their
interaction as predictors. Both of the self-esteem measures yielded identical results–a significant
main effect of self-esteem (showing that self-esteem predicted anxiety) and a nearly-significant
(p < .06) interaction of essay condition by self-esteem. The nature of this interaction can be seen
by examining the correlations between self-esteem and anxiety separately for each essay
condition in Table 3. Scores on the self-esteem measures were not significantly correlated with
anxiety when participants wrote about death or retirement. However, self-esteem scores and
Leary - 9
anxiety were inversely correlated (rs > -.73) when participants wrote about rejection, suggesting
that trait self-esteem moderated reactions to imagined rejection, a finding consistent with the
idea that self-esteem monitors social acceptance and rejection (Leary & Downs, 1995). Although
it is possible that the experimental manipulation was not strong enough to induce anxiety about
death, the essay-writing paradigm has demonstrated terror-management effects in many previous
studies (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). Furthermore, parallel instructions to write about rejection
had different effects depending on participants' self-esteem.
Self-Esteem and Death Concerns After Ego-Threat
The results of the three studies just described showed a negligible relationship between
self-esteem and fear of death. Furthermore, when correlations were obtained, they tended to
involve uncertainty or coping rather than fears of nonexistence, and were mediated by anxiety.
If high self-esteem buffers people against death-related anxiety, events that threaten self-
esteem should increase concerns about death (because the esteem-based anxiety buffer is
compromised), whereas events that increase self-esteem should lower them. Along these lines,
Greenberg et al. (1992) found that participants who received positive feedback about themselves
expressed less anxiety about watching a videotape of death-related scenes (such an autopsy and
an electrocution) than participants who received neutral feedback.
In a study that examined this hypothesis using a real threat to self-esteem, 122 students
were tested on the day that they received grades on a midterm exam in a psychology course.
After the instructor distributed students’ scored tests, a questionnaire booklet was distributed.
Participants were led to imagine vividly two positive and two negative events: their own death,
graduating from college, rejection by another person, and receiving an honor or award. (The
Leary - 10
order of these four situations was counterbalanced.) After imagining each situation, participants
rated how the hypothetical situation made them feel. Participants also indicated the score they
had expected to obtain on the exam and the minimum score with which they would have been
satisfied, and rated their state self-esteem.
Correlations between self-esteem and feelings after imagining death, rejection, and
graduation were all nonsignificant (-.08 < rs < -.11). Only feelings about being honored
correlated with self-esteem, r = -.20, p < .05. (Perhaps persons with higher self-esteem are more
accustomed to being honored and, thus, experience less positive affect in such situations.) Again,
no support was obtained for a link between self-esteem and death-related anxiety.
To test the possibility that self-esteem and feelings about death are related only in the
face of an esteem-threatening event, two indices of success vs. failure were calculated. One
involved the difference between the score participants expected on the exam and the score they
obtained, and the other involved the difference between the minimum score with which
participants would have been satisfied and the score they earned. In both cases, a positive
difference reflected subjective failure, whereas a negative difference indicated subjective
success. Both indices correlated highly with self-feelings (r = -.39 with the expected-obtained
difference; r = -.60 with minimum-obtained difference), but neither index of subjective success-
failure correlated with anxiety after imagining one’s death. Thus, this study obtained no
evidence of a link between self-esteem and feelings about death either in general or after
contemplating one's own death, and subjective failure on the test was unrelated to death anxiety.
Summary and Critique
Taken together, these four studies provide little support for a relationship between self-
Leary - 11
esteem and fear of death. A few negative correlations between self-esteem and death-related
anxiety were obtained, but the effects involved fears stemming from uncertainty, loss of control,
and pain rather than from death per se. Furthermore, the magnitude of the relationships were
small, and analyses suggested that they were mediated by anxiety. In brief, the failure to obtain
notable negative correlations between self-esteem and anxiety about death fails to support the
hypothesis that high self-esteem buffers people against fears of death. Although each of the
studies reported here has potential limitations, the failure to detect the predicted effect across
four different studies using different methods and measures provides converging evidence that
high self-esteem neither attenuates nor increases the fear of dying. Furthermore, the fact that all
studies showed self-esteem to be related to other measures makes it unlikely that the null
findings resulted from problems with the methods or measures used. It is also noteworthy that
other research has failed to support the prediction that thinking about mortality leads people to
bolster their self-esteem (Sowards, Moniz, & Harris, 1991). I wish to stress that these data are
relevant only to the self-esteem hypothesis of TMT and do not in any way disconfirm other
aspects of the theory. As noted, considerable research has supported the effects of mortality
salience on judgments of people who violate cultural standards.
Sociometer Theory
Sociometer theory (Leary, 1999; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary & Downs, 1995)
offers an alternative interpersonal explanation of self-esteem, proposing that self-esteem
responds to others’ evaluations because the self-esteem system evolved to monitor the degree to
which other people accept vs. reject the individual. According to sociometer theory, the system
monitors the social environment for cues indicating low or declining relational evaluation (e.g.,
Leary - 12
disinterest, dislike, rejection) and warns the individual via lowered self-esteem when such cues
are detected. Thus, events that lower self-esteem do so because they indicate low or declining
acceptance. Furthermore, the theory suggests that people are not motivated to increase their self-
esteem per se as has been typically assumed, but rather seek to increase their relational value and
social acceptance. Self-esteem is simply the meter they use to gauge their success in doing so.
A great deal of existing research is consistent with sociometer theory. For example, self-
esteem responds strongly to social acceptance and rejection, public events affect self-esteem
more strongly than private events (presumably because public events have greater implications
for acceptance and rejection), the primary dimensions of self-esteem reflect attributes that are
relevant to one’s relational value, the importance people place on various dimensions of self-
esteem is based on the importance that significant others place on them, and individual
differences in self-esteem are related to the degree to which people believe that they are accepted
vs. rejected by other people (for a review, see Leary & Baumeister, 2000).
Acceptance, Rejection, and State Self-Esteem
Our own research shows that individuals’ feelings about themselves vary systematically
as a function of even minor changes in other people’s appraisals of them. Leary, Tambor,
Terdal, and Downs (1995, Study 3) gave participants bogus feedback indicating that they were
either included or excluded as members of a laboratory group and that their membership was
based either on a random selection or a vote of the other group members. Participants who
thought they were excluded on the basis of a group vote subsequently showed notably lower
state self-esteem than the other conditions. A second study (Leary et al., 1995, Study 4)
conceptually replicated this finding by showing that participants who believed that another
Leary - 13
individual was ambivalent about interacting with them had lower state self-esteem than those
who thought the other person wanted to interact with them.
Leary, Haupt, Strausser, and Chokel (1998, Study 4) provided participants with ongoing
bogus feedback from another individual and measured state self-esteem “on line” by having
participants move a computer mouse to indicate how they were feeling about themselves in real
time. State self-esteem increased as a function of feedback that connoted social acceptance and
declined as a function of feedback that connoted rejection. In fact, 77% of the reliable variance
in state self-esteem could be accounted for by the degree to which the interpersonal feedback
connoted acceptance vs. rejection. Interestingly, the relationship between rejection-acceptance
feedback and state self-esteem was not strictly linear, taking an ogival function that flattened at
the bottom and top of the curve. This ogival pattern, which was replicated in three other studies
(Leary et al., 1998), suggests that self-esteem is most responsive to acceptance-rejection
feedback in the middle range and less so at the extremes.
In another study (Leary et al., 1995, Study 2), participants wrote essays about a recent
occasion on which they felt accepted or rejected, then answered questions regarding how
excluded they felt in the situation and how they had felt about themselves at the time. Results
showed that the more excluded that participants felt in the situation, the worse they felt about
themselves. Ratings of perceived exclusion correlated very highly (between -.68 and -.92,
depending on condition) with state self-esteem.
Esteem-Threatening Events
From the standpoint of sociometer theory, events that threaten self-esteem have their
effects not because they challenge self-esteem per se but rather because they raise the specter of
Leary - 14
relational devaluation and rejection. Leary et al. (1995, Study 1) provided direct evidence that
events that lower self-esteem are those that people assume might lead others to reject them.
Participants were given a list of behaviors that varied in social desirability, such as “I donated
blood,” “I lost my temper,” and “I cheated on my boyfriend or girlfriend.” They went through
the list once and indicated how they thought other people would react toward them if they
performed each behavior (1 = many people would reject or avoid me; 5 = many people would
accept or include me). Later, they went through the list again and indicated on bipolar adjective
scales how they would personally feel about themselves (e.g., good-bad, valuable-worthless) if
they performed each behavior. The canonical correlation between participants’ ratings of others’
reactions vis-a-vis inclusion-exclusion and their own feelings about themselves was .70, and the
order of the two sets of ratings was virtually identical. These data suggest that how people feel
about themselves (i.e., their state self-esteem) after behaving in particular ways is a function of
how they think others will react.
Individual Differences in Trait Self-Esteem
Sociometer theory predicts that individual differences in trait self-esteem should be
predicted by how accepted people generally feel they are (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In
essence, trait self-esteem may be conceptualized as the resting position of the sociometer in the
absence of explicit social feedback. In support of this idea, Leary et al. (1995, Study 5) found
that two separate measures of trait self-esteem each correlated in excess of .50 with the degree to
which respondents felt that other people valued and accepted them. Similarly, Cottrell and Leary
(2001) found that perceived acceptance accounted for almost 40% of the variance in trait self-
esteem
Leary - 15
In an experimental study, Haupt and Leary (1997) showed that people with low self-esteem
assume that other people who they have not yet met will be more likely to reject them than
people with high self-esteem.
Summary and Critique
In general, support for sociometer theory is quite strong. Not only have studies designed
to test the theory’s predictions generally supported it, but the theory has been able to explain and
integrate much of the existing literature on self-esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Although
there seems little doubt that self-esteem is exquisitely sensitive to events that connote relational
devaluation and that people act as if they use self-esteem to gauge their social acceptability, the
question may be raised of whether self-esteem is “only” a sociometer. Is self-esteem affected
only by events with real or imagined implications for acceptance and rejection, or do other
things influence self-esteem as well? When people appear to be motivated to protect or enhance
their self-esteem are they always actually seeking to increase social acceptance or avoid
rejection? Although the strong version of sociometer theory maintains that all self-esteem
phenomena are based on acceptance and rejection (or, possibly, are the result of processes that
have become functionally autonomous), we should be open to the possibility that self-esteem
may serve other interpersonal functions (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, in press)..
Dominance Theory
An often overlooked interpersonal perspective on self-esteem is offered by dominance
theory (Barkow, 1980). Like sociometer theory, dominance theory assumes that self-esteem
monitors aspects of the social environment. However, whereas sociometer theory conceptualizes
self-esteem as a monitor of relational value, dominance theory suggests that the self-esteem
Leary - 16
system evolved to monitor dominance (Barkow, 1980). Because dominance was associated with
increased reproductive success in the ancestral environment, systems evolved to monitor one’s
social standing and to motivate behaviors that increase one’s dominance. According to the
theory, self-esteem reflects the amount of attention, deference, and respect that one receives
from other people. Although the dominance hypothesis has not attracted much research
attention, evidence shows that perceptions of one’s social influence and dominance correlate
moderately with self-esteem as the theory predicts (Hamilton, 1971; Heaven, 1986; Raskin,
Novacek, & Hogan, 1991).
Deconfounding Dominance and Acceptance
One difficulty in assessing the dominance hypothesis involves the fact that dominance
and acceptance are typically confounded in everyday life. In general, people who are deferred to
and selected for positions of leadership are likely to feel more accepted than those who are never
dominant or influential within their social groups. At the same time, people who feel accepted
and valued may feel dominant and influential because they exercise referent power based on
their likeability.
To disentangle the natural confound between acceptance and dominance, we devised an
experimental paradigm in which participants received independent feedback regarding the
degree to which other people desired them as a member and as a leader of a group (Leary,
Cottrell, & Phillips, 2000). After participants completed a background questionnaire, copies of
their answers were ostensibly given to four other participants. Thus, each participant received
what they believed were copies of one another’s personal information questionnaires in order to
judge each person’s membership and leadership qualities.
Leary - 17
Each participant then rated the other four participants by allotting eight “membership
points” to indicate the degree to which he or she desired each other participant as a member of
the group. Participants were told to divide these eight points among the other four people in any
proportion they desired. Similarly, each participant was given eight “leadership points” that were
to be assigned to the other four people to indicate the degree to which the participant desired
each other participant as a leader of the group.
When the ratings were completed, the researcher ostensibly calculated the total
membership and leadership points that each participant received and gave the participants false
feedback regarding the number of membership and leadership points that they had been awarded
by the other participants. Although each participant logically could receive between 0 points (if
none of the other participants gave the person any points) and 32 points (if all of the four other
participants gave the person the maximum of 8 points), participants received between 2 and 14
points to make the feedback plausible. The feedback form showed the points that all five group
members ostensibly received, thereby allowing them to easily understand their relative standings
on the membership and leadership dimensions. Each participant received either a low or high
number of points on both the membership and leadership ratings, and we then used five different
measures to assess participants’ feelings about themselves.
As expected, high membership feedback not only made participants feel accepted but
also made them feel influential, and high leadership feedback not only increased perceptions of
dominance and influence but also led participants to feel accepted. Given that the two feedback
manipulations affected perceptions of both acceptance and dominance, it is not surprising that
four of the five measures of self-esteem revealed significant or nearly significant effects of both
Leary - 18
membership and leadership feedback.
To examine the unique influence of membership and leadership feedback, we partialed
out participants’ ratings of how accepted and influential they felt from their state self-esteem
scores. After doing so, membership feedback had an independent effect on two of the measures
of self-esteem, both membership and leadership feedback had separate unique effects on one
measure each, and neither membership nor leadership feedback had separate effects on the fifth
measure. In no instance did leadership feedback have an independent effect on self-esteem when
membership feedback did not. The most conservative interpretation of these results is that they
provide support for both sociometer and dominance theory, although the membership (i.e.,
acceptance) feedback showed more and stronger independent effects than the leadership (i.e.,
dominance) feedback.
Dominance and Trait Self-Esteem
If self-esteem reflects perceived dominance as dominance theory maintains, individual
differences in self-esteem should be strongly related to perceptions of dominance and influence,
and research supports this hypothesis (Hamilton, 1971; Heaven, 1986; Raskin et al., 1991).
However, again, the natural confound between perceived dominance and perceived acceptance
makes it necessary to partial out perceived acceptance in order to discern the unique relationship
between perceived dominance and self-esteem.
In a study designed to test predictions of dominance theory and sociometer theory
regarding the basis of trait self-esteem (Cottrell & Leary, 2001), 180 undergraduate students
completed multiple measures of perceived dominance, perceived acceptance, and trait self-
esteem. Results showed that both perceived dominance and perceived acceptance accounted for
Leary - 19
unique variance in trait self-esteem, but that perceived acceptance consistently accounted for
substantially more variance in self-esteem than perceived dominance. Whereas perceived
acceptance accounted for between 9% and 21% of the unique variance in trait self-esteem
(depending on the analysis), perceived dominance accounted for between 0% and 5% of the
unique variance. (Together, perceived acceptance and perceived dominance accounted for
between 40 and 50% of the variance in trait self-esteem.) In addition, whereas the degree to
which participants felt valued by particular people in their lives consistently predicted trait self-
esteem, the degree to which participants thought those individuals perceived them as influential
and dominant was unrelated to their self-esteem.
Summary and Critique
Overall, the data suggested that perceived dominance may account for unique variance in
self-esteem as dominance theory predicts. Even with perceived acceptance partialed out,
perceived dominance predicted both state and trait self-esteem. If dominance theory has a
weakness, it is that it does not capture the full range of situations that affect self-esteem.
Although dominance is by no means unimportant in interpersonal relations, human groups are
characterized less by dominance hierarchies than the nonhuman primates that provided the
model for the theory. Human self-esteem appears to be affected by many events that do not
involve dominance. Thus, it seems unlikely that dominance tells the entire story of self-esteem.
Conclusions
Despite their differences, terror management, sociometer, and dominance theory concur
that self-esteem is inherently tied to interpersonal processes and, thus, is understandably affected
by interpersonal events, other people’s appraisals, and the individual’s perceptions of his or her
Leary - 20
personal characteristics. Of the three, terror management theory’s perspective on self-esteem has
the least support. As noted earlier, this does not suggest that people’s concerns about their deaths
do not have profound effects on their perceptions of other people and themselves, but rather that
self-esteem per se does not seem to be uniquely connected to death anxiety or serve as a special
buffer against it (except in as much as it is related to anxiety more generally). In the one head-to-
head test against sociometer theory, self-esteem was related to anxiety from thinking about
rejection but not about death.
Dominance theory fares somewhat better. Unique variance in state self-esteem can be
predicted by one’s perceived dominance in a particular context, and trait self-esteem is related to
one’s general sense of being dominant and influential. Even so, head-to-head competition
continually showed that self-esteem was more strongly related to perceived acceptance than
dominance, thus suggesting that acceptance may be more central to self-esteem than dominance.
The original statements of sociometer and dominance theory (e.g., Barkow, 1980; Leary
& Downs, 1995) suggest two different interpersonal bases for self-esteem--one involving
acceptance and the other involving dominance. To the extent that being accepted and being
dominant both lead to beneficial outcomes, it is certainly possible that self-esteem serves to
monitor and respond to interpersonal outcomes vis-a-vis both acceptance and dominance. In fact,
taking the evolutionary perspectives advanced by both Barkow (1980) and Leary and Downs
(1995; see also Kirkpatrick & Ellis, in press), one could see how both acceptance and dominance
would have increased individuals’ chances of survival and reproduction in the ancestral
environment, possibly leading to psychological mechanisms that track these important outcomes.
However, the effects of acceptance and dominance on self-esteem might be mediated by
Leary - 21
a single process. Perhaps self-esteem monitors not acceptance or dominance per se but rather the
individual’s social value to other people. The important consideration may not be whether the
person is accepted or dominant, but rather whether he or she is regarded as a valued group
member or relational partner (friend, mate, coalition member, or whatever). People may be
relationally valued for many reasons. They may be friendly and likeable, thereby engendering
affection and acceptance based on their social desirability. Alternatively, they may emerge as a
central, dominant member of a social group, thereby making themselves valued by virtue of their
leadership ability, strength, influence, or effectiveness. People may also be valued because they
are competent at important tasks, or because they promote cooperation and cohesiveness among
group members. In each instance, the individual would be relationally valued by other people,
albeit for different reasons. Perhaps sociometer theory and dominance theory converge in a
common process for monitoring relational value.
Along these lines, Leary and Baumeister (2000) suggested, “self-esteem serves as a
subjective monitor of one's relational evaluation--the degree to other people regard their
relationships with the individual to be valuable, important, or close” (p. 9). Importantly,
relational value may go beyond considerations other than simply whether the individual is liked
and accepted but that nonetheless make the person eligible for desired social outcomes.
Believing that one possesses attributes that lead one to be valued by others will result in higher
self-esteem than believing that one does not possess such attributes (or, worse, believing that
one’s characteristics are likely to lead to relational devaluation).
At this point, the choice between a model that posits two distinct processes (acceptance
and dominance) versus a single process that subsumes social acceptance and dominance
Leary - 22
(relational value) is a matter of preference. The one-process model has the benefit of parsimony
to recommend it, but future research is needed to determine whether the effects of both
acceptance and dominance on self-esteem are mediated by an individual’s perception of his or
her relational value.
References
Barkow, J. H. (1980). Pretige and self-esteem: A biosocial interpretation. In D. R.
Omark, F. F. Strayer, & D. G. Freedman (Eds.), Dominance relations: An ethological view of
human conflict and social interaction (pp. 319-332). New York: Garland STPM Press.
Barlow, D. H. (1988). Anxiety and its disorders: The nature and treatment of anxiety and
panic. New York: Guilford.
Becker, E. (1971). The birth and death of meaning. New York: Free Press.
Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free Press.
Bednar, R. L., Wells, M. G., & Peterson, S. R. (1989). Self-esteem: Paradoxes and
innovations in clinical theory and practice. Washington, D. C.: American Psychological
Association.
Psychology, 68, 1152-1162.
Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner.
Cottrell, C. A., & Leary, M. R. (2001). Dominance and social acceptance as predictors of
trait self-esteem: Testing predictions of dominance theory and sociometer theory. Manuscript
under editorial review, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1995). Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem. In
M. H. Kernis (Ed.), Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem (pp.31-49). New York: Plenum Press.
Leary - 23
Feifel, H., & Branscomb, A. B. (1973). Who's afraid of death? Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 81, 82-88.
Feifel, H., & Nagy, V. T. (1981). Another look at fear of death. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 49, 278-286.
Fleming, J. S., & Courtney, B. E. (1984). The dimensionality of self-esteem: II.
Hierarchical facet model for revised measurement scales. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 46, 404-421.
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., &
Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on
reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 58, 308-318.
Greenberg, J., Simon, L., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Chatel, D. (1992). Terror
management and tolerance: Does mortality salience always intensify negative reactions to others
who threaten one's worldview? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 212-220.
Greenberg, J., Pysczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1986). The causes and consequences of a
need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), Public self and
private self (pp. 189-212). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., Rosenblatt, A., Burling, J., Lyon, D.,
Simon, L., & Pinel, E. (1992). Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-
esteem serves and anxiety-buffering function. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63,
913-922.
Hamilton, D. L. (1971). A comparative study of five methods of assessing self-esteem,
Leary - 24
dominance, and dogmatism. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 31, 441-452.
Haupt, A., & Leary, M. R. (1997). The appeal of worthless groups: Moderating effects of
trait self-esteem. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1, 124-132.
Heaven, P. C. (1986). Authoritarianism, directiveness, and self-esteem revisited: A cross-
cultural analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 7, 225-228.
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Dover.
Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Ellis, B. J. (in press). Evolutionary perspectives on self-evaluation
and self-esteem. In M. Clark & G. Fletcher (Eds.), The Blackwell handbook of social
psychology, Vol. 2: Interpersonal processes. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
Leary, M. R. (1999). The social and psychological importance of self-esteem. In R. M.
Kowalski & M. R. Leary (Eds.), The social psychology of emotional and behavioral problems:
Interfaces of social and clinical psychology (pp. 197-221). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). The nature and function of self-esteem:
Sociometer theory. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 32,
pp. 1-62). San Diego: Academic Press.
Leary, M. R., Cottrell, C. A., & Phillips, M. (2000). Acceptance and dominance: Two
routes to self-esteem? Unpublished manuscript, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC.
Leary, M. R., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Interpersonal functions of the self-esteem motive:
The self-esteem system as a sociometer. In M. Kernis (Ed.), Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem
(pp. 123-144). New York: Plenum.
Leary, M. R., Haupt, A., Strausser, K., & Chokel, J. (1998). Calibrating the sociometer:
Leary - 25
The relationship between interpersonal appraisals and state self-esteem. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 74, 1290-1299.
Leary, M. R., Tambor, E. S., Terdal, S. K., & Downs, D. L. (1995). Self-esteem as an
interpersonal monitor: The sociometer hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
68, 518-530.
McFarland, C., & Ross, M. (1982). Impact of causal attributions on affective reactions to
success and failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 937-946.
Maris, R. (1981). Pathways to suicide: A survey of self-destructive behavior. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
McFarland, C., & Ross, M. (1982). Impact of causal attributions on affective reactions to
success and failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 937-946.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Neuringer, C. (1974). Attitudes toward self in suicidal individuals. Life-Threatening
Behavior, 4, 96-106.
Raskin, R., Novacek, J., & Hogan, R. (1991). Narcissistic self-esteem management.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 911-918.
Rogers, C. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as
developed in the client-centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of a science
(Vol. 3). (pp. 184-256). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszcynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1989). Evidence
for terror management I: The effects of mortality salience on reaction to those who violate and
uphold cultural values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 681-690.
Leary - 26
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory of
social behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem. Advances in experimental social
psychology, 24, 93-159.
Sowards, B. A., Moniz, A. J., & Harris, M. J. (1991). Self-esteem and bolstering: Testing
major assumptions of terror management theory. Representative Research in Social Psychology,
19, 95-106.
Thorsen, J. A., & Powell, F. C. (1992). A revised death anxiety scale. Death Studies, 16,
507-521.
Table 1. Correlations Between Trait Self-Esteem and Subscales of the RDAS
RDAS Subscale Alpha Self-Feelings Self-
Regard
Nonexistence .92 -.11
-.14
Loss of control .58 -.18*
-.20*
After-death events .66 -.11
-.18*
Pain .71 -.20*
-.28**
Total RDAS Score .90 -.17*
-.22*
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; Cronbach's alpha coefficient was .87 for the self-feelings measure and
.89 for the self-regard scale.
Table 2. Correlations Between Trait Self-Esteem and Domains of Death Anxiety
Domain of Death Anxiety Self-
Feelings Self-
Regard
Uncertainty about what happens after death -.17*
-.18*
Being separated from loved ones -.06
-.04
Things not done; goals not reached -.03
-.11
Other people's distress
-.08
-.06
No longer existing
-.09
-.13
Possible pain while dying
-.08
-.12
Overall
-.09
.01