Aulo Gelli, Noora-Lisa Aberman,

Amy Margolies, Marco Santacroce, Bob Baulch

and Ephraim Chirwa

The impact of lean season food transfers

on food security, diets and nutrition

status

Study objectives

• To estimate the impact and targeting of (MVAC) lean season food transfers on households’ food security and children’s diets and nutrition

• To understand village-level norms on allocation of food transfers and other resources that may help explain those results

Study sites

• Data was collected from 60 communities randomly selected among a set of food-insecure villages in MVAC targeted region of Zombadistrict in southern Malawi

Study methods: Quantitative Data

• Longitudinal study based on two rounds of surveys (as part of a cluster randomized controlled trial of a pre-school based agriculture and nutrition intervention):

– Baseline survey undertaken in the post-harvest season (September 2015)

– Follow-up undertaken during the peak lean season (February 2016) after scale-up of food transfers

– Rich data set including ~1200 households, over 1,500 children

Study methods: Qualitative Data

• Qualitative data is made up of 45 in-depth time-line interviews in the same communities in Zomba, with women, men and adolescent girls (March 2016)

– Translated and transcribed, then thematically coded

Evaluation strategy

• First estimated a probit model to assess the probability of targeting criteria to predict program participation

– using range of household and community level characteristics on sample of MVAC beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries

• Then we evaluated the impact of MVAC by combining propensity score matching and difference in difference (DID) methods

MVAC programme characteristics

• Eligibility criteria for MVAC food assistance included households headed by women, the elderly or children, or households including orphans, the chronically ill or households that had lost their main source of income due to chronic illness

• Household screening criteria also included asset holdings (including livestock, land and small durables) and participation in other social assistance programs (including social cash transfers, inputs subsidy programme and school meals)

Food transfers

• Food rations were to be provided to households on a monthly basis and included maize (50kg), legumes (10kg) and fortified vegetable oil (1.84 kg)

• At endline, 175 (15%) out of 1,191 households had received MVAC in the survey population

• Households consuming <1800 calories per capital per day: 36% at baseline and 46% during lean season

Quantitative Results

Effects of MVAC Food Transfer

• During the lean season, households in the sample experienced substantive declines in household food security

• Compared to control, MVAC food recipients were better off:

– substantive positive impact on household food consumption in 7 day recall period

– substantive positive impact on young children’s diets and nutrition outcomes

Treatment effects: Household level

• Substantive positive impact on household food consumption in 7 day recall period

– Per capita food expenditures + 19% / 35MK pppd

– Daily acquisition of iron +16% / 3.92mg pppd

** p<0.05.

MKw

/day

Treatment effects: Child level

• Substantive positive impact on young children’s diets (DDS +15% & FVS +13%)

• And nutrition outcomes: weight-for-height z-scores (+14%)

Children 36-72m Children 6-59m

***

*****

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05.

MVAC targeting

• Findings indicate that MVAC targeting criteria are not good predictors of program participation

• Data on MVAC participation also suggests that ~20% of most food secure households (by quintile) received transfers

• Positive effects on food expenditures and children’s diets are concentrated among the poorer households

• SCTP recipients appear to be excluded from receiving MVAC food

MVAC participation by socioeconomic

and food security status

MVAC participation by official

poverty line

Household expenditures

poor non-poor

MVAC 10% 5%

no MVAC 55% 31%

Qualitative Results

Social norms, targeting & favoritism

• Village heads play a significant role in determining who receives MVAC and other social support programs.– Primarily through control over beneficiary selection, also

through directives about sharing

• Perceptions of extent of consultation in allocation process: varies by village

• Perceptions of the extent of favoritism also varies

• Some complaints about chief intervention, e.g., inclusion errors (favoritism) and forced sharing, but frequently this is viewed as unavoidable and part of village norms

• Beyond some complaints about chief intervention, the primary complaint about targeting is “not enough benefit” related to feeling that “everyone should get something”

Social norms and sharing

• About half the time sharing is dictated by the chief. When it’s not, HHs decide to share on their own due to kinship obligations, social pressure, and hope for reciprocation (often described as a moral or humanitarian requirement).

• Some people complained about forced sharing and community pressure to share. No one complained about sharing with relatives => social requirement.

• Sharing is required even if targeted recipient is objectively poorer than those with whom they share (relative wealth does not seem to be considered in sharing decisions)

Female MVAC recipient in Zomba in favor of forced sharing:

Interviewer: Did you think this sharing was beneficial?Respondent 1: Yes, it was beneficial because it could be you next year not in the program, and your friends would help you. But the owners of the program say not to share, this only happens in the village to just help each other.

Female MVAC recipients in Zomba unhappy with targeting and forced sharing:

I: So what criteria were they using to select beneficiaries?

R: They were choosing people who had nothing to eat…But at times they recorded names of people who had food but those who lacked food were also being skipped…As per village level problems, the chief said, “This maize should be shared amongst you. You will see how you can share.” So people could share two [households] per bag…

Conclusions: Effects of MVAC

• Quantitative data suggests that MVAC food transfers are effective in protecting short term food security and nutrition status during the lean season.

– Evidence of protective impact on household food consumption, and on dietary diversity (of 3-6yr olds) and weight for height z-scores of young children (0-5yrs)

Conclusions: Targeting and Coverage

• Targeting and coverage of MVAC:

– Overall coverage of transfers was low in the survey population (~15% of HH)

– Data on targeting criteria are not good predictors of program participation

– Evidence suggests that ~20% of the most food secure households received transfers

• Effects on food expenditures and diets are greater for poorer households (better targeting=>more efficient)

Conclusions: Sharing and Favoritism

• Insufficient public social support reinforces high dependence on kinship networks and community support

• Favoritism in community-based targeting seen as unavoidable (villagers cannot contest/ it’s chief’s prerogative)

• A more objective targeting system could improve targeting to some extent, but pressure to reallocate once transfer arrive in the village is likely to remain

Policy Implications

• Educating villagers on good local governance practices, may slowly begin to alter norms that yield exclusion and inclusion errors, but weak social support system reinforces these practices.

• Most people face dietary shocks each year: suggesting that other social support mechanisms (productive and protective) must be scaled up to meet the current need.

– NOTE: there is a significant challenge separating chronic from acute food insecurity in this context…

Thank you!