The History of International Food Safety Standards and the Codex Alimentarius (1955-1995)

by

Brigit Lee Naida Ramsingh

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Institute for the History & Philosophy of Science & Technology University of Toronto

© Copyright by Brigit Ramsingh 2011

ii

The History of International Food Safety Standards and the

Codex Alimentarius (1955-1995)

Brigit Ramsingh

Doctor of Philosophy

Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology University of Toronto

2011

Abstract

Following the Second World War, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World

Health Organization (WHO) teamed up to construct an international Codex Alimentarius (or

“food code”) in 1962. Inspired by the work of its European predecessor, the Codex Europaeus,

these two UN agencies assembled teams of health professionals, government civil servants,

medical and scientific experts to draft food standards. Once ratified, the standards were

distributed to governments for voluntary adoption and implementation. By the mid-1990s, the

World Trade Organization (WTO) identified the Codex as a key reference point for scientific

food standards.

The role of science within this highly political and economic organization poses interesting

questions about the process of knowledge production and the scientific expertise underpinning

the food standards. Standards were constructed and contested according to the Codex twin goals

of: (1) protecting public health, and (2) facilitating trade. One recent criticism of Codex is that

these two aims are opposed, or that one is given primacy over the other, which results in

protectionism. Bearing these themes in mind, in this dissertation I examine the relationship

between the scientific and the ‘social’ elements embodied by the Codex food standards since its

iii

inception after the Second World War. I argue that these attempts to reach scientific standards

represent an example of coproduction– one in which the natural and social orders are produced

alongside each other.

What follows from this central claim is an attempt to characterize the pre-WTO years of the

Codex through a case study approach. The narrative begins with a description of the predecessor

regional group the Codex europaeus, and then proceeds to key areas affecting human health: 1)

food additives, 2) food hygiene, and 3) pesticides residues.

iv

Acknowledgments

This research began in Rome, the writing started in Toronto, and the completion occurred in

Berlin, and so there are many colleagues, mentors and friends to thank for their help along the

way.

First, I am greatly indebted to the guidance and support of my thesis supervisor, Pauline

Mazumdar. Had we not met on that fateful day years ago in the elevator at the Institute for the

History & Philosophy of Science & Technology (IHPST) in Toronto, where she encouraged me

to return to do a thesis on the Codex Alimentarius, this project may never have come to fruition.

She has taught me how to be an historian, and I am forever grateful for her mentorship, not to

mention the memorable trips to EURAS. I am lucky to have had the opportunity to work with her

not only for this project but also as a teaching assistant for her undergraduate history of medicine

courses.

Lucia Dacome has been a most wonderful co-supervisor and reliable source of feedback. She

has offered helpful support throughout both the writing and administrative processes and has also

reminded me of broader historiographic issues that have enriched this work. I have learned a

great deal from her, not only from this project, but also from sitting in on her graduate seminars

that exposed me to wider selection of literature and approaches in the history of medicine.

I am honoured to have had the guidance of Harriet Friedmann throughout the course of this

project. Her knowledge of food systems and sociology of food has pointed me in the right

direction at every step of the way and I thank her not only for the depth and richness of her

knowledge on the topic, but also for her enthusiasm, interest and perspective which kept me

afloat as I waded through archival material, finding my way out of the murky depths of the

details to get a sense of the bigger picture in which the Codex emerged.

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Ross Upshur has also been a trustworthy advisor and wonderful presence on this committee, not

only for his pragmatism but also for his sense of humour. He has helpfully urged me to think of

my goals and overall argument, and these elements were valuable in helping me to push toward

the finish.

Finally, I am extremely grateful to Professor David Smith from the University of Aberdeen for

his thorough and helpful reading of this dissertation and for providing a rigorous External

Examiners report, as well as cogent questions during the oral examination.

I am fortunate to have received assistance from several Canadian and German funding sources.

This research was made possible thanks to the financial support of The Canadian Social Sciences

and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), The Ontario Graduate Scholarship (OGS), and the

Lupina Foundation (which provides funding to the Comparative Program on Health and Society

at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto), and the Max Planck

Institute for the History of Science in Berlin.

I have benefited from feedback and discussions with various colleagues from the History of

Medicine and related fields. First and foremost, I am proud to have started my work at the

Institute for the History & Philosophy of Science & Technology (IHPST) at the University of

Toronto. The students and colleagues in this department have consistently fostered and

maintained a stimulating and ‘intellectually-nourishing’ environment, which I am fortunate to

have benefited from. I am thankful to the CPHS and its fellows for the opportunity to present

this work in 2007 as part of their colloquia series. I am also grateful to the Max Planck Institute

for the History of Science and its Predoctoral discussion group, and in particular, Lorraine

Daston and Fernando Vidal for comments on the hygiene chapter. At the Charité Institut für

Geschichte der Medizin, I am indebted to colleagues such as Ulrike Thoms, Frau Stefanie Voth

and Frau Sabine Selle for their support, especially during the final stages of this project. I am

also grateful for the encouragement from and the opportunity to discuss this work with

colleagues Ximo Guillem Llobat and Patrick Zylberman.

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I shall never forget my time at the FAO archives, made all the more enjoyable thanks to the

hospitality and warm welcome of the team of hard-working men in the records department in

Rome: Giuliano Fregoli, Enrique Anton, Nicola, Maurice, Leonardo and Albert. I thank you all

for the macchiatos, limoncello, the Spaghetti alle Vongole, the David Bowie caricatures, and the

imitation Lacoste t-shirt.

I am also indebted to the team at the World Health Organization, especially Fiona Fleck, who

helped to make my stay there as part of the Bulletin of the World Health Organization editorial

group possible. I am also thankful to those in charge of the Archives of European Integration,

housed in the Hillman Library at the University of Pittsburgh, especially Phil Wilkin and

assistant Amélie. Who would have ever thought that a copy of Brussels could exist in

Pittsburgh?

Finally, I am blessed with an abundance of delightful, lovely, witty and caring friends without

whom I could not have completed this thesis. Their presence in my life has kept me grounded

and laughing (and in some case, especially in the final stages) well fed. To avoid embarrassing

both myself and them, I will merely list their names here, but each person knows they hold a

special and prized place in my pantheon of most cherished people in the world. I could easily

write another 200 pages, single-spaced, and perhaps even using a smaller font size, on the topic

of how each of these people is special to me:

Jill Lazenby, Delia Gavrus, Eileen Clarkin, Nancy Dawe, Tara Abraham, Daniela Monaldi,

Michele Murray, Alison & Eddy Popp (especially for the Kraft dinner), Ruth Gmehlin, my

brother Sean, my sister-in-law Debbie, Denise Horsley, Muna Salloum, Gary Kezar, Grace

Vigneron, Uncle John and Aunt Flo, Aunt Ro, Jarrett Carty, the Bank of Mom and Dad, Monica

Aufrecht, Alice Mah, Kirsten Leng, Pam Glowacki, and my Edinburgh family: Tracy Lazenby,

Fraser Paterson and Giuliano Broccato.

Thanks also to Lyndsey Cockwell and the Berlin Pop Choir, especially Harriet and Steve, Skadi,

Abby and Tom, Aldewin, Frederick (Lilo), Rob, and to Julie Blumenthal for the asana; this

group has collectively helped me in finding my voice, another worthwhile ongoing project.

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Table of Contents

List of Figures x

List of Abbreviations xi

1. Introduction 1-37

1.1. Co production Framework

1.2. Background on the Codex alimentarius

1.3 Standardization literature

1.4. Outline of chapters

1.5 Sources and methodology

1.6 FAO Archives

1.7 WHO Archives

1.8 EU Collection at the Hillman Library

1.9 Committees

1.10 Secretariat

1.11 Codex europaeus

1.12 Additives

1.13 Hygiene

1.14 Pesticide Residues

1.15 Science in the Codex

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2. The Codex Europaeus 32-69

2.1. European Council (1958-1962)

2.2. The International Codex and Högl’s Reign at the Codex Europaeus (1962-1965)

2.3. Der Anschluss: “this sounds like a holy mess”

3. Food Additives 70-116

3.1. The Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) (1955-1963)

3.2. Industrialist Presence

3.3. Scientific Experts

3.4. The Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA), est. 1963

3.5. The European Economic Community work on food additives

4. Food Hygiene 117-145

4.1 The Codex Committee on Food Hygiene

4.2. Codes of Hygienic Practice

4.3. Enter the Biometricians

4.4 “Not Scientifically Correct”

5. Pesticide Residues 146-175

5.1 Defining Tolerance

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5.2 The Joint Expert Committee of the FAO and WHO

5.3 The Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, est. 1966

5.4 Harmonizing Tolerance: Case study of pesticides in the EEC

6. Conclusion / Epilogue 176-184

6.1 The SPS Agreement

6.2 Other Legitimate or Limiting Factors

References 185-209

x

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Structure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Source: The Food and Agriculture

Organization Archives, Rome.

Figure 1.2. Meeting of the Second Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Palais des

nations, Geneva, October 1964. Source: The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives,

Rome.

Figure 1.3. The Gentleman’s Club. Delegates to the Second Session of the Codex Alimentarius

Commission, Geneva, 1964. Source: The Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome.

Figure 3.1. Members of the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives. Source: The Food and

Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

Figure 4.1. “Habits to Avoid.” Source: Betty Hobbs, Food Poisoning and Food Hygiene (1953).

Figure 4.2. Human Salmonellosis and its possible sources. Source: Betty Hobbs, Food

Poisoning and Food Hygiene, 1953.

Figure 4.3. To Kill a Chicken. Standardized poultry killing recommendations From Report of

the Sixth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, May 1969. Source: The Food and

Agriculture Organization, Rome.

Figure 4.4. Sampling plans and recommended microbiological limits for dried foods: ingredients

known to present microbiological hazards. From Thatcher and Clark (eds.) Microorganisms in

Foods: their significance and methods of enumeration, 2nd Edition, Toronto, University of

Toronto Press, 1978.

Figure 5.1. List of Experts on Pesticide Residues from the FAO and WHO, Source: The Food and

Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

Figure 6.1. “The World Under Codex Alimentarius ?” (Source: Resistnet.com – “Home of

Patriotic Resistance”)

xi

List of Abbreviations

ADIs Acceptable Daily Intakes

BIBRA British Industrial Biological Research Association

CAC Codex Alimentarius Commission

CCFA Codex Committee on Food Additives

CCFH Codex Committee on Food Hygiene

CCPM Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues

CIIA Commission Internationale des Industries Agricoles

EEC European Economic Community

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

ICMSF International Committee for the Microbial Specifications for Foods

IDF International Dairy Federation

ISO International Organisation for Standardization

JECFA Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives

MRL Maximum Residue Limit

SPS Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

UN ECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

WHO World Health Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

1

Chapter 1 Introduction

The Codex Alimentarius is to be a collection of internationally adopted food standards presented

in a unified form. These food standards aim at protecting consumer’s health and ensuring fair

practices in the food trade. Their publication is intended to promote the standardization of

foodstuffs in the various parts of the world, to facilitate harmonization of standards and in so

doing to further the development of the international food trade.1

Since the early 1960s, this Codex, published by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO), became an instrument for setting international food

standards. Within its first decade, the Codex had developed a variety of standards for products

ranging from honey to lard, canned fruit and vegetables, rendered pork fat and fish sticks; they

also established food labelling guidelines, standards for scientific methods of analysis, as well as

tolerances and parameters for food additives, food hygiene and pesticide residues. Inspired by

the work of its European predecessor, a group known as the Codex europaeus, these two UN

agencies assembled teams of health professionals, government civil servants, medical and

scientific experts to draft the food standards. The Codex was intended to meet the agencies' twin

aims of protecting human health and promoting trade interests of its member states. Once

ratified, the food standards were distributed to governments for adoption and implementation on

a voluntary basis. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, several factors began to increase pressure

on worldwide markets. With the rising trade agenda of the 1970s, and in the wake of the 1972

global financial and food crisis, the 1973-74 oil crisis, and an increased focus by world leaders

on the North-South divide, by the early 1980s it became of paramount importance to harmonize

and establish international standards for many commodities and products. This need for

standardization was apparent, and some of the issues and tensions inherent to the process of

harmonization of food standards first played out on a regional level within the European

Economic Community, a microcosm of the Codex.2 By 1985, a resolution passed by the UN

1 FAO/WHO, “Purpose and Scope of the Codex Alimentarius” ALINORM 62/8/WHO, 1962. Report of the Joint

FAO/WHO Conference on Food Standards. 1-5 October 1962. Geneva, page 8 2 W.H. B. Denner. 1990. “Food Additives: Recommendations for Harmonization and Control” In: Food Control.

1(3): 150-162.

2

General Assembly strongly urged that the Codex serve as the basis for informing national food

policy of governments worldwide. By the mid-1990s, the World Trade Organization (WTO)

identified the Codex as a key reference point for scientific food standards.3

The role of science within – and the character of – this highly political and economic

organization pose interesting questions about the process of knowledge production and the

expertise underpinning the international food standards. Standards are constructed and shaped

according to their goals and, in the case of the Codex since the 1960s these were its explicit twin

aims of: (1) protecting public health, and (2) facilitating trade.4 One recent criticism of the

Codex is that these two aims are opposed, or that one is given primacy over the other, resulting

in protectionism, whether it be a form of protectionism for reasons of unsafe health, or,

protectionism in terms of erecting barriers to trade – an approach not always grounded in strictly

scientific or objective reasoning. In recent debates around the Codex, ‘scientific or objective

reasoning’ refers to evidence based upon toxicological studies – exposing test animals to food

chemicals in order to establish tolerance levels – and primarily since 1997 statistical data based

on risk analysis and risk assessments, for example, a measurement of the number of Listeria

monocytogenes organisms in ready-to-eat foods in large sample sizes.5

1.1 Co-production framework

Bearing these themes in mind, I will examine the relationship between the scientific and the

‘social’ elements embodied by the Codex food standards since its inception after the Second

World War. In examining the historical roots of the Codex and early controversies over Codex

3 WHO/FAO 2005. Understanding the Codex, 3rd Edition, URL:

http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y7867e/y7867e00.htm [Accessed October 2010] 4 FAO. “Guidelines for the Codex Alimentarius”. 1962. Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Conference on Food

Standards, 1-5 October 1962, Geneva. p. 8. ALINORM 62/8/WHO. 5 See: FAO/WHO, “Codex and Science” in Understanding the Codex, Rome 2005; Jeffrey M. Farber, “Present

situation in Canada regarding Listeria monocytogenes and ready-to-eat seafood products,” International Journal of Food Microbiology, Vol. 62, December 2000 (3):247-251.

3

food standards, I argue that these attempts to reach scientific standards represent an example of

‘co-production’– one in which natural and social orders are produced alongside each other. To

support this claim, I adopt Sheila Jasanoff’s idiom of “co-production” which suggests that the

ways of knowing the world are linked to the ways people seek to organize and control it, or, “the

ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from

the ways in which we choose to live in it.”6 A co-production framework allows us to look at

how ‘knowledge-making’ is incorporated into the practices of governance, and thus, when

looking at states, organizations or institutions who are in the business of producing scientific

knowledge, the natural and the social are linked and developed in a parallel sense, each

embedded within and underwriting the other. The ‘natural’ order is that which is normally

associated with the ‘scientific’ objective or rational knowledge, whereas the ‘social’ can come to

mean a variety of “building blocks” – norms, politics, institutions, social practices, identity,

culture, attitudes, values, beliefs.7

Within the structure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and its joint subcommittees of the

FAO and WHO, the ‘natural order’ took the form of scientific and technological expertise related

to the food safety standards: mainly toxicological, chemical or microbiological evidence or data.

The ‘social’ order of the Codex standards includes several elements: the economic impetus of

‘facilitating trade’, political or personal relationships between member states (or sometimes

between members of the same sub-committee), attempting to harmonize the standards across

national boundaries, balancing regional interests with national or international interests (for

example with the European Economic Community or the predecessor to the Codex – the Codex

Europaeus) as the imposition of one standard would be at the cost of localizing and

marginalizing regional interests. The historical evidence suggests that in the Codex food safety

standards, these two broad areas of scientific and biomedical expertise on the one hand, and

social, political, cultural and economic interests on the other, were co-produced together.

6 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order, New York: Routledge,

2004, p. 2. 7 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order, New York: Routledge,

2004, p. 3.

4

What follows from this central claim (and thus the principle aim of this dissertation) is an

attempt to characterize the pre-WTO years of the Codex, from 1955-1995, through a case study

approach considering topics where scientific expertise over human health effects met with the

other interests or values connected with the food standards.8 The key areas affecting human

health and emerging food safety problems post-WWII identified by the WHO were those of 1)

food hygiene, 2) food additives, and 3) pesticides residues. The Codex created subcommittees

charged with the task of developing standards for each of these areas: food hygiene dealt with all

microbiological problems such as salmonella contamination; food additives dealt with chemical

substances added (intentionally) to food products (such as colours, emulsifiers, enzymes or anti-

microbials); and pesticide residues in food were drawing more attention with the increasing

recognition of adverse health effects for chemicals like agent orange, dioxins, and the synthetic

pesticide DDT.

1.2 Background on the Codex Alimentarius

Of course the Codex Alimentarius Commission had areas of focus other than strictly food safety.

The main administrative and secretariat functions were headquartered in Rome, mainly because

the FAO and its director, Binay Ranjan Sen, played a more active role in its establishment. The

WHO, although approached by the European Codex Europaeus to take up the work, referred the

matter to the FAO. 9 These two UN agencies were both created after the Second World War, and

each with different mandates, but had collaborated before. Founded on October 16, 1945 in

Quebec, Canada, the FAO was the first of the UN’s specialized agencies and had the major goal

8 David F. Smith and Jim Phillips have advocated the historical case study approach for examining the complexity

of the food system with an emphasis on the role of expertise in the history of food policy and regulation making. Their “multiplicity of actors and experts” assessment can also be applied to the Codex and narratives of international food safety standard development. As they admit, most case studies do not necessarily devote much time to a discussion of theory of food policy, but more often than not historians of this topic are informed by some form of social constructionism. See: David F. Smith and Jim Phillips, “Food policy and regulation: a multiplicity of actors and experts.” In: David F. Smith and Jim Phillips (Eds.) Food Science Policy and Regulation in the Twentieth Century: International and Comparative Perspectives. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. 9 A. Randell, “The Codex Alimentarius: How it all began” In: J.R. Lupien, K. Richmond, A. Randell, J.P. Cotier, R.

Dawson, W.D. Clay, V. Menza (Eds.) FAO Celebrates 50 years, Produced by FAO/WHO Agriculture and Consumer Protection: Rome, 1995.

5

of ending malnutrition in Asia, Africa and Latin America.10 The WHO was founded a few years

later in 1948, but efforts in international health cooperation had already emerged in the form of

the League of Nations Health Organization during the interwar period, or the international

sanitary conferences occurring between 1851-1903 in Europe.11 The WHO had many priority

areas of work which included not only addressing infectious diseases like cholera or malaria, but

also normative activities like standardization (it had a biological standards bureau). The two

organizations seemed a good fit to combine efforts and tackle food standards. They first

collaborated over emerging problems of food additives and hygiene in milk and meat products in

the mid-1950s.

The Codex was comprised of individual representatives from member states of the WHO and

FAO, and, in addition to the food safety committees, by November 1965 it was made up of many

specific commodity committees (such as cocoa, milk, fruits and vegetables), an Executive

Committee, a Committee on General Principles, and one on Methods of Analysis and Sampling

(Figure i). The overall Commission met once per year alternating locations in Rome or Geneva

and was chaired by a scientist from the Government of the United States, Dr. John L. Harvey,

Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. FDA, chosen for his “long experience on both the scientific

and legal aspects of food standards work.”12 (See Figure ii). The Additives and Pesticide

Committees were both Chaired by the Netherlands, and the Food Hygiene Committee also of the

United States. These three areas of food safety will be examined in relationship to the

emergence of other organizations involved in food and agriculture standardization, especially the

European Community, given the strong European presence and interests at the outset of the

international Codex (as discussed in Chapter 1) as examples of the process of co-production.

Co-production is an explanatory framework and idiom, not necessarily a full-fledged theory, but

it is an approach that is both integrative and interdisciplinary and underwritten by several

10

“Editorial” In: J.R. Lupien, K. Richmond, A. Randell, J.P. Cotier, R. Dawson, W.D. Clay, V. Menza (Eds.) FAO Celebrates 50 years, Produced by FAO/WHO Agriculture and Consumer Protection: Rome, 1995. 11 Siddiqi, Javed. 1995. World Health and World Politics. The World Health Organization and the UN System. London: Hurst & Company, 14-20. 12 B.R. Sen, Director-General of the FAO, Letter to Dr. John L. Harvey, Chairman of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and Deputy Commissioner of the USFDA. 29 October 1965. SP 10/2 Policy Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

6

constructionist frameworks. A term first introduced by Bruno Latour13, co-production allows for

the scientific and the social elements to be produced in parallel to one another. This does not

suggest that one directs the other, or that there is a causal link between the two elements or that

the two elements are fundamentally opposed to each other; they can co-exist. For example,

scientific evidence or any attempt to define or categorize or explain the natural world (or natural

knowledge, falling in to the realm of ‘the natural order’) is an equally as valid and relevant factor

as the social, political, geographical, national, administrative, cultural, and economic interests

and considerations (the social order) that shape knowledge. This relationship between the social

and the natural orders has generated broader debates in the fields of History of Science, Science

Studies and Science and Technology Studies (STS) where disciplinary boundaries are alleged to

exist over the question of how scientific knowledge is produced14; co-production contributes to

discussion by subsuming or being versatile enough to work with other frameworks in these

fields. For example, co-productionist accounts avoid charges of strict social determinism (e.g

that espoused by the Edinburgh School ‘Strong Programme’ of Sociology of Scientific

Knowledge, SSK) and at the same time disallowing an overly positivistic account that science is

disembodied knowledge, a collection of separate facts that transcend the institutions and social

contexts in which it is produced.15

Another appeal of co-production is its flexibility. In other words, it can be used to explain or

analyze a variety of situations where scientific evidence or knowledge is produced or contested,

particularly in large institutions or organizations which also have clear economic or geopolitical

mandates. According to Jasanoff, there are two major themes in Science and Technology Studies

(STS) scholarship that underpin and are subsumed by the notion of co-production: the

constitutive and the interactive. The constitutive brand of co-production accounts for the

emergence and stabilization of new objects and phenomena, or socio-technical formations, such

as the emergence of actor-networks, whereas the interactive deals with problems of conflicts

13

Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society, Harvard University of Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987. 14

See for example, Peter Dear and Sheila Jasanoff, “Dismantling Boundaries in Science and Technology Studies” in ISIS (Critiques and Connections), Forthcoming; in response to: Lorraine Daston, “Science Studies and the History of Science,” Critical Enquiry 35 (Summer 2009): 798-813. 15

Jasanoff, p. 20.

7

within these existing formations.16 The interactive stream of co-production has had great

currency when examining the relationship between science and all that is “social” within power

structures or networks.17 For example, within the United Nations’ system and its power

structures of the FAO and WHO agencies, the scientific expertise generated by their joint expert

Codex committees was often developed in concert with other interests. Membership of these

expert committees included scientists, but also representatives from industry and politicians from

member states, all of whom could provide input into the process of standard development. The

process of generating Codex scientific standards thus involved an interaction of several factors.

The constitutive stream of co-production is also effective in analyzing the emergence of

standards and other stabilized representations (like objects, for example) as seen in the work of

people like Lorraine Daston, or, with the emergence of a language of numbers in the work of

people like Ian Hacking and Ted Porter.18 Borrowing an example once more for the Codex

Alimentarius, the food standards themselves could be considered emergent objects, stabilized

representations of how a food product should be (like an ideal goal or target for producers and

manufacturers) in order to go on the market for consumption by consumers.

Thus, an appealing facet of co-production is that it allows for the use of several constructionist

frameworks which attempt to explain relationships within institutions which produce natural

knowledge. The Codex Alimentarius story can draw upon both streams of co-production not only

in describing conflicts between member states or committee members who have different

interests and intentions when establishing standards (for example with the hygiene committee, or

with the Codex Europaeus), but also in that it is part of a larger history of scientific food

knowledge – part of an emerging late 19th and early 20th century trend – of making food and their

contaminants (be they microbes or chemicals) significant objects of scientific inquiry.

16

Jasanoff, p. 15. 17

One example of the interactive is the disagreement between Hobbes and Boyle as described in S. Shapin and S. Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985) 18

See for example, Ian Hacking The Taming of Chance (1990), Ted Porter Trust in Numbers (1986); Lorraine Daston (Ed.), Biographies of Scientific Objects (2000), Daston and Peter Gallison, Objectivity (2007).

8

The Codex thus serves as a case study for examining the process of knowledge production within

international structures and for unpacking the process of the elaboration of scientific standards

which rely upon such natural knowledge – especially that of food microbiology, toxicology,

statistical data and chemistry. These scientific standards are embedded in and shaped by the

administrative, social, cultural, governmental structures in which they are created and at the same

time, power structures and social orders can emerge and are shaped by the creation of these

standards. The aims of health and trade co-exist in such a structure; and the relationship between

the two can only be revealed through further historical enquiry. However, what follows is not a

strict institutional history of these UN agencies; my goal is to start at the standards themselves,

placing each within a larger context, drawing upon archival material, correspondence, meeting

reports as well as contemporary public health literature.

1.3 Standardization Literature

But first, it is helpful to consider what the term ‘standard’ and the process of ‘standardization’

mean in a broader sense, and how historians of science and STS scholars have considered the

themes that emerge when examining the nature of standards. Most narratives are imbued with

the idea that standards are constructed or made, that there is a process, and this road to attaining

standardization can be rife with tensions, particularly between that which is ‘scientific’ and that

which is ‘social’. And thus, any history of standards lends itself quite easily to STS

methodologies and social constructivist frameworks.

At first glance, the history of standards appears to have had greater currency in other disciplines,

particularly in the history of technology, but it has become a popular theme in histories of

biomedicine and public health.19 Many historians20 do not explicitly discuss a standard without

19

For example, there has been a lot of focus on drug standardization, with active networks emerging such as the European Science Foundation’s DRUGS Research Program. Their many publications include overviews such as: Bonah, C., Masutti, C., Rasmussen, A. and J. Simon (Eds.) Harmonizing Drugs: Standards in 20th Century Pharmaceutical History, Paris: Editions Glyphe, 2009; and Gradmann, C., and J. Simon (Eds.) Evaluating and Standardizing Therapeutic Agents, 1890-1950, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. 20 For example: Slaton, Amy and Janet Abbate. 2001. “The Hidden Lives of Standards: Technical Prescriptions and the Transformation of Work in America” In: Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and

9

also making reference to its process of development; that is, the idea of a standard as a fixed final

product is inextricably bound up with the process by which it is attained. Or the more pertinent

question to ask is: what are the aims or outcomes of standards and standardization? Drawing

upon definitions and approaches that have been originally employed mainly by historians of

technology, but have also been adopted by historians who investigate biological or biomedical

standards, these aims include: (1) to neutralize, objectify knowledge; to make things uniform; it

is a way of ‘making things the same’ (to borrow from historian of technology Ken Alder); (2) to

make knowledge and products more transportable from the local setting to the global; standards

allow for universal application, for example moving knowledge from the laboratory to the

outside world;21 (3) to mitigate risks such as injury to health; (4) to enable collaboration among

communities, countries, or laboratories, because, as Pieters has remarked, for pragmatic reasons

“matching nature is not as important as matching other laboratories”.22

Thus, this aim of producing functionally identical artefacts ideally should equalize power

distribution and create a level playing field for those with interests in the product, however some

historians of technology and industry have suggested that in some cases the opposite occurs. The

process has inherent social, political and economic biases, and results in struggles of authority

and conflict when trying to reach consensus. For example, Ken Alder shows how in late 18th

Century France the standardization of interchangeable parts for Napoleon’s weapons by military

engineers occurred at the cost of marginalizing local artisans and craftsmen, effectively

subordinating their knowledge to a more centralized authority.23

Agatha Chipley Hughes: 95-143. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; and most recently: Martha Lampland and Susan Leigh Star (Eds.) Standards and their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. 21 Latour, Bruno. 1999. Give me a laboratory and I will raise the World. In Mario Biagioli (Ed). Science Studies Reader: 258-275. New York, Routledge. 22 O'Connell, Joseph. Metrology: The creation of universality by the circulation of Particulars. Social Studies of Science (1993) 23: 129-173; and Pieters, Toine. Managing differences in biomedical research: The case of standardizing Interferons. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 29 (1998): 31-79. 23

Alder, Ken. Making things the same. Social Studies of Science. 28 (1998): 499-545.

10

Amy Slaton and Janet Abbate have also similarly mapped how conflicts or struggles of authority

and expertise occur. She argues that an “occupational identity” is tied in with the selection of

some technological or industry standards, and her examples come from describing specifications

for technological items and systems such as: General Electric (GE) refrigerators, elevators and

dumbwaiters, prefab concrete reinforcement materials (e.g. roofing supports) in the early 20th

century and (toward the later 20th Century) internet protocols.24 There are thus many impacts of

standardization; there are economic considerations, and effects on labour and the work force.

Slaton also presents the idea that the lives of standards are “hidden” or invisible, that there is a

great deal of work that goes on behind the scenes before the final product is available for use,

application or consumption.25 Standards are thought to be “instruments of reduction: reducing

complexity and variety in products and processes, reducing costs, reducing the time and effort

for efficient industrial operation.”26 But ultimately, they argue that standards effectively add

complexity, bring economic control and serve as mediums of exchange and negotiation.27

Standards are dynamic and not necessarily stable entities or uniform when considering their

effects.

And so, following up on some of these themes and approaches, and employing the idiom of co-

production, in this project I suggest that scientific standards cannot be examined in isolation

from their context – whether the item under scrutiny be a unit of electrical resistance, a pound of

platinum, an ampoule of penicillin, a can of string beans or a block of cheese. There are “stories

behind the standards”: they are cultural artefacts of the entire process, they embody all of the

knowledge that goes in to their development, they are symbols of scientific expertise, and

authority, national and economic interests, they can be a result of a political, economic,

epistemological, cultural or ideological struggle or discussion when one standard is created or

24 Slaton, Amy and Janet Abbate. 2001. “The Hidden Lives of Standards: Technical Prescriptions and the Transformation of Work in America” In: Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes: 95-143. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 25

Slaton, Amy and Janet Abbate. 2001. “The Hidden Lives of Standards: Technical Prescriptions and the Transformation of Work in America” In: Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes: 95-143. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press., p. 95. 26

Slaton and Abbate, p. 95. 27

Slaton and Abbate, pp. 95-97.

11

adopted over another.28 Bearing this in mind, the role of scientific principles within a highly

politicized and economic environment such as Codex is intriguing.

Few scholars have focussed on characterizing the origins of Codex before its alliance with the

WTO, but histories of the organizations that authored the food code are abundant. The World

Health Organization, which turned 60 years old in 2008, has attracted a number of historians to

its archives to research and describe various programs; or, sometimes the failure of programs, for

example, the Malaria Eradication Program.29 This work adds to the myriad of internal histories

told by FAO staff,30 and has also established a network of historians through initiatives like the

Global Health Histories project.31 There has been significant attention paid to the WHO’s

predecessor organization, the League of Nations Health Organization, and accounts of the history

of its work with expert groups and institutes on biological standards – penicillin, insulin, and

syphilis tests to name a few examples.32 Similarly, historians have begun to examine the Food

and Agriculture Organization at large, and its various programs, particularly its role in post-war

development and campaigns like the Freedom from Hunger initiative, or, the trajectory of the

Protein Advisory Group, devised to address the perceived post-WWII protein gap.33 Amy

28

The most recent diverse collection of examples are captured in Martha Lampland and Susan Leigh Star (Eds.) Standards and their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. 29

Siddiqi, Javed. 1995. World Health and World Politics. The World Health Organization and the UN System. London: Hurst & Company, 123 – 192. 30 For example, A. Randell, “The Codex Alimentarius: How it all began” In: J.R. Lupien, K. Richmond, A. Randell, J.P. Cotier, R. Dawson, W.D. Clay, V. Menza (Eds.) FAO Celebrates 50 years, Produced by FAO/WHO Agriculture and Consumer Protection: Rome, 1995. 31 Global Health Histories at the WHO, Geneva. URL: http://www.who.int/global_health_histories/en/ [Accessed October 2010.] 32 Mazumdar, P.M.H. “In the Silence of the Laboratory”: The League of Nations Standardizes Syphilis Tests. Social History of Medicine (2003) 16: 437-459; and Murnaghan, J. H. and P. Talalay. H. H. Dale's account of the standardization of insulin. Bulletin of the history of medicine. 66 (1992): 440-450; and John Patrick Swann, “The search for synthetic penicillin during World War II”, British Journal for the History of Science, (1983) 16: 154-190, and, Robert Bud, Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy 2007, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 33

Bunch, Matthew. 2007. Canada and the Freedom from Hunger Campaign. PhD. diss., University of Waterloo; Ruxin, Josh N., 2000. The United Nations Protein Advisory Group, In: Food, science, policy, and regulation in the twentieth century: international and comparative perspectives, ed. Jim Phillips and David F. Smith, 151-166. London: Routledge, pp. 151-166.

12

Staples has identified this post-war period (with the rise of the WHO, the FAO and the World

Bank) as a unique historical moment she calls the “birth of development.”34

The Codex Alimentarius was thrust into the limelight in the mid-1990s when high-profile health

concerns, import bans and court cases began to surface as a result of the use of growth-

promoting hormones in beef, as well as the rise of production aids such as the milk hormone

Bovine Somato-tropin (BST). Debates over maximum residue limits (MRLs) for these

substances often pitted countries like the U.S. against the European Union, and forced the Codex

to consider whether to base its decisions strictly on sound science or consider “other limiting

factors” such as consumer concerns, animal welfare, fraudulent or unfair trading practices,

labelling and other ethical and cultural considerations.35 The Codex had enjoyed a relatively

quieter life in its early years, but in the mid-1990s, as it became linked up with the WTO, it was

consequently given more prominence and indirect legislative power through the Sanitary and

Phytosanitary (or SPS) Agreement.36 The SPS agreement came into force in January 1995 and

emphasized how any disputes between member states over the health risks of a particular

commodity must be resolved through the use of “sound scientific” principles.37 And since many

members of the WTO were also members of Codex, it naturally followed that Codex was to

become the source of these scientific principles for food standards.38

But in spite of this recent attention the Codex food standards have not been thoroughly examined

historically, and only mentioned briefly as part of broader narratives of international food

standards. Its recent relationship with the WTO has garnered Codex much attention from

various academic circles, particularly among those researchers who focus on contemporary

34Staples, Amy L.S. 2006. The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 35

Jukes, David. The Role of Science in International Food Standards. Food Control 11 (2000): 181-194. 36

Veggeland, Frode and Svein Ole Borgen. Changing the Codex: The Role of International Institutions. Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2002. 37

WHO/FAO 2005. Understanding the Codex, 3rd Edition, URL: http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y7867e/y7867e00.htm [Accessed October 2010]. 38

Jukes, David. The Role of Science in International Food Standards. Food Control 11 (2000): 181-194.

13

political economy of institutions, sociology of food, international relations and trade, and

international food law.39

This interdisciplinary attraction of the Codex is obvious in the work of Susan Ilcan and Lynne

Philips, who draw upon the work of Ian Hacking and Ted Porter, and also employ the sociologist

Nikolas Rose’s concept of “technologies of government” to describe the role of FAO and WHO

in ‘making food count’.40 Technologies of government are “an assemblage of forms of practical

knowledge” and include modes of perception, vocabularies, types of authority, or practices of

calculation, employed not only to govern conduct, but also as they suggest, to make objects, in

this case, food, more ‘knowable’.41

Researchers from other disciplines have suggested that its historical character and the question of

continuity need further unpacking, particularly in light of its link up with the World Trade

Organization in mid-1990s. Harriet Friedmann has contemplated the character of Codex, and

described it as an ambiguous and vague ‘hero’ in the story.42 It seems that prior to its

connection with the World Trade Organization, no one seemed to pay much attention to the

Codex, and given its standards’ lack of force or legislative clout, it is tempting to suggest that

there exists a discontinuity between the pre-WTO Codex and the post-WTO Codex that emerged

since 1995 although this question remains unclear.

One recent study of the Codex described that it functioned like a sort of “gentlemen’s club” in its

early years, before its entanglement with the WTO (See Figure iii).43 This was a self-referential

observation made by a Codex member and this phrase was also picked up and used in an

39

Winickoff, D.E.; Bushey, D.M. (2010). Science and Power in Global Food Regulation: The Rise of the Codex Alimentarius. Science, Technology and Human Values 35 (3): 356-381. 40

See for example, Hacking, I, The Taming of Chance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Porter, T., The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900, Princeton University Press, 1986; and N. Rose, “Governing by Numbers: Figuring out democracy” Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 16 No. 7, (1991): pp. 673-92. 41Ilcan, Susan and Lynne Phillips, 'Making Food Count: Expert Knowledge and Global Technologies of Government', The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology; Nov 2003, Vol. 40 No. 4, pp 444. 42

Friedmann, Harriet “Shooting Star of the Codex Alimentarius” URL: www.havenscenter.org/vsp/harriet_friedmann [Accessed October 2010] 43

Veggeland, Frode and Svein Ole Borgen. Changing the Codex: The Role of International Institutions. Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2002, p. 9.

14

empirical study of Codex, one that attempted to assess its institutional values and culture. These

researchers observed the Codex meetings and suggested that before it linked up with the WTO,

Codex focused more on technical discussions and there were fewer politically or economically

motivated obstructions; that is, despite its politicized environment, disagreements over standards

rarely arose or impeded the work of the committees. Furthermore, this phrase conjures up images

of a friendly, diplomatic setting, with polite correspondence, and networks of experts all acting

in mutual cooperation as standards are developed.

Although members were guided by an explicit aim of mutual cooperation, it is unclear whether

this description of Codex is entirely fitting. Through the lens of co-production, I argue that

despite the retrospective reasoning that it was a smoothly running institution, the Codex was a

forum in which discussion and disagreements over standards were quite common. The standards

represent and embody a co-production of natural and social orders; they incorporate multiple

interests as the Codex attempted to fulfill its explicit aims of protecting consumer health whilst

facilitating international trade.

Patrick Zylberman has appropriately suggested that health and trade “were never on equal

footing” in the Codex and much of the problems with European protectionism lies in

understanding its historical elements;44 as the roots of protectionism run much deeper. He argues

that food standards are agonistic in that experts use them in “strategic arguments” and thus

multiple interests come into conflict in their construction45. Taking this as a cue, an examination

of these diverse interests in the Codex presents a unique opportunity to better understand how

scientific and technical standards relate to the social, political, economic and cultural features of

the institutions in which they are created. I will demonstrate this by looking at its relationships

within the organization itself and also with external groups, especially those influential groups

which form the ‘European core’ of this international organization.

44

Zylberman, Patrick, “Making Food Safety an Issue: Internationalized Food Politics and French Public Health 1870s to the Present” Medical History, Volume 48 (1): Jan 1, 2004. 45

Zylberman, Patrick. “Making Food Safety an Issue: Internationalized Food Politics and French Public Health from the 1870s to the Present.” Medical History. 48 (1): Jan 1, 2004, p. 1.

15

1.4 Outline of chapters

One of these key groups discussed in the next chapter, is that of the Codex Europaeus.

The predecessor of the International Codex was the European Codex Alimentarius, which in turn

was a product of an original Austrian Codex Austriacus originating in the late 19th Century. In

Chapter 1, I will map out the origins of the International Codex and its ‘pre-history’ before it was

brought into existence by the WHO and FAO in the early 1960s. This period was marked by

tense discussions over whether or not the Europeans should join the new Codex and what would

be the nature of this union. The balance between health and trade aspects of the food standards

were topics of much debate and also invoked by the European regional group as reasons for

abandoning an international approach in favour of a more local or regional one. They posed the

question of whether a truly international standard could be attained, and adopted many strategies

to challenge the international approach for fear that local and regional interests would be

overlooked.

Particularly vociferous were the Austrian Dr. Hans Frenzel, the Swiss Professor Otto Högl, along

with French delegates, all fearing that standards set for commodities from other nations would

not be on par with European health requirements. They also argued that public health would not

be safeguarded and that there was not enough WHO (and hence medical) involvement in the new

joint Codex. As will be shown in Chapter 1, the response by the international group and the

FAO/WHO never really resolved the concerns, and the tension between regional and

international interests was left ambiguous as the new Codex began to take shape. In spite of these

concerns over European separatism within the Codex, by 1962 the international ‘gentleman’s

club’ had emerged: the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program became anointed as the new

international Codex. Nowhere else did ‘health’ receive as much attention in the Codex standards

as with the emerging problems of microbes and chemicals in foods. At the start of the

international Codex, the WHO voiced its concern over the “use of chemicals, either as direct

food additives or as aids to agricultural production.”46 Once the Codex was underway, this

concern that health comes first before trade was echoed repeatedly, as the WHO Director-

46

Dorolle, Pierre. 1964. “Opening Speech of the Assistant Director-General [of the WHO] at the Second Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, Geneva” Archives of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. CX2/20. Box 12 C x 6. p. 3

16

General Marcolino Gomes Candau reminded FAO Director-General Binay Ranjan Sen, that

“food standards, should, in the first place, aim at protecting the health of the consumer.”47

However, by the mid-1960s, not even five years into the new Codex program, a budgetary crisis

between the two organizations was severely limiting the WHO involvement. In the same letter

emphasizing that health of the consumer should take precedence over facilitating trade, Candau

also told Sen that, “whilst I recognize the importance of this activity and our mutual concern that

the program be satisfactorily continued, I do not see my way clear to justify to my governing

bodies the large increase which you have recommended.”48 This was further justified by the

comment that “I trust you [Sen] will agree that the majority of the Codex Committees are of

predominant interest to FAO.” 49

The Codex was funded mainly by a Trust Fund No. 40 made up of contributions from its own

member states; there was some contribution from the two organizations’ regular annual budgets,

but by and large, the FAO contributed more money than the WHO.

Nevertheless, Joint committees between the WHO and FAO were struck in each of the areas of

concern (hygiene, additives and pesticides) and scientific experts were called upon to assist in

developing standards around these emerging health issues. In some cases there were overlapping

committees – technical “expert” committees of the WHO and also specific Codex committees of

the FAO dealing with broader concerns, but both contained experts in each (sometimes, but not

always, the same people). It is within these key safety areas that scientific and health issues

came into conflict or had to be taken into account alongside the “social” orders – be they

economic, cultural, administrative or tied up with institutional values, norms, identities.

47

M.G. Candau, Director General of the WHO, Letter to B.R. Sen, Director General of FAO. 5 August 1966. BU 2/1 Budget. Box 12 C x 1. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 48

M.G. Candau, Director General of the WHO, Letter to B.R. Sen, Director General of FAO. 5 August 1966. BU 2/1 Budget. Box 12 C x 1. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 49

M.G. Candau, Director General of the WHO, Letter to B.R. Sen, Director General of FAO. 5 August 1966. BU 2/1 Budget. Box 12 C x 1. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

17

Chapter 2 introduces the first of these key areas, when in 1955 a conference on Food Additives

was convened in Geneva to address chemicals in food, one of four expert committees established

in the mid-1950s.50 This group, the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA), was

one of the four joint expert committees that predated the Codex and paved the way for closer

collaboration between the WHO and FAO on food safety. In this chapter I examine their

reliance upon expertise, particularly upon medical, toxicological and chemical expertise, and

how this was co-produced and considered alongside other factors as the standards took shape, for

example with the development of Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs). The Codex Committee on

Food Additives (CCFA) inherited some of this work and carried on with establishing standards

for additives well into the 1960s. The Committee met in The Hague, chaired by Dr. Dols of the

Netherlands, but also attended by delegates from the EEC, ISO and the International Vine and

Wine Office, as well as participants from industry.51

The initial focus of this group was to generate “positive lists” of additives for those chemicals

which were permitted to be added to foods, and to establish tolerances for individual food

additives in specific food items, and determine methods for estimating Acceptable Daily Intakes

(ADIs). ADIs represent an intriguing example of how standards – in this case standardized

methods of calculation and estimating – can produce not only scientific knowledge but also

shape and reflect social orders at the same time. The value of an ADI was measured in units of

mg/kg/day, and the committee interestingly began discussing the setting up of “conditional” and

“unconditional” zones of acceptability, mapped onto developing versus developed countries, the

former needing more guidance and infrastructure, and the latter being more advanced in their

food policies and in addressing health hazards to the consumer. Again, in looking at the example

of food additives, it becomes apparent how the natural knowledge generated by scientific experts

– captured in the form of standard tolerance levels or ADIs – are intertwined with industrial

interests, as will be demonstrated by discussing the presence of companies like Unilever or the

Codex Committee on Food Additives’ (CCFA) close relationship with the British Industrial

50

Dorolle, Pierre. 1964. Opening Speech of the Assistant Director-General [of the WHO] at the Second Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission. Geneva. CX2/20. Box 12 C x 6. p. 3 51

FAO/WHO. 1964. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Alimentarius Commission: Progress Report of the Expert Committee on Food Additives. The Hague, 19-22 May 1964. ALINORM 64/4.

18

Biological Research Association (BIBRA). Moreover, the mingling of the ‘natural’ and ‘social’

orders also occurred in the work of the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives in

their attempts to connect scientific evidence in the form of ADIs with the geopolitical categories

of the “zones of acceptability.”

The reliance upon scientific expertise became a contentious issue within the Codex hygiene

committee, as discussed in Chapter 3. The Codex Food Hygiene Committee was chaired by Bob

Shelton of the United States’ Food and Drug Administration (USFDA) and this group consisted

of experts drawn from the fields of bacteriology and medicine; many were also representatives

from member states’ ministries of hygiene, health or agriculture. This group initially

approached food hygiene standards from a more qualitative perspective, and advocated

guidelines that attempted to standardize behaviour. (In itself this represented a co-production of

scientific expertise and social practices.) By the mid-1960s, however, with the advent of new

statistical and sampling techniques for microogranisms like salmonella, they increasingly – at

first reluctantly – had to incorporate the expertise of biometricians into their work. The WHO

increasingly relied on the International Commission for the Microbiological Specifications for

Foods (ICMSF) and the input of biometricians, highlighting their role in changing the shape of

food safety. The biometrical approach to food safety meant an increased application of

statistical methods to food microbiology in order for a standard to be deemed ‘scientifically

correct’ with more emphasis on the final product rather than on the food handling behaviour of

all those along the food and agricultural production chain.

The Codex Food Hygiene Committee also had to contend with standardizing and harmonizing

salmonella testing methods, and the pragmatic question of choosing one standard method among

several laboratories involved in the testing, each with different interests, cultural and institutional

values (for example, the International Commission for the Microbial Specifications for Food and

also the International Standards Organisation were involved in this question). Moreover, the

ICSMSF, created around the same time as the Codex, explicitly aimed to develop standards free

from national interests.52 Thus, in examining the increasing reliance upon the authority of

52

The ICMSF relies upon its members for their “technical expertise, not as national delegates” http://www.icmsf.iit.edu/about/our_approach.html [accessed March 20 2009]

19

another discipline and group of experts for microbiological food issues, an apparent shift in

approach to food hygiene standards, this chapter describes how scientific expertise cannot be

divorced from the social context in which it is produced. In this case, competing microbiological

expertise (the holistic approach of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene or the statistical

approach of the ICMSF endorsed by the WHO) was produced in connection with the varying

laboratories, institutions, cultures, attitudes and aims of its parent communities and networks.

The final key area of food hazards addressed by Codex standards is that of pesticide residues.

The establishment of ADIs for pesticide residues was also a pressing topic in the 1960s, as the

finding of these chemicals in grain and cereal products focused Codex attention not only on these

commodities but also on the pesticides themselves. Chaired by the Netherlands and attended by

delegates from member states, this group was also attended by “advisers” from ISO the EEC,

companies such as Shell, and the International Federation of National Associations of Pesticide

Manufacturers (GIFAP).53 In chapter 4, I describe how health conflicted with the aims of trade

as international tolerances for pesticides were debated in The Hague. Similar to Chapter 2

above on additives, there was a heavy industrialist presence around the table as toxicological and

medical expertise was co-produced with trading interests, and these interests most notably

involved industries producing or using chemicals in agriculture or food manufacturing.

Also of concern was the debate over intentional versus unintentional residues, and the WHO

reliance on toxicological data, as well as questions over whether to focus on the pesticide or on

the commodity? This also opened up debate over whether the pesticide residue levels should be

measured and allowed at the point of import versus those levels at the point of consumption, as

grain is further processed (and presumably less toxic post-processing) after it has entered a

country. The overarching concern, as voiced within this Codex subcommittee, was that through

defining ‘tolerance’, and depending upon the context, there might be variable consequences for

recipients of these standards (member states, industry, consumers) and possibly used as an

obstacle to trade whilst trying to determine the health effects.

53

FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967.

20

1.5 Sources and methodology

To develop this narrative, I visited three institutions: the FAO archives in Rome, the WHO

library in Geneva and the EU collection at the University of Pittsburgh’s Hillman Library. The

primary sources used in the thesis are a mix of private and institutional correspondence, official

meeting reports, news articles, directives and memos. By analyzing the discussion of scientific

expertise and “other factors”, this mixture of documents allowed me to begin to address the

question of how a process of co-production might unfold within the Codex. The diversity of

sources allowed, on the one hand, an attempt to get at the voices of the actors through private

correspondence, and learn about some of their personal interests or disagreements over the nature

of the standards and the form the standards should take. On the other hand, the official meeting

reports would show how the standards were ‘officially’ represented to the world (or at least to

the international community of member states who were involved with the Codex) or to the

general public in the occasional press clipping on the Codex or the EU directives. This tension

between the standards as they were elaborated and represented officially or publicly, and the

standards as they were discussed behind closed doors is most apparent in the chapters on the

Codex Europaeus and the food hygiene committee, mainly due to the greater use of personal

correspondence (and the reasons for this greater use of personal correspondence in these chapters

is described in more detail below).

1.6 FAO Archives

The bulk of the material on the Codex is housed at the FAO Headquarters in Rome. They have a

searchable online catalogue for their library (the David Lubin Library) on general food topics,

but more private corporate documents and items such as personal correspondence is kept in their

records department. The online catalogue is searchable only for official meeting reports by date

or keyword (but with more emphasis on recent meetings) and monographs related to relevant

subject material.

21

When I contacted the head librarian to seek permission to visit, and upon arrival in Rome, they

were surprised that I had interest in their “Records” department or in the Codex for that matter. It

was rare for an historical researcher to visit, and few have looked at the FAO retrospectively

other than internal staff members with a curiosity in telling institutional history. At that point

(2007) there had been only two or three other historians/researchers who had visited the FAO to

look at the correspondence and report files: 1) Amy Staples, the author of The Birth of

Development as discussed above; and 2) Matthew Bunch, a Canadian PhD student who wrote a

thesis on the FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign. The private correspondence is patchy, with

some missing documents, and is only vaguely grouped into committee files. The only finding aid

is a listing of the title of the file, for example “The Codex Committee on Food Hygiene”, or

“Executive Files”.

Since 2007, however, there has been as an increasing trend toward the digitization of official

annual Codex Alimentarius Commission reports from the early 1960s, most of which are also

now available online. I made use of these online official meeting reports, especially for the

chapters on food additives and pesticide residues.

When I first set out to do this project, I initially intended to focus strictly on microbial hygiene

standards, and that is why the chapter on hygiene contains more private correspondence than the

additives and pesticides chapters. Thus, not knowing what I might find at the archives, I chose to

zero in on the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene files and came away with a lot of info in that

area. I also paid attention to the Executive Committee files and the recurring problems with the

Codex europaeus, and another file labelled “Special Programs” as part of the “Joint Food Safety

Program” files (which was the proto-name of the program before it was officially known as the

Codex alimentarius.) Finally, I gathered some material from the “Budget files” though I was told

afterwards that I could not make this public.

My initial focus was mainly on hygiene standards; however, it was only after returning to

Toronto, sifting through the material and discussing it with Harriet Friedmann that it became

clear I needed to broaden my focus to not only hygiene standards, but also food additives and

pesticides. These areas were the other key food safety problems and health concerns of the

postwar period, and a discussion of additives and pesticides would also explain and trace some of

the conditions and reasons for the emergence of the Codex.

22

1.7 WHO Archives

I was at the WHO briefly as an intern for another project in the library, but during this period I

familiarized myself with its food safety sources and gleaned some material on meat and milk

hygiene standards. The milk and meat hygiene work was a precursor to the broader joint food

safety program of the two organizations, which eventually gave rise to the Codex. The bulk of

the Codex material, however, is kept at the FAO. One key and important feature of the WHO

collection is their Technical Report Series for Expert committees such as the Joint Expert

Committee on Food Additives and the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues. Conceptually, these

Joint Expert committees were subsumed under the vague umbrella of the “Joint Food Safety

Program” but little documentation on these committees were found under the Joint Food Safety

Program files in the FAO archives; the technical reports were kept at the WHO. The reports of

both of these committees are all available online and are featured in the chapters on Food

Additives (Chapter 2) and Pesticides (Chapter 4), along with reports from the Codex Committee

on Food Additives and the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, as well as material from the

EU collection at the Hillman Library.

1.8 EU Collection at the Hillman Library in Pittsburgh

In 2008, it was announced at the American Association for the History of Medicine meeting in

Rochester that the EU had come to Pittsburgh: that is, a collection of all documents from

Brussels documenting the EU activities, its directives and correspondence, was moved from

Washington D.C. and obtained by the Hillman Library at the University of Pittsburgh. Seeing

how the regional-international theme was percolating out of the evidence I had obtained from the

FAO archives, I set out to Pittsburgh to obtain a sense of the broader context on the European

front with regard to food safety, and to see how things were developing in the 1960s in this arena

and whether there were references to the Codex or other European-International issues. I located

material under the categories of: Food Safety, FAO and Codex alimentarius and especially

focused on Food Additives and Pesticide Residues in order to cross reference what was going on

23

in the European context on the one hand, and on the other, to enhance some of the gaps in the

correspondence material for these areas. Given that it was unchartered territory, the collection at

the Hillman Library was understandably somewhat disorganized; there was no database or

repository of information or no online searchable catalogue for this collection. I was one of the

first people to visit it in November of 2008. What I did was to try to find anything related to

“food safety” directives. The collection had two key features: it contained recent items, and it

was not sorted or organized. It covered mainly post-EEC developments, but the emphasis was

on material from the late sixties and seventies; it was rare to find anything from the early sixties.

I found some official reports, correspondence in the form of official letters between bodies or

sent to the EU commission, news clippings, media communications materials and press releases.

Consequently, in some parts of the narrative that follows there is a need for more private

correspondence. This is true especially in the additive and pesticide residue chapters, as it might

unearth more of the tensions going on below the surface when the actors were attempting to

carve out the standards whilst relying upon concepts such as tolerance or ADIs. I suspect that

there exists such correspondence at the FAO on food additives and pesticide residues which

would enhance the “co-production” framework and possibly get a bit closer to the “co-

production in action” element.

1.9 Committees

Tracing the Codex and all of its Committees and members who were involved in the

development of standards can be confusing, to say the least. I have organized the narrative

around the activities and work in the areas of hygiene, additives and pesticide residues; however,

these were often not only strictly Codex committees, but also joint WHO/FAO expert

committees on the same subject, the latter being more ad hoc, smaller and relying upon a

changing roster of people depending on the specific topic to be discussed. Also unlike the Codex

Committees, the joint expert committees were not chaired by governments of member states, but

instead enlisted scientific experts for that particular subject and meeting, and would produce a

‘technical report’. Below is a description of each of the main committees, comments on who are

the main people on these committees (e.g. some of the key figures mentioned in the chapters that

24

follow) and in which archives or sources they appear. By approaching all of these committees

(and the documents they produced) together, a complex picture of the Codex emerges. It is not a

simple organization or structure, and, by untangling these committees and all of the outside

groups who were involved in and interested in the standards, it becomes clear how many

interests were at play or shaping the Codex throughout its early history. The sources emanating

from different committees and groups internationally also show and confirm how important food

safety standards were to a variety of stakeholders during this time period, many of whom had

vested interests.

1.10 Secretariat

The Secretariat for the Codex was based out of the FAO in Rome, and consisted of a small staff

division. One of the main characters is Frank Townshend, a liaison officer. He figures

prominently in Chapter 1 as the discussion with the Codex Europaeus takes centre stage in the

narrative, and briefly in Chapter 2 in the discussion of food additives. Most references to

Townshend appear in private correspondence taken from the FAO archives. Similarly, all

references to the leadership of the FAO and the WHO (Assistant Directors General like

Orbaneja, Directors General like the FAO´s Binay R Sen or the WHO´s Candau), or other staff

(such as food scientists like Claus Agthe of the WHO) all come from the FAO Archives on the

Codex alimentarius, again mainly from private correspondence.

1.11 Codex Europaeus

The Codex Europaeus was also sometimes called the “European Council of the Codex

alimentarius”. Later on, under the aegis of the international Codex, it would become the

Regional Coordinating Committee for Europe. The key figure in the Codex europaeus is Otto

Högl, Professor of Food Chemistry at the University of Berne, Switzerland, who succeeded Hans

Frenzel of Vienna as President of the Codex Europaeus in 1962. The bulk of the material on the

Codex europaeus is taken from the FAO Archives under the “Executive Committee” files.

25

1.12 Additives

There are two key groups examined for the area of food additives. The Codex Committee on

Food Additives (CCFA) was chaired by the Government of the Netherlands and met annually.

This group often featured a very large membership (over 80 members), and included

representatives from industry like the General Foods Corporation or the Office International du

Vin. It was chaired by Professor Dols who was a Cabinet Adviser in the Netherlands´ Ministry of

Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. It also included participants from member states (usually from

Ministries of Agriculture) as well as observers from countries who were not yet members of

either the FAO or WHO. The material for this committee was taken from official meeting

reports, available online on the Codex website: www.codexalimentarius.net), and also in the

FAO Archives.

The other key group working on food additives, and which provided scientific “expertise” to

complement the work of the Codex Committee on Food Additives, was the Joint Expert

Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) which was summoned by the WHO to meet (most often

in Geneva) to discuss a special topic or issue related to food additives, for example, carcinogenic

substances. The membership of this group was much smaller and focused (approximately 10

people), and a spot around the table was granted by invitation only. It was often also Chaired by

Dr. Maurice Dols. Other members included Dr. René Truhaut, a Professor of Toxicology at

l´université de Paris and Dr. Hermann Druckrey, a Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology at

the University of Freiburg. The material for this Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives was

available as part of the WHO Technical Report Series found in the library in Geneva, but also

now digitized and available on the WHO website at: www.who.int/foodsafety/chem/jecfa. As

mentioned above (p. 33), the European Scientific Committee for Food and various news

clippings and directives from the EU archives at the Hillman library were used to enhance this

section.

1.13 Hygiene

The Codex Committee on Food Hygiene is the key group examined in Chapter 3. It was chaired

by the Government of the United States and Dr. Bob Shelton, a scientist from the Food and Drug

26

Administration. The majority of this material was taken from the FAO archives – the private

correspondence from the “Codex Committee on Food Hygiene” file. It was in this file that I also

found correspondence from the International Commission for the Microbial Specifications for

Food (ICMSF), and learned of a rival WHO/FAO Joint Expert Committee on Food Hygiene,

which seemed to be similar in function as the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives

discussed above. Very little is known or was found about the membership or reports of this Joint

Expert Committee on Food Hygiene, so I chose to focus more on the Codex Committee on Food

Hygiene and its relations with the ICMSF. The ICMSF co-chairs, Drs. Fred Thatcher and David

Clarke also produced monographs on microbial sampling techniques which were available

through the University of Toronto Gerstein Library.54 I was also able to find a monograph by

another ICMSF member, Dr. Betty Hobbs, at the U of T Library which provided further

information about the work the ICMSF was doing at the same time as the Codex.55

1.14 Pesticide Residues

As in both Hygiene and Food Additives, there were two overlapping groups within the

WHO and FAO, both working on pesticide residues, a large general conference and a smaller

group of invited experts. One was the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) chaired

by Dr. A. Kruysse, the Inspector General of Public Health in the Netherlands. It was established

in the mid-1960s (about 1966) and its meeting was attended by delegates from member states,

“advisers” from the International Organization for Standardization, the European Economic

Community, companies such as Shell, and the International Federation of National Associations

of Pesticide Manufacturers (GIFAP). Like with the Codex Committee on Food Additives, its

membership was very large (at least 80 or more members) and met once per year. The material

54

Thatcher F. and D. Clark (eds.) Microorganisms in Foods: their significance and methods of enumeration, 2nd Edition, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978.

55 Hobbs, Betty C. Food Poisoning and Food Hygiene, London: Central Public Health Laboratory,1953.

27

for this Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues was gleaned from official meeting reports from

the 1960s, which are available on the Codex website.

The second, smaller group was known as the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues. This group

was much smaller (about 10 experts) and met in Geneva. The characters on this committee only

play a very minor role in the chapter on pesticides, and, since I have no private correspondence

for this committee, I instead relied once again upon the Technical Report Series produced by the

WHO (available on its website and in the library in Geneva.) Moreover, for reasons outlined in

the Sources and Methodology section, the European Scientific Committee for Food and various

news clippings and directives from the EU archives at the Hillman library were used to enhance

this section.

1.15 Science in the Codex

I chose these committees chiefly because they are the main health and safety related areas, with

scientific information and expert knowledge underpinning the work. Admittedly, although the

thesis is intended to address the process of co-production of “science” with other “social”

factors, it discusses in more detail the “other” factors rather than unpack the “scientific” elements

of the standards themselves. Part of the reason for choosing to focus more on the other “social”

elements is that in my thesis I am trying to challenge the traditional narrative that takes for

granted that pre-1990s Codex was just about science as is often assumed. This has been

discussed in more detail by authors who have looked at the nature of science within the Codex

post-1995. For example, David Jukes has shown how science was constructed along with “other

limiting factors” such as consumer preferences, economic and cultural considerations.56 More

recently, David Winickoff and Douglas Bushey have written about the co-production of

scientific expertise with legal authority in the Codex, and once again in the post-1995 era.5755

These authors tend to focus more on describing the construction or the consideration of the other

56

Jukes, David. The Role of Science in International Food Standards. Food Control 11 (2000): 181-194. 57 Winickoff, David E. and Douglas M. Bushey, "Science and power in global food regulation: the rise of the Codex Alimentarius."Journal of the Society for Social Studies of Science, vol. 35, no. 3 (May 2010), starting on p. 356.

28

factors being co-produced rather than by unpacking “science” as an isolated entity in itself. In a

similar vein, my goal with this thesis is to show that in fact the Codex and its “scientific

standards” are just as much about politics before 1995 (as it was after 1995), and the status it has

been afforded by the WTO as the key source for scientific principles is not entirely justified.

Nonetheless, the word “science” should appear in quotation marks throughout the thesis to

suggest its contingent nature, and to leave it as something which should be examined more

closely in a future research.

It is rather naïve to suggest that the Codex ran effortlessly or seamlessly in its early years before

these standards had the endorsement of the WTO. Long before recent controversies over growth

hormones in milk and meat which plagued the Codex in the 1990s, there existed disagreements

in the process of constructing standards, as the tropes of health and trade – enshrined in the

Codex principles from the beginning – had to be considered together. As I will argue in the

chapters to follow, these tensions are a further hallmark of how the natural and social orders are

produced together, and when examining the history of such international organizations, scientific

evidence and knowledge cannot be divorced or considered separate from the political, economic,

cultural and social structures and practices in which this knowledge is crafted. International food

standards from the beginning were very much negotiated and constructed: Their emergence is

the result of a very long process which unfolded within a climate of intense political, economic,

technical and scientific expertise, and which involved a multitude of actors with diverse and

disparate interests. The historical evidence paints an intricate picture, and an examination of the

Codex elements and actors, all that is health and trade, all that is science and social, will shed

new insight into how this international food code came into being. The story begins in Europe.

29

Figure 1.1 Structure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 1965. The Food and Agriculture

Organization Archives, Rome.

30

Figure 1.2. Meeting of the Second Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Palais des

nations, Geneva, October 1964. Source: The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives,

Rome.

31

Figure 1.3. The “Gentlemen’s Club”. Delegates to the Second Session of the Codex

Alimentarius Commission, Geneva, 1964. Source: The Food and Agriculture Organization,

Rome.

32

Chapter 2 The Codex Europaeus

“Why would we want a connection to this large and powerful organisation?”58

At the end of his reign in 1962, Dr. Hans Frenzel, the Austrian first president of the European

Council of the Codex, posed this question to the audience at his farewell meeting in Berne. But

the answer to this question proved to be less than straightforward, and the path to union with the

UN agencies was not a smooth one. In the early 1960s, the Codex Europaeus – the key

inspiration for the international Codex – began to work with the FAO and WHO in order to

construct an international food code. The result of this cooperation, however, was an uneasy

compromise and vague attempt to construct food safety standards that could meet both regional

and worldwide needs at the same time.

There were several implications of this delicate balance. It provoked objections from the

Europeans, and sparked discussions and debates which helped to shape the structure of the

International Codex. The resistance from the European group highlighted how multiple interests

are present within the standards. For the Europeans, these interests included: the question of

financial costs to member states; the assurance that European autonomy within an international

group would be maintained, and that consumer health would be safeguarded against the

perceived ‘lower’ health standards of developing nations. The desire that health aspects be given

more emphasis over trade or commercial interests was a key factor; however, notwithstanding

these concerns, the Europeans recognized the value of a connection at the international level for

both reasons of safety and the potential for increased commercial opportunities. This

ambiguous European attitude and reluctance to join the international Codex during its first few

years highlights how multiple aspects were at play in shaping not only the structure of the

international body, but also the standards themselves. Scientific, medical and technical interests,

along with questions of trade, tradition, power and autonomy were all influencing the

construction of early Codex food standards. An analysis of this relationship and the debates

58

Dr. Hans Frenzel: “Warum wollen wir einen Anschluss an eine grosse mächtige Organisation?” Frenzel, “Report of Berne meeting, 1962.” SP10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

33

between the regional Codex Europaeus and the emerging international Codex suggests how

diverse elements within food standards are co-produced alongside each other. In other words,

the food safety standards incorporate, represent and direct both the natural and social orders, as

they contained much diverse information on the food commodities in question and had broad

organizational and behavioural implications for the member states that adopted them. The

standards often took the form of lengthy documents which described not only how the final food

product should appear, but also the behaviour along the food production continuum, in many

cases from the point of production with the raw material, through the manufacturing and

processing steps. If a member state were to implement and adopt these recommended standards

– based on scientific and technical evidence – in many cases it would mean reorganizing the food

safety system within their own country in order to conform to the Codex Alimentarius. For

example, the earliest joint international work of the WHO and the FAO, as well as the Codex

Europaeus, was the development of standards for food additives – lists of permitted substances –

documents which took the form of lengthy “data sheets” based on chemical and toxicological

science and these would have implication for the ‘social orders’ – trade networks, the producers

of food additives, implications for health protection bureaus and also for consumers59

(Discussed in more detail in Chapter 2).

The intention was for the European group to become integrated into the new international

Codex, and serve as a coordinating regional committee for Europe. But there existed

considerable tension between the new Codex and its European predecessor, and the latter was

not easily subsumed without strife. Certain members of the European regional group expressed

concerns over the question of merging with the international Codex. Particularly vociferous

were the representatives from founding countries like France, Switzerland and Austria, who

feared that the standards of other developing countries would simply not be on par with

European requirements. Meanwhile, the FAO and WHO were distrustful of the European

group’s ability to cooperate in the administration of the Codex, and especially wary of the Swiss

Professor Otto Högl, the president of the European Codex at the time of the Anschluss, a term

which generally indicates a political union, but specifically recalls the union of Germany and

59

General Principles Governing the Use of Food Additives, World Health Organization Technical Report Series No. 129. First Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Geneva, 1957.

34

Austria in 1938. Examining the relationship between the two groups at this moment of transition

from the European Council to the International Codex illustrates how tensions arose over the

very nature of the food standards, whether they should be worldwide or regional in scope, how

much emphasis there should be on health and how much on trade or commercial standards. In

some ways the voices of characters like Högl represented the allegiance to more local

approaches, which emphasized the health aspects, versus the more international approach which

could more easily facilitate trade. Debates also surfaced over the costs to member states for

funding this initiative, and how much autonomy would be afforded to a regional European group

and the problem of whether a truly international standard could be attained, as adoption of one

might occur at the cost of marginalizing local and regional interests.

In this sense, the idiom of co-production serves as useful tool for analyzing the host of factors

that were at play when the European group linked up with the international Codex in the 1960s.

These factors are difficult to categorize as being strictly “scientific” or “social” in nature or only

related to the aspects of “health” or “trade”; the boundaries between these factors are blurred just

as a co-productionist approach allows. For example, the Europeans’ concern that the WHO was

not playing as great a role in the international Codex might have been motivated by their fear

that health would not be given enough consideration, as equally as it might have been motivated

by the fact that the WHO was based out of a country with more obvious political and national

connections to the European Codex and its (Swiss) president Professor Otto Högl. Switzerland

was involved in the European Codex from the beginning, and Italy was not; consequently, there

may have been a desire to keep the administration headquartered in one of these countries.

By emphasizing the European interests, this chapter describes how the FAO/WHO Codex

attempted to strike a balance by constructing international standards that would also allow for

regional differences, or a combined “hybrid” regional and worldwide approach. They ultimately

recognized the need to have two types of standards for a given commodity: a minimum

“platform standard” to ensure a minimum standard for safety protection of public health and thus

for wider worldwide use, and then “higher” or “stricter” (or trade standard) which could be more

35

geared toward regional use.60 Of particular interest to the international Codex was the adoption

of the Codex Europaeus’s existing ‘methods of analysis and sampling for worldwide use’; these

methods provided a way to standardize scientific and technical practices and behaviour for food

analysis and testing.

The International Codex was intended to meet the two UN agencies’ twin aims of protecting

human health and promoting trade interests of its member states. Once ratified, the food

standards were distributed to governments for adoption and implementation on a voluntary basis.

However, this shift of focus from regional to worldwide standards and attempt to manage a

relationship with the Europeans would haunt the new international leadership during its first few

years. The result was an inherent tension within Codex standards which threatened the overall

aim of stabilizing the food data sheets - the objects which were to be made uniform and then

distributed to nations and experts worldwide for use and implementation.

2.1. European Council of the Codex (or, the Codex Europaeus) (1958-1962):

The European Council of the Codex Alimentarius was established following a conference in

Paris in April 1958 and existed formally for only about five years. It had its roots in older

institutions. Part of the initiative for sponsoring this body came from the Commission

Internationale des Industries Agricoles (the International Commission for Agricultural Industries,

abridged CIIA in French). The other main precursor to the Codex Europaeus (also called the

‘European Council of the Codex alimentarius’) was an Austrian food code (originating with Dr.

Hans Frenzel) called the Codex Austriacus.61

60

Report of the Joint Meeting of the WHO/FAO Food Standards Program 1962, Geneva. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Archives, Rome. 61 Beyond Europe, another key region that contributed to the emergence of the Codex was Latin America. A chemistry congress in 1924 had proposed the drawing up of a Código Latino Americano de alimentos, launched under the Leadership of Dr. Carlos C. Grau of Argentina. A portion of the Latin American Code was included and absorbed into the international Codex (general provisions, definitions, additives lists) but the establishment of a coordinating committee for this region did not formally occur until 1976 (from: Joint Report of FAO/WHO Conference, 1962).

36

The Commission Internationale des Industries Agricoles was founded in 1934 and worked

closely with the Bureau Internationale Permanent de Chimie Analytique (BIPCA) which was

created in 1912 and re-constituted in 1923. 62 The CIIA was an international and inter-

governmental organisation created by 49 states and by 1949 it was recognised by the United

Nations Economic and Social Council not only as an intergovernmental organisation but also as

a vocational body.63 That same year, an agreement for co-operation and work relations was

established with the UN’s FAO from which it obtained status as a consultant. In the mid-1950s

the CIIA was involved with organizing a number of “large scale symposia” devoted to the study

of foreign substances in food such as the ones held in Amsterdam (1956) and Como (1957).64

Working closely with the CIIA was the other predecessor to the European Codex originating

from Austria, the Codex austriacus. The idea of an Austrian Codex had been around since

1891, but there was little support for it until the mid 20th Century when it fell under the energetic

guidance of Dr. Hans Frenzel, a minister in the Austrian government.65 The secretariat functions

were largely covered by the CIIA and the presidential office was maintained in Vienna, where

many of the meetings were hosted.

Frenzel said of his efforts: “Often I believed myself like an itinerant preacher who moves

through the lands of Germany, Poland, France, Holland, Switzerland, and in my native country

Austria. I was not lonesome on these ways, followers were found in all lands. But on all these

traveling journeys Dr. Richard Wildner accompanied me as a faithful Palladin. Thanks are to be

said to him for his loyalty to the idea.”66

62

Draft Document of WHO Exec Board Jan 62 Meeting Joint FAO WHO Programme on Food Standards (Codex Alimentarius) SP 10/1 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 63 Memorandum concernant le “Codex Alimentaire Européen” pour reunion Codex, Berne, Juin 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 64 Advertisement. Journal of American Oil Chemists. Volume 33. 1956, p. 26. 65 Memorandum concernant le “Codex Alimentaire Européen” pour reunion Codex, Berne, Juin 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 66 Dr. Richard Wildner worked for the “Oesterreichische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Volksgesundheit” Austrian study group for people's health (c.f. Joint FAO/WHO meeting report 1962. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Archives, Rome.)

37

The aim of these early founders of the Codex europaeus based out of Vienna was to raise the

quality of food by formulating specifications for its standardization, for methods of identity and

assay and for labeling and thus prevent the marketing of spoilt, harmful or adulterated goods. 67

It was only meant to be a provisional ad hoc organization with a very firm founding principle not

to create a new institution altogether, but work toward the ideals of the Codex europaeus within

the auspices of member governments.68 Although at the time of the inception of the European

Council of the Codex Alimentarius certain governments took the position that the functions

relating to the Codex Alimentarius could be absorbed into the activities of existing international

organizations, in particular FAO and WHO, and the statutes of the European Council were

drafted in such a manner as to permit the absorption (Anchluss) of the activities of the Council by

one or more general international organizations.69 This position, however, would later prove to

be a sticking point with the international Codex.

The European Council of the Codex had the participation of experts from 19 countries, mainly

food additive scientists, but many were also representative of government ministries as well. By

the early 1960s, these experts had met several times and dealt mainly with standards for

preservatives, dyes, additives, honey, cocoa products and chocolate, fruit and vegetable

preserves, jams and jellies, and as mentioned, the methods for sampling and analysis.70

Around the same time, there were many other players on the scene in Europe who were also in

the business of drafting standards related to food, agriculture and trade as Europe was beginning

to take a more unified shape. The six countries of the European Economic Community (EEC)

had formed with its centre of power in Brussels as had the Council of Europe, based out of

67

Letter from Dr. Hans Frenzel, President of the European Codex to Addeke Hendrik Boerma, Assistant Director-General of FAO, 6 April 1962 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 68 Memorandum concernant le “Codex Alimentaire Européen” pour reunion Codex, Berne, Juin 1962. SP10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 69 “Draft Document of WHO Exec Board Concerning a Meeting Joint FAO WHO Programme on Food Standards (Codex Alimentarius)” January 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 70 Maurice Cépède, President of the French Inter-Ministerial Committee of Agriculture and Food, Letter to J. Nehemiah, Director of Program Liaison Division, FAO, 1964: “International Harmonization of food standards ‘(World) Codex Alimentarius Commission and regional groups’”. SP 10/1. Policy. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

38

Strasbourg71. Each of these conglomerations had started developing standards, suggesting to one

member from France how “..this shows that this problem is common to all European countries

and stresses its importance.”72 Moreover, by 1958, the UN Economic Commission for Europe

(UN ECE) had developed its Protocol for the Standardization of Fruits and Vegetables and this

became subsumed by the international Codex, along with work already done by International

Organisation for Standardization (ISO) on methods of analysis and sampling, and the

International Dairy Federation (IDF) on milk. Part of the role of Codex was to coordinate,

harmonize and integrate existing standards, as well as develop new ones. ISO, created in 1947,

was focused mainly on industrial standards for activities ranging from agriculture to

construction, engineering and medical devices, and in some cases former members of ISO went

to work for the FAO given their expertise.73

The International Dairy Federation was another key group involved with the Joint FAO/WHO

Food Standards program early on (for example with the Milk Hygiene Principles Committee that

predated the Codex) and held the role of “an NGO enjoying specialized consultative status with

the FAO”.74 Based out of Brussels, within the framework of the new Codex the IDF would

technically have observer status, but its members were in fact able to join “ad hoc working

parties” as guest experts or specialists.75

Thus, with these other European-based international interest groups on board, by the early 1960s,

the idea of an international food standards body had gathered momentum and the European

Council of the Codex had requested affiliation with the WHO (not the FAO, but just the

71 Cépède, Letter to J. Nehemiah, 1964.

72 Cépède, Letter to J. Nehemiah, 1964.

73 For example, Dr. Winklemann of the FAO Dairy Division was an “experienced officer in the field of food standards generally because of his prior service with the International Oranisation for Standardization (ISO).” From Graham Kermode, Chief of Food Standards Branch FAO, Letter to Mr.Pierre Terver, Assistant Director General PBD, FAO. 18 November 1966. SP 10/1 Policy Confidential. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

74 G. Saint-Pol, Legal Counsel FAO, Letter to Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Subject: Joint FAO Study Groups with NGOs. 13 March 1963. SP 10/1 Policy. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

75 G. Saint-Pol, Legal Counsel FAO, Letter to Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Subject: Joint FAO Study Groups with NGOs. 13 March 1963. SP 10/1 Policy. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

39

WHO).76 The idea of making it a joint program originated in off-stage discussions at the London

Food Law Centenary meeting in September 1960, attended by Dr. Norman C. Wright (Deputy

Director General of the FAO) and Francis Townshend (Liaison Officer). According to those in

attendance, three forces were behind the idea: 1) the feeling clearly expressed at the meeting that

the then-present situation was “chaotic”; 2) the request for “affiliation” just made by the recent

European council of the Codex Alimentarius to WHO (and referred by WHO to the FAO); and

3) the very encouraging experiences of FAO in its milk products standards program.77

Meanwhile, in addition to the emergence of the Common Market in Europe, in the eyes of the

WHO and FAO, developing countries were seeking markets for raw and manufactured foods in

“industrialised” countries.78 Industrialised countries were likewise urgently searching for greater

outlets, in parallel with the growth of mass produced foods and tariff reduction.79

One of the ways of reducing tariffs, and a hallmark of food and agricultural trading systems

during this period, was for nations to provide subsidies to producers and also maintain import

controls. This post war “food regime” had implicit rules, which drew upon the United States as

its model. The United States had developed national farm programs that subsidized its farmers

and protected its domestic markets from imports, a method which at the same time generated

chronic surpluses.80

The need to get rid of these surpluses, coupled with the impetus by countries in the North to

assist those in the South, resulted in surpluses being sent to developing countries in the form of

food ‘aid’.81 Thus, this period saw an expansion in markets and trade and movement of foods

76 “Origin Codex Alimentarius program”. SP 10/1. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 77 “Origin Codex Alimentarius program.” SP 10/1. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 78 Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards (Codex Alimentarius Program) – Background. SP 10/1 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 79 Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards (Codex Alimentarius Program) – Background SP 10/1 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 80 Harriet Friedmann, has described and thoroughly analyzed these dynamics and implicit rules of the postwar “food regime”; see Friedmann, Harriet, “The Political Economy of Food: a Global Crisis”, New Left Review, I/197, Jan-Feb 1993, pp. 29-57. 81

Friedmann, Harriet, “The Political Economy of Food: a Global Crisis”, New Left Review, I/197, Jan-Feb 1993, pp. 29-57.

40

globally; they were not governed by explicit international agreements, even though the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had been established in 1947, it excluded agriculture at

the urging of the United States and Britain.82 The newly-formed European Economic

Community’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), was Europe’s answer to replicating the

United States model of subsiding domestic production.83 The international Codex was emerging

within this context and at the same time as this “food regime” was also developing its ‘rules’.

By the following month (October of 1960) the FAO Regional Conference for Europe requested

the Director-General (in collaboration with the Director General of WHO) to present proposals

for a joint food standards program to the XIth session of the FAO conference. From the FAO´s

perspective, the reason for including the WHO were twofold: to cover the health aspects of food

standards and to benefit by its larger membership.

The proposed program was adopted by the Conference following a “most full and encouraging

debate” in the Commission where twenty countries spoke, and only one (France) voted against it

for reasons of wider policy being against funding international programs.84 All major food-

exporting countries were in favour of it, and the members at the FAO Conference agreed that the

program should initially be financed by a separate Trust Fund, although a number of countries

would have preferred to have it on the general budget.85 And finally, they had hoped to avoid re-

discussion of policy issues, “especially that of the regional v. world-wide approach, but it is just

possible that France may try to raise the question afresh.”86 The first meeting of this Joint Food

Standards Conference would occur in Geneva in October of 1962.

With the plans for a new international Codex taking shape, the European codex was starting to

dismantle and dissolve, albeit slowly, and the future role of its members was uncertain. Two of

82 The GATT Uruguay round is the one which brought about the existence of the WTO, spanning from 1986-1994, and the WTO was established in 1995. 83 Robert Ackrill, The Common Agricultural Policy, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000. 84 Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards (Codex Alimentarius Program) – Background SP 10/1 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 85 Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards (Codex Alimentarius Program) – Background SP 10/1 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 86 Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards (Codex Alimentarius Program) – Background SP 10/1 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

41

the main differences would be that the International Codex differed from the European one in

that it dealt with raw materials as well as finished products and (obviously) that it would be a

worldwide commission with worldwide standards as its focus. As the European group was

absorbed by the international one, however, other differences in approach to standards emerged

during this transition period.

Thus it was in April of 1962 (just as the International Codex was forming) that Dr. Frenzel

decided to step down as President of the European group, and passed the leadership on to his

Swiss colleague, Professor Otto Högl. Addressing his Council in a farewell speech, and perhaps

foreshadowing the problems to come, he admitted in his “non-binding private opinion” that he

could never agree with the fact that one completes the present work and then starts completely

from the beginning under quite a new flag. He added, “we are ready with pleasure – this was said

repeatedly – to work in agreement with existing professional circles – but can you imagine that a

completely new, foreign circle can continue our efforts, without having acquired in the last four

years the spirit of our unselfish work?”87 And he further suggested that the issue of money

would not be in line with the same “unselfish spirit” of the European Codex that he tried to

promote. And finally, he pointed to “the question of the independence” of the European region:

“The present circle of experts continues the work already begun: but this question [of

independence]…remains unanswered.”88 It was a question his successor would have to address.

2.2. The International Codex and Högl’s reign at the Codex europaeus (1962-1965)

The year 1962 was not only the year in which Frenzel stepped down as President of the

European Council of the Codex, it was also the year in which the first Joint Food Standards

Conference was held in Geneva between the WHO and the FAO in order to lay the groundwork

for an international Codex. Members of the European group were in attendance, and the idea (as

87 Dr. Hans Frenzel, President of the Codex Europaeus (1958-1962). Report of Berne meeting, 1962. SP10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 88 Dr. Hans Frenzel, President of the Codex Europaeus (1958-1962). Report of Berne meeting, 1962. SP10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

42

least in the eyes of the UN agencies) was that the Europeans would be subsumed by the larger

organization and form a subcommittee – a regional “Advisory Group” for Europe – and

controlled under the jurisdiction of the principles as set out by the FAO and WHO. The new

Codex would absorb certain bits of work already completed by the Codex Europaeus, namely,

their definitions of foodstuffs, their descriptions of how to go about collection of samples for

analysis, as well as some of their preliminary standards for various commodities like jams and

jellies. The new president of the Codex Europaeus, Professor Otto Högl, a food additives

scientist, was in attendance at two key meetings of the new Joint FAO/WHO program: (1) the

conference in 1962, and (2) the first official session of the international Codex Alimentarius

Commission in 1963. 89

Being merely absorbed by the larger international body and acting as a “advisory group” did not

sit well with the European Codex. Nevertheless, the worldwide approach had great appeal;

especially the idea that a standard could be used as a “passport” for food products in international

trade, valid for entry into all countries”.90

This notion of a food “passport” was already somewhat developed in the European region with

the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Europe’s Geneva Protocol on the

Standardization of Fruits and Vegetables. The Protocol differentiated between Extra I and Extra

II fruits and vegetables according to quality characteristics such as appearance, size, absence of

spoilage (cracking, rotting) and guidance for packaging. Batches of produce were exported and

issued with a “Certificate of Inspection”. The Certificate required completion by the exporter

and signature by an inspector to allow for movement within Europe. This system had been

underway since 1958, around the same time that the Codex Europaeus emerged. This system of

standardization and guidelines for fruits and vegetables was possible on a regional level as the

Europe was already becoming unified with the Common Market and Common Agricultural

Policy (CAP).

89 Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer, Interagency Liaison Branch, FAO Letter to JVA Nehemiah, Director, Program Liaison Division FAO. Office memorandum: Report on Duty Travel 23 January – 2 February 1963, 14 February 1963. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 90 Maurice Cépède, Inter-Ministerial Committee for France of the FAO, Letter to J.V.A. Nehemiah, Director of Program Liaison Division at FAO. 1964 – International Harmonization of food standards p 1 “(World) Codex Alimentarius Commission and regional groups. SP 10/1. Policy. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

43

Developing countries, however, were starting to export to more markets overseas, and vice versa

and the question of how to develop and facilitate similar international trading and standards

systems were swirling about. But how would a regional approach to standards work within a

worldwide body? This discussion over the nature of these European standards and region within

an international context unearthed several potential problems. Within the European camp, the

voices of dissent came mainly from France, Switzerland (with Högl) and perhaps more

discreetly, from Austria, as Frenzel still played a role behind the scenes from Vienna, ensuring

that European interests were safeguarded within the new international regime.

Leading up to the joint FAO/WHO 1962 Conference there were several meetings and

discussions between representatives of the international food standards program, and the

dissolving European Codex, either in print or in person. Professor Högl was the new leader of the

European regional group; his other duties were as a Professor of Food Chemistry at the

University of Berne and the Chef du controle des Denrées alimentaires (Head of Foodstuffs

control) in the Service fédéral de l’Hygiène publique.91 Another key voice in these discussions

was Mr. Maurice Cépède, Le President du Comité Interministeriel de l’OAA in Paris

(Interministerial Committee for Food and Agriculture.)

Before the 1962 Conference – the one which would set the stage and define the working plan for

the new international codex – rumblings and rumours of discontent from the Europeans began to

get back to the FAO and WHO. In the eyes of the FAO and WHO, the problems at first seemed

a question of semantics, as Claus Agthe, a food additives scientist at the WHO, wrote to Francis

Townshend of the FAO:

“Our disagreement [with the Europeans] seems to be more on the question of terminology. All I

want to say is that I have the impression that the Council of the Codex Alimentarius Europaeus

in its present form – that is with all its national committees – would like to become the

“European Subcommittee” of the Joint FAO/WHO Commission….In any case I do not consider

that we need worry too much at this stage. I am sure that we shall have a clearer picture of the

situation after the Codex Conference, 1-6 October 1962, has taken place…This whole question is

91 Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Conference on Food Additives Geneva, World Health Organization Technical Report Series No. 107, 19-22 September 1955, Geneva July 1956.

44

so complex that I cannot help feeling how much more valuable than correspondence a personal

talk between us would be! Could you not come to Geneva for a few hour on one of your next

trips between now and the date of the Codex Conference?”92

In the lead up to this preparatory conference in 1962, more discussion over the new international

Codex, its relationship to the regional elements, and the nature of its standards continued.

Professor Högl was very active in ensuring that the European interests were expressed to and

heard by the FAO and the WHO. He would travel frequently to Rome to meet with FAO

officials and write appeals to the Director Generals of both organizations, Marcolino Gomes

Candau (WHO, 1953-1973) and Binay Ranjan Sen (FAO, 1956-1967).93,94

One month before the first joint meeting, Paul Lamartine Yates, the FAO Regional

Representative for Europe was accosted with a surprise visit by a Swiss team led by Högl

wanting to inform him of the European position on the Codex. His entourage included Dr.

Ernest Feisst, the former Swiss Minister of Agriculture, Pierre Bolle, of the Swiss Federal Health

Service, and P. Hohl, Secretary to the Swiss National FAO Committee. The Swiss wanted to

inform Yates of their position which they thought was possibly one also supported by “the

majority of European governments.”.95 Their main concerns were over the regional versus

world-wide approach, finance of the new program, the role of the Common Market and FAO

representation at the 1962 conference.

Paul Yates wrote to his colleague, the Assistant DG of the FAO, how the Europeans,

“assert that, on account of the different levels of development in different parts of the

world, inter-governmental agreements on food standards must first be worked out on a

regional level among governments which are more or less at the same stage of

92 Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist WHO, Letter to Francis Townshend, 30 August 1962. SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 93 Memorandum: Visit of Professor O. Högl to FAO Programme. May 31 1962. SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 94 B.R. Sen, Director-General of the FAO (1956-1967), Letter to Otto Högl, President of the Codex Europaeus, 13 September 1962, SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 95 Paul Lamartine Yates, Regional representative for Europe Letter to Oris V. Wells, Assistant Director General of FAO, 7 September 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

45

advancement. They say, for example, that a set of standards which would be extremely

high and ambitious for a group of Latin American countries would be much too lax for

Europe. They therefore suggest that the task of the World Commission should be to

secure uniformity in methodology and procedures while, under its general auspices,

regional committees or commissions should be entrusted with the work of developing

food standards appropriate to the member countries of the region.”96

Högl´s group recognized the importance of worldwide trade, but they expressed the desire to

continue work of much more “stringent standards” applicable to Europe on a great range of

commodities.97 In terms of finance, Högl and company also warned that the French in particular

were worried, at the “relatively large sum of money” which the FAO Secretariat suggested was

necessary for a World Commission on Food Standards. They also pointed out that the Codex

Europaeus had been run on a small central budget with most of its work farmed out to

participating governments each of which financed the work of the respective sub-commissions.

The Europeans hoped that similar practices would be carried over into the new Organization.

The European lobby seemed to be successful. After this meeting, Paul Yates, the FAO Regional

Representative for Europe, appeared to have been won over by the compelling arguments put

forth by Högl and his team. He wrote to Oris Wells, an Assistant Director General at the FAO

and flagged possible roadblocks and concerns, and thought the regional work should be

intensified. He was particularly concerned about the new European Economic Community

which for its purposes, would also have to develop a number of food standards. Yates urged his

colleague that the new international Codex must avoid having one set of standards developing in

Brussels and various other standards emanating from other parts of Europe. 98 As an example,

Yates suggested that with regard to fruits and vegetables, the EEC co-operate with the Geneva

Group and adopt the Geneva Standards:

96

Paul Lamartine Yates, Regional representative for Europe Letter to Oris V. Wells, Assistant Director General of FAO, 7 September 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 97

Paul Lamartine Yates, Regional representative for Europe Letter to Oris V. Wells, Assistant Director General of FAO, 7 September 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 98

Paul Lamartine Yates, Regional representative for Europe Letter to Mr. Oris V. Wells, Assistant Director General of FAO, 7 September 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

46

“If a European regional Codex committee were at work, then similar co-operation with

EEC could be arranged for other foodstuffs. There were difficulties in the past in Europe

and with the Geneva group, and had we been trying to operate over a much wider

geographic area agreement would have been impossible.” 99

In response to Yates’ letter and this news of the European lobby, one of the other Assistant

Director-Generals of the FAO, A.G. Orbaneja, could not hide his agitation at the Swiss President

of the European Codex because,

“Professor Högl has…given you only one side of a problem with many facets. You will

see had he carefully studied the many FAO and WHO papers on these points he might

have wasted less of your time. Unfortunately we have had the same experience with him

before.”100

Orbaneja reassured Yates that:

“All of us fully agree with you that the standard methods of world-wide programs will be

quite unsuited to international food standards work. For this reason right from the

beginning we made it clear that such an approach would be unworkable….They were

also discussed and submitted in draft to the Common Market Organization (the EEC), the

ISO and OECD, as well as to Professor Högl!...We feel…that it is the only method to do

justice to the problem and in particular in no way restricts but on the contrary encourages

work at the regional level whether in Europe or elsewhere.”101

Therefore, at least in one key area the FAO and the Swiss team led by Högl were in agreement:

the FAO/WHO had already agreed to the regional approach, and thought that a strictly

international approach would be ‘unworkable’. At the recent FAO conference this concept was

adopted after debate, 20 out of 21 countries agreed with the exception being France. Various

99 ISO’s Secretariat was based out of Geneva. 100 Antonio G. Orbaneja, Chief of the International Agency Liaison Branch FAO, Letter to Paul Yates, Regional Representative for Europe. 10 Sept 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 101 Antonio G. Orbaneja, Chief of the International Agency Liaison Branch FAO, Letter to Paul Yates, Regional Representative for Europe. 10 Sept 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

47

papers and proposals had been drafted, and the idea of a regional approach within an

international Codex was on the table and supported at the international level. The problem was

over to what extent the regional approach would take precedence within an international setting.

It was easy to agree in official reports or documents that ‘regionalization’ was an important and

necessary factor in ensuring the international Codex could function properly, but in pragmatic

terms, and in terms of the actual working power afforded to the European subgroup, the regional

and worldwide balance also seemed unworkable due to disagreements over what this meant.

And yet, the FAO maintained an optimistic outlook and the Assistant DG Orbaneja urged that

definitely all food standards work affecting Europe must be done “hand in glove with the

Brussels Organization”, that is the European Economic Community, the EEC. 102 Drafts of the

main papers were sent to the Common Market secretariat, and FAO representatives had been

sent to Brussels to discuss their implications. Orbaneja insisted that “The program must in no

way hamper the EEC. On the other hand each could help the other. Particularly if Common

Market membership widens, the centre of gravity of Western European standards work is bound

to shift to Brussels, the primary role of the new FAO and WHO program being to make the

essential link with overseas countries and with non-EEC European countries.” 103 Orbaneja

further agreed that a purely regional body under the new FAO/WHO program might cause the

same difficulties that also arose within the old Codex Europaeus without any of the advantages

now proposed by the new approach to non-European countries. It is unclear from archival

evidence alone what these “difficulties” were, and given that the European Codex only existed

for about 4 years, it is difficult to gauge the impact of its standards within Europe during this

time period.

Högl´s group had expressed concern about financial issues and about lack of European support,

but within three months of publication of the report, the first contributions began to come in to

the Special Trust Fund by which the program was to be financed:

102 Antonio G. Orbaneja, Chief of the International Agency Liaison Branch FAO, Letter to Paul Yates, Regional Representative for Europe. 10 Sept 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 103 Antonio G. Orbaneja, Chief of the International Agency Liaison Branch FAO, Letter to Paul Yates, Regional Representative for Europe. 10 Sept 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

48

“To date we have received some $36,000 for 1962 alone from Denmark, Netherlands,

United Kingdom, Poland and Switzerland. $1,000 has also been received from an

overseas country: New Zealand. Eight other countries are in contact with the FAO as to

their contributions and details from these are expected any day. In light of these facts

Professor Högl’s remarks to you that European governments might be unwilling to

contribute significant sums’ seems very quaint indeed.”104

The European Council of the Codex had used funds from various national sources (for example,

Minster Frenzel, the former president, until 1962 was auditor general of Austria.) Orbaneja

argued, “Professor Högl has informed us that he and his office are costing the Swiss government

something in the region of $30,000 a year. To do nothing should cost nothing. To do a lot

always costs quite a bit.”105

And so began the rough few years during Professor Högl’s reign between 1962 to 1965, when

the European resistance to joining Codex was always looming below the surface. At official

meetings of the international Codex, there would be heated debate followed by a tentative

agreement to collaborate, but at the European Codex meetings, the terms of union were brought

into question once more. These examples point to the complexity of constructing international

standards, how tenuous the arrangements were, how many different positions and reasons were

evoked by the Europeans for joining or not joining the group. Moreover, this relationship

between the old and the new Codex set the stage for how the food standards would be

constructed; how the technical and scientific information contained within the standards had to

combine with many other factors in order for the standards to work – that is to be accepted and

stabilized through the machinery and forum of the international Codex in a process of co-

production.

104 Antonio G. Orbaneja, Chief of the International Agency Liaison Branch FAO, Letter to Paul Yates, Regional Representative for Europe. 10 Sept 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 105 Antonio G. Orbaneja, Chief of the International Agency Liaison Branch FAO, Letter to Paul Yates, Regional Representative for Europe. 10 Sept 1962. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

49

The Joint conference in October 1962 was held in Geneva, where the groundwork was laid down

for the new international codex, and, most pertinent for the Europeans, the Draft Rules of

Procedure that outlined the powers of subsidiary committees were defined. One of these

subsidiary committees was the “Advisory Group for Europe” which would be the European

Codex clothed anew.

The European comments on the official meeting report raised some eyebrows at the WHO and

the FAO, prompting a private meeting with Högl; these comments gave added emphasis to

regionalisation and did not follow the October Conference’s recommendations on this important

point.106 As a result, in April of 1963 a WHO Representative and food additives scientist, Claus

Agthe, and FAO Staff Member Francis Townshend went to Vienna to discuss this problem with

the former Codex europaeus president, Dr. Hans Frenzel, and Frenzel reassured Agthe and

Townshend that everything would run smoothly as planned.107

The report from the 1962 meeting went before the 16th Session of the World Health Assembly in

early 1963, with recommendations that the Codex alimentarius be officially brought into being

under the auspices of the two UN Agencies. At this meeting in Geneva, the FAO representative

sung the praises of the new Codex: how it was an “excellent example of interagency co-

operation, stressed that it had no financial implications for WHO”. 108

Although no debate had been anticipated, an unforeseen “crisis” emerged as the Austrian, Dutch

and Swiss delegates “immediately expressed reservations, asking that the programme be

financed by the regular budget, and not by a trust fund; that it be financed by government

contributions alone; that more emphasis be given to the existing regional set-up and that the

initiative rest with the regions; finally, that the health aspects of the programme be given

priority.”109 All speakers nevertheless voiced agreement “in principle” to the Joint Programme

106 Francis H Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Letter to Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist WHO, 4 April 1963. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 107 Francis H Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Letter to Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist WHO, 4 April 1963. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 108 Mr. Crapon de Caprona, Report on 16th World Health Assembly 7-24 May 1963 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 109

Mr. Crapon de Caprona. Report on 16th World Health Assembly 7-24 May 1963 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

50

but still wanted to make changes. At this point, change was difficult. It was impossible for the

FAO representative in attendance (Crapon de Caprona) to take action in that forum of the WHO,

and to enter into a debate on the financial aspects of the programme “particularly as the

Netherlands were requesting an amendment to the Codex Statutes, already adopted by our [1962]

conference.” 110 As he wrote,

“My aim was to avoid above all a sharpening of the debate, and to bring the WHO

secretariat to intervene more actively. [The Chairman] Dr. Dorolle’s immediate reaction

was to propose an adjournment of the discussions to give time for WHO to consult with

its Legal Advisors and FAO. It was indeed the only thing to do as this crisis had not been

forseen….”111

Crapon de Caprona called a legal advisor at the FAO headquarters in Rome alerting him to the

official amendment to changes requested by the original three countries, Austria, Netherlands

and Switzerland, now jointed by Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, and

the U.K. They wanted to replace the operative paragraphs pending “results of further study on

the financial consequences of including a proportion agreed with FAO of the costs of the

programme in the Regular Budget of WHO” and requested the Director-General to report to the

Executive Board at its 35th Session the following January.112

The World Health Assembly thus adjourned this discussion and called in the Food Standards

Officer-in-Charge – Francis Townshend – from Rome to address these questions. This was not

the first time Townshend had to intervene; he had already intervened in the European regional

meetings at The Hague a few months earlier in order to bring about a deal with the group. 113

110

Mr. Crapon de Caprona. Report on 16th World Health Assembly 7-24 May 1963 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 111

Mr. Crapon de Caprona. Report on 16th World Health Assembly 7-24 May 1963 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 112

JVH Nehemiah Letter to Antonio Orbaneja, 17 March 1964. SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 113

Francis Townshend Letter to Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist at the WHO, October 11, 1963. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

51

At the Hague, Professor Högl had unilaterally called a meeting of the Expert Committees based

on Europe on Oct 2-3 of that year (1962), prior to the Joint Meeting and thus prior to the

Advisory Group’s official existence in the eyes of the international Commission. The FAO had

to exercise damage control for fear of a European camp forming within the international Codex,

and potentially alienating other member states who chaired expert committees (e.g. the U.S. was

appointed to chair the Food Hygiene subcommittee as discussed later in Chapter 3).114 But

Townshend reported that the Hague meeting went “smoothly”: Germany and UK for instance

had made “considerable progress”.115 The Netherlands had also made many plans, but their

realization was slowed by “the necessary agreement between the Ministries of Health and

Agriculture.”116 Austria’s uncertainties about their mandate for methods of analysis were cleared

up and the “importance of this work was made clear by all.”117

But even with these deals brokered with the European group at the Hague or in Geneva at the

World Health Assembly, it appeared as though the regional question would not go away. Even

though a “regional approach” was important to both parties – what did that mean? How would

regional standards operate? It appeared the question went beyond just semantics or terminology,

but had to do with many aspects belonging to both the natural and social order of things:

scientific, technical and medical elements were key, yes, but so were the economic and political

aspect at shaping how the work would unfold.

Professor Maurice Cépède, the representative from France reasoned: “The concept of region

should not be understood in its strictly geographical sense and can be applied to countries with

similar ecological, economic and social conditions having brought about closely related food

114

Francis Townshend Letter to John L. Harvey 10.9.1963 SP 10/3 Confidential Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 115

Germany was in charge of working on standards for meats and meat products; the UK was charged with looking at developing standards for fats and oils (not olive oil), sugars, and (with the Czech Republic) soft fizzy drinks. Letter from Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer of the FAO, to Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist of the WHO, October 11, 1963, SP 10/2 – WHO Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 116

The Netherlands was chairing committees on food additives (see Chapter 3) and Pesticide Residues (Chapter 5). Letter from Francis Townshend to Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist at the WHO October 11, 1963, SP 10/2 – WHO Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 117

Francis Townshend Letter to Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist at WHO, October 11, 1963, SP 10/2 – WHO Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

52

habits. These countries with similar standards of living and whose inspection services have

similar structures and comparable methods will naturally be led to enforce unified rules in

trade.”118 These sentiments were reflected in the 1962 conference discussion and report,

stressing the need for world-wide standards on the one hand, and on the other for those of

primary interest to a specific region or groups of countries. As the report outlined, international

food standards are “largely conditioned by similar food habits”. 119 As a result, international

trade in food is often localized within regions but may also cut across regional groups. In some

cases, therefore, a standard will be required for a given region but in other [cases] by groups of

countries belonging to more than one region or even for world-wide use. Health aspects, being

of the widest interest, will usually need to be handled on a worldwide basis.”120 (This was the

minimum platform standard and the FAO and WHO had prior success with this approach in their

standards and principles governing milk products in the mid-1950s.) At least in official

channels, the Codex groups (both old and new) appeared to be in agreement. Then what was the

problem?

Underpinning these arguments, however, was the idea that European standards were inherently at

a higher level. In a hypothetical example, the same French representative (Cépède) argued: “It is

quite conceivable that a given region, Europe for example, will try to define the acceptable purity

criteria – let us say for jams – and that another region, Africa for instance, will be working on the

same problem. If the European requirements are stricter than the African ones, what will this

situation lead to? … Foodstuffs complying with the strictest standards will circulate without

difficulty from the standpoints of consumer health protection and of the existence or fair

practices in food trade in the countries of the region which have adopted them. They should

meet no limitations dictated by considerations of consumer health protection of fair trade

practices when exported to countries of the other region, Africa in this case, which would have

adopted less strict standards: He who can do more can do less. Regarding foodstuffs complying

118 Maurice Cépède, Inter-Ministerial Committee for France of the FAO, Letter to J.V.A. Nehemiah, Director of Program Liaison Division at FAO, 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 119 Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Conference on Food Standards, Geneva 1-5 Oct 1962. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 120 Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Conference on Food Standards, Geneva 1-5 Oct 1962. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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with African standards, they could circulate in the African countries which will have adopted

these standards. They could be admitted into Europe – in our theoretical example – only

inasmuch as they comply with the European standards, going beyond the African ones.” 121

The built-in assumptions to this reasoning, of course, was 1) that the European standards were

better, and consequently, 2) the international standards developed by the new international body

should be based upon European ones.

Other arguments had little to do with health at all, but more to do with adulteration and fraud in

the classic sense, or with purely matters of taste, as the French representative suggested: “the

guarantee of honesty in commercial transactions must be insured against any fraud without

medical implications…the WHO for example is badly prepared to guarantee the quality and the

origin of a cognac, a whisky or even a high-class wine or foie gras.”122

But foie gras notwithstanding, the WHO was expected to deal with the health aspects. At the

World Health Assembly in March 1964, the “main issue” of funding was scheduled to come up

again, and the idea of transferring the food standards work from a special trust fund to the regular

budgets of FAO and WHO. Unlike at the FAO conference, or in the previous World Health

Assembly, when the “unforeseen crisis” had emerged, the financial statement was left in the

hands of the Assistant DG of WHO and no problems were expected to arise. As one FAO

representative suggested:

“It is hard to explain why some of the countries which strongly opposed the FAO budget

took a different attitude with regard to the budget of the WHO. One of the principal

reasons is, in my opinion, that all the delegates are doctors or doctor-diplomats. Their

attitude generally is very different from that of administrators and civil servants who

attend the FAO conference. Secondly, proposals relating to the health of human beings

seem to elicit greater sympathy with the delegations than matters concerning food. The

U.S. stressed the point that the proposals were concentrated on a few selected fields and

121 Maurice Cépède, Inter-Ministerial Committee for France of the FAO, Letter to J.V.A. Nehemiah, Director of Program Liaison Division at FAO. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 122 Memorandum concernant le “Codex Alimentaire Européen” pour reunion Codex, Berne, Juin 1962. SP10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. (Author’s translation).

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that most of the money was spent on field activities in order to strengthen the national

health services which was important for world health security.”123

The regional issue persisted, however. Högl began to call his own meetings of European-only

Codex representatives, and fearing that this might result in a ‘European’ camp forming against

the U.S. and non-European committees, the officer in charge of the FAO/WHO food standards

program, Francis Townshend, wrote to his colleague Dr. John Harvey at the US Food & Drug

Administration, the Chairman of the new international Codex Alimentarius Commission, for

advice on how to deal with Högl. Townshend wrote to Harvey:

“His approach is strictly, even narrowly European and his experience has been

exclusively in the laboratory and lecture hall, his work therefore needing careful and

tactful guidance if in fact his role is to be carried out in the sense the Commission had in

mind.”124

When considering whether to rein in Högl’s mini-Europe meetings, he admitted:

“in any case it would be extremely difficult to oppose it at this stage since this might

upset the Europe/Worldwide balance we hope the Commission achieved….we have

however a coordinator and we must in all fairness give him a chance to coordinate, even

if this work might be done more effectively in a different way.”125

The concern was that all but two of the Codex Expert Committees were ‘based on Europe’ and

therefore within the terms of reference for the coordinator for Europe (Högl), although of course

all of them should be on a world-wide basis. As Townshend wrote, “There seems therefore a

danger that such meetings become in effect little ‘Executive Committees’ of the Commission

123 JVA Nehemiah, Director of Program Liaison Division of the FAO, letter to Mr. P. Terver 16 March 1964. SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 124 Francis Townshend Letter to Dr. John L. Harvey, Codex Alimentarius Commission Chairman and member of the United States Food and Drug Administration, 10 September 1963, SP 10/3 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 125 Townshend, Letter to Harvey, 10 September 1963, SP 10/3 Confidential Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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without the careful balance of membership agreed upon.” 126 There was also the danger that an

illogical discrimination might result against these Expert Committees on Processed Fruit and

Vegetables (chaired by the U.S) and on Hygiene (also chaired by the U.S). 127 This discussion

underlines a broader trend at work globally during this period within the agricultural trading

system and “food regime”. That is, the concern about one set of the Codex standards being

‘based on Europe’ versus ‘based on the U.S’ possibly connects to the power struggle among

nations who were keen on “restructuring international trade and production in one state’s

favour.”128

In order to avoid this development, Townshend asked Prof. Högl “…that the meeting´s agenda

should be limited to coordinating the work of the European organizations, in particular the

Common Market, with that of the Commission, as well as to streamlining timetables.” 129

What they wanted Högl to do was to coordinate the Expert Committees based on Europe, namely

those set up by the Codex Commission, under the Governments of Austria, Germany,

Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K. The international Codex was expecting to start receiving

the first government comments on draft standards shortly before Christmas of 1962, and ideally,

they would send Högl copies so that he could have the earliest advance notice of any differing

comments among European countries. He would then be in a position to take any steps

necessary to contact those involved in order to harmonize differences.130

Townshend asked Harvey to intervene; to write to Högl and “Thank him for his energies but

explain that he is to coordinate European groups, the common market, Comecon. He should not

extend his activities to coordinating the entire work of all Expert Committees based on Europe (a

largely fortuitous factor), which might nullify the delicate solution agreed to by the

126 Townshend, Letter to Harvey, 10 September 1963, SP 10/3 Confidential Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 127 Townshend, Letter to Harvey, 10 September 1963, SP 10/3 Confidential Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 128 Harriet Friedmann, “The Political Economy of Food: a Global Crisis”, New Left Review, I/197, Jan-Feb 1993, pp. 29-57. 129 Francis Townshend, draft letter to Otto Högl, 22 November 1963 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 130 Townshend letter to Högl, 22 November 1963 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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Commission.” 131 These “based on Europe” ad hoc Expert Committees were continuing the

work first started by the Euopean Codex but now open to all members of the international Codex

Alimentarius Commission and the standards had to be worldwide – and not regional – in scope.

These sub-committees (for example, cocoa beans or honey) therefore did not fall under the

jurisdiction of the Coordinator for Europe, Högl, but because of their European roots, he

appeared to be trying to continue to exert an influence. Dr. Frenzel (who stayed on as a

committee leader) seemed to have been interpreting his mandate in the same way already with

his work on the Honey Expert Committee. As Townshend confided in Harvey: “The

coordinator´s position is at the moment a delicate one. I think we must support him even to the

extent of delegating some functions which we could do ourselves, in order to get over the

suspicion he has shown signs of in the past. He should be able to feel this support so that he may

give his best.”132

For the 1963 First official session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission in Rome, the

Europeans (and especially Högl) had prepared the background materials. The “Methods of

Sampling” document was prepared by Högl through the Austrian National Committee which led

the Codex Group on this subject; the “Jams and Jellies” background material was the territory of

the French, and thus was prepared by the French National Committee via Högl; the Cocoa and

Chocolate material was prepared by Högl; the Fresh Fruit and Vegetables by the UNECE (the

Protocol as discussed above), and finally, dietetic products information also prepared by Högl.133

Generally, the committees for standards which had been already developed by the European

Codex (like cocoa, honey, mineral waters) were chaired by members of European nations who

had expertise in that particular subject area. The main difference was that the committee was

now worldwide in scope and open to all members of the International Codex Alimentarius

Commission.

131 Townshend, Letter to Harvey, 10 September 1963, SP 10/3 Confidential Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 132 Francis Townshend, Letter to Dr. John L. Harvey, Chairman of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and Staff at United States Food and Drug Administration. 10 September 1963, SP 10/3 Confidential Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 133 Background Papers for Codex Alimentarius Commission of June 1963, attached to a letter from Francis H.Townshend to Dr. G.D. Kapsiotis (from the Food Technology/Nutrition Department of the FAO) 28 February 1963. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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The official report of this meeting boasted how it “…was particularly gratifying to the Directors-

General that the Commission at its first session placed much emphasis on the need to elaborate

international food standards on the widest possible basis and that in most cases a world wide

standard was envisaged. This does not however, preclude work especially in connexion with

health aspects where appropriate, on a regional basis.” 134 Nevertheless, at this session, the same

problems arose; the French delegation again presented their concerns around three key issues: 1)

the “Codex Alimentarius” standards vs. trade standards; 2) world standards and regional

standards; and finally, 3) the cost of the program.

The French suggested that there existed “confusion between “Codex Alimentarius” standards

and “Commercial Exchange trade standards” and preferred that the Codex focus much less on

raw materials. 135 Here, they were specifically referring to the International Codex plans to

incorporate the EEC protocol concerning commercial standards of quality for fruits and

vegetables, and also standards governing the grading of cocoa beans according to quality. The

main concern was that “…as trade standards almost exclusively deal with raw materials or

materials produced within the country, it is legitimate to inquire whether the time has not come

to limit the harmonizing of food standards to food products ready for consumption.” 136 The

concern with cocoa, for example, could stem from the fact that Europe needed to import raw

materials (beans) from Africa (especially West Africa and countries like Ghana which was one

of the biggest cocoa producers in the 1960s) for manufacturing in Spain, Switzerland, Italy,

France, Belgium, England and Holland.137 In this specific case of cocoa, it would benefit Europe

to have lesser standards for raw materials, but higher standards of quality for the finished product

(e.g. like chocolate bars or drinking cocoa powder).

134 “Opening Speech of the Assistant Director-General [of the WHO, Dr. P. Dorolle]” at the Second Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, 1964. SP 10/1. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 135 Memorandum on the “Codex Alimentarius” presented by the French delegation to the 12th FAO Conference, November 1963. SP 10/1 Policy Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 136 Memorandum on the “Codex Alimentarius” presented by the French delegation to the 12th FAO Conference, November 1963. SP 10/1 Policy Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 137 Niels Fold, “Restructuring of the European chocolate industry and its impact on cocoa production in West Africa,” Journal of Economic Geography, 1 (2001) pp 405-420.

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Another concern put forth by the French Government was once again the question of World

Standards and Regional Standards:

“The drawing up of world standards should take advantage of the development work carried out

in the regions, confining itself to seeking provisions common to the various regional standards,

to bringing them closer together, and to eliminating differences which may appear among them,

although without infringing the highest standards. Hence, regional standards should be adopted

before world standards are drawn up, and consequently: It is best on the one hand to encourage,

maintain and strengthen cooperation at the regional level, and this holds especially with regard to

pursuing harmonization operations undertaken in Europe in particular by the European Codex

Council.”138

Clearly, once again the French were pushing for stronger regional powers within the

international group.

And finally, the problem of funding the Codex was an issue for France: “The Budget of 112,800

US$ for a full year as approved by the Executive Committee of the Commission, seems out of

proportion to the real requirements of such a program, and the French government cannot see its

way to contributing toward a project which involves such high costs, either through deposit

funds, against the principle of which it has formulated objections right from the very beginning,

or through the ordinary FAO budget.”139

Echoing all of these concerns after the 1963 conference, Professor Högl stepped up the pressure

and wrote letters to the Directors General of the WHO and the FAO attempting to schedule

private meetings, creating a process which Townshend, though overtly diplomatic, privately

found “cumbersome and time-consuming” for the agencies when trying to respond as one

common voice to the European President of the Council.140

138 Memorandum on the “Codex Alimentarius” presented by the French delegation to the 12th FAO Conference, November 1963. SP 10/1 Policy Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 139 Memorandum on the “Codex Alimentarius” presented by the French delegation to the 12th FAO Conference, November 1963. SP 10/1 Policy Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 140 Francis Townshend, Letter to Claus Agthe, Food Additives Scientist at the WHO, 26 November 1963. SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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Högl wrote to M.G. Candau (the Director General of the WHO) strongly urging that there be

greater involvement from that agency, for fear that with the FAO and its agricultural interests “it

is almost impossible to prevent economic aspects from having too much weight.”141 He

explained that in their European Codex: “In the majority of the States, these laws are enacted by

the ministry responsible for the public health. The economic aspects are kept out of the

discussion as far as possible.”142

To appease the financial concerns, BR Sen, the Director General of the FAO responded to Högl

to say that he had consulted with the Candau of the WHO, and at the next Executive meeting of

the Codex Commission he would put forward Högl´s suggestion that the Trust Fund assume

certain costs of the Secretariat of the Advisory Group for Europe, since these were not in the

approved budget for 1963/64.143

Despite this seeming temporary calm and agreement, however, tensions arose once again, and in

the lead up to the second session of the international Codex would reach a boiling point over the

question of regional standards.

Dr. L. Verhoestraete, an M.D. from WHO, tried to set Högl’s mind at rest and assure him that

“technical work, in which the activity of WHO is of great importance particularly in the fields of

food hygiene and food additives, has only just begun…” and the public health aspects would be

safeguarded. 144 Verhoestraete reminded Högl how the first two years of the International Codex

were devoted mainly to setting up the Codex Alimentarius Commission and its auxiliary bodies,

and for this reason the FAO, which handled the administrative side of the programme, had to

141 Högl: “Il est presque impossible d’éviter que des aspects économiques apparaisent assez fortement”. Otto Högl, Letter to M.G. Candau, Director-General of the WHO, 16 January 1964. SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. (Author´s translation.) 142 Otto Högl Letter to MG Candau, Director-General of the WHO, 16 January 1964: “..participation plus active de l’OMS, les instances responsables de la sante publique dans les differentes Etats se sentiraient apuyes et incites a deployer une activite plus intense au sein de la Commission, ce qui repondrait certainement a une necessite urgente.” SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. (Author´s translation.) 143 Director-General of the FAO Letter to Otto Högl, 6 November 1963 SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 144 L. Verhoestraete, Director of the Division of Health Promotion and Protection WHO, Letter to Professor Högl, 29 January 1964. SP 10/2 WHO Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome.

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play a more active part in it than the WHO. 145 Verhoestraete told Högl: “As you know, at

present the food standards programme is being handled in WHO by staff members who have to

do this work in addition to their normal duties. Steps are now being taken however to appoint a

Food Hygienist who will work full time on the programme. We are also asking that at the

forthcoming meeting of the Executive Committee of the Commission consideration be given to

the provision of funds for additional staff in the Nutrition Unit of WHO to assist in increased

work on food additives, pesticides, poisonous substances occurring naturally in food, and other

nutritional problems related to food standards.”146

Meanwhile, Högl asked M.G. Candau, DG of the WHO, to see that international standards be

based on Europe. Despite being reminded of the FAO´s role in the work of the Codex, Högl did

not send them a copy of this letter; the FAO only found out about his appeals indirectly, which

further strained relations between the FAO and Högl. Högl reminded Candau that the European

situation was exceptional, and that at the FAO Conference of 1961, there had been a special rule

for Europe that with the first 4 years of the Commission the work on this continent was most

urgent, especially in light of the activities of all the different economic alliances. He argued that

there were particular conditions, different from other continents which made this work and

acceptance of the European standards particularly pressing. He wrote that “The organizations

responsible for public health in the various States feel they are forced to exert a more active

pressure on the Commission. There is in fact an urgent need for that.”147

145 L. Verhoestraete, Direction of the Division of Health Promotion and Protection WHO, Letter to Professor Högl, 29 January 1964. SP 10/2 WHO Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization, Archives Rome. 146 L. Verhoestraete, Direction of the Division of Health Promotion and Protection WHO, Letter to Prof. Högl, 6 February 1964. SP 10/2 WHO Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 147 Professor Otto Högl, letter to M.G. Candau, Director General of the WHO, 20 January 1964:

“Déjà lors de l”Assemblée générale de la FAO en November 1961 on prévoyait dans les statuts d’alors de la Commission du Codex Alimentarius une réglementation spéciale pour l’Europe, du moins pour le quatre premières années (1963-1967). On estimait que l’unification des exigencies pour les denrées alimentaires apparaissait particulièrement urgente sur ce continent, vu le regroupement des Etats en différentes alliances économiques (CEE, AELE, Conseil de l’Europe, Comecon, etc.). Afin d’accélerer le travail et de tenir compte de l’intégration rapide du marché europeen, l’acceptation de toute norme par les gouvernements européen sera, pendant une periode initiale de 4 ans, la condition necessaire et suffisante de sa publication dans le Codex Alimentarius.”….on peut dire que partout règne l’opinion qu’en Europe existent des conditions particulières, tres differentes de celles d’autres continents, et qui font apparaître une unification dans le sens précité comme spécialement urgente.”

[Author’s Transl.] SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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Dr. Michael Sacks, the Chief of Program Coordination of the WHO drafted a letter on behalf of

both UN organizations telling Högl that his ideas still contained no concrete working plan for the

group for Europe, and “not until you have plans can we look at your requests”.148

But these concerns were not merely a personality clash between the FAO officials and the Swiss

Professor; he was speaking on behalf of his constituency; other appeals were being launched

from France, with similar rumblings emanating from Vienna as well, the seat of power of the

former Codex Europaeus.

In fact, Townshend sought Harvey’s counsel once more after discovering a strange letter, “a

copy of a curious “Circular No. 1” sent out by a body calling itself the “Public Health Workshop,

Foodstuffs Legislation Section” in Vienna, dated December 20, 1963. He sent this to Harvey

along with the list of addresses to which it was sent by the originators to show Harvey how the

plans to link up the European group with the International Codex were not going well:

“You will see that it is sent out “at the suggestion” of Doctor Hans Frenzel and reads very

like a carefully edited “anti-Codex” manifesto (although the dateline is indeed Vienna

and not Avignon!). There is clearly much more in this than can be read between its

closely typed lines. It is, however, quite new to me and I have not yet been able to find

out what exactly lies behind it. If I may mix some good metaphors, it looks a bit like a

kite sent up by….leaving what they hope is a sinking ship. If it is so they will surely be

steam-rollered! I want to try to analyse thoroughly the various reasons behind European

separatism in Codex matters; there are at least a half dozen, some of which are not

emotional and I believe could and indeed must be cured.”149

148 Dr. Michael R. Sacks, Chief of Program Coordination, WHO. DRAFT Letter to Otto Högl, March 1964. SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 149 Francis Townshend, Letter to Doctor John Harvey, Chairman of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and staff member of the United States Food and Drug Administration, 23 January 1964. SP 10/2/WHO Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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2.3. Der Anschluss: “this sounds like a holy mess”

It is unclear whether these reasons were “cured” as Townshend had wished. After the first

session of the Commission was held in Rome in June of 1963, everything seemed set, although

debate lingered over the powers of the regional group. The final meeting of the European

Council of the Codex was to occur in May of 1964 in Berne, where it was expected to approve

the terms of its entry into the International Codex. Until then, the new international “Advisory

Group for Europe” could not officially meet until they decided to take over this capacity

officially.150 The Codex Europaeus met for the last time in Vienna from 21 to 23 October, 1963

and “unanimously reached the conclusion that that it was not competent and that only a plenary

session could decide to convert the European Council to an Advisory Group for Europe.”151

This plenary session was to take place at Berne and its principal task was to find a formula and

ways and means acceptable to the large majority of European countries to proceed with joining

the international group. It had to find a compromise formula between the “two main schools of

thought in Europe” at the time: “those countries that are pressing for a close integration of the

European council with the worldwide commission, and those others, which up to the present

have been more active, especially in France, Germany and Austria, and which strongly advocate

an organization having powers more or less similar to those of the present European Council.”152

But after the first session of Codex, and just months prior to this critical Berne meeting, a “holy

mess” erupted over the report from the Rome session. The English version did not correspond

with the French translation; or, as the European Council charged, changes were made to the

English translation after the meeting which would ultimately strip the European region of its

desired autonomy. The blame for the changes (according to the Swiss and French

representatives) was attributed to Townshend, the FAO officer-in-charge who had coincidentally

resigned his post just after the report was released, and they felt that it was a deliberate attempt to

embarrass the Europeans at their upcoming meeting in Berne.

150 J. V. A. Nehemiah, Director of the Program Liaison Division FAO, letter to Dr. Michael Sacks of the WHO, 8 May 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 151 O. Högl, Letter to B.R Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 2 April 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 152 O. Högl, Letter to B.R. Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 2 April 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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Högl indicated that the European Codex Council may have to back out of the deal altogether and

warned B.R. Sen: “We must at all costs find a compromise solution that will win the approval of

both sides. To side with one group of countries would mean losing the collaboration of the other

group and make the “European” ideal an illusion.”153 Perhaps in less subtle terms, Cépède, the

French representative wrote to Sen reminding him that: “These changes refer to an article which

was the object of very heated debate…I hope, Mr. Director-General, that without waiting to

receive a more formal protest from the French Government, you will kindly give this matter the

attention it deserves and that a note from you to all the addressees of Mr. Townshend’s circular

on the terms of the same.”154

This sparked a flurry of correspondence and memos within and between the FAO and WHO,

with one hand-written note scrawled in the margins aptly capturing the situation: “this sounds

like a holy mess.” 155

Cépède reminded the FAO that France had participated in the European Codex from the start and

“I sincerely do hope that a solution will be found to ensure the continuation of the activities of

the European Codex Alimentarius Council, according to the recommendations of its 6th plenary

assembly held, this Spring, in Berne, in the frame-work of the FAO-WHO Codex Alimentarius

Commission. Otherwise I fear the 2nd session of the Commission as well as the Council and the

European regional Conference meeting will be difficult on that matter.” 156

The sticking point was paragraph 8 of the Report of the First Session of the Codex Alimentarius

Commission which stated that the Advisory Group for Europe would be empowered to “…fix its

own working procedures if required within the general framework of the Commission's Statutes

153 O. Högl, Letter to BR Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 2 April 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 154 M. Cépède, Inter-Ministerial Committee for France of the FAO, Letter to BR Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 3 April 1964. SP 10/1 Policy. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 155 J.V.A Nehemiah, Director of the Program Liaison Division FAO, Letter to Mr. Oris Wells, Assistant Director General of the FAO, 9 April 1964. CX 2/20 Exec Files. Box 12 C x 6. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 156 M. Cépède, Inter-Ministerial Committee for France of the FAO, Letter to BR Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 3 April 1964. SP 10/1. Policy. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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and Rules of Procedure.”157 The same point (paragraph 8) of the French version of this report,

reads:

“La Commission note avec satisfaction que l'actuel Conseil européen du Codex

Alimentarius a accepté de fonctionner dorénavant comme "Groupe consultative pour

l'Europe de la Commission mixte FAO/OMS du Codex Alimentarius". En tant que tel, il

devient un organe de la Commission, ouvert à tous les gouvernements de l'Europe

mentionnés plus haut, et est habilité à élire son propre Vice-Président ainsi qu'à

déterminer, si nécessaire, ses propres norms et procédures de travail.”158

The equivalent phrase, “within the general framework of the Commission's Statutes and Rules of

Procedure” is missing from the French version.

Högl reminded Sen that “On such a basis, and with the assurance that a European regional group

might fix and adopt its own food standards whenever world standards did not lend themselves to

special situations in Europe, countries such as France, Germany and Austria would appear

disposed to accept a compromise.”159 But as Högl charged “However, simultaneously with the

announcement of his resignation, Mr. Townshend advised us on 20 March 1964 of a

modification in the report of the Rome Session, which removes the basis for our attempts, and

makes the agreement we had been seeking extremely doubtful.”160 It is unclear who was

responsible for the translation work directly, but Högl’s implication was that some form of

betrayal had occurred.161

157 FAO/WHO. Report of the First Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, 25 June – 3 July, 1963. ALINORM 63/12. [English version]. At the meeting itself the French delegation reserved its position on this point. 158FAO/WHO. Rapport de la premiere session de la Commission mixte FAO/OMS du Codex Alimentarius, Rome, 25 juin - 3 juillet 1963. ALINORM 63/12. [French version]. 159 O. Högl, Letter to B.R. Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 2 April 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 160 O. Högl, Letter to BR Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 2 April 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 161This role of translators as ‘go-betweens’ and brokers of knowledge has recently been explored with the recognition that sometimes “Translators were often also traitors.” (p.xxxvii) or “trusty messengers.” (p.ix)In: Simon Schaffer, Lissa Roberts, Kapil Raj, James Delbourgo, eds., The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820. Uppsala Studies in History of Science, N° 35 Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2009.

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Högl wrote to B.R. Sen how “we cannot subscribe either to the form or substance of this

alternation of the report” and cited the Rules of Procedure XI of the CAC and how the official

languages must be in French and English. “In our opinion, it follows that all documents issued

in one or other of these languages are equally authentic. Bearing this in mind, and basing their

opinions on the French text, several delegates from French-speaking countries gave their

approval at the Rome Session. In addition, it is the rule that once adopted, the text of a report or

a protocol of a session cannot be modified, except by a majority of those attending. It is our

opinion, therefore, that the Secretariat had no authority to change the text as it did.” 162

And from France, Cepede argued, “…the question of the scope of the powers of the Advisory

Group for Europe gave rise to heated discussion in Rome. It was only with the understanding

that the European group could, if need be, frame its own food standards that we gave our

approval to the proposed text….We therefore also challenge the authenticity of the English text.

If, against our will, the French text is modified, we will be obliged to make serious reservations

as to all decisions made at the Rome session.” 163

In actual fact, the ‘holy mess’ appeared to have been an opportunity seized upon by Högl, if he

did in fact read the English version. The mistake in the original English report was caught by

Townshend a week after the Rome meeting and he communicated it to Högl, who never raised

the issue to the European council, knowing that the French version (with the omission) would be

to the liking of some of the members (e.g. France), and the English version might be labelled as

the “mistake” instead. The FAO Legal Advisor, Nehemiah, described how this oversight

happened: delegates at the Rome session had the draft report in three languages when it came up

for approval. At the table the Secretariat was noting on the English master copy all the

amendments approved by the Commission. The delegates speaking languages other than English

were noting on their own language versions of the amendments translated through the

simultaneous interpretation system. There was no time for the Commission to approve clean

162 O. Högl, Letter to BR Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 2 April 1964. SP 10/2. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 163 M. Cépède, Inter-Ministerial Committee for France of the FAO, Letter to BR Sen, Director-General of the FAO, 3 April 1964. SP 10/1. Policy. Box 12 C x 74. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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copies of the draft report. There is however no doubt about the amendment as it was a key issue

debated at length and on which the French delegate went so far as to reserve his position. While

translating the report for printing, however, the crucial amendment was unfortunately omitted.

The printed copies in three languages were distributed as a matter of course with the differences

in the wording.”164 But they came to know of the mistake as a result of a letter from Prof. Högl

on 11th February in another context. Townshend took up the matter immediately with the

Chairman of the CAC who also felt the English was the final accepted version. And so the

amendment was issued with Chairman’s approval March 20th, 1964.

On 16 July 1963 (hardly a week after the Codex Commission concluded its session), in a circular

letter to all members of the European Codex Council, Prof. Högl reported on the outcome of the

Commission’s meeting and circulated the crucial amendments with a copy to the FAO. In the

enclosure to the circular, the position was stated as in the French version, that is, with the

omission of the words which limited the autonomy of the Advisory Group for Europe. As the

FAO legal expert Nehemiah explained,

“As soon as this communication was received, Mr. Townshend wrote on 23 July 1963 to

Prof. Högl pointing out the mistake and giving the correct version as in the English

text…Prof. Högl did not contest this position. This is a clear indication that the version

in the English text was the one accepted by the Codex Commission and the affected party

(Prof. Högl) had also intimation in writing of the correct position as far back as July

1963. The official change intimated in March 1964 should not therefore upset Prof. Högl

unduly. Mr. Cépède was not aware of this correction we communicated to Högl soon

after the Commission. Had he known it before, he would not have perhaps

complained.”165

Nehemiah concluded that: “It is obvious [Högl] is attempting to exploit the unfortunate oversight

in translation to get over an important decision of the Codex Commission which is not to the

164 JVA Nehemiah, Director of the Program Liaison Division FAO, Letter to Mr. Oris Wells, Assistant Director-General of the FAO, 9 April 1964. CX2/20 Exec Files. Box 12 C x 6. Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 165 JVA Nehemiah, Director of the Program Liaison Division FAO, Letter to Mr. O.V. Wells, Assistant Director-General of the FAO, 9 April 1964. CX2/20 Exec Files. Box 12 C x 6. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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liking of a few members of his Council (France, Germany, Switzerland and Austria.)” 166 As

Nehemiah wrote: “I have examined this matter very carefully with reference to the relevant

records. While the introduction of these changes at this stage is an unfortunate coincidence, I

could find nothing to show that Mr. Townshend has acted with any malice or has deliberately

distorted the records.”167 This analysis of the situation was reported in April of 1964.

At the May Meeting in Berne, the European Council decided the terms of its entry into the

worldwide Codex, and, despite the “holy mess”, continued to insist on its autonomy in

establishing its own standards for problems of a particularly European nature. Nevertheless, the

English version was accepted at the Second Session of the International Codex in the fall of that

same year. 168 But, although the English version was accepted, at the same session and perhaps

as a result of the lessons learned from the “holy mess”, on the advice of the Executive Board and

Working Party on Rules of Procedure, the International Codex decided to change the Rules of

Procedure for Advisory bodies, admitting that it “seemed advisable…not to define the functions

of these bodies too restrictively…. since it might become necessary to assign other functions to

them in the future which might be markedly different from those contemplated at present.”169

They added that the term “Co-ordinating Committees” would more properly express the

proposed functions of these subsidiary bodies than the expression “Advisory Groups”. Högl was

immediately appointed the Chair of this Coordinating Committee for Europe; however, he

stepped down after less than one year in the post. Dr. Frenzel came out of retirement to chair the

committee in 1965, but he passed away in 1966, and another Austrian representative, his loyal

Palladin, Dr. Richard Wildner, took his place.

166 JVA Nehemiah, Director of the Program Liaison Division FAO, Letter to Mr. O.V. Wells, Assistant Director-General of the FAO, 9 April 1964. CX2/20 Exec Files. Box 12 C x 6. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 167 JVA Nehemiah, Director of the Program Liaison Division FAO, Letter to Mr. O.V. Wells, Assistant Director-General of the FAO, 9 April 1964. CX2/20 Exec Files. Box 12 C x 6. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 168 Report of the Second Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, Geneva, 28 September – 7 October 1964. 169 Report of the Second Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, Geneva, 28 September – 7 October 1964.

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On their own terms, they had finally established the connection to the “large and mighty

organization”, but leaving in their wake an awkward structure: an international group with a

strongly independent European core, and an ambiguous mandate to produce both regional and

worldwide standards.

What did this mean in terms of the food standards or food data that was to be produced by the

international Codex? There were many implications of this tug-of-war over what the standards

should look like: the International Codex was indeed an international body but with a strongly

European core. The standards thus had to incorporate many interests in order to be accepted in

the worldwide commission, and as shown by the evidence above, health was not necessarily at

the forefront in the discussions over why the European Council would join (or at times show

reluctance to join) the international group. Discussions of health and protecting health are

certainly there, although the underlying key concerns appeared to do with control of the

decision-making for the European region, with problems of cost, of European autonomy, and of

trade, along with the concerns over safeguarding and protecting public health. This moment of

transition with the European Codex set the course for the international structure, and created a

power dynamic that would last and have an impact on the world stage of food standards and

trading for years to come. The technical details and science underpinning the standards could

not be produced in isolation from these powerful economic and geopolitical influences.

Thus, the multifaceted nature of the international Codex and its food standards is reflected in the

diverse reasons and concerns of its European predecessor. The dynamics and power relations

between the Codex Europaeus and the UN Agencies suggest how the health concerns are co-

produced with conflicting political and economic interests – in this case, preserving the trading

network of the European region and preventing less ‘healthy’ products from entering its

boundaries. To return to the framework of co-production, this represents a mingling of both

natural and social interests; an instance of how the idea of health protection becomes intertwined

with cultural protection.

Once the structure and organization of the International Codex was established, however, putting

into practice a process of constructing standards further revealed the multiple interests at play

when states get into the business of the co-production of knowledge. An analysis of the Codex

standards also highlights how easily natural and social orders intermingle for the most pressing

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areas affecting consumer health: food safety issues such as hygiene, additives and pesticides.

The remaining chapters will address each of these problem areas, starting with food additives

which were among the very first joint standards produced by the two UN agencies, and

continued to capture the interests of member states (including the European subgroup) for

reasons beyond strictly health.

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Chapter 3 Food Additives

“Primitive man discovered one useful chemical substance to make his food taste better

and keep longer. That was salt. Modern man still uses salt, but has added literally

hundreds of other products which are now used to flavour, colour or preserve food.”170

“Any decision to use an intentional additive must be based on the considered judgment of

properly qualified scientists that the intake of the additive will be substantially below any

level which could be harmful to consumers.”171

The question of whether a food additive was deemed harmful by a qualified scientist or was

always an advantage to the consumer was problematized and became ambiguous in the postwar

era for several reasons. Additives—defined as the substances used in small quantities to improve

the texture, appearance, flavour or storage properties of food—did not include vitamins, and

minerals were also omitted from the scope of the expert committee. Some of the reasons for

intentionally adding these substances were to prevent the wastage of seasonal surpluses,

something which was becoming a problem, especially for producers in the United States.172

Additives, at least in the eyes of the FAO and WHO experts, were intended to supplement rather

than replace traditional methods. And so, unlike the idea of adulterants, additives were welcomed

in this context for their beneficial properties to consumers and industrialists alike. There were

nutritional arguments in favour of using food additives: for example, in fats like margarine, it

was suggested that the colouring of margarine with beta carotene would enhance its Vitamin A

activity, and the addition of antioxidants would prevent loss of the same.173 There was

encouragement for the use of inert gases and curing agents for meats. All work of this nature

170 “Concern over Number of Chemicals Added to Food: WHO/FAO Recommends Coordinated Investigations.” International Journal of Food Science and Nutrition Jan 1956, Vol. 10 No. 1: 231-232. 171 Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Conference on Food Additives, Geneva , 19-22 September 1955. World Health Organization Technical Report Series No. 107, WHO, Geneva, July 1956. 172 Friedmann, H. 1993. The Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis. New Left Review, no. 197: 29–57. 173 General principles governing the use of food additives (First report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 129, 1957

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was under the guise of “making food attractive to the customer” through various chemicals

falling under broad headings of colours, emulsifiers, stabilizers, thickening agents, bleaching

agents and clarifiers.

Food additives, as with other safety standards, took on multiple meanings and had varying

impacts in the areas of consumer health, international trade, industrial development, and

scientific expertise. The Codex was an early player in the development of food additives

standards which were to be implemented by member states and serve as a model for regional

bodies, such as the European Community.

As seen in other chapters, however, regardless of the forum in which food additives and their

standards were being considered, their underlying technical and scientific data could not be

divorced from a variety circumstances which shaped the standards – co-produced with economic

interests, cultural and consumer preferences, as well as the suspected health risks and benefits.

And, also as shown in the previous chapter, regional and nationalistic interests of Europe were

still a consideration not only in this postwar era, but also as they continued to play out for years

and years thereafter.

This ambiguity and concern over food additives was one many years in the making, and arguably

dating back to the start of the German purity law of 1516, but this increased attention on these

substances at the international and regional level intensified in the postwar period with

involvement from the FAO, WHO as well as the newly formed European Economic Community

(EEC). Some might argue that the use of food additives is as old as time itself, as one chemist

remarked at the American Chemical Society’s Centennial Meeting in 1976, that since the

“beginning of time, nature began putting chemical substances together in ways that were

attractive and nutritious for man and beast. Only in recent decades has man intervened

significantly with nature to make food more abundant, more useful, more convenient and

available, more affordable.”174

With nature no longer at the helm, however, by the end of the Second World War, food additives

were increasingly being developed and produced on a larger scale, and thus widely injected into

174 Clausi, A.S. “Food Ingredient Challenges,” in Roy Teranishi (Ed.) Agricultural & Food Chemistry: Past, Present, Future. AVI Publishing Company Inc. Westport Connecticut, 1978.

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the food chain. As our chemist above mentions, additives were generally developed in order to

combat problems of food scarcity and malnutrition, to improve taste, texture, colour and

appearance and guard against spoilage and microbes, but minor consideration was given to

possible – albeit largely unknown at the time – health risks Within a short space of time,

however, the problem of food additives began to attract medical attention, and by 1967, the

World Health Magazine announced, “Many food additives are natural products but still more are

the results of chemists’ fertile imaginations… Chemists have discovered formulas that can lend

strawberry flavour to soft drinks that never came near a strawberry and others to keep shredded

coconut soft and humid on a kitchen shelf.”175 From surveys conducted at the time, it was

estimated that in the U.S. over 800 chemicals had been recommended as additives, in Sweden

approximately 500 were in use, and a list compiled in Germany over 1000 of these chemicals

were identified.176

By way of response, international groups such as the FAO and WHO began to construct

“positive lists” of permitted food additives, captured and documented within the Codex

Alimentarius, and later, the European Scientific Committee for Food (ESCF) – a subsidiary body

of the European Economic Community – steered the European Community toward its major

directives for additives, colours and sweeteners which was cause to such an uproar in the early

1990s.177

Food additives were one of the major areas of concern which prompted the need for joint

collaboration of the UN agencies. Arguments from industrialists who blurred the boundaries

between synthetic and natural chemicals (e.g. “food is nothing but chemicals” or “rhubarb and

strawberries contain large quantities of oxalic acid, a chemical which is unacceptable for use as

an intentional food additive”178) were persuasive and tried to downplay fears over this

undeniable surge in the usage of intentional synthetic chemicals in foods in the postwar era. The

concerns and increased attention stemmed from not only from this postwar shift in the use of

175 “Food Additives”, World Health, May 1967, pp. 12-14. 176 Concern over Number of Chemicals Added to Food: WHO/FAO Recommends Coordinated Investigations. Int J Food Sci Nutrition Jan 1956 Volume 10 No.1: 231-232. 177 Branen, Alfred Larry, P. Michael Davidson and Seppo Salminen, 2002, Food Additives, 2nd Edition, CRC Press. 178 Bey, J.A. The British Industrial Biological Research Association. Int. J. Food Sci. Nutrition. 1963, Vol. 17 No. 2 pp. 72-75.

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additives, but also in their meaning which became ambiguous with their newly cloaked dual

nature as both beneficial and potentially harmful to the consumer. This stands in marked

contrast to the earlier meaning of food additives which was tied up with earlier attempts at food

regulation that aimed to quell and prevent the act of adulteration, a concept which is historically

contingent. Following on what Anne Hardy has written about food poisoning, adulteration and

adding substances to food in its earlier incarnation had strictly negative connotations and seen as

a fraudulent or devious act done by “unscrupulous merchants” who meant to cheat the consumer,

for example, by putting chicory in coffee, sand in teabags or chalk in cheese.179 Accordingly,

legislation against adulteration was aimed at ensuring purity and protecting the consumer both in

a financial way as well as in a health sense.

Purity itself was a highly contested notion, however, and contingent upon not only national

contexts and cultural traditions but also the time period in which it was discussed. For example,

in England and Canada, their “Adulteration Acts” of the late 19th Century at first aimed at

ensuring the purity of alcohol, wines and spirits but also expanded to include food. Pure food

(and alcohol) would mean that it was free from added cheap bulk material designed to give it

more weight or volume (like chalk in cheese, sand in teabags) and thus appear to be 100%

genuine, real or ‘pure’. Purity, then, was more about ensuring that the consumer got what he or

she paid for; to a lesser extent it meant safety from harmful substances, although that was also a

growing concern. These early acts aimed at preventing food adulteration – such as those that

were passed in France (1851) 180, England (1860),181 Canada (1875)182 and the United States

(1906)183 were more concerned with the purity of the food product itself. The role of earlier food

analysts with their microscopes was thus mainly to examine the composition of food and guard

against such adulteration by additives as seen in the early work done by people like Dr. Arthur

179 Hardy, Anne, “Food, Hygiene and the Laboratory. A Short History of Food Poisoning in Britain circa 1850-1950,” Social History of Medicine, Vol 12 no. 2, pp 293-311. 1999. 180 Stanziani, Alessandro, “Quality Rules: What for? Consumers vs. lobbies protection, the case of France, 19th early 20th C”, XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006, Session 9 181 Michael French, Jim Phillips Cheated not poisoned?: food regulation in the United Kingdom, 1875-1938, Manchester University Press, 2000. 182 Davidson, Alexander, The Genesis and Growth of Food and Drug Administration in Canada, 1949. 183 Hilts, Philip J., Protecting America's health : the FDA, business, and one hundred years of regulation Chapel Hill, UNC Press, 2004.

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Hill Hassall in England.184 In the interwar years, and under the Third Reich in Germany,

however, purity of food not only mirrored the ideas of purity of the race, but this notion also fit

into the National Socialists’ broader war against foods and toxic agents that might cause

cancer.185 The Nazis advocated for food standards, barred chemicals like pesticides in foods, as

well as additives such as the colour “Butter Yellow” – a campaign that found great support

among housewives and Catholic womens’ organizations, even after the Second World War.186

And so, entering into the postwar era, purity of food retained these loaded contextual meanings.

Adulteration, purity and additives are historically contingent concepts and additives took on new

meaning in the postwar era as they start to become seen as actually beneficial to the consumer in

that they were intentionally added and welcomed on a worldwide basis for their purported

helpful properties.187 This postwar story of food additives is one in which there is a shift and

these agents are at first welcomed by international health authorities as (at least initially) a

legitimate act with the goals of both benefiting and protecting the consumer in some cases from

other threats like microbes. Food experts began to focus not only on the purity of food, but now

also on the purity of the additives.

The use of additives was welcomed by industry, as their invention fostered the creation of new

products and types of highly-processed food, for example, “Cheese Whiz” – a bright yellow

spreadable topping made possible by emulsifiers – developed by scientists at Kraft Foods.188

Therefore, although additives and chemicals in food may arguably and indeed have a long

history, their profile was raised not only with their abundance in the postwar era, but also with

their dual role of potentially helping or hurting consumers, as there was the growing recognition

that some might be the cause of adverse health effects. For example, as Ian Mosby has recently

184 Berris Charnley, “Arguing over adulteration: the success of the Analytical Sanitary Commission,”

Endeavour, Volume 32, Issue 4, December 2008, Pages 129-133 185Robert Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 120-170. 186Proctor, Nazi War on Cancer. (1999) p. 124; Stoff, Heiko: „Hexa-Sabbat. Fremdstoffe und Vitalstoffe, Experten und der kritische Verbraucher in der BRD der 1950er und 1960er Jahre“, NTM 17(2009): 55-83. 187 This stands in contrast to authors like Michael Pollan who suggests that additives should be called adulteration and thus makes a claim against the important historical context of these terms. 188 “Edwin Traisman, 91, Dies; Helped Create Iconic Foods.” The New York Times, June 9, 2007.

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described, it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the additive Monosodium Glutamate

(MSG) was first isolated and controversially associated with the set of symptoms vaguely

recognized as the “Chinese restaurant syndrome”.189 Moreover, in what was perhaps one of the

most high profile (at least in North America) national pieces of legislation to emerge during this

time period, the “Delaney Clause” was introduced in 1958 as an amendment to the United States

Food and Drugs Administration’s Food Drugs and Cosmetics Acts of 1938. The Delaney Clause

attempted to address evidence linking food additives (and this broad label at the time included

pesticides) with cancer, and banned any food additive known to cause cancer from entering into

the human food chain, effectively enforcing a ‘zero risk’ policy.190 It was invoked in 1959 - the

year following its introduction - to prompt a nation-wide ban on cranberries believed to contain

pesticides.191 Around the same time, other controversies were brewing over additives such as

dietyhlstilbestrol (DES) a growth hormone used in cattle and subsequently found in beef in the

United States throughout the 1960s.192 DES was originally synthesized as a contraceptive drug

in 1938, and used by women since the 1940s, until it became increasingly known to cause

serious birth defects and ovarian cancer.193 Its presence in beef also raised alarm and in this new

Delaney era of legislation, additives were given a higher profile.

And so, with an increasing medical focus on establishing causality between particular food

additives and certain symptoms or diseases, during the postwar period there began a shift from

merely identifying additives to classifying and quantifying additive levels, and sometimes

restricting their use altogether. For example, DES, the growth hormone used in the beef and

189 Ian Mosby, ‘That Won-Ton Soup Headache’: The Chinese Restaurant Syndrome, MSG and the Making of American Food, 1968-1980.” Social History of Medicine Vol. 22, No. 1 pp. 133-151. 190 FDA, Food Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1958, Food Additives Amendment incl. Delaney Clause. FSIS. 191 Aaron Wildavsky and Leo Levenson “Were the early scares justified by the evidence? Cranberries, Dieldrin, Saccharin. I. The Cranberry Scare of 1959” In A. Wildavsky, But is it True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues. 1995. Harvard: Harvard University Press and The Estate of Aaron Wildavsky, pp.11-37. 192US Food and Drug Administration: http://www.fda.gov/Fdac/features/2004/204_gras.html. [Accessed October 2010]. For a discussion on the DES controversy, see Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “Food Drug and Consumer Regulation: The ‘Meat, DES and Cancer’ Debates in the United States’” in: David Cantor, Christian Bonah and Matthias Doerres (Eds.) Meat Medicine and Health in the Twentieth Century. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010. pp. 179-202. 193 Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “Food Drug and Consumer Regulation: The ‘Meat, DES and Cancer’ Debates in the United States’” in: David Cantor, Christian Bonah and Matthias Doerres (Eds.) Meat Medicine and Health in the Twentieth Century. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010. p. 179.

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poultry industry was recalled as a birth control drug in the United States in the late 1970s, and

banned by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the 1980s.194 Prior to these recalls,

however, there was discussion in the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee over the “safe level”

that DES could still be ingested without harm to humans even though it was known to have

“carcinogenic properties” and was banned in some countries.195 Other additives, such as food

colours, had to be tested through oral injection in animals and were only allowed to be on the

“permitted lists” if they did not cause local sarcomas.196 Purity of the food colour was also

important, as some components of food colours, such as β-napthylamine, might also be a risk.197

Overall, however, the experts recommended that potential risks to the consumer were to be

considered alongside the potential benefits that the additive might provide for the consumer;

benefits such as: a longer shelf-life, more attractive appearance, reduction of spoilage or

protection from microbial threats.198

The postwar work on additives thus resulted in lists of either ‘permissible’ substances, tolerance

levels, and in some cases prohibited substances. As seen in the previous chapter, the

International Codex aimed to not only protect public health but also facilitate trade, and with

growing concern over particular commodities (bleach in flour, for example) and other additives

(emulsifiers, thickening agents, colours, flavours, hormones, antioxidants or antimicrobials)

these lists posed intriguing problems for member states as they tried to balance political,

economic and cultural interests with the medical and toxicological expertise in order to address

concerns over public safety and health. In this chapter I will highlight some of these issues such

as the emergence of food additives as a medical problem, the implications of the acceptable daily

intake (ADI) on international health and trade relations, and comment on the role of various

actors on the development and use of food additives. For example, when untangling the interests

bound up in food additive standards, it is evident that this is a story of many actors, interests, and

194 Gaudillière, “Food Drug and Consumer Regulation” (2010), pp. 180. 195 Evaluation of the carcinogenic hazards of food additives (Fifth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 220, 1961. 196 Evaluation of the carcinogenic hazards of food additives (Fifth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 220, 1961. 197 Evaluation of the carcinogenic hazards of food additives (Fifth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 220, 1961. 198 Longer shelf life and more attractive appearance of the food – not necessarily the consumer.

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disciplines: chemists (who produce the additives), toxicologists, medical experts, injected test

subjects (rats mainly), international bureaucrats, industry and ultimately consumers.

I focus on the work of the WHO and FAO, and, because of their later influence and challenges

with harmonization, on the European Community starting from the early 1970s to the 1990s. In

particular, I will show how their work on food additives and generating lists and standards

represent an attempt to address and balance emerging health concerns with technological and

trade needs, a story which shows the co-production of scientific expertise (toxicological,

chemical) with economic, industrial, cultural, political and social interests.

Regulations, standardized lists of additives, toxicological data and acceptable daily intakes often

lagged behind, however, suggesting that health and medical experts played a lesser role than

industrialists, since “in its desire to fulfill consumer needs, the food industry’s rapid advances in

food technology during the last few decades have stepped up its intervention with nature.”199

By the time World Health featured its article on the ubiquity of food additives in the late 1960s,

it was clear that “aided by sophisticated tools, such as the mass spectrometer and gas

chromatography, the ability of flavor chemists to analyze and synthesize flavours has expanded

markedly.”200 By the late 1960s, however, because “the range of laboratory-made food

additives seems almost endless” the World Health Organization urged food chemists and to work

with physicians to study any short- and long-term health effects of these substances.201

3.1. The WHO/FAO Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) 1955-1963

More than a decade earlier, in September 1955 a conference on food additives was convened in

Geneva, by one of four expert committees established in the mid-1950s hosted jointly by the

199 Clausi, (1978), p. 194. 200 Clausi, (1978), p. 194. 201 “Food Additives”, World Health, May 1967, pp. 12-14.

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WHO and FAO. 202 Additives, along with hygiene for meat and milk (discussed in chapter 3),

were some of the earliest problems that prompted the two organizations to join forces against a

common concern.

The Sixth World Health Assembly in 1953 noted the increased use of additives and chemicals in

the food industry and called for further investigation into the matter. The Joint FAO/WHO

Expert committee on Nutrition first reviewed the problem of food additives in 1954 and, realized

the problem was bigger than suspected because of divergent international legislation in this area,

not to mention the “serious lack of data” on the purity and health effects of food additives. It is

interesting to note that at this point, the emphasis is on the purity of the food additives and not of

the food itself, which stands in contrast to the earlier frameworks of adulteration rooted in the

late 19th C. Once again, purity is a contested concept in the case of food additives. In the

postwar era, however, the problem becomes whether to define purity in terms of focussing on the

food product or the chemical substance intentionally added to the food product that might cause

adverse health effects, or both. Moreover, there was “conflicting evidence” on food additives

and differences in interpretation of this evidence, which prompted the need for greater

coordination at the international level to avoid duplication of efforts or conflicting guidelines for

member states.

To address all of these problems, the Nutrition committee and the larger conference

recommended that the two organizations collect and disseminate information on food additives

by creating another new Expert Committee specific to this problem.

This cooperation laid the foundation for the work that was carried over into the international

Codex; this first additives conference in 1955 was to be an “exploratory” one that focussed on

what they called “non nutritive substances which are intentionally added to food.” 203 The

Conference attendees included members from Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany,

202 Dorolle, Pierre. 1964. Opening Speech of the Assistant Director-General [of the WHO] at the Second Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission. Geneva. CX2/20. Box 12 C x 6. p. 3 The original four expert committees were on nutrition, milk and milk products, meat products and finally, on additives. 203General principles governing the use of food additives (First report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 129, 1957

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Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United

States. Australia sent an observer. Professor Högl was also present.204

The members of the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives varied according to the subject

being addressed. At the first meeting, there were only 8 members and it was chaired by Dr.

William J. Darby, a Professor of Biochemistry and Director of the Nutrition Division at

Vanderbilt University in the United States. The members were experts from, but not explicitly

representing: Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, U.S. (Chair), India, France, Australia, and

England. Most were scientists – in many cases professors of toxicology or biochemistry or

pharmacology- and a few were representative from their respective countries or Ministries of

Agriculture, Health or Food (See Figure 3.1).

204Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Conference on Food Additives, Geneva , 19-22 September 1955. World Health Organization Technical Report Series No. 107, WHO, Geneva, July 1956.

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Figure 3.1: Members of the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (1955-1965)

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For example, from the Netherlands, Dr. Maurice Dols was there as was Norman C. Wright from

the United Kingdom. Dols was a food scientist from the Dutch Ministry

of Agriculture and Fisheries and also a member of the International Union of Nutritional

Sciences, an international congress of food scientists which emerged in 1946. Wright was from

the British Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and a former Deputy-Director General of the FAO

(his term lasted from 1959-1963, just as the Codex emerged).

Supporting staff members from the FAO Secretariat were also in attendance, including Francis

Townshend, the same person who had difficulties with the Codex Europaeus as discussed in

Chapter 1. Observers on this committee were invited from the International Union of Pure and

Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), the International Commiission for Agricultural and Food Industries

(Commission Internationale des Industries Agricoles et Alimentaires - abridged CIIA in French),

represented by the delegate Henri François Dupont also mentioned in the context of the Codex

Europaeus) and finally, representatives from the Permanent International Commission on

Canned Foods (la Commission scientifique du Comité international permanent de la Conserve –

CIPC).205

3.2. Industrialist presence

Notwithstanding the presence of these monitoring and data-producing commissions, another

feature of these early expert meetings on food additives was that large international chemical-

producing companies such as the Dow Chemical Company and Unilever were also members (not

just observers) around the table. The Dow Chemical Company had its own scientist, Dr. H.C.

Spencer from its Biochemistry Department, and Spencer even held the role of Chairman of the

Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) for some meetings.206 The Dow Chemical

Company, originally headquartered out of the United States, had gone ‘international’ in 1951 and

opened offices in Europe (Rotterdam, Stockholm) and Mexico by 1951. By 1961, Dow had

205 General Principles Governing the Use of Food Additives WHO Technical Report Series, No. 129, 1957 (First Report of the JECFA which met in 1956). 206 Evaluation of the toxicity of a number of antimicrobials and antioxidants (Sixth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 228, 1962

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purchased property in the Netherlands for the purposes of manufacturing its chemicals.207 By

1957, Dow was already present at the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives, as

an invited guest expert, and asked to provide data on its chemicals. The representative in 1957

was from the United States office in Midland, Michigan, Dr. Hansen Spencer, a scientist in

charge of Dow’s Food Research Division in its Biochemical Department.208

The most urgent information needed for addressing this emerging health concern were details on

an additive’s chemical composition, namely its substance, quantity, chemical structure and

breakdown. The FAO and WHO had to rely upon these outside groups for chemical and

technical data, mainly because these companies were often the producers of the chemicals and

additives, and thus the keeper of information about the nature and composition of these

substances.209 Also enlisted for help in compiling data were the Deutsche Forschung

Gemeinschaft (DFG) (German Research Society) along with the International Union Against

Cancer (l’Union International Contre le Cancer -UICC).210 It was encouraged that all members,

including the industrialist representatives, be responsible for providing “data sheets” to the two

UN organizations.

For example, for the purposes of developing a standard for margarine, at its very first session the

Codex gladly accepted an offer from the International Federation of Margarine Associations

(IFMA) to do this work. Although this standard was mainly the domain of the Codex Committee

on Fats and Oils (a commodity committee), the Food Additives committees were also kept

abreast of this work due to the addition of colours to margarine.211 Margarine and butter have

been a source of conflict, a battle ground not only between industrialists with different interests

but also pitted squarely against questions of health and nutrition. Although the addition of the

207 Dow, “Our Company”. URL: http://www.dow.com/about/aboutdow/history/1960s.htm [Accessed February 2011]. 208 The Dow Company was there by the Second meeting of this expert committee in 1957 (Procedures for the Testing of Intentional Food Additives to Establish their Safety and Use). 209 The Dow Company was there by the Second meeting of this expert committee in 1957 (Procedures for the Testing of Intentional Food Additives to Establish their Safety and Use). 210 Evaluation of the toxicity of a number of antimicrobials and antioxidants (Sixth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 228, 1962 211Ruth Dupre: "If It's Yellow, It Must be Butter": Margarine Regulation in North America Since 1886 The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 353-371. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566555 ).

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colour yellow to margarine has been hotly contested in some contexts, this debate did not seem

to be as evident on the international stage, although the International Dairy Federation (IDF) was

present at Codex as well, and would have been interested in pushing the standards more in

favour of butter. Because the Codex standards were voluntary, decisions at the international

level during this time would not necessarily have a huge an impact on trade as it would post-

WTO in 1995, but by then, all the fuss around margarine had died down. This process of having

a standard drafted by an industrial association such as the margarine group was not welcomed by

all members, however, and the delegates of the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland

both reserved the positions of their respective governments on the process.212

But behind the International Federation of Margarine Associations, however, was support and

assistance from Unilever. Unilever was (and still is) a British – Dutch company that emerged in

the 1930s, and focussed mainly on oils and fats (including margarine). By the 1950s and 1960s,

the company had begun to expand move into the food market.213 Francis Townshend was in

close contact with Dr. J.P.K. van der Steur from Unilever’s Rotterdam research laboratories,

expressing concern over some recent accident with van der Steur’s left leg, that Townshend was

“looking forward” to seeing him again in Rome, and “very glad that [Dr. van der Steur was] able

to arrange with I.F.M.A for the preparation of a paper on margarine.”214 The paper was to be

submitted by I.F.M.A. directly to the Codex. Moreover, it was “equally good news” that

Unilever was also able to prepare:

“…a similar paper on oils and fats in connection with Fediol. I take it that the finished paper in

this case will be submitted to us by the Dutch National Codex Alimentarius Committee, or would

you prefer it to come through Professor Högl given that the European Council is working on this

subject? I imagine that you are in touch with him on this matter. From our point of view it does

not matter who submits the paper as long as it is submitted and the paper is a good one.”215

212 FAO/WHO. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Geneva 28 September-7 October 1964. 213 Unilever, “Our History”. URL: http://www.unilever.co.uk/aboutus/ourhistory/ [Accessed Feb 2011]. 214 Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Letter to Dr. J.P.K. van der Steur, Unilever N.V. Research Division, 29 November 1962. SP 10/2 Policy Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 215

Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Letter to Dr. J.P.K. van der Steur, Unilever N.V. Research Division, 29 November 1962. SP 10/2 Policy Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. Note

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This correspondence raises many questions, not the least of which is: what was Högl ’s

involvement with Unilever? But on a broader level, this letter suggests the informality of the

process of submitting and developing standards to the Codex – it was not as great a concern as in

the formal statutes and principles. The formal statues gave the impression that that NGOs had

limited influence; they could attend and have observational privileges and not voting rights.216

But there were other ways to influence the Codex, as Townshend instructed the Unilever

researcher: “as we discussed it in Rome, these papers should consist essentially of two parts: the

first summarizing the major national provisions for the products dealt with in the principle

countries concerned; the second –an optional part – containing proposals for a draft international

standard.”217

3.3. Scientific Experts

To be sure, industrialists were not the only ones welcomed around the table at these ‘expert’

gatherings. Industrial representatives were not as prominent when the meeting addressed the

question of carcinogenic risks in 1961; in light of this topic the members around the table would

shift substantially to include more toxicologists, oncologists and other scientific experts from

university research laboratories, medical institutions or ministries of health.218 Prompted by

studies ranging from reports of small Icelandic communities having a high incidence of cancer

possibly due to the consumption of the smoke found in smoked fish, to high profile cases such as

“FEDIOL” is the EU Oil and Proteinmeal Industry; a European industry federation based in Brussels that was founded in 1958. 216 G. Saint-Pol, Legal Counsel FAO, Letter to Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Subject: Joint FAO Study Groups with NGOs. 13 March 1963. SP 10/1 Policy. Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 217 Francis Townshend, Liaison Officer FAO, Letter to Dr. J.P.K. van der Steur, Unilever N.V. Research Division, 29 November 1962. SP 10/2 Policy Box 12 C x 74. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 218 Evaluation of the toxicity of a number of antimicrobials and antioxidants (Sixth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 228, 1962

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the use of additives like the hormone DES in meat in the United States, the JECFA gathered to

establish international guidelines and investigate the link between food additives and cancer.219

The Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives also drafted influential General Principles

Governing the Use of Food Additives which would be promoted later on by the Codex

Alimentarius. According to these General Principles, the use of food additives was justified

only when it served one or more of the following purposes: (a) to maintain the nutritional quality

of a food; (b) to enhance the keeping quality or stability of a food; (c) to make foods attractive to

the consumer; (d) to provide aids in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing,

treating, packaging, transporting or holding food.220 On the other hand, however, the use of food

additives was not justified: (e) if the proposed level of use constitutes a hazard to the health of

the consumer; (f) when it causes a substantial reduction in the nutritive value of a food; (g) when

it disguises the faulty qualities of a product or the use of processing and handling techniques

which are not permitted; (h) when it deceives the consumer; (i) when the desired effect can be

obtained by food manufacturing practices which are economically feasible.221 These General

Principles also stipulated that “contaminants” must not exceed levels that are both safe and

technologically feasible, and the levels of use of food additives should not exceed the level

reasonably required to achieve the desired technological effect under good manufacturing

practice, and should also be in conformity with an approved standard of purity.222

Other meetings involved the drafting of standardized procedures for testing intentional food

additives to establish their safety and use.223 The expert committee emphasized the role of the

scientist in assessing food additives and that “scientists working in this field have a responsibility

219 Evaluation of the carcinogenic hazards of food additives (Fifth report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 220, 1961. DES was not banned in cattle feed in the United States, but was in other parts of the world. Despite its carcinogenic properties, it was also good for “caponizing” (e.g. castrating) poultry, and it “increases the efficiency of utilization of food.” 220 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Committee on Food Additives, Report of the Fifth Session, Arnhem, The Netherlands, 18-22 March 1968 221 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Committee on Food Additives, Report of the Fifth Session, Arnhem, The Netherlands, 18-22 March 1968 222 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Committee on Food Additives, Report of the Fifth Session, Arnhem, The Netherlands, 18-22 March 1968 223 Procedures for the testing of intentional food additives to establish their safety for use (Second report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 144, 1958 (out of print).

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to indicate what should be done to provide evidence upon which decisions on safe use may be

made.”224 At the same time, however, pointing to the role of other factors influencing food

additives, and the problems inherent in the nature of these chemicals, the committee recognized

that “...decisions reached by expert groups in different countries with respect to any food

additive may vary, since the relative importance of different aspects of the problem may be

affected by the circumstances, dietary habits or legislative background of the community that

expert group serves.”225

The FAO and WHO not only highlighted the importance of the role of the scientist, but also the

need for flexibility with additive guidelines, and, interestingly, the explicit recognition that

standardization of procedures and methods may not work or be appropriate at all times. As they

reported, “No single pattern of tests could cover adequately, but not wastefully, the testing of

substances so diverse in structure and function as food additives. The Committee considers that

the establishment of a uniform set of experimental procedures that would be standardized and

obligatory is therefore undesirable. Furthermore, it would not necessarily resolve the difficulties

that have sometimes been encountered in reaching decisions on the safe use of food

additives.”226

Moreover, given the nature of toxicological evidence (as discussed in more detail in the section

below): “…while safety for use is an all-important consideration…it is impossible to establish

absolute proof of the non-toxicity of a specified use of an additive. The occasional case of

idiosyncrasy may illustrate this point. It is also important to remember…that the use of the food

additive shall be to the advantage of the consumer.” 227”

224 Procedures for the testing of intentional food additives to establish their safety for use (Second report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 144, 1958 (out of print), p. 5. 225 Procedures for the testing of intentional food additives to establish their safety for use (Second report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 144, 1958 (out of print), p. 5. 226 Procedures for the testing of intentional food additives to establish their safety for use (Second report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 144, 1958. 227 Procedures for the testing of Intentional Food Additives to establish their Safety for Use (Second Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives) Technical Report Series, No. 144, 1958.

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But in spite of this reliance upon scientific experts and the official discourse on the role of the

scientist and advantage to the consumer, by 1963, members or observers of this expert committee

included not only Dow Chemical Company, but also Atlas Chemical Industries from the United

States, Royal Industrial Company of the Netherlands, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works also from

the United States, and the British Industrial Biological Research Association (B.I.B.R.A).228

The British Industrial Biological Research Association was an organization which also emerged

in 1963, a funded-by-industry conglomeration of scientific experts and researchers whose “sole

business was to carry out fundamental research and routine testing on the safety-in-use of food

additives.”229 It was, however, mainly a partnership between government (the Department of

Science and Industry) and industry with a membership of over 160 firms who were “leaders in

chemicals, cosmetics, plastics, packaging and food manufacture.”230 Touted as an “independent”

and “not for profit” research association whose aim was to “foster and facilitate technological

progress in the industries they serve”, the British Industrial Biological Research Association

began conducting its own experiments to assess the harm of food additives through toxicological

tests and animal feeding studies at the same time as the Codex.231 It even initiated its own

international journal, Food and Cosmetics Toxicology, as a means to disseminate its findings and

scientific expertise.

And herein lies the ambiguous nature of food additives which the international organizations

were confronted with: many interests were at stake and to some degree represented around the

table. Additives were the area where trade and health and industry and the consumer collided

and thus standards and guidelines represented a co-production of epistemological expertise

(chemical, toxicological data) with economic, trade, and cultural concerns and consumer

preferences. This recurring theme of competing interests was echoed over and over again not

228 Specifications for the identity and purity of food additives and their toxicological evaluation: emulsifiers, stabilizers, bleaching and maturing agents (Seventh report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 281, 1964 229 Bey, J.A. The British Industrial Biological Research Association. Int. J. Food Sci. Nutrition. 1963, Vol. 17 No. 2 p. 72. 230 Bey, J.A. The British Industrial Biological Research Association. Int. J. Food Sci. Nutrition. 1963, Vol. 17 No. 2 p. 73. 231 Bey, J.A. The British Industrial Biological Research Association. Int. J. Food Sci. Nutrition. 1963, Vol. 17 No. 2 p 75.

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only in the early meetings, but also as the Codex developed and later on within the European

Community which in many ways came to be seen as a “microcosm of the Codex” – a term

coined by a future leader of the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives.232

This early work of the expert committees and its (perhaps idealistic) goals meant that the next

phase – the putting of these standards and guidelines into practice internationally – fell partly

under the guise of the new international Codex Alimentarius in the early 1960s. Although the

WHO/FAO joint expert meetings (JECFA) continued, the attention on their work increased as

the new international Codex began to take shape and more observers – including the EEC and

industrialist companies and associations like the British Industrial Biological Research

Association – began to attend and the stage was set for a tug-of-war over the direction the work

should take as interests of trade and health were considered alongside each other.233 As the

work on food additives expanded, so too did the problems related to toxicological evidence and

expertise, the possible links with cancer, and difficulties over defining these substances, their

recommended intake, and several other ambiguities specific to the nature of food additives

standards.

3.4. The Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) est. 1963

Upon its establishment in 1963, the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) inherited part

of this work of the WHO/FAO Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives and carried on with

establishing standards for additives, and lists of permitted substances. But the JECFA itself

continued with its meetings in Geneva to generate technical expert knowledge about food

additives, and continued to influence and in some cases overlap (in some cases with

membership) with the new group. The membership of the JECFA was much smaller and

focused on more technical and scientific aspects of the food additives, and served as an ad hoc

232 W.H. B. Denner. 1990. “Food Additives: Recommendations for Harmonization and Control” In: Food Control, p. 152. Denner was the leader of the Joint FAO/WHO expert committee on food additives in the 1980s, and he coined this term retrospectively in 1990. Discussed further below. 233 Specifications for the identity and purity of food additives and their toxicological evaluation: emulsifiers, stabilizers, bleaching and maturing agents (Seventh report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives). WHO Technical Report Series, No. 281, 1964.

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expert group, unlike the Codex Committee on Food Additives which met regularly and had a

much larger membership (See Figure 2.2). The CCFA often met in The Hague or Arnhem,

chaired by Dr. Dols of the Netherlands, but also attended by delegates from the EEC, the

International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Vine and Wine Office.

Dols, a cabinet adviser with the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, was also

Chair of the Executive Committee for the entire Codex Alimentarius Commission at the time,

along with Vice Chairs from Canada (Mr. H.V. Dempsey of the Department of Health and

Welfare), France (Mr. Gérard Weill, the Secretary of the Commission Internationale des

Industries Agricoles) and the United Kingdom (Mr. John H.V. Davies, the Principal of the Food

Standards Division in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food).234

In the mid-1960s, one health concern arose over the use of sulfur dioxide (SO2) in foods, as an

antioxidant; it was also becoming known to cause allergic reactions or sensitivities. But

restrictions on this additive bred anxiety among wine producers, and limits for SO2 in this

commodity was postponed pending further work on “technological justifications” for its

necessary use at higher levels in wine than in other commodities.235 By 1972, however, the

Committee considered a memorandum by Prof. E.J. Bigwood, representative of the International

Union of Nutritional Sciences, which pointed out that legal tolerances for sulphur dioxide in

wine were generally too high and no longer corresponded to actual technological requirements.

There was a need, therefore, to reduce not only the legal tolerances but also the actual quantities

of this substance in wine. The memorandum described recent investigations in Belgium on the

probable intake of sulphur dioxide, which showed that the ADI established by the Expert

Committee on Food Additives was exceeded by adult persons who regularly consumed wine in

moderate amounts or who consumed excessive amounts of beer.236

By 1973, then, the observer from the Office International de la Vigne et du Vin informed the

Committee that, as a result of a campaign carried out over a period of twenty years by his

234 FAO/WHO. 1964. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Alimentarius Commission: Progress Report of the Expert Committee on Food Additives. The Hague, 19-22 May 1964. ALINORM 64/4. 235 FAO/WHO. (1964) Progress Report of the Expert Committee on Food Additives. 236 FAO/WHO. 1972. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Report of the Eighth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Additives. Wageningen, 29 May - 2 June 1972.

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organization, “a reduction in the use of sulphur dioxide had finally been agreed to in September

1972 by the General Assembly of the Office, and lowered the limits to 200 mg SO2/ litre for red

wine and of 250 mg SO2/ litre for dry white wine, replacing earlier values of 350 to 450 mg

S02/litre, depending on the country.”237 These limits would be adopted by the member countries

of the EEC and also, by other countries. It was expected that the SO2 values would in fact be

considerably lower and that, eventually, with further improvements in technology and

equipment, still lower limits might be achieved.238

Another controversy arose in the early years of the Codex Committee on Food Additives –pitting

the question of health over technological need – with regard to the use of a certain antimicrobial

additive, nisin, a preservative that combats bacterial growth in canned fruits and vegetables. The

Codex Committee on Food Hygiene recommended against its use on the one hand (because its

presence could also lead to the growth of Clostridium botulinum, an emerging threat at the time

which causes the fatal botulism), and, on the other hand, the JECFA had recommended its use

worldwide. This prompted the makers of the additive, Aplin and Barrett Ltd., to complain to the

secretariat of the FAO for confusing messages that might also “discourage purposeful

technological progress” and “creating alarm.”239 The additive could be still be used, but it was

promoted as being more advantageous in warmer climates – as long as its approval was also

issued with guidance on maintaining a lower pH (e.g. lower than 4.5) to prevent thermophilic

growth of these deadly bacteria.240

As well, other concerns and controversies began to surface over the use of bleach in flour,

antimicrobials, colours, enzymes, and antioxidants such as Butylated Hydroxytoluene (B.H.T.) –

a preservative which delays the onset of rancidity in oils, fats and fatty foods but also shown to

cause depressed growth rate, foetal abnormalities and enlarged livers and increased cholesterol in

237 FAO/WHO. 1973. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Report of the Ninth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Additives. Wageningen, 10-14 December 1973 238 FAO/WHO. (1973) Report of the Ninth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Additives. 239 Letter from G. G. Fowler to H. McNally 14th April 1970, CX 4/20 The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. Box 12C x 12. 240 Letter from H. McNally to G.G. Fowler 28th April 1970. CX4/20. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. Box 12C x 12.

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rats.241 To tackle the problem the Codex started out first by defining food additives as “any

substance, including microbial material, not normally consumed as a food by itself, whether or

not it has nutritive value, the intended use of which results directly or indirectly in it or its by-

products becoming a component of, or otherwise affecting the characteristics of a food. The term

includes any substance intended for the use in the production, manufacture, processing,

preparing, treating, packing, packaging, transporting or holding of a food. The term does not

include either contaminants or pesticide residues242

At the same time, however, the Codex found that it had to make the distinction between food

additives, and contaminants to differentiate (albeit vaguely) between substances which were

intentionally added to foods versus those which remain as residues or in trace amounts: “For the

purpose of the Codex Alimentarius, contaminant means any substance not consumed as a food by

itself, not being a food additive, some traces of which remain in the finished product as a result

of production, manufacture, processing, preparing, treating, packing, packaging, transporting or

holding such food.”243

Note that a definition of pesticide residues took a bit longer to develop, although indeed during

this same time period, pesticide residues in food were becoming associated with adverse health

issues. Similar to food additives, there was increased use of pesticides and other ‘plant

protection products’ like insecticides during the postwar period in order to protect food and

agriculture from spoilage and disease. Agents like DDT and dioxins were applied liberally to

kill pests or protect food intended for human consumption, not fully realizing that the products

themselves might cause severe long or short-term health damage. As it will be discussed in

Chapter 4, there were separate committees within the Codex and also within the European

Community who started to tackle questions of pesticide residue tolerances and harmonization of

laws for such substances.244

241 “The Eventful History of B.H.T.” Leading Articles, Lancet – November 20, 1965, p.1056-1058. 242FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Committee on Food Additives, Report of the Fifth Session, Arnhem, The Netherlands, 18-22 March 1968 243 FAO/WHO. (1968) Report of the Fifth Session. 244 Brigit Ramsingh, “Standardizing Tolerance or Tolerating Standards?: Pesticide Residues in the European Community in Historical Perspective (1955-1995)” in EURAS Proceedings, 2009.

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The initial focus of the Codex Committee on Food Additives group was to generate definitions,

categories, “positive lists” of additives for those chemicals which were permitted to be added to

foods, but reluctantly, the focus eventually shifted away from mere positive lists into a

discussion of restricted substances, or removing substances altogether from permitted lists. For

example, the suggestion to remove BHT from the permitted list in 1965, sparked controversy not

just among industry but also medical experts. As one leading article in the Lancet complained:

“Not surprisingly, the world situation with regard to B.H.T. is chaotic…” and “confused” and

there existed a “multitude of interpretations that have obscured the main issues.”245 The crux of

the problem was “the realisation that toxicology, as it is practised in many centres, is still far

from an exact science,” as, the author suggested, the figures and evidence used to suggest a

maximum tolerance level of BHT failed to take into account other parameters. The maximum

value in Britain for BHT was set at 200 parts per million initially, then, after studies purportedly

linked BHT with birth defects, liver problems and balding in rats, the U.K. Ministry of Fisheries,

Agriculture and Food recommended it be reduced to 100 p.p.m, and the U.K. Food Standards

Committee proposed it be banned outright as an antioxidant. Meanwhile, the United States Food

and Drug Administration continued its use at higher levels despite “the fiercest pressures” and

the “widely misunderstood” attitude of the Codex Expert Committee on Food Additives, who set

a conditional ADI for BHT at 0.5 mg per kg per day.” (0.5 p.p.m.)246 The medical concern was

that the toxicological data did not reflect a realistic intake, consumption and retention levels of

BHT, and in particular “failure to measure faecal output of B.H.T. led to a report that the fate of

46% of the administered B.H.T. was unknown, which was widely interpreted as signifying that

the missing B.H.T. had been spirited away into some dark and dangerous recess of the body.”247

Toxicologists fought back, however, over the BHT issue, food additives and pesticide residues in

general. As an expert from the Medical Research Council’s Toxicology Unit in Surrey

responded, “We are all driven to favour the use of substances like dicophane which may increase

food production and B.H.T. which may reduce food spoilage, by our realization of world food

shortage. At the same time we are driven in the direction of more stringent control of allowable

245 “The Eventful History of B.H.T.” Leading Articles, Lancet – November 20, 1965, p.1056-1058. 246 “The Eventful History of B.H.T.” Leading Articles, Lancet – November 20, 1965, p.1056-1058. 247 “The Eventful History of B.H.T.” Leading Articles, Lancet – November 20, 1965, p. 1056-1058.

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pesticide residues and additives in food by the realisation of the extent to which we are exposed,

and our ignorance of the long-term effects of such exposure. Meanwhile the dicophane intake of

some breast-fed infants already exceeds the W.H.O. recommended figure. There is no easy

solution. I feel that your leaders do not do justice to both sides of the conflict, or to your

readers.”248

Meanwhile, the British Industrial Biological Research Association (mentioned above)

complained about how “expensive” toxicological research was, and promoted its cost-effective

approach and wide dissemination of scientific results in its journal Food and Cosmetics

Toxicology in order to avoid costly and wasteful duplication of work. In fact, BIBRA secretary

Bey suggested that the “minimum cost of a test likely to satisfy the U.S. Food and Drug

Administration is $100,000.”249 (These tests included toxicological testing for carcinogenic

risks, toxicity testing, data and information on the composition of the additive as well as

information about any impurities.) Moreover, BIBRA was trying to reach a different audience:

the every day reader and not necessarily someone with toxicological training as “he can fend for

himself.”250 They also criticized the secrecy of safety evaluations and how they should not be

under lock and key in government or industrial offices or filing cabinets. At the same time,

however, Food and Cosmetic Toxicology editors urged its readers and scientists (self described

“young and daring” researchers) to publish negative results as well:

“We do not feel that a scientific journal suffers by being lively, interesting and

controversial. There is much that is controversial in the world of food additive

toxicology, and we invite readers to air their views on questions of general interest.251

This “pull no punches” and “toxicology without tears” approach had much currency and even

worked its way into the hearts and minds of the Codex Committee and the Joint Expert

248 A. E. M. McLean., Letters to the Editor, the Lancet December 18, 1965, p. 1295. 249 Bey, J.A. “The British Industrial Biological Research Association.” Int. J. Food Sci. Nutrition. 1963, Vol. 17 No. 2 pp. 72-75 250 Editorial. Food and Cosmetics Toxicology. Vol 1, pp. 3-16. 1963. Pergamon Press Great Britain. 251Editorial. Food and Cosmetics Toxicology. Vol 1, pp. 3-16. 1963. Pergamon Press Great Britain

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Committee on Food Additives. In fact, BIBRA also attempted to seek the endorsement of Dr.

Norman Wright, not only a member of both the JECFA and the CCFA, but also the Deputy

Director-General of the FAO from 1959-1963. BIBRA asked him to write a foreword for the

journal. Wright turned them down politely, partly because he was leaving the Codex to take up

the post of Secretary with the British Association for the Advancement of Science, but also

because, as he wrote to their assistant editor, “I fear that my commitments here will not give me

time to do justice to the subject” and asked them to delete his name from their mailing list.252

But this in no way meant that there was not a close relationship between the Codex and BIBRA.

Francis Townshend, Liaison officer of the FAO, told the BIBRA Director in 1963 that he was

“extremely glad” to accept their invitation to join the Honorary Board of the new journal, and

would have done sooner since “already before Christmas I was authorized to accept your

invitation, but repeated doses of flu plus the holiday season have prevented me from answering

before.”253 He would meet in London with the association and also provided their Director Dr.

L. Golberg with lists of addresses of “people in the food field throughout the world” who they

could collaborate with.254

A key area of concern was the dissemination of information, and abstracts about food additives

and toxicological research in this area, and although the Food Cosmetics and Toxicology

abstracts were admittedly meant to be “informative and interpretive” and not a substitute for

original research “in the eyes of the specialist”, they were used as sources of expert information

and raised in profile internationally thanks not only to BIBRA´s industrial contacts, but also due

to its relationship with the Codex and JECFA.255 Although a key goal with the BIBRA and other

252 Letter from Norman C. Wright to Mr. A.J. Cohen, 15 May 1963. Re: Food and Cosmetics Toxicology. SP 10/1 Policy. The Archives of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, Italy. 253 Letter from Francis Townshend to Dr. L. Golberg, 16 January 1963. SP10/1 Policy. The Archives of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, Italy. 254 Letter from Francis Townshend to Dr. L. Golberg, 16 January 1963. SP10/1 Policy. The Archives of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, Italy. 255 Minutes of a Meeting held at 4, Hanway Place, W.1. on 30th January 1963. between FH Townshend, B.R. Knapp, Dr. L.Golberg of BIBRA. DRAFT. The Archives of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. This meeting had been called to discuss in an ‘informal manner’ the possibility of establishing an organization to provide food science abstracts under three headings: 1) Food composition Food Technology. To a lesser degree Food Analysis, possibly directing attention to methods published in “Analytical Abtracts” and “Chemical Abstracts.” 2) Toxicology of Food and Food Additives and 3) Legal aspects of Food including science and technology.

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industrial food additive toxicological research was to assist in the integration and harmonization

of international legislation on tolerances, it cannot be ignored that documents from these

meetings between BIBRA and Townshend, abstracts and reports, were circulated to “major

parties interested or potentially interested in the abstracts, for example, Nestle, Unilever, etc.”256

These close relationships make it difficult to detangle the scientific from industrial ‘expertise’

suggesting once again how this information was co-produced in the process of establishing

international food additive standards.

So what of this evidence and how was this measured?

One of the underlying goals of the Codex Additive group was to establish tolerances for

individual food additives in specific food items, and determine methods for estimating

Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs). The Council of Europe had introduced the concept of the

ADI in 1957, it was later adopted by the FAO/WHO Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives

to evaluate the intake of nitrite and nitrates, and later also used by the Codex Committee on Food

Additives for other concerns such as sulfites257 Finding data for ADIs was difficult, however, as

the United States was the only member nation that had consumption data available, a result of a

national household survey performed in 1955 by the US Department of Agriculture.258

The value of an ADI was measured in units of mg/kg/day, and calculated based on the

assumption of adult weighing 60 kg, albeit making allowance for the fact that for some

commodities (e.g. “beverages and sweets”) these “may be consumed by children in much larger

quantities than the average.”259

256 Minutes of a Meeting held at 4, Hanway Place, W.1. on 30th January 1963. between Francis Townshend, B.R. Knapp, Dr. L.Golberg of BIBRA. DRAFT. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 257 Dr. L.J. Schuddeboom, “Nitrates and Nitrites in Foodstuffs” Prepared for the Committee of Experts on Health Control of Foodstuffs, The Council of Europe Press, 1993. http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/soc-sp/public_health/food_contact/NITR-E.pdf [Accessed September 2010]. 258 FAO/WHO. 1965. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Alimentarius Commission: Report of the Second Meeting of the Codex Committee on Food Additives. The Hague, 10-14 May 1965. ALINORM 65/12. In 1958, different regulatory categories of additives emerged in the United States when an amendment to the Food Drug and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act resulted in its Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) list. See: http://www.fda.gov/Fdac/features/2004/204_gras.html 259 FAO/WHO. 1964. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Alimentarius Commission: Progress Report of the Expert Committee on Food Additives. The Hague, 19-22 May 1964. ALINORM 64/4.

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Moreover, as the leading article in the Lancet had mentioned, the value of an ADI was placed

into two categories: an “unconditional zone” and a “conditional zone”. If the ADI fell into the

range of ‘unconditional zone’, it meant that the value was much lower than the established

maximum tolerance (the maximum as established by the Codex committee) and thus no further

input from scientific experts or technical data was needed, and assuming best practices, the

additive was safe. Interestingly, the unconditional zone was intended “as a guide to developing

countries that may not be able to call upon appropriate experts to guide them in the handling of

problems in this field.” On the other hand, “The conditional zones of acceptability…are more

likely to be of interest to those countries that have a more elaborate organization for dealing with

food policy and the health hazard of the consumer.” 260 Under the guise of relying upon

“scientific expertise”, this conditional versus unconditional dichotomy thereby set up an implicit

tension between developed and industrialized member states on the one hand, and, on the other,

less developed nations often from the African, Asian, or South American regions. Countries like

India, Japan, Thailand, and South Africa (to name a few) wanted greater involvement with the

Codex, and came on board early on in the program in the hope that, by meeting these

internationally accepted standards, this exposure to more markets farther overseas might boost

their economies.261 But realistically, with attempts by the international agencies to impose

different levels of standards depending on a country´s assumed level of “expertise”, this hope

was difficult to realize and shows how scientific expertise was inextricably paired (intentionally

or not) with economic, political or cultural factors when developing an international standard.

Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs) were a very good idea in theory, but putting these into practice

with the Codex standards for adoption at the international level proved to be fraught with

complications such as these “zones”.

A clear way in which these ‘zones’ might cause complications for example, was in trading

between developed and developing countries, or North and South regions of the world, or even

between former empires and its former colonies (like the United Kingdom and Jamaica, for

260 FAO/WHO. 1964. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Alimentarius Commission: Progress Report of the Expert Committee on Food Additives. The Hague, 19-22 May 1964. ALINORM 64/4. 261 Sorin C. Hansen, Acting Officer, Food Standards Program FAO, Letter to J.V.A. Nehemiah, Director, Liaison Branch FAO, 14 August 1964. Box 12C x 74. SP 10/1 Policy The Archives of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

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example.) Poorer countries in the developing world (e.g. those which could not afford the

infrastructure or expertise to put into place more stringent food policies or protection methods for

health hazards) would be automatically at a disadvantage under this system of ‘zones’ as their

products would have less mobility on the world market, compared to developed zones. Built into

these zones were barriers along economic and political lines. Moreover, as postwar frameworks

such as Bretton Woods system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

emerged to rationalize trading patterns, allow for greater international economic integration and

government intervention, prevent barriers to trade and promote the freer movement of goods

internationally, these variable values of the ADI – although purportedly grounded in scientific

expertise – could bring into question the power dynamic in these trading patterns if the values

were in favour of more developed countries and afforded them greater permissibility of food

additive in their products.262 Because the Codex standards (and their associated ADIs) were

voluntary in nature, however, this issue never reached great conflict until the 1980s and 1990s,

when the legislative frameworks tightened up, transnational companies expanded and flexed

their economic muscles, and the looming emergence of the World Trade Organization began to

shift the global trading landscape.263

There were other “uncertainties” with the ADIs and their interpretation, the most persistent

difficulty having to do with food consumed by children:

“Adequate guidance is given in the case of babies and very young children but there is

still confusion among those who have to translate ADIs into practical usage levels about

how, for example, one takes account of the consumption of high levels of soft drinks in

children aged say 6-12”.264

262 Peter B. Kenen (Ed). Managing the World Economy: 50 Years After Bretton Woods. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994. 263 By the late 1980s and early 1990s, it became clear that some governments were reluctant to adopt the standards put forth by the Codex food additives or recommended by the EU. The most high profile conflict occurred between the United States and the European Union over the use of hormones in beef and Bovine Somatotropin (BST) in milk where all of the uncertainties over ADI and toxicological data came into conflict with trade interests. This is discussed in more detail below on page 128 and also in the Conclusion, pp 204-213. 264 W.H. B. Denner. 1990. “Food Additives: Recommendations for Harmonization and Control” In: Food Control, p. 154.

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In the context of toxicological data, short-term exposure was not clearly defined – it could be a

day, a week, a month, a year or 10% of a lifetime. Although defining an Acceptable Daily Intake

was an attempt at addressing the problem of food additives, this measurement and concept in

itself had its own ambiguities and challenges, as the chair of the JECFA in the 1980s remarked:

“The apparent precision of the ADI should not be over-rated; there is no great precision

in any of the methods of estimating food additive intake except for duplicate diet studies.

These are rarely available, and even when they are, they have been carried out for only

short periods of time because they are enormously expensive. In such circumstances only

a broad approach can be taken. Sophisticated calculations may appear to be impressive

but can never add the precision that is lacking in the basic data. The most useful factors in

this exercise will be common sense and good will.”265

In addition to common sense and goodwill and ADIs, the Codex Food Additive Committee

adopted and promoted the JECFA’s General Principles for the Use of Food Additives in the late

1960s.266 Despite the issues with toxicological evidence as debated in the Lancet, the General

Principles stipulated how all food additives, whether actually in use or being proposed for future

use, should be subjected to adequate toxicological evaluation, and permitted food additives

should be subjected to continuing observation for possible deleterious effects and “should be re-

appraised whenever necessary in the light of changing conditions of use and new scientific

information.”267 Moreover, the inclusion of a food additive in a permitted list should, as far as

possible, be limited to specific foods for specific purposes and under specific conditions, and

finally, “when a food containing additives is consumed mainly by some special groups in the

community, the approval to use the additives should be based on knowledge of the intake by

such special groups concerning the food in question.”268

265 W.H. B. Denner. 1990. “Food Additives: Recommendations for Harmonization and Control” In: Food Control, p. 159. 266 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Committee on Food Additives, Report of the Fifth Session, Arnhem, The Netherlands, 18-22 March 1968 267 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Committee on Food Additives, Report of the Fifth Session, Arnhem, The Netherlands, 18-22 March 1968 268 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Program on Food Standards, Codex Committee on Food Additives, Report of the Fifth Session, Arnhem, The Netherlands, 18-22 March 1968

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The voice of these ‘special groups’ is remarkably absent from the Codex reports; unlike those of

industrial lobby groups or research associations such as BIBRA.

The consumer may have been missing, but government and industry were well represented. One

of the key actors around the table not only for the Codex additive work but for the Codex

commission at large was the newly formed European Community. The Codex began writing to

the EEC for reports and information on its program of work for food additives. Both groups kept

in contact over these issues and the EEC recognized how “Codex provisions may have an

incidence on trade. A coordinated approach of the Member States is therefore necessary.”269

3.5 The European Economic Community work on Food Additives

The European Community began to work more closely with the JECFA, where it sat as an

observer, and also with the CCFA, and generally looked to Codex and commented on its work on

food additives. Although the European Community was slower at producing food additive

standards than was the Codex, it is worthwhile to compare and examine both of these

international efforts, because, as a member of the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives

remarked, “in many respects, the European Community (EC) is a microcosm of Codex.”270

Although they both began to produce additive directives at the same time, the Codex produced

much more than the EEC, but relied upon the EEC for input and feedback. More explicitly than

the Codex, however, the EEC expertise on food additive was coproduced alongside regional

cultural concerns, something which echoes the problems of the Codex Europaeus and the

tensions of regional and national pride as presented in Chapter 1. Moreover, the new economic

agreements (such as the Common Agricultural Policy) of the Common Market posed a whole

new set of concerns in terms of potential trade barriers if standards were not uniform or

harmonized. The European core of the Codex food standards meant European interests – a

269 Commission of the European Communities SEC(74) 5249 final Brussels, 9 January 1975 COMMISSION REPORT TO THE COUNCIL on the action to be taken following the requests for comments on the carry-over principle concerning food additives contained in the letter sent by the secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme (OL 1974/13 August 1974). 270 W.H. B. Denner. 1990. “Food Additives: Recommendations for Harmonization and Control” In: Food Control, p. 152.

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recurring theme – were once again well represented in the discussion of food additive standards

at the international level.

Dr. William Butler Howard Denner, the Vice-chairman of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert

Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) during the 1980s, suggested that the development of

food additive standards in the EEC was much slower because “national food legislation is deeply

rooted in the culture and individuality of each country” and

“…so many foods had individual traditional national characteristics that it was not

possible to agree to common standards of identity that would allow all the national

variants to be traded under the same name or description.

With strict legal obligations to accept the results of negotiations, member states simply failed to

reach agreement.”271

Nonetheless, the European Community managed to establish its own principles and criteria on

food additives the late 1970s, and identified four broad classes of additives covered by its

Community Directives: 1) colouring matter, 2) preserving agents, 3) antioxidants and 4) lastly

emulsifiers, stabilizers, thickeners and gelling agents. This early directive also set up two

“essential conditions” on the use of additives (albeit vaguely defined): 1) they must not present

any danger to human health; and 2) they must meet a proven technological need.”272

Interestingly, at the same time as the EC moved to harmonize politically and integrate

economically – almost right after as it had set its conditions for food additives – it began to relax

certain standards.273 This relaxation in 1978 included additives used for pears and apples

(ethoxiquine), antioxygen substances (propyl gallate), smoking solution for smoking food

products, and a preserving agent for Grana-Padano cheese (formaldehyde).274 The rationale for

the relaxation was based upon only one of the two criteria for food additives: the substances in

271 W.H. B. Denner. 1990. “Food Additives: Recommendations for Harmonization and Control” In: Food Control, p. 154. 272 Additives in Foodstuffs: Amendments Proposed (Information Memo), Brussels, November 1977. 273 “Relaxation of Certain EEC Standards on Food Additives”, Europe, Monday 6 February 1978 274 “Relaxation of Certain EEC Standards on Food Additives”, Europe, Monday 6 February 1978.

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question were seen as useful from the “technological point of view” even though the research on

their “toxicological acceptability” was not yet complete.275 And so, even without any evidence

relating to human health, the technological use of these additives outweighed any potential

danger to human health.

This move brought criticism from various European countries as, the Commission was accused

of “partially yielding to pressure from the manufacturers of additives and from certain food

industries (particularly in Britain), and it was stressed that the drafts had been drawn up by the

general directorate for industrial affairs, without sufficient account being taken of the comments

of the ‘agricultural’ directorate-general and the department responsible for consumer

protection.”276

By 1981 more concerns were arising in the Community as a document called, ‘Food Additives

and the consumer’ was published under contract by the Commission of the European

Communities and seen by some as “manifestly one-sided and alarmist”. 277 The Commission

maintained that this document was not the opinion of the EC, and that for any directive related to

additives, it would consult its independent expert scientists on the EEC Scientific Committee for

Food. And so, in one of the few instances where the voice of the consumer crept through, it was

balanced out with the assurance that scientific expertise would ultimately prevail.

The turning point in the EEC occurred in 1988 when it drew up a framework directive that aimed

for harmonization of food additive laws within the Community. These separate directives

covered colours, sweeteners and miscellaneous additives including food acids used in fruit

juices, nectars and vinegar, preservatives against micro-organisms, antioxidants which retard

oxidation of oils and fats; gelling, thickening and stabilizing agents which give food the desired

texture and consistency and emulsifiers and stabilizers used in the manufacture of foods

containing fats and oils, such as ice cream, yoghourt, chocolate and whipping cream.278

275 “Relaxation of Certain EEC Standards on Food Additives”, Europe, Monday 6 February 1978. 276 “Relaxation of Certain EEC Standards on Food Additives”, Europe, Monday 6 February 1978. 277 Written Question No. 1807/81 by Mr Tyrrell to the Commission of the European Communities. 446.63 Food Additives March 24 1982. 278 Foodstuffs: New Proposal in the Pipeline on Food Additives, European Report April 11, 1992.

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Of course, the main factor driving the move toward harmonization was the difference among the

national laws relating to additives – especially preservatives and antioxidants – laws which were

seen to hinder the free movement of goods and create unfair competition.279 Although by this

time some additives (such as monosodium glutamate or sulfites) were known to cause reported

reactions such as “migraine, headaches, diarrhoea, respiratory problems and skin rashes” it

appeared that the thought of unfair competition was just as problematic and prompted the EEC to

adopt a ‘horizontal approach’ which some saw as a move toward ‘relaxation’ of additive

standards. 280 Regardless, it meant that factors other than simply health criteria or scientific or

medical expertise were being considered in the development of these directives.

And so, in the early 1990s, the European Parliament put out its directives: one on sweeteners,

one on colourings, and one on all other additives not covered by the first two categories.281 But

it was the one concerning sweeteners that left a sour taste in the mouths of its many members. A

proposed amendment to this directive gave protection to ‘traditional’ foods and was particularly

aimed at protecting the 16th C German purity law (the Reinheitsgebot) that restricted beer from

containing anything other than water, barley and hops.282 The Germans wanted to prohibit the

addition of sweeteners in beer, and this “German footnote” was being “attacked from all sides”

as it had ominous consequences for the use of additives by other member states.283 “British food

minister Nicholas Soames declared that, contrary to public fears, the new rules would not take

the colour away from mushy peas, bangers or any other of Britain’s cherished foods.

‘Everything will be safeguarded,’ he told reporters. Denmark did not come off as well. It voted

against the rules because it would no longer be able to add titanium dioxide to feta cheese to

make it whiter, EC officials said. Greece and Italy fought against colouring of white cheese such

as feta and mozzarella, one official said. The Council agreed to authorize only natural colourings

279 Foodstuffs: new proposal in the pipeline on food additives, European Report, April 11, 1992 280 Foodstuffs: new proposal in the pipeline on food additives, European Report, April 11, 1992. 281 See David Jukes, “Food Additives in the European Union” http://www.rdg.ac.uk/foodlaw/additive.htm 282 See: Karl J. Eden, "History of German Brewing" Zymurgy magazine, Vol. 16, No. 4 Special 1993; and Horst D. Dornbusch, Prost!: The Story of German Beer, Brewers Publications,U.S. (1 Dec 1997) 283 “Foodstuffs: New proposal in the pipeline on food additives.” European Report April 11, 1992.

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for generic categories of meat, but synthetic colourings for specific products such as Strasbourg

sausage.”284

Drawing upon some of the Codex guidelines, then, the EC suggested the following (revised)

criteria for the proposed regulation governing the use of additives: 1) there can be demonstrated

a reasonable technological need and that the purpose cannot be achieved by other means which

are economically and technologically practicable; 2) they do not mislead the consumer; 3) there

is evidence that the use of the additive would be of benefit to the consumer; and 4) additives are

continuously monitored and re-evaluated whenever necessary.285

This framework invoked two concepts, 1) that of the “Quantum Satis” level (meaning that no

maximum level is specified) and 2) the use of Good Manufacturing Practice. With these two

concepts in mind, the framework suggested that “food additives should be used according to

good manufacturing practice at a level not higher than is necessary to achieve the intended

purpose.”286

In this move toward harmonization, the EEC was drawing heavily upon the “Denner Paper”

presented to the Codex Joint Expert Committee for Food Additives in 1990 (see p. 118, n. 266),

which called for a reform for international and regional standards, and a more horizontal

approach. Denner was the former chair of the JECFA and served in the UK Ministry of

Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and he argued that in the early years of additive standard

development, the Codex and European Community approach was “over ambitious and too

idealistic.”287 The main problem with the standards was their slow (or entirely absent) adoption

and implementation by governments, as Denner wrote: “Each standard is only as good as the

number of member nations who accept them, formally or informally.”288 A great deal of time

was spent on a vertical approach, namely by drafting many standards for individual commodities

284 Perry, Suzanne “Council Resolves German Beer Conflict” Reuter Sept 27 1993. 285 Commission of the European Communities. Brussels, 28 February 1992. Comments of the European Community on the Items of the Agenda CX/FAC 92/1 for the Twenty-Fourth session of the Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants. (The Hague, 23-28 March 1992). 286 Foodstuffs: new proposal in the pipeline on food additives, European Report, April 11, 1992 287 W.H. B. Denner. 1990. “Food Additives: Recommendations for Harmonization and Control” In: Food Control, 1 (3), p. 151. 288 Denner. (1990) “Food Additives”, p. 160.

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and additives. The EEC needed to move more quickly because by the early 1990s full

unification was on the horizon, and thus a broader ‘horizontal’ approach to many European

problems like additives was required.

As with other standards and the inherent problems of trying to impose one model onto diverse

contexts and situations, in terms of technological need, there existed many problems in that

different countries and regions have differences in: raw materials, processing equipment, process

control equipment, packaging equipment, climates, storage conditions, distribution methods,

retailing conditions, home storage conditions and consumer expectations.

In light of these challenges, the perception of the (mainly absent) consumer and their opinion

was that they 1) “expect the use of food additives to be uniform and, even more surprisingly, to

be uniformly in accordance with food additive usage in their own country.”289, and caused

problems by putting pressure on governments for food additives standards. As Denner

suggested,

“The problem with consumer pressure is that it is frequently based on emotion rather than

fact. That is not to say that it is not genuinely felt -it most certainly is. It does, however,

present governments with a dilemma. If food policy is based on the emotions of the day

this can be a recipe for disaster for a strategic industry which must stay viable in order to

feed those very consumers. The most realistic way forward, particularly in the interests of

international harmonization, is for governments to restrict their activities so far as

possible to science-based decisions and allow market forces to take care of the emotional

swings of consumer opinion.”290

289 Denner. (1990) “Food Additives”, p. 155. 290 Denner. (1990) “Food Additives”, p. 156.

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Despite all of the earlier work done on additives since the 1950s, the vastness of the issue meant

that international organizations and regional communities eventually adopted a more ‘horizontal’

approach rather than attempt to tackle each additive individually. The focus shifted away from

producing exhaustive lists of additives (the “bread and butter” of former agendas)291, to broader

issues such as intake studies of food additives and contaminants, a procedure for priority setting

for the safety evaluation of flavouring substances, labelling and good manufacturing practices,

and an international numbering system for food additives.292

Nonetheless, Denner warned that, “nothing will be achieved unless some way is found to

preserve the identity and character of foods in each member nation. That national character is

often significantly dependent on the use of food additives.”293 By way of example, he pointed to

sausages, another recurring theme:

“The English sausage is very different from the French sausage or the German sausage.

Nobody should try to make them conform to the same compositional standard. They are

different and should always remain different. This means that they have to be called by a

different name which reflects their national or regional origin such as ‘English sausage’

or ‘English-style sausage’. The presence of added colouring matter will be clearly shown

on the label. Nobody will be deceived or will confuse the different products. Nobody will

be poisoned either, because the colouring matter has been given an ADI by JECFA”.294

And so, despite the role of the chemists, toxicologists, industry representatives and governmental

officials, he concluded

291 FAO/WHO. 1988. “Opening Speech of the Director General”. Report of the Twentieth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants. The Hague, 7-12 March 1988. 292 Both the Codex and EC developed systems such as the International Numbering System (INS) and the “E” list of additives. 293 Denner (1990) “Food Additives”, p. 159. 294 Denner (1990) “Food Additives”, p. 160.

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“…that consumers in certain nations do not want sausages with added colour, in which

case they will not buy them. The people should be able to decide for themselves. To ban

such products is unnecessary and a barrier to trade.”295

The Director General of Codex wrote in the late 1980s how the trend toward deregulation and

streamlining of food additives still meant that “consumer protection…was a basic principle.”296

For the EEC and other regions, the work of the Codex additives experts was instrumental in this

respect, even though technological need, cultural and national preferences, and promotion of

trade often factored into the basic principles underpinning food additives policies, in other

words, a co-production of all of these factors as standards were developed. As shown through

the early work of the JECFA and the CCFA, and the EEC activities, this pattern of co-production

was present in the development of food additive standards since the 1950s, and would take center

stage by the 1990s.

In 1995, the Codex became linked to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Codex

Alimentarius was thrust into the limelight when high-profile health concerns, import bans and

court cases began to surface as a result of the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef, as well

as the rise of production aids such abs the milk hormone Bovine Somato-tropin (BST). Debates

over maximum residue limits (MRLs) for these substances often pitted countries like the U.S.

against the newly harmonized European Union, and forced the Codex to consider whether to

base its decisions strictly on sound science or consider “other limiting factors” such as consumer

concerns, animal welfare, fraudulent or unfair trading practices, labelling and other ethical and

cultural considerations.297 Thus, through legislation like the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS

Agreement), and a revision of Codex general principles to be based on ‘sound science’, barriers

to trade lingered and presented what seemed like new problems but were in fact well rooted in

the earlier formations of the Codex and its additive committee work. As will be shown in the

next chapters on food hygiene and pesticide residues, this tension between scientific and medical

295

Denner (1990) “Food Additives”, p. 160. 296

FAO/WHO. 1988. “Opening Speech of the Director General”. Report of the Twentieth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants. The Hague, 7-12 March 1988. 297

Jukes, David. The Role of Science in International Food Standards. Food Control 11 (2000): 181-194.

107

expertise and other factors can also be rooted in the postwar initiatives of the Joint FAO/WHO

food standards program.

108

Figure 3.2. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS from CODEX COMMITTEE ON FOOD

ADDITIVES, Report of the sixth session 15-22 October 1969, Arnhem, The Netherlands.

Note that participants from 1963-1966 are omitted from the reports. Due to the size of the

committee this list is provided as an illustration of the membership.

DELEGATES

CHAIRMAN:

Professor Dr. M.J.L. Dols

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

1e van de Boschstraat 4

The Hague

The Netherlands

AUSTRALIA

Dr. R.H.C. FLEMING

Commonwealth Department of Health

Canberra A.C.T. 2605

AUSTRIA

Dr. K. PFOSER

A-1160 Wien

Koppstrasse 6p/3/18

Bundesministerium für soziale

Verwaltung

Stubenring 1

BELGIUM

M. FONDU

Laboratoire Union de Merksum

122 Rerum Novarumlaan

Merksum

BELGIUM

G.V. ART

Ministère Santé Publique

Cite Administrative

Quartier Vésale

Bruxelles

CANADA

Dr. W.A. MANNELL

Food and Drug Directorate

Department of National Health and

Welfare

Tunney's Pasture

Ottawa

CUBA

Mrs. DRA. A. FERNANDEZ CONDE

Ministerio de la Industria

Ave 41 # 4455, Marianao

Habana

CUBA

A. GARCIA VÁZQUEZ

Ministerio de la Industria

Ave 41 # 4455, Marianao

Habana

DENMARK

S.C. HANSEN

National Food Institute

Mørkhøj Bygade 19

DK 2860 Søborg

109

DENMARK

M. BERGSTRØM-NIELSEN

Department of Food Additives

National Food Institute

Mørkhøj Bygade 19

DK 2860 Søborg

DENMARK

E. POULSEN

Institute of Toxicology-

National Food Institute

Mørkhøj Bygade 19

DK 2860 Søborg

DENMARK

M. KONDRUP

Isalesta

H.C. Andersen Blvd. 18

DK-1553 Kobenhavn V

DENMARK

N. SKOVGAARD

State Veterinary Services

Nyropsgade 37

Copenhagen V

FINLAND

Mrs. A-L. KOSKINEN

Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Aleksanterinkatu 10

Helsinki 17

FINLAND

V. AALTO

Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Aleksanterinkatu 10

Helsinki 17

GERMANY FED.REP.

H.P. MOLLENHAUER

Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen

Deutschherrenstrasse 87

532 Bad Godesberg

FRANCE

Mrs. S. ROCHIZÉ

Ministère de l'Agriculture

Service de la repression des frauds

et du Contrôle de la qualité

42 bis rue de Bourgogne

Paris-7

GERMANY FED REP.

Dr. O. PAULI

D.415 Krefeld

Friedrich-Ebertstrasse 321

FED. REP of GERMANY

Dr. W. SCHUCHARDT

D.7887 Grenzach

Baslerstrasse 54

FED. REP OF GERMANY

Dr. H. VON PEZOLD

2 Hamburg 36

Dammtorwall 15

GHANA

K.K. EYESON

Food Research Institute

P.O. Box M.20

Accra

110

GHANA

A.O. NTIFORO

Standards Board

P.O. Box M.245

Accra

ITALY

Prof. G.L. GATTI

Istituto Superiore di Sanità

Viale Regina Elena 299

I-00161 Roma

ITALY

A. STACCHINI

Istituto Superiore di Sanità

Viale Regina Elena 299

I-00161 Roma

JAPAN

Dr. K. Kojima

Food Chemistry Section

Ministry of Health and Welfare

Kasumigaseki 1-2-2

Chiyodaku

Tokyo

JAPAN

J. KIRIMURA

Central Research Laboratory

Ajinomoto Co.

Suzulei-cho

Kawasaki

MOROCCO

N. HASNAOUI

Ambassade du Maroc

38 Avenue F. Roosvelt

Bruxelles 5

Belgique

THE NETHERLANDS

M.J.M. OSSE

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

Direction of International Trade and

Industries

1e van den Boschstraat 4

Den Haag

THE NETHERLANDS

P.H. BERBEN

Hoofdinspectie Levensmiddelen

Dr. Reijersstraat 10

Leidschendam

THE NETHERLANDS

J.P. GODDIJN

Dr. Reijersstraat 10

Leidschendam

THE NETHERLANDS

J.P.K. VAN DER STEUR

Rochussenstraat 49º

Rotterdam

THE NETHERLANDS

Dr. G.F. WILMINK

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

1e van den Boschstraat 4

Den Haag

PORTUGAL

Mrs. M.E. SILVA GRACA

Ministère de la Santé

Institute de Higiéne, Campo dos Martires

da Patria 91, Lisboa

111

POLAND

Mrs. A. BIENIEWSKA

Ministry of Foreign Trade

Quality Inspection Office – Laboratory

Gdynia

Pulaskiego 6

POLAND

Mrs. K. LEMIESZEK

State Institute of Hygiene

Warszava

Chocimska 24

SWEDEN

Dr. W. JENNING

Kungl. Kommerskollegium

Box 1209

111 82 Stockholm

SWEDEN

T. STORGARDS

Swedish Meat Research Centre

Kávlinge, Box 50

SWEDEN

Dr. A. EDHBORG

AB Findus

26700 Bjuv

SWITZERLAND

E. MATTHEY

Service Fédéral de I’hygiène publique

Contrôle des denrées alimentaires

Haslerstraase 16

3000-Berne

SWITZERLAND

G.F. SCHUBIGER

AFICO SA

Case Postale 88

1814 La Tour de Peilz

SWITZERLAND

Dr. W. HAUSHEER

CH 4000 Basel

Grenzacherstrasse 124

SWITZERLAND

J. RUFFY

Président du Comité National Suisse du

Codex

Alimentarius

Haslerstrasse 16

3000 Berne

THAILAND

Prof. Y. BUNNAG

c/o Department of Science

Ministry of Industry

Rama VI Street, Bangkok

UNITED KINGDOM

Dr. P.S. ELIAS

Department of Health and Social Security

Alexander Fleming House

London S.E.1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. H.P. BINGER

U.S. Mission to Europe Communities

23 Avenue das Arts

Brussels, Belgium

112

UNITED KINGDOM

Dr. F.H. BANFIELD

Food Manufacturers Federation Inc.

4 Lygon Place

London S.W.1

UNITED KINGDOM

N.K.S. BAKER

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and

Food

Horseferry Road

London S.W.1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. B.F. DAUBERT

General Foods Corporation

250 North Street

White Plains

New York

UNITED KINGDOM

T.J. COOMES

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and

Food

Great Westminster House

Horseferry Road

London S.W.1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. H. BLUMENTHAL

Food and Drug Administration

Washington D.C. 20205

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MORGAN M. HOOVER

Manufacturing Chemists Association

1825 Connecticut Ave

Washington D.C. 20016

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

R.J. OLSON

General Foods Corporation

36 Avenue des Arts

Brussels

Belgium

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

R.G. RUARK

C.P.C. International Inc.

International Plaza

Englewood Cliffs

New Jersey

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

B. BRISKI

Central Institute of Hygiene

Department of Food Hygiene

7 Rockefeller Street

Zagreb

113

OBSERVER COUNTRIES

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dr. V. BENEŠ

Institute of Hygiene

Srobárova 48

Prague 10

SOUTH AFRICA

S.P. MALHERBE

c/o S.A. Bureau of Standards

Private Bag 191

Pretoria.

REPRESENTATIVES OF UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES & INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

FAO PERSONNEL

A. EISENBFRG

Consultant, Food Standards Branch

FAO

00100 Rome

Italy

FAO PERSONNEL

Dr. L.G. LADOMERY

Food Standards Officer

Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards

Programme

FAO

00100 Rome

Italy

FAO PERSONNEL

R.K. MALIK

Chief

Food Standards, Additives and

Regulations Section

Nutrition Division

FAO

00100 Rome

Italy

WHO PERSONNEL

Dr. C. AGTHE

Food Additives Unit

WHO

1211 Geneva 27

Switzerland

WHO PERSONNEL

Dr. F.C. LU

Chief

Food Additives Unit

WHO

1211 Geneva 27

Switzerland

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

J. STEGEN

F-67 Strasbourg

France

114

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

COMMUNITY

E. GAERNER

Direction Générale de l'Agriculture

200 rue de la Loi

Bruxelles 4

Belgium

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

COMMUNITY

Mrs. C. DEMINE

D.G. V1/2

Beri. 5/5

Bruxelles

Belgium

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

COMMUNITY

G.J.J. NIJHOFF

Organization of Manufacturers of

Cellulose Products for

Foodstuffs in the E.E.C.

Waalbandijk 36-38

P.O. Box 31

Nijmegen

The Netherlands

INDUSTRIES / STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE

DES INDUSTRIES ET DU

COMMERCE EN GROS DES VINS

SPIRITUEUX, EAUX-DE-VIE ET

LIQUEURS

S. VALVASSORI

C. Umberto 76

Torino

Italy

FEDERATION EUROPEENE DES

FABRICANTS D'ADJUVANTS POUR

LA NUTRITION ANIMALE (FEFANA)

Dr. G. BEHM

Bonn

Adenauerallee 170

Federal Republic of Germany

P.R. MAINGUY

17 rue Denfert-Roohereau

Le Perreux 94

France

FEDERATION EUROPEENE DES

FABRICANTS D'ADJUVANTS POUR

LA NUTRITION ANIMALE (FEFANA)

E.E. MUYTJENS

c/o Merok, Sharp and Dohme

Nijverheidsweg

Haarlem

The Netherlands

115

EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF

MANUFACTURERS OF COMPOSITE

FOODSTUFFS FOR ANIMALS

(FEFAC)

Dr. C. BRENNINKMEIJER

Postbus 1

Boxmeer

The Netherlands

BUREAU DE LIAISON DES

PRODUITS AROMATIQUES

N. MESSINA

Via Fatebenefratelli 10

Milano

Italy

OFFICE INTERNATIONAL DU VIN

(OIV)

Prof. P. JAULMES

4 rue Donnat 34

Montpellier

France

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO)

TC 34 and TC 34/SC 5

J.B. ROOS

Rijkszuivelstation

Vreewijkstraat 12b

Leiden

The Netherlands

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO)

TC 34 and TC 34/SC 5

L.G.M.Th. TUINSTRA

Rijkszuivelstation

Vreewijkstraat 12b

Leiden

The Netherlands

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF

NUTRITIONAL SCIENCES (IUNS)

Professor E.J. BIGWOOD

Foodlaw Research Centre

Institute of European Studies

39 Avenue F.D. Roosevelt

Bruxelles 5

Belgium

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF

NUTRITIONAL SCIENCES (IUNS)

A. GERARD

Centre de Recherches sur le droit de

l'Alimentation

Institut d’Etudes européennes

University de Bruxelles

39 Avenue F.D. Roosevelt

Bruxelles 5, Belgium

INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES

INDUSTRIES DE LA PECTINE

A. CAPRIOLI

Via Carducci 27

Bergamo

Italy

INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES

INDUSTRIES DE LA PECTINE

M. de WHITTE

59 Bd. Lannes

Paris 16

France

116

WORLD ASSOCIATION OF

VETERINARY FOOD HYGIENISTS

M. van SCHOTHORST

Sterrenbos 1

Utrecht

The Netherlands

SECRETARIAT

TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

Dr. P.L. SCHULLER

Rijksinstituut voor de Volksgezondheid

Sterrenbos 1

Utrecht

The Netherlands

TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

Dr. P.W.M. van der WEIJDEN

Unilever N.V.

Burg. ‘s Jacobpleln 1

Rotterdam

The Netherlands

TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

Dr. W.A. SEEDER

Koninklijk Verkade Fabrieken N.V.

Zaandam

The Netherlands

ORGANIZATIONAL SECRETARIAT

J. DRIJVER

Miss L.A. BROOKMAN

Miss M.J. van EIJK

Miss H.A. STARINK

International Agricultural Centre

P.O. Box 88

Wageningen, The Netherlands

ORGANIZATIONAL SECRETARIAT

Miss O. DIXON

Food Standards Branch

FAO

00100 Rome

Italy

ORGANIZATIONAL SECRETARIAT

Miss L. POLM

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

1e van den Boschstraat 4

The Hague

The Netherlands

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Chapter 4 Microbial Threats: Food Hygiene

“The habit of licking the fingers to pick up paper or to turn over the pages of a book is a

bad one at any time but particularly so when the paper, contaminated with saliva, is used

for wrapping food.”– Dr. Betty Hobbs, Food Poisoning and Food Hygiene, 1953

A surge of advice on food hygiene emerged in the post-war era when scientists and bureaucrats

alike became involved in the process of trying to eliminate these threats to the food supply.

Hygiene standards often took the material form of exhaustive lists, reports, charts, manuals,

books and pamphlets – lengthy paper documents which eventually gave way to electronic

versions and often set limits on the maximum microbial counts permitted in the final product.

In addition to describing numerical limits and parameters, however, the standards would also

advocate behavioural guidelines for anyone in contact with the food object, or, present

specifications that might either impinge upon or promote the cultural heritage embodied by the

food object; for example control of hygiene habits of labourers who work in abbatoirs or

prohibitions on the use of raw (e.g., unpasteurized) milk in cheese products. Dr. Betty Hobbs, a

British bacteriologist and an internationally recognized authority on food poisoning and food

hygiene, was just one of many experts doling out advice aimed at various audiences (Figure 4.1).

Hobbs was one of the first members of the Public Health Laboratory Service in London, and

became director of its Food Hygiene Laboratory. The FAO and WHO experts would draw upon

the work of microbiologists like Betty Hobbs in developing food safety standards starting in the

1960s, at a time when two different approaches to food hygiene were combining. One approach

was to descriptively and qualitatively address behaviour and practices and infrastructure at all

points along the food production continuum, for example, by reorganizing abbatoir layout,

advocating the use of hair nets in factories, urging labourers to refrain from chewing gum or

picking one’s nose. The other approach involved the application of statistical methods to food

safety problems, but mainly focusing quantitatively on the food product itself moreso than the

entire food production continuum. Ultimately, both approaches were retained and blended

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together, but the clash within the Codex in the 1960s showcases not only the different attitudes

of the WHO and the FAO toward food hygiene, but also how these two approaches drew upon

and placed emphasis on different forms of expertise, which had consequences for both health

protection and the food industry. As in previous examples, the hygiene work will show how

standards represent a co-production of different elements: not only are they collections of

numerical data and parameters, but they can also direct cultural traditions, social behaviour and

practices. In the Codex it became apparent through work on establishing hygiene standards and

attempting to curb the presence of microbes in food, that there was a difference between

standardizing the objects and standardizing the practices which bring about a desired end. There

were economic, legal, social and political implications of conflating the two and this debate

played out in the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH).

In this chapter, I focus on a debate over the form that the hygiene standards should take and the

implications for adopting one approach over others. This discussion at the international level

had two key features. First, the distinction between standardizing practices versus standardizing

the food object itself presented pragmatic problems of enforcement within member states as well

as varying degrees of burden upon industry and public health systems and thus prompted the

Codex Commission to differentiate between Standards for “End Products” versus “Codes of

Practice”. The second feature of this discussion is marked by a shift from more qualitative

descriptions to include standards that emphasize numerical parameters and employ statistical

data in order to be deemed “scientifically correct”. Implicit with this second feature is a

contested meaning of safety and international endorsement of how to assess risk quantitatively.

As seen in previous chapters, the discussion over the nature of these food standards showcase

once again how standards are an example of ‘co-production’ – that is, an example of how

standards can incorporate, represent and direct both the natural and social orders. An

examination of the Codex food hygiene committee’s work demonstrates how the production and

construction of standards based on microbiological science and statistical evidence involves a

parallel construction and consideration of the social order (e.g. the practices and behaviours that

ensure good hygiene). In the eyes of the Codex, the two could not be separated.

Microbes had been already identified as a problem in food in the late 19th century, so why the

sudden increase in attention toward such matters? Hygiene problems intensified in the post war

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era for several reasons. The increased industrialization of the food system in the 1950s and

1960s brought about the appearance of large-sized “factory” farms, many of which made use of

antibiotics to combat zoonotic infections. This increased use of these drugs, however, also

brought about bacterial resistance to emerging microbial problems, for example, Salmonellosis

which was identified as a key concern in poultry and dairy sectors (Figure 4.2). These

developments also meant that more food safety problems emerged as food travelled longer

distances, and new technologies and hygiene measures were required to address these

problems.298

Similar to additives, the meaning of food hygiene is also historically contingent. Recalling

Hardy’s historiographic distinction, there are two types of distinct illnesses associated with food:

1) one associated with adulteration (e.g. deliberate contamination, addition of foreign substances

like chemicals) as discussed in the previous chapter; versus 2) the illness caused by foods which

had undergone decomposition, putrefaction or decay – the products of which were once thought

of as chemical toxins and called ptomaines in the 19th c, said to cause ptomaine poisoning.299

Alongside these older frameworks of food adulteration and putrefaction, however, there also

arose a growing awareness of the role of the microbe in making food unsafe, and by the late 19th

c the term ‘food poisoning’ emerged, with its implications of bacteria as causal agent.300

Bacteriology was entering its heyday in late 19th and early 20th centuries with the race to identify

and classify newly discovered microbes. Once food poisoning began to emerge as a medical

problem in the early part of the 20th c, rumblings began to set food hygiene standards. For

example, in England the young medical officer William Savage called for bacteriological

standards and hygiene standards as early as 1909, but the complexity of the problem made it

difficult to know where to focus: the farms, the abbatoirs, the vendors, the consumers? And more

importantly, which disciplines should be involved to address the problem: bacteriologists,

veterinarians, public health officers.301,302 The end of the Second World War marked a watershed

298 Thoms, Ulrike, “Between promise and threat: Antibiotics in Foods in Germany 1950-1980” (Unpublished paper, 2010.); 299 Hardy, Anne, “Food, Hygiene and the Laboratory. A Short History of Food Poisoning in Britain circa 1850-1950,” The Society for the Social History of Medicine, Vol 12 no. 2, pp 293-311. 1999, p. 294. 300 Hardy, “Food, Hygiene and the Laboratory,” (1999), p.294. 301 Hardy, p. 302.

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for food poisoning and food safety standards. This period saw a rise of intensive farming

techniques, increased focus on the health of developing populations, worldwide trade, and the

industrialization and ‘scaling up’ of food systems and processes. For example, frozen foods,

which prior to WWII were sold only at “high prices in low volumes in fragmented markets”

became the fastest growing food sector by the 1950s.303 Moreover, increased reporting of

foodborne illnesses and emergence of surveillance networks for problems like salmonellosis all

meant that the time was ripe for coordinated international efforts in establishing food standards.

Food hygiene (at least in the eyes of the Codex) accounted for the overall cleanliness and

prevention of pathogenic or other biological contamination of food. Initially, however, the

Codex standards did not focus on counting microbes or other unwanted pests, just on simply

whether or not they were present in a food product without any concern over methods of

enumeration or statistical significance.

One way to combat this problem of controlling the microbe was to eliminate any ‘subjective’

qualitative descriptions of the hygiene standards, especially in the final product specifications.

Enlisting biometricians was one way to do so and this is where the differences in opinion over

the standards emerged between the major players. Appealing to expert statistical knowledge is

not novel; it has been well documented that statistical styles of reasoning had been occurring

within pockets of scientific and medical research communities starting in the early and

throughout the 19th century.304 And indeed, bacteriologists and biometricians have met before,

for example during debates over who should be “the final arbiter of medical knowledge”

(clinicians, biometricans or bacteriologists) which influenced the disputes between the British

302 Marion Nestle has described food safety as a “shared responsibility” in Safe Food: Bacteria, Biotechnology and Bioterrorism Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p. 1. 303 Hamilton, Shane. The Economies and Conveniences of Modern-Day Living: Frozen Foods and Mass Marketing, 1945-1965. The Business History Review, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 33-60. 304 And here, I am referring to work done by Ian Hacking and Ted Porter in describing the end of determinism in the 19th C, the onslaught of what Hacking calls an ‘avalanche of numbers’ and Porter sees as ‘the rise of statistical thinking’ all part of a trend which made objects more knowable. See Hacking, Ian, The Taming of Chance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; and Porter, Theodore, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986; and Porter, Theodore M., Trust in Numbers: the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. 1995. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

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biometrical school (Karl Pearson) and the bacteriologist Sir Almoth Wright over the

effectiveness of Wright’s antityphoid inoculation.305 This was the first time bacteriologists knew

or appreciated the importance of counting their subjects. On an international scale, the statistical

approach to food hygiene standards was becoming codified and institutionalized, and the role of

players such as the FAO, WHO and others described below showcases this shift in approach to

preventing foodborne illness.

This Codex initiative followed on the heels of similarly-minded groups which emerged during

the same post-WWII period, such as in 1947 the International Organization for Standardization

(ISO) based out of Geneva, and its subgroup ISO-TC34, based out of Hungary, which was

starting to investigate standard methods for microbial testing and identification of salmonella.306

The International Committee for Microbial Safety in Foods (ICMSF) (of which Dr. Betty Hobbs

was a member) emerged in 1962 – the same year as the Codex Alimentarius. It was a standing

committee of the International Association of Microbiological Societies (IAMS), which was

divided into three broad sections: bacteriology, virology and mycology.307 The WHO would

provide grants to the IAMS and its subsidiary bodies for expert advice.308 The International

Committee for the Microbial Safety for Food consisted of 22 members from 15 countries,

selected on the basis of their “technical competence and interest rather than as national

representatives.”309

Meanwhile, the young European Economic Community (EEC) was also focused on establishing

directives, but in these early years aimed more at agricultural targets, as its Scientific Committee

on Food was only established in 1974. For example, in 1973 the EEC produced some directives

305 Matthews, Rosser J. Quantification and the Quest for Medical Certainty. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 100. 306 Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the Ninth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. 19-23 June 1972. 307 Dr. P Sand, Legal Officer, WHO, Letter to W.L. de Haas, 28 January 1972. This group was formerly known as the International Society for Microbiology, founded in 1927, and by the late 1960s became part of the International Union of Biological Sciences (IUBS). 308 Mr. P.H. Crane, FAO Staff, Letter to Graham O. Kermode, Chief of the Food Standards Program, 31 January 1972. CX 4/20 The Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 309 Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the Ninth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. 19-23 June 1972.

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urging member states to adopt standard hygiene practices aimed at farmers and the poultry

industry.310

At this same time, microbes were also garnering great interest internationally for their potential

uses and abuses. The use of microbes for food production (for example for cheese, beer,

yogourt) was practised and known for a long time, but during the postwar period,

industrialization of these (and other) food sectors meant that such processes were being scaled

up. Other non-food-related potential areas of use were being explored, however, such as

‘geomicrobiology’ or how to exploit microbial activity for the treatment of raw materials like

fuel and mineral resources, such as in sulphur production.311 There were potential industrial and

medical uses for microbes: to assist in the production of chemical solvents, dextrans and

hydroxyethyl (starch-like substitutes for plasma in blood transfusions) for the development of

antibiotics312 and for cleaning up waste water effluent before its discharge into rivers to help curb

pollution.313 On the other hand, within the context of the Cold War and increasing fear of atomic

warfare, there too were fears even among microbiologists that “mankind’s control over microbes

provides a greater threat to his future than his control of the atom.”314 The “Global Impacts of

Applied Microbiology” consortium had emerged during this time, exploring topics such as

“Microbes for Peace”, and by 1970, the International Committee on Microbial Ecology was

established, to examine the role that microrganisms play in addressing the “various problems of

the environment” including marine pollution. 315 The FAO and WHO as well as UNESCO were

invited along to some of these activities.

For the Codex, however, the motivation behind many of its standards – as seen with the

examples of the European Codex, and food additives discussed in previous chapters – was the

securing of developing countries’ exports for reasons of both safety and the assurance of

310 Our View: EEC poultry directive – Unreasonable and unnecessary? Frozen Foods August/September 1973. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 311 John Postgate, Microbes and Man, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1969, pp.118-131. 312 John Postgate, Microbes and Man, (1969), pp.132-145. 313 John Postgate, Microbes and Man, (1969), pp. 163-166. 314 John Postgate, Microbes and Man, (1969), p.210. 315 Dr. P. Sand, Legal Officer, Letter to W. L. de Haas, 28 January 1972. CX 4/20. Vol.II. Box 12C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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increased trade. As the Codex Europaeus (the regional predecessor group) linked up with the

international Codex in the early 1960s, many of the debates and tensions around the decision to

join forces were framed around these issues of protecting both health and trade. With the food

additives work, the Codex experts were equally motivated by concerns over the health effects of

increasing usage of chemicals added to foods in the postwar era, but at the same time had to

balance these concerns by establishing standards of additive levels that still permitted movement

of goods internationally.

This diversity of interests that had to be taken into account when constructing the hygiene

standards, not just the health and trade aspects, but also the numerical inputs, statistical evidence,

qualitative descriptions and behavioural practices that went into the finalized drafts sent to

governments, once again support the notion that standards are the result of a process of co-

production. Behavioural practices are an obvious link to the social order, as some directives

might instruct the users of standards on how to work, for example by urging labourers to adopt

practices such as wearing hair nets or proper hand washing. But a not-so-obvious connection to

the social order is the way the statistical aspect of hygiene standards and their discussion at the

level of the FAO and WHO committees show how, borrowing from Alain Derosières, a large

part of statistical reasoning is a contingent and local enterprise.316 Statistical practices are

grounded in particular social political and cultural contexts in which they are employed and the

adoption of statistical methods at the UN agency level and in the field of microbiology is no

exception.317 As mentioned above, statistics as a discipline and the use of statistical evidence in

biomedical contexts did emerge earlier than the postwar period. However, the globalization of

statistical techniques was helped along by the UN agencies: by the WHO through its monitoring

and surveillance of global incidence of diseases like smallpox or malaria, and the FAO with its

counting and surveying of the worldwide food supply and emphasis on nutritional data.318

316 Alain Desrosières, The politics of large numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning. Transl. Camille Naish. 1998. Cambridge: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, pp. 3-4. 317 Desrosières, Politics of large numbers. (1998), pp. 3-4. 318 The WHO’s activities and interests in statistical monitoring of diseases is rooted in earlier activities of the League of Nations’ Health Organization. See, Iris Borowy, “Maneuvering for Space: International Health Work of the League of Nations during World War II.” In: Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard and Patrick Zylberman (Eds.) Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century. Rochester Studies in Medical History Series, Theodore M. Brown (Editor) Rochester: University of Rochester Press, pp. 104-105. For the FAO work in this area, see: Ilcan S.; Phillips L. Making food count: expert knowledge and global technologies of government

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Statistical evidence lends itself to a co-production framework in that it showcases an interplay

between the natural and social orders in several ways. In the more obvious sense, gathering or

employing statistical and numerical techniques for objects like microbes is a way of ordering or

structuring the natural world. In another, more social, sense, however, statistical evidence can be

“intimately bound up with forms of community and social identity of researchers.”319 As will be

shown below, the conflict between the FAO and the WHO researchers (who employed the

expertise of biometricians) was due in part to the identity of the different communities

developing these standards. In a broader sense, however, and as also shown by the debate over

the hygiene standards, statistical evidence (or as Porter says, “numbers, graphs and formulas” is

also a strategy of communication that can “conveniently summarize a multitude of complex

events and transactions [and behaviours].”320 Moreover, a quantitative approach can be a

“technology of distance” and the means by which “science has been constructed as a global

network”.321 A quantitative approach in the international food hygiene context would also mean

different roles and expertise required for public health and food safety departments. This

restructuring of the social order, be it the national, regional or local infrastructure, could, for

example, mean that food inspectors would have to become trained in statistical sampling

techniques.

In light of what statistical methods can represent, then, and given the intended goals and reach of

the international Codex standards, quantitative approaches were seemingly a good match for the

food hygiene standards work. Ultimately the qualitative approach to food hygiene was not

completely eclipsed by a quantitative method, however; instead, the discussion fostered the

Canadian review of sociology and anthropology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. , vol. 40., n° 4, P. 441-461 319 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. 1995. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, viii. 320Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. 1995. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, ix. 321 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. 1995. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, ix.

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blending of two outlooks and resulted in the refining notions of risk and how to measure it.

Both methods to food hygiene had varying impacts and consequences for both health and trade.

4.1. The Codex Committee on Food Hygiene

The Codex Food Hygiene committee was of great interest to the WHO, more than other codex

committees. Chaired by the Government of the United States, members included delegates from:

Australia, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden,

Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, along with representatives from various international

organizations. The majority were scientists ranging from food technologists, veterinary

inspectors, medical inspectors, directors of laboratories for food zoonoses, and professors of food

hygiene and environmental sanitation and many were also representatives from member states’

ministries of hygiene, health or agriculture. Its secretariat was particularly active in arranging

tours of processing plants and meat packaging facilities, along with distributing reports,

information and the draft hygiene standards to countries, industries or members who requested

them.

The first meeting of the Codex Expert Committee on Food Hygiene was held in Washington DC

in 1964 at the Pan American Health Organization/WHO Building where it remained for the next

several years, under the chairmanship of the Government of the United States. The Chairman

was Lavega Robert (Bob) Shelton, a Bacteriologist working in the Division of Microbiology at

the United States Food and Drug Administration. After completing his Masters, he spent a year

working in the laboratory in his home state with the Missouri Board of Health and then went on

to join the FDA as a Seafood Supervisor.

The focus of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH) was not solely on the final

product; rather, they described the entire process of food production, including methods,

practices and behaviours. The standards, once fully elaborated, were thick documents giving the

definition, storage requirements, plant and operational facilities, and ‘end product description’

(Figure 4.3).

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These standards, best illustrated by the end product description – the product that would go on

the market so that it is ready for human consumption – would be a mainly qualitative description.

From the same poultry code displayed in Figure 4.3, this would read, rather simply:

“END-PRODUCT SPECIFICATIONS: Appropriate methods should be used for sampling,

analysis, and determination to meet the following specifications:

To the extent possible in good manufacturing practice the products should be free from

objectionable matter.

The products should not contain any pathogenic microorganisms or any toxic substances

originating from microorganisms.

The products should comply with the requirements set forth by the Codex Committee on

Pesticide Residues and Food Additives as referenced in the Commodity Standards.”

Some of the CCFH end product specifications were slightly more specific, but emphasized the

same basic message that the final object should be clean and free from harmful bits, loosely

defined. Using another example from a Canned Fruit and Vegetable standard:

To the extent possible in good manufacturing practice the product should be free from

objectionable matter including insects and insect parts, insect webbing, soil, sand, or stone

fragments, faecal matter of any kind, human or animal hair, and free from fungal filaments

(mold) to an extent indicative of decayed ingredients; The product should be free from any

pathogen infectious to man and from any toxic substance originating from bacteria or fungi;

Products with an equilibrium pH above 4.5 should have received a processing treatment

sufficient to destroy all spores of Clostridium botulinium, unless growth of surviving spores

would be permanently prevented by product characteristics other than pH.322

322 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of the Fourth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, Washington D.C., USA, 1967. Appendix III. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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The Codex hygiene group had been happily developing standards like these for a few years

focussing on descriptive requirements and standard operating procedures, and also detailing

hygienic steps to be taken at the processing or manufacturing stages of the food supply chain.

By the mid-1960s, however, some controversies arose among some members of the CCFH and

with the WHO particularly with regard to attempting to standardize behaviours or hygienic

practices, rather than just the final food object for human consumption. Moreover, a second key

debate emerged over determining microbial counts in the final food product, and which sampling

methods to employ, particularly because a statistical approach to microbial counts was now

demanded. The WHO increasingly insisted upon the input of biometricians and highlighted the

role of biometricians in changing the shape of food safety and even went so far as to create its

own expert food hygiene group independent of the Codex. Thus the work of the CCFH started to

pose a problem for the push to establish international hygiene standards because it attempted to

standardize behaviours and practices which would combat hygiene problems at all points along

the food chain, rather than quantify microbial counts and methods of sampling that focused on

the final (end) product.

4.2. Codes of Hygienic Practice

By the end of the 1960s, a “feeling of doubt and trouble” began to emerge in different countries

and circles over accepting standards in the Codex Alimentarius – whether to adopt the standards

for the final food object or the “Code of Principles” which one had to follow to produce a food

object in a hygienic manner.323 One of these circles included the International Dairy Federation

(the I.D.F.) a powerful industrialist lobby group based out of Belgium with an interest in hygiene

standards for milk and milk products. The trouble was that Codex standards were intended – and

according to its statutes mandatory – for adoption among member states, and the onus would be

on them to integrate the standards into their respective national legislation governing matters of

public health and agriculture.

323 J. Servais, Chief Engineer-Director of the Ministry of Agriculture, Bruxelles, Belgium, Letter to Dr. Kesteven, Chief Animal Industry Branch, FAO, 4 July 1968. CX 4/20 Vol. III Box 12Cx12 Food and Agriculture Organization, Archives, Rome.

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This was not the first time that Codes of Practice were attempted; about a decade earlier in 1956

the WHO and FAO joined forces as a joint “Committee of Government Experts” to establish a

Code of Principles on Milk and Milk Products, governing such matters as methods of sampling

and methods for the determination of fat contents or acidity in fluid and dried milks. This

teamwork was one of the key inspirations to expand the international food standards program

into the broader Codex.324 The I.D.F. had worked closely with the two agencies (WHO and

FAO) on these earlier principles, and it was recognized that the principles could not be

mandatory, but instead provide guidance to those in “warm weather countries” and those at a

“low stage of technical development.” This milk team argued that:

“One of the major problems faced by the Committee stems from the wide variety of local

situations in the world. While the same general principles are basic to dairy hygiene the

world over, the methods by which these principles are to be applied must vary greatly

from one country to another. This is particularly true with respect to those countries

which are in the early stages of developing a milk programme, and where the nutritional

needs of the population require the production and salvaging of as much milk as possible.

Under primitive conditions, it is difficult if not impossible to apply the hygienic practices

which are utilized in the more highly-developed countries.”325

The work of the CCFH was under scrutiny because it had come to the attention of the IDF and

the larger Commission “that some of its subsidiary bodies were considering the elaboration, or

were in fact elaborating, “international codes of practice” rather than standards.”326 A code of

practice dealt with matters which were not strictly specifications or requirements for the foods

themselves, (e.g. definition of terms, guiding principles, lists of commercial units), and their

integration into national legislation would pose challenges to individual governments.

Legislating international behaviours (for example, the wearing of hair nets, or gloves, on the

324 G. Saint-Pol, Legal Counsel FAO, Letter to Mr. G.O. Kermode 22 November 1968. Cx 4/20 Vol. I. Box 12C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 325 World Health Organization. Second Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Milk Hygiene, 29 July 1959. World Health Organization Archives, Geneva. 326 Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme “Codes of Practice in Relation to the Codex Alimentarius” Sixth Session, Geneva, 4-14 March 1969. CX 4/20 Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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abbatoir killing floor, or banning chewing gum in the kitchen) presents obvious problems for

monitoring and enforcing these behaviours. And moreover, the cost of implementing

recommended infrastructure (like stainless steel countertops, or elaborate irrigation systems on

farms) was costly for member states, and impossible for some developing countries.

There were broader consequences for trade as well: For example, by 1969 U.K. veterinary

inspectors had advised the U.K. not to accept meat from Paraguay, Uruguay and Northern

Argentina, complaining that its refrigeration transport containers (“frigo-rificas”) were not up to

par, admitting that the “whole subject in the UK is a mixture of animal health, hygiene from the

human health point of view and certainly domestic politics.”327 This “mixture” was also causing

“headaches” for Australia, as the U.S Inspectors were also starting to question its meat handling

practices.

Attempting to lay down “internationally acceptable” basic hygiene requirements was thus an

attempt at a “common understanding” yet the FAO recognized that in this field there would

“always be an area of judgement which can only be exercised by qualified veterinarians.”328 At

the same time, however, and perhaps adding to the complexity of standardizing hygiene

practices, the “purchaser” will always have the “last word”. What the Codex hoped for was a

common understanding at least between importer and exporter, but the hygiene committee kept

running into problems, as hygiene practices were needed along the entire food production

chain.329 In many cases member states would have to anticipate such contingencies, and

“provisions were needed which would deal with hygiene practices all along the course

which the initial raw material has to follow in order to become a food for final

consumption. Such hygiene aspects would cover all aspects of the handling of the raw

material – be it the growing or harvesting of fish on board fishing vessels – the process

327 G.O. Kermode, Chief of the FAO/WHO Programme, Food Standards Branch, Letter to Oris Wells, Director-General of the FAO, 13 June 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 328 Kermode to Wells, 13 June 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 329 In recent years in light of Mad Cow and BSE outbreaks, awareness of this food production chain has grown in public health circles through the use of catch-phrases like “farm to fork” or “gate to plate.”

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and manufacturing of the raw material and the transportation and storage as well as the

distribution of the final product.”330

Because it was obvious that “a standard could not exhaustively provide for all contingencies

which would cause a food either to become the carrier or the origin of a disease” the complaint

from the IDF called into question the first 10 years of the Codex work.

To solve (or perhaps avoid) this problem, the legal counsels of both the WHO and the FAO were

brought in for advice, and it was recommended that the Codes of principles or “Codes of

Hygienic practice” developed by the CCFH and any other subsidiary bodies should be called

advisory rather than ‘mandatory’ standards. The key factor was to ensure that the Codex work

did not conflict with its two overarching goals of protecting consumer health and ensuring fair

practices in the food trade.

One of the recommendations was thus to focus on the final product and make those standards (or

parts of the standards) count as the mandatory parts. Stripping down the codes of hygienic

practice like this to an advisory status, also meant reducing both the workload and the

effectiveness of the CCFH. It was at this same time that the WHO also began to exert its

authority and enlist the support of biometricians in making the still- mandatory standards more

quantitative in nature.

4.3. Enter the Biometricians

One of the key developments around this time, was the increasing role of biometricians in

shaping the food safety standards, especially the work of the International Commission for the

Microbial Specifications for Food which the WHO was increasingly coming to rely upon for

technical advice.331 The Co-Chairs of the ICMSF were Canadian microbiologists, Drs. Fred

Thatcher and David Clarke, based out of the Department of Health and Welfare’s Food and Drug

330 Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme “Codes of Practice in Relation to the Codex Alimentarius” Sixth Session, Geneva, 4-14 March 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 331 Dr. Zdenek Matyas, WHO Food Hygienist, letter to Dr. Fred Thatcher, Co-Chair of ICMSF, 28 January 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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Directorate in Ottawa. Other members were from the Netherlands, such as Dr. David Mossel (a

Dutch expert on food microbiology) as well as Dr. Betty Hobbs. At a time when few women

were working as microbiologists, Hobbs produced an influential series of books aimed not only

at microbiologists but also at those working in the food service industry and for those preparing

food in the home. These included Food Poisoning and Food Hygiene (1953) and Hygienic Food

Handling (1962).

In May of 1969, the International Committee for the Microbial Specifications for Foods

microbiologists met in Dubrovnik, and for the first time, their invited guests included

biometricians. The ICMSF had convened before, but on this occasion they required the

assistance of experts trained in statistical methods. Fred Thatcher, its co-chair, announced to his

colleagues how their “biometrican friends” deserved thanks for developing and explaining

statistical sampling plans to the microbiologists.332 With a biometrical approach to microbes,

the ICMSF began to exert great influence on the science of food hygiene. The Codex

Committee’s approach to food hygiene standards was from a more qualitative perspective,

providing descriptions in lieu of numerical values such as microbial counts for food products.

With the emergence of the ICMSF, however, and the advent of new statistical sampling

techniques for microogranisms like Salmonella, the Codex increasingly – at first reluctantly –

had to incorporate the expertise of biometricians into their work, as the WHO, who worked much

more closely with the international microbiologists than the FAO, insisted along with the ICMSF

upon the input of biometricians and highlighted their role in changing the shape of food safety.

Collectively, the International Committee for the Microbial Specifications for Foods produced a

monograph and series of volumes on micro-organisms in foods and how to count them, which

became very influential worldwide and adopted in universities for teaching purposes.333 The first

edition of Microorganisms in Foods: their significance and methods of enumeration (1968)

identified the main culprits of food poisoning (salmonella, Escherichia coli, clostridium,

332 Fred S Thatcher, Co-Chair of ICMSF, Letter to the International Committee on Microbiological Specifications for Foods, January 13, 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 333 Fred S Thatcher, Co-Chair of the ICSMF, Letter to the International Committee on Microbiological Specifications for Foods, January 13, 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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staphylococcus) and the methods and reagents needed to detect, isolate and analyze them. The

second edition, however, was to be revised based on decisions made in Dubrovnik.

Even before this meeting the ICMSF decided that:

Assuming some agreement on ‘standards’ the committee will again meet with the biometricans.

If sampling plans have been recommended, these will be referred to the biometricians for

comment; if not, then appropriate data and proposals for ‘standards’ will be offered to the

biometricians and their advice sought.334

And

“…In due course, the overall objective is to publish a sequel to our book…under a title

such as ‘Sampling Plans for the Microbiological Analysis of Foods.’ Our biometrician

colleagues have kindly consented to assist in such a venture.”335

The meeting in Dubrovnik was attended by a WHO representative, the food hygienist Dr.

Ždenek Matyás, and the agenda included a day-and-a-half discussion led by the biometricians.336

The three biometricians present were: Dr. D.F. Bray from Canada, Irving W. Burr from the U.S.,

and Dr. E.F. Drion of the Netherlands.337 Dr. Bray, an employee of the Department of Health

and Welfare, was a member of the Statistical Society of Canada and had a background in poultry

science.338 Irving W. Burr, was a Purdue faculty member in the United States, and leading

expert in quality control and industrial statistics. Dr. Drion had collaborated previously with Dr.

Mossel on the importance of establishing microbial limits in food.

334 Thatcher, Letter to the International Committee on Microbiological Specifications for Foods, January 13, 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 335 Thatcher, Letter to the International Committee on Microbiological Specifications for Foods, January 13, 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 336 Dr. Zdenek Matyas, WHO Food Hygienist Letter to Fred.S. Thatcher, Co-Chair of the ICMSF, 28 January 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 337 Thatcher, Letter to ICMSF, 13 January 1969. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 338 Bray, D.F., “A History of the Statistical Society of Canada: The Formative Years” Statistical Science, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 123-124, Published by: The Institute of Mathematical Statistics

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Biometricians had come to be important figures in public health organizations during the

interwar years, and particularly at the international level. Several international health

foundations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Milbank Foundation, had enlisted the

expertise of statisticians as early as the 1920s.339 For example, Edgar Sydenstricker, a

statistician from the United States Public Health Service, was commissioned by the Milbank

Foundation to analyze the effects of health promotion and diseases like tuberculosis, cancer and

heart-disease control. His expertise brought about his transfer to Geneva to provide a review of

the League of Nations Health Organization’s programs in medical statistics, and his successor,

the statistician Frank Boudreau, eventually became deputy director of the LNHO. The Milbank

Foundation joined forces with the LNHO in 1935 to commission Isidore Falk, an American

public health statistician, to study European health insurance programs. 340 Their work and

influence raised the status of biometricians as experts and judges of evidence relevant to

international public health concerns, and were often called upon to provide “proof” for linking

social and economic factors to disease or nutrition concerns.341 In the food hygiene area, this

proof took the form of sampling plans.

The sampling plans themselves were very detailed and relied upon concepts of sample size,

probability, population estimates, the use of lots and batches and coding systems, and the value

“c”: the maximum allowable number of microbes found in a product. These numerical values

were specific to the microbe and specific to the food product (e.g. for salmonella, “c” had to be

relatively lower, if not “0” depending upon the food it is found in).342 (See Figure 4.4.)

The increased reliance upon biometrical approaches to microbial food issues clashed with the

standards set by the Codex food hygiene committee, mainly over the question of what was

‘scientifically correct.’ Despite the Codex being a joint FAO/WHO initiative, the WHO and

339 Paul Weindling, “American Foundations and the Internationalizing of Public Health”, In: Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard and Patrick Zylberman (Eds.) Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century. Rochester Studies in Medical History Series, Theodore M. Brown (Editor) Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008, pp. 63-86. 340Weindling, “American Foundations and the Internationalizing of Public Health” (2008), p.77. 341 Weindling, “American Foundations and the Internationalizing of Public Health” (2008), pp. pp. 63-86. 342 Fred S. Thatcher, ICMSF Microorganisms in Foods: Sampling for microbial analysis: Principles and specific applications. Volume 2. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1974, pp. 100-101.

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went so far as to create its own expert food hygiene group independent of the Codex, and worked

more closely with the ICMSF and thus with the biometricians, which brought an onslaught of

confusion. As one member of the Codex wrote: “The argument over the functions of the Codex

Committee on Food Hygiene and the [WHO] Expert Committee on Food Hygiene respectively

seems to be going round in circles.”343 The WHO had greater interest in pathogens and in

methods of sampling, whereas the Codex seemed to focus more broadly on the products

themselves and approached their standards with a broader meaning of hygiene, not limited

strictly to microbes, and also not relying upon numerical definitions.

There were similar trends occurring in other affiliated organizations: For example, researchers at

the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service - National Seafood Inspection Agency had developed

a “Risk potential index”, a numerical scoring system whereby fishery products could be screened

and categorized as to their possible microbial risk potential. The “Index” was an attempt at

planning for all contingencies and mapping behaviours around fish inspection: it would classify

fishery products into priority groupings, and listed the calculated risk based on the type, species

and form of starting raw material, presence of sensitive ingredients (spices, batter, breading,

etc.), took into consideration plant processing control procedures, consumer serving (use)

methods, and differing populations at risk.344

This Index was developed at a time when the idea of taking a systems approach to food - by

monitoring the relative risks along a production chain - was gaining more currency. In the early

1960s, the United States Nautical and Space Association (NASA) had enlisted the help of the

Pillsbury food company to create its Hazard Analysis Criticial Control Points (HACCP) system

for space missions.345 HACCP applied engineering principles of “Critical Control Points” to

food systems in order to gauge the hazard levels at various points in the food supply continuum,

343 N.O. Götzsche, Letter to Dr. F. Winkelmann, Dairy Branch FAO, April 10, 1968. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 344 E. Spencer Garrett, Special Assistant to the Assistant Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, Letter to Professor C.G Heden, Chairman of the International Advisory Committee, GIAM IV (Sweden) 27 December 1972. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 345 Robert L. Buchanan, “Understanding and Managing Food Safety Risks” Food Safety Magazine December 2010/January 2011. http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/article.asp?id=3882&sub=sub1 [Accessed February 2011].

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for example, in the abbatoir post-slaughter, in the processing plant pre-packaging.346 The fish-

focused Risk Potential Index was the first to examine the HACCP principle of hazard analysis in

terms of “integrated numerically weighted product risk potential”.347 The National Seafood

Inspection Laboratory’s risk potential values were calculated from a detailed examination of the

hazards associated with seafoods, variables of not only the type of fish, but also harvest area or

intended consumer group.348

The sampling plans put forward by the ICMSF were connected to this overall shift in microbial

food safety, marked by a blending of qualitative with more quantitative approaches to food

hygiene. It marked a shift where the meaning of safety became contested: the mere presence or

absence of a microbe in a product did not make it (respectively) unsafe or safe as before.

Instead, the application of a statistical approach to food hygiene meant that varying degrees of

safety or risk could be assessed and expressed numerically.

4.4. “Not scientifically correct”

Dr. Ždenek Matyás admitted that the sampling plans were “a very controversial issue ” at the

time of development. And, when the question of uniting the two food hygiene groups arose,

Matyás reported that when he “spoke privately at the [Codex] sessions in Washington with some

of the recognized microbiologists present, they were against such closer relationships, saying that

there are many other international committees or commissions working in the same field as

International Commission for the Microbial Specifications for Food and which have also

excellent results.”349

346 Sperder, William H. and Richard F. Stier. "Happy 50th Birthday to HACCP: Retrospective and Prospective". Food Safety magazine. December 2009-January 2010. pp. 42, 44-46. 347 von A.M. Pearson & T.R. Dutson, “HACCP for the Seafood Industry” In: von A.M. Pearson and T.R.Dutson (Eds) HACCP in Meat Poultry and Fish Processing. 1995. New York: Chapman & Hall, pp. 104-133. 348 von A.M. Pearson & T.R. Dutson, “HACCP for the Seafood Industry” In: von A.M. Pearson and T.R.Dutson (Eds) HACCP in Meat Poultry and Fish Processing. 1995. New York: Chapman & Hall, pp. 104-133. 349

Dr. Zdenek Matyas, WHO Food Hygienist Letter to Graham Kermode, 27 March 1972. CX4/20.Vol. II. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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The Chairman of the Codex Food Hygiene group, Bob Shelton, wrote to his liaison officer in

Rome:

“The question of Codex / ICMSF relations has always been intriguing to me. As a food

microbiologist by training and experience, I am very sympathetic to the aims of the

ICMSF and appreciative of the problems with which the group is wrestling. The method

testing program and the studies on statistical design for sampling are splendid – no other

group is in a position to take on such work. The individual members are experts in the

field and I have high regard for each of them. Consequently, in my opinion, it is entirely

logical to depend heavily on their expertise in food microbiology. For some reason

which I never been able to fathom, there seems to be a deep antipathy toward the ICMSF

on the part of Australia (Mr. Smith) and the U.K. (Dr. Ross). It is my understanding that

these gentlemen were the principle antagonists to the liaison proposed at the second

session of the Food Hygiene Committee. I believe we have our work cut out for us to

achieve a good working relationship!”350

Part of the problem was the involvement of the WHO with the outside groups and their failure

(at least in the eyes of some of the FAO delegates) to communicate the information to the Codex

Committee on Food Hygiene. Indeed, as the Australian committee member Ivan Smith aptly

complained, “I find it somewhat surprising that one of the Governing Bodies [The W.H.O.]

should be engaged in the elaboration of microbiological specifications for food with I.C.M.S.F.

while the Codex subsidiary whose terms of reference encompass all aspects of food hygiene, is

uniformed of the nature of that work.”351

One FDA observer to the Codex food Hygiene meetings noted how: “I have dropped by the

Hygiene Committee meeting this week. These hygienists are difficult to please. Both McNally

and Shelton have to work hard in order to move them past any controversial point.”

350 Dr. Bob Shelton, Chairman of the Codex Food Hygiene Committee (CCFH) and Staff of the USFDA, Letter to Willem de Haas, Secretary of the CCFH, February 9, 1972, CX4/20. Vol. II. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 351 Ivan H. Smith, CCFH Member from Australia (Department of Primary Industry), Letter to Graham Kermode, Chief, Food Standards Branch, Joint Food Standards Program of the FAO/WHO, 6 January 1972. CX4/20. Vol.II. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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But beyond administrative and communication complaints, the main sticking point appeared to

be over the two different food hygiene approaches, on the one hand pursuing the raw material

throughout its journey, and on the other, defining the microbial counts in the final product, items

which would go on the market ready for consumption. The crux of the issue was a phrase that

appeared in most of the Codex Group’s standards for the final product: “…that products should

be free from any pathogen infectious to man and from any toxic substance originating from

micro-organisms”.352 The ICMSF strongly urged that simply describing the final product as

“free from pathogens” was not enough; there had to be more rigorous numerical standards and

methods for sampling. The WHO’s position was that simple descriptive qualitative hygiene

standards were “not scientifically correct”. In a report describing the role of the food hygiene

laboratory, they explained:

“The food hygiene laboratory can only give the microbial status of the food in relation to

the sensitivity of the test used and with the consideration that tests can be used only for a

limited range of pathogenic organisms. Further, the finding of no pathogens does not

mean that such pathogens are absent from the food. They may not be found by the

methods used. This caution is especially important since any other interpretation of

microbiological data would lead to the impression that foods certified by a laboratory as

pathogen-free did not contain pathogens, or might be so safe that subsequent care in

handling could be disregarded. In order to maintain the scientific integrity of the food

hygiene laboratory, the Committee recommends that no microbiological results be issued

without a qualifying statement which indicates the exact number of samples examined in

relation to the total lot in question, the quantity of sample, and the methods used.”353

The WHO warning above does not entirely rule out vigilance at other points along the food

chain, as it suggested that ‘subsequent care’ was still necessary to ensure safe food. It clearly,

however, supported the notion of sampling plans and the statistical approach. But, what was at

stake by endorsing statistical evidence? By pairing the language of ‘scientific correctness’ with

352 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Report of the Fifth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, Washington, D.C., p. 4. 353 “The Role of the Food Hygiene Laboratory in Food Hygiene Programs” Report of the WHO Expert Committee on Microbiological Aspects of Food Hygiene, Geneva, October 1967. CX4/20. Vol. I. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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the sampling plans, the WHO was implicitly linking scientific with statistical evidence.

(Thereby making qualitative descriptions a subordinate form of evidence.) Given the

international reach of the UN agencies, this specific application of a quantitative risk assessment

to food marks a period in which debates about the type of evidence upon which food hygiene

standards should be based reaches a global level.354 This debate over the balance of quantitative

and qualitative evidence is still occurring in food safety circles – particularly regarding the nature

of risk and how to assess risk in food. The HACCP system described above has been

“controversial” as it is a “semi-quantitative” in its approach to microbial food safety.355 Food

safety experts have recently labelled qualitative measures to be “non-transparent”, whereas

quantitative evidence, in the form of risk assessments similar to that being described here by the

WHO and the ICMSF, has become synonymous with “transparent” evidence. 356 This discussion

over qualitative and quantitative measures, and their implications for defining both the natural

and social orders, appears to be rooted in the 1960s hygiene meetings of the Codex.

By 1973, methods for salmonella isolation for eggs and egg products were of particular concern

and a growing problem, and at this point another international group, the International

Organization for Standardization, or ISO, wrote to the Codex to notify them of its interest in

developing Salmonella standards. This made for a total of three groups of international experts

all attempting to draft microbiological food hygiene standards. Within days of this news, Bob

Shelton, a bacteriologist from the FDA, submitted his resignation as the Codex hygiene chairman

citing how it was evidently a time for “new ideas” in food hygiene.357 Announcing his

resignation, he wrote: “While I am a staunch advocate that continuity of membership is desirable

for the work of Codex Committees, I believe length of service by the Chairman can be carried to

354 Robert L. Buchanan, “Understanding and Managing Food Safety Risks” Food Safety Magazine December 2010/January 2011. http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/article.asp?id=3882&sub=sub1 [Accessed February 2011]. 355 Buchanan, “Understanding and Managing Food Safety Risks” December 2010/January 2011. 356 Buchanan, “Understanding and Managing Food Safety Risks” Food Safety Magazine December 2010/January 2011. 357 Dr. Bob Shelton, Chairman of the CCFH and USFDA staff member, Letter to William de Haas, Secretary of the CCFH, Sept 6, 1973, CX4/20. Vol. III. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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extremes. There is a risk of becoming fixed in ideas and this could be damaging to the work of

the Committee.”358

His replacement as Chair of the Codex Committee, Dr. Joseph C. Olson, worked with the U.S.

Food and Drug Administration and was also a member of the International Committee for the

Microbial Specifications for Food and with this connection, he was well-prepared to tackle the

question of salmonella standards for egg and egg products. At this stage, all groups were

prepared to embark upon inter-laboratory testing of methods of detection of salmonellae in egg

and egg products and attempt to settle on salmonella testing standards. Olson wrote to a

colleague about the ISO, Codex and ICMSF attempts to collaborate:

“We must recognize that microbiological methodology is in a dynamic state, and

probably always will be. Unanimity of agreement of what is the best method is perhaps

too much to ask. Undoubtedly some compromise will be necessary to reach a position

that the Committee can be comfortable with. Personally, I feel that such can take place

without consequence of adverse practical significance.”359

Interestingly, then, once this shift has occurred in adopting statistical methods then it was more

acceptable in the eyes of this international community to standardize practices such as laboratory

methodologies for isolating salmonella. This domain was easier for controlling and

collaboration purposes, even if “matching laboratories became more important than matching

nature.”360 Indeed, Salmonella became a sort of microbial “poster-child” for studies in microbial

standardization: many articles and studies on how to control and test for this pathogen appeared

in public health and medical journals during this time.361 Approaches and methods may have

358 Dr. Bob Shelton, Chairman of the CCFH and USFDA Staff Member, Letter to William de Haas, CCFH Secretary, Sept 6, 1973. CX4/20. Vol. III. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 359 Dr. Joseph C. Olson, Chairman of the CCFH and USFDA staff member, Letter to Dr. K. Buchli, Public Health Officer, Ministry of Public Health, the Netherlands, November 12, 1973. CX4/20. Vol. III. Box 12 C x 12. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 360 See Pieters, “Managing Differences” for a thorough discussion on laboratory collaboration in attempting to match laboratories moreso than finding a universal standard or a “laboratory yardstick” for interferon research. Pieters, Toine. Managing differences in biomedical research: The case of standardizing Interferons. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 29 (1998): 31-79. 361

See for example, Edel, W. and E.H. Kampelmacher, “Comparative Studies on Salmonella-isolation in Eight European Laboratories,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 1968 39 (3): 487-491; Edel, W. and E.H.

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differed among laboratories, and even among inspectors, but gradually standardization using

statistics became the favoured way of addressing hygiene problems.

The qualitative approach was not completely replaced; however. Part of the qualitative approach

is retained in the HACCP system which became endorsed by the ICMSF in the 1980s (they

produced a volume on it in 1988) and thereby also by the Codex Alimentarius Commission,

giving it worldwide currency. It is problematic to say that one approach or the other was

victorious in the food safety system as industrialization increased. This clash of two approaches

to food hygiene, marked by the rise of statistical applications toward microbiology, and the

WHO’s urge to shift away from focusing on standardizing human behaviour to the food product

instead represents once again how the Codex standards represent a co-production of scientific

expertise and broader considerations. In this case, the broader motivations may not have been

necessarily as trade-related as seen in other chapters, but more to do with scientific expertise and

disciplinary preferences, or as Porter suggests, how statistical evidence can be “intimately bound

up with forms of community and social identity of researchers” or the small ‘p’ politics within

the committees of the FAO and WHO organizations.362 This conflict between the FAO and

WHO expert groups may in fact represent a variation on a common theme, as conflicts between

experts, as Smith and Phillips have argued, seem so “widespread in food policy making and

regulation that they might fairly be described as endemic.”363 The motivations may not have

been driven by trade interests but the impacts certainly were; either method, especially the

Kampelmacher, “Salmonella Isolation in Nine European Laboratories Using a Standardized Technnique,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 1969 41 (2): 297-308; Diane Roberts, Karen Boag, Mary L. M. Hall and Christine R. Shipp, “The Isolation of Salmonellas from British Pork Sausages and Sausage Meat” The Journal of Hygiene, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Oct., 1975), pp. 173-184; Williams, L. and K.W. Newell, “Salmonella excretion in joy riding pigs,” American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 60. no. 5., pp.929-929. 362 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: the Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. 1995. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, viii. 363 In fact, they describe how “…tensions and disputes between government departments often paralleled tensions and disputes between experts. For example a government department may form an alliance with outside experts, such as scientists from universities or independent research institutes, with a view to applying pressure upon or resisting competing demands being pressed by a second government department which is interested in the same issue.” D.F. Smith and J. Phillips, “Food policy and regulation: a mulitiplicity of actors and experts” in D.F. Smith and J. Phillips (Eds.) Food, Science, Policy and Regulation in the Twentieth Century: International and Comparative Perspectives. New York and London: Routledge, 2000, p. 8.

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former, would mean a reorganization of the ‘social order’ for member states’ food production

and labour systems. For example, the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene recommended

standardizing the layout of an abbatoir’s slaughtering system for poultry, one which (like that

shown in figure 3.3) recommended separate areas between the reception of the chickens and the

areas for killing and bleeding them as well as covered containers for blood for storage.

Agricultural output (including chickens) had been increasing in the United States since the

1940s, with chickens increasing by 10% by 1966, and poultry producers and processes in that

country could afford implementing these changes and standards more easily than developing

countries, as the latter did not have the same resources to reorganize abbatoirs or production

facilities.364 The industrialization of the food industry during this period greatly favoured

wealthier countries which could afford to implement technologies, such as air conditioning in the

‘waiting area’ where the chickens were held prior to slaughter.365 Consequently, the number of

‘broilers’ (chickens) produced per labourer increased greatly in the European Community

between 1970-1995, from 150 to 1,500 broilers/labourer and somewhat less in the United States

due to the “due to the greater number of people used for veterinary inspection, grading, and

recovering of B-grade birds”.366 Other markets, such as India, were slower to develop, but with

increasing recognition of the cheaper cost of labour in this country for performing the tasks

needed to develop ‘safe’ and ‘hygienic’ poultry products this meant a greater investment in

poultry processing starting in the 1970s.367 Again, because the recommendations by the Codex

Alimentarius Commission were voluntary in nature, it meant that a variety of ‘social orders’

could develop separately among different nations interested in producing and trading poultry.

The more statistical approach would also require more investment in epidemiologists in member

states health, food and agricultural departments. The burden would thus shift away from

industry; a presence which, unlike the additive and pesticide residue committees, was relatively

364 Terry G. Summons, “Animal Feed Additives, 1940-1966” Agricultural History Vol. 42, No. 4 (Oct., 1968), pp. 305-313. 365 Theo G. Uijttenboogaart. 1999 European Perspective on Poultry Slaughter Technology Poultry Science. 78:295–297. 366 Theo G. Uijttenboogaart. 1999 European Perspective on Poultry Slaughter Technology Poultry Science. 78:295–297. 367 Christopher L. Delgado, Ph.D.Clare A. Narrod and Marites M. Tiongco. Policy, Technical, and Environmental Determinants and Implications of the Scaling-Up of Livestock Production in Four Fast-Growing Developing Countries: A Synthesis. Rome, FAO, 2003.

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absent from the hygiene committee.368 As the final chapter on pesticide residues reveals,

however, the industrial presence facilitated the co-production of toxicological expertise with

trading and national interests.

Figure 4.1: Habits to Avoid. From Hobbs, Food Poisoning and Food Hygiene (1953).

368 The IDF tended to focus more on lobbying the specific commodity committees which affected more directly its interests, for example, the Milk Hygiene committee.

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Figure 4.2. Human salmonellosis and its possible sources. From Hobbs, Food Poisoning and

Food Hygiene, 1953.

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Figure 4.3. To Kill a Chicken. Standardized poultry killing recommendations From Report of the

Sixth Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, May 1969.

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Figure 4.4. Sampling plans and recommended microbiological limits for dried foods: ingredients

known to present microbiological hazards. From Thatcher and Clark (eds.) Microorganisms in

Foods: their significance and methods of enumeration, 2nd Edition, Toronto, University of

Toronto Press, 1978.

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Chapter 5 Pesticide Residues

“The Codex Program for adopting tolerances for pesticide residues is encountering some

difficult problems. These arise out of the desire of importing countries, chiefly north

European and the European Community countries, for very low tolerances for consumer-

ready food, and the need of producing and exporting countries for higher tolerances

related to the conditions under which foods are grown and raw agricultural products as

they are harvested. It is difficult to reconcile these two completely different points of

view toward pesticide residues.”369

In 1973, rumours were circulating that a number of people in Germany fell ill upon eating apples

from France and Italy, the Golden variety which (according to the member’s report) contained

traces of arsenic.370 The Commission of the European Communities responded to the member’s

concerns by stating how analysis of the fruit showed arsenic concentrations of less than 0.1 ppm,

a level well below what was considered toxic to most member states in the Community, thus

conforming to the regulations and standards at the time. Circulating rumours aside, however,

there were mounting reports from scientific and medical experts that pesticide residues were

harmful to the environment, to humans, animals and all other forms of life, even though

toxicology, as discussed in chapter 2 on food additives, was “still far from an exact science”.371

This report of the tainted Golden Apples, however, pointed to the much larger problem of

harmonization of tolerance levels for harmful substances, a topic of great concern and debate not

only in the European Community but also within other international organizations.

369 L. M. Beacham, “Ten Years of Codex Alimentarius – A Progress Report.” Foreign Agriculture, pp. 10-11. 446.63 Food laws relating to the Codex Alimentarius. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 370 Official Journal of the European Communities, Written Question No 16/73; 28 March 1973. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 371 “The Eventful History of B.H.T.” The Lancet, November 20, 1965, pp. 1056-1058.

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Standards and guidelines for pesticide residues were being drawn up as early as 1959 within the

Expert Committee on Pesticides of the FAO.372 As with food additives, pesticide residues found

in food and agricultural products were a mounting problem, and various experts from both the

FAO and WHO attempted to regulate and standardize their use by setting out guidelines for good

manufacturing or agricultural practices, establishing ‘acceptable daily intakes’, permissible

levels and defining the idea of “tolerance”.

Tolerance, a way of defining safety, was a constructed and contested idea. Tolerance was simply

the concentration of pesticide permitted in and on food.373 This concentration was a numerical

value measured in parts per million (ppm). Many of these Codex delegates had the opinion that

there was a need to establish two types of tolerances for pesticide residues – those entering into

international trade versus a tolerance for products at the consumer level, mainly because

pesticides were known to change in composition and levels following processing and storage,

meaning that final food product could contain considerably less pesticide residue than when it

began its journey. As a result, the committee distinguished between “trade or import tolerance”

and “acceptable consumer residue”.374 The idea of ‘tolerance’ thus took on many meanings

within the Codex, which increased the difficulty of attempting to harmonize standard levels for

pesticide residues. Within the Codex, the scientific and technical data built in to the concept of

tolerance were constructed to also fit with trading requirements. The Codex emerged as an

international body right in the midst of the Green Revolution, when new agricultural techniques

and solutions were being sought to increase world crop supply, for example, experimenting with

new varieties of wheat, especially in developing areas like India, or, producing synthetic

fertilizers.375

372 Dorolle, Pierre. 1964. Opening Speech of the Assistant Director-General [of the WHO] at the Second Session of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission. Geneva. CX2/20. Exec Files. Box 12 C x 6. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 373 FAO/WHO. 1966. Report of the First Meeting of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues. The Hague, 17-21 January 1966 and FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967. 374 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967. 375 Jain, H.K. (2010). The Green Revolution: History, Impact and Future. Houston, Texas: Studium Press, 2010.

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The increased use of these chemical agents may have reduced the harmful effects of pests;

however, the harmful effects of residues of these substances were becoming a problem in their

own right. The Commission of European Communities also began to consider this issue, as there

was growing concern among its Member States over different tolerance levels for harmful plant

protection products – high profile chemicals like dioxin, and DDT. In addition to fears over

consumer health, however, there existed fears that a failure to harmonize might present barriers

to trade within the Community. Pesticide production was concentrated in Canada, the United

States, Australia, Western Europe and Japan, and so the trade standards were of great concern to

producers in these nations.376 Even greater was the fear outside the European Economic

Community, however, as industry in United States, and exporters in Canada and Australia

“indirectly feared that it would have to register its products separately in each jurisdiction, and

therefore pushed for international harmonization.” 377 These producers worried that the EEC

would use internal regulations as barriers to trade. 378

The various interests in setting the levels of tolerance for a given raw or processed food product

meant that these standards represent a co-production of scientific and technical expertise

(toxicological data, chemical and medical research) with industrial and consumer concerns. In

short, it was a balancing act of the different interests of those who were in the business of

examining pesticides found in foods.

This balance became difficult in the case of pesticide residues for many reasons: their nature, the

diverse range of chemicals available, their unpredictable chemical behaviour, and the question of

where standards and restrictions should be developed, on the pesticide itself or on the commodity

in which they are found? This closer scrutiny of pesticides was part of a broader framework, an

ongoing discussion on intentional versus unintentional chemicals and residues found in food, and

for the most part pesticides fell into the latter category. In addition to their “unintentional”

nature, what made pesticides even more difficult to standardize was that their composition could

376 Aynsley Kellow, “The Political, Social and Economic Framework” In: Derek J. Knight and Mel Cooke (Eds.) The Biocides Business: Regulation, Safety and Applications. Wemheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH, 2002, pp. 1-23. 377 Aynsley Kellow, “The Political, Social and Economic Framework” In: Derek J. Knight and Mel Cooke (Eds.) The Biocides Business: Regulation, Safety and Applications. Wemheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH, 2002, pp. 1-23. 378 Aynsley Kellow, “The Political, Social and Economic Framework” In: Derek J. Knight and Mel Cooke (Eds.) The Biocides Business: Regulation, Safety and Applications. Wemheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH, 2002, pp. 1-23.

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change from the point of manufacture, or from the point where it was applied in a field, and,

after assuming a harmful quality, ultimately end up in places where they were not intended, for

example in animals which were destined to become food, in water, or produce like fruits and

vegetables which were directly consumed. In a close trading community such as the European

Common Market, this ‘shape-shifting’ quality of pesticides posed many problems for developing

and harmonizing tolerance levels.

Some of these issues and approaches to dealing with the problem included generating positive

(‘accepted’) versus prohibited lists, priority lists, establishing ADIs and monitoring tolerance

levels at the point of import versus the point of consumption. The overarching concern, as

voiced within the EC and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, was that through defining

‘tolerance’, and depending upon the context, there might be variable consequences for recipients

of these standards (member states, industry, consumers) and possibly used as an obstacle to trade

whilst trying to protect public health.

The European Community had already established a close trading community and drew upon

agreements such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Protocol on the Standardization

for Fruits and Vegetables, established in 1955. The Protocol was a classification scheme that

distinguished between “first” and “second-class” foods ranging from apples and pears to

tomatoes, endives and table grapes (first class being better than second class). It established

limits, tolerances and allowable dimensions for blemished, cracked, or unclean items in a given

batch, particularly if the fruits or vegetables in question posed a threat to public health. Under

this scheme, products were classified as “Extra, I and II”, and defined according to their quality

characteristics and the extent to which they have certain defects. This meant that, for example,

not all apples were equal, but still allowed to circulate on the market as either the best quality, or,

if not the finest, at least still consumable but perhaps with a few blemishes or undersize or

misshapen. To capture this data and information on each food item, the Protocol (also called the

Geneva Protocol) recommended issuing standardized control certificates for fruits and

vegetables – a kind of ‘passport’ intended to keep such rogue produce from deviating from the

set norms and circulating in the European Common Market.

Thus in the early 1960s, the initial focus of these groups was on harmonizing plant-pest control

methods (herbicides, pesticides and insecticides) in order to prevent the introduction of harmful

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pests like potato wart, among others, from entering into Member States. 379 Therefore, before

the harmful effects of plant protection substances were known, the focus on food safety was

geared more toward preventing pests such as insects and viruses from spoiling produce.

Consequently, in the mid-1960s, the Community was more concerned about harmonizing the

“laws, regulations and administrative instructions governing plant protection within the EEC” so

that “plant health control among the Member States is to be reorganized and simplified with a

view to reducing obstacles to trade within the Community.”380

This chapter focuses primarily on the work of the scientific and economic food and agricultural

committees within the European Community, as well as the United Nation’s FAO and WHO

work, namely their Codex Alimentarius Commission, and their Joint Expert Committee (later

known as the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues – JMPR) as these groups grappled with the

problem of generating standards for pesticide residues. The work of these groups further

illustrates some of the inherent issues of standardizing food, that is, how production of these

standards and harmonization of standards for pesticide levels required the balancing of multiple

interests and a co-production of scientific expertise with other factors like trading goals.

5.1. Defining Tolerance

The 1960s and 1970s marked a period of growing concern, awareness and alarm over the use of

pesticides in food and agriculture. In 1962, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was first published,

sparking widespread concern and anger certainly in the United States, and across the Atlantic,

mounting medical and toxicological studies and events like the Seveso dioxin disaster in

Northern Italy in 1976 forced the recognition that industrial chemicals, including herbicides and

pesticides, were a tremendous problem to human, animal and environmental health.381

379 Press Release: Potato Pest Control. European Economic Community Official Spokesman for the Commission, Brussels, 24 October 1966. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 380 Information Memo: Harmonization of Plant Pest Control. European Economic Community Official Spokesman Brussels, March 1965. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 381 John M. Lee, “‘Silent Spring’ is Now Noisy Summer” The New York Times, 22 July 1962; Pier Alberto Bertrazzi, “Long Term Effects of Chemical Disasters. Lessons and Results from Seveso.” Science of The Total Environment, Vol 106, Issues 1-2, July 1991, pp. 5-20; Carson, Rachel, Silent Spring, (first printed 1962 by Rachel Carson), New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002.

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Recognizing pesticides as a problem was only the first step: Assessing the problem, and

establishing standards in order to mitigate the problem – standards in the form of tolerances –

proved to be a much larger task. Curbing the problem involved attempting to harmonize

tolerances through 1) collecting data on acceptable daily intakes, consumption levels and

toxicological data, 2) standardizing methods of analysis, 3) promoting behavioural guidelines in

the form of ‘good agricultural practices’ and 4) establishing priority lists for substances.

The Codex Committee on Pesticides first met in 1966, although there had been earlier efforts as

early as 1955 to address the problem of chemicals in foods, with expert committees jointly

chaired by the WHO and FAO for additives, which, like the pesticide committees, relied upon

toxicological expertise and approaches.

5.2. The Joint Expert Committee of the FAO and WHO

The FAO and WHO first assembled a panel of experts to address the pesticide problem in Rome

in late 1961. Each institution had its own group of experts, the FAO’s panel of experts on the use

of pesticides in agriculture first met in 1959,382 but now the two combined forces with the aim of

coming up with general definitions and establishing guidelines and principles, emphasizing the

need for toxicological investigations.383

The meeting, chaired by a representative from the U.S. Centre for Disease Control, also included

(among others) experts from Canada’s Department of Agriculture, an entomologist from Cornell

382 In fact, there were several groups working on the overlapping problem of pesticides at the time. Other than this joint meeting discussed above, there was the “FAO Working Party on Pesticide Residues” – a “Meeting of agricultural experts to consider tolerances, on scientific grounds, for those pesticides for which acceptable daily intakes have been established [by the Joint meeting.]” and an “Expert Committee of the Codex Alimentarius on Pesticides” which seems to have become simply the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues as discussed below. This meeting was of “governmental experts” to “reach agreement” on world-wide or regional tolerances for those pesticides dealt with by the FAO Working Party. As confusing as this was, staff from the WHO felt that there could be “a place for all three committees” and that they might “work together.” For simplicity’s sake, and because the FAO working party seems to have disappeared from the records, I am focusing on the work of only two of these groups. (Claus Agthe, Letter to Francis Townshend, 12 September 1963. FAO Archives, Rome SP 10/2 Box 12 C x 74. 383 The WHO and the FAO both contributed funds for this event, $9,400 (U.S.D) from the WHO (of which $2,000 USD went toward printing the report) and $6,000 (U.S.D) from the FAO. (Dr. L. Verhoestraete, Director of the Division of Health Promotion and Protection of the WHO, Letter to Mr J. Vallega, FAO Staff, 12 February 1964. BU 2/1 Budget Box 12 C x 1. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.

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(USA); a representative from the Chemical Hygiene Fellowship and the Mellon Institute

(Pittsburgh, USA), a chemist from the Toxicological Research Unit of the Medical Research

Council in England; and, finally, from France, Dr. Réné C. Truhaut a Professor of Toxicology

from the Université de Paris who was also a frequent participant in the expert food additive

meetings of the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives and insisted on particular

terminology and classifying the different categories of pesticides into “Insecticides, Fungicides,

Herbicides, Rodenticides, Molluscicides, etc…”384 (See Figure 4.1).

As seen in the previous examples of the food additives and microbial hygiene committees, many

actors were involved in carving out the standards and guidelines for pesticides – a process which

drew upon epistemological expertise as much as it did economic, political, cultural and social

concerns. In the case of pesticide residues, however, there was an added element to social

concerns as not only the interests and expertise of toxicologists, industrialists and consumers

were represented, but also now those of farm labourers and nature conservationists, due to the

potential harm that pesticides could do to the broader environment and to anyone coming into

contact with these chemicals.

The goal of this meeting then was to determine the “feasibility of preparing an International

Code for toxicological and residue data required in achieving safe use of a pesticide” and also to

establish tolerances for pesticide residues in food and principles of consumer safety.385 The

safety of the operator (that is, farmer or agricultural labourer) had already caught the attention of

the WHO and the International Labour Organization (ILO), prompting an ethos of aiming for

either “no residue” or “unquestionably harmless” residues in food.386

They had deemed, for example, that sulfur presented “no real problem” and there was no

problem with ornamental plants, nursery stock or crops not intended for human or animal

384 Letter from Professeur Réné Truhaut to Dr. M. Autret, 13 February 1970. CX 2/20, Exec Files, Box 12 C x 6. The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 385 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” WHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva. 386 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16).” WHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, Published 1962 Geneva.

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consumption. With news of poisoned golden apples and cranberry scares circulating about,

however, pesticide residues on foods needed to be addressed more rigorously at the international

level.387

Rigour came in the form of data. Residue was measured in parts per million (ppm), and they

defined the term “food factor” to mean a fraction of the total diet – the food in question which

was believed to be containing the residue as a portion of the individual’s total diet. This value

could be obtained from the FAO´s Food Balance Sheets, a “systematic international comparison

of food consumption data”. 388 The Food Balance sheets were established in 1936 by the League

of Nations´ “Mixed Committee on the Problem of Nutrition and the Subcommittee on Nutritional

Statistics” which arguably can be connected back to WWI when international public health

foundations first began keeping data on food consumption. This trend of consumption data

intensified after WWII with the establishment of the FAO.389 The FAO encouraged Member

Nations to prepare "food balance sheets" covering all the principle food commodities classified

into eleven food groups, “a self-auditing procedure that tracked food vulnerabilities and signalled

the potential need for intervention”.390

Armed with these definitions, then, the FAO and WHO experts adopted three key concepts: 1)

acceptable daily intakes; 2) permissible levels and 3) tolerance. The Acceptable Daily Intake

(ADI), also used in food additive evaluations as discussed in Chapter 2, was measured in mg of

the chemical in question, per kg of body weight per day to generate a value for which there

existed no “appreciable risk” and a practical certainty that injury would not result even with a

lifetime of exposure.391

387 Aaron Wildavsky and Leo Levenson “Were the early scares justified by the evidence? Cranberries, Dieldrin, Saccharin. I. The Cranberry Scare of 1959” In A. Wildavsky, But is it True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues. 1995. Harvard: Harvard University Press and The Estate of Aaron Wildavsky, pp.11-37. 388 FAO, Food Balance Sheets: A Handbook, 2001. 389 FAO, Food Balance Sheets: A Handbook, 2001. 390 Ilcan S.; Phillips L. Making food count: expert knowledge and global technologies of government Canadian review of sociology and anthropology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. , vol. 40., n° 4, p. 455. 391 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” WHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva.

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The Permissible Level was the “permissible concentration of a residue on or in food when first

offered for consumption, calculated from the ADI, food factor and average weight of the

consumer.392 The permissible level was expressed in parts per million (ppm) of the fresh weight

of the food.

Tolerance, often (and not surprisingly) confused with “Permissible Level” was defined as the

permitted concentration of residue and was derived from the permissible level and the range of

residues actually remaining when the food was first offered for consumption (following good

agricultural practice). Or more simply, the “concentration that is permitted in and on food’.393

Tolerance was also measured in ppm, and normally smaller than permissible level.394

392 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” FWHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva. 393 FAO/WHO. 1966. Report of the First Meeting of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues. The Hague, 17-21 January 1966 and FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967. 394 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” FWHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva.

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Figure 5.1. List of Experts on Pesticide Residues from the FAO and WHO

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Tolerance, proposed by the WHO and the FAO, with its added element of “good agricultural

practice” embedded within its principles, came to have greater currency in the discussions at the

international level, however, and was picked up by the Codex Alimentarius as a means of

measurement for trade purposes (discussed below). Interestingly, however, both the permissible

level and tolerance levels operated on the assumed “average man” being a weight of 70 kg in

some countries and yet of lower “average man” weight in other countries (e.g. 50 kg in others –

see Figure 4.2.). The WHO had worked out some “hypothetical” scenarios using the data to

determine how tolerance levels can be used as a guide for trade between different countries –

countries with different tolerance levels and different “average men”. For example, a country

full of heavier average men (e.g. 70 kg men) could ship their pesticide-laced rice to a country

with lighter and smaller average men (e.g. 50 kg men), and although this might increase the

smaller-man country’s intake of the pesticide residue, this trading pattern could still be

“scientifically justified” through the use of these tolerance levels.

Thus, this measure of tolerance became inextricably bound up with the question of importing and

exporting through the use of this residue data developed by the WHO and FAO experts, another

key example of how – through the standardization of tolerance as a key measurement and

principle – scientific data and trade guidelines were co-produced.

As for controlling and implementing these principles and guidelines, “common pattern[s]”

existed: 1) the informal consultation between manufacturers, research and government; 2)

guidance had to be given to farmers on how to use pesticides so that “any residues ultimately

present in the food do not offer a hazard to consumers”; and 3) “punitive means exist to

deal…with farmers who, in ignorance or defiance of that advice, so misuse a pesticide that

unnecessarily high residues remain in the food.” Overall, the FAO and WHO urged consultation

among government, industry, research, scientists, cooperation and a “knowledge of the national

diet is essential”, again something obtainable from the FAO food balance sheets.

Indeed, collaboration and cooperation were some of the values and principles put forth, but so,

too, was punishment, and these guidelines were rife with the rhetoric of collaborating with

industry and educating or punishing the farmer. Punitive measures, especially for farmers and

not industry, were one of their solutions to the pesticide residue problem. They urged that

measures be “mandatory” and based on either the measure of tolerance, with models of this sort

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of system already established in the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, or by monitoring

the intervals between last application of the pesticide and the harvest of the crop (as established

in countries like Austria, Belgium and France.)395

In addition to this trend, however, and like in the food additives work, toxicological evidence,

experimentation and expertise were deemed most essential for the task at hand. Citing the work

of the JECFA, the group urged how “the conduct of the toxicological investigation remains the

responsibility of the competent expert.”396

395 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” FWHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva. 396 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” FWHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva.

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Figure 5.2. How Tolerance and Trade become “Scientifically Justified”, from Principles

Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, Geneva, 1962.

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The question of toxicity was a challenging problem for these experts, however. Because the role

of pesticides was to be toxic to some creatures (insects, weeds, other pests) and not others

(humans and animals, for example), in their guidelines the FAO and WHO experts had to

account and allow for this dual requirement for pesticides. As a result, they urged developers

and manufacturers to find pesticides which have “selective toxicity” – toxic to some pests but

non-toxic to man or animals.397

This early work of the joint expert committee of the FAO and WHO on pesticides set the stage

for international guidelines as guided by their own principles of rationality and expertise in

developing the standards. For example, an oft-cited case was the problem recognized in 1958 by

the United States Food Protection Committee that overprotection is to be avoided, especially

when dealing with “insignificant or inconsequential intakes” of food additives.398 To curb this

problem, the FAO and WHO experts explicitly urged how “frequent consultations should take

place between the manufacturers and the agricultural and health authorities to ensure that all data

will be developed in an adequate and rational manner.”399 At the same time, however, they

recognized that other factors had to be considered when developing standards, factors particular

to the problem of pesticides: differences in country legislation, differences in agricultural

practices, differences in metrology and local flora and fauna. It was explicitly recognized that

information, knowledge and expertise on all of these other factors were required for an

“intelligent interpretation” of differences in the residue data which explicitly recognized and yet

implicitly suggested a process of co-production.400 The “intelligent interpretation” placed the

information and knowledge in the hands of industry, scientific and medical experts (for example,

toxicologists) and public health officials to work out the uncertainty and variability of the data

397 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” FWHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva. 398 “WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” FWHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva. 399 WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” WHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva. 400 WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues and the FAO Panel of Experts on the Use of Pesticides in Agriculture.” WHO TRS No. 240 Principles Governing Consumer Safety in Relation to Pesticide Residues, held in Rome 1961 (October 9-16). Published 1962 Geneva.

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and take into account social, cultural and political factors, and yet, omitted from this process

were the ultimate users of the data or products, for example, farmers, labourers and consumers.

Moreover, even with the “intelligent interpretation” offered by these experts, they ultimately had

to admit that there remained variability in defining tolerance for pesticides – the need for

‘interpretation’ meant that uncertainty would be a recurring theme in the standards.

5.3 The Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, est. 1966

With the establishment of the Codex Alimentarius in the early 1960s, the establishment of ADIs

for pesticide residues continued to be a pressing topic, as the finding of these chemicals in grain

and cereal products focused Codex attention not only on these commodities but also on the

pesticides themselves, substances such as malathion and hydrogen cyanide.401 By 1969, the

Codex Executive Committee urged “intensification” of the pesticide work, but provided it was

only done on the basis of “adequate scientific data.”402

The Codex pesticide committee was chaired by Dr. A. Kruysse, the Inspector General of Public

Health in the Netherlands, attended by delegates from member states, and by “advisers” from

ISO the EEC, companies such as Shell, and the International Federation of National Associations

of Pesticide Manufacturers (GIFAP) based out of Amsterdam.403

The industrialist presence was heavier on this committee than most others in the Codex, and its

location in the Netherlands not coincidental, as many manufacturers were based in this country.

For example, the Shell Petroleum company, based out of the Netherlands (described below), was

developing projects for obtaining protein from natural methane gas.404 Shell started exploring

ways in which methane could yield a mass culture of methane-oxidizing bacteria, which in turn

401 FAO/WHO. Report of The First Meeting of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues,The Hague, 17-21 January 1966. ALINORM 66/24. 402 Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, Executive Committee, Report of the Fourteenth Session, Rome, 17-19 September 1969. ALINORM 70/3 The Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome. 403FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967. 404 John Postgate, Microbes and Man, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1969, p. 116.

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could be used for animal feed or fertilizer. 405 At its first meeting in 1966 at the Hague, the list

of participants was omitted from the report but noted a vague blend of government experts and

advisers from the countries of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,

Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United

Kingdom and the United States.

By 1967, the list of participants was available, and the line between observer, adviser and

delegate became blurred and included a strong presence from Shell representatives, not only

from Shell International in the Netherlands (Dr. H.G.S. van Raalte) but also from Shell Research

Limited in England (Dr. D.E. Stevenson.), Shell Chemical Company in the United States (Dr. R.

F. Glasser) and a representative from the Australian Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals

Association – who worked for Shell Australia.406 Canada also sent a representative from the

Canadian Agricultural Chemical Association, D. D.A. Bever, who was also the Technical

Director of Niagara Brand Chemicals based out of Burlington, Ontario.407

A representative from Unilever Research Laboratories (also based in the Netherlands) was

present (Dr. J. B. De Letter) as well as a member from the H.J. Heinz company – famous for its

ketchup – based in England.408 The Dow Chemical Company, based out of Michigan in the U.S.

also had a representative at the table (Mr. G.E. Lynn).

Members of the Joint FAO/WHO expert team discussed above were also in attendance, such as

Professor Truhaut from Paris or Dr. Hurtig from Canada, but in some cases, for example with the

United States or the Netherlands delegations, the number of representatives from government

were matched or exceeded by the number of industry representatives. For example, by the

CCPR’s third session in 1968, the distinction between delegate and adviser and observer had

405 Postgate, Microbes and Man, (1969), p. 116. 406 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967. 407 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967. 408 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967.

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disappeared altogether (each role with variable influential power on the Codex committee, an

example of co-production in action) and the number of industrial representatives increased

dramatically. The Netherlands’ National Association of Pesticide Manufacturers had 3 members

in attendance, and another industrial representative from the Dutch Shell and Unilever operations

were also present.409

One key concern of this committee was of course the ADIs for pesticide residues found in crops,

raw food and food products; of particular concern, however, was the levels found in both pre-

and post-processed grains, cereals, wheat, barley, oats. It was decided early on, however, that

standards and priorities should be drafted according to the pesticide, and not the commodity.410

This was a similar trend with potential hazards like food additives or microbes, but moreover,

part of the reasoning behind this approach was because any “decision to establish a tolerance for

a pesticide residue in a particular crop would normally constitute a formal recognition of the use

of the pesticide on that crop.” [italics added for emphasis.]411 This might not have always been

the case. Moreover, it was noted, against the suggestion of the United States representative that

‘zero tolerance’ was not a feasible option.412 The Secretariat of the Netherlands presented a

paper on how to proceed with setting pesticide residue limits, but it was not agreed upon by all

members at the meeting, mainly because the paper argued how “the establishment of an

international tolerance based on public health needs is the logical conclusion of such a

process.”413

Returning to the measurement of tolerance, the industrialist presence had an impact as many of

these Codex delegates had the opinion that there was a need to establish two types of tolerances

for pesticide residues – those entering into international trade versus a tolerance for products at

the consumer level, mainly because pesticides were known to change in composition and levels

409 The 1968 report published in 1969 of the Third Session. 410 FAO/WHO. 1966. Report of the First Meeting of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues. The Hague, 17-21 January 1966. 411 FAO/WHO. 1966. Report of the First Meeting of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues. The Hague, 17-21 January 1966. 412 FAO/WHO. 1966. Report of the First Meeting of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues. The Hague, 17-21 January 1966. 413 FAO/WHO. 1966. Report of the First Meeting of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues. The Hague, 17-21 January 1966. Appendix IV.

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following processing and storage, meaning that final food product could contain considerably

less pesticide residue than when it began its journey. As a result, the committee distinguished

between “trade or import tolerance” and “acceptable consumer residue”.414 The idea of

‘tolerance’ took on many meanings within the Codex, which increased the difficulty of

attempting to harmonize standard levels for pesticide residues.

A working party of the FAO established a category of ‘temporary tolerances’, a label which

could be used in two circumstances: “a. when it was derived from a temporary ADI; and b)

when it was derived from an ADI that could be exceeded when the pesticide is applied according

to good agricultural practice.”415 “Good agricultural practices” encompassed a wide range of

behavioural guidelines, from proper storage, disposal and application of the pesticide, to

ensuring that the “area to be treated and conditions of use should be precisely prescribed by

‘qualified persons’ with an eye for the weather.”416 Nonetheless, standardizing behavioural

practices was tricky as the Australian delegation reminded the Committee of “the fact that

residues resulting from good agricultural practice vary from country to country and that

exporting countries should recognize the good agricultural practices of exporting and provide

tolerances accordingly.”417

Some of the approaches suggested to tackle this problem included: multi-detection

methods for pesticide analysis, and monitoring such as “restaurant meal studies”, “total diet

414 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session,

Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues,

The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967.

415 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session,

Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues,

The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967.

416 Eric Pace, “15 Nations Join in Pesticide Pact” The New York Times July 22, 1970. Archive of European

Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

417 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session,

Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues,

The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967.

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studies” and “market basket surveys” – analyses where a combination of foods were analysed to

get a better sense of what a realistic daily intake might be, to capture how much pesticide residue

someone might ingest in a given day, rather than focusing on analyzing just one commodity.418

Part of the reasoning behind these suggested approaches, and similar to the example in the

previous chapter of the microbial hazards and the Codex hygiene committee, is that complete

elimination of pesticides residues from the food chain with absolute certainty was not realistic

because “if pesticides are to be used, as they must be, some ingestion will occur.” 419 And, “It

would help in the assessment of any possible hazards arising from the consumption of these tiny

amounts of pesticides if it were known how much could be consumed daily without risk.”420

Moreover, because of the uncertainty of tolerances, moving toward measures of degrees of risk

and combination of residues in a total diet shifts the onus away from industry and alleviates

focus on any one particular pesticide product. The implication of this approach is that it

implicitly shifts onus away from industry and instead emphasizes the consumption pattern of

consumers, something which can vary by individual and also by national and cultural

consumption patterns.

The setting up of these guidelines, ADIs and tolerance levels at the international level by FAO

and WHO were given a test run in the newly-formed European Economic Community. As seen

in previous chapters, because the Codex standards were developed as mere “advice to

governments” and at least internationally had little real legislative or punitive backing, it was

difficult to judge the impacts or effectiveness of the standards on the world market. On a

regional scale, however, the more closely economically linked European community proved to

be an interesting case study as harmonizing tolerance levels for pesticides meant a smoother flow

418 FAO/WHO. 1968. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Fifth Session, Rome, 19 February – 1 March 1968. Report of the Second Session of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, The Hague, Netherlands, 18 – 22 September 1967. 419 FAO/WHO. 1965. EVALUATION OF THE TOXICITY OF PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN FOOD. Report of the second joint meeting of the FAO Committee on Pesticides in Agriculture and the WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues, FAO Meeting Report No. PL/1965/10; WHO/Food Add./26.65. 420 FAO/WHO. 1965. EVALUATION OF THE TOXICITY OF PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN FOOD, (1965).

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of trade, and scientific data and expertise had to be considered alongside trade, political and

cultural factors.

5.4 Harmonizing Tolerance: Case study of pesticides in the EEC

As mentioned, in the late 1960s, communities like the EEC were working closely with or relying

upon the Codex for its data and expertise, forming networks and focusing their efforts on

establishing and harmonizing tolerances for pesticide residues. In 1967 (at the initiative of the

United States) there was a meeting in Bonn421 and again in 1968 in Washington between the U.S.

Agriculture department, the Food and Drug Administration, and representatives from Germany,

Belgium and the Netherlands, all seeking to “develop routine procedures for the systematic and

continuous exchange among the four nations of data on pesticide enforcement, monitoring,

accidents, toxicology, and other related subjects.”422

The European Community introduced a resolution in 1969, a ‘pact’ to control the sale and use of

pesticides. The Resolution was controversial but seen as important step in the regulation and

standardization of pesticide use, as it specified instructions for labelling and packaging, storage,

disposal and use. Most agreed on regulating the marketing and use of pesticides, but there was

still a dispute over regulating their manufacturing. In terms of labelling, the resolution called for

clearer instructions concerning active ingredients, method of using and transporting it, listing

hazards to the environment, flora and fauna, and advice on proper disposal.

Although two nations refrained – Switzerland and the Netherlands – this pact reflecting growing

concerns about health effects as “[p]esticides have been shown to be indirectly dangerous to

foxes, pheasants and partridge – along with many varieties of humbler animals and fish – which

lie close to the hearts of many influential Europeans.”423 The human counterparts of these

421 United States Department of Agriculture, “Background on: United States – European Meeting on Pesticide Residues Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, December 18-20, 1967.” Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 422 United States Department of Agriculture, “U.S., Europeans to Continue Pesticide Talks Here” Washington, Feb. 9, 1968. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 423 Eric Pace, “15 Nations Join in Pesticide Pact” The New York Times, July 22, 1970. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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‘humbler animals’ were not immune to the harmful effects, however, and, like with the Codex,

the need for a concerted effort was becoming more obvious.

But this 1969 resolution stalled for years, and reflected the different opinions of Member States

and the scope of the difficulty in assessing the data, and then setting and standardizing levels for

the most harmful of pesticides, without imposing an outright ban at the Community level.

Nevertheless, in the Spring of 1971 West Germany banned DDT, and this measure pushed the

EC to consider extending this act to all of its Member States, using this legislation as the basis of

a Community ban.424 A letter addressed to Commissioner Spinelli from Mr. Genscher (Federal

Minister for the Interior) urged the EEC to examine DDT at a Community level, as the German

bill “contains important public health policy measures which are totally and perfectly in harmony

with existing legislation on the use of DDT in agriculture, forestry and horticulture, and on the

maximum level of DDT residue permitted in vegetable foodstuffs. Because of the potential

danger from DDT to human health, these measures can no longer be delayed.”425 The German

government wanted this to form the basis of harmonization of measures without “the protection

of public health being compromised.” There were similar measures against DDT in the United

States with its Environment Protection Agency (EPA) banning it in 1972.

The recurring view of the Commission, however, was that the Member States were responsible

for enforcing their own standards and tolerance levels. Despite growing calls for a broader

framework for protecting health and ensuring efficient trade, the Commission urged that matters

of enforcement must be kept within national boundaries, and in the event of any wrongdoing or

harm to consumers, any compensation must come from the polluters; it felt the onus should be

on the pesticide manufacturers as “aid from the public authorities would be contrary to the

‘polluter pays’ principle.426

424 Thomas B. O’Connell, “West Germans Enforce Strict Pesticide Control Laws” Foreign Agriculture, p. 6. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 425 The Threat to Human Health Represented by DDT is So serious that the approval of the German Bill dealing with it can no longer be put off, the Bonn Government considers.” “Europe” Wednesday 26 January 1972. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 426

Answer to Written Question no 386/73 from Mr Haerzschel, 28. 2. 1974. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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Still, with growing reports of toxic produce and carcinogenic effects of agrochemicals, there

came rumblings from within the Commission. As a member wrote in 1973, complaining that the

1969 Resolution just sat still for years, reminded how “The Commissioner at the time, Mr.

Bodson, said, “The danger of poisoning from fruit and vegetables is indeed very great. All these

pesticides are applied more or less haphazardly, and even slow poisoning could have catastrophic

results in a few years time…You may rest assured….that the Commission….will do everything

in its power to ensure that this warning (by the European Parliament) is heard throughout the

Member States, including those which still apply the maximum levels; they too will have to

reduce their residues in order to lessen the risks to human health.’”427

But four years later, there appeared to be very little movement at the broader Community level,

and there were reports of different standard tolerances between states. As one Member raised

concern, “France has meanwhile passed a regulation on maximum residues which is far less

stringent than the corresponding German legislation.” As with all pesticide residue standards

and tolerances, the circumstances had to be qualified according to the type of pesticide, and the

produce involved. Indeed, France had laid down by ministerial decree on 5th July 1973 the

maximum pesticides residues permissible in and on the surface of fruit and vegetables. But as

the Commission pointed out, “The concentrations conform to the figures agreed by the

Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Six, and they are not less stringent than those

laid down in the German regulations. The difference is simply that the German regulations apply

to a larger number of pesticides residues.”428

Nonetheless, these reports emanating from Member States again begged the question, as one

member aptly asked, “Is the Commission aware that legislation in Member States in this sphere

is becoming increasingly divergent in the absence of harmonized community regulations, and

what does it intend to do about it?…. Is the Commission prepared to take up once again this

427 Written question no. 572/73 by Mr Jahn to the Commission of the European Communities. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 428 Answer to Written Question No. 572/73 by Mr. Jahn. 1974. European Communities Spokesman’s Group. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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matter which is of such great importance for the health of the peoples of the Community?”429

The Commission of the European Communities was “aware that the absence of Community

legislation tends to encourage divergent national regulations. In order to prevent this situation

arising, it is actively preparing, in collaboration with experts from Member States, draft

regulations designed to supplement its first proposal, and it hopes shortly to present proposals on

other food products which are liable to contain pesticide residues.”430

Meanwhile, other reports were circulating of helicopter spraying polluting surface water, and

even of one woman in France dying after being accidentally sprayed while she was out on her

property, killed by a defoliant which was intended for a nearby wood.431 And yet, although the

Commission was aware of the potential risks to surface waters and dwellings from such large

scale spraying of crops, it stated “Whilst it is true that a certain number of usually isolated

incidents are reported each year, the Commission is not aware that these at present constitute a

serious general health risk in the Community.”432

As with the Codex Committee, the Commission of the European Communities was not inactive

on the matter, but grappling with the problems posed by pesticides and other additives found in

food was compounded by the challenge of trying to standardize and set firm values for moving

targets. By the time a proposal or resolution or directive was drafted, the toxicological data or

scientific evidence had changed, or new threats and reports of harmful substances had emerged.

With intentional additives it was much easier, as with legislating the use of preservatives for the

surface treatment of citrus fruit, “the presence of additives in or on foodstuffs should be

mentioned on the labels or accompanying documents.”433 But, “the extension of this measure to

pesticide residues in or on the fruit is proving to be difficult. The crops are treated in the field,

429 Written Question No. 572/73 by Mr. Jahn to the Commission of the European Communities. 2.4.1974. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 430 Answer to Written Question No. 572/73 by Mr. Jahn. 1974. European Communities Spokesman’s Group. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 431 Written Question No. 572/76 by Mr. Pisoni to the Commission of the European Communities. 23.12.1976. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 432 Answer to Written Question No 610/74 by Mr. Kater and Mr. Willi Muller. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 433 Answer to Written Question No 263/74 by Mr. Seefeld. 15. 11. 1974. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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and it does not follow that residues will be present in the harvested fruit. Moreover, any residues

which are present may be breakdown products with a different chemical composition from the

pesticides employed. Hence, a declaration from the exporter as to the chemicals used in treating

the fruit might not be indicative of the kind or amount of pesticide residues actually present in or

on the fruit. As it also appears extremely difficult, and in many cases impossible, to check the

accuracy of such a declaration, whether in the importing or in the exporting country, the

Commission feels that the most suitable form of quality control is that applied to finished

products.”434

On 31 December 1974 the Commission forwarded to the Council a proposal for a directive on

the classification, packaging and labelling of pesticides scheduled for adoption by the Council

before 1 January 1976. By making the use of danger symbols compulsory and requiring that

every package bears a label drawing attention to the danger of the contents and giving obligatory

safety instructions, “this recommendation will also help to provide greater protection for public

health and the environment. Once adopted the proposals should provide an appropriate

framework within which further measures on specific aspects of the marketing and use of

pesticides….could be taken at the Community level.”435

Thus, in this 1974 proposal, the topic of “total harmonization” was introduced in a more formal

sense. When the proposal was referred to the Economic and Social Committee, however, it was

obvious that more work and attention was needed, not to mention consideration of the work on

pesticide residues being worked upon by the WHO and the FAO, in addition to the Commission

of the European Communities.436 Furthermore, the classification scheme required more

qualifications: “The Committee feels that the definition of a pesticide as ‘very toxic’ deserves

more attention than it seems to get in the proposal, which merely states that the term ‘very toxic’

and not ‘toxic’ is to be used in the labelling in certain cases. A ‘very toxic’ category should be

434 Answer to Written Question No 263/74 by Mr. Seefeld. 15. 11. 1974. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 435 Answer to Written Question No 610/74 by Mr. Kater and Mr. Willi Muller. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 436 Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of pesticides. Official Journal of the European Communities 17.11.75. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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included in the pesticide classification; pesticides should thus be classified in three categories,

according to the degree of toxicity of the commercial preparation.”437

In terms of labelling, it was generally accepted that any indication of pesticide residues could not

be made compulsory: “This is recognized in the recommended International Standard for

labelling pre-packaged foodstuffs drawn up by the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme

(Codex Alimentarius) the reason being….that, in the majority of cases, it is not possible to tell

whether pesticide residues are still present when foodstuffs are sold to the final consumer.”438

Once again, the nature of pesticides made it difficult to standardize any attempts to safeguard

their use, even through labelling. Even if a measurement of residue content were made at the

time of processing, the actual value could shift at the point of consumption. Moreover, given the

rising concerns during this period about the dangers of pesticides, it would be difficult to enforce

a rule or to press industry to label its products as ‘containing pesticides’. At the same time,

however, like with the microbes in the previous chapter, to issue results which claimed the

product was ‘free from pesticides’ would not necessarily be accurate or correct either, as their

use was either a) widespread, or b) unintentionally added and present as unintentional residues.

By 1976 a follow-up and related directive was put forward to complement the work on labelling

and classification of pesticides. Part of this directive promoted the idea of an optional “EEC-

acceptance” which would operate in conjunction with existing national arrangements. Member

states could use either their own national legislation or, if adopting the EEC-acceptance product,

Member States would not be able to “refuse, prohibit or restrict the movement and sale of an

EEC-accepted product.”439 The Commission would publish a list of EEC-approved items,

acting as a kind of ‘positive’ list of pre-approved plant protection products. The second part of

this directive aimed at harmonizing national prohibitions and restrictions on those products

hazardous to human health and the environment, focusing mainly on those substances containing

437 Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of pesticides. Official Journal of the European Communities 17.11.75. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh 438 Answer to Written Question No 757/74 by Mr Jahn. 26. 3. 1975. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 439 Press-Release: “The Placing on the Market of Plant Protection Products” Brussels 5 August 1976. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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mercury or organochlorine active substances, such as those found in DDT and Dioxin. But the

overwhelming flaw in this proposal was that this directive was optional. Most Committees of the

EC (the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs, on Agriculture, and on the

Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection) all agreed that total harmonization was

necessary and the most beneficial route both for protecting health and removing obstacles to

trade.440

The 1976 measure stalled, however, and it was not until public demands, crises like Seveso, and

calls from individual member states prompted renewed action. On July 10, 1976, there was an

explosion at a chemical factory in Seveso Italy, which released four pounds of dioxin into the

atmosphere, killing thousands of animals and forcing hundreds from their homes.441 Although

the evidence was under close scrutiny, it was ultimately reported that about 30 women suffered

miscarriages and at least 100 children developed the “terrible cysts” of chloracne, prompting

many members of the Community to call for its ban by all Member States.442 Used as a defoliant

in the Vietnam War (Agent Orange), dioxin was banned in Italy since 1970, the Netherlands

since 1978 and commercially unavailable in Denmark since 1979.443 When the Swiss Company

(Givaudan) that manufactured the 2,4,5-T (containing dioxin) in Seveso was charged and fined

for its negligence in 1980, this renewed concern and public alarm over its ban, and there were

more calls for action within the Community.

Nonetheless, the Scientific Committee for Pesticides (established in April of 1978) approved the

continued application of 2,4,5-T, the weedkiller containing dioxin, and was satisfied that,

according to tolerance levels and acceptable daily intake values determined by animal

440 European Communities, European Parliament Working Documents: Report Drawn up on behalf of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, on the Proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Docs 269/76 and 270/76 for – A directive concerning the placing of EEC-accepted plant protection products on the market – a directive prohibiting the placing on the market and use of plant protection products concerning certain active substances. 13 December 1976. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 441 “Inquiry opens on herbicide 2,4,5-T; could be banned under existing directive.” International Environment Reporter, 1980, pp. 235-36. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 442 Written Question No. 575/80 by Mr. O’Connell to the Commission of the European Communities,” 4. XI. 1980. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 443 Press Release: “Environment: Scientific Committee For Pesticides Gives Go-Ahead to 245T”, Brussels, December 22, 1981. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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toxicological studies, there would be no ecological or toxicological effects. The evidence

suggested that a daily intake of 0.005 mg/kg produced “no observable effect”444, and the

FAO/WHO findings reported that the consumption data indicated intakes of 0.003 mg/kg of

body weight per day were safe. Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom had taken steps to

set their levels to 0.01 mg, and the Commission urged its members to aim for that target of

enforcement.445

This recommendation was controversial given the public outcry over dioxin, and the slow

movement toward harmonization prompted the British Agriculture Minister to remark, “It was

now six years since the EC commission proposed a modest measure, but progress on the draft

directive had been bedevilled by a combination of ‘over-cautious parochialism’ and other

considerations extending beyond the plant protection products themselves.”446 Once again, the

‘other considerations’ point to co-production in action.

By 1980, two directives on cereals and foods of animal origin marked further steps toward total

harmonization. As it stated, the European Parliament, “notes with satisfaction that the

Commission has chosen total harmonization, which is more effective in protecting the

environment and the health of consumers while doing more to promote trade…” and “stresses

once again the need to rank consumer health protection higher than economic considerations”.447

Although total harmonization would benefit the Community in terms of trade, these directives

suggested that protecting health was of greater importance: “the letter of the law says that a batch

of grain, in order to be reckoned sound, genuine and marketable must be free of live insects and

mites, and this frequently leads to the excessive use of insecticides for stored grain. To make

444 Press Release: “Environment: Scientific Committee For Pesticides Gives Go-Ahead to 245T”, Brussels, December 22, 1981. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 445 Press Release: “Environment: Scientific Committee For Pesticides Gives Go-Ahead to 245T”, Brussels, December 22, 1981. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 446 “Pesticide safety call by minister” British Business 3 December 1982, p. 610. 447 European Communities, European Parliament Working Documents: Report Drawn up on behalf of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, on the Proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Docs 1-806/79 for – I. A directive on the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on cereals intended for human consumption; II. A directive on the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on foodstuffs of animal origin. 7 January 1981. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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sure that not a single weevil survives in a train or barge, large doses are used, with ‘booster’

doses each time the goods are moved. This should be stopped.”448

The concern over dioxin was raised again and again, and in 1980 a motion was put forth for a

resolution that the

“European Parliament;

-sensitive to mounting public concern about pesticides which can contain traces of the

powerful and toxic material Dioxin,

-aware of the horrifying effects of dioxin,

-informed that the original evidence concerning these pesticides which came from

Oregon in the United States of America, is no longer to be considered reliable,

Urges the Commission to examine the true facts in an unbiased, scientific and non-

emotional way, and to report to the European Parliament what action, if any, is

necessary.”449

The Seveso I Directive was put forward in 1982, and brought into full force by 1985 in all

Member Communites.450 The scope was broad, but included pesticides and all other accidents,

outlining the responsibilities of Member States to bring their national legislation in line with the

Directive. Although it did not harmonize tolerance levels per se, it was a major step in the

broader push to harmonize environmental protection measures within the Community. Just after

Seveso I was initiated, however, the world witnessed its “deadliest industrial disaster” in Bhopal

India on December 3, 1984. After DDT was banned in the early 1970s in the United States, the

448 European Communities, I. A directive on the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on cereals intended for human consumption; II. A directive on the fixing of maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on foodstuffs of animal origin. 7 January 1981. 449 “Motion for a Resolution tabled by Mr. Newton-Dunn, Mr. Seligman, Mr. Sherlock, Miss Hooper, Mr. Pearce, Mr. Forth, Mr. Howell, Mr. Spicer Concerning Pesticides which contain traces of Dioxin” European Parliament Working Documents, 31 March 1980. Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh. 450 Original Seveso Directive 82/501/EEC (“Seveso I”) Council Directive of 24 June 1982 on the Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities (82/501/EEC). Archive of European Integration, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh.

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company Union Carbide decided to develop and push an alternative compound called Sevin, a

“highly toxic” and “unstable” pesticide produced outside of the United States (and in avoidance

of its laws) at a plant in Bhopal, India. During a routine inspection, noxious vapours leaked

from the plant, killing between 16,000 and 30,000 people and leaving over 500,000 permanently

injured.451

This tragedy further highlighted how, in spite of, or perhaps as a result of, EEC and Codex

efforts, concepts of safety were not equal on an international scale. Concerns that pesticide

products deemed unsafe for “Northern” or developed countries were now being produced or

shipped to Southern or developing countries, as a form of “toxic colonialism”.452 Harmonizing

tolerance levels was not necessarily advantageous for strictly health reasons; as mentioned

above, it would mean that industries would not have to register their product in every national

framework and could trade distribute products more easily.

It would not be until 1996 that the Seveso II directive emerged, harmonizing and standardizing

Community actions toward chemical disasters, manufacturing of harmful substances, safety

measures, land-use planning, inspections, and prohibition of use.

By 1996, however, the layout of the land had also changed legislatively for the Codex

Alimentarius as well as the European Economic Community. The end of the last round of

multilateral trade talks under the GATT framework (the Uruguay Round) concluded in 1994 and

gave rise to the WTO in 1995, and the emergence of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)

Agreement, gave the Codex the legislative clout it was lacking at the international level.

Tolerance as a measure of additives and pesticide residues was gradually replaced with the

“Maximum Residue Limit” (MRLs) but the principle remained the same, and this measurement

would feature again in prominent disputes over additives in beef and milk.

451 Dominque Lapierre and Javier Moro, Five Minutes After Midnight in Bhopal: The Epic Story of the World's Deadliest Industrial Disaster. Trans. By Kathryn Spink. New York: Warner, 2002; P. Shrivastava, Bhopal: Anatomy of a Crisis, Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1987; F. M. Bordewich, The Lessons of Bhopal: The Lure of Foreign Capital is Stronger Than Environmental Worries, Atlantic Monthly. 1987, March, 30; 34. 452 Aynsley Kellow, “The Political, Social and Economic Framework” In: Derek J. Knight and Mel Cooke (Eds.) The Biocides Business: Regulation, Safety and Applications. Wemheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH, 2002, pp. 1-23.

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Thus the move to harmonize standard tolerances for pesticide residues in food and agricultural

products represent an example of how complex and how lengthy the process of harmonization

can be – not to mention how ambiguous its benefits – especially at the international level. In the

case of the Codex Alimentarius, the international nature of the standards, and thus the lack of an

international legislative framework for its standards, prior to the mid-1990s Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Agreement, made the question of international harmonization unlikely. However,

its methods and expert committees provided important technical underpinnings, particularly the

ideas of tolerance levels and ADIs, and thus aided in regional harmonization initiatives as seen in

the European Community.

It also, however, gave more voice and a forum for industrialists to lodge complaints for

perceived trade barriers which were not based upon “sound science” – a key principle that the

Codex was suddenly praised (by the WTO) for upholding even though, in fact, the Codex

showed evidence of a co-production of scientific standards with other interests since the early

1960s. In other words, embedded within these scientific Codex standards from the very

beginning there existed uncertainty in its measurements and definitions of key “sound” concepts

such as tolerance and permissible levels for pesticide standards. The other interests were mainly

emanating from major pesticide producers around the table, and by the mid-1990s, the top

transnational companies (some of them also major pharmaceutical producers) included: Ciba-

Geigy, Zeneca, Monsanto, Bayer, DuPont, Dow Elasco, Rhone-Poulenc, BASF, American

Cyanamid.453 As will be shown in the epilogue, these key areas of food safety – pesticide

residues, hygiene and additives – were seemingly clothed anew in the 1990s as standing on

scientific principles, but the continuity with the earlier efforts of the FAO and WHO and their

Codex Alimentarius show that co-production of scientific expertise and knowledge with other

purportedly “outside” factors has in fact been the norm from the beginning.

453 Aynsley Kellow, “The Political, Social and Economic Framework” In: Derek J. Knight and Mel Cooke (Eds.) The Biocides Business: Regulation, Safety and Applications. Wemheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH, 2002, pp. 1-23.

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Conclusion

“The Codex Alimentarius agenda, which has long metastasized in the recesses of closed

board rooms and governmental chambers, is now coming to light. This is the paramount

issue of our times, yet few know about it.”454

Even if few consumers or the public knew about the Codex, its early years were anything but

quiet. Its more public persona emerged in the early to mid 1990s and it became not only more

known by industry and governments but also gradually by consumers and the general public.

There are several reasons for this shift from the recesses and chambers of government

boardrooms. In part, it was due to a greater consumer ‘voice’ emerging in the 1960s and 1970s,

and particularly the rise of the international consumer and consumer movements in response to

various public health and environmental disasters.455 But another reason for the higher profile of

Codex on the international stage was certainly due to the greater legislative and economic

implications of its the link up with the World Trade Organization and the measures imposed by

the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement).

6.1. The SPS Agreement

The SPS Agreement was developed as international legislation on food safety, animal and plant

health; it would prevent unfair trading practices and ensure that sound science was underpinning

any decision on food and agricultural products.456 In the event of trade disputes which had a

health or scientific element to them, the WTO identified three bodies, including the Codex, as a

454 From a collection of articles (edited by David Klein, Ph.D) available at: http://educate-yourself.org/cn/codexalimentarius15jan09.shtml [Accessed October 2010]. As with many websites from the consumers’ or health activist perspective, it is difficult to get reliable or peer reviewed information. This can be a good source of quotations and opinions, but not always for tracing the source of the information. 455Some of these have been mentioned earlier, but again, include for example: the Seveso explosion in Italy, the Love Canal scandal in the United States, the rise of botulism (See, “Medicine: Death in cans” in Time, July 19th, 1971), the Thanksgiving cranberry scare of 1959, among many others. The International Organization of Consumers Unions (which later became “Consumers International”) first met in the Hague in March of 1960. See also, Sheryl Kroen, “The Political History of the Consumer” The Historical Journal (2004) 47; 709-736; Lawrence B. Glickman, Buying Power: A history of Consumer Activism in America. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 456 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm [Accessed October 2010].

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source and arbiter of sound science, from having based its decisions on “scientific principles”.457

The greater legislative clout finally gave the Codex work a greater impact on trading and health,

that is, its rhetoric of both protecting health and facilitating trade finally came to have a very real

impact as the international legislation tightened up. Its work and procedures, however, for the

most part remained the same.

In light of this, it is tempting to recast the Codex in a new role and frame this as a radical break

in its way of doing business and functioning; however, as I have suggested throughout this

thesis, there is a greater continuity between the pre-WTO Codex and the post-WTO Codex, and

through the lens of co-production it becomes more clear how these elements were there from the

start and always factored into the process of developing Codex food safety standards. These

elements included scientific and medical expertise vis-à-vis other factors like trading interests,

consumer and cultural considerations, geopolitical or regional interests and administrative snags

like translation errors. The expertise itself was often contested or constructed; the medical,

scientific and technical data defining the ‘natural order’ took the form of toxicological data for

chemicals like pesticide residues and additives, and biometrical and statistical evidence for

hygiene standards. Concepts like tolerance and Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs) were also

contested and uncertain within the Codex, FAO and WHO expert committees, especially in

attempting blend these ideas with the social and economic interests of member states and to

apply these definitions and measures to international trading contexts. Even the discussion over

what was ‘scientifically correct’ for food hygiene standards and the tension between quantitative

and qualitative evidence resulted in a blending of two approaches to managing safety and risk

with programs like the ICMSF-endorsed HACCP principles – a program which is still somewhat

controversial among food safety experts.

Perhaps it is made more explicit now, but by examining its origins, its recent high profile persona

does not signify a huge break from its internal values or accusations of being motivated by

economic interests in addition to health and scientific expertise. Since the beginning of the

457 The other two bodies were the Office Internationale Epizootique (OIE) and international and regional groups opering within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). From the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 2 “Basic Rights and Obligations” discusses ‘scientific principles’, and both the Preamble section and Article 3 “Harmonization” mentions the three organizations. URL: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm [Accessed October 2010].

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Codex, and even during its pre-history formation period with the Codex Europaeus, there was

always a tug-of-war among different groups each with varying interests and motivations in

developing and defining the nature of food safety standards. There were many reasons why the

Codex Europaeus showed resistance to joining with the international Codex – reasons not only

based on scientific or health claims about the standards – and these interests highlighted what

would become a recurring theme of tension between harmonization and regional independence.

The European “core” group would always remain a part of the Codex, and this harmonization

problem was echoed again in the European common market (a ‘microcosm’ of the Codex) with

the move to try to establish similar ADI and MRL limits for additives and pesticides, a task with

tremendous health implications that was heavily influenced by trading interests.

Alongside political, regional or trading interests, however, the role of scientific expertise

factored into the development of ADIs and MRLs and microbial limits for the food products,

signifying a co-production of these elements in the food additive, pesticide and hygiene areas.

But even with the influence of scientific or technical expertise – be it toxicological, statistical,

chemical or microbiological – there was also a clear industrialist presence. Industrial researchers

or industrial scientists’ involvement in the Codex was clear with the presence of groups like

BIBRA or Unilever with the food additives committee or Shell with the pesticide residues.

The work of these three main original consumer health and food safety areas – food additives,

hygiene and pesticides – still continue in the present manifestation of Codex, but with expanded

focus. In some cases new or evolved “sub sub-Committees” have been struck to deal with

emerging threats and new technology which have changed the shape of food safety and

necessitated the evolution of food safety standards accordingly. For example, growth hormones

in beef or production aids such as Bovine Somato-Tropin (BST) in milk were biological food

additives (which fell under the jurisdiction of both the Joint Expert Committee on Food

Additives, as representing foreign items added to the food chain, as well as the Codex Veterinary

Drugs Residue Committee) and drew a lot of attention in an oft-cited high profile debate pitting

the U.S. against Europe in the early 1990s.458 The geopolitical arrangements that had been

458 David Jukes, The Role of Science in International Food Standards. Food Control, Vol 11 (3) June 2000. Recombinant BST was first developed by Monsanto and marketed as Posilac and a concern in milk. In beef, the growth hormones of concern were: estradiol 17-beta, progesterone, testosterone, zeranol and trenbolone acetate.

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developed in the postwar era came to a head: Europe had a greater level of protection (and was

thus charged with protectionism) and had banned growth hormones, whereas the United States

did not. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was also being revisited and reformed

during this period (1993-96) as subsidies for European farmers – originally in place to protect

them from the peaks and troughs of the international market – were not only eliciting

“international unease” and being seen as a protectionist measure, but were also getting costly.459

The regional core of the European food and agricultural system was also once again being

challenged within this international forum – a reoccurring theme – but in the case of the

hormones, the EU insisted that it took consumer concerns or perceptions of safety more

seriously.460

6.2. Other Legitimate or Limiting Factors

These debates prompted the Codex to consider explicitly adding “science” and “other legitimate

factors” to its general principles. The “other legitimate factors” included such things as

consumer concerns, animal welfare, fraudulent or unfair trading practices, labelling and other

ethical or cultural considerations.461 These explicit principles were under more intense discussion

in the years leading up to the formation of the WTO and the SPS Agreement.

It is undeniable, however, that even if there is continuity within the Codex organization itself, the

food safety landscape around Codex has been changing. Microbial safety and food hygiene most

certainly remain an issue; the lines have become blurred however with microbiological problems

now joined by food safety concerns at the molecular level. Not only has this area expanded with

the rise of particularly tenacious resistant strains of Escherichia coli and recognition of new

459 History of the Common Agricultural Policy. (Discussion Paper). The Scottish Government. 2004. 460 David Jukes, The Role of Science in International Food Standards. Food Control, Vol 11 (3) June 2000. 461 (FAO/WHO 1993; FAO/WHO 1995 “Statements of Principle Concerning the Role of Science in the Codex Decision making Process and the Extent to Which Other Factors are Taken into Account”).

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threats such as listeria in ready-to-eat foods, but also, and most notably, the concern and raging

debate over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).462

Conceptually GMOs represent an area where all three of the key food safety issues connect: 1)

food additives in the sense that a ‘foreign’ substance is being intentionally added for the

purported benefit of the consumer or end-user; 2) hygiene and microbial issues in the sense of

the scale upon which this research is occurring on the one hand, and also on the other, in that

some GMOs are designed by making use of microorganisms as vectors for genetic material; and

finally 3) pesticide residues in the sense that GM crops can be manufactured for the quality of

chemical resistance and thus promote even greater use potentially harmful pesticides altogether,

or, in some cases, like with the Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) variety, developing crops which are

resistant to the pests and thus less pesticides are required.463 But this debate is being adequately

recounted and analyzed by other researchers looking at contemporary food studies or the

relationship between science and culture, as the story is still unfolding.464

Although historically, the industrialist presence in the Codex is clear, one actor has been missing,

however. Although the trope of “protecting consumer health” was present from the very

beginning, the opinions and voices of consumers or consumer lobby groups were missing. As the

quotation above emphasizes, few people in the public domain knew about the Codex

Alimentarius, its work or its history. The perception of it remains diverse, ranging from claims

that it is too restrictive or not protective enough, with exclamations of “Big Brother !” or

“Draconian” restrictions at work, or “They want to kill us!” And the Codex is attracting greater

controversy from consumers as it is moving toward natural health supplements and herbals (See

462 The number of publications on GMOs are too numerous to mention in one footnote, but as a short selection: Brian Wynne, “Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on GMOs.” Science as Culture, 10 (2001): 445-481; Britt Bailey and Marc Lappé (Eds.) Engineering the Farm: Ethical and Social Aspects of Agricultural Biotechnology. Washington: Island Press, 2002.; Steven Yearley, “Mapping and Interpreting Societal Responses to Genetically Modified Crops and Food”, Social Studies of Science, 31 (2001): 151-160; Les Levidow, “Ignorance-based Risk Assessment? Scientific Controversy over GM Food Safety.” Science as Culture 11 (2002), 61-67; Michael Lipton, “Biotechnology, genetically modified crops and the poor”. In: R. Herring, ed. Transgenics and the Poor: Biotechnology in Development Studies. London: Routledge, 2008. 463 For example, Monsanto’s development of “Roundup ready” GM crops such as soy or corn has contributed to this debate. Roundup, a herbicide produced by Monsanto, can be sprayed on these crops but their safety is in question by consumers, not to mention the overuse of this herbicide has raised concerns that weeds are becoming resistant as well. 464 Again, see footnote number 9 for examples.

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Figure 6.1)465 Many of the arguments against Codex seem to be emanating from the United

States – charges that it is a secret organization attempting to suppress individual liberties by

regulating access to beloved medicines like vitamins and minerals. The Codex began looking at

vitamins, minerals and other health products starting in the 1990s and adopted a Guideline in

2005, only for products (containing vitamins and minerals) that are regulated as foods,

establishing daily limits, criteria for purity and composition.466

This perception of “few knowing” about the Codex as quoted above has created an impression

that it was somehow intentionally meant to be a secret, but partly, and perhaps more realistically,

it was because its standards were distributed to governments who could voluntarily adopt them,

with little felt impact in its early years.

One of the oldest groups – Consumers International (based out of the UK)467 – was founded in

1960 and now sits around the table at the Codex as observer. It did attend some of the hygiene

meetings in the 1960s to report upon them in its journal, but this presence was certainly

outnumbered by other NGOs or industrialists.468 Another lobby group officially around the

Codex table with NGO status: is the National Health Federation in the U.S., a non-profit

international “Health Freedom Organization” and the International Association of Consumer

Food Organization based out of Washington, D.C.469

Interestingly, Consumers International weighed in the recent hormone debate and not

surprisingly emphasized the importance given to “other factors” in developing scientific

465 For example, these sentiments are expressed on the National Health Federation website with the title “Codex Alimentarius: Monstrously Toxic Power Play for Control of the Global Food Supply & Natural Health Industry” a compilation of sources and articles edited by Dr. David Klein the Editor of Living Nutrition magazine on August 1, 2007. http://www.thenhf.com/article.php?id=1668 [Accessed October 2010]. 466 FAO/WHO, Guidelines for Vitamin and Mineral Food Supplements. CAC/GL 55 – 2005 http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10206/cxg_055e.pdf . [Accessed February 2011]. 467 Consumers International has a membership of more than 234 organisations in almost 113 countries. 468 Meanwhile, industry remains a strong presence. A quick search for Industry (as NGO) on the Codex Alimentarius website reveals the following current (but not exhaustive) list of members: Association of the European Self-Medication Industry (AESGP); Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO); Conseil europeen de l’industrie chimique (CEFIC); Industry Council for Development (ICD); International Feed Industry Federation (IFIF); International Organization of the Flavour Industry (IOFI); World Self Medication Industry. 469 The NHF website: http://www.thenhf.com/ [Accessed October 2010]

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standards for additives, pesticides and microbes. More intriguing, however, is their insightful

comments on the elements (scientific versus non-scientific) that go into the decision-making

processes of experts, an implicit recognition of their co-production:

“Risk assessment, which in the Codex context may include those performed by JECFA and

JMPR, and possibly in the future by a similar Joint Expert Committee on Microbiological

Hazards, is primarily a scientific process. At the same time, scientific experts carrying out risk

assessments routinely make a range of judgments on matters such as which risks are within the

scope of their assessment and which are not; how much depth of scientific analysis is justified on

a particular question or risk; where adequate scientific data do or do not exist to support an

assessment; which evidence is most central or most credible on a particular point; and many

other questions. In deciding these matters, experts are guided in part by scientific criteria and in

part by their own subjective beliefs as to what is important, relevant, reasonable, and so forth.

These subjective factors are at least partly non-scientific in nature.”470

The fact that consumer groups are now making these claims about the scientific process and

nature of scientific expertise shows a remarkable shift toward the emergence and increasing role

of the ‘consumer expert’ on food safety issues. This thesis, however, was about the foundations

and the starting points in the construction of knowledge in the standards, the areas where health

expertise and knowledge about ‘other factors’ have to be weighed and considered accordingly.

The future of Codex historiography and analysis points toward looking to the impact of these

standards on the day-to-day lives and health of consumers, and other users of these standards

(labourers, food service workers), and the role of consumer movements internationally.

Clearly, in this new era the Codex Alimentarius will remain a contentious institution for

consumers, industry, scientists, medical experts and governments worldwide. A new form of

‘consumer expertise’ has emerged: information, interests and knowledge that will no doubt feed

470 Consumers International, “The Role of Science and “Other Factors” in Codex Decisions. A discussion paper by Consumers International Prepared for the CODEX COMMITTEE ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES Thirteenth Session Paris, France, 7-11 September, 1998 AGENDA ITEM 8 Review of the Statements of Principle on the Role of Science and the Extent to which Other Factors are Taken Into Account: Application in the Case of BST and PST.” URL: http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_food_safety/002270.html [Accessed October 2010].

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into the “other legitimate factors” which are co-produced together with the scientific and trade

interests underpinning the Codex food safety standards.

Figure 5.1. “The World Under Codex Alimentarius ?” (Source: Resistnet.com – “Home of

Patriotic Resistance”)

More broadly, however, the historiography of food safety is enriched by taking a co-

productionist account. As Scholliers has recently noted, safe food is a social construction and a

more promising trend in historiography is (rather than simply teleological or linear accounts) is

for historians to contextualize food safety issues in terms of “power relations” between actors

and also exploring “unfixed food safety” and no stable concept of quality.471 As I have tried to

show in this account of the Codex, international food standards are a key example of how the

471 Scholliers, Peter. Defining Food Risks and Food Anxieties Throughout History. Appetite 51 (2008):3-6.

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lens of co-production can account not only for relationships between different forms of scientific

expertise and the actors who develop this knowledge, but also for unpacking the very notion of

safety.

185

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