The Graniteville DisasterThe Graniteville DisasterMark T. Arden Mark T. Arden

Chappell Smith and ArdenChappell Smith and ArdenSouth Carolina Workers Compensation South Carolina Workers Compensation

Educational Association Educational Association 31st Annual Medical Seminar31st Annual Medical Seminar

February 28-March 2,2010February 28-March 2,2010Francis Marion Hotel Charleston S.C. Francis Marion Hotel Charleston S.C.

There's a long black train There's a long black train Coming down the line Coming down the line

Feeding off the souls that are lost and crying Feeding off the souls that are lost and crying Tails of sin only evil remains Tails of sin only evil remains

Watch out brother for that Long Black TrainWatch out brother for that Long Black Train

Facts Concerning the DisasterFacts Concerning the Disaster

At approximately 2:39 At approximately 2:39 a.m. on 1/6/05, NS Train a.m. on 1/6/05, NS Train 192 was heading north on 192 was heading north on the NS R-line between the NS R-line between August and Columbia.August and Columbia.

Train 192 consisted of 2 Train 192 consisted of 2 locomotives, 25 loaded locomotives, 25 loaded cars, and 17 empty cars. cars, and 17 empty cars. Of the 25 loaded cars, 3 Of the 25 loaded cars, 3 contained chlorine.contained chlorine.

The ninth car, UTLX The ninth car, UTLX 900270 contained 900270 contained approximately 90 tons of approximately 90 tons of chlorine.chlorine.

Facts Concerning the DisasterFacts Concerning the Disaster

Train 192 rounded a Train 192 rounded a 1-degree curve 1-degree curve approaching the approaching the Avondale Mills Avondale Mills Gregg Plant Lead Gregg Plant Lead Switch.Switch.

Train 192 was Train 192 was traveling traveling approximately 49 approximately 49 m.p.h as it m.p.h as it approached the approached the switch.switch.

Facts Concerning the DisasterFacts Concerning the Disaster Unbeknownst to the Unbeknownst to the

crew of Train 192, the crew of Train 192, the Avondale Mills switch Avondale Mills switch was incorrectly lined was incorrectly lined for the Avondale Mills for the Avondale Mills industry track.industry track.

Train 192 entered the Train 192 entered the Avondale Mills industry Avondale Mills industry spur with no chance to spur with no chance to stop prior to colliding stop prior to colliding with parked Train P22.with parked Train P22.

Car UTLX 900270 was Car UTLX 900270 was punctured, releasing a punctured, releasing a poison chlorine gas poison chlorine gas cloud all around the cloud all around the Gregg Plant area. Gregg Plant area.

Damage to the lead locomotives of Train Damage to the lead locomotives of Train 192 (left) and Train P22 (right).192 (left) and Train P22 (right).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Graniteville_derailment%2C_aerial_view_closeup.jpg

Chlorine GasChlorine Gas

Chlorine GasChlorine Gas

Chlorine Gas developed by German chemist Fritz Harbor in Chlorine Gas developed by German chemist Fritz Harbor in 1915 for use as a poison gas in WWI.1915 for use as a poison gas in WWI.

Tear gas first was the first recorded gas attack used by the Tear gas first was the first recorded gas attack used by the French Army against the German Army in August of 1914. French Army against the German Army in August of 1914. Chlorine gas developed shortly thereafter. Chlorine gas developed shortly thereafter.

The density of chlorine gas is approximately 2.5 times The density of chlorine gas is approximately 2.5 times greater than air, which will cause it to initially remain near greater than air, which will cause it to initially remain near the ground in areas with little air movement.the ground in areas with little air movement.

The strong oxidizing effects of chlorine produce corrosive The strong oxidizing effects of chlorine produce corrosive tissue damage. The oxidation of chlorine will penetrate cells tissue damage. The oxidation of chlorine will penetrate cells and react with cytoplasmic proteins to destroy cell and react with cytoplasmic proteins to destroy cell structurestructure..

Chlorine GasChlorine Gas

The health effects resulting from most chlorine exposures The health effects resulting from most chlorine exposures begin within seconds to minutes.begin within seconds to minutes.

There is no antidote for chlorine poisoning.There is no antidote for chlorine poisoning.

When liquid chlorine is released, it quickly turns into a gas When liquid chlorine is released, it quickly turns into a gas that stays close to the ground and spreads rapidly. that stays close to the ground and spreads rapidly.

When chlorine gas comes into contact with moist tissues When chlorine gas comes into contact with moist tissues such as the eyes, throat, and lungs, an acid is produced such as the eyes, throat, and lungs, an acid is produced that can damage these tissues.that can damage these tissues.

The gas causes both internal and external blisters on the victim within hours of being exposed to it.

World War One World War One French Soldier/ British French Soldier/ British

CasualtiesCasualties

Human CostsHuman Costs

Country Total Casualties Deaths

Austria-Hungary 100,000 3,000

British Empire 188,706 8,109

France 190,000 8,000

Germany 200,000 9,000

Italy 60,000 4,627

Russia 419,340 56,000

USA 72,807 1,462

Others 10,000 1,000

Casualties From Gas- The Numbers

The FalloutThe Fallout

9 chlorine related deaths;9 chlorine related deaths;

554 injured who reported 554 injured who reported to hospital;to hospital;

75 hospital admissions;75 hospital admissions;

11 in critical care;11 in critical care;

Over 5,000 people Over 5,000 people evacuated.evacuated.

Complexities of the DiagnosisComplexities of the Diagnosisfrom the Graniteville Disasterfrom the Graniteville Disaster

Case StudiesCase Studies Pulmonary (reactive airways, restrictive Pulmonary (reactive airways, restrictive

lung disorder, sleep apnea, cough variant lung disorder, sleep apnea, cough variant asthma- multiple diagnoses of bronchitis) asthma- multiple diagnoses of bronchitis) Dyspnea and hypoxia with exertion Dyspnea and hypoxia with exertion

Sinus Issues/Skin Rash Issues- recurrent Sinus Issues/Skin Rash Issues- recurrent sinusitus-acute bilateral external otitis, sinusitus-acute bilateral external otitis, hypertropy of inferiror turbinateshypertropy of inferiror turbinates

Eye problems –ocular injuryEye problems –ocular injury Psychiatric Disorders- post traumatic Psychiatric Disorders- post traumatic

stress disorder, anxiety, major depression, stress disorder, anxiety, major depression, nightmares, flashbacks,nightmares, flashbacks,

Case Study ACase Study A

Case Study ACase Study A Six days admitted in the hospital , 3 in ICUSix days admitted in the hospital , 3 in ICU 64% saturation at the decontamination site, spirometry shows primarily a 64% saturation at the decontamination site, spirometry shows primarily a

restrictive pattern with an FEV1 of 3.18 liters or 73% of predictedrestrictive pattern with an FEV1 of 3.18 liters or 73% of predicted Initial complaints – difficulty breathing, severe dyspnea, severe wheezing, Initial complaints – difficulty breathing, severe dyspnea, severe wheezing,

burning sensation, dizziness, nausea and vomitingburning sensation, dizziness, nausea and vomiting Diagnosis: Acute lung injury associated with both hypoxemic and Diagnosis: Acute lung injury associated with both hypoxemic and

hypercapnic respiratory failure hypercapnic respiratory failure Reactive airways disease secondary to chlorine exposure, obstructive Reactive airways disease secondary to chlorine exposure, obstructive

sleep apnea, moderate persistent asthma secondary to chlorine exposuresleep apnea, moderate persistent asthma secondary to chlorine exposure Subsequent right lower lobe pneumonia with streptococcus pneumoniaeSubsequent right lower lobe pneumonia with streptococcus pneumoniae Impairment rating: 30% to each lung and sinus tractImpairment rating: 30% to each lung and sinus tract Restrictions: no exposure to airborne dust particles, gases, fumes, Restrictions: no exposure to airborne dust particles, gases, fumes,

extremes in temperatures and molds- No walking distances greater than extremes in temperatures and molds- No walking distances greater than one block-No freguent lifting more than 10 poundsone block-No freguent lifting more than 10 pounds

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder- persistent symptoms of insomniaPost Traumatic Stress Disorder- persistent symptoms of insomnia Initial GAF: 45. Last GAF:50. Initial GAF: 45. Last GAF:50.

TreatmentTreatment

Pulmonolgist: reactive airways Pulmonolgist: reactive airways disease ongoing visits-medicine disease ongoing visits-medicine regimine includes Advair 250/50 and regimine includes Advair 250/50 and as needed does of albuterol.as needed does of albuterol.

Psychiatrist: Counseling and Psychiatrist: Counseling and Effexor,Trazadone, Clonidine, Effexor,Trazadone, Clonidine, Seroquel and WellbutrinSeroquel and Wellbutrin

Case Study A ClothingCase Study A Clothing

Case Study BCase Study B

One day ICU- Six Days HospitalizedOne day ICU- Six Days Hospitalized Initial complaints-Dyspnea with exertion;Initial complaints-Dyspnea with exertion;

documented hypoxia; tachycardia with simple activities; insomnia, ocular injury; documented hypoxia; tachycardia with simple activities; insomnia, ocular injury; reactive airways disease with restrictive appearing spirometry; obstructive sleep reactive airways disease with restrictive appearing spirometry; obstructive sleep apnea; recurrent sinusitus, cough varient asthma; multiple issues of apnea; recurrent sinusitus, cough varient asthma; multiple issues of bronchitus;Impotence bronchitus;Impotence

Initial FVC 51% of predicted, FEV1 53% of predicted.Initial FVC 51% of predicted, FEV1 53% of predicted. 4 months later- FVC 52% of predicted, FEV1 53% predicted4 months later- FVC 52% of predicted, FEV1 53% predicted Low lung volumes- off medication patient respiratory function is in the severe Low lung volumes- off medication patient respiratory function is in the severe

range.range. Pulmonary Function Tests reveal severe airflow limitation with noted Pulmonary Function Tests reveal severe airflow limitation with noted

bronchodialator response, severe airway resistance, significantly reduced diffusion bronchodialator response, severe airway resistance, significantly reduced diffusion capacity. capacity.

Diagnosis- Severe occupational-induced asthma with a reactive airways Diagnosis- Severe occupational-induced asthma with a reactive airways syndrome physiology;severe bilateral external otitis, chronic sinusitis, syndrome physiology;severe bilateral external otitis, chronic sinusitis, hypertrophy of inferior turbinates: PTSD, Major depression hypertrophy of inferior turbinates: PTSD, Major depression

Impairment- 70% to both lungs as well as airway sinus tractImpairment- 70% to both lungs as well as airway sinus tract Restrictions- Limited standing,lifting,bending or strenuous activity: Avoid Restrictions- Limited standing,lifting,bending or strenuous activity: Avoid

exposure to airborne dust particles, inicluding gases,fumes,extremes of exposure to airborne dust particles, inicluding gases,fumes,extremes of temperature and humidity, - lung capacity restricts him to sedentary duties-temperature and humidity, - lung capacity restricts him to sedentary duties-Modified sedentary FCE. Modified sedentary FCE.

TreatmentTreatment

Pulmonologist-”It is expected that the Pulmonologist-”It is expected that the patient will suffer from recurrent patient will suffer from recurrent bronchitis,pneumonia and other lung bronchitis,pneumonia and other lung infections in the future.” Ongoing infections in the future.” Ongoing hospitalizations,treatment and medicine hospitalizations,treatment and medicine regimine. regimine.

ENT- visits for chronic sinusitusENT- visits for chronic sinusitus Psychiatrist- ongoing counseling and Psychiatrist- ongoing counseling and

medicine/treatment.medicine/treatment. Obesity and onset of weight gain due to use Obesity and onset of weight gain due to use

of oral steroids combined with inactivity. of oral steroids combined with inactivity.

Psychiatric IssuesPsychiatric Issues

Multitude of DSM IV diagnosisMultitude of DSM IV diagnosis Most prevelant – Post Traumatic Stress Most prevelant – Post Traumatic Stress

DisorderDisorder Unusual triggering factors- smells/crowds Unusual triggering factors- smells/crowds

hospitals, sirens verses trains hospitals, sirens verses trains Common complaints involve sleep Common complaints involve sleep

variations, anxiety, cautious and on edge variations, anxiety, cautious and on edge demeanor, irritability, fearfulness, demeanor, irritability, fearfulness, hypervigilance, avoidance/anxiety related to hypervigilance, avoidance/anxiety related to social situations, nightmares, flashbacks, social situations, nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive recollections of the traumatic and intrusive recollections of the traumatic eventevent

Conclusion and Lessons Conclusion and Lessons LearnedLearned

Same exposure-varied diagnosisSame exposure-varied diagnosis Five different presentations can be from the same Five different presentations can be from the same

type of exposuretype of exposure The need for different medical specialist leads The need for different medical specialist leads

often to a time lapse prior to acurate diagnosis. It often to a time lapse prior to acurate diagnosis. It does not mean the patient is a poor historian or does not mean the patient is a poor historian or exagerating his symptoms.exagerating his symptoms.

Minor exposures harder to assess/diagnose and Minor exposures harder to assess/diagnose and even harder to treat.even harder to treat.

Effects of the exposure are lifelong and there is Effects of the exposure are lifelong and there is no cure. no cure.

Emergency Response Issues: Emergency Response Issues: What Went Wrong in What Went Wrong in

Graniteville (Stephen Brittle)Graniteville (Stephen Brittle) 1. Emergency responders from the local volunteer fire department responded to the train crash 1. Emergency responders from the local volunteer fire department responded to the train crash

and subsequent chlorine release without first donning personal protective gear. This severely and subsequent chlorine release without first donning personal protective gear. This severely hampered and compromised their response. Some wound up with blisters on their lungs. This hampered and compromised their response. Some wound up with blisters on their lungs. This volunteer fire department had HAZMAT training and equipment due to the proximity if the volunteer fire department had HAZMAT training and equipment due to the proximity if the Savannah River Nuclear Site. One would think that the scenario of a train derailment involving Savannah River Nuclear Site. One would think that the scenario of a train derailment involving hazardous materials such as chlorine would have been part of their training, as well as hazardous materials such as chlorine would have been part of their training, as well as something the Aiken County LEPC would have contemplated and prepared for in preparing and something the Aiken County LEPC would have contemplated and prepared for in preparing and updating its EPCRA Section 303 emergency plan. Neither law enforcement personnel nor updating its EPCRA Section 303 emergency plan. Neither law enforcement personnel nor emergency responders seemed trained/drilled/prepared for this scenario. emergency responders seemed trained/drilled/prepared for this scenario.

2. Civilians were mostly on their own when it came to evacuating. There were true accounts of 2. Civilians were mostly on their own when it came to evacuating. There were true accounts of heroism and good Samaritans. Workers at the Avondale Mills plant worked together to make heroism and good Samaritans. Workers at the Avondale Mills plant worked together to make sure they got away. Some trying to flee had difficulty starting their cars and trucks as the sure they got away. Some trying to flee had difficulty starting their cars and trucks as the chlorine worked with the humidity in the air on ignitions. Cell phones also did not always work chlorine worked with the humidity in the air on ignitions. Cell phones also did not always work for the same reason. for the same reason.

3.The community had a rare resource, an emergency telephone ring-down system, but it was 3.The community had a rare resource, an emergency telephone ring-down system, but it was not activated for hours after the incident, then told people to shelter-in-place at first, when it not activated for hours after the incident, then told people to shelter-in-place at first, when it should have told many to evacuate. Later, it was used to tell people to evacuate. should have told many to evacuate. Later, it was used to tell people to evacuate.

4.The railroad did not make the call to the National Response Center required by CERCLA 103 4.The railroad did not make the call to the National Response Center required by CERCLA 103 until over an hour and fifteen minutes after the release of chlorine. [According to the NRC report, until over an hour and fifteen minutes after the release of chlorine. [According to the NRC report, the incident occurred on 06-JAN-05 at 02:40 local time. *Report taken by: MST3 CREWS at 03:58 the incident occurred on 06-JAN-05 at 02:40 local time. *Report taken by: MST3 CREWS at 03:58 on 06-JAN-05] It is unknown what effect this had on the actual response, or if the delay on 06-JAN-05] It is unknown what effect this had on the actual response, or if the delay exacerbated the emergency response issues, but the system set up by federal law was not exacerbated the emergency response issues, but the system set up by federal law was not properly utilized. CERCLA requires an immediate phone call. Under the EPA penalty policy, properly utilized. CERCLA requires an immediate phone call. Under the EPA penalty policy, penalties begin after a 15-minute delay, and the maximum penalty is assessed after one hour. penalties begin after a 15-minute delay, and the maximum penalty is assessed after one hour. The notifications from the NRC to the various state and federal emergency response agencies The notifications from the NRC to the various state and federal emergency response agencies came after at least a fifteen-minute delay. came after at least a fifteen-minute delay.

5. EPA set up a chlorine monitor at the crash site that maxed out at 1.5 ppm. Although the 5. EPA set up a chlorine monitor at the crash site that maxed out at 1.5 ppm. Although the incident response lasted for several days, a better monitor that would show actual levels of incident response lasted for several days, a better monitor that would show actual levels of chlorine in the ambient air was not used. It would have served the immediate community of chlorine in the ambient air was not used. It would have served the immediate community of Graniteville, as well as the nearby community and county seat of Aiken, to have had the Graniteville, as well as the nearby community and county seat of Aiken, to have had the information and technical data about maximum concentrations of chlorine at the site and a information and technical data about maximum concentrations of chlorine at the site and a variety of off-site locations. Again, one wonders why the local volunteer fire department did variety of off-site locations. Again, one wonders why the local volunteer fire department did not have this type of monitor, as an incident such as a local train derailment involving chlorine not have this type of monitor, as an incident such as a local train derailment involving chlorine or other HAZMAT would be a foreseeable contingency. or other HAZMAT would be a foreseeable contingency.

6. The ALOHA modeling program distributed by EPA (for use by responders and emergency 6. The ALOHA modeling program distributed by EPA (for use by responders and emergency planners in modeling chemical spills) seems to have not worked very well in modeling this planners in modeling chemical spills) seems to have not worked very well in modeling this particular chlorine spill. The official account available in the press was that only one railcar particular chlorine spill. The official account available in the press was that only one railcar was breached and leaking, but according to an ALOHA model, it would have been expected to was breached and leaking, but according to an ALOHA model, it would have been expected to empty rather quickly, certainly within hours. The report later was that much of the chlorine in empty rather quickly, certainly within hours. The report later was that much of the chlorine in the breached railcar did not leak into the atmosphere, and eventually was neutralized and off-the breached railcar did not leak into the atmosphere, and eventually was neutralized and off-loaded. There was some confusion about how many of the rail cars of chlorine were breached. loaded. There was some confusion about how many of the rail cars of chlorine were breached. Utilizing this ALOHA modeling, responders could have made an educated guess about just Utilizing this ALOHA modeling, responders could have made an educated guess about just how far away adverse effects of the chlorine might have been felt, as well as the infiltration of how far away adverse effects of the chlorine might have been felt, as well as the infiltration of dwellings. dwellings.

7. The head of the local volunteer fire department and designated incident commander was 7. The head of the local volunteer fire department and designated incident commander was also an employee of the railroad. It is unclear whether this had an effect on the release of also an employee of the railroad. It is unclear whether this had an effect on the release of information to the press and the public about the incident. I certainly got the impression that information to the press and the public about the incident. I certainly got the impression that the Norfolk Southern Railroad was in control of the command center and the flow of the Norfolk Southern Railroad was in control of the command center and the flow of information. All press statements and information seemed to be carefully controlled to information. All press statements and information seemed to be carefully controlled to minimize embarrassment to the company. Questioning would be cut off whenever the press minimize embarrassment to the company. Questioning would be cut off whenever the press asked hard questions of the rail company, at least when I was present. I was able to find out the asked hard questions of the rail company, at least when I was present. I was able to find out the cause of the incident almost immediately upon arrival at Breezy Hill (adjacent to Graniteville) cause of the incident almost immediately upon arrival at Breezy Hill (adjacent to Graniteville) on the morning of the 6th of January. I learned that the rail crew that parked a locomotive and on the morning of the 6th of January. I learned that the rail crew that parked a locomotive and two cars on the side rail by the Avondale Mills facility had not switched the diversion switch two cars on the side rail by the Avondale Mills facility had not switched the diversion switch back and had gone home hours before the oncoming train with the chlorine railcars arrived. back and had gone home hours before the oncoming train with the chlorine railcars arrived. The NTSB announced some of the information The NTSB announced some of the information

8.As I wandered the incident command center area the day after the crash, I noticed a very 8.As I wandered the incident command center area the day after the crash, I noticed a very distressed young black woman who seemed to be ignored by the various officials and staff distressed young black woman who seemed to be ignored by the various officials and staff present at the area. I asked her and found out that she was trying to locate information about present at the area. I asked her and found out that she was trying to locate information about her father, Willie Tyler, and that she had not been able to get any kind of answer from her father, Willie Tyler, and that she had not been able to get any kind of answer from hospitals or anyone. I convinced a sheriff’s deputy to assist her, and she was referred to a hospitals or anyone. I convinced a sheriff’s deputy to assist her, and she was referred to a Red Cross center some miles away. Later, Willie Tyler was found dead at the Avondale Red Cross center some miles away. Later, Willie Tyler was found dead at the Avondale Mills plant. He was the ninth victim. It seems wrong that he was known to be missing and Mills plant. He was the ninth victim. It seems wrong that he was known to be missing and yet no one or official had contacted his family. It also seems wrong that she could not find yet no one or official had contacted his family. It also seems wrong that she could not find out this vital information easily. out this vital information easily.

9. The area of evacuation was likely not sufficient. I spoke with a woman who lived about 9. The area of evacuation was likely not sufficient. I spoke with a woman who lived about 2.5 miles downwind from the rail crash site who had not ever been evacuated by emergency 2.5 miles downwind from the rail crash site who had not ever been evacuated by emergency responders. She had heard the crash but thought it was thunder. She awoke the morning of responders. She had heard the crash but thought it was thunder. She awoke the morning of the crash feeling weak, and noticed what she described as “a strange fog” outside. She the crash feeling weak, and noticed what she described as “a strange fog” outside. She learned about the disaster on television. When her husband came home later that day, they learned about the disaster on television. When her husband came home later that day, they left their home and went further away to some relatives, but the chlorine fumes came there left their home and went further away to some relatives, but the chlorine fumes came there also, so they went back home. Considering that the potential off-site consequence of a also, so they went back home. Considering that the potential off-site consequence of a catastrophic release of chlorine from a rail car can be up to 14 miles away, according to EPA, catastrophic release of chlorine from a rail car can be up to 14 miles away, according to EPA, it appears that the emergency response and evacuation should have looked further into the it appears that the emergency response and evacuation should have looked further into the area outside the IDLH (10ppm for Chlorine), and should have conducted air monitoring area outside the IDLH (10ppm for Chlorine), and should have conducted air monitoring periodically throughout the areas downwind. This appears to be a common problem going periodically throughout the areas downwind. This appears to be a common problem going back to the mindset of the emergency response community using ALOHA. The area of IDLH back to the mindset of the emergency response community using ALOHA. The area of IDLH (Immediate Danger to Life and Health) gets much attention, but the levels of chlorine in the (Immediate Danger to Life and Health) gets much attention, but the levels of chlorine in the ambient air outside an IDLH can still be at harmful levels, certainly with chronic exposure. ambient air outside an IDLH can still be at harmful levels, certainly with chronic exposure. Even the OSHA standard for workplace exposure is 0.5 ppm, TWA. People outside the Even the OSHA standard for workplace exposure is 0.5 ppm, TWA. People outside the designated IDLH should have been warned to avoid exposure and what symptoms might designated IDLH should have been warned to avoid exposure and what symptoms might indicate an adverse effect. indicate an adverse effect.

10. Some of the medical community, despite the rail disaster, seems to have ignored the 10. Some of the medical community, despite the rail disaster, seems to have ignored the obvious. This aforementioned woman did not go to an emergency room until Sunday the 9th obvious. This aforementioned woman did not go to an emergency room until Sunday the 9th of January, four days after the incident, because she did not get any better. There was no of January, four days after the incident, because she did not get any better. There was no notification to her and others about potential health effects to watch out for. The hospital, notification to her and others about potential health effects to watch out for. The hospital, unfortunately, diagnosed her with pneumonia and merely gave her antibiotics, which did not unfortunately, diagnosed her with pneumonia and merely gave her antibiotics, which did not help at all. She saw her primary care physician on Tuesday, the 11th of January, who realized help at all. She saw her primary care physician on Tuesday, the 11th of January, who realized her chlorine exposure, and prescribed something to ease the inflammation of her lungs and her chlorine exposure, and prescribed something to ease the inflammation of her lungs and allow her to breathe easier. allow her to breathe easier.

11. It is always helpful when the responsible party steps up to the plate 11. It is always helpful when the responsible party steps up to the plate to assist in relieving the problems caused by a chemical accident. to assist in relieving the problems caused by a chemical accident. However, although Norfolk Southern Railroad set up a relief center to However, although Norfolk Southern Railroad set up a relief center to give people checks to cover motel and food expenses, but people had to give people checks to cover motel and food expenses, but people had to wait hours to process paperwork and get these checks. It would have wait hours to process paperwork and get these checks. It would have been better if this had been expedited with more staffing and resources, been better if this had been expedited with more staffing and resources, and it would have also looked better for the railroad company if it had and it would have also looked better for the railroad company if it had not put releases for people to sign on these checks. (A court action soon not put releases for people to sign on these checks. (A court action soon ruled that these releases were invalid.) ruled that these releases were invalid.)

12. It is unbelievable and appalling that the Federal Emergency 12. It is unbelievable and appalling that the Federal Emergency Management Agency rejected Gov. Mark Sanford's request for federal Management Agency rejected Gov. Mark Sanford's request for federal disaster relief in the wake of the Jan. 6 train accident and chlorine gas disaster relief in the wake of the Jan. 6 train accident and chlorine gas spill that killed nine and temporarily displaced thousands in Graniteville. spill that killed nine and temporarily displaced thousands in Graniteville. A Feb. 9 letter from FEMA Under Secretary Michael Brown told Sanford A Feb. 9 letter from FEMA Under Secretary Michael Brown told Sanford the agency didn't think the Graniteville derailment and chemical spill the agency didn't think the Graniteville derailment and chemical spill warranted an emergency declaration. warranted an emergency declaration.

13. The hazardous materials contents of the railcars traveling through 13. The hazardous materials contents of the railcars traveling through Graniteville or anywhere need not be a mystery. OREIS™ is a software Graniteville or anywhere need not be a mystery. OREIS™ is a software tool that provides emergency responders, emergency planners, on-tool that provides emergency responders, emergency planners, on-scene fire, police and EMS responders with vital information for dealing scene fire, police and EMS responders with vital information for dealing with rescue, response and counter-terrorism operations on or around with rescue, response and counter-terrorism operations on or around railroads and highways, including those involving hazardous materials. railroads and highways, including those involving hazardous materials. The software provides responders with real-time information about the The software provides responders with real-time information about the chemical contents of railcars and trucks that have been involved in an chemical contents of railcars and trucks that have been involved in an incident, schematics for passenger railroads and a host of other life and incident, schematics for passenger railroads and a host of other life and timesaving features for emergency responders. The concept was born in timesaving features for emergency responders. The concept was born in 1995 in Houston, Texas and sprang from a Federal Railroad 1995 in Houston, Texas and sprang from a Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) initiative to provide hazardous materials Administration (FRA) initiative to provide hazardous materials information to emergency responders.information to emergency responders.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=echttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecEmm-ZSKU4Emm-ZSKU4