the global navy/coast guard relationship: a mandate-based typology

THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP

A MANDATE-BASED TYPOLOGY

5 APRIL 2010

MATTHEW GILLIS

MA CANDIDATE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

RESEARCH ASSISTANT, CENTRE FOR FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

OBJECTIVES

TO DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A TYPOLOGY OF

NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIPS.

TO ESTABLISH A TYPOLOGY OF NAVY/COAST GUARD

RELATIONSHIPS WORLD-WIDE.

TO OFFER POLICY OPTIONS FOR NAVY/COAST GUARD

REFORM IN CANADA AS THEY ARE PRODUCED BY

THIS TYPOLOGY.

THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS

A MANDATE-BASED TYPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

1. WHY A TYPOLOGY?

THE [RE]EMERGING NEED FOR A PRESENCE IN

CANADA‟S „THIRD OCEAN.‟



“...the Canadian Forces must have the capacity to exercise control over

and defend Canada‟s sovereignty in the Arctic. New opportunities are

emerging across the region, bringing with them new challenges. As

activity in northern lands and waters accelerates, the military will play

an increasingly vital role in demonstrating a visible Canadian presence

in this potentially resource-rich region...”

Canada First Defence Strategy, 8, emphasis added

1. WHY A TYPOLOGY?

PROBLEM: THE CANADIAN FORCES HAVE THE

MANDATE FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN

INTERNAL/TERRITORIAL CANADIAN WATERS,BUT LACK THE EXPERIENCE OR EQUIPMENT

NECESSARY FOR A SUSTAINED ARCTIC

PRESENCE.



1. WHY A TYPOLOGY?



1. WHY A TYPOLOGY?

THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD (CCG) HAS THE

EXPERIENCE AND THE EQUIPMENT...



“It is the CCG that annually sends its most capable units into the high

Arctic, including Canada's largest icebreaker, CCGS Louis S. St. Laurent.

Each summer, up to eight CCG icebreakers provide not only scientific

research platforms, search-and-rescue capability, pollution response

capacity, support for commercial shipping engaged in the annual

„sealift,‟ and occasionally „platform‟ support for the RCMP and Armed

Forces, but the big red and white hulls are also the main element in

Canada's sovereignty presence in these waters...”

Former deputy commissioner of CCG Michael Turner, “Guarding Canada's northern coast,” Ottawa Citizen, 13

July 2007.

...BUT NOT THE MANDATE.

1. WHY A TYPOLOGY?

SO WHY NOT AN ENFORCEMENT MANDATE FOR THE CCG?



“A fairly widespread belief exists that the Canadian Coast Guard should undertake all the

domestic maritime security roles in a similar manner to the US Coast Guard. This is more

easily said than done. The US Coast Guard is very different from the Canadian Coast Guard in

being a paramilitary (non-unionized) force with a broad maritime enforcement mandate that

draws in responsibilities that in Canada are shared between several government

departments. Although such a change could be authorized with the stroke of a pen, making

the related operational transformation would be costly and time consuming.

Moreover, one has to ask if the coast guard people would be prepared to work on a basis of

continual (24/7) availability or accept far broader responsibilities with the associated

personal risk – the unlimited liability criteria under which the military serves. Does the

present coast guard structure include people to maintain and operate such things as complex

electronic systems, weapons and helicopters? Can an existing coast guard ship muster and

land an armed force, albeit limited in capability, to provide a government presence ashore in

a remote area in the face of a crisis? Could the Canadian Coast Guard undertake the

essential data management task presently done by the navy?”

Commander (Ret‟d) Peter Haydon, “Do We Really Need a Canadian Navy?”, Canadian Naval Review 5:3.

2. BUILDING A TYPOLOGY

THE UNITED STATES IS NOT THE ONLY OTHER NATION

WITH A COAST GUARD.

OF THE APPROXIMATELY 150 NATIONS WITH A

COASTLINE, 72 HAVE COAST GUARDS.

SO, HOW IS EVERYONE ELSE RUNNING BUSINESS?




GENERATING SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIPS

BETWEEN COAST GUARDS AND NAVIES...

1. MANY NATIONS, INCLUDING CANADA AND THE U.S., HAVE BOTH A

COAST GUARD AND A NAVY.

2. SOME NATIONS, LIKE MEXICO AND DENMARK, HAVE NO COAST GUARD

– ONLY A NAVY.

3. EVEN A FEW NATIONS, LIKE ICELAND AND JAMAICA, HAVE NO NAVY –ONLY A COAST GUARD.




GENERATING SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE ENFORCEMENT

MANDATES OF COAST GUARDS...

1. ONLY TWO NATIONS, CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, HAVE

CIVILIAN COAST GUARDS (I.E., NO ENFORCEMENT MANDATE).

2. MANY NATIONS (52) HAVE COAST GUARDS WITH A LIMITED

PARAMILITARY ENFORCEMENT MANDATE.

3. SOME NATIONS, LIKE THE U.S., INDIA, AND EGYPT, EMPOWER THEIR

COAST GUARDS WITH A MILITARY ENFORCEMENT MANDATE.






NAVY/COAST GUARD ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE

CLASSIFIED UNDER TWO HEADINGS:

Coast Guard Mandate Navy/Coast Guard Relationship

Civilian Full Coast Guard

Paramilitary Divided Responsibility

Military Full Military




Navy/Coast Guard Relationship

Full Coast Guard Divided Responsibility Full Navy

Co

ast

Gu

ard

Ma

nd

ate

Civ

ilia

n

(0) Canada, United Kingdom (2)

Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia,

Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia,

Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea,

Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras,

Laos, Malawi, Mexico,

Montenegro, North Korea,

Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,

Portugal, Romania, Senegal,

Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria,

Venezuela, Vietnam (27)

Pa

ram

ilit

ary

Burundi, Costa Rica,

Iceland, Mauritius,

Panama, Seychelles (6)

Algeria, Argentina, Australia*, Azerbaijan*, Bahrain,

Bangladesh, Bulgaria*, Djibouti*, Ecuador,

Equatorial Guinea, Estonia*, Finland, France,

Georgia, Germany, Greece, Indonesia*, Iran*,

Ireland, Israel, Italy*, Ivory Coast*, Japan, Kenya*,

Lebanon*, Lithuania, Madagascar*, Malaysia,

Mauritania*, Morocco*, Myanmar, Netherlands,

Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, PRC, Philippines, Poland*,

Republic of Korea, Russia*, Saudi Arabia,

Singapore*, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan,

Thailand, Tunisia*, Turkey, Ukraine*, United Arab

Emirates, Yemen (52)

* = no dedicated coast-guarding org.

Milit

ary

Cape Verde, Jamaica,

Trinidad and Tobago (3)

Chile, Egypt, India, Kuwait, Norway, Peru, Tanzania,

United States, Uruguay (9)


THE CANADIAN ARRANGEMENT, AS A

CIVILIAN/DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY CASE, IS UNIQUE.



Personnel Strength

Active

Strength

Naval

Strength

Navy %

of Active

Nav. Res.

Strength

Nav. Res.

% of Navy

Coast Guard

Strength

CG % of

Navy

Canada 64,000 11,100 17.3 4,200 37.8 9,350 84.2

USA 1,498,157 341,588 22.8 128,293 37.6 40,500 11.9

Global

Average196,860 24,612 12.5 8,696 35.3 4,837 19.7

Less USA 178,531 20,148 11.3 6,702 33.3 4,026 20.0

3. POLICY OPTIONS





Co

ast

Gu

ard

Ma

nd

ate

Civ

ilia

n Eliminate the Navy

Keep the Coast Guard as is

Status Quo

Eliminate the Coast Guard

Assign coast-guarding duties

to Navy

Pa

ram

ilit

ary

Eliminate the Navy

Give Coast Guard Security Mandate

Keep the Navy as is

Give the Coast Guard Security Mandate

Mil

ita

ry Eliminate the Navy

Give Coast Guard Military Mandate

Keep the Navy as is

Give the Coast Guard Military Mandate

3. POLICY OPTIONS

EACH OPTION IMPLIES A VARIETY OF NEEDED

REFORMS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS.

EXAMPLE: PARAMILITARY COAST GUARD / DIVIDED

RESPONSIBILITY MODEL



3. POLICY OPTIONS

PARAMILITARY COAST GUARD / DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY:

NEEDED REFORMS

REVISIT EXISTING LEGISLATION, E.G. OCEANS ACT

PROVIDE CCG WITH NECESSARY TRAINING/ARMAMENTS.

RE-BALANCE NAVY‟S COMMITMENTS

COSTS

FINANCIAL COSTS

ADDED RISKS/RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CCG

BENEFITS

AMELIORATES THE MANDATE/EXPERIENCE DEFICIT IN THE ARCTIC.

NAVY‟S RETURN TO MORE TRADITIONAL HOMELAND DEFENCE/OVERSEAS

DEPLOYMENTS?



WHICH OPTION FOR CANADA?





Co

ast

Gu

ard

Ma

nd

ate

Civ

ilia

n Eliminate the Navy

Keep the Coast Guard as is

Status Quo

Eliminate the Coast Guard

Assign coast-guarding duties

to Navy

Pa

ram

ilit

ary

Eliminate the Navy

Give Coast Guard Security Mandate

Keep the Navy as is

Give the Coast Guard Security Mandate

Milit

ary Eliminate the Navy

Give Coast Guard Military Mandate

Keep the Navy as is

Give the Coast Guard Military Mandate

QUESTIONS?

the global navy/coast guard relationship: a mandate-based typology

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