the future of u.s. overseas presenceby the eve of the korean war in 1950, the 12 million americans...

T he future of U.S. overseas military presence cannot be properlyassessed without going back to first principles. It is essential toexamine the historical pattern and purposes of presence; domes-tic economic and political factors likely to affect overseas com-

mitments; the future security environment, including possible require-ments for U.S. action; the changing nature of warfare; and the basicchoices that we will face as our policies stop coasting on the residual iner-tia of the immediate post-Cold War era.

These choices will ultimately concern how to conduct sensible policiesand strategies within a broad approach of overseas engagement. This arti-cle argues that disengagement could not satisfy U.S. national security ob-jectives. If the United States is to be guided by a prudent assessment of itsstrategic position, it must accept responsibilities for continuing engage-ment in the management of international security affairs. Moreover, it isurgent to place the debate on overseas presence in a broad, long-term con-text. Some recent discussions of presence have been based on a short-termperspective—no more than a few years—and influenced by intra-allianceburden-sharing disputes or interservice competition for resources. Deci-sions on presence must be reached in light of larger choices about securitycommitments, economic interests, national purposes, and grand strategy.

70 JFQ / Summer 1995

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The Future of U.S. Overseas PresenceBy D A V I D S. Y O S T

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Historical OverviewPrior to 1898, the Nation deployed al-

most no land forces in peacetime outside theterritory that became the continental UnitedStates, except for token forces in Alaska afterits purchase from Russia in 1867.1 For mostof the 19th century, U.S. forces did not haveto go overseas to engage external presencechallenges. Central preoccupations were eco-nomic progress, national cohesion, and con-tinental expansion. The adversaries in ensur-ing freedom of navigation or realizing the

“manifest destiny” of theNation included Britain,France, Spain, Mexico, andAmerican Indian tribes.Overseas military opera-tions consisted primarily of

brief expeditionary actions in North Africaand the Mediterranean, the Caribbean andCentral America, and Asia. Some operationswere small in scale but relatively prolonged(for instance, the First Barbary War againstTripoli, 1801–05), while others had signifi-cant consequences (such as opening Japanto international trade in 1853–54).2

These operations were facilitated bynaval detachments that cruised far fromNorth America almost continuously, such asthe Mediterranean (1801–07; 1815–61), Euro-pean (1865–1905), East India (1835–61), andAsiatic (1866–1902) squadrons. With a fewexceptions (such as Yokohama, Nagasaki,Hong Kong, Macao, Gibraltar, Port Mahon,Spezia, and Villefranche), the Nation was re-luctant to establish depots or shore facilitiesabroad, and foreign ports were used on aminimal basis. Navy policy called for em-ploying floating storeships anchored at ren-dezvous points.3

The turning point came in 1898, partlybecause of the annexation of Hawaii—thetreaty of 1887 had granted America the rightto establish a base at Pearl Harbor—andpartly because of the Spanish-American War,through which Puerto Rico, Guam, and thePhilippines were acquired. Moreover, Amer-ica obtained part of Samoa in 1899 from

Britain and Germany. As a byproduct of thewar with Spain, Cuba in 1903 leased Guan-tanamo Bay indefinitely. Also in 1903,Washington recognized the independence ofPanama and gained control of the CanalZone in perpetuity.4

The Spanish-American War was also sig-nificant because it (and the Venezuelanboundary crisis, 1895–96) inaugurated an eraof U.S. interventionism in Latin America.President Theodore Roosevelt declared a“corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904that asserted a national right to assume “aninternational police power” in “flagrantcases of . . . wrong-doing or impotence” inthe Western Hemisphere. The United Statesintervened repeatedly in Cuba, Haiti, Mex-ico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.Some interventions were prolonged (for ex-ample, Haiti, 1915–34, and Nicaragua,1912–33, almost continuously). Franklin D.Roosevelt’s noninterventionist “GoodNeighbor” policy in 1933 marked the end ofthis phase.

The main historic thrust of U.S. isola-tionism was to keep clear of war in Europe, apolicy that was sustained until World War I.American forces were sent to Europe in1917–18 for combat and post-war occupa-tion duties (in Germany until 1923), and toSiberia and northern Russia for intervention(1918–20) in the Russian civil war. Afterthese events associated with World War I,however, overseas deployments of groundforces were mainly limited to areas acquiredor leased at the turn of the century. In 1939about a quarter of the Army was assignedoutside the continental United States(20,000 in Hawaii, 17,000 in the PanamaCanal Zone, 4,000 in the Philippines, 900 inPuerto Rico, and 400 in Alaska) while theNavy was based at Guantanamo Bay, Samoa,Guam, Hawaii, the Canal Zone, the VirginIslands, and the Philippines. The Navy regu-larly cruised the international waters of theCaribbean and elsewhere, however, and theUnited States based troops and ships inChina (including gunboats on the Yangtze)continuously from 1912 to 1941.

After Hitler’s Blitzkrieg victories in 1940the United States reached agreements withBritain and other nations on bases overseas,including Newfoundland, Iceland, Green-land, and Bermuda. Then, after enteringWorld War II with the Japanese attack on

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Summer 1995 / JFQ 71

the main historic thrust ofU.S. isolationism was tokeep clear of war in Europe

David S. Yost teaches at the Naval PostgraduateSchool. He has been a fellow at the Woodrow Wil-son International Center for Scholars and visitingprofessor at the École Militaire in Paris.

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Pearl Harbor in 1941, Washington acquiredan array of overseas bases and facilities inEurope, the Mediterranean, the Middle East,and Asia. Despite rapid post-war demobiliza-tion, occupation kept U.S. forces in Europeand East Asia (especially in Austria, Ger-many, Japan, and Korea) during the onset ofthe Cold War with the Soviet Union. Crisesin Berlin, Greece, Iran, and Czechoslovakia,and the Korean War led to many U.S. com-mitments, which required retaining and up-grading much of the World War II basestructure.

By the eve of the Korean War in 1950,the 12 million Americans who had beenunder arms during World War II had beenreduced to 953,000, with 328,000 overseas.The latter included 122,000 in Europe,150,000 in Japan, and only 500 in SouthKorea. (American and Soviet occupationforces had been withdrawn from Korea bymid-1949.) The Korean War resulted in ahuge expansion of the Armed Forces. Thehighest level of U.S. military strength (andoverseas deployments) during the war camein 1953, when the combat stopped. Asshown in the accompanying chart, overseasdeployments remained relatively high in the1950s and 1960s, with a quarter to a third ofall active forces serving in some 35 coun-tries, mainly in Europe and East Asia.

The decline in overseas bases and forcelevels began in the late 1960s. The causes in-cluded technical factors—for instance, im-provements in command, control, commu-nications, and intelligence; the shift frommedium-range B–47s to long-range B–52s;and increased numbers of ICBMs and SLBMsfor strategic nuclear deterrence—as well aspolitical events in France, Okinawa, Libya,and Vietnam. As the chart shows, substan-tially fewer personnel served at home orabroad after the Vietnam War. Various fac-tors explain this decline, including the em-phasis of the Nixon Doctrine on more bal-anced burden-sharing in alliance relations,reduced defense spending, and the move tothe all-volunteer force (which created asmaller, costlier personnel system). The1970s saw further reductions, with partialdisengagement (Spain, Thailand, and thePhilippines) or total withdrawal (Morocco).

The overall force levels overseas nonethelessremained remarkably consistent through the1980s, with a brief surge during the 1990–91Persian Gulf War.

The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 ledto substantial cutbacks in U.S. force structureand overseas deployments. The drawdownhas been most dramatic in Europe, wheretwo-thirds of all the bases have been closedand forces have been pared from 341,000 in1989 to 109,000 in 1995. The reduced threatand the sense of diminished need for over-seas deployments seem to have encouragedand justified withdrawals hastened by otherfactors (for example, the departure from thePhilippines in 1991–92 after the unfavorablevotes in the Manila Senate and the eruptionof Mount Pinatubo).

Historical PurposesThe United States has deployed forces

overseas for many purposes short of war. Priorto World War II these included protectingcommerce and trade routes, deterring andpunishing piracy, enhancing prestige, culti-vating relations with foreign governments,restoring order, guaranteeing the collection ofdebts, and defending American citizens andinterests during regional upheavals.

The primary justification for FDR’s firstbase accords in 1940 was U.S. forward de-fense. Overseas deployments can provideearly warning of aggressive actions and fur-nish opportunities for prompt response anddefense in depth. Moreover, they facilitatethe organization of coalitions for collectivedefense against aggression and multilateralenforcement of international law. Anotherpurpose has thus been post-war occupationto enforce peace settlements, including dis-armament and political reeducation (as inAustria, Germany, Japan, and Korea follow-ing World War II). The restrictions on Iraqsince the Gulf War—including those en-forced under Provide Comfort and SouthernWatch—offer a contemporary example of ef-forts to uphold a peace settlement.

Owing in part to its interest in deter-ring—and, if necessary, fighting—adversariesfar from North America, the United Stateshas made numerous security commitments.Its forces have thus helped protect hostcountries against coercion or aggression, aswell as allies without a continuing militarypresence such as Norway, Denmark, and

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France. The United States has given credibil-ity to security commitments by placingthese forces (and, in many cases, accompa-nying dependents) at risk overseas.

In backing its commitments with forcesabroad, the United States has reassured na-tions that might otherwise seek nuclearweapons or other exceptional capabilities.Overseas presence has thus supported non-proliferation. Besides, it has—by making po-litical will manifest—contributed to broadgoals of deterrence, war-prevention, politicaland economic stabilization, and influence inregional balance of power configurationsacross Europe, East Asia, and the greaterMiddle East. These purposes support largergoals, such as supplying an enduring frame-work of confidence for trade and (at least insome regions) democratization efforts.

Moreover, bases in Europe and East Asiahave provided essential logistical support forforces operating far beyond the host coun-tries, as in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.Overseas presence has also offered: means tocultivate relationships with foreign govern-ments to improve prospects for U.S. accessto key facilities during crises; resources forexercises and other bi- and multinational ac-tivities (including foreign military sales) thatmaintain interoperability; opportunities for

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Active Duty Military Strength, 1953–94 (in thousands)

joint and multinational training in specificclimate or terrain conditions and combatzones; and facilities for maintaining andprotecting air and sea lines of communica-tion and for ensuring orderly air and mar-itime traffic control and freedom of naviga-tion in international waters and straits.

Since the late 1980s overseas presencehas also become a major element in opera-tions other than war—peace operations, em-bargoes, no-fly-zone enforcement, nation-building, arms control, democratization,civil-military education, et al. Special opera-tions forces, moreover, participate in unobtru-sive foreign internal defense programs thatprotect societies from anarchy, subversion,and insurgency, and that promote humanrights and civilian control of the military.

U.S. forces were deployed at their high-est levels after World War II in three con-flicts—the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars.In situations short of actual combat duringthe Cold War, the largest concentrationswere in Europe, particularly Germany. Thiswas understandable, given that the bulk ofSoviet military power was in Europe, includ-ing Russia west of the Urals, with the best-equipped forces massed in Germany. In view

0

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of the collapse of the Soviet Union, thewithdrawal of former Soviet forces fromCentral and Eastern Europe, the continuingshift in U.S. overseas commerce from atransatlantic to a transpacific emphasis, theincrease in military and economic potential

in Asia (notably in Japan,China, and India), and thedangerous situation inKorea, the continued con-centration of U.S. forces inAsia might appear morelikely than the retention ofsignificant force levels in

Europe. But the Gulf War and subsequentevents have shown a continuing interest inMiddle East oil. The political obstacles toprepositioning equipment and basing forcesin large numbers in this region constituteone of the many arguments for sustainingthe U.S. military presence in Europe.

Domestic FactorsEconomic and demographic trends will

constrain U.S. defense spending and the ca-pacity to maintain a large defense establish-ment, including forces abroad. It will proba-bly be hard to arrest the continuing declinein defense spending underway since 1985for several reasons: pressures to reduce thedeficit; possible tax cuts (or at least a reluc-tance in Congress and the White House toraise taxes); and growth in entitlements (So-cial Security, Medicare, et al.) and interestpayments on the deficit. These paymentswill be about $257 billion in FY96 (16 per-cent of the Federal budget), and almostequal to defense spending ($262 billion).Medicare and Medicaid will total $271 bil-lion while Social Security will amount to$351 billion. Some project that spending onMedicare and Medicaid will grow at a 7 per-cent annual rate in real terms in 1995–2000,in part because of increased demand due tothe continued growth of the elderly popula-tion. During 1983–93, defense spending fellfrom 6.3 percent to 4.7 percent of GNP, andit is expected to decline further.5

In this budgetary context (absent amajor international crisis), decisionmakersmay perceive financial incentives to furtherreduce deployments overseas or to demandmore host nation support from foreign gov-ernments. In this regard the debate in theHouse of Representatives in 1994 on the

Frank amendment was noteworthy. It calledfor reducing authorized end strength forNATO Europe unless host nations paid 75percent of nonpersonnel costs (on the modelof the agreement with Tokyo). Without thecompliance of our allies, the amendmentwould have cut strength to 25,000 personnelin Europe and reduced end strength world-wide. The Frank amendment was approvedin the House by a vote of 268 to 144, and ar-guments in its favor were essentially eco-nomic—equity in burden-sharing, deficit re-duction, and economic competitiveness.6

Economic arguments and domestic pre-occupations take on greater political signifi-cance at times when no serious threat is onthe horizon. The sense of a challenge to vitalU.S. interests that justified an extensiveoverseas presence during the Cold Warseems to be in decline. The lack of a galva-nizing ideological as well as military threatto NATO or world security has raised doubtsin the minds of many Americans about theneed for much of the remaining overseaspresence.

A recent survey of American elites foundthat “almost half of the Influentials wouldkeep U.S. troop strength in Europe at the100,000-man level. . . . More than one-third . . . would cut significantly below the100,000-man level, however, and more thanone in ten favor bringing the U.S. force homeentirely.” In contrast, the survey reported “astrong two-thirds majority . . . favored keep-ing U.S. troop strength in South Korea . . . at39,000 men.” 7

The same survey found noteworthy dif-ferences between U.S. elites and the generalpublic in foreign policy priorities and withregard to the possible use of force:

The Influentials were clearly prepared to send Ameri-can fighting men to honor long-standing U.S. commit-ments and protect vital interests. By margins of abouttwo-thirds or more, they would support the use ofAmerican forces to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraq,South Korea against North Korea, and Israel againstArab invaders. . . . Compared to the Influentials, thepublic appeared willing to go to war for almost no-body. The exception was to fight Iraq (53 percent ap-prove, 40 against). . . . The public was stronglyagainst fighting on behalf of South Korea (63 percentversus 31 percent), and marginally against fightingfor Israel (48 percent versus 45 percent).8



economic and demographictrends will constrain the capacity to maintain forces abroad

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At both the elite and popular levels, the deter-mination to exercise greater caution and se-lectivity in accepting security commitmentsoverseas—even of a limited and humanitariannature—appears to have grown, especiallyafter the 1992–94 Somalia intervention. 9

Americans looking for rationales to cutoverseas commitments have found inspira-tion in the long historyof U.S. isolationism.Some cite John QuincyAdams: “America goesnot abroad in search ofmonsters to destroy.She is the well-wisherto the freedom and in-dependence of all. Sheis the champion andvindicator only of herown.” 10 Indeed, GeorgeF. Kennan, the authorof the famous “X” arti-cle on containmentwhich appeared in1947, has argued thatthe principles outlinedby Adams are relevanttoday. Kennan now ad-vocates a “principle ofnonintervention” andsuggests that “The bestway for a larger country to help smaller onesis surely by the power of example.” 11 Otherspropose disengaging from Cold War securitycommitments and exercising greater restraintin intervening or assuming obligations over-seas,12 adding to the plurality of viewpointson U.S. international security policy.

The Future Security EnvironmentThe increasing caution about overseas

commitments has also stemmed from aresurgence of ethnic conflicts in Europe,Africa, the former Soviet Union, and else-where—complex, intractable, age-old an-tipathies that seem impossible for outsidersto resolve at a reasonable cost and that donot appear to involve vital American inter-ests. The potential security environment, in-cluding possible requirements for U.S. mili-tary action, is nonetheless far more complexthan this general impression.

To begin with, overseas bases may notbe as readily available as they were duringthe Cold War. Political and social trends

abroad may make it more costly and difficultfor the United States to maintain bases, facil-ities, and burden-sharing and host-nationsupport arrangements in specific countriesand regions. In a number of nations thereseems to be a growing sentiment that for-eign bases amount to a derogation of sover-eignty, and sometimes anti-Western or anti-American feelings are concentrated againstsuch installations. There is no longer a con-vincing Soviet threat to persuade host gov-ernments to put up with a politically sensi-tive U.S. military presence.

Moreover, it became apparent in the1970s and 1980s—particularly in Spain,Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Japan—thatgreater consensus, coordination, and com-bined action would be needed for the UnitedStates to be able to use the facilities. Theobligation to get permission from a foreigncountry before taking military action hasseemed irksome to some American officials

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Combat Camera Imagery (Efrain Gonzalez )

Macedonia.

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Osan Air Base, Korea.

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and members of Congress and has reinforcedinterest in disengagement, unilateralism,and autonomous military capabilities lessdependent on foreign facilities. Specific casesdiffer, however. The desirability of U.S. pres-ence for general regional stability or imme-diate security needs may be rapidly re-assessed, depending on circumstances. Baseaccess may be directly related to the degreeof perceived threat and consequent need forhelp. For example, Iraq’s action in August1990 led to a prompt revision of Saudi poli-cies on foreign military presence. Since theGulf War some U.S. equipment has beenprepositioned in Kuwait, complementing fa-cilities in Oman, Bahrain, and elsewhere.

In surveying probable sources and typesof conflict—challenges for overseas presenceand power-projection capabilities—it is use-ful to consider a range of scenarios and criti-cally evaluate forecasts about the future se-curity environment. For example, RobertKaplan’s provocative article, “The ComingAnarchy,” draws on Martin van Creveld’sThe Transformation of War, and both are sub-ject to the same criticisms: overstating the

decline of the nation-state and underesti-mating the prospect for large-scale powercompetitions and conflicts in comingdecades.13

A recent book by Max Singer and AaronWildavsky contains a useful point of depar-ture for thinking about the international sit-uation at hand. They contend that the in-dustrial democracies of North America,Western Europe, East Asia, and the South Pa-cific constitute “zones of peace,” with politi-cal systems favoring compromise, tolerance,consensus-building, and power-sharing. Therest of the world consists mostly of “zones ofturmoil,” burdened by poverty and either ac-tual or latent ethno-national struggles. Al-though the industrial democracies are eco-nomic competitors and often differ overhow to deal with conflicts in the “zones ofturmoil,” and although some assert nationalautonomy on a Gaullist model, there is noprospect of armed conflict among them inthe foreseeable future.14

This study may nonetheless understatethe importance of continuing U.S. engage-



Major Active Air Unit Locations (as of June 30, 1994)

Source: Armed Forces Information Service, Defense 94 Almanac.

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ment for political stabilization in Europeand East Asia and the vast differences be-tween the regions. East Asia lacks institu-tions comparable to NATO, the EuropeanUnion, and Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe.Democratic institutionsare, for the most part, lessfirmly established. Theeconomic dynamism ofspecific rising powers is

such that—given the unresolved territorialdisputes and historical grievances—the re-gion seems much more “ripe for rivalry”than Europe. According to Aaron Friedberg,“While civil wars and ethnic strife will con-tinue for some time to smolder along Eu-rope’s peripheries, in the long run it is Asiathat seems far more likely to be the cockpitof great power conflict.” 15

The potential for large-scale conflict inEurope should not be underestimated, how-ever. Though clashes in the former Yu-goslavia and the Caucasus have been con-tained so far, both could lead to wider warswith greater involvement by external powers,including Islamic countries. Russia could pre-sent greater uncertainties, owing in part tothe risk that democratization efforts couldfail and the Russian federation could breakapart. Anarchy and civil war, or confronta-tions with states such as Ukraine, could drawin other powers and result in major conflicts.

Long-term assessments of the interna-tional scene should take other risks into ac-count. For example, a depression could leadto a sharper decline in U.S. defense spendingas well as overseas presence and engage-ment, in conjunction with a rise in protec-tionism and the formation of antagonistictrading blocs, even within supposed “zonesof peace.” Anti-Western as well as anti-U.S.ideologies vehemently articulated in someIslamic and East Asian circles could give newpurposes to those bent on the acquisition ofweapons of mass destruction—leaders whoseem to be motivated mainly by regionalambitions and insecurities. Relatively fragilecommunications and energy infrastructuresin America as well as other advanced soci-eties in zones of peace could become targetsfor adversaries from zones of turmoil, risksthat could be incentives for closer coopera-tion—and continued U.S. engagement andoverseas presence.

Some speculation has focused on thepossibility of facing new military peer com-petitors. Owing to its rapid economicgrowth—according to some, its GNP couldexceed our own in 25 years—China is seenas a potential military peer competitor of theUnited States if it can avoid civil war andmaintain its cohesion. Speculative long-termanalyses have also mentioned Russia underdictatorship, Japan after events such as Ko-rean unification and U.S. disengagement,and even India if it could gain greater politi-cal and social cohesion. Even if they did notbecome peer competitors, some observerssuggest, such countries might become“niche competitors” with substantial capa-bilities in certain areas—for instance, land-based sea control—or, at least, sea denial (tocounter foreign naval forces in littoral areas).

The Changing Nature of WarfareNew methods of combat could well alter

overseas presence requirements, especially ifa revolution in military affairs (RMA) is un-derway or imminent. Although various defi-nitions of the concept are in circulation, it isgenerally agreed that an RMA requires thecombination of advanced weapons and asso-ciated systems based on new technologies,innovative operational concepts, and astuteorganizational adaptations. The result ofsuch a revolution is a basic change in thecharacter and conduct of operations, withsubstantially increased combat effectiveness.

Specialists do not agree on the identifi-cation of previous RMAs but offer examplessuch as the standardization of parts for large-scale arms production, plus mass conscrip-tion (1789–1815); the railroad, telegraph,and rifled weaponry (1850–71); and the in-ternal combustion engine, aircraft, radio,radar, carrier air, and strategic bombing(World Wars I and II). During the interwarperiod Germany was the most farsighted andadept in preparing for land warfare, includ-ing coordinating airpower for ground sup-port, while Japan and the United States bothexploited carrier aviation and developedconcepts and organizations for long-distanceoperations and amphibious attacks.

If a new RMA is at hand, it may be based onadvances in at least three areas of technology:

▼ information systems to gather, process,and disseminate data about targets and plans as

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the potential for large-scaleconflict in Europe should notbe underestimated

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well as to deny data to an enemy and thus createan “information gap” or “information dominance”

▼ extended-range, highly accurate conven-tional munitions

▼ simulations techniques to train forces anddevelop new capabilities and operational con-cepts. It is generally agreed that such a revolutionmight have greater effects on mid- to high-inten-sity conventional warfare than on low-intensityconflicts or “operations other than war,” and thatmastering the new capabilities (with the requisitenew organizations and operational concepts)could take twenty to fifty years.16

Changes foreseen by current assessmentsof a new RMA remain to be demonstrated,and some observers have reservations aboutthese assessments.17 If such a revolution wasrealized, it would put a high premium onjointness—that is, a closer integration of ca-

pabilities to exploit infor-mation and long-range pre-cision-strike systems invirtually simultaneous andmultidimensional land, sea,air, and space operations.

Operational and organizational innovationscould include improved forces dedicated tostrategic mobility, information dominance,space control, forcible entry, long-range pre-cision attacks, air superiority, and strategicand theater defense.

Some implications for overseas presencewould flow from the probability that anenemy might also obtain new capabilities. Inthat event, perhaps in 2015–20, preposi-tioned equipment, ports, airfields, ammuni-tion stockpiles, and infrastructure could be-come large fixed targets, highly vulnerableto long-range precision-strike attacks. Somespeculate that an enemy with extensive sur-veillance and target-acquisition capabilitiesmight monitor the oceans far offshore andmake U.S. carriers vulnerable to precision-guided missiles in some situations.18

In other words, future planners may findincentives to cut forces overseas, includingnaval forces in littoral areas, to lessen the riskof losses in preemptive attacks. Alternatively,to operate in range of enemy strike systems,U.S. forces might need improved mobility,stealth, deception, and active defenses—andenhanced means of preemptively neutraliz-ing surveillance, command and control, andstrike systems. Some envisage arsenal ships

armed with long-range precision-guided mis-siles and other strike systems that wouldimply a drastically reduced need for a hugelogistical infrastructure ashore, with reloads,personnel support facilities, and so forth.

Mobility, dispersion, deception, stealth,electronic warfare, and active defenses mightbe better sources of protection—and wiserinvestments—than costly permanent instal-lations. It might be desirable to increase in-vestment in maritime prepositioning and toinvestigate the potential merits of dispersed,“transitory,” low-cost facilities as well as thesustainability of defenses for a smaller num-ber of permanent bases. Overall, changes inhigh-intensity conflict may imply reducedneeds for forward bases and prepositioningashore but call for maintaining access to for-eign-operated facilities. Low-intensity con-flict, crisis management, and overseas pres-ence activities comparable to those in recentyears might, however, be conducted with as-sets little different from those today. Re-quirements for temporary but prolongedoverseas basing in support of specific opera-tions might also emerge.

Even with a new RMA, some continuingpurposes of overseas presence will requireforces abroad, on land or at sea—for in-stance, to maintain relations with foreigngovernments and militaries, partly to im-prove prospects for access to facilities;demonstrate security commitments; andsupport broader missions such as politicalstabilization, deterrence, and war-preven-tion. But presence will probably continue todecline from Cold War levels for political,economic, and military-technical reasons,perhaps without clear-cut strategic decisionsin the near term.

Grand Strategy ChoicesAlthough deliberate decisions about

overseas deployments and security commit-ments may be evaded or postponed, theUnited States will eventually face fundamen-tal choices. It will not be possible to coast in-definitely on the inertia of the immediatepost-Cold War era, cutting forces and spend-ing on a percentage basis while trying to re-tain all the essential elements of past policies.

It was pointed out in 1986 that WorldWar II and subsequent Cold War commit-ments put the United States “in an unprece-dented position of geopolitical extension,”



changes in high-intensity conflict may imply reducedneed for forward bases

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with virtually global deployments. This posi-tion is difficult to maintain on logisticalgrounds, given the need to protect sea andair lines of communication, overseas bases,and related assets; costly to sustain becauseof the expense of overseas basing, reinforce-ment capabilities, extended deterrence, C3I,and support facilities; and dangerous to re-tain, in that overseas commitments implythe risk of being drawn into foreign wars, in-cluding nuclear conflicts.19

It was also pointed out in 1986 that“Virtually the only way in which this coun-try is ever likely to become involved in a nu-clear conflict would be in support of one ofthe overseas commitments which we tookon forty years ago. If avoiding nuclear warwere the sole objective of our foreign policy,the critical first step would undoubtedly beto withdraw from these responsibilities andto bring our forces home.” 20 Exactly this sortof argument for disengagement is now madein some circles, justified not only by the endof the Cold War but also by increased risksof nuclear proliferation.21

Aaron Friedberg suggested that Amer-ica’s unprecedented overseas engagementswould be “hard to justify over time to ademocratic polity,” given its isolationist tra-ditions. As a result, U.S. policymakers havehad to provide justifications for the “effort,expense, and danger of intervention and

continuing engagement.” Three approacheshave been available:

▼ an “explicitly imperial” rationale—glory,economic gain, even a “civilizing mission”

▼ power politics—preserving a favorablebalance of power and securing national interests

▼ ideology—America’s duty “to oppose aninimical political creed or to promulgate its ownbeliefs.”

Except for the era of the Spanish-Ameri-can War, Friedberg observed, Americanshave been reluctant to see their nation as animperial power. A combination of powerpolitics and ideology has usually providedthe rationale for involvement in war andoverseas commitments in this century.22

The argument can be made that U.S. se-curity commitments and military presencein Europe and East Asia help to prevent localarms races and power competitions and thusdiminish the risks of war. The political stabi-lization function may, however, become lessand less credible in domestic politics. In ef-fect, the argument is that U.S. involvementhelps to prevent or postpone arms competi-tions and conflicts between major powers inEurasia. Ultimately, such wars may takeplace—perhaps in fifty or a hundred years.American politicians and commentatorsmay ask whether lessening the possibility ofsuch major-power regional wars is worth theexpense and security risks involved.

Such questions draw attention to thecrossroads America faces. As Friedberg askedin 1986:

How could the case for continuing U.S. engagementbest be made? . . . Presumably the truest, and onehopes therefore the most persuasive, argument will in-volve again a blending of ideology (both positive andnegative) and power politics. Perhaps it will also haveto include an appeal from necessity, which has asomewhat unfamiliar ring to American ears. Howeverdifficult the course on which we embarked forty yearsago and however distant its end, the alternatives to itare all likely to be far worse.23

Engagement versus DisengagementIn broad terms the Nation faces a choice

between continuing engagement and disen-gagement. As the figure suggests, continuingengagement would imply an enduring andcentral U.S. role in meeting challenges to in-ternational security. The United States would

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thus maintain extended deterrence and otherprotection and support to key allies and secu-rity partners, and corresponding capabilitiesincluding global surveillance and power-pro-jection assets. This would represent a moredifficult course in U.S. domestic politics, be-cause it would involve a higher level of im-mediate costs and risks. But it might substan-tially reduce prospects for major-powerregional confrontations and thus markedlylessen long-term costs and risks. The alterna-tive of disengagement would be less costly inthe near term, after the United States ab-sorbed the initial cost of withdrawing anddisbanding forces, transporting and storingequipment, and closing bases. But disengage-ment could radically increase long-term risks.Long-standing alliances could break down,perhaps in a surprisingly rapid “renational-ization” of defense policies; regional powervacuums and arms competitions couldemerge; nuclear proliferation could acceler-ate; and power configurations unfavorable toU.S. security interests could arise.

Some prominent Americans have under-scored the U.S. role as a guarantor and stabi-lizer to prevent unwanted outcomes. For ex-ample, in August 1991, after the attemptedcoup in Moscow, Secretary of Defense DickCheney warned that disengaging from ouralliance commitments could cause destabi-lization by encouraging nuclear proliferation:

If I look at Germany or . . . Japan, I see two nationsthat I hope will continue to be close allies of theUnited States. . . . I would think [that] if the UnitedStates cuts back so much that all we can do and allwe can talk about is defending the continental UnitedStates, we’ll create an incentive for other nations thatdo not now feel the need to develop their own nucleararsenals to do so.24

Similarly, shortly before joining theClinton administration, Walter Slocombe,who currently serves as the Under Secretaryof Defense for Policy, wrote:

A unified Germany would not readily rely indefinitelyon a British or French deterrent. The practical issue,therefore, is whether there will be U.S. nuclear weaponsin Europe—or German ones. So long as there is a reluc-tance to see German nuclear weapons, there will be astrong case for an American nuclear guarantee mademanifest by the presence of nuclear weapons nearby.25

In February 1995, Joseph Nye, AssistantSecretary of Defense for International Secu-rity Affairs, indicated that one of the pur-poses of forward presence in the Asia-Pacificregion is to “discourage the emergence of aregional hegemon,” adding that “[the]United States has the capability, credibility,and even-handedness to play the ‘honestbroker’ among nervous neighbors, historicalenemies, and potential antagonists.” 26



Engagement versus Disengagement

Continuing Engagement Disengagement

Basic U.S. Role Remain at center of international security Concentrate on immediate security needsmanagement efforts

U.S. Posture Overseas Provide extended deterrence and other types of Withdraw from extended deterrence and cutprotection and support (including intelligence) other security commitments and partnershipto allies and key security partners activities (including intelligence-sharing)

Near-Term Costs The more difficult course to pursue politically, Perhaps the course of least resistance inowing to domestic priorities and the short-term domestic politics—less costly in the nearanalysis tendency in U.S. politics term, with fewer immediate risks

Long-Term Implications Lower probability of regional conflicts among Higher probability of major-power regionalmajor powers, but continued immediate risks conflicts owing to renationalization and

greater multipolarity, and more nuclear proliferation, with the risk of the United States being drawn into war on unfavorable terms

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One must distinguish between differentmodels of disengagement and various out-comes of reduced involvement in Eurasianpower configurations. What might the U.S.military posture look like under a disengage-ment approach that was nonetheless orientedto defending immediate and longer-range se-curity interests? The defensive perimeterwould naturally include Alaska, Hawaii, andU.S. territories in the Pacific and theCaribbean and might extend to the mid-At-lantic and the northern part of South Amer-ica, to protect access to Venezuelan oil. In-vestments in intelligence, space, ballisticmissile and air defenses, and nuclear forceswould have to continue and perhaps be in-creased to compensate for greater instabilities

and risks in key regions.America would still needairlift, sealift, maritimeprepositioning, powerprojection, and interven-tionary capabilities that,

in turn, might need to be improved to com-pensate for a lack of forces, equipment, andinstallations prepositioned forward ashore. Itis not clear whether the financial savingswould be significant in relation to the in-creased risks to national interests, such asoverseas allies, economic and security part-ners, and key resources—to say nothing ofthe greater potential for major-power regionalrivalries and wars, absent the U.S. engage-ment as a stabilizer and balancer.

While disengagement options would re-quire extensive analysis, one might also pos-tulate a comprehensive disengagement ratherthan a partial disengagement as outlinedabove. This would imply a far smaller mili-tary establishment; a defensive perimeterlimited to territorial possessions; continuedor increased investments in intelligence,space, ballistic missile defense, air defense,and nuclear forces; and greatly reduced air-lift, sealift, power-projection, and interven-tionary capabilities. In this hypothesis, awithdrawal from the greater Middle Eastmight be justified by the emergence of hy-drogen fuels or other substitutes for oil, newoil deposits, and greater conservation mea-sures. More generally, the advocates of a U.S.withdrawal from Europe, East Asia, and theMiddle East might appeal to arguments suchas the following: commerce will continue inthe economic self-interest of the trading

partners; arms competitions, wars, and otherstruggles among regional powers do not en-gage vital national interests; peace is “divisi-ble,” contrary to the rhetoric of those whowould entangle the United States in theEurasian balance of power; and America canbest serve democracy by minding its ownbusiness, addressing its domestic problems,and serving as a good example.

Such arguments may gain political po-tency and should not be dismissed as short-sighted or as half-truths without due analy-sis. The military posture and nationalsecurity strategy postulated under either apartial or comprehensive disengagement ap-pear, however, to pose greater long-termrisks than being immediately engaged andwell-positioned to shape the internationalsecurity scene. The damaging consequencesof disengagement might take years to de-velop, but there can be little doubt abouttheir nature. Crisis response actions andoverseas commitments and deployments arescrutinized abroad for signals of the risksthat America is prepared to accept and thebehavior that it is likely to oppose. U.S. dis-engagement could be destabilizing becausesome nations might seek to acquire new ca-pabilities (including nuclear arms) and es-tablish new coalitions to substitute for part-nership with the United States.

Fundamental choices are involved: Towhat extent can the United States sustainover the long term the task of serving as acentral leader in world security management,one of the strongest guardians of interna-tional order in the U.N. Security Council,and a key stabilizer and balancer inhibitingnew major-power regional rivalries and con-flicts? The limits to America’s resources andthe nature of its interests argue for interna-tional engagement, renewing the key al-liances, and pursuing skillful, long-term ef-forts to maintain alliance cohesion andmilitary interoperability and effectiveness.For its own security, the Nation must pro-mote an international security environmentwhich is pervaded by confidence in its mili-tary credibility and in America’s politicalsagacity and staying power.

The United States should be resolute inupholding its commitments to key securitypartners. Backed by overseas presence and

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other capabilities, these commitments con-tribute to a structure of stability and order(albeit imperfect). This structure will be nec-essary, for the foreseeable future, to promotevitality in the world economy, sustain demo-cratic reform, organize collective actionagainst aggression and other threats (such asthe proliferation of weapons of mass de-struction), and ensure America’s own secu-rity and prosperity. Uncertainty about ourpolitical will and priorities over the longterm can only be addressed through persua-sive and steadfast leadership. Doubts aboutthe wisdom of continuing our overseas en-gagement would, of course, be compoundedby political and strategic blunders. Hence,perhaps even more than in the past, U.S.leaders will have incentives to cultivate dis-cernment and to exercise selectivity in theface of specific military challenges. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Special thanks are owed to members of the over-seas presence working group sponsored by the Institutefor Joint Warfare Analysis at the Naval PostgraduateSchool. The historical section benefitted greatly fromthe advice of Frank Schubert, Joint History Office, Of-fice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Amongthe best sources on overseas presence are George Stam-buk, American Military Forces Abroad (Columbus: TheOhio State University Press, 1963) and Robert E.Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: TheGeopolitics of Access Diplomacy (New York: PergamonPress, 1982).

2 For background, see Ellen C. Collier, ed., Instancesof Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1989(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library ofCongress, December 4, 1989).

3 Paolo E. Coletta, ed., United States Navy and MarineCorps Bases, Overseas (Westport, Conn.: GreenwoodPress, 1985), pp. 115–21, 202–06.

4 This arrangement was modified by treaty in 1978.The United States agreed to withdraw all its forces bythe end of the century, but with (1) a permanent rightto return to defend the canal against any external threatto its neutral service to the ships of all nations and (2) aguarantee that U.S. warships would have a right to ex-peditious passage in emergencies.

5 The data in the last sentence of this paragraphmay be found in U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,1993–1994 (Washington: Government Printing Office,February 1995), p. 87. The Office of Management andBudget furnished the rest of the data in this paragraph.

6 Congressional Record (May 19, 1994), pp. H3736–46.No comparable amendment was passed in the Senate. InAugust 1994 the House-Senate conference committeeapproved a defense authorization bill for FY95 that sub-stantially qualified the Frank amendment. The level ofroughly 100,000 as the authorized end strength for Eu-rope was retained for the end of FY96; but the Frank

amendment goal to have our European allies pay at least37.5 percent of the stationing costs by that date wasadopted by the conference committee.

7 Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press,America’s Place in the World: An Investigation of the Atti-tudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Publicabout International Affairs (Washington: Times MirrorCompany, November 1993), pp. 37–38.

8 Ibid., pp. 24, 26.9 See, among other sources, Andrew Kohut and

Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs,vol. 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 47–61.

10 John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, ad-dress on July 4, 1823, cited in George F. Kennan, “OnAmerican Principles,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2(March/April 1995), p. 118.

11 Kennan, ibid., pp. 123, 125. 12 See, for example, Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Su-

perpower (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).13 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic

Monthly, vol. 273, no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 44–76;Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (NewYork: The Free Press, 1991).

14 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real WorldOrder: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, N.J.:Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

15 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects forPeace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security, vol.18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), p. 7.

16 For background, see James R. FitzSimonds and JanM. van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint ForceQuarterly, no. 4 (Spring 1994); Andrew F. Krepinevich,“Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolu-tions,” The National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp.30–42; and testimony presented by Andrew F. Kre-pinevich and Andrew W. Marshall before the Subcom-mittee on Acquisition and Technology, Senate ArmedServices Committee, May 5, 1995.

17 A.J. Bacevich, “Preserving the Well-Bred Horse,”The National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 43–49; andCarl H. Builder, “Looking in All the Wrong Places?”Armed Forces Journal International (May 1995).

18 Barbara Opall, “China Sinks U.S. in SimulatedWar,” Defense News (January 30, 1995), pp. 1, 26.

19 Aaron L. Friedberg, “America’s Strategic Position,”Parameters, vol. 16, no. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 30–36.

20 Ibid., p. 36. 21 See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, “Closing

the Nuclear Umbrella,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2(March/April 1994), pp. 8–13.

22 Friedberg, “America’s Strategic Position,” pp. 36–38.23 Ibid., p. 38.24 Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, address

to the American Political Science Association, August29, 1991, p. 8–1 of text furnished by the Departmentof Defense.

25 Walter B. Slocombe, “The Future of U.S. NuclearWeapons in a Restructured World,” in Patrick J. Garrityand Steven A. Maarenen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in theChanging World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and NorthAmerica (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), p. 63.

26 U.S. Department of Defense, United States SecurityStrategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington: Of-fice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-tional Security Affairs, February 1995), p. 23.



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