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TheEvolvingInterpretationsoftheOriginsoftheColdWar

HaveHistoriansReachedaConsensusontheOriginsoftheCold

War?

RitgerðtilB.A.prófs

SagaHelgasonMorrisKt.:011097-3329

Leiðbeinandi:JónÓlafsson

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AbstractTheColdWaranditsoriginshavebeenaconstantsourceofdebateamonghistoriansandquiterightlyso.WithnoaccesstoSovietarchivesuntil1991andtheoutcomeofthehostilities unknown, historianswere left to draw their own conclusions fromofficialdocuments and published propaganda. Hence, as with any historical event,interpretations have changed over time. In this paper, I set out to explorewhetherassessmentshaveshiftedtoadegreewherebyhistorianstodayhavecometogetherintheirunderstandingoftheoriginsoftheColdWar.Inordertoanswerthisquestion,aninvestigation is required to explore how andwhy these historical perspectives havechanged.First,thetwotraditionalviewpointsoftheColdWararediscussed,namelytheorthodoxandrevisionistinterpretations.TheorthodoxviewplacesresponsibilityontheUSSRforthedevelopmentoftheColdWarwhereastherevisionistviewarguesthatthehostilitiesdevelopedasaresultofreactingtooneanother’sactions.Subsequently,theviewpointsof a selected group of post-Cold War historians are explored. Gaddis argues thathostilitiesbetweentheUnitedStatesandSovietUnionhadtheirrootsinthenations’differentperceptionsofsecurity.ZubokandPleshakovmaintainthatStalin’scharacterand diplomatic actionswere of particular importance in the onset of the ColdWar.MastnyalsoemphasisestheroleofsecurityandhowtheUSSR’sperceptionofthepastshapedtheirfuturepolicies.Theirconclusionsarecomparedandcontrastedinordertoevaluatewhichviews theyhave incommon.Whenanalysingcurrentperspectives, itremainsessentialtodeterminewhatRussianhistoriansarehighlightingtoday.Todoso,theRussianoutlookisexploredthroughthehistorycurriculumofhighschooltextbooksandteachingmaterial,wheretextbooksfrom2009(andteachingmaterialfrom2007)arecontrastedtotherecent2017edition.Notonlyarethevariousviewpointsofseveralhistoriansevaluated,butequallyimportantistoevaluatethereasonsthathaveledtothechangesintheiroutlook.Itiscleartoseethattheopeningofthearchives,combinedwiththepassageoftime,politicaldepolarisationandthereforealessenedroleofideology,hasledtoachangeinviewsontheoriginsoftheColdWar.HistorianstodayhavelargelyreachedaconsensusonthegeneralpictureoftheoriginsoftheColdWar.Theyinterpretthebeginningofhostilitiesinamoreinsightfullight,wheredeeperrootedconcernscometotheforeandtheroleofideologyhasdiminishedsignificantlyfromtheprominenceitenjoyedduringthecourseoftheColdWar.ThesearchforsecurityhasanewsignificanceforboththeUnitedStatesandparticularlytheSovietUnion.Thenagain,historians inanyfieldofexpertisewillneverreachthesameconclusionwhenevaluatinganyconflictinhistoryandthereforediscrepanciesareboundtoarisebutarenotacauseforconcern.TheoriginsoftheColdWarremainsignificanttodayandarerelevanttoanalysingthefutureofthecurrentrelationshipbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStates.

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TableofContents

Abstract....................................................................................................................2

Introduction..............................................................................................................4

TraditionalInterpretations........................................................................................5OrthodoxView..................................................................................................................5RevisionistView................................................................................................................7

Post-RevisionistInterpretations..............................................................................10Gaddis.............................................................................................................................10ZubokandPleshakov.......................................................................................................15Mastny............................................................................................................................19Evaluation.......................................................................................................................21

Russianschooltextbooks........................................................................................24Currenttextbookoverview.............................................................................................24Earlierhistorytextbooksandteachers’guideoverview...................................................26Evaluation.......................................................................................................................28

ReasonsforChangeinViews...................................................................................30

Conclusion...............................................................................................................36

Bibliography............................................................................................................39

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IntroductionTheColdWaranditsoriginshavelongbeendebatedbyhistorians.Spanningmorethanfourdecades, theColdWarwas ‘fought’by theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnion,although it never culminated in a direct military confrontation. The Cold War wascharacterisedbyhostilitybetweenthesesuperpowersandencompassedallaspectsofpolitical, economic, social, cultural and military life, but fell short of open warfare.Traditionally,ideology,thefightbetweencommunismandcapitalism,wasaccreditedtobeattheforefrontofallpolicydecisions.Similarly,deterioratingrelationsbetweenthetwopowerswasexplainedbythefactofeachnationreactingtotheother’sactions.However,afterthecollapseoftheUSSRandsubsequentendoftheColdWar,alongwiththeopeningoftheSovietarchivesandthedecreaseinpoliticalpolarisationofhistoricalevents,currentevaluationsoftheoriginsoftheColdWarhavebecomemoreinsightful,objectiveandthereforeaccurate.ThedebatesurroundingtheoriginsoftheColdWarisofparticularrelevancetoday.Inaworldwheremediaisfesteredwith‘fakenews’weneedtofindmethodstodiscernandanalysedocuments,motivesandpolicies,and to remember that there isalwaysmorethanonefactoratplay.Onehastodigcriticallydeeperandfindmorewholesomeinformationfrommultipleperspectivesthanwhatisofficiallybroadcast,orprovethatthepublishednewsdoesnotdeviatefarfromreality.HavingstudiedColdWarhistoryearlier,IwasspecificallyintriguedtofindoutmoreaboutwhatlaybehindtheactionsandmotivationsofboththeSovietUnionandUnitedStates.WhentranslatingchaptersfromtheRussianhistorytextbooks,IfounditparticularlyinterestingtodiscoverhowsimilarWesternandRussianviewsaretoday,i.e.theyarerelativelybalancedandnotwrittenforpoliticalpurposes.Thispaperisorganisedintofoursections.First,theviewsoforthodoxandrevisionisthistoriansarediscussed.AgainstthebackdropofthesetraditionalhistoricalviewpointswrittenduringtheColdWar,theviewsoffourpost-ColdWarhistoriansareconsidered,described and evaluated, namely John Lewis Gaddis, Vladislav Zubok, ConstantinePleshakovandVojtechMastny.Subsequently,Russiantextbooksandteachers’guidesareanalysedfrom2007and2009andcomparedwiththemostrecenthistorysyllabusfrom2017.Thereasonsforthechangeinviewsareexplored,namelyfactorsincludingtheopeningoftheSovietarchives,theconclusionoftheColdWaritself,followedbythetrends of historians in the 1990s and the shift to a more balanced, less politicalunderstandingoftheeventsthatisupheldtoday.AconclusionisreachedastohowandforwhatreasonstheseviewsoftheoriginsoftheColdWarhavechangedandevolvedtoformageneralconsensustodayamongWesternandRussianhistorians.The authorswere chosen based on the fact that they arewell known and serve asrepresentativesoftheviewssharedbymanyintheirspecificinterpretationoftheColdWar.Similarly,Gaddis,Zubok,PleshakovandMastnyallprovidebroaddiscussionpoints,astheydonotsolelyfocusononeaspectoftheColdWaroranother.Someauthors,forexample, focus only on the impact of the atomic bomb whilst others exclusively

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concentrateontheroleofGermany.Awidearrayoftopicsiscoveredbythepost-ColdWarauthorsdiscussedinthispaper,whichshouldprovideasufficientoverviewofthemulti-facetedandcomplexworldthatexistedatthetimeofthebeginningoftheColdWar.Aswithanyhistoricalevent, interpretationsofeventsandconflictschangeovertimeandthispapersetsouttoexplorehowtheapproachestostudyingthecausesoftheColdWarhavedevelopedovertheyears,whathistorianstodayemphasiseandagreeuponincomparisonwithearlierorthodoxandrevisionisthistoriansandthereasonsfortheseconvergencestakingplace.

TraditionalInterpretationsDuring the ColdWar, twoprincipal theories developed and evolvedby historians toexplaintheintricaciesoftheColdWar.Thefirstistheorthodoxview,whichsoughttoplaceresponsibilityoftheColdWarontheshouldersoftheSovietUnion.Thesecond,whichdevelopedlater,isreferredtoastherevisionistapproach.RevisionistsrejectthenotionthattheSovietUnionwassolelyresponsiblefortheColdWarandthatinstead,the development of the Cold War was a result of mutual suspicion and the twosuperpowers reacting off each other. It is important to bear in mind that theseinterpretationswerealldevisedwhilsttheColdWarwasstillongoing.OrthodoxViewTheWesternorthodoxviewoftheColdWarplacesresponsibilityforthedevelopmentoftheColdWarontheSovietUnion.ThisperspectivebecametheadoptedviewoftheAmerican government. Orthodox historians emphasise that the Soviet regime wasunquestionablyexpansionistandwouldtakeanymeasuresnecessarytoincreaseSovietinfluence.Accordingtothisview,AmericasimplyreactedtoSovietexpansionism.Itwasinterpreted to be the combination of Soviet ideology, expansionist tendencies andStalin’scharacterthatultimatelyledtotheColdWar.1The nature of Soviet expansionism, discussed by Arthur Schlesinger, an Americanhistorian,was a result of both imperial Russian expansionist tendencies, namely thedesireforbetteraccesstothesea,combinedwithaLeninistideologicalquestforworldrevolution.2RevisionistswillarguethattheUSSR/Russiahasalwaysbeeninsearchofsecurity;tostrengthendefencesagainstfutureinvasions.Historically,Russiahasbeenatargetforinvasion,fromtheMongolstotheNaziinvasionof1941.TheUSSRsufferedterriblelossesduringWWII,whichledsometoconsiderStalintobereasonabletowanttoestablisha‘bufferzone’,duetothelackofnaturalborderssurroundingthenation.3However,evidenceexiststhattheUSSRwasnotsimplyinsearchofa‘bufferzone’for

1Schlesinger,“OriginsoftheColdWar,”23.2Schlesinger,“OriginsoftheColdWar,”24.3Schlesinger,“OriginsoftheColdWar,”29.

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security:theywantedmore,asseenthroughStalin’s‘salamitactics’whentakingoverEasternEuropeandSovietinvolvementinIran.Itisclearthroughtreaties,suchasthePercentagesAgreementwithChurchill,thatStalinwasastrongadvocateofthe‘spheres-of-influence’strategytomaintainworldorder.Britain,throughChurchill,wasopentothismethodwhilsttheUSwasstronglyopposed.Thisapproachwastheoppositetouniversalism,assupportedbyRoosevelt,wherebythebalanceofpowershouldliewithinaninternationalorganisation,suchastheUnitedNations.Universalistsadvocatedthat“allnationssharedacommoninterestinalltheaffairs of theworld.”4 As the term suggests, ‘spheres-of-influence’ refers to regionswhereonepowerdominatespolitically,culturallyandeconomicallyoverothernations.Althoughthisapproachevidentlyendeduptakingroot,Schlesingerpointsoutseveralreasons why Americans were against any agreements with regard to spheres ofinfluence,andthedangersofsuchagreements.Thefirstreasonbeingthatdividingtheworldisinherentlyunstableandnotsustainable,andAmericansfearedthiswouldleadtoathirdworldwar.TheCubanMissileCrisisarguablyshowshowadivisionoftheworldcould lead to confrontations that are difficult to contain. The second, that it wouldhindertheestablishmentofaninternationalbodyfrommanagingthebalanceofpower.The third was that a ‘spheres-of-influence’ world order would inherently lead toisolationistpolicieswhichwouldcloseofftrade,whichisessentialinacapitalistsystem.ThefourthreasonSchlesingerexplainsisthatoncegivenasphereofinfluence,whenwoulditbeenoughfortheSoviets?5Wouldn’ttheprobabilityofwantingtoincreasethespherebeevermorelikelyifitwasagreedto?OnewouldonlyhavetolookbackafewyearsatHitler’spolicies:hewasevidentlynotabout to stophisexpansionafter theMunich Agreement in regard to Czechoslovakia. The last and probably the mostimportantreasonwasthatitwentagainsteverythingtheAmericanshadbeenfightingforduringtheSecondWorldWar:theprincipleoffreeingPoland,justsothatitwouldcomeunderSovietcontrol,wentagainstthereasonfordeclaringwarinthefirstplace.Therefore, it was the combination of ideals and realistic approaches that createdAmericanoppositiontodividingtheworldintospheresofinfluence.Schlesinger admits that the ColdWarwas a result of a kind of a chain reaction, asrevisionistswillargue,wherebyeachsuperpoweradoptedpoliciesthatwereperceivedasathreatbytheother,andthenbothtookdefensivemeasuresagainstthosepolicies.He describes it as “suspicion and counter-suspicion, action and counter-action.”6However,Schlesingerargues that the revisionistsneglectkeyaspectson theSoviets’behalf that leads him to the conclusion that the Soviet regime and its nature wasultimatelyresponsiblefortheColdWaranditsescalation.ThefirstmostevidentcomponentistheSovietUnion’sideology.Leninhimselfpreachedthatthereistobeaclassstruggle,thatonlyoneideologycanwin;notbothcansurvive,4Schlesinger,“OriginsoftheColdWar,”26.5Schlesinger,“OriginsoftheColdWar,”36-9.6Schlesinger,“OriginsoftheColdWar,”45-6.

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i.e.capitalismandcommunism.Assuch,bydefinition,thetwosuperpowersareswornenemiesbytheideologythatencompassestheirbeliefs,astheUnitedStateswasthelargestcapitaliststateatthetime.NomatterwhattheAmericangovernmentattemptedto do, it would not change themind of Soviet Russiawhowould continue to bringcommunist ideology to theworld. Itmade ameaningful dialogue between the twonationsideologicallyimpossible.As Schlesinger mentions, ideology, however, is not enough to sustain revolutionaryactivity over a long time and so the character of Stalin is examined. With theundemocraticandauthoritativenatureoftheSovietUnion,SchlesingerarguesthattheonlypossiblehindrancetothedevelopmentoftheColdWarwasStalinhimself.HewasunquestionablythetotalitariandictatoroftheUSSR.IfStalinhadpossessedthewilltoavoid such confrontationwith theUS, hewould have done so. Stalin alone had thepowertomakeadifferenceashehadthe,althoughterrorised,supportofthepeople.Nevertheless,theverynatureofStalindeterredhimfromtakingactiontopreventthedevelopmentoftheColdWar.AsisevidentthroughthepurgesandtheGreatTerror,Stalin was excessively prone to paranoia, suspicion, “obsessions and compulsions.”Somewouldgoasfarastosayhewaspronetomadness.TheargumenthereisthatnothingwasclearlyevergoingtoeaseStalin’sparanoiaandsohowcoulditbeexpectedthatAmericanplanswouldhavesuchaneffect?7Inthischapter,theorthodoxview,asrepresentedbySchlesinger,hasbeendiscussed.OrthodoxhistoriansemphasisetheneedfortheUStocontaintheeverexpansionistandaggressivecommunistSovietUnion,ledbyStalin.IfHitlerwouldstopatnothing,surely,leadersofthecapitalistworldshouldpreventsuchanescalationfromhappeningagain.InadditiontoLenin’sideologyofworldrevolution,theSovietUnionalsoshowedsignsofwantingtoincreasetheirsphereofinfluence,afteraseriesofinvasionsandattacks.According to Schlesinger, the Soviet Union was ultimately responsible for thedevelopmentoftheColdWarduetoitsaggressivenature.RevisionistViewTherevisionist interpretationofunderstandingtheColdWarplacesemphasisonthemutualsuspicionandreactionofboththeUSandtheSovietUnion.RevisionistsdonotplacefullresponsibilityontheUSSRfortheColdWar’sdevelopmentand,inextremecases,evenarguethattheUnitedStatesaloneshouldbeheldculpable.Inthischapter,LaFeber’sexaminationoftheColdWarisdiscussed.HearguesthattheoriginsoftheColdWarhavetheirrootsmuchearlierthanthesettingofWorldWarII.HeanalysesthepoliciesandobjectivesofboththeAmericanandSovietgovernmentsandconcludesthattheUSintentionallydesignedvariousorganisationssothattheUSSRwouldbeexcluded,inordertoguaranteeAmericancontrol.

7Schlesinger,“OriginsoftheColdWar,”46-50.

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TheColdWarisarguedtohavehadmuchearliermanifestationsthantheendofWWIbyWalterLaFeber,anAmericanhistorian.ThesimilaritiesbetweentheUSandRussiaaredrawnup:bothhadlargeempiresandbelievedtheyhada‘calling’forexpansion,underthetsar’s“instrumentofGod’swill”andtheAmericans’spreadingtheinfluencesofcapitalism.However, intermsofstructure,theUSwasafederalsystemwhilsttheRussianempirewashighlycentralised.TheUSbelievedinanopenmarketplacewhilstthe Russia wanted to control trade. The conflict between America and Russia overManchuriaduringthe1890sisportrayedasbeingthefirstconfrontationbetweenthetwopowersoverexactlythisissueofinternationalismorisolationism.LaFeberexplainsthat,overtheyears,theUSandtheWestattemptedtoisolateRussiafrominternationalaffairs,asseenintheVersaillesSettlement.8There isnodoubtthatAmericawasreallytheonlycountrythatcameoutofWWIIavictor.ThemajorityofEuropewasdevastatedbymassivedestruction,economicturmoiland outright exhaustion. No fighting had taken place on American soil. TheUSwasindisputablythestrongesteconomicpoweraswellasbeingtheonlyoneinpossessionoftheatomicbombbytheendofthewar.Awareofthisstrategicposition,theAmericansusedtheireconomicstrengthtotheiradvantage.LaFeberillustrateshowtheAmericanswerewillingtosupportinternationalorganisations and funds such as the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), the UnitedNationsandtheMarshallPlanasAmericansknewtheywouldbethedominatingforceofsuchundertakings.Ascapitalistmarketeconomiesrelyontradeandcompetition,theUS stood to lose if assistance was not provided to Europe to aid in the post-warrecovery.9AsfortheUnitedNations,thedesignofArticle51gavetheUSthecontrolitneeded,withoutSovietvetointerference.Therefore,LaFeberhighlightsthattheUSonlyjoinedtheUNknowingtheycouldcontrolit.10Likewise,financialcontributionsaffectedvoting in the IMFandsincetheUShadthemost tocontribute, itwouldalsobe inapositionofpower.11Similarly,theMarshallPlan,introducedin1948,wasdeliberatelydesignedsothattheSovietswouldrefusetoacceptfinancialaid.Theplanrequired“economicrecords(…)beopenforscrutiny,”whichtheSovietUnioncouldnotaccept.Also,hadtheSovietsbeeninvolved,thecostsoftheprogramwouldhavegreatlyincreased.12ItseemshighlyhypocriticalthattheUSwouldrefuseaidtosomeoneforthereasonsofcostwhentheUSwasattemptingtokick-starttheEuropeaneconomyagain,nomatterthecosts.TheUShadnointerestindesigningtheMarshallPlaninanappealingwayfortheUSSRtoaccept. LaFeber implies that the US added significantly to the division of theworldthrougheconomicfavouritism.However,theUSSR’sharshtreatmentofsmallerEastern

8LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,1-4.9LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,12.10LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,24.11LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,11.12LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,60.

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Europeancountriesdidnotcontributeeitherto improvedrelationsbetweenthetwopowers.ContrastingtheUS’sstrongpositionafterWWII,theSovietUnionsufferedseverelossesduringthewaranditsconditionswerefarworsethaninAmerica.MuchofthefightinghadtakenplaceonRussiansoil.Althoughfiguresvary, theSovietUnion lostover20millionpeople.Therefore,itseemedlogicalthatStalinandtheSovietUniondidnotwanta repeat of such devastation. Thus, LaFeber argues that Stalin’s policies were notdeterminedbyideology,expansionorworldrevolution;theyweredeterminedbytheterribleconditionsthattheUSSRwasin.13TheSovietswerenotlookingtoexpandtheirsphereofinfluence,asorthodoxhistorianswouldargue,butinsteadtheywerelookingfor a ‘buffer zone’ for security in order to prevent a future invasion and ‘capitalistencirclement’.TheUScouldnotrelatetosuchconditionsasatthispoint,Americansfacednothreatofinvasion.Consequently,countertoorthodoxviews,Stalin’ssuspicionsoftheWestwerehencerealistic,notparanoid,althoughsomepost-revisionistswillarguethathewasboth.TheWest’s involvement in Russia’s Civil War and the delayed promise of opening up asecondfrontinWWIIarehighlightedasexamplesthatcausedrealisticsuspicionamongtheSoviets. Therefore, Stalin’spriorities laynot in startingaworld revolutionbut insecuringRussiaandhisownpower.14Similarly,theexplosionoftheAmericanatomicbombinHiroshimaandNagasakiwasprimarilymotivatedbytwoobjectives.ThemilitaryobjectivewasclearlytoendthewaragainstJapanmorequicklyandtosaveAmericanlives.Theunderlyingpoliticalambitionhowever,despiteSovietpromisesto invadeJapan inAugust1945(eagertogettheirrevengeafterbeingdefeatedintheRusso-JapaneseWarof1904/5),wastoshowcasethestrengthofAmericanmilitarymighttotheSovietUnion.TheUnitedStateswastheonly power in possession of the deadliest weapon in the world at that time.15 ThebombingofHiroshimaandNagasakiservedasthestartofthearmsrace,asignificantaspectoftheColdWarforyearstocome.Lastly,theadoptionoftheTrumanDoctrinein1947allowed theAmericangovernment toeffectivelyhidebehindan“ideologicalshield”tojustifyanyinterventioninothernations’affairs.LaFeberpointsoutthattheSovietshadnotevenbeenasaggressiveduringthemonthsprecedingthedeclarationofcontainment.16Inthischapter,thepositionsoftheUSandSovietUnionafterWorldWarIIandhowtheyaffected policy-making were discussed. Americans used their strength to theiradvantage, referring to the atomic bomb and the endorsement of internationalorganisations. The Soviet Union was looking to prevent another occurrence of thestaggeringlossesofWWII.LaFeberdemonstrateshowrevisionistsarguethattheCold13LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,5,19.14LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,22.15LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,26-7.16LaFeber,America,RussiaandtheColdWar,50,59.

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WarwasaresultoftheSovietUnion’sandtheUS’sreactiontoeachother’sactions.Inthe most extreme cases, roles are reversed from the orthodox view by attributingforemostresponsibility to theUnitedStatesand implyingthat itsactionswerethosethatledtotensionsininternationalrelations.

Post-RevisionistInterpretationsThe assessments of four well-known post-Cold War historians are explored in thefollowingchapters, followedbyanevaluationof their views.Gaddispresentsaviewwhereultimatelythetwonationsclashedoverdifferentperceptionsofsecurityandthewaysofupholdingit.ZubokandPleshakovofferadynamicperspectiveastheyhaveaSovietbackground.TheyhighlighttheimportanceofStalin’scharacteranddiplomaticfailuresintermsofunderstandingtheescalationoftensions.Mastnyalsoaddressesthesecurityquestionandplaces importanceonStalin’s character in thedevelopmentofevents.GaddisJohnLewisGaddis,anAmericanhistorian,presentstheColdWarinadifferentlighttobothorthodoxandrevisionisthistoriansandarguesthataggressionofoneortheothersidewasnotthesolereasonfortheoutcomeofevents.Hediscussesthesimilaritiesbetween the two superpowers beforeWWI, the ideological influences of Lenin andWilson,theUS’andUSSR’isolationisttendenciesinthe1920sand1930s,althoughfordifferentreasons,theeffectofthePearlHarbour,theatomicbomb,theimplicationsofthe Marshall Plan, and the quest for security. Gaddis argues that the differentperceptionsofsecurity,notideology,wereboundtoclasheventuallyandhencewereanessentialaspectoftheColdWar.EmphasisisplacedonthesimilaritiesbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussialeadinguptotheturnofthe20thcentury,eventhoughthesenationsinteractedverylittlewithoneanother. Both abolished slavery and serfdom around the same time. Both hadisolationist and self-interested propensities that dominated policies. Both wereexpandingempires,but,asGaddispointsout,atthistimeinhistorythiswasnotacauseforconflictasthe“worldwasstillemptyenough.”17Heimpliesthatthisexpansion,asprophesisedbyTocqueville,wouldeventually leadtoconfrontationastheworld‘fillsup’. Improvements intechnology,transportationandcommunicationacceleratedthespeedof deteriorationofUS-Russian relations.Nationalswereexposed to theotherculturefromtravelormedia,whichplantedtheseedsformistrustoftheotherandmade(anegative)interactionmorelikely.18ThemessianicinfluencesofLeninandWilsonshouldnotbeoverlookedeither.Gaddisargues that their personalities and ambitionsmagnified their countries’ differences.

17Gaddis,WeNowKnow,2.18Gaddis,WeNowKnow,3-4.

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Leninbasedhis ideologyonMarx’s teachingsofasupposedscienceofclassstrugglewherebyLenin’sultimategoalwasworldrevolutionandthedefeatofcapitalism.Wilsonwasjustasambitious,butinthecompleteoppositedirection,namelyinthepromotionof free and openmarkets and the removal of injustice. Gaddis highlights that bothnations set out on their ideological pilgrimage around exactly the same time: withRussia’srevolutionstartinginNovember1917andWilson’sFourteenPointsaddressinJanuary1918fortheVersaillesSettlement.(Itisnoteworthyhowever,thatboth,failedtoseetheirvisionsfulfilledasnotalloftheFourteenPointswereincorporatedandLenindidnotachieveworldrevolution).AlthoughGaddisarguesthatconfrontationwasnotapredestined ideological clash but rather a coincidence and a result of Germandiplomacy;eventsonamassscalewouldhavetakenacompletelydifferentturnhadWilson and Lenin not been around. In otherwords, to a large degree, these two asleaders, (as well as their successors), determined the direction of their respectivecountries.19Additionally,the1920susheredinatimeofpoliticalisolationfortheUSandUSSRbutfordifferent reasonsand circumstances.Gaddisexplains that, althoughundoubtedlyinvestedeconomicallyinEurope,theUSturnedpoliticallyinwardafterWorldWarIasnorealthreattoUSsecurityexisted.Germanyhadbeendefeated,RussiawasconsumedbycivilwarandBritainandFrancewereunlikelytobecomeenemiesagainafterthewar.TheUSsawnoneedtoassumeworldresponsibilitywhennoobviousenemyexisted.AftertheWallStreetCrashin1929andthesubsequentGreatDepression,theUnitedStatesalsolookedinwardtostrengthenthecountry’seconomy.Similarly,StalinwasnotmuchinvolvedinEuropeanaffairsashisprioritieslayinstrengtheningthestate,asitwasconsideredtobeaprerequisiteforworldrevolution.20The attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 serves as the “defining event” that shockedAmericansoutofisolation.Itwasviewedthatinternationalinvolvementwastheonlywaytoprotectnationalsecurityandpreventsuchapivotalattackfromhappeningagain.AccordingtoGaddis,methodssuchasestablishingpeacetimemilitarybasesaroundtheworld and ‘reviving the international community’ through the United Nations, theInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBankwereusedtoachievethisobjective.Atthistime,theSovietUnionwasnotyetanobviousenemy.However,itisundeniablethattheseattemptsbytheUSwereseenasachallengetotheUSSRastheAmericanswereviewedtobeimposingtheirwillonothers.21ThethemeofsecurityisrecurrentandcrucialtounderstandingtheoriginsoftheColdWar.Securitywasanecessityforbothsuperpowers,buttheirperceptionandmethodsof obtaining it were completely different. This, Gaddis argues, made confrontationunavoidable. In theeyesofPresidentRoosevelt, securitywas tobe reached throughbothpragmatismandprinciples.IntheWest,“securitywastobeacollectivegood,notabenefitdeniedtosomeinordertoprovideittoothers.”Inotherwords,theWestand19Gaddis,WeNowKnow,5-6.20Gaddis,WeNowKnow,7-8.21Gaddis,WeNowKnow,35-6.

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USadvocatedforcollectivesecurity.Ontheotherhand,Stalin’spolicywasmuchmoreunilateralthantheUSgovernment’sashehadtotalcontroloverhiscountry.InStalin’smind, “security cameonly by intimidating or eliminating potential challengers.” Thisviewsharessimilaritieswiththeoldeconomictheoryclaimingthatthereisonlyasetamountofwealthintheworld,wherethewealthofonenationautomaticallydecreaseswhenanother’sincreases.ForStalin,nationalsecuritymeantpersonalsecurityandhewaspreparedtodoalmostanythingtosecureboth.Suchcontrastingviewsofsecuritywereboundtoclashatsomepoint.22Withreferencetopastconflictsandchangestothebalanceofpower,GaddissuggeststhatperhapsideologywasirrelevanttotheColdWar.Heexplainsthatasinanyhistoricalconflict, “bumping and bruising” takes place when a power vacuum arises after aconflict,whether both contenderswere democratic or authoritarian.23 He comparesstatestobilliardballstoexplainthatnationsareonlyensuringtheirsurvivalthroughpower.Statescanbebiggerorsmallerbutwillstillcollideinthestruggleforpower.24Thus,hesuggeststhattheUSandUSSRwouldhavecometoaheadregardlessoftheirideology;theyweresimplytwooftheonlycontendersforthebalanceofpowerafterWorldWarII.Furthermore, during the Second World War, Gaddis mentions that Roosevelt andChurchillwerewilling toputaside ideologicaldifferences forgeopolitics, referring toworking with Stalin against Nazi Germany. Stalin even expressed compassion andsympathyforRoosevelt’sphysicalillnessofpolio.Clearly,somerespectwastobehadforthePresidentforhisskillsasastatesman,asMolotovexplains:“RooseveltknewhowtoconcealhisattitudetowardusbutTruman–hedidn’tknowhowtodothatatall.”However,inspiteofthis,GaddisgoesontosaythatStalinnevertrustedRoosevelt.Duetothislackoftrust,GaddisdoesnotconsiderRoosevelt’sdeathtobeaturningpointinalteringlong-termrelations,arguingthatifStalindidnottrustRoosevelt,whatreasonwould we have in assuming that he would begin to trust Truman, “that noisyshopkeeper”wholackedtheabilitytoconcealhishard-linethoughts.25Theeffectsofnuclearwarmustalsobeconsideredwhenanalysingthedevelopmentofthe Cold War. Contrary to past advances in military technology, the emergence ofnuclear weapons promoted “peace and not war.” A “new rationality” developed inleadersaftertheSecondWorldWarastheycametorealisethat“themoredevastating(weaponsbecome)theybecomelessusable.”Gaddis indicatesthatnuclearweaponswereonlyusedasaprovocationandthattheintentionwasneverto‘pushthebutton’.Henonethelesswarnsoftheprecariousdecisionssurroundingsuchweaponsandthatanythingcouldhappenwithasimilarlycapriciousleader.ThedecisionoftheAmericanstousetheirnewlydevelopedatomicbombonJapanwasneverupfordebate.Gaddisdemonstratesthatreflectionupontheeffectsofatomicweaponsonlycameafterthe22Gaddis,WeNowKnow,15.23Gaddis,WeNowKnow,11.24Gaddis,WeNowKnow,27.25Gaddis,WeNowKnow,10,22-3.

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war.Trumanandhisadministrationwereinastate-of-warframeofmind.Hence,theAmericanuseofthebombwasnotprimarilyto“impress”or“intimidate”theSoviets,asrevisionistswouldargue,buttodefeattheJapaneseasquicklyaspossible.26Similarly,inrelationtoAmericanincentivesforcreatingtheMarshallPlan,theUSwaswilling to sacrifice “immediate economic gains to invest in long-term geopoliticalstabilisation.”Gaddisdoesnotdeny,however,thatlikeanypowerfulstate,thepoliciesoftheUnitedStates,referringtotheMarshallPlan,were“self-serving”andadmitsthattheAmericaninvitationfortheUSSRtojoinwas“onlysymbolic.”Nevertheless,intheend,whatendedupsurprisingtheSovietsandperhapstheAmericansthemselveswasthat the US effectively set the stage for their own future “exploitation” by creating“futureeconomiccompetitors”astheyweresupposedto“balance”theSovietUnion.27As stated, although having the unanticipated consequence of creating futurechallengers, at the time of theMarshall Plan’s creation, the US government gave ahigherprioritytoeconomicandpoliticalstabilitywithintheWestratherthantoexploitthe West themselves. The American leadership sought to create an advantageousenvironmentforinteractionandtrade.Incontrast,theSovietUnionpreferredtobeincomplete control of their allies and satellite states. Again, these differentunderstandingsofeconomicstrengthwerelikelytoconflictwitheachother.Thus,thesemethodsofinternationalcooperationtoensurefuturestabilitythroughtheMarshall Plan rendered Stalin’s calculations completely inadequate. Stalin’smisinterpretationsendedupcostinghim.Stalinwasconvincedthatcapitalistpowerswouldinevitablycausefuturewarsandconflicts.Duetotheinherentcharacteristicsofcapitalismand its“greedybelligerency,”StalindidnotbelievethattheWestandtheSovietUnionwere likely tocooperatewithoneanother.However,asGaddisargues,Stalinfailedtograspkeyreasonswhysuchaconflictwasunlikelytodevelopbetweencapitaliststates.OnereasonisthattheveryfactthatWorldWarIIhadoccurredandthatmemorymadeleadersoftheWesternworldwanttopreventsuchanatrocityfromdeveloping at all costs. Similar to Gaddis’ analogy of billiard balls colliding, Stalin’sreasoningwasbasedontheassumptionthatmulti-polarityofstatesexisted inworldaffairs. Lenin had based his theory on themulti-polarity of states, which led to theclashes of the late 19th century. The Second World War effectively cleaned theinternationalarenaofsuchstatesof“roughlyequalstrength,”producingabipolarityinstead,betweentheUSandUSSR.Thus,conflictbetweenstatesthatwerefarweakerthantheUSwasmuchlesslikelytodevelop.Gaddiscomparesthecircumstancesafterthe Second World War to the “early stages of imperialism” where few capitalistcountriesclashedoverperipheries.Ineffect,GaddissuggeststhatStalingot“hismodelswrong.”28StalinfailedtograspWesternconcernsanddidnotpossessaconcretevisionforthefutureoftheSovietUnion,ashasbeenupheldbytraditionalhistorians.

26Gaddis,WeNowKnow,85-8.27Gaddis,WeNowKnow,194,196-7.28Gaddis,WeNowKnow,195-6.

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Contrary to traditional views, Americans and Soviets had the same concerns aboutGermany’sfuture.GaddisassumesthattheAlliesdidnothavetheirownexpansionistobjectivesbutrather,similarfears.QuestionsofwhetherGermanyshouldbeunifiedordivided,grantedharshormoderatereparationsschemes,wereconsideredbyallsides.The harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty were believed to have contributed to theoutbreakoftheSecondWorldWar.No-onewantedtorepeatthatmistake,butatthesametimeitwasdesirabletoseeksomeguaranteessuchthatGermanywouldnotre-emergeasastrongandpowerfulstate.Similarly,ifGermanywereunified,Allieswouldrun the risk of either Germany itself becoming a threat again or falling under theinfluenceoftheotherside,i.e.underAmericanorSovietinfluence.29Germanywasasource of tension for both sides as it encapsulated many of the hostilities anddisagreementsbetweentheUSandUSSR.ThedevelopmentoftheKoreanWarwasseenasasurprisebyallsides.Thequestionofresponsibilityhaslongbeencontested,aswellasjustsimplematterssuchasthewar’sinitial beginning, given the lack of sources from all sides involved, including theAmericans,Soviets,ChineseandKoreans.NewevidenceshowsthatStalinwasthefirsttogivethe‘greenlight’forattacktoNorthKoreanKimIl-Sung,afterrejectingearlierdemands.Itisclearthatno-oneexpectedtheconflicttoescalatetothedegreeitdid.ThereappearedtobenoapparentevidenceofAmerican intentionto intervene.ThespeechmadebyAchesoninJanuary1950portrayedevidentintentionstoothernationsthatKoreawasnotontheUS’slistofprioritiesinAsia.Hence,thedecisivenessoftheAmericanresponsecaughttheSovietsandNorthKoreansbysurprise.ThereasonforsuchaswiftreactiontothenatureoftheNorthKoreaninvasionistwofold.Firstly,theattack crossed the 38th Parallel, an international boundary established after Japan’sdefeat in 1945. Secondly, the invasion resembled another infamous surprise thatremainedfreshinAmericans’minds:PearlHarbour.Thus,theUSwasnotpreparedtolet this conflictgowithout involvement.Therehaveevenbeenconspiracies that theAmericans set thewar up and colludedwith Rhee, the South Korean leader, but asGaddispointsout,nohardevidenceexistsforthis.30In summary, Gaddis presents a view that emphasises the importance of Lenin andWilsoninsettingtheideologicalstagefortheeventsthatfollowed,howtheUSandUSSRwerepronetoisolationisminthe1920sand1930s,albeitfordifferentmotivations,theeffectoftheattackonPearlHarbourthatshooktheUSoutofisolation,theimpactoftheatomicbombandtheimplicationsoftheMarshallPlan.Ultimately,Gaddisupholdsthat the two nations clashed over different perceptions of security (political andeconomic) and how to uphold it, rather than ideological differences, although theyplayedapartinshapingpolicies.ThesearchforsecurityisarguedtobetherootofUSand Soviet concerns over the future of Germany, America’s unexpected decision tointerveneintheKoreanWar,theshapingoftheMarshallPlan,ensuringfutureAmericansecurity through the fortification of European markets, which as a consequence,throughitsdesign,conflictedwiththeSovietperceptionofensuringsecuritybyforce.29Gaddis,WeNowKnow,115-6.30Gaddis,WeNowKnow,70-7.

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ZubokandPleshakovAmore Sovietorientedviewof theColdWar is put forwardbyVladislav ZubokandConstantinePleshakov,astheirbookfocusesonthefactorsthatshapedtheKremlin’spolicies.ThecharacterofStalin,hisdiplomaticfaults,aswellastheeffectoftheideaofRussia being a historical ‘saviour’ on Soviet policies are analysed. ImportantjuxtapositionsareconsideredtoexplainthecomplexitiesandoftencontradictorynatureoftheUSSRanditsleaders.AccordingtoZubokandPleshakov,Stalin’sweaknessesasadiplomatultimatelyledtothedevelopmentoftheColdWarandvariouscasestudiesaredepictedtoportraythisclaim,includingGermanyandtheKoreanWar.Intheprefaceoftheirbook,ZubokandPleshakovmakeapointtoillustratethattheygrewupintheSovietUnionwithverylittleunderstandingofinternationalaffairsandthat“two-thirdsofourlivespassedundertheshadowoftheColdWar”.Theywereonly‘drilled’aboutwhattodoincaseanotherfull-blownoutwarwouldensuebetweenthetwo superpowers; but other than that, they had little awareness of their politicalsurroundings.Mostofthehistoriceventshadalreadytakenplacebythetimetheywereadults. Both also have a background that gave them exposure to the West.31 Thisundoubtedlydistances theauthors fromtheevents,makingthem lesssusceptible tobiasandmorelikelytobasetheirargumentsonevidence.Similar toGaddis, Zubok andPleshakovunderline the role of Russia’smessianism inshaping policies. The idea of Russia as a saviour, especially of European civilisationthroughouthistory,canbeinterpretedasakeycomponentindeterminingitsobjectives.ThereligiousconceptofRussiaastheThirdRomeandassumingtheroleof‘protector’ofOrthodoxChristianity,combinedwithadoptingtherevolutionarypartof‘messenger’to spread the ideals of communism, as well as protecting Europe from multipleinvasions,(includingtheMongols,NapoleonanddefeatingtheNazis),cometogethertogiveRussianstheassumedpositionas“protectorofmankind”,however justifiedthismaybe.ZubokandPleshakovexplainthataftersuchsacrificeinWorldWarII,itwasnotsurprisingthattheSovietsfelttheAllies“owedthem,”32astheyhadjustpreventedNazidominationoverEurope.SomemayarguethattheUSSRwillinglygaveintothedevelopmentoftheColdWar,butZubokandPleshakovprovidethreemainreasonswhytheUSSRdidnotdesiresuchanoutcome.Thefirstbeingthetremendoushumanloss(morethan20milliondied)anddestructionafter theSecondWorldWar.These losses lead toSovietexpectation for“special treatment” which could have developed in two ways: through economicassistanceorviatheestablishmentofspheresofinfluence.TheSovietUnionwasinnowaypreparedforanotherwaraftersuchsacrificesandthereforenoreasonexistedforStalinto“pursuebrinkmanship.”Lastly,thecooperationbetweentheUSSR,BritainandtheUSduringthewardidnotseemtoindicatefuturedeteriorationoftheirinteractions.

31ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,ix-xiii.32ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,2-3.

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Allsidesmadecompromises.No-onewouldhavebelievedrelationswouldworsensoquicklyafterthewar.33Onasimilarnote,ZubokandPleshakovimplythatRoosevelt’sdeathwasaturningpointinthedeclineofrelationsashehadbeenagoodpartnerforStalin.ThecombinationofRoosevelt’sdeath,Churchill’selectoraldefeatandthedroppingoftheatomicbombisarguedtohaveledStalintoreturntohisinsecuritiesanddistrustfulnessthat,inturn,contributedtodegeneratingrelationsbetweenallthreenations.ItisexplainedthatinthecompanyofRooseveltandChurchill,Stalinfeltasifhewereamongequalsandthathecouldachievesomeofhisdemandswithsuccess.Rooseveltwas“important”tohimandthe“onlypresidentwhomStalinacceptedasapartner.”ItisevensuggestedthatStalin had a certain degree of trust for the President as hewas “not shaken”whennotifiedofaseparateNazipeacewiththeUS.However,withRoosevelt’sdeathinApril1945andChurchillnotbeingre-electedtoofficethatJuly,thetidesturnedtoincreaseStalin’sdistrust.Withtwofamiliarfacesgone,theywerereplacedbyanewgroupofpoliticianswhowerenotperceivedtobeaspowerfulbyStalinastheBigThree,ashewasusedtoonlydealingwithafewplayers.Thus,withinafewmonthsthe“trilateraldiplomacydeterioratedbeforeStalin’seyes.”Nevertheless,ZubokandPleshakovderivethatStalinwasstillhopefulforcooperation,despiteTruman,“arookiepresident,”beingtestedbyStalinatPotsdam.Intheiranalysis,itwasnotuntiltheatomicexplosionsinAugust1945thateffectivelypushedStalinovertheedgetowardshis“olddemonsofinsecurity.”Thebombcameasasurprise,giventhatStalinandMolotovbelievedthewarnings about the Manhattan Project they had received were “disinformation.”34RooseveltandChurchillwereabletokeepStalin’sparanoiaatbay.Hence,withbothofthemgone,thecommonenemydefeatedandtheeffectoftheexplosionofthemostdestructiveweapon,thereremainedlittlehopeforStalinforfuturecooperationwithBritainandtheUnitedStates,andrelationssoonturnedsour.Turning to the character of Stalin, his nature enabled a variety of interpretations toemerge.Itisexplainedthatthroughrecords,Stalinisdescribedassecluded,reservedandanintrovertwhorarelysharedhisfeelings,whetheronpaperorspoken.Stalin´sreticence has led to somany interpretations, since hismind evidently could not beread.35Comprehensionsofhimareboundtodifferandwillbestyledaccordingtothepointbeingmade.But thenagain, it is alsoarguable, that thephrase ‘actions speaklouderthanwords’isalsoapplicable,althoughStalin’sactionsmayhavebeendistortedbyofficialrecordsorWesternperceptions.AdiscrepancybetweentheoryandrealityisafrequentthemeinSovietideologyandisimportant when analysing Russian objectives during the Cold War. Two mainjuxtapositionsarise,asnotedbyZubokandPleshakov,andtheyrelatetoindividualsandtheroleofthestate.AccordingtoMarxistideology,individualsandpersonalitiesshould

33ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,6-7.34ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,39-41.35ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,11.

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beinsignificanttotheclassstruggle.Inreality,asnotablydiscussedaboveaboutStalinandbyotherscholars,itistheoppositeintheUSSRwheretheroleoftheleaderisofparamount importance to policy-making.36 Similarly, reality deviates from thetheoreticalwiththe‘socialisminonecountry’policy.InLeninistideology,thestateissupposed towither awayeventually.However, in Stalin’s eyes, a strong statewas aprerequisite forworldrevolutionandturningRussia intoaworldpower.Thisview isdescribedasa“revolutionary-imperialparadigm”byZubokandPleshakovandservesastheoriginofthe‘socialismincountry’.AlthoughStalin’smethodsseemtocontradicttheveryidealsofcommunism,ZubokandPleshakovarguethatStalinismwasjusta“branch”offMarxism,andthatBolshevism,LeninismandStalinismallsharethesameroot.37ItisexplainedthatStalinhadtwocontradictoryobjectiveswhenitcametothefutureofGermany.Ontheonehand,hehadlong-termplansofestablishinganalliancewithGermanyashewasawareofGermany’spotentialstrengthasanation.ThisconnotesthatStalindidnotwishforthepermanentseparationofGermany.However,contrarytothislong-termaimwerehisshort-termgoalsofextractingresourcesfromGermanyaspartoftheSovietUnion’srearmament.Thiswouldnothavemadeafuturefriendshipallthatlikely.Hence,mixedmessageswerebeingsentfromtheSovietadministration.Here,theBerlinblockadeof1948servesasagoodexample.Originally,StalinstrovetoforcetheWesternpowersoutofagreementsofformingaunitedWestGermany,whichcorresponds to his long-term aim of preventing German separation. However, theblockade had unintended consequences, referring to the successful airlift, which, inreality,madethedivisionsevenmoreclearandbroughtWesternEuropeevenclosertotheUS.Stalindidnotforeseethisand,asaresult,theblockadebecameadiplomaticfailure.ThedivisionofGermanywouldlatersymbolisethedivisionoftheEuropeandtheworld.ZubokandPleshakovarguethatStalin’sfailuresindiplomacypartlyexplaintheonsetoftheColdWarandsaythathe“couldhaveperformedbetter.”38Inthislight,StalinsawtheMarshallPlanasaplanto indirectly“reviveGermanmilitary-industrialpotential”tobedirectedagainsttheSovietUnion.39AsimilarcaseofunforeseenconsequencesisportrayedbythestartoftheKoreanWar.ZubokandPleshakovexplainthatStalin’ssupportoftheNorthKoreaninvasionoftheSouth in1950wascarefullyconsidered. It isexplained thatStalinhad“reservations”abouttheattackwhenKimIlSung“beggedforhisblessing,”asshownina“classifiedSovietaccount,”buteventuallyagreed.40ThisimpliesthattheKoreaninvasionwasnotStalin’soriginalideabutbyagreeingtoaidKim,heactedinanopportunisticmannerinthe hopes of expanding Soviet revolutionary influence in Asia. Zubok and PleshakovexplainStalin’sreasonsforagreeingtoKim’sdemandsbyanalysingtheanswerstothesimplequestionsof‘whynow?’and‘whyNorthKorea?’Tosummarise,Stalinagreedto

36ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,5.37ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,12-13,17.38ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,47-52.39ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,50.40ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,54-5.

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theinvasionas,atthattime,hedidnotpresumethattheUSwouldintervenebasedonvarious sources. Intervention had previously been a fear. Also, North Korea was ofstrategicimportance,withitsproximitytoJapanandSovietdesiresofensuringSovietdominanceinthatareaofAsia.Ifaninvasionwasnotsupported,inthecontextofSino-Sovietrelations,theUSSRwouldbeseenasback-trackingandnotasrevolutionaryinthemindsof theChinese communists, towhom the Sovietswerenowallied. ItwasnecessaryforStalintoupholdSovietleadershipasacommunistworldpower.41Stalin’sreasoning appears to be logical in retaining and expanding Soviet influence in Asia.However, it is demonstrated that heultimatelymiscalculated: theUS did intervene,Soviet involvement wasmisinterpreted, and the outcome of the war was less thansatisfactory.AlthoughZubokandPleshakovadmitthattheKoreanWarwasnotaresultofSovietaggression,StalinisnonethelessportrayedastakingadvantageofthesituationtoexpandSovietauthority.Inturn,theKoreanWarcastashadowoverSovietrelationswiththeWestandtheUSinparticular,asStalinwasseenasaggressiveandexpansionistinAsia,yetwithoutconcreteevidenceofhismotivesforbackingsuchanattack.ZubokandPleshakovgointosomedetailabouttheinfluenceofthecooperativenatureofSovietofficialsLitvinovandMaiskyonStalin’spolicytowardstheWest.LitvinovandMaisky advocated cooperation over confrontation with theWest. Their reasons forcooperationlayinsecuringapeaceforatleasttenyearsinordertorebuildthestate’sstrength,winningbackterritoryinEurope,beingallieswiththeBritishandAmericansforeconomicassistance (whereSoviet losseshavebeenestimated tobe700 to800billionrublesbytheMaiskycommission)andguaranteeingaSovietUnionvetopowerinan internationalorganisation topreventactionsagainstSovietwill. Inmanyways,Stalin heeded their advice to beginwith, for example, in gaining veto power in theUnitedNationsandinraisinghisdemandof$5billionto$10billioninreparationsatYalta along with the general feeling and expectation of peace at the wartimeconferences.42However,aspreviouslydiscussed,ZubokandPleshakovexplainthatthedrastic shift in policy afterWorldWar II from cooperation (followingMaisky’s andLitvinov’s guidance) to conflict lay in Stalin’s “obsessions and compulsions.”43 HisparanoidnaturepartlyledtothedeteriorationofSoviet-Americanrelations.Traditional views of orthodox and revisionist historians are criticised for being toosimplistic inanalysingtheoriginsof theColdWar.Asmentionedabove,Stalinwasahugely complicated individual and did not just ‘switch’ from cooperation toconfrontation after the Second World War. His diplomatic weaknesses did notcontribute to improved relations. The development of the Cold War was morecomplicatedthanaresultof reactions,asarguedbyrevisionists,orexpansionism,asadvocatedbyorthodoxhistorians.AlargepartoftheSovietUnion’soutlookwasbasedonhistory,beingcharacterisedbyempiresandensuringsecurity.

41ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,62-3.42ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,28-34.43ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,38.

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In this chapter Zubok and Pleshakov’s views of the origins of the Cold War werediscussed.TheypresentaviewthatdepictsStalinascrucial intheshapingofevents.Their work focuses primarily on the Soviet side of events, rather than Americanobjectives,astheywereabletoaccesssourcesfromtheSovietarchiveswhentheywereopened.EmphasisisplacedonStalin’scharacter,ashewastheonewhopreventedtheUSSR fromtaking thepathof cooperation,asadvocatedbyMaiskyandLitvinovandotherswhopreferredarouteofnon-confrontationwiththeWest.Stalinwasparanoidofsecuritythreats,whethernationalorpersonal,andhisdistrustwas‘unleashed’withthedeathofRooseveltandChurchill’s failuretogainre-election.Heviewedthemasequalsbutoncethatbalancewasgone,Stalin’sapprehensionsincreased.Hisparanoidnature is revealed throughhis faileddiplomatic ventures inBerlinandKorea.At theoutset,hismotivesfortheblockadeandtheaidtoKimIlSungwereopportunisticandbased on logical reasoning, but in both cases, Stalin miscalculated the Americanresponse.MastnyVojtechMastny,anAmericanofCzechdescent,isanotherhistorianwhowritesafterthefalloftheSovietUnionin1991.HeprincipallyarguesthatStalinandtheSovietUnion’squestforsecurity ledtotheonsetanddevelopmentoftheColdWar.MastnyarguesagainstasimplisticchainreactionbetweenthetwosuperpowersandinsteadlookstomoredeeplyrootedSovietsecurityconcerns.Thesearchforsecurityhaditsoriginsinthe post-war euphoria and the example of Iran is provided. The Marshall Planthreatened theUSSR’s security interests and hence led to a tightening of control inEasternEuropeaswellasthecreationofCOMECON.Similarly,GermanywasasourceoftensionandtheBerlinblockadeeffectivelybecameaquestionofcredibility.Firstly,afewcontradictionsattheendofWorldWarIIwereapparent.WhilsttheUSSRwas possibly in the optimal position for future security after the defeat of Nazism,MastnyarguesthateventhiswasnotenoughforStalin.HereferstoStalin’scharacterandhis “insatiable craving” for securityas themainpropagatorof tensionswith theWest.ThedelayedevacuationofSoviettroopsfromIranisexplainedasanexampleoftheexuberantjoyafterthevictory,whereStalindidnotfeeltheneedtoevacuatethetroopsimmediately,whichwasinterpretedasexpansionist.44Mastny similarlymaintains that securityweighedmore on Soviet policy than simplyreactingtotheUS. It isarguedthattheunforeseenobstaclesofobtainingsecurity inEasternEuropeledtoStalin’stighteningofcontroloverthesatellitestates,ratherthana response to US actions. Stalin rejected East German pleas to stop the Soviet“dismantling” of German industries as part of its reparations and refused to makeGermany’sgovernmentafederalsystemasitwouldmakeGermanymoreautonomous.It is clear that the Soviet perception of security revolved around having weakenedneighbours, whilst the US saw security in the strengthening of markets.

44Mastny,TheColdWarandSovietInsecurity,23.

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Correspondingly,MastnyagreeswithGaddisonthedifferentperceptionsofsecurity.Inaddition, Mastny’s view resembles Zubok and Pleshakov’s assessment of Stalin’scontradictory policies towardsGermany,which lead to thedevelopmentof tensionsbetweenEastandWest.Inotherwords,primingGermanytobeafutureallywhilstalsoimplementing oppressive policies on the German people did not equate to friendlyrelations.45MastnyimpliesthatwiththeshifttoharsherhandlingofEasternEuropeanstates,withtheexampleofGermany,StalineffectivelyclosedthedoorondemocracytopreservetheSovietUnion’spositioninEurope.Onceagain,thiswastheoppositetoAmericantacticsusedtoensuretheireconomicinfluenceinWesternEurope.TheTrumanDoctrine,accordingtoMastny,wasnotascriticalasmadeouttobe.TheMarshallPlan, instead,wasperceivedby theSoviet leadership tobeamuchgreaterthreattoSovietsecurity.InregardtotheproclamationoftheTrumanDoctrine,whereAmericanswoulddoeverythingintheirpowertocontainthespreadofcommunism,theSovietswerenotasalarmedbyitaseveryonethought.ThiswasduetothefactthatStalininterpretedthatthedoctrinedidnotapplytoterritoriesalreadyunderhiscontrol.Ontheotherhand,theMarshallPlanthreatenedSovietsecuritydirectlyasitentailedlong-termEuropeanintegrationandunification.MastnypointsoutthattheAmericanswerecunninginplacingthedecisionofthefutureofEurope,whetherdividedorunited,inSoviethands.46ItisimportanttobearthisinmindincomprehendinghowandwithwhatmeasurestheSovietleadershipbelieveditwasnecessarytoensuresecurity.In response to the Marshall Plan, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance(COMECON)wascreatedbytheUSSR.Mastnypointsoutthekeydifferencesthatshouldbekeptinmindbetweentheset-upoftheMarshallPlancomparedtothatofCOMECON.The foundation of COMECON differed from the American Marshall Plan in itsimplementationbyforceratherthanby“invitation.”Additionally,COMECONallowedtheSovietUnion“toextractfrom”thepartners,whereastheUnitedStates“suppliedto”itsEuropeancounterparts.AlthoughCOMECONisdescribedasan“emptyshell”,47itatteststhattheSovietUnionactivelytriedtoaffirmitsholdonitssatellitestatesforsecurity purposes. The Soviet leadership never effectively believed in voluntaryalliances,yetinstead,soughttocoercethesatellitestatesintoobedienceandthusweremoreprepared tousemilitary force than theirAmericancounterparts.Withsuchanunderstanding,expansionwasalwaysapartoftheSovietdefencepolicy.OnthesubjectofGermany,theBerlinblockadeisarguedtohaveessentiallybeenaboutcredibility. Contrary to the original blockade plans laid out by the foreign ministry,Mastnyclaims thatStalindeliberatelychosenot toblockairaccess toBerlin for tworeasons.ThefirstwaseffectivelycostsavingasStalinsoughttoavoidamilitaryclashinvolvingtheuseoftheUSSR’sownfighters.Thesecond,andperhapsmoreimportantreason,wasthatStalinconsideredAmericansuccessunlikely(sincethismeantsupplying

45Mastny,TheColdWarandSovietInsecurity,24-5.46Mastny,TheColdWarandSovietInsecurity,27.47Mastny,TheColdWarandSovietInsecurity,57-8.

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goods to twomillion people) and so predicted the US to come out of this venturehumiliatedandhenceforcedtoacceptMoscow’sdemands.48StalincountedonaSoviettriumph and an increase in credibility. But things turned out differently and thehumiliationshiftedtotheSovietUnioninstead.MastnyintroducesthekeycharacteristicsofSovietinsecurityandhowtheyembodiedthemselvesineconomicandmilitaryplans.UnliketheTrumanDoctrine,theMarshallPlanwasadirectthreattoSovietsecuritywhereCOMECONservedasasubstituteandaguarantorofSovieteconomicsecurity,butwasimplementedthroughforce.Finally,theBerlinblockadewasmeanttosaveSovietresources,avoidadirectconfrontationandbolsterStalin’simage,noneofwhichwereachieved.Thequestforsecurityremainsa key component of understanding Soviet motives and policy when it comes tocomprehendingdeterioratingrelationsinthewakeoftheSecondWorldWar.EvaluationGaddis, Zubok, Pleshakov and Mastny all show a greater understanding of Sovietsecurity concerns in their attempts to rethink Cold War history than traditionalhistorians. They all agree that the Cold War was not simply a result of ideologicalconflicts.Suchconflictsexistedandcertainlyhadsomeeffect,buttheywerenotthemaincauseofthedeteriorationofrelations.Ifanything,ideologyhadthebiggestroleto play for propaganda purposes to ensure US/Soviet influence in their respectivespheres.Ideologywasusedtojustifyeachnation’srespectiveactions.Thereappearstobeageneralconsensusamongpost-revisionistauthorsrelatingtothesecurityconcernsof both superpowers and of the importance of Stalin, his character, policies andmiscalculations on the shape of events that ensued. However, some differences, ormore accurately different emphases, arise in regard to more specific matters, forexample,whendiscussingtheMarshallPlan,GermanyandtheKoreanWar.Onmattersofsecurity,GaddisandMastnyexpresssimilarviews.GaddishighlightsthedifferenceinperceptionofsecurityoftheUSandSovietUnionandhowthisinevitablyledtoconflict.TheUSwasastrongbelieverincollectivesecurity,wheresecuritywassharedbyallthroughtheenforcementofpragmatismandprinciples.Ontheotherhand,theUSSRfavouredsecuritybyforceanddidnotbelieveitcouldbeshared.ForStalin,national securitymeantpersonal securityandwasachieved through threatsand theremoval/weakeningofopponents.Likewise,Mastnyarguesthatsecuritywasthemaininfluence on the nature of Soviet policies. Obtaining security took precedence overreacting to the US. Stalin’s obsessive quest for security led to the deterioration ofrelationsinthepost-warworld.TheobstaclesofobtainingsecurityinEasternEuropeled to a tightening of control, not aggressive tendencies. Security is a ubiquitousphenomenon,prevalentinallthecasestudiesdiscussed.

48Mastny,TheColdWarandSovietInsecurity,48-9.

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All thepost-ColdWarauthors share thebelief that Stalin’s roleasan individualwascrucial in thedevelopmentof theColdWar.Historywouldhave taken a completelydifferentturnwithouthim.Gaddis,ZubokandPleshakovallemphasisetheRussian,andStalin’sinparticular,messianicviewoftheworld.ZubokandPleshakovunderlinethatStalinthrivedonusingthemessianicandchivalrousrolesthatRussiahasplayedinthepast, including fighting theMongols,defending the countryagainstNapoleonand indefeatingtheNazis,tojustifydemandsofa‘specialtreatment’forallofthesacrificesmadetosaveWesterncivilisation.WithadeeperunderstandingofSovietattitudesandofwhatwasgoingonintheKremlin,theyarguethatitwasStalin’sobsessivenatureandinsecurity that eventually caused him to stop listening to the advice of Litvinov andMaisky, who advocated cooperation with the West. This led to a deterioration ofrelations.MastnyfurtherarguesthatStalin’s“insatiablecraving”forsecuritypreventedhimfromseeingtherelativelysecurepositionoftheSovietUniondirectlyafterthewar.Gaddis also points out the impact made by Lenin and Wilson respectively on thedevelopmentofthe20thcenturyastheysettheideologicalframeworkonwhichfuturepolicieswould be based.Gaddis concludes that the role playedby leaders is just asimportant,ifnotmore,thanthepoliciesandideologiesofnations.Similarly,Gaddis,ZubokandPleshakovportraytheimportanceofRooseveltintheeyesofStalin.ZubokandPleshakovdiscusshowRoosevelt’sdeath,combinedwithChurchill’selectoraldefeat,alsoleadtoincreasedtensions,sinceTrumanlackedthetoleranceand,to some extent, understanding of Stalin that Roosevelt possessed; Stalin’sapprehensionsthereforegrewsignificantlywithhimgone.However,GaddisdisagreesandclaimsthatStalinnevertrustedRooseveltbutwaswillingtoputasideideologicalconflictsforgeopolitics.GaddisconcludesthatRoosevelt’sdeathhadnolastingimpactforrelations,whilstZubokandPleshakovimplytherewasadegreeoftrustthatexistedbetweenthetwoleadersandoncegone,ledtoanincreaseindistrust.With regard to more specific cases and actions, the Korean War, the situation inGermany,theBerlinblockadeaswellastheimplicationsoftheMarshallPlanallprovidebetterinsightintothepoliciespursuedbybothAmericanandSovietleadership.TheKoreanWarwasnotaresultofaggressiveSovietpoliciesbutdidinflictunforeseenconsequences,asagreedonbyGaddis,Zubok,andPleshakov.GaddisdiscusseshowtheKoreanWaranditsescalationcameasasurprisebyallsidesasno-onehadanticipatedAmerican involvement.ZubokandPleshakovfocusmoreontheconflict’scausesandStalin’srelativelylogicalreasonsforgivingKimIlSungthego-ahead.Theseincludedthepreservation of communist credibility in Asia in the eyes of the Chinese, theopportunisticapproachtospreadSovietinfluenceduetoKorea’sstrategiclocation,aswell as the conviction that the US would not intervene. As noted previously, StalinmiscalculatedhisstepsandthisunderestimationendedupcostingtheSovietUnion.TheUSSRwasperceivedasaggressiveandthisovershadoweditsrelationshipwiththeWest.GermanybecameasourceoftensionprimarilyasaresultofthecontradictoryobjectivesoftheSovietUnion(aswellasothernations)astohowGermany’s futurewastobe

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perceived.Thisismentionedbyallthepost-revisionistscholars.Ontheonehand,StalinsoughttopreventGermanyfromeverobtainingitspre-WWIandWWIIstrengthfromasecurityperspectiveasthiswould inevitablythreatentheSovietUnion.Ontheotherhand,theSovietUnionwantedtoensurethatGermanywouldbecomeafutureallyandnot succumb to western influences. As noted by Zubok and Pleshakov, employingoppressivemeasuresinGermanytoensureSovietcontrolwouldnotappearconvincingtotheGermanpopulationtobecomeallieswiththeUSSR.TheBerlinblockadesimilarly,alongwiththeKoreanwar,wasalsoamatterofcredibility,asarguedbyMastny.Zubokand Pleshakov argue that Stalin did not foresee that the Americans could pull off asuccessful airlift and somiscalculated hismoves;which according toMastny,was asevereblowtotheSovietUnion’scredibilityandtoStalin’sinparticular.TheintentionwastopreventfurthertalksonaunitedWestGermany,whichwerebeingdiscussedbythe other three occupants ofWest Germany, but the final result was ironically thefurtherdivisionofGermanyandEuropeas theblockadebrought theUS,BritainandFranceclosertogether.OnthesubjectoftheMarshallPlan,GaddisandMastnydiscusstheimplicationsofitsimplementation for both theUS andUSSR. Gaddis underlines that evidently theUSdesignedtheMarshallPlanforitsownbenefit,asanystrongstatewould,buteffectivelyalsomade itself subject to losing the economic powerhouse status that theUS hadacquired.TheMarshallfinancialaidwastohelptherecoveryofEuropeafterthewarandwasintendedtocountertheUSSR’sinfluences.However,theUSwaswillingtosetaside short-term gains for long-term stability within the international arena. TheMarshall Plan, advocated by Mastny, threatened the security of the Soviet Uniondirectly.ContrarytothebeliefduringtheColdWarthattheTrumanDoctrinewashugelysignificant inshapingfurtherevents, itwas infacttheMarshallPlanthatprovokedagreaterreactionfromtheUSSR,asStalindidnotseetheTrumanDoctrineasapplyingto spheres he already controlled. The Marshall Plan, however, endangered Sovietsecurity as it would entail a consolidation of western countries through economicintegration that would essentially alienate the USSR economically. Furthermore, inextremecases,asmentionedbyZubokandPleshakov,theMarshallPlanwasseenasanindirect plan to revive Germanymilitarymight to counter the Soviet Union, and someasuresweretaken(thecreationofCOMECON)inanattempttocounterthissenseofalienationandinsecurity.Allthepost-revisionisthistorianscometoasimilarconclusionthattheColdWarwasaproductofsecurityconcerns,Stalin’scharacterandmishapsindiplomacy.Eachscholaremphasiseskeyareasoverothersthatconfirmthisoutlook.Mastnystressesfirstandforemost thatSovietpoliciesweredominatedbythesearch forsecurity.Gaddisalsomaintains that the issue of security was of principal concern, whereby the twosuperpowers had different perceptions and methods of obtaining and maintainingsecurity,yetthattheseconflictingviewswereboundtoclashatsomepoint.Ideologyplayedasmallerrolethantraditionallymaintained.ZubokandPleshakovdevotetheiranalysistothefailuresofStalinasadiplomatandhisbeliefthattheSovietUnionwasvalidatedinitssecuritydemandsafterplayingtheroleofa‘saviour’throughouthistory.

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RussianschooltextbooksWhenevaluatingthechangingviewsoftheoriginsoftheColdWar,inordertobroadenour horizons of understanding, an important aspect to explore is how historians inRussiahaveinterpretedtheeventsleadingtothedevelopmentoftheColdWar.Historytextbooks forhighschool students inRussiaofferaway todiscovermoreabout theofficialstancetowardstheoriginsoftheColdWar.ThefollowingchaptershavebeentranslatedfromRussianhighschooltextbooksandteachers’guidesandthemainpointsarediscussedandcontrasted.Nationalisttrendsemergedinthetextbooksfrom2007and2009butfailedtotakeroot.Themostrecenttextbookfrom2017doesnotplaceresponsibilityononecountryoranother,makingwayforamorebalancedandobjectiveviewoftheColdWar.AsthetextbooksfeaturealargepartofRussianhistory,itcannotbeexpectedoftheauthorstogointogreatdetailandanalysisofevents.Onlythemaineventsandgeneraloutcomeofthemarediscussed.However,eventheseshortchaptersaresufficient,astheyprovideavaluableglimpseintotheRussianhistoricalnarrativeforstudents.CurrenttextbookoverviewForthissection,twochaptersfromaRussianschooltextbookforGrade10from2017wereanalysed.ThechapterscovertheUSSR’sstandingaftertheSecondWorldWar,thecollisionsofgeopolitical interests, thecharacteristicsof theColdWar, thedivisionofEuropeaswellasthearmsrace.TheaccountisgenerallybalancedbetweenbothsidesbutitisnoticeablethatStalinisnotoftenmentionedbyname,butcitedthroughthe‘leaders’orthe‘leadership’.Onesideisnotgivenfullresponsibilityforthedevelopmentofthehostilities,insteadthedescriptionsarefairlyobjectiveandmatter-of-fact.AttheendoftheSecondWorldWar,thetextbookverifiesthattheUSSRhadestablisheditspositioninglobalaffairsasaworldpower.Althoughhavingsacrificedmanylives,theSovietUnioncontrolledalargepartofEurope,northernChina,KoreaandIran,aspartofatemporaryoccupationafterthewar.Similarly,someterritorialgainsweremade,includinganagreementsignedwithChinaoverjointoperationofarailwayfromChitatoVladivostokaswellasgainingaccesstoPortArthurasanavalbase.TheSovietUnionfounditselfinastrengthenedandexpandedpositionintheFarEast,afterthevictoryinWorldWarIIandthedefeatofJapan.ItisalsomentionedthattheUSSRwasoneoftheinitiatorsinthecreationoftheUnitedNationsandheldaplaceintheSecurityCouncilwithvetopoweralongwiththeUS,Britain,FranceandChina.49Thetextbook illustratesthatthe likelihoodofcollisionofgeopolitical interestsoftheUSSRandUSwasapparentevenbeforetheendofthewar.InEurope,theSovietUnionhadaimsofconsolidatingitssecuritybycreatingabufferzoneoffriendlystates.InAsia,theUSSRwantedanequalparticipationintheoccupationofJapan. Inthesouth,theSoviet Union ´s objective was to gain a foothold in Iran and access to the passage49Gorinovetal.,IstoriiaRossii:10klass,74.

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throughBlackSeastraits.ItisportrayedthattheleadersoftheSovietUnionregardedtheir victory and growth as a historical pattern. The interests of the United Statesdifferedsignificantly.Themaingoalsofwesterncapitaliststateswastoconfirmtheirleadingpositionsintheworldandtopreventthespreadofcommunistinfluence.TheUnited States assumed the leadership role in this regard asBritain and Francewereseverelyweakenedbythedevastationofwar.Bytheendofthewar,theUSwasthemostsignificanteconomicpoweraswellasbeinginsolepossessionoftheatomicbomb.TheUSprevented the SovietUnion fromoccupying Japan in 1945.According to theauthors,inordertostrengthentheirholdonEurope,theTrumanDoctrineandMarshallPlanwerelaunchedbytheUS.TheTrumanDoctrinesignifiedthattheUnitedStateswasactivelypreparedtocounteractSovietinfluence.TheimplementationoftheMarshallPlanin1948,whichconsistedoflarge-scalefinancialassistancetoWesternEurope,hadobviouspoliticalimplicationsasEurope’sfasteconomicrecoverywouldprotectthosestatesfromSovietinfluences.TheUSSRrefusedaidforpoliticalreasons.InresponsetotheMarshallPlan,Cominformwasestablished,whichconsistedofcommunistpartiesinmanyEasternEuropeancountries.InSeptember1947,athesisaboutthedivisionoftheworldintotwocampswasproclaimedattheCominformconference.50Thetextclearlydoesnotplaceunilateralblameoneithersideforthedevelopmentoftensions.ThechaptersdiscussthemaincharacteristicsoftheColdWar,whichincludedthearmsrace,ideologicalconfrontationsandlocalconflicts.ThetextarguesthatChurchill’s“IronCurtainspeech”madeanimpactonStalinandtheworldandthatStalinlaterproclaimedthat itwasChurchillwhohadcalledforanewwar.Bothsidesdevelopedplansforamilitaryconfrontation,yetneitherwaspreparedtoengagetheother.Theauthorsclaimthatbothsuperpowersactedinareasonablewayastheydidnotcrossthelinebeyondwhichwouldstartanewworldwar.ConflictsduringtheColdWarneverledtolarge-scale collisions between the two nations. It was necessary to reach a peacefulcoexistencesoastoavoidathirdworldwardeveloping,whichwoulddestroymankindwiththeuseofatomicweapons.51TheauthorsadditionallydiscusshowthebiggestmanifestationoftheColdWarfounditselfinEurope;Germanyinparticular.ItisstatedthatinitiallytheSovietsdidnotforcecommunisttransformationsinEasternEurope,similartoMastny’sargument.However,theintensificationoftheColdWarledtheSovietUniontogettingatightergriparoundthegovernmentsinEasternEuropetoassumemorecontrol.Germanywasdividedintotwo.TheBerlinblockadedevelopedinthewakeofthedeterioratingeconomicsituationinEastGermany,afterthewesternpartreceivedseparatemonetaryreformin1948.Aban on the transportation of goods into west Berlin was introduced. The Westrespondedwithanairlift.TheBerlinblockadewasatypicalmanifestationoftheColdWar where the conflict did not escalate into a full-blown military confrontation.However,theeventsaugmentedthedivisionofEurope.TheformationofNATOin1949ledtofurtherdivisions.ThecreationoftheFederalRepublicofGermany(FRG;west)

50Gorinovetal,IstoriiaRossii:10klass,75-6.51Gorinovetal,IstoriiaRossii:10klass,76-7.

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andtheGermanDemocraticRepublic(GDR;east)madethetwofactionsintooutpostsofcapitalismandcommunism.52ArmsproductionintheUSSRcontinuedatahighpaceafterWorldWarII,accordingtothetextbook.ThetestingofthefirstatomicbombintheSovietUnionwas inAugust1949inSemipalatinsk.TheKoreanWarandinternationaltensionshadadirectimpactontheinternalpoliticsofbothcountries.ThegrowingthreatofNATOledtoadecisiontakenby theSoviet leadership to sharply increase thestrengthandnumberofUSSRarmamentswithinthreeyearsandthecreationofmilitary-industrialbasesinsocialistEuropean countries.According toofficial data, thenumberof Soviet troopsdoubledbetween1949and1953from2.9millionto5.8million.Theairforce,navyandlandunitswere all extended. The atomic projectwas themost expensive and time-consumingendeavour.Theresultofmanyyearsofhardworkwasthetestingofthehydrogenbombin 1953. New military bases were built in close proximity to US borders. Hostilitybetween the US and USSR, combined with the continued war in Korea and lack ofnuclearparity,contributedtothegrowthofthearmsrace.53Thetextbookfrom2017clearlyoffersarelativelybalancedperspectiveontheoriginsoftheColdWar.Itisnotone-sidedintermsoffavouringtheUnitedStatesorSovietUnionintheiractions.Theyarenotpresentedinaparticularlynegativelighteither.Therefore,an objective stance is taken, which does not pronounce one nation more or lessresponsibleforthedeteriorationinrelationsanddecreasingchancesforprospectsoffuture peace. Both the US and USSR contributed to escalating tensions and bothappearedlogicalintheirthinkingintermsofformulatingpolicies,plans,agreementsandincreasesinarmsproduction.ThereisneveranoutrightmentionoftheSovietUnionasexpansionist,ratherhowabufferzonewasrequiredforsecuritypurposes.TheUSactedfromapositiontocounterthespreadofcommunistinfluenceandtosecureAmericaninfluenceinWesternEurope.Conflictsarosefromdifferencesingeopoliticalinterestsandmotivesforinvolvementintheinternationalcommunity.Earlierhistorytextbooksandteachers’guideoverviewIncontrasttothemostrecentandfairlyobjectivehistorycurriculumoftheColdWardescribed above, an earlier government-sponsored educational program, created in2007 but conceived a few years earlier, sought to incorporate re-Stalinisation andnationalismintheteachingofhighschoolstudents.ThisreturntonationalismfocusedonthepositiveaspectsandachievementsoftheStalinistera,discussedbyKhapaeva.Consequently,thehistoricalnarrativeoftheColdWarslantstowardsanegativeviewofAmericanactions and seeks to justify theUSSRas simply respondingwithnecessarymeasures to counter American hostility. A chapter from a 2009 Russian high schooltextbookalongwithteachingmaterialsfrom2007writtenbyDanilovandFilipovwereusedinthissection.

52Gorinovetal.,IstoriiaRossii:10klass,103-4.53Gorinovetal.,IstoriiaRossii:10klass,106-7.

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DinaKhapaevadescribesameetingPutinheldwithhistoryteachersandprincipals in2007todiscussthe importanceofastate-sponsoredpositivehistoricalnarrativeandclaimedthatthenationwas“inneed”ofone.Putinissaidtohaverealisedthathistorycan be a “potent tool of ideological propaganda” and deemed it crucial that no“competingversions”versionsofhistoryexisted,whichheconsideredtobeoften“paidbyforeigngrants.”Inthemeeting,itwasagreedthat“historicaltextbooksshouldfosteroptimisticattitudestothepresentandpasthistoryoftheircountry.”54ThecurriculumupholdsthatideologicaldifferencesbetweenthecapitalistUnitedStatesand communist Soviet Union prevented a post-war peace developing. Despite theUnitedNations laying the foundations for futurecooperationwhen itwascreated in1945 in San Francisco, the textbook argues that America and the Soviet Union’sideologiesledtoanotherwar,referredtoas‘cold’asitneverturned‘hot’throughdirectmilitaryconfrontation.55ThechaptergoesfairlysystematicallyandobjectivelythroughtheinitialeventsoftheColdWar,includingtheestablishmentoftheUnitedNationsandthestateofEasternEuropeafterWorldWarII,similartothecoverageoftheseeventsbythelatesteditionfrom2017.However,whenvariousaspectsarediscussedingreaterdetail,suchastheMarshall Plan andarmsproduction, especially as seen in the teachers’ guidebook, aclearerpositionisrevealed.Inaccordancewiththeprogramofre-Stalinisationofthistime,thecurriculumplacesresponsibilityontheshouldersofAmericansinsteadofbothorattributingtheColdWarasbeingmorecomplexthanadebatearoundblame.Accordingtothetext,whenanalysingthecircumstancesoftheMarshallPlan,archivesshowthatthecreatorsoftheMarshallPlan,infact,fearedtheparticipationoftheSovietUnionandhencepreventedSovietaccesstoaid.GuyBurgess,whohadbeenrecruitedto work with the Soviet intelligence services, provided information that easternGermany,occupiedbytheUSSR,wouldnotreceiveUSfinancialaid.TheSovietsidethensuggestedchanging theprocedure forprovidingaidwhereeachcountrywouldstatewhich goods it required, on the basis of a bilateral agreement. The propositionwasrejectedbut shows that theUSSRwas in favourof cooperation to finda solution toprovideaidtoall.56Thus,theauthorssuggestthattheUSSRdidallitcouldtopreventhostilities and that Stalin was subsequently justified in taking measures to preventfurther isolationandUS influence spreading. The teachers’ supportingmaterial goeseven further. It states that “historians today agree that in the event of the USSR’saccessiontotheMarshallPlan,Congresswouldhavemadetheaidpurelydecorative”and that in reality “the Iron Curtain separated those who received aid through theMarshallPlanandthosewhodidnot.”ThedirectimplicationthattheauthorsmakeisthattheUSwasthemaincontributortothedivisionofEuropeastheMarshallPlanwas

54Khapaeva,“Putin’spoliticsofre-Stalinization,”66.55Utkinetal.,“KholodnaiaVoina,”14-15.56Utkinetal.,“KholodnaiaVoina,”16.

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clearlyintendedforthestrengtheningofUSpoliticalinfluence,notsolelyeconomic.ItisexplainedthattheSovietreactionwasthenmisinterpretedbyAmericansandseenasoffensive,ratherthandefensive.57In relation to the arms race, American overestimation of Soviet strength for thepurposesofjustifyingtheirmilitaryexpenditureisthemainfocusofboththetextbookandauxiliarymaterial.ThedevelopmentoftheSoviet“planfortheactivedefenceoftheUSSR’s territories” in 1947 was purely defensive and the official discourse is that“nothingisknownabouttheexistenceofoffensiveplans”.Similarly,variousquantitativedataabouttheconditionofSovietversusAmericanandBritishmilitariesrevealsthattheUSSRwasinamuchweakerstatethanitswartimeallies.ItisarguedthattheUSSRdidnotpossessthecapacitytoplanstrategicmilitaryoperationsoverseasasitsimplydid not have the forces necessary for this.58 However, in contrast to this militaryweakness,theAmericangovernmentdeliberatelyoverstatedSovietmilitarycapabilitiesfor propaganda purposes, implying American awareness of the disparity in militarystrength,soastojustifypotentiallyoffensiveUSactions.TheUSgovernmentdeemeditessential to enhance the nation’s military power and in order to ensure thisstrengthening, itwasnecessary to convince thepopulationof the growing threat ofcommunism. An example of General Sullivan is provided, where he states to thepresidential committee that the Soviets were in possession of five times moresubmarinesthantheGermans.Atthesametime,thetextimpliesthattheUSleadershipfabricatedthesefacts.59Therefore,anegativeviewofAmericanactionsduringtheinitialstagesoftheColdWarservestoheightentheimageoftheSovietUnionintheeyesofRussianhighschoolstudentsastheAmericanswereculpritsoffalselyinformingtheirnationforpoliticalpurposes.Thetextbookandteachers’guidecontinuouslybolstertheimageoftheSovietUnionwhereitappearstobeattemptingcooperationandthenbeingjustifiedintakingharshmeasureswhenthoseproposalswererejected,namelythesuggestionaboutsupplyingaid toall Europeancountries.Alongside this, the chapters simultaneouslydepict theUnitedStatesasself-servingandmanipulative.EvaluationWhencomparingtheofficialtextinbothtextbooksfrom2007and2017,thereaderdoesnotimmediatelynoticethedifferencesbetweenthetwopublications.Onthesurface,theversionfrom2009attemptstoconveyaneutralandobjectivestandpointontheCold War and the events that took place, however, upon closer inspection, theaccompanying teachers’ guidebook suggests something different. In the supportingmaterial,emphasis isplacedonthecombinationofAmerican intentions, failuresanddeceit, aswell as themisinterpretation and overestimation by the US of the Soviet

57Filipov,““KholodnaiaVoina”:pervyeskhvatki,”56-7.58Utkinetal.,“KholodnaiaVoina,”17-18.59Filipov,““KholodnaiaVoina”:pervyeskhvatki,”58.

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Union’scapabilities.ItisimpliedthattheUSSRactedoutofnecessity,notaggression.Theearliertextshavemuchmoreincommonwithtraditionalinterpretations,sharingmanysimilaritieswithextremerevisionistswhoplaceblameontheUnitedStatesfortheColdWar’sdevelopment.The earlier version argues that the US, and the Marshall Plan specifically, directlycontributedtothedivisionoftheworldintotwocampsandthattheSovietUniondiditsbesttopreventsuchadevelopment.TheteachingmaterialoftenmentionsextremeexamplesofUSleadersemployingtheadvantageouseconomicpositionoftheUSfortheirownimplicitbenefit;i.e.thecaseofGeneralSullivanconsciouslyoverstatingtheUSSRmilitarycapabilitytothepresidentialcommissioninordertojustifyanincreaseinUSmilitaryexpenditure.Conversely,itisconveyedthattheSovietUniononlypossesseddefensivemilitaryplansandmadeasuggestionallEuropeannationsreceiveMarshallaid, but this was rejected. Ideology, the curriculum states, was at the heart of thedevelopmentoftheColdWar,atraditionalviewpoint.Theobjectiveofteachingsuchanationalist syllabus was first and foremost to increase patriotic pride for theachievements of the Soviet regime, as mentioned by Khapaeva. Thomas Sherlock,however, who compares these two government-sponsored historical narratives,explains that the former, more Stalinist oriented syllabus, failed to emerge as thedominanthistoricalnarrativeduetovariouscriticismsasitwasnotinkeepingwiththecurrent international community. In otherwords, the nationalist stancewas hurtingRussia’s reputation abroad due to its anti-Westernism. The textbooks of 2009 andteachingmaterial from 2007were strongly nationalistic as they sought to unite thepopulationthroughdistrustoftheWest.SherlockconcludesthatthetextsblamedtheWestfortheatrocitiesofStalinism,andineffect,forcedtheUSSRtotakethemeasuresit took to secure its influence. In contrast, themore recent texts approved in 2015contain “none of the anti-Western language” seen in the older versions. Althoughclassifying the United States as self-serving and exploitative of the USSR, Sherlockexplainsthatobjectivityiscentraltothenewtextbooks.Thetexts,hepointsout,donotseetheUnitedStatestoblame,insteadtheColdWarwasaresultofgeopoliticalaswellasideologicalclashes.60Thelatesthistorycurriculumprovidesamuchmoreneutralstandpointofevents,takinganobjectivestancewhenevaluatingtheeventscontributingtotheonsetoftheColdWar.Thetextgoesmethodicallythroughtheevents,fromtheconditionsoftheUSandUSSRafterthewartothedevelopmentofthearmsrace.TheauthorssuggestthattheUSandUSSRhadvitalgeopolitical intereststhatwereboundtoclash,whereneithersuperpowerispresentedinamorenegativeorpositivelightthantheother.Itisclearthat taking apolitical stance in education is no longer in the interest of theRussiangovernment.Politicallychargedwritingisapartofthepastandnolongerdeterminescurrentevents. Young studentsare the futuregenerationof thecountry,whomost,today,havelittleornoknowledgeofwhatlifewaslikebeforetheendoftheColdWar.Thus,theauthoritiesandthosewhodevisethehistorycurriculumhavelittlereasonto

60Sherlock,"RussianpoliticsandtheSovietpast,"48-52.

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floodstudentswithoverchargedpoliticalsentimentswhenitisnotapplicableintoday’sworld.Itismoreimportantforstudentstogainacomprehensiveunderstandingofpastevents, without solely focusing on the misdeeds of the American leadership orunrealisticallybolsteringtheSovietUnion’sactions.Similarly, it is highly contradictory to be teaching students to be well-rounded,inquisitive and knowledgeable without actually revealing to them all the facts andmotivations,notjusttheinformationthatmakesRussiaandSovietUnionlook‘good’.Bothnationssucceededandfailedinachievingtheiraims,justlikeanycountry,andonemustbeawareofthistobecomeawell-informedandenlightenedhistoricalthinker.Therefore,combinedwiththeviewsofthepost-ColdWarhistoriansitisclearthatbothWesternandRussianauthorstodayarecomingtogetherintheirunderstandingoftheColdWarthatemphasisesabalancedandinsightfulviewandtheirconclusionsareofasimilarcalibre.Ofcourse,itcannotbeexpectedtogainafullunderstandingofRussianviewsthroughschooltextbooksalone.Theyaresimplifiedversionsofhistorytomakeunderstandingeasierforstudents.However,theirimportanceshouldnotbeoverlookedforthesereasonsastheyprovideausefulobservationofwhattheauthoritieswishthehistoricalnarrativetobe,whichtodayisabalancedperspectiveontheoriginsoftheColdWar.

ReasonsforChangeinViewsAfewpost-revisionisthistorianshaveexaminedtheenvironmentofthepost-ColdWaryearsandtheeffectsoftheopeningoftheSovietarchivesinrelationtochangingviewsandapproachestostudyingtheoriginsoftheColdWar.Fitzpatrickoutlinestheextentof restrictionsbeforeandafter1991.VonHagendiscusses the tendency in theearly1990s to focus on less academic questionswhen analysing new sources, due to thepoliticalsituationofthetime.GaddisandLundestadhighlightthatperspectiveshavechangedwiththeendoftheColdWaritself,ashistoriansareabletoanalysetheconflictasawhole.Theyaddthataccesstonewsourcesfrompreviouslyclassifiedarchiveshavealteredourunderstandingsomewhat.Ostermansimilarlynotesthatbroadertypesofsources,i.e.notallfromWesternarchives,havewidenedourperspectiveoftheeventsoftheColdWar.PleshakovandAntonioVarsoriarguethatideologyplayedaroleinthedevelopmentofconflictsbutessentiallywasnotascrucialastraditionallybelievedtobe.OstermanobservesthatColdWaranalysisbeforethecollapseoftheUSSRwaslargelyconducted “by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources.” The result,therefore,requiredhistorianstoinferandinterpretSovietmotivationsandsoforthfromofficialSovietrhetoricanddiplomaticexchangeswithouthardevidence.61UponrevisingthedebatessurroundingtheColdWar,AntonioVarsori,anItalianhistorian,arguesthatiftheColdWarwaspurelyideological,thenthestartoftheColdWarwouldhavebeen

61Pechatnov,“TheBigThreeafterWorldWarII.”

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setatthebeginningoftheRussianRevolutionin1917,theheightofideologyinRussiawhenWesternforcesassistedtheWhiteArmyagainsttheBolsheviks.62ThisleadstotheconclusionthattherehadtobeotherfactorsinvolvedsincetheColdWarisacceptedtohave begun in the 1940s. Similarly, ideology, according to Pleshakov, has been a“cushion”forSovietleaderstofallbackonandwasusedasa“smokescreen”tojustifymilitaryinvasionssuchastheinvasionofAfghanistanin1979.63Sheila Fitzpatrick, an Australian historian, offers further insight into the effects ofrestrictedarchivalaccessbeforeandafter1991.Despitebeinga socialhistorianandtherefore not discussing political and international aspects, Fitzpatrick criticallyevaluatesthechangesthathavetakenplace.Archivalaccessforforeignscholarswasnotcompletelyrestrictedbefore1991,contrarytopopularbelief.However,therewereafewobstaclesthatfacedhistorianswishingtogetaccesstoSovietarchives.ThefirsthurdlewasgettingintoanationalexchangewherestudentsandscholarscouldvisittheSovietUnion.Thisprocesswasrigorousandcompetitive.Onceaccepted, thesecondandmoreimportanthindrancewasthatscholarswerenotpermittedtoaccess“opisi”(theinventories).Asaresult,itwasdifficulttoknowwhatsourceswereavailableandresearchershadtorelyontheirknowledgeofwhichdocumentsexistedtobeabletorequestthem.Additionally,scholarsandtheirrespectiverequestscouldberejectedbythe institution at any point during this process. Thus, in an attempt to increase thechanceofsuccess,researchsubjectswereoftenchosenthatwereconsideredtobelesscontroversialor“risky”,i.e.notpolitical.Topicstoexplorewerethenlimitedto“social,economic,andculturalhistory.”Fitzpatrickfurtherexplainsthatpoliticalrequestswerepossibleintheorybutrarelysuccessfulinpractise.64Afterthearchiveswereopened,alargepartofthe1990swasspentonuncoveringthetruthaboutwhatFitzpatrickcalls“victimnarratives.”Theserefertotheinformationthathad been kept “top secret” under the Soviet leadership, relating to the purges,repressions,theGulagandsoforth.TherewasevidentlyademandtoknowwhattheSovietUnionhadnotpublishedonceitnolongerexistedandcouldnolongerenforcearchival restrictions.65 This directly corresponds with the question of why access toarchiveswasrestrictedduringtheSovietera.ItisunderstandablethatwhilsttheColdWar was on-going, the Soviet Union was resistant to give foreigners, especiallyWesterners, access to their records for riskof threator retaliation. From theUSSR’sperspective,thescholars,ifgivenaccess,coulduseinformationasfuelforideologicalorrealattacks.Fitzpatrickrevealsthat“militaryandmobilisationplans”aswellas“materialonpurges”werepart of the “top secret” information thatwas classified. Therefore,interestindiscoveringwhathadbeenrestrictedunderstandablygrew.

62Varsori,“ReflectionsontheOriginsoftheColdWar,”282.63Pleshakov,“StudyingSovietStrategiesandDecisionmakingintheColdWarYears,”238.64Fitzpatrick,“ImpactoftheOpeningofSovietArchives,”378-82.65Fitzpatrick,“ImpactoftheOpeningofSovietArchives,”396.

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ThetrendsthatcharacterisedtheperiodwhenrestrictionstoSovietarchiveswereliftedare also illustrated by Mark von Hagen, an American professor. First, politicalmotivations during Yeltsin’s era (which iswhen the article iswritten)meddledwithhistorians’ access to and analysis of archival sources. “Foreign pressures” distortedevaluation as somematerialswere not released,which could have been potentiallyharmfulforforeignactorsastheymight“revealSovietfundingofpoliticalparties.”Inaddition,archivistshavebeen“reluctanttoreleasedocumentswhichmayjeopardiseinternationalconnectionsandforeignfinancialsupport.”66Evidently,politicalagendasand objectives affected archivists’ ability to release and historians’ ability to discerndocuments objectively. This trend has diminished now that archives are much lesspoliticised,butitisimportanttobeawareofthesepoliticallimitationsduringthe1990s.The second trend, outlined by von Hagen, and perhaps a consequence of the first(avoidingfindingsthataretoopolitical)wasthefrenzysurroundingfindinganswerstotrivialquestions.Therewasdemandandinterestinpersonalstoriesand‘non-academic’informationinthenewlyreleasedarchives.Theseincludedquestionssuchaswhether“Lenin’sgrandfather(was)aJewishconverttoOrthodoxy”orwhichjokeMandelstam“told that resulted in his death in a labour camp” and so on. As a result, the rightquestionsforhistoricalcontextandunderstandingwerenotbeingasked.Similarly,withtheopeningof thearchives, vonHagenargues that “wecontinue tounquestionablyaccept” findings “as the truth.” He compares attitudes to the discovery of theNewWorld:“wereturnfromthearchivesthinkingwehavediscoveredAmericaandinfactare often repeating (…)withmore detail the findings of earlier scholars”who ofteninferred accurately from official documents surrounding Soviet intentions. Criticalthinkingwasnotbeingemployedtoanalysedocumentswherehighexpectationsexistedforfindingground-breakinginformation.Theresultisa“declineinthescholarlyagenda”by not asking critical questions and not exercising critical thinking when analysingsources.Hence,inordertoimproveourunderstandingofevents,vonHagensuggests,wemust remain critical and “make a collective effort to keep disciplinary standardshigh”whenevaluatingnewsources.67However, not everything was accessible at once and “important gaps remained.”Fitzpatrick explains that a large number of sources remain under the control of theFederal Security Service (FSB).68 Similarly, Natalia Yegorova explains that whilst theForeignMinistry is“stillthemainsourceofnewdocuments”fortheColdWar,otherarchivesexist,whichcouldpotentiallyprovideabetterpictureoftheSoviet“decision-makingmechanismasawholebutcontinuetohaverestrictedaccess.Throughoutherarticle,Yegorovaexplainsthataccessisonlypartialbutisimproving.Forexample,thePresidentialArchiveis“especiallyvaluable”buthaslimitedaccess,theStatePlanningCommittee(Gosplan)contains“importantcollections”butis“declassifiedonlypartly”andtheDefenceMinistryandForeignIntelligenceServicearchivesremaindifficultto

66vonHagen,“TheArchivalGoldRush,”96-7.67vonHagen,“TheArchivalGoldRush,”98-100.68Fitzpatrick,“ImpactoftheOpeningofSovietArchives,”387.

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access.Additionally,whilst theCOMECONarchives couldenlightenhistorianson the“internalprocesseswithintheEasternbloc,”accesstothemcontinuestoberestricted:“researcherscanstudyjustafewfilesoncertainspecificissues,selectedbyarchivists.”69Fitzpatrick also explains that the (partial) opening of the archives was abrupt,unexpectedandoverwhelming. Itmadehistoriansquestion thevalueof theirearlierwork.70 Similarly, Swedish academicsMartin Kragh and StefanHedlundhighlight theimportanceoftheopeningofthearchives,combinedwiththeendofcensorship,asitprovided an “opportunity to reassess and reinterpret” as well as challengeunderstandingsofthehistoryofRussiaandthe20thcentury.“Archivalrevolution”isatermused to describe the “qualitative leap” in access to Soviet archives. Kragh andHedlund,however,warnthatthetermisnotabsolute,sinceaccessbefore1991wasnotcompletely classified, as highlighted by Fitzpatrick, and the “degree of archivalopenness”variesbetweencountriesandperiodsafter1991.71Nonetheless, onemust not consider access to sources as the only way to evaluatehistoricalevents.SimilartovonHagen’sadvocacyofcriticalthinking,Fitzpatrickarguesthat“abundanceofdatadoesnotinitselfanswerquestions.”72KraghandHedlundstatethatdisputesoverhistoricalevaluationsstillexist.Newsourcesdonotaccountforallhistorical revelations. The topics chosen, research questions and other “conceptualissues” are just as valuable as primary sources when forming a valuable historicalanalysis.Asaresult,awidevarietyofevaluations“willcontinuouslycoexist.”73Similarly,Mastny advocates the ‘less ismore’ approach to analysing the archives aspossessingmoresourcesdoesnotnecessarilyprovidemind-blowing revelations.Thedrawbacksoftheopeningofthearchivesfindthemselvesinthetoohighexpectationsofhistorians to findparadigm-shiftingevidence,similar tovonHagen’sview.Mastnypointsoutthatthe“greatestsurprisesofar(…)isthattherewasnosurprise,”74whichindicates that the formerly classified documents do not expose any hidden plans orpolicies. Strategies did not exist behind the scenes that differed dramatically frominformationpublishedinofficialdocumentsatthetimeoftheColdWar.Thevalueofthenewly availabledocumentsdependsonhow the sources are interpretedandbywhom.Furthermore,Gaddis emphasises that the ColdWarmust be put into perspective inregard tootherwarswhen analysing its origins. TheColdWarwasunlike anyotherconflictinhistory;itdidnotspanfouryearsastheFirstWorldWardid,itspannedfour(ormore)decades(dependingonthestartchosen).Thelengthofthe‘war’itselfplaces

69Yegorova,“RussianArchives:ProspectsforColdWarStudies,”546.70Fitzpatrick,“ImpactoftheOpeningofSovietArchives,”377.71KraghandHedlund,“ResearchingSovietArchives”373.72Fitzpatrick,“ImpactoftheOpeningofSovietArchives,”398.73KraghandHedlund,“ResearchingSovietArchives,”375.74Mastny,TheColdWarandSovietInsecurity,9.

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limitsonthehistorian’sabilitytobeobjectivewhenwritingwhilsttheColdWarwason-going. It was difficult for historians to write about the war without knowing theoutcome. Gaddis provides an analogy to explain that few would value a scholar’saccountofthecausesofWorldWarIIwrittenin1942.PerhapsthesamecanbesaidfortheColdWar.Asaresult,sourcesbecamebiasedandincompleteastherewaslittletono access to the other side’s archives.75 Ideologists would strive to “convincethemselves”and“seektoconvinceothers”76thattheirswasthebest,mostjustifiedandmost victorious ideology. The interpretations published during the Cold War wereartifactsoftheColdWarthemselves.77Geir Lundestad, a Norwegian historian, similarly emphasises the limitationsencountered by historians writing during the Cold War itself, without knowing itsconclusion,astheinterpretationswereproductsoftheColdWarthemselves.Hegoesfurtherandexplains, forexample, thatrevisionismreflected“doubts”aroundtheUSfailureintheVietnamwarandwhetherthisalsomirroredtheColdWaritself.Healsoadds that post-revisionism,which arose in the early 1970s,mirrored the policies ofdétenteasitsoughttodistribute“blame(…)alittlemoreevenly.”Lundestadstatesthatperspectives “inevitably changedwith theendof theColdWar itself” as it becomes“mucheasiertoexplainwarandconflictwhentheyareover.”78Mastnyarguesthatwiththepassageoftime,theColdWarappearstobeheadingintooblivionandhasstarted“tofadefrommemory”andhesetsouttoanswerwhythisis.TheSovietUnion’sdisintegrationhasmadeiteasiertodelveintoitsleaders’motivesand intentions. The “partial” opening of the archives and thewillingness of “Sovietwitnesses” has added another dimension to the study of the ColdWar, yetMastnycautionsthatthesetestimoniesofwitnessesareofteninaccuratebutareneverthelessvaluable.Mastnyevenclaimsthatthequestionofblameisan“oldinquiry,”implyingthetopichasbecomearchaicwhichcorrespondstohiswork,asalargepartofhisbookfocusesontheunexpecteddemiseoftheUSSRandColdWar.Thedistinctionsbetweenorthodox and revisionist views have “become blurred.”79 Lundestad, like Mastny,believestheargumentofresponsibilitytobeout-dated.“Conflictarisesbecauseneitheriswillingtoyield”whereonesidechallengesthestatusquoandtheotherattemptstopreserveit.Lundestadsuggestsinsteadoffocusingonblameand“politicalagendas,”weshouldanalyse“whathappenedandwhythishappened.”80ZubokandPleshakovadvocatethatColdWarhistory“mustbere-examined”withtheopeningoftheSovietarchives.Sovietpoliciesandobjectiveshavebecomealot“clearernow” as not surprisingly, one cannot understand the Soviet perspective or know its

75Gaddis,WeNowKnow,281-2.76Gaddis,WeNowKnow,5.77Gaddis,“OnStartingAllOverAgain,”27-8.78Lundestad,“How(Not)toStudytheOriginsoftheColdWar,” 66-7. 79Mastny,TheColdWarandSovietInsecurity,3-4,7-8.80Lundestad,“How(Not)toStudytheOriginsoftheColdWar,” 70.

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leaders’perspectivewithoutanyevidence.Onemustalsoconsiderthatdifficulties intranslationofRussiansourcesarealsoencountered.Itisnotenoughtounderstandthelanguage as it is difficult to convey the cultural meaning of Soviet documents to aWesternaudienceinarelatableway.81ThedebatesurroundingtheoriginsoftheColdWarwillneverbecomplete.SimilartoKraghandHedlund,Gaddisadmitsthatyes,wenowknowmorethanweusedto,withhelpfromtheopeningofthearchivesandconclusionoftheColdWar,although“wewillneverhavethefullstory.”82Pleshakovagreesbystatingwedefinitelyhave“aclearervision”todaybutheremainsscepticaloverwhetherwewilleverbeableto‘fullyexplainevents.’83 Gaddis advocates looking at events and new evidence from differentperspectives,suchas“intermsofecology,orautonomy,orrationality,ormorality.”84‘New’ Cold War history will be based on an international and multi-archivalperspective.85AlloftheauthorsdiscussedinthischapteragreethattheopeningofthearchivesandtheendoftheColdWargavewaytosignificantchangesininterpretationssurroundingthe origins of the ColdWar and the SovietUnion in general. Political tensions havesubsided which makes the exploration of archives less threatening to the Russiangovernment.Whilearchivestodaymaybemoreaccessible, it is importanttobear inmindtheevolutionofaccess:archiveswerenotallopenedatonceandhistorianswerestillencounteringdifficultiesinthe2000s,ashighlightedbyYegorova,whosearticlewaswrittenin2006.ThepreviousconcernsoftheSovietUnionandRussiaintheearly1990saboutarchivalaccessarenolongerofmuchimportancetoday;afteralotofinstabilityduringthe1990s,Russiahasnowformedintoasolidfederation.Newsourcestodaydonot threaten the existence of the state. Obstacles to archives along with “politicaltensions” are gone. Soviet history, according to Fitzpatrick, “has become (…)depoliticizedwiththewaningoftheColdWar.”86Newsourcesarenotground-breaking,yethistoriansagreethattheanalysisoftheColdWarwillneverbeover.

81ZubokandPleshakov,InsidetheKremlin’sColdWar,xii.82Gaddis,“OnStartingAllOverAgain,”27-8.83Pleshakov,“StudyingSovietStrategiesandDecisionmakingintheColdWarYears,”240.84Gaddis,“OnStartingAllOverAgain,”38.85Gaddis,WeNowKnow,283.86Fitzpatrick,“ImpactoftheOpeningofSovietArchives,”399-400.

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ConclusionPriortotheendoftheColdWaritwasunimaginabletobelievethatWesternandRussianhistorianscouldpossiblysharesimilarviewsinregardtotheoriginsoftheColdWar.Itisasignofprogressthattodaythisiswidelythecase,asdiscussedthroughthecourseofthispaper.Aconvergenceofviewsappearstobedeveloping,shownamongthepost-ColdWarhistorians,andalsodemonstratedinthemostrecentRussianhistorytextbookfrom2017whichsetsforthamoreobjectiveandbalancedperspectivesurroundingtheeveoftheColdWar.TraditionalColdWarhistoriansemphasisetherolesplayedbytheconflictingideologiesof capitalismand communismaswell asmutual suspicion,whereboth superpowersrespondedtoeachother’sactionsthatledtohostilities.Uponreflection,ideologywasaneffectivetoolthatwasutilisedtojustifycertainforeignpolicymeasures,potentiallyperceivedasaggressive,giventhelackofaccessiblesourcesfromtheotherside.Therationale of reacting to one another’s actions overlooks the conditions and deeperconcerns that shaped both the United States’ and Soviet Union’s objectives. Thequestionofblameitselfhasbecomearchaic.ThedrivingfactorsbehindUSandSovietpolicyweremorecomplexthanbelievedtobeandthereweremanythingsatstakeontheinternationalstage,includingsecurity,reputation,andinfluence.Asdiscussedbythevariouspost-ColdWarhistorians,theColdWarwasnotsimplyaproduct of ideology and reaction. Emphasis is now placed on the role of individualleaders,includingLenin,Wilson,TrumanandparticularlyStalin.SeveralacademicshaveexploredStalin’snatureofparanoia,insecurityandapprehensionsthatareconsideredto have contributed to his diplomatic failures. Geopolitical interests led to powerstruggles,whoserootslayinthefundamentaldifferencesbetweentheSovietUnion’sandtheUnitedStates’perceptionofsecurity,namelyhowtosecureandmaintain it.ThespheresofinfluenceapproachingoverningworldaffairswasneverrecognisedbytheAmerican government,whilst Stalin could not accept the idea of the balance ofpower being in the hands of an international body. These security concerns andgeopoliticalinterestscametoahead,asillustratedintheindividualcases;namely,thefutureofGermany,thereasonsforandimplicationsoftheBerlinblockade,thestartoftheKoreanWarandthedesignandconsequencesoftheMarshallPlan.Duringthe1990s,politicians,historiansandthepublicwereengulfedbythecollapseoftheUSSRand its implications,whereas today the shockhas subsided. Initially,manyviewedthedissolutionoftheUSSRasasignthatcapitalismhad‘won’theColdWar;ineffect,thattheUShadbeenjustifiedinitsactions.However,thecollapseoftheSovietUniondoesnotfreetheUnitedStatesfromevaluationinregardtotheoriginsoftheColdWar.Today,mostacademicsacceptthatinherentflawsexistwithinanyformofgovernmentandthat ideologyisnotalwaysthedomineeringfactor inpolicy-making,althoughitalwayshasaroletoplay.

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Once theSovietarchiveswereopened, specific trendsemerged inarchival research,fromuncoveringthetruthabout“victimnarratives”tofindingpersonalstories,inorderto complywitharchival restrictionsandpolitical agendas.Conversely, it is clear thattoday, politics and governments have no vested interest in the type of historicalnarrativebeingpresented.Thetumultuous1990shavetakenonasteadyformintheRussianstatetoday,withPutinrecentlyelectedtohisfourthtermasPresident.AlthoughdifferencescontinuetoexistbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStatesontheinternationalstage,thereappearstobenoconflictsurroundingtheinterpretationofhistory,furtherillustrating how ideology is no longer as important in the international dialogue aspreviously.It is evident that views have evolved towards a more balanced approach tounderstandingtheColdWar.Politicalagendasnolongerinfluenceviewsasmuchastheyused to during the Cold War era, most recently demonstrated in the shift from anationalisticstanceofthe2007/9historytextbookstoamoreneutralviewpresentedinthe2017version.RussiannationalisminhistoricalwritingsisoverestimatedbyWesternscholarsastherealityclearlyshowsthattheRussiannarrative(from2017)is, infact,much like that ofWestern historians’ today.With the opening of the archives, newevidencehasemerged,butmuchtopeople’ssurprise,thesefindingsdidnotresultintheparadigmshiftsscholarsexpectedtoencounterintheirunderstandingofpolicies,particularlywithrelationtotheSovietUnion.Inmanyways,historianstodayseemtobereachingageneralconsensusontheoriginsof the Cold War. The arguments of orthodox and revisionist historians are largelyrejected, as they were often written without concrete evidence to support theirpreordainedbeliefs.Furthermore,interpretationsaremovingawayfromthequestionofblameand instead,acceptthatevents inhistoryareneversolelytriggeredbyonesource,asmosthistorianswillappreciate.Withthehelpofabroaderbaseofarchives,historians aredelvingdeeper into the circumstances thatdetermined the respectivenations’ actions. Individual leaders,perspectivesof securityand specific case studieshavebeenexaminedtobetteranalysethebroaderpictureinregardtotheonsetoftheCold War. However, it is wrong to say that a full consensus has been reached, ashistorians,beitthosediscussedinthispaperorelsewhere,willalwayspresentavarietyofviewsandinterpretations.Weshouldnotexpectacademicstoagreeonallaspectsofthe origins of the Cold War and this is precisely what makes the study of historyfascinating.Perspectiveswillalwaysbeuniquetothescholar,varyingaccordingtohisorherbackground,interestsand/ormotivationforresearch.SecurityremainsacriticalconcernforbothRussiaandtheUnitedStates,beiteconomic,geographical or political. Whilst the ColdWar may be over, it does not mean thatconflictscannotarisebetweenthetwonations.Somemayevenarguethattheclashestoday are of a different and perhaps more serious nature than previously, asdemonstratedthroughtheeconomicsanctionsplacedonRussiaaftertheannexationofCrimea. Thus, the debate surrounding the origins of the Cold War is of particularrelevanceincurrentevents.Itbegsthequestion:ifideologydidnothaveavitalstakein

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thedevelopmentoftheColdWar,asagreedonbythepost-ColdWarhistorians,doesthatmeana‘newColdWar’couldbrewgiventhatRussiahasnoofficialpoliticalstateideology? US and Russian security concerns, individual leaders and geopolitical andeconomicinterestswillmostlikelycontinuetocollideintheyearstocome.However,theColdWar,asweknowittoday,willnotberepeated,atleastnotintheforeseeablefuture,duetothefactthatthebipolarityoftheUSandRussianpowernolongerexists.Other contenders have emerged, most notably China. North Korea also poses newthreatsthatarechallengingthebalanceofpowerandongoingconflictsintheMiddleEastcannotbeoverlooked.Themulti-polarityofstateshasreturnedtotheinternationalstage.WhilstLeninbasedhisteachingsonmulti-polarity,thistimearounditisnotonlycapitalistnations,whetherideologicalornot,whoseimpactsaretobefelt.Onlytimewilltellwhattheoutcomesmaybe.

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